SIGINT & IMINT
Pre-processing Architecture (S&IPA)
Requirements Document (CRD)
6 April 1997.
General Description of Operational Capability.
a. The purpose of this Capstone Requirements
Document (CRD) is to establish the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) pre-processing architecture (S&IPA)
requirements for the Tactical Exploitation System (TES) and the
Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS) Integrated Processing Facility
(IPF) and its follow-on, the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) Ground
Processing Facility (GPF). The Operational Requirements Documents
(ORDs) and other requirements documentation for these systems
will fall under the purview of this CRD. As the Division commander's
intelligence pre-processor, and a primary recipient of the information
generated by the S&IPA, the Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal
(MITT), will also fall under the purview of this CRD. Any changes
to the MITT necessary to meet the requirements of the S&IPA
will be reflected in changes to the MITT ORD. The S&IPA CRD
is a living requirements document that establishes compliance
and interoperability requirements based on the Joint Technical
Architecture, the Army Technical Architecture (ATA) and the Defense
Information Infrastructure (DII) Common Operating Environment
(COE). This CRD will be periodically (annually) reviewed to determine
if other related Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) systems
should be added.
b. The TES is the Army's Tactical Exploitation
of National Capabilities (TENCAP) migration system. The first
system will be fielded in 1999-2000 to replace three legacy systems.
It will provide the Commander an ability to receive, process
and exploit ELINT and IMINT data from selected national and theater
sensors, and receive, process exploit, and generate timely information
and intelligence. The TES will have a robust communications suite
with LAN/WAN capability and dedicated links to the Integrated
Broadcast Service (IBS) for receipt of National and other Service
information and intelligence and the rapid dissemination of information
and intelligence to joint warfighters at all echelons. The TES
will be able to seamlessly interface with the All-Source Analysis
System (ASAS), the Common Ground Station (CGS), the Digital Topographic
Support System (DTSS) and all other TENCAP systems (i.e., the
Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal (MITT) and the Forward Analytical
Support Terminal (FAST)). It will be configured in Main (TES-M)
and Forward (TES-F) elements, both of which will be C-130 drive-on/drive-off
capable. The TES-F will be High Mobility Multiple Wheeled Vehicle
(HMMWV) based to meet the Commander's lift and mobility requirements.
The TES will meet the Commanders requirement for a tailorable
and scaleable system capable of early entry operations and supporting
contingencies from peace keeping to all out war. The TES falls
under the TENCAP acquisition model and does not follow the normal
5000 series acquisition and testing process. This model provides
the ability for system development based on technological objectives
and informal requirements (formal requirements are developed and
published concurrently); and operational user evaluations vice
formal Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E)
methods. The TENCAP General Officer Steering Committee oversees
this process and directs the implementation of all requirements
and milestone decisions.
c. The GRCS IPF will migrate into the
GPF as the Army moves from the GRCS and Airborne Reconnaissance
Low (ARL) to the ACS. The GPF provides the capability to dynamically
control the ELINT COMINT, IMINT and high accuracy location capabilities
on the ACS, and other selected airborne systems, and receive,
process exploit, and generate timely information and intelligence.
The GPF will have a communications suite with LAN/WAN capability
and dedicated links to the IBS for receipt of National and other
Service information and intelligence, and, the rapid dissemination
of information and intelligence to joint warfighters at all echelons.
Selected elements of the GPF will be configured in HMMWVs with
external workstations for operations in tents, buildings, or other
shelters. During split-based operations, the forward deployed
GPF elements will be capable of airborne sensor control shared
with the GPF located in sanctuary, as well as processing, analysis,
and timely reporting on high payoff targets. The GPF will be able
to seamlessly interface with the ASAS and the CGS.
d. The MITT
is a highly mobile system that provides the Division commanders
with organic SIGINT and IMINT capabilities. It receives, processes,
and disseminates multi-disciplined information to the users' location
in the required timelines. It provides security sanitization
and tailored reporting. The MITT supports deep and rear operations
(as well as special operations) by providing the ability to see
deep; by providing targeting, terrain, ingress/egress information;
and through improved command and control. The MITT also provides
the Division commander with a very robust communications front-end.
The MITT will migrate to the TES hardware and software baseline.
The MITT falls under the TENCAP acquisition model and does not
follow the normal 5000 series acquisition and testing process.
