Intelligence is one of the hardest things to share in a coalition environment. Each partner, no matter how dedicated to the general cause, has a natural tendency to mask his intelligence capabilities and to retain control of what tasks he performs and how his products are disseminated. Furthermore, there are differences in national doctrine and disclosure rules. For IFOR, there was some confusion as to roles and responsibilities and duplication of effort. In spite of this, the coalition members were willing to cooperate and share information. The nations shared intelligence to a remarkable degree and certainly beyond most expectations.
The intelligence setting for Operation Joint Endeavor was Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, and parts of the Central European Region. IFOR and the nations had one eye on the military activity of the former warring factions (FWF) and the other on potential disruptions to civil order. Intelligence had to cast a wide net, far beyond the theater of operation, to grasp the influences in the area. For the United States, as a global power with vital interests outside of the NATO area, this was an operation of worldwide proportion and implications.
Operation Joint Endeavor, probably more clearly than any other recent operation, showcased the strategic, theater (operational), and tactical levels of intelligence operating in joint and combined roles. Additionally for the United States, the interagency (DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), NSA (National Security Agency), DOS (Department of State), and others) role was highlighted as well.
The nature of the operation muddled any clear division among the strategic, theater, and tactical levels. At the tactical level, the deployed functional units contributed to the reconnaissance and surveillance plans, to the intelligence reporting process, and to the synthesis of information that painted the picture for the commanders. Tactical commanders at the brigade and battalion levels needed access to political intelligence and so-called "strategic intelligence" in order to make some sense of the big picture to meet their locally focused peace operations responsibilities. As a result, "total mission awareness" had to be pushed to much lower levels than for conventional operations. The United States as a global power needed flexibility to deal with a broader set of strategic intelligence requirements and implications. The theater and tactical commanders needed help to reduce battlefield uncertainty related to peace operations and to adapt warfighting-oriented capabilities to meet some of the unexpected peace operation requirements. The national (strategic) and theater levels of the intelligence community gave priority attention to the intelligence gaps, stepped into the area of operation with specially equipped forward support teams, and designed and fitted "purpose-built" collection systems to exploit the non-lethal environment.
The core requirement of IFOR was to monitor the military situation and the Dayton Accord compliance-related activities. In the coalition peace operation environment of Operation Joint Endeavor, this also included extensive interaction with indigenous populations and non-military organizations, such as the NGOs, PVOs, and IOs. These organizations have representatives in country before the military arrive, while the military are present, and after the military leave. They are important players that the military needs to be prepared to deal with in peace operations.
Exploiting intelligence capabilities across service and agency boundaries and enhanced sharing of information among echelons of command, NATO and the participating coalition partners also became essential to meet mission needs. Yet, missing from most off-the-shelf intelligence doctrines, plans, tactics, techniques, and procedures were the multi-service/agency and multinational dimensions for operating in a coalition peace support environment.
During the Cold War, NATO and national intelligence capabilities were designed and deployed to collect against known Warsaw Pact military capabilities; soldiers were trained to predict enemy maneuver, objectives, and courses of action. The national intelligence systems were organized, staffed, and equipped for sensor-to-shooter targeting with go-to-war, mobile tactical assets.
The end of the Cold War brought a change in the types of operations the national military forces of NATO were planning for, training for, and being asked to support. There was much more emphasis on support to peace operations and this was forcing a concurrent change in intelligence support activities.
Warfighting and peace operations require different skill sets. Equipped to function in a tactical fight, NATO and the national tactical forces were less prepared to function in a peace support role. The Operation Joint Endeavor challenge was to transform an intelligence structure that could monitor tactical military capabilities into one that provided current and predictive intelligence of intentions in a non-lethal, coalition peace operation environment.
The theater intelligence mission was to-
The first challenge facing IFOR was to understand the intentions of the FWF and determine their resolve to use military force. A second challenge was integrating the NATO and national intelligence doctrines, capabilities, and procedures into the Operation Joint Endeavor environment and the IFOR structure.
Bosnia was more peaceful than expected. There were few overt physical attacks on IFOR facilities and personnel. The FWF were generally in compliance (but continuously testing IFOR resolve) with the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). One must be reminded, however, that the situation could have changed for the worse at a moment's notice.
Upon arrival in country, IFOR made it very clear to the FWF at the outset that they were different than UNPROFOR and were there to enforce compliance with the Dayton Accord, using force if necessary. Checkpoints were bulldozed, roadblocks were shut down, and the FWF equipment and forces placed in cantonment areas and barracks. On 19 February 1996, COMIFOR held a meeting of the Joint Military Commission on board the USS George Washington aircraft carrier. COMIFOR stated that the reason for having the meeting on board the "Spirit of Freedom" was to give the leaders of the FWF a display of the firepower the United States was prepared to use in the enforcement of the Dayton Peace Accord. IFOR's tremendous military firepower was certainly a major deterrent but the military also put a lot of faith in the deterrent power of "information dominance." IFOR, through its intelligence operation (supported by significant national contributions, especially from the United States), was able to make it clear to the FWF that they could monitor them any time of the day or night and under all weather conditions. The ability to see, understand the situation, and strike with precision no doubt had its effect in deterring aggressive actions on the part of the FWF and maintaining the peace during the IFOR operation.
Violations were experienced from time to time: weapons discovered in unauthorized locations, soldiers and tanks in the Zone of Separation, and unauthorized police checkpoints. Such violations were detected by the IFOR intelligence operation, and swift actions were taken when the FWF tested IFOR's resolve. The intelligence operation was an IFOR success story. In spite of remarkable challenges, it was a powerful tool that helped IFOR successfully monitor FWF activities and get the message to the FWF and the local population that IFOR was there to make a difference.
Although Bosnia was more peaceful than expected, the threats were real. The three FWF not only possessed combat power but also had a robust intelligence collection capability. In the case of the Serbs, there was an active information campaign targeted against NATO, member NATO nations, and IFOR. The Karadzic regime was extremely well organized and had a seamless military-political-media continuum. They were the home team, spoke the home language to the home culture, and had an internal security system that could apply thuggery to keep people in line if all else failed.
There were land mines everywhere, snipers, and the possibilities of civil disturbances. Terrorists, organized crime, and petty criminals were also considered in the threat picture. Local civilians were hired as linguists, cooks, maids, handymen, electricians, and carpenters and their activities needed to be monitored.
The local, national, and ethnic media were well established and generally trusted. The population of Bosnia was to a large extent literate and relatively well educated and used to all forms of media that characterizes an "information society." There were of course exceptions such as Gorazde, an isolated Muslim-dominated enclave where the population had little access to the news media and the outside world. The international, national, and local television, radio, and print journalists were everywhere questioning soldiers and reporting on events as they occurred. Finally, some of the toughest terrain in the world and formidable weather conditions posed a significant challenge to mobility and everyday survival of the intelligence operations and collection efforts.
