SIGINT & IMINT
Pre-processing Architecture (S&IPA)
Capstone Requirements Document (CRD)
6 April 1997.

General Description of Operational Capability.

a. The purpose of this Capstone Requirements Document (CRD) is to establish the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) pre-processing architecture (S&IPA) requirements for the Tactical Exploitation System (TES) and the Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS) Integrated Processing Facility (IPF) and its follow-on, the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) Ground Processing Facility (GPF). The Operational Requirements Documents (ORDs) and other requirements documentation for these systems will fall under the purview of this CRD. As the Division commander's intelligence pre-processor, and a primary recipient of the information generated by the S&IPA, the Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal (MITT), will also fall under the purview of this CRD. Any changes to the MITT necessary to meet the requirements of the S&IPA will be reflected in changes to the MITT ORD. The S&IPA CRD is a living requirements document that establishes compliance and interoperability requirements based on the Joint Technical Architecture, the Army Technical Architecture (ATA) and the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) Common Operating Environment (COE). This CRD will be periodically (annually) reviewed to determine if other related Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) systems should be added.

b. The TES is the Army's Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) migration system. The first system will be fielded in 1999-2000 to replace three legacy systems.

It will provide the Commander an ability to receive, process and exploit ELINT and IMINT data from selected national and theater sensors, and receive, process exploit, and generate timely information and intelligence. The TES will have a robust communications suite with LAN/WAN capability and dedicated links to the Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS) for receipt of National and other Service information and intelligence and the rapid dissemination of information and intelligence to joint warfighters at all echelons. The TES will be able to seamlessly interface with the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS), the Common Ground Station (CGS), the Digital Topographic Support System (DTSS) and all other TENCAP systems (i.e., the Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal (MITT) and the Forward Analytical Support Terminal (FAST)). It will be configured in Main (TES-M) and Forward (TES-F) elements, both of which will be C-130 drive-on/drive-off capable. The TES-F will be High Mobility Multiple Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) based to meet the Commander's lift and mobility requirements.

The TES will meet the Commanders requirement for a tailorable and scaleable system capable of early entry operations and supporting contingencies from peace keeping to all out war. The TES falls under the TENCAP acquisition model and does not follow the normal 5000 series acquisition and testing process. This model provides the ability for system development based on technological objectives and informal requirements (formal requirements are developed and published concurrently); and operational user evaluations vice formal Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) methods. The TENCAP General Officer Steering Committee oversees this process and directs the implementation of all requirements and milestone decisions.

c. The GRCS IPF will migrate into the GPF as the Army moves from the GRCS and Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL) to the ACS. The GPF provides the capability to dynamically control the ELINT COMINT, IMINT and high accuracy location capabilities on the ACS, and other selected airborne systems, and receive, process exploit, and generate timely information and intelligence.

The GPF will have a communications suite with LAN/WAN capability and dedicated links to the IBS for receipt of National and other Service information and intelligence, and, the rapid dissemination of information and intelligence to joint warfighters at all echelons.

Selected elements of the GPF will be configured in HMMWVs with external workstations for operations in tents, buildings, or other shelters. During split-based operations, the forward deployed GPF elements will be capable of airborne sensor control shared with the GPF located in sanctuary, as well as processing, analysis, and timely reporting on high payoff targets. The GPF will be able to seamlessly interface with the ASAS and the CGS.

d. The MITT is a highly mobile system that provides the Division commanders with organic SIGINT and IMINT capabilities. It receives, processes, and disseminates multi-disciplined information to the users' location in the required timelines. It provides security sanitization and tailored reporting. The MITT supports deep and rear operations (as well as special operations) by providing the ability to see deep; by providing targeting, terrain, ingress/egress information; and through improved command and control. The MITT also provides the Division commander with a very robust communications front-end.

The MITT will migrate to the TES hardware and software baseline. The MITT falls under the TENCAP acquisition model and does not follow the normal 5000 series acquisition and testing process.