This model provides the ability for system development based
on technological objectives and informal requirements (formal
requirements are developed and published concurrently); and operational
user evaluations vice formal Director, Operational Test &
Evaluation (DOT&E) methods. The TENCAP General Officer Steering
Committee oversees this process and directs the implementation
of all requirements and milestone decisions.
e. The S&IPA
provides the framework for the TES and IPF/GPF to become interoperable,
achieve selective commonality of processors and methods, and to
operate as an integrated system of systems. The S&IPA will
allow the TES and the IPF/GPF to provide Army Tactical (Corps
& Division), Joint Task Force, and Combined Force commanders
with a tailorable, scaleable, modular, and easily deployable intelligence
pre-processing system of systems, capable of split based operations.
This architecture supports national security objectives, assists
in the planning and execution of strategic, operational and tactical
deployments, and becomes part of contingency operations as an
element of an Army, joint, or combined force, for stability and
support operations (formerly operations other than war) and war,
across the spectrum of conflict.
f. The S&IPA will provide
the commander the capability to control, receive, process, display,
exploit and disseminate SIGINT and IMINT sensor data from selected
national, theater, and organic intelligence platforms, to all
echelons, at varying levels of detail, to meet the requirements
of mobile, dispersed commanders and staffs in the execution of
their mission. The S&IPA will allow situationally-defined
user access to its intelligence product databases on a smart push-pull
basis, to provide required reports and products; and to assist
in the production of other IEW products through cross cueing.
Defined users will almost always include the ASAS, the CGS, the
DTSS and the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) at the supported
g. The S&IPA will provide a single pre-processing
resource and focus for the Commander, G-2, and G-3. It will leverage
the synergy of the collocated analysts and their methods, techniques,
and tip-offs. These characteristics will be critical in achieving
a coherent data stream to the G-2/G-3, in a timely manner, so
that the data may be fused and a common picture of the battlefield
formed and disseminated.
a. Threat to be Countered. While not specifically targeting any single weapons systems,
the S&IPA provides a fundamental technical underpinning enabling
the execution of AirLand Battle on the extended, non-linear battlefields
of the next century. In its support of an accelerated decision
cycle, the S&IPA will foster enhanced strategic, operational
and tactical agility in a smaller yet more highly lethal force
structure. The S&IPA enhances the capability to mass effects
rather than forces, altering fundamentally the nature of mass
in modern combat. The modularity, tailorability and mobility
provided by the S&IPA allows the pertinent intelligence pre-processing
assets to move with the command to provide targeting and other
information to US commanders that is more complete, accurate and
timely, enabling our forces to control the battlefield in both
space and time.
b. Projected Threat Environment.
(1) US Forces
must be prepared to deploy worldwide, and if necessary, defeat
threat forces of varying degrees of military sophistication at
any level of conflict. In the Post-Cold War world, split based
operations will be the norm. Vast amounts of information and
services which support the S&IPA will reside in CONUS and
will be transmitted across the Army's tactical, strategic and
sustaining base information architecture. One of the greatest
dangers will be the proliferation of advanced technologies that
have the ability to damage, disrupt or destroy the elements of
the S&IPA, as well as the information residing on them.
The elements of the S&IPA are generally collocated with the
headquarters element they support. As such, they will be in the
same danger of direct and indirect fire, sabotage, terrorism etc.
as the supported headquarters. Additionally an adversary can
threaten the S&IPA in three fundamental ways:
of data by gaining access to sensitive or classified information
stored within the systems. (b.) Corruption of data by the alteration
of electronically stored or processed information so it becomes
misleading or worthless. (c.) Disruption of operations by inflicting
damage or causing delays (physically or electronically).
More specifically, these threats include: spoofing, electronic
warfare, signals intelligence, technical attack, directed energy,
malicious code, physical destruction, unconventional warfare and
(4) Individually, or collectively, these
threats can distort the picture of the battlefield, effect tempo,
lethality, survivability, and battlefield synchronization which
all impact on mission performance.3. Shortcomings of Existing
Systems. The commander does not have a single point of focus
for the ground pre-processing of data received from National,
Theater, and Organic platforms. The current TENCAP and Guardrail
Common Sensor systems together do not provide the mobility, functional
flexibility or interoperability required in support of the SIGINT
and IMINT pre-processing.
4. Capabilities Required.
indicated, all capabilities are considered threshold (T) requirements.