The Bosnia operating environment was marked by large areas of operation and interest and difficult terrain and weather conditions. There were multiple belligerent factions and a "front line" that was 360 degrees. There were a large number of consumers and a wide spectrum of threats and intelligence requirements to accommodate. The operation had to adapt to differences in NATO and national methodologies and procedures. Force protection measures and the constant threat of land mines forced an adaptation of normal operating procedures. The operation had to monitor a wide spectrum of threats including the FWF, criminal activities, extremists, civil disturbances, and terrorism. FWF equipment storage sites and barracks, the Zone of Separation, mass gravesites, and potential "hot spots" caused by freedom of movement, resettlement, and inter-ethnic conflicts had to be monitored as well.
Intelligence planning dovetailed with operations planning. Yet, several uncontrollable factors shaped the intelligence planning effort: troop end strength (force caps), pre-deployment reconnaissance constraints, IFOR and national command structures, simultaneously developed plans, and the intelligence capabilities peculiar to participating nations. These factors established the conditions within which intelligence plans and relationships were developed.
Forces were tailored to ensure that factional hostilities could be predicted and force protection measures could be implemented. The troop end strength of 20,000 U.S. soldiers affected the augmentation of intelligence units and cells from outside the command. Any time new units or personnel were added to the force, an equal number of personnel had to be removed. With the United States planning to deploy a division MI battalion, a corps MI brigade, half of an echelons above corps (EAC) intelligence group, and one-third of the DCSINT staff, augmentation would be necessarily limited.
Before deployment, only one military reconnaissance of Bosnia was authorized. This drove intelligence planning in directed ways. Requirements increased, and became urgent, for overhead imagery of base camp locations, routes, bridges, and staging areas. When the reconnaissance ban was lifted and hasty reconnaissance commenced, it was clear that overhead imagery did not tell the whole story.
The near-simultaneous publishing of the SACEUR OPLAN, AFSOUTH campaign plan, and ARRC OPLAN only broadly addressed intelligence reporting procedures, information-sharing techniques, and national intelligence responsibilities required to understand and operate in the multinational environment.
National intelligence support plans were closely held and therefore it was not clear to IFOR and others what nations would bring what capabilities in terms of intelligence systems to support IFOR requirements. USAREUR planning had to take into consideration the known intelligence strengths and weaknesses of the Operation Joint Endeavor partners to plan its support arrangements. For instance the U.S. technical prowess in satellite imagery, intelligence electronic warfare adaptability, and rapid processing capabilities needed to be balanced with the HUMINT (human intelligence) expertise of the United Kingdom and France. There was a planning concern of several of the nations that the U.S. technical capabilities, with its downlinks, high-speed processors, specialized communications, and specialized manning, would overshadow the allies and their intelligence methods. The extent to which nations would be willing to share information with NATO and coalition partners was also unclear.
Intelligence requirements in Bosnia varied depending upon the phase of the operation but consistently required expertise in military, political, cultural, and economic issue areas. The information environment was complex and consisted of numerous, non-traditional sources. The major challenge was leveraging information from these sources, which were as varied as public affairs, civil affairs, PSYOP, military police, political advisors, UN organizations, the IPTF (International Police Task Force), IOs, NGOs, PVOs, joint commissions, government agencies, intelligence organizations, and even the commercial Internet. Interestingly enough, these sources were also consumers of information and intelligence. Hence, the cumulative information and intelligence requirements were tremendous and difficult to anticipate. In addition to traditional databases, non-traditional databases needed to be developed to address the varied needs such as police checkpoints, storage sites, license plates, personalities, treaty compliance, site declarations, mass gravesites, ethnicity, and others. The databases therefore had to be flexible enough to quickly respond to requirements from the commanders as well as a wide range of other consumers.
Analytical efforts differed as well. It was difficult to collect and exploit the full range of information, identify indicators, and provide predictive analysis. The analysts were trained for hard targeting-based analysis supporting military courses of action; they were not as well prepared for "softer" analysis of political issues, treaty compliance, civil unrest, vigilante activities, election support, refugee movements, and faction and population intentions. Since soft analysis was more challenging and difficult, there was a tendency to be more reactive and analyze what happened rather than predict what might happen. In retrospect, indicators of events were often there-the challenge was developing the expertise to recognize them and then using these insights to influence outcomes. This placed high demands on intellectual and analytical flexibility.
During Operation Joint Endeavor, military interaction with civilian organizations was more than civil-military cooperation. Civilian agencies (i.e., NGOs, PVOs, and IOs) had developed a network of influential contacts, compiled historical and specialty archives, and established relationships with local leaders and business people. They understood the infrastructure of the region, and the political and economic influences. Identification of the civilian organization strengths, limitations, and vulnerabilities were intelligence requirements. These same civilian agencies and centers of operation were sources of intelligence information as well. Intelligence requirements for civilian organizations were stated in collection plans. The IFOR system of civil affairs liaison officers (LNO) proved particularly well suited to interact with these organizations. The UNIPTF, which had some 1,600 members throughout Bosnia, provided its daily situation reports to COMIFOR through the IPTF LNO. These reports covered freedom of movement violations, human rights violations, and other incidents.
The U.S. Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, states, "There is no single intelligence doctrine for multinational operations. Each coalition or alliance must develop its own doctrine." NATO intelligence doctrine states, "In peacetime, NATO commanders have to rely largely on Member Nations for the intelligence they need. In wartime, the majority of NATO commanders' intelligence may still come from the member nations; however, they will also acquire intelligence from many different sources and agencies such as assigned combat units, reconnaissance units, and aircraft." The U.S. Army FM 100-23 states, "Peace operations take place in environments less well-defined than war..the traditional elements of combat power may not apply..the political and cultural dimensions become more critical..the needs of the commander involved in peace operations are in some ways more complex than those of the commander conducting combat operations."
At the outset of Operation Joint Endeavor, the first task was to separate the FWF by no later than D+30 (19 January 1996) and create a "Zone of Separation" (ZOS). The ZOS was 4 km wide, 2 km on either side of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line (ACFL). The ACFL was the line where the fighting stopped. The aggressive timeline to get the FWF personnel and equipment out of the ZOS created a number of challenges. For example, the required U.S. ground forces to reconnoiter the ZOS in MND(N) would not be fully deployed until early February 1996. The mine hazards made ground reconnaissance difficult and the weather in late December 1995 and early January 1996 limited use of ground reconnaissance and airborne theater imagery platforms. Because of these factors, organic U.S. helicopter assets (the AH-64s) were used to reconnoiter the ZOS in MND(N).