This model provides the ability for system development based on technological objectives and informal requirements (formal requirements are developed and published concurrently); and operational user evaluations vice formal Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) methods. The TENCAP General Officer Steering Committee oversees this process and directs the implementation of all requirements and milestone decisions.

e. The S&IPA provides the framework for the TES and IPF/GPF to become interoperable, achieve selective commonality of processors and methods, and to operate as an integrated system of systems. The S&IPA will allow the TES and the IPF/GPF to provide Army Tactical (Corps & Division), Joint Task Force, and Combined Force commanders with a tailorable, scaleable, modular, and easily deployable intelligence pre-processing system of systems, capable of split based operations.

This architecture supports national security objectives, assists in the planning and execution of strategic, operational and tactical deployments, and becomes part of contingency operations as an element of an Army, joint, or combined force, for stability and support operations (formerly operations other than war) and war, across the spectrum of conflict.

f. The S&IPA will provide the commander the capability to control, receive, process, display, exploit and disseminate SIGINT and IMINT sensor data from selected national, theater, and organic intelligence platforms, to all echelons, at varying levels of detail, to meet the requirements of mobile, dispersed commanders and staffs in the execution of their mission. The S&IPA will allow situationally-defined user access to its intelligence product databases on a smart push-pull basis, to provide required reports and products; and to assist in the production of other IEW products through cross cueing. Defined users will almost always include the ASAS, the CGS, the DTSS and the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) at the supported echelon.

g. The S&IPA will provide a single pre-processing resource and focus for the Commander, G-2, and G-3. It will leverage the synergy of the collocated analysts and their methods, techniques, and tip-offs. These characteristics will be critical in achieving a coherent data stream to the G-2/G-3, in a timely manner, so that the data may be fused and a common picture of the battlefield formed and disseminated.

2. Threat.

a. Threat to be Countered. While not specifically targeting any single weapons systems, the S&IPA provides a fundamental technical underpinning enabling the execution of AirLand Battle on the extended, non-linear battlefields of the next century. In its support of an accelerated decision cycle, the S&IPA will foster enhanced strategic, operational and tactical agility in a smaller yet more highly lethal force structure. The S&IPA enhances the capability to mass effects rather than forces, altering fundamentally the nature of mass in modern combat. The modularity, tailorability and mobility provided by the S&IPA allows the pertinent intelligence pre-processing assets to move with the command to provide targeting and other information to US commanders that is more complete, accurate and timely, enabling our forces to control the battlefield in both space and time.

b. Projected Threat Environment.

(1) US Forces must be prepared to deploy worldwide, and if necessary, defeat threat forces of varying degrees of military sophistication at any level of conflict. In the Post-Cold War world, split based operations will be the norm. Vast amounts of information and services which support the S&IPA will reside in CONUS and will be transmitted across the Army's tactical, strategic and sustaining base information architecture. One of the greatest dangers will be the proliferation of advanced technologies that have the ability to damage, disrupt or destroy the elements of the S&IPA, as well as the information residing on them.

(2) The elements of the S&IPA are generally collocated with the headquarters element they support. As such, they will be in the same danger of direct and indirect fire, sabotage, terrorism etc. as the supported headquarters. Additionally an adversary can threaten the S&IPA in three fundamental ways:

(a.) Compromise of data by gaining access to sensitive or classified information stored within the systems.

(b.) Corruption of data by the alteration of electronically stored or processed information so it becomes misleading or worthless.

(c.) Disruption of operations by inflicting damage or causing delays (physically or electronically).

(3) More specifically, these threats include: spoofing, electronic warfare, signals intelligence, technical attack, directed energy, malicious code, physical destruction, unconventional warfare and unauthorized access.

(4) Individually, or collectively, these threats can distort the picture of the battlefield, effect tempo, lethality, survivability, and battlefield synchronization which all impact on mission performance.3. Shortcomings of Existing Systems. The commander does not have a single point of focus for the ground pre-processing of data received from National, Theater, and Organic platforms. The current TENCAP and Guardrail Common Sensor systems together do not provide the mobility, functional flexibility or interoperability required in support of the SIGINT and IMINT pre-processing.