If there is an objective (O) requirement, it will be identified
a. The S&IPA reflects a transition from autonomous
TENCAP and GRCS IPF system operations to a state of interoperability
and selective commonality (T) for TES and the ACS GPF, that operates
as an integrated system of systems. (O). The detailed operational
performance parameters are stated within the underlying TES and
ACS ORDs. In general, the S&IPA will combine all of the functions
of the TES and the GPF into a system of systems that is tailorable,
scaleable, modular and easily deployable. The tailorability of
this architecture will be such that the commander will have an
early entry capability for access to the information provided
by selected national, theater and organic intelligence platforms
and agencies. As the theater matures, the commander will be able
to expand this capability by bringing in additional segments,
in a building block approach, until the required in-theater pre-processing,
analysis, and dissemination requirements are met.
b. The S&IPA
will support the commander by providing products and reports in
the format desired and within the timelines required. These formats
and timelines are scenario based and could change with every deployment.
The architecture requires connectivity with (e.g., LAN/WAN) national,
theater, and organic IEW, maneuver, fire, and fire support elements
for the seamless interaction of requirements, tip-off, database
transfer, exploitation, and dissemination. The S&IPA will
include public SIGINT and IMINT product libraries with tailorable
accessibility for the smart push/pull of products. With the capability
to interact with, and in some cases control, the national, theater,
and organic intelligence platforms, the S&IPA enhances the
commander's look-shoot-look capability.
c. The existing ORDs
and other requirement documentation for the TES and IPF/GPF provide
detailed amplification of specific functional and technical requirements
within the overall S&IPA concept. While adhering to those
requirements, the S&IPA will minimize (T) / eliminate (O)
all non-mission-essential duplicate processing, analysis, dissemination,
management, maintenance and communication functions.
d. The S&IPA
will provide the flexibility for split based operations, that
support deployable/deployed forward and main headquarters elements
of the JTF or Ground Component Commander (at Corps or attached
to the Division or Brigade echelons coincident with the contingency
e. The S&IPA requires a forward deploying element
that will operate with the early entry forces and can continue
on with the Forward HQ built around a maximum of 12 HMMWVs and
generators/trailers/antennas (T); 7 HMMWVs and generators/trailers/antennas
(O) capable of commencing operations within two hours of arrival.
The objective of this architecture is for the forward deploying
element to maximize modularity and tailorability to provide the
commander the greatest amount of flexibility in making deployment
decisions ranging from a single GRCS/ACS aircraft (relaying SIGINT
and IMINT data to the rear for processing, exploitation and dissemination),
to a single C130 load (providing, for example, comms, a SIGINT
database, and a secondary imagery capability), to the entire forward
element (providing sensor control, data receipt, processing, exploitation
and dissemination from all S&IPA associated national, theater,
and organic platforms/sensors). This paragraph will be removed
from the CRD when the underlying ORDs are amended to reflect these
f. The S&IPA requires a follow-on segment that
will operate with the Main HQ in sanctuary or in theater consisting
of SIGINT and IMINT processors mounted in eight C130 drive-on/drive-off
capable vehicles (T) and four C130 drive-on/drive-off capable
vehicles or ten HMMWVs (O). All support vehicles will also be
C130 drive- on/drive off capable. The S&IPA follow-on segment
will be able to keep pace with the Main HQ element being supported.
The S&IPA follow-on segment will be able to set-up/tear-down
in a time frame no greater than allowed for the main HQ element
at the supported echelon. g. While the overall collection management
and tasking functions resides in the ACE, the S&IPA supports
dynamic tasking, retasking and synchronized collection, processing
and exploitation of selected theater and organic IMINT & SIGINT
platforms/sensors. The architecture will include the necessary
collection management processors and interfaces, and technical
and operational databases. (T) The S&IPA supports dynamic
tasking, retasking and synchronized collection, processing and
exploitation of national, theater and organic platforms/sensors.
h. The S&IPA will allow operators to use SIGINT and IMINT
data and products internally for cross-INT analysis to include
tip-off for dynamic tasking and retasking. It will include visual
and aural alarms to alert analysts and mission supervisors of
critical/threat intelligence. (T) The automation of the tip-off
process within the resource, mission and requirements management
processes will be maximized. (O)
i. In the processing or analysis
of data, the S&IPA will not degrade the geolocation accuracy
capability inherent in any given sensor, platform, or system.
j. The S&IPA is constructed around a continuously evolving
network of SIGINT and IMINT systems, sensors, and processors.
With each new generation of applications and supporting communication
and support software modules, the S&IPA will be upgraded and
undergo revalidation/limited testing to ensure full interoperability
is maintained between applications, S&IPA segments and customers.