The second most important mission was ensuring that the FWF placed all units and equipment (based on D+90 FWF declarations) in designated barracks and cantonment areas by D+120 (17 April 1996). This too presented some interesting intelligence challenges related to approving/disapproving FWF declarations, especially when the ARRC, which was dissatisfied with the D+90 declarations, levied a requirement for the FWF to re-declare barracks and cantonment sites at D+120. In addition to initial problems associated with translating the original FWF data and removing inconsistencies, it became necessary to scrub databases to eliminate duplicate records as well. There were often multiple declarations at a single site, e.g., three separate declarations for three separate warehouses all on the same compound. The divisions also had some problems interpreting the ARRC guidance, regarding FWF unit and artillery consolidation, so the ARRC's envisioned end-state was unclear and frustrated Division Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) development. The U.S. approach to verification in MND(N) was to assume that what was declared by the FWF was there and to go look for equipment that was not there. The British and French approach in MND(SW) and MND(SE) respectively was to go verify that what the FWF said was there was in fact there. As a result, the U.S. verification efforts were much more intensive and demanding.
Although the ACFL was where the fighting stopped, it was not the final division of territory between the entities established under the GFAP. Rather, the IEBL was the line that the parties in Dayton agreed to as the boundary between them. The IEBL came into effect at D+45, replacing the ACFL ZOS. In many cases, the IEBL and the ACFL were one in the same but there were also those cases where they were not. An area of transfer (AOT) from one FWF to another occurred in these cases. This created additional challenges since some villages now fell either in an AOT or on the IEBL creating potential "hot spots." It was necessary to determine the ethnic majority of these villages. In some cases the villages fell on the wrong side of the IEBL (e.g., Muslims in Serb territory). Although HUMINT was the ideal way to verify, the shear number of villages precluded doing this.
Another challenge arose in late January 1996 when de-mobilized soldiers began entering the local police forces in large numbers. Not surprisingly, IFOR began to notice an increase in the number of police checkpoints, particularly along sensitive areas of the ZOS. The police restricted civilian freedom of movement in many areas and often carried weapons. In short, they were "skirting" the provisions of the GFAP by transferring soldiers to local police forces. In response to this action, the ARRC issued specific guidance to the FWF regarding "legitimate" police forces and activities. The ARRC also provided guidance to the MNDs to close unauthorized police checkpoints. In response to the ARRC guidance, the divisions established police checkpoint databases and initiated monitoring and reporting activities.
The diverse languages in the Balkans region (see figure 4-1) proved to be a real challenge for IFOR and the participating nations. For example, the U.S. military did not have enough trained linguists for the theater. USAREUR had to fill a large number of linguist requirements to provide translators for the battalions and brigades of the U.S.-led MND(N) and for the intelligence positions in U.S. military intelligence (MI) units. As in Operation Desert Storm, the United States relied on contracting local nationals for a majority of its linguist support. Military linguists were primarily saved for those positions requiring access to classified or otherwise sensitive information. The relationships among the FWF complicated the hire of local nationals in Bosnia. A native speaking Muslim was not necessarily able to function effectively in a Serb or Croat enclave. In addition, most native linguists had little or no background in the military and therefore had difficulties in translating military "lingo."
Figure 4-1. Languages in the Balkan Region
A contract for linguist support was awarded to BDM Corporation on 10 December 1995. BDM provided linguist contractor support for operations in Haiti, Somalia, and southwest Asia. BDM hired U.S. linguists and native linguists. The contract eventually supplied a sufficient number of native speakers with English capability to allow U.S. units to conduct operations. However, no distinctions were made as to the level of English proficiency required. Native speaking linguists were hired though less qualified speakers would have been sufficient and considerably cheaper for many positions. BDM contracted a total of 57 U.S. linguists and 439 native linguists for a cost of $13 million. Costs included billeting, transportation, and management.
In some areas, such as those occupied by the Serbs, an information campaign targeted against NATO was already in full operation when the IFOR troops arrived. Hence, the IFOR Information Campaign (IIC) was at a disadvantage at the outset because it had to compete immediately with an already established and effective campaign that could get inside of the IFOR decision loop and outmaneuver some of the initial IFOR efforts. IFOR also had some problems adapting to the local population's media consumption habits. While IFOR relied primarily on printed material (The Herald of Peace, posters, and handbills) and AM radio to start with, the Bosnians' preferred medium was television. Also, IFOR radio transmitted on AM and the Bosnians listened mostly to FM radios. Adjustments were made to accommodate other media forms such as FM radio and television and mechanisms were also put in place to achieve IIC integrated product development. The PSYOP capability Commando Solo (an EC-130 aircraft configured for radio and television broadcasting) was not, however, deployed during the IFOR portion of the operation. It was deployed in the September 1997 time frame to support SFOR activities related to the Bosnia elections. A Combined Joint IFOR Information Campaign Task Force was established to coordinate the activities of Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, PSYOP, International Organizations (e.g., UN-IPTF, UNHCR, OSCE, OHR, and others), and IFOR command elements. They also orchestrated the IIC for IFOR.
The IIC proved to be a difficult task and the jury is still out on its overall success for the IFOR operation. It was certainly a success during the first 9 months of the operation in support of force protection and military compliance activities (transfer of AOTs and placing heavy weapons in cantonment areas). LTG Mike Walker, UKA, Commander ARRC, said, "the IIC was an unqualified success during military compliance activities (D+3 through D+120) and in support of the September 1996 National elections." There were also some successes against the Serbs, e.g., the use of war criminal awareness posters and the destruction of 252 tons of Bosnian Serb munitions (Operation Volcano). Information was used effectively by the IFOR commanders as a non-lethal weapon to communicate intentions, might, and resolve to the local population and FWF.
The use of maps was another unanticipated issue area. The Yugoslav maps used a local grid coordinate system and there was no system for converting them into UTM coordinates. Interpolating grid coordinates caused compliance verification problems when exchanging information with the factions, so in the end the FWF were provided WGS-84 UTM maps, taught how to use them, and then required to use them for compliance discussions.
Operational Security (OPSEC) was particularly challenging for the IFOR operation. The operational environment was reasonably stable for Bosnia. However, the lack of an obvious threat bred a sense of complacency, which is a threat in and of itself. Other types of OPSEC risks had to be managed as well. There were numerous television and print journalists questioning soldiers, and the soldiers had to be briefed to ensure they did not release classified information to the media. Every day, hundreds of local national workers entered IFOR areas of operation. It was a challenge to keep a close eye on these daily visitors. OPSEC is an operations function, not a security function per se. Therefore, there must be a proponent for OPSEC functions and the functions must be integrated into the planning and execution of the operation.
COMSEC and INFOSEC issues had to be dealt with as well. Although the military communications and information systems operated SECRET system-high, other systems were not secure. The UN VSAT network, the Internet, INMARSAT, cellular, and commercial PTT telephone systems were not protected and were used frequently for command and control purposes. Configuration management and information protection measures (e.g., virus protection and intrusion detection and protection) were slow in implementation. Diskettes were shared between classified and unclassified systems and there was a lack of discipline and standard operating procedures to effectively control the situation. There was a lack of security devices such as secure telephones, safes, and shredders. Security was an ongoing responsibility for which improvements were continuously made over the duration of the operation.