4. Capabilities Required.

Unless otherwise indicated, all capabilities are considered threshold (T) requirements. If there is an objective (O) requirement, it will be identified as such.

a. The S&IPA reflects a transition from autonomous TENCAP and GRCS IPF system operations to a state of interoperability and selective commonality (T) for TES and the ACS GPF, that operates as an integrated system of systems. (O). The detailed operational performance parameters are stated within the underlying TES and ACS ORDs. In general, the S&IPA will combine all of the functions of the TES and the GPF into a system of systems that is tailorable, scaleable, modular and easily deployable. The tailorability of this architecture will be such that the commander will have an early entry capability for access to the information provided by selected national, theater and organic intelligence platforms and agencies. As the theater matures, the commander will be able to expand this capability by bringing in additional segments, in a building block approach, until the required in-theater pre-processing, analysis, and dissemination requirements are met.

b. The S&IPA will support the commander by providing products and reports in the format desired and within the timelines required. These formats and timelines are scenario based and could change with every deployment. The architecture requires connectivity with (e.g., LAN/WAN) national, theater, and organic IEW, maneuver, fire, and fire support elements for the seamless interaction of requirements, tip-off, database transfer, exploitation, and dissemination. The S&IPA will include public SIGINT and IMINT product libraries with tailorable accessibility for the smart push/pull of products. With the capability to interact with, and in some cases control, the national, theater, and organic intelligence platforms, the S&IPA enhances the commander's look-shoot-look capability.

c. The existing ORDs and other requirement documentation for the TES and IPF/GPF provide detailed amplification of specific functional and technical requirements within the overall S&IPA concept. While adhering to those requirements, the S&IPA will minimize (T) / eliminate (O) all non-mission-essential duplicate processing, analysis, dissemination, management, maintenance and communication functions.

d. The S&IPA will provide the flexibility for split based operations, that support deployable/deployed forward and main headquarters elements of the JTF or Ground Component Commander (at Corps or attached to the Division or Brigade echelons coincident with the contingency operation).

e. The S&IPA requires a forward deploying element that will operate with the early entry forces and can continue on with the Forward HQ built around a maximum of 12 HMMWVs and generators/trailers/antennas (T); 7 HMMWVs and generators/trailers/antennas (O) capable of commencing operations within two hours of arrival. The objective of this architecture is for the forward deploying element to maximize modularity and tailorability to provide the commander the greatest amount of flexibility in making deployment decisions ranging from a single GRCS/ACS aircraft (relaying SIGINT and IMINT data to the rear for processing, exploitation and dissemination), to a single C130 load (providing, for example, comms, a SIGINT database, and a secondary imagery capability), to the entire forward element (providing sensor control, data receipt, processing, exploitation and dissemination from all S&IPA associated national, theater, and organic platforms/sensors). This paragraph will be removed from the CRD when the underlying ORDs are amended to reflect these requirements.

f. The S&IPA requires a follow-on segment that will operate with the Main HQ in sanctuary or in theater consisting of SIGINT and IMINT processors mounted in eight C130 drive-on/drive-off capable vehicles (T) and four C130 drive-on/drive-off capable vehicles or ten HMMWVs (O). All support vehicles will also be C130 drive- on/drive off capable. The S&IPA follow-on segment will be able to keep pace with the Main HQ element being supported.

The S&IPA follow-on segment will be able to set-up/tear-down in a time frame no greater than allowed for the main HQ element at the supported echelon. g. While the overall collection management and tasking functions resides in the ACE, the S&IPA supports dynamic tasking, retasking and synchronized collection, processing and exploitation of selected theater and organic IMINT & SIGINT platforms/sensors. The architecture will include the necessary collection management processors and interfaces, and technical and operational databases. (T) The S&IPA supports dynamic tasking, retasking and synchronized collection, processing and exploitation of national, theater and organic platforms/sensors. (O)

h. The S&IPA will allow operators to use SIGINT and IMINT data and products internally for cross-INT analysis to include tip-off for dynamic tasking and retasking. It will include visual and aural alarms to alert analysts and mission supervisors of critical/threat intelligence. (T) The automation of the tip-off process within the resource, mission and requirements management processes will be maximized. (O)

i. In the processing or analysis of data, the S&IPA will not degrade the geolocation accuracy capability inherent in any given sensor, platform, or system.

j. The S&IPA is constructed around a continuously evolving network of SIGINT and IMINT systems, sensors, and processors.

With each new generation of applications and supporting communication and support software modules, the S&IPA will be upgraded and undergo revalidation/limited testing to ensure full interoperability is maintained between applications, S&IPA segments and customers.