The U.S. intelligence effort in support of Operation Joint Endeavor was massive. The national, theater, and tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets included aerial systems (manned and unmanned), surface systems, and satellite systems. The most responsive manned aerial systems were the U-2, P-3s, JSTARS, RIVET JOINT, and the NATO E-3s (and to a lesser extent the U.S. E-2Cs). These systems could respond to changing conditions by modifying their mission while in flight. These systems had one disadvantage in that they put personnel at risk so the standoff requirements tended to limit the depth of the sensor capabilities. The unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) did not put personnel at risk, provided reduced detection (smaller cross-section), and supplied a broad range of collection capabilities (SIGINT, ELINT, EO, IR, and live video). Their greatest limitation was their lack of flexibility; they either needed to be pre-programmed or controlled by personnel within line of sight. Both the manned and unmanned systems were susceptible to reduced capability due to adverse weather.
The land-based assets ranged from CI/HUMINT teams to dedicated SIGINT and electronic warfare (EW) units to Special Operations Forces (SOF). CI/HUMINT and SOF were also a valuable complement to the national and theater assets in that they could verify and obtain information. The national satellite systems provided worldwide, quick-reaction coverage of areas of interest, especially remote or potentially hostile areas. Limitations include degraded imagery due to atmospheric and weather disturbances. U.S. national systems were controlled by the U.S. intelligence community and provided direct support to the National Command Authorities. Information from national systems was provided through service component Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program (TENCAP) systems. The deployed National Intelligence Cells (NICs) and National Intelligence Support Teams (NIST) facilitated U.S. and IFOR command access to U.S. national information.
Two U.S. theater-level analysis centers supported the U.S. and IFOR requests for information. The USAREUR Combat Intelligence Readiness Facility (UCIRF) in Augsburg, Germany, provided multi-spectral SIGINT support and all-source intelligence access to deployed U.S. forces; maintained an IFOR threat database; and installed and maintained U.S. collection, processing, and analysis systems deployed in country. The USEUCOM Joint Analysis Center (JAC) in Molesworth, England, integrated imagery and other intelligence and inserted IFOR-releasable information into the LOCE system for broader access by authorized IFOR consumers. There was a close working relationship between the JAC and the U.S. NIC at the ARRC and with Task Force Eagle in support of MND(N). The JAC committed about 70 percent if its intelligence collection and analysis efforts to the IFOR operation. The U.S. Navy Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facility (FOSIF) provided maritime information to the NATO Combined Air Operations Center in Vicenza, Italy, as well.
Joint Endeavor was clearly a CI (counterintelligence) and HUMINT intensive environment. The establishment of the G2X staff officer dedicated to CI/HUMINT asset management for the MND(N) (Task Force Eagle) was an effective means to manage HUMINT collection, management, processing, and dissemination. CI/HUMINT provided invaluable support to force protection and insights into intentions and the general "pulse" of the operational environment. The force protection measures in the U.S.-controlled areas were strict and had some impact on the ability to carry out CI/HUMINT activities. Measures such as the four-vehicle convoy rule, the wearing of full battle dress, and restrictions on leaving the immediate area of operation did not permit the teams to operate to their fullest potential. An exception was ultimately granted for the CI/HUMINT teams allowing them to operate in two-vehicle convoys during the daylight hours. In spite of the freedom of movement restrictions, CI/HUMINT was one of the success stories of the operation.
The other intelligence disciplines proved important as well. SIGINT provided warning and a hedge against conventional threats. On 30 August 1996, the NATO AWACS flew its 50,000th flying hour in support of operations in the former Yugoslavia. IMINT used the full spectrum of traditional assets from hand-held to national capabilities to monitor verification sites and for the surveillance of "hot spots" and FWF compliance activities. There were also some non-traditional IMINT sources such as the Combat Camera Crew products, the AH-64 gun camera tapes, and the OH-58 cockpit tapes that proved invaluable. In addition, downlinked UAV imagery provided near real-time surveillance support. Areas such as the ZOS were mined and other areas were denied easy access from the ground; hence, the use of the advanced surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities avoided the need to put soldiers in harm's way. OSINT (open source intelligence) provided indications and warning of increased tensions in local areas, supported predictive analysis efforts, and helped focus and queue other collection efforts. The "Night Owl," which was produced by the U.S. at Camp Lukavac in MND(N), provided a daily summary of news and media commentary-a Bosnia version of the Pentagon's "Early Bird." Through its publication and use, commanders and staff were able to gain a better appreciation for the political, economic, and cultural environment. MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence) was used to support treaty compliance, early warning, and force protection. The cumulative effect of the intelligence operation sent a clear signal to the FWF that IFOR was capable of knowing all and seeing all-information dominance.
Under UNPROFOR, Joint Commission Officers (JCOs) were employed to deal with the FWF and in that capacity, they formed a close working relationship with the factions. At the outset of the IFOR operation, the JCOs served as the IFOR "direct telescope" regarding FWF activities. In fact, IFOR division commanders used them in this role throughout the operation because they were the most credible source of information on the capabilities and intentions of the FWF.
U.S. Special Forces conducted operations employing a wide range of capabilities and were among the earliest to deploy into the area. Special Forces established an operating base in San Vito, Italy, and a forward operating base in Sarajevo under IFOR control. Special Forces assisted UNPROFOR, NATO, and non-NATO forces and provided liaison with non-NATO forces and the FWF. They also assisted with surveying and monitoring the demarcation line and ZOS and supported civil-military activities. The Special Forces liaison control elements assigned to NATO and coalition units supported integration of intelligence, operations, communications, close air support, and medical evacuations. The interface with NATO and non-NATO forces proved to be of great value to the IFOR operation.
For peace operations, co-opting factions' C2 may be a better strategy than destroying it. During Operation Joint Endeavor, it became clear that the FWF needed the ability to command and control their forces in order to be able to comply with the Dayton Accord. Therefore, actions such as jamming, electronic deception, and physical destruction were not used by IFOR.
Commanders found themselves spending a lot of time conducting diplomacy and mediation to resolve disputes and conflicts. They were able to deter violence and diffuse potential conflicts by developing a positive relationship with key FWF leaders and local community leaders. Regular visits and meetings with all parties concerned developed mutual trust and respect that became invaluable in resolving conflicts through means other than force. Insights and understandings derived from these relationships were invaluable to the overall success of the IFOR information operation.
Preparation for Operation Joint Endeavor engaged the intelligence community up front. An intensive U.S. IPB process made products on weather, terrain, and force protection available to the deploying forces. Other IPB products for treaty compliance, cantonment sites, weapons storage sites, and personalities were developed after initial deployment. The IPB was different in later phases of the operation as the focus changed to peace support requirements.
Tools for analyzing and exploiting the conventional combat environment were adapted for the peace environment. Intelligence forces were formed and trained. USEUCOM and the ARRC led an effort to assign responsibilities for intelligence production. The U.S. and NATO structures did not always work in harmony to de-conflict and align production efforts. The importance of identifying the right products, accomplished by designated experts, and delivered to the right customer in a timely manner is the hallmark of good IPB. However, for NATO and IFOR this became a challenge due to the unknowns associated with the first-ever peace operation and the need to establish an IFOR peace-oriented IPB process and meld it with national approaches as the operation unfolded. The mix of uneven intelligence experiences and capabilities of the participating nations was a factor as well.
USAREUR, in support of Task Force Eagle and the ARRC, developed IPBs for treaty compliance. Cantonment areas, weapons storage sites, refugees, the politics of freedom of movement, and the right to inspect sites were compliance issues that needed to be addressed. Task Force Eagle tracked ZOS violations using aggressive reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) operations based on a thorough IPB analysis and an extensive database capability. Databases were also established and used for minefield tracking, critical event tracking, and other GFAP-related monitoring activities. As the process for putting in place democratic institutions in Bosnia took hold, the intelligence effort shifted to supporting federal and planned municipal elections. Election monitoring requirements included watching cross-border refugee migration and potential voting corruption.
The fast-paced IFOR and national planning efforts had some negative impacts on the orchestration of theater intelligence production. Several organizations, in their enthusiasm to provide useful products, ended up duplicating efforts. For instance, for the United States both the Task Force Eagle and the UCIRF produced assessments on the links between NGOs and foreign forces; and both the JAC and the USAREUR Forward Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE) produced pieces on political-military analysis. Likewise, while some efforts were duplicated, other critical areas fell short. For Operation Joint Endeavor, the roles of all the intelligence producers could have been more clearly defined. A better division of effort could have been assigned among the IFOR, ARRC, and MND players.
Link analysis, sometimes called pattern analysis, was a practical tool for supporting USAREUR Forward and Task Force Eagle. The analyses associated indicators, personalities, and contact networks, and then related activities that could point to probable future events or actions. They also helped determine force protection vulnerabilities and threats. The downside to the initial IFOR link analysis activity was that it took months to develop the field intelligence and contact network that led to the first results. Collection and analysis operations that began in January 1996 received their first products in March 1996.
During the separation of the FWFs, Task Force Eagle Analysis and Control Element used some locally developed tools to manage the sites that were approved for FWF relocation. These tools were passed to the Joint Military Commission (JMC) so that FWF could be notified which sites were approved and which were not. An example of one such tool was the method developed by Task Force Eagle for downloading information from its intelligence processing system to diskette, then uploading it into a Microsoft Office Excel spreadsheet. Because the JMC did not have direct access to the Task Force Eagle database, the ability to place selected fields of a database into a spreadsheet proved invaluable in the intelligence production activities. Everyone, including the non-NATO allies, seemed to have the Microsoft Office suite of software, so the Excel spreadsheets became a useful and effective tool for sharing information. The only drawback was that the Excel spreadsheet data could not be plotted onto a computer-generated map or graphic.
Prior to deployment, USAREUR created an all source correlation database on the U.S. All Source Analysis System (ASAS). The JAC-provided ground order of battle and equipment baseline information was not in a format that would easily auto-parse into the Army system. Hence, most of the data had to be entered manually. As a result, the analysts that deployed probably knew a lot about entering data into ASAS and less about the target environment itself since they did not have time to study it in detail. Task Force Eagle deployed with its Balkans-based military database filled with military order of battle and designed for war not peace operations. In the early phase of the operation it was fortuitous that such a database had been developed since without it, Task Force Eagle would not have had a baseline from which to direct its early reconnaissance and surveillance activities.
Relying on a Military Integrated Data System/Intelligence Database (MIDS/IDB) dump was viewed by USAREUR/Task Force Eagle intelligence staff as problematic (earlier attempts in garrison were unsuccessful) at the time and certainly not the optimal solution during deployment-ASAS databases need to be developed before deployment. The MIDS/IDB was apparently a larger issue than the IFOR operation. The general military intelligence databases maintained by the theater and national intelligence production elements (DIA, JICs, and JAC) have used an IDB data scheme for almost 10 years. The Army evidently has not yet adopted this scheme in ASAS or WARLORD.
USAREUR (Task Force Eagle elements) had planned, rehearsed, and conducted conventional operations in pre-deployment training (Mountain Shield exercises) to the point that the commanders' information requirements could be predicted. In actuality, however, information requirements for Operation Joint Endeavor were not so easy to predict, and information sources came from diverse elements and unanticipated sources. Pre-deployment military databases provided a snapshot of what to expect militarily, but multiple new databases became the "bread and butter" of Task Force Eagle and IFOR operations. They had license plate databases, key personality databases, environmental databases, mass grave databases, imagery target deck databases, Named Areas of Interest databases, Request for Information databases, and more. Without them, predictive analysis, mission management, and technical control would have been virtually impossible. Database management knowledge and the automation skills to manipulate information required new levels of dexterity in Operation Joint Endeavor. On-the-job training, discovery training (i.e., trial and error method), and contractor support became the norm for building the necessary expertise for analysis and information system operation.
The JAC maintained the U.S. theater database, a fusion of air, ground, and maritime intelligence, which was culled and disseminated to U.S. elements through the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS). This all-source, U.S.-only processing system was available at all U.S. intelligence nodes. The JDISS provided the primary link to the rest of the U.S. intelligence world and intelligence operations could not function without it.
The ARRC too maintained similar databases for authorized use by and appropriate distribution to IFOR, the MNDs and participating nations. The United States placed IFOR-releasable information on the LOCE server for use by the ARRC and other authorized IFOR users. The U.S. National Intelligence Cell at the ARRC also responded directly to COMARRC needs.
Several other automated systems were key to storing information and delivering timely intelligence, especially during the deployment phase. The UCIRF created and maintained the theater force protection database, called Blackbird. Force protection teams interviewed the local populace and passed information, to include digitized images, to the Blackbird database with their Theater Rapid Response Intelligence Package (TRRIP) systems. New information was passed through the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) to the INTELINK national level database. In this way, the collateral database could be shared immediately from U.S. national to tactical levels.
The ARRC inherited the UNPROFOR databases during the transfer of mission in December 1995. UNPROFOR provided some mine data but the information was not organized. Mine location data was vital for the security of the military and the population. The ARRC assigned responsibility for mine data development and archiving to the divisions. Native language speakers proved crucial for translating mine information delivered by the FWF and interpreting poorly drawn schematics. The U.S. intelligence and engineering communities coordinated responsibilities for mine and terrain databases from the start of Operation Joint Endeavor and were able to add to the NATO effort.
The ARRC provided GFAP compliance monitoring and reporting guidance to the divisions, monitored the overall compliance activities, and maintained a number of databases covering ground order of battle, cantonment weapons status, personalities, and other areas of interest to the ARRCs mission. They used the UK-provided THISTLE information system and NATO-provided systems such as CRONOS (with intelligence applications) for this purpose as well. The ARRC also had other capabilities such as geographic information support systems that provided maps and boundary databases. The Allied Military Intelligence Battalion (AMIB) provided human intelligence support to the ARRC as well.
The NATO CRONOS system provided several intelligence applications for use by IFOR, the ARRC, and others. Applications such as the Prototype ACE Intelligence System (PAIS), Crisis Response Prototype (CRESP), and Recognized Air Picture (RAP) were used for displaying and distributing intelligence information. These applications used information from a number of different sources.
PAIS, originally designed for use at the strategic level, was used at the theater (operational) level to view and analyze order of battle (ORBAT) information, personalities database, weapons cantonment database, and other related databases for monitoring the warring factions and related IFOR activities. The ORBAT and other monitored information were imported from LOCE, the ARRC, and other sources. Using PAIS subroutines, ORBAT information could be overlaid on a map with military symbols indicating the position of units, events, and facilities.
CRESP was used for situation monitoring and reporting and received its inputs mainly from the ARRC's THISTLE system. With the TOA to the SFOR, the CRESP evolved to be "the Operations Support System" and was used to monitor incidents, SFOR deployments, the IEBL, locations of minefields, and other areas of interest to the commander of SFOR.
The IFOR live, real-time air picture was produced at the CAOC and distributed over CRONOS to key command centers using server and workstation software developed by the SHAPE Technical Center (now the NATO C3 Agency-the Hague). A software package (ARKONA) developed by the German Air Defense Programming Center was modified to allow the RAP to be displayed on PCs as well as high-end workstations.
An Operational Analysis Branch (OAB) was an integral part of the ARRC staff. This branch had been a part of the ARRC for years and had worked and trained with the military staff. The mission of the small five-man cell was "to give independent analytical and scientific advice to the commander to aid his decision-making over the spectrum of ARRC activities." Throughout its year-long deployment, the OAB provided this type of support to the commander and his supporting staff in such diverse areas as military compliance with the GFAP, traffic surveys, transition and redeployment planning, elections support, information management, and software tool development.
The initial emphasis of the OAB analysis was on GFAP compliance issues. Compliance went better than expected so in February 1996, the OAB shifted its assessment activities to issues related to return to normality, freedom of movement, and redeployment. A major task undertaken by the OAB at this time was to develop normality indicators to provide a measure of operational success in terms of changes in the social and economic situation in Bosnia-"to assess the beneficial impact of the security framework provided by IFOR." The ARRC used soldiers (mainly U.S. Civil Affairs teams in MND(N) and in MND(SW) and regular unit patrols in MND(SE)) to collect the raw data. Data were collected on food and other staple goods, fuel stock and traffic on main roads, use of community buildings and private housing, social activities related to schools and churches/mosques, sports events, and farming activities. The data were collected twice a month on 109 towns spread throughout Bosnia and sent to the ARRC to be analyzed. Two control towns were selected to represent the worst case (Bosansko Grahovo, a ghost town) and best case (Tomislavgrad, a normal town) situations. A monthly assessment of the sampled towns against the control towns using a simple red (poorest), amber, yellow, and green (best) relative-rating scheme was employed to quickly judge and display the status of towns and Opstinas. The monthly data was then used to forecast trends. In October after 8 months of collection and analysis, the ARRC came to the following conclusions:
Weather operations and support to IFOR forces during Operation Joint Endeavor were a success. The Staff Weather Office (SWO) provided numerous briefings and products that included satellite weather imagery of the central region and the area of responsibility (AOR), 24- and 48-hour forecasts, and weather impacts on operations. Thanks to the use of a German satellite communications weather broadcast system, the amount of real-time useful weather data to the troops in the field was, in USAREUR's view, the best in the history of the U.S. military. From either a logistics or reconnaissance point of view, the commander needed weather information far away from the physical confines of the AOR. Weather forecasts were routinely briefed (by forecasters within the AOR) on locations such as Dover, Delaware (CONUS logistics point of debarkation), and Istres, France (U-2 aircraft base). The valid requirement for this type of information expanded the need for trained personnel at remote locations, stretching the capabilities of the United States, in particular, and created some shortfalls in weather support later in the operation.
The MNDs produced daily intelligence summaries (INTSUM) for the ARRC. The document went out every evening at 2300 hours. Its format was dictated by the ARRC and was driven by treaty-compliance deadlines. As there was no real "doctrinal format" for a peace operations INTSUM, the compliance aspects provided an easy and logical way to organize the potential peace enforcement issues for the commanders. The divisions had other reporting requirements as well. For MND(N), two other products were developed daily. The intelligence input for the morning battle update briefing (BUB) went out at 0730 hours and covered any significant reporting that came in after 1600 hours the previous afternoon. The JAC Balkan INTSUM was published daily at 2300 hours so inputs from it were used for the morning briefing as well as inputs from the brigade daily INTSUM (due at 2000 hours) or periodic intelligence reports (INTREP) due at 0300 hours. The other product was the intelligence input for the evening BUB that occurred nightly at 1800 hours. This input covered all of the day's major events and issues. Operational reports, press releases, and ground reporting from the brigade INTREPs at 1500 hours were used to create the briefing. The INTEL products and BUB were disseminated to all subordinate brigades and other appropriate command elements. The Task Force Eagle INTSUMs were also posted daily to the INTELINK for broader intelligence community consumption and they relied on U.S. V CORPS in Heidelberg to do this for them. There was a lot of intelligence information at Task Force Eagle that was not available elsewhere and needed to be posted to the INTELINK so that the intelligence community could use it for long-term analysis. There was a problem in finding time at the Task Force Eagle level to get the information on INTELINK.
The BUB occurred twice daily in the MND(N) headquarters "Battle Star" command center. The G2 and G3 briefed jointly. Once the briefing slides were loaded into the PowerPoint presentation, they were displayed on a big-screen television monitor in the command center. Following the morning briefing to the Commanding General, the presentation was put on continuous "auto-pilot" throughout the day with slides rotating once every 15 seconds. The idea was that one could walk into the command center and get a complete update on the Task Force Eagle operation in about 15 minutes-a sort of "Task Force Eagle Headline News."
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO and national intelligence needs have expanded into areas not of concern in the confrontation with the former Warsaw Pact. As a result, NATO and national doctrines had either changed or were in the process of changing when Operation Joint Endeavor was launched. The NATO intelligence doctrine, which was based on Cold War scenarios, was under review to consider adjustments to accommodate the needs other types of operations such as peace support where the intelligence activities differ from the traditional combat operations.
The IFOR intelligence community faced the unique collection challenges of coalition peace operations at the outset of Operation Joint Endeavor. Traditionally, intelligence tended to focus on the enemy. However, it was not always clear who and what was an enemy in the IFOR operation. Instead, there were collection needs to support monitoring human rights and freedom of movement and verification of cantonment inventories. These activities and others required new and different databases and collection approaches. In peace operations as well as combat, the side with the best situation awareness has the greatest advantage. In the multi-faction and multiethnic setting of Bosnia, there were, by definition, many sides. For IFOR, there were also releasability issues related to sharing information and capabilities among 36 nations. These nations included the Russians, Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries, and others with whom NATO had never shared or anticipated sharing intelligence information.
The synchronization of the IFOR information operations with the commander's intent and objectives was a recognized need and actions were taken early on to establish means to improve the ability to do this. However, since this was an evolving doctrine area for NATO and many of the nations, application and understanding of the components and critical activities varied greatly between individuals and units. It was recognized that information operations could give the commander options the same as maneuver and firepower. Most events had an informational aspect that could be exploited. Evaluating these in the context of information engagement and then exploiting them with a synchronized effort was a challenge. Difficulties included identifying sources and participants, establishing objectives, integrating into the battle staff and planning process, and establishing a process and methodology to manage exploitation and use the results. Over time, IFOR and the nations were able to both individually and collectively synchronize the intelligence assets not only among the intelligence collection assets but with operational reconnaissance assets as well. For the first time, CI/HUMINT was synchronized with other assets and the communications systems facilitated re-tasking. Dynamic re-tasking of CI/HUMINT strategic, theater, and tactical assets was possible. Furthermore, using different intelligence assets to queue others worked quite effectively.
There was no single doctrine for multinational intelligence operations or intelligence architecture. The nations developed their own approach to establish the foundation on which IFOR built its coalition intelligence operation. NATO did not implement its Cold War intelligence architecture, but tailored a multinational intelligence organization with shared responsibilities that included NICs at the ARRC and integrated positions within the IFOR command structure. A U.S. NIC was collocated with ARRC headquarters at Ilidza. The United Kingdom and France deployed NICs, and conducted intelligence operations under the direction of COMARRC. Other national contingents had intelligence representation at brigade level, with varying degrees of effectiveness. Each nation brought certain strengths and weaknesses to the table and its own national augmentation. For example, U.S. NIST formed from the JCS's National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) capabilities supported the dual U.S. and NATO structure. They were able to provide rapid answers to the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and were valued additions to the overall intelligence operation. Procedures, responsibilities, and command relationships for integrating the U.S. NISTs were not fully developed and as a result, the NISTs operated and supported command elements differently. Some problems were experienced in passing U.S. military staff special access clearances to the NIC and obtaining access to NIC/NIST TS/SCI level elements and information. For example, it took the Deputy Commander Joint IFOR Information Campaign Task Force, a U.S. officer, until February 1996 to obtain access to certain U.S. NIC elements. The breadth and depth of U.S. intelligence support to IFOR and the framework nations operational elements are illustrated in figure 4-2.
Figure 4-2. U.S. Intelligence Support for NATO
The basic intelligence principles remained appropriate guides for getting the operation started. The intelligence staffs had to provide the commanders and their staffs with intelligence estimates based on the commanders' PIRs. The intelligence cycle of direct, collect, process, and disseminate were employed to create inputs to the IPB. There was, however, little doctrine on how to conduct an IPB in preparation for or during peace operations, so this presented a significant challenge at the outset of the operation. None of the manuals addressed how to verify specific treaty compliance issues such as those laid out in the Dayton Accord. Creative and innovative staffs came through and developed techniques and approaches to peace operations IPB and intelligence analysis.
USEUCOM, USAREUR, USAFE, NAVEUR/6th Fleet, and intelligence operators down the line employed existing doctrine and incorporated proven intelligence functions to plan for sanctuary and forward intelligence operations. Documents such as USEUCOM Directive 55-11, Joint Pubs 2-0 and 3-07, and service publications provided guidance for establishing joint U.S. intelligence support for coalition operations other than war. Where there was no doctrine, new architectures, tactics, techniques, and procedures were devised to provide support to U.S. elements, NATO, and especially non-NATO allies in the coalition environment. U.S. doctrine in FM 100-18 and FM 34-1 describes a split-based intelligence operational concept. The concept consists of broadcasting intelligence through a multilevel information system structure; providing for shared situational awareness among the different levels; tailoring assets tactically for efficient management of scarce resources; and synchronizing the intelligence system with the commander's operational concept across the operational spectrum. The principles of split-based, tactical tailoring and broadcast dissemination were the starting point for U.S. intelligence support planning for Operation Joint Endeavor. The Army doctrine of maneuver warfare dominated the intelligence architecture's implementation for Task Force Eagle (Bosnia was not, however, maneuver warfare).
Six intelligence functions, detailed in FM 34-1, were written into the USAREUR campaign plan: IPB, force protection, indications and warning, situational development, target development, and battle damage assessment (BDA). The de facto Operation Joint Endeavor intelligence architecture supported this doctrine and facilitated integration of these functions. However, the functions were designed to support conventional combat operations, and had to be adapted for use in a peace operation.
The split-based concept and the employment of sanctuary and forward elements are depicted in Figure 4-3. The intelligence operational terms for split-based parts are sanctuary and forward. A sanctuary can be located wherever it best supports the forward elements. There can be more than one sanctuary if there are various echelons of players. For Operation Joint Endeavor, one sanctuary was located at the UCIRF in Augsburg, Germany, the other at the JAC in Molesworth, England. The UCIRF and USEUCOM's JAC were separate theater sanctuary pieces.
Figure 4-3. Split-based Intelligence Concept
USAREUR tactically tailored its intelligence forces and deployed them forward in the DISE. As the operation developed, so would the intelligence support provided. Broadcast dissemination meant that both EAC and echelons corps and below (ECB) information-processing systems received raw information and analyzed intelligence directly at their locations. Specific processing systems, some used only at certain levels, had to be deployed as part of the forward package to provide intelligence system connectivity to databases. For instance, the processing systems used at EAC did not "talk" to the ECB systems. To fix the problem, some EAC processing systems had to be deployed to ECB intelligence centers.
The JDISS, sponsored by DIA's General Defense Intelligence Program, was one of these systems. The JDISS is a computer workstation (including laptops) that compartmentalizes highly classified intelligence information by intelligence discipline. This EAC system was the primary connectivity to U.S. national databases during Operation Joint Endeavor. There were more than 750 JDISS workstations deployed in USEUCOM, with over half at the JAC. JDISS provided immediate access to nearly all of the theater- and national-level databases. NISTs equipped with JDISS gave COMIFOR, COMARRC, and COMEAGLE (Commander MND(N)) direct access to the latest U.S. national information. However, the JDISS, a strategic and operational tool, could not be electronically connected for data exchange to the processing systems at corps and division. Instead, a workstation was modified at corps and division to take advantage of the JDISS capability. All the intelligence centers agreed that this system capability was vital to their operations. The lack of connectivity between EAC and ECB systems was caused by security restrictions on certain intelligence information being processed with other kinds of intelligence information. Another factor was that intelligence systems proliferate at ECB because technologies have not matured to allow for a single processor that can be networked from U.S. national to tactical levels. The lack of multilevel security created a complex IFOR information system environment and contributed to the duplication of fielded capabilities and excessive use of scarce bandwidth.
Operation Joint Endeavor pushed an early fielding by the United States of some systems such as an upgraded ASAS and the use of theater discretionary funds to purchase others such as the Theater Rapid Response Intelligence Package (TRRIP). There were no programmed funds during the operation to keep these systems maintained, so USAREUR obtained help from the Department of the Army to sustain these fielded capabilities. The ASAS, a corps and division processor, was the heart of Task Force Eagle ACE operations. This asset had limited storage, retrieval, and information parsing functionality, and was not user-friendly. The division and brigade intelligence processor, the WARLORD (ASAS-W), was a better tool. The most effective processing system deployed was the TRRIP. Used by force protection teams, the ACE, and USAREUR Forward DISE, the TRRIP could transmit digital imagery, pull still images from videotape, scan and transmit documents, and create and transmit written reports. It linked to U.S. national databases, pushing and pulling intelligence.
To push all this information around required large communications pipes. Trojan Spirit II, an intelligence-only communications pipeline, provided the throughput for the intelligence system in Operation Joint Endeavor. Intelligence providers could deliver voluminous information to user processing systems. Trojan Spirit II deployed with all the forward intelligence elements and was key to the success of the operation. It provided 128kb/s pipes to the brigade level. A prototype Joint Broadcast System (JBS), deployed as part of the BC2A advanced technology implementation, was made available to intelligence users for UAV (Predator) transmissions and imagery dissemination. It provided plenty of bandwidth, but technical and experimental restrictions on its use required the dedicated communications switches of Trojan Spirit II to be relied on for operational purposes.
Managing all of the information available to the commander and his staff became a serious problem. Users did not have adequate tools to search for available information. Likewise, there were inadequate tools for managing information collection, storage, and distribution. This was particularly true in the area of coordinating, integrating, and fusing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and making this information available to the user in a timely fashion. In reality, the intelligence process was not as smooth a cycle as one might have expected. There were numerous stove-piped processes that provided information directly to the commander or his intelligence staff on the ground. In the end, it was up to the commander and his staff to sort things out. As a result, the process placed too much of a burden on the commanders with data overload and not enough on imparting knowledge to them and their staff. The bigger the pipes got, the worse the problem got. Imagery was a good example. There were hundreds of images in the database, but getting to them and finding the one you needed was a nightmare and therefore limited their use in affecting decision making.
In the final analysis, it was the willingness of the nations to collaborate (up to a point), to go the extra mile to exploit existing and field advanced capabilities, and to share information beyond expectations that was the key contributor to the success of the IFOR intelligence operation. It also took creative and innovative staff to develop the techniques and approaches for the IPB and intelligence analysis to make it really happen. It demanded greater intellectual and analytical flexibility as well to produce predictive templates and analysis. The experiences gained by IFOR and SFOR will certainly serve to shape NATO and the member nations' future intelligence doctrine and architecture for peace support operations.
Intelligence flowed neatly across channels, with U.S. support nearly transparent to NATO. The ARRC's use of NICs was actually its doctrine for the Cold War as well as what it did in Bosnia and therefore, it was able to make effective use of these capabilities. Figure 4-4 shows how requests for U.S.-provided information flowed. IFOR access to the JAC allowed the U.S. intelligence elements to provide selected technical information that otherwise was not readily available to NATO. Some of the allies employed their long-established HUMINT capabilities to great effect, the United Kingdom and France in particular. The United Kingdom had a great deal of background in these types of operations based on its experiences in northern Ireland and, was able to effectively apply this experience in Bosnia. For example, the ARRC (a UK-led operation) made very meaningful contributions to the IFOR CI/HUMINT activities.
Figure 4-4. Requests for Information Flow
One area that varied across the IFOR operation was information sharing. Theater plans did not elaborate releasability and sanitization procedures of sensitive national information. U.S. intelligence elements enacted U.S. national procedures and were able to successfully release classified information to the partner nations. It was sometimes a one-way street. NATO and many of the NATO nations had not yet made the change that the U.S. intelligence community had made in terms of more open sharing. There were basic disconnects in how the United States and others viewed information sharing with coalition partners in warfare and security operations and how intelligence supports decision making. As a result, these differing philosophies affected responsive intelligence analysis and dissemination by NATO elements, such as the ARRC, to U.S. commanders (i.e., from the U.S. commander's perspective). For example, the ARRC G2, a UK officer, released information strictly on a "need to know" basis. This conflicted with U.S. doctrine of shared situational awareness and broadcast intelligence. UK and French reporting flowed directly into the ARRC, with little getting into U.S. hands.17 As a result, the Commander MND(N) relied heavily on the U.S. intelligence structure that was more responsive to his needs and provided greater detail. This situation was symptomatic of U.S. commanders' frustrations with working in a coalition environment that controls the intelligence process.
USEUCOM created a parallel U.S. structure for managing collection requirements and requests for information to ensure that MND(N)-Task Force Eagle-benefited from U.S. ground-based to space-based intelligence systems. The U.S. intelligence structure ran from Task Force Eagle through USAREUR FWD to USAREUR Main to the EAC intelligence centers, the JAC, and UCIRF. Task Force Eagle nevertheless sent its requirements both to the ARRC as well as to USAREUR FWD (see Figure 4-4). Through its NIST, Task Force Eagle could also "backdoor" requirements to the national-level systems. USAREUR FWD supported Task Force Eagle with terrain and long-term analyses, and had the force protection lead. A USAREUR-FWD-led Force Protection Working Group directed the Operation Joint Endeavor force protection intelligence efforts. Despite the complexity and redundancy, the system seemed to work reasonably well.
Over time, some common principles guided and national actions facilitated improved intelligence sharing and dissemination for IFOR. There was a multi-layer information (intelligence) sharing structure established which consisted of national-only, NATO-releasable, and IFOR-releasable categories. IFOR-releasable was a new category established and approved by NATO for this operation. In order to facilitate the sharing process, NICs, coordination cells, and liaisons were established and used by the nations and IFOR. IFOR dissemination was enhanced through the deployment and use of the U.S. Linked Operations-Intelligence Centers Europe (LOCE) network. The CRONOS data network was used to distribute the CAOC-generated RAP to all IFOR C2 nodes as well as other IFOR-releasable information, an example of NATO and national sharing.
USAREUR EAC units provided direct support to NATO. USAREUR intelligence units assigned to Task Force Eagle deployed their combat electronic warfare intelligence (CEWI) assets to conduct the early warning mission of detecting FWF military activity. The intelligence concept had to adapt capabilities to accomplish the mission. CI/HUMINT was the intelligence discipline that most accurately targeted the intentions of belligerents, so a large and pervasive CI/HUMINT capability had to be put in place to ensure reliable and timely returns. CEWI equipment enhancements had to be defined and created to broaden environmental capabilities. Civil action emerged as a paramount intelligence consideration in Operation Joint Endeavor because of the unknown temperament of the population. NGOs, PVOs, and IOs took on increased importance and needed to be included in collection plans. IPB tools like event, situation, and decision support templates had to be used differently for Operation Joint Endeavor, because their war preparation techniques did not always apply. For example, IPB for a combat operation might have an enemy command and control center labeled as a named area of interest (NAI), but for a peace support operation like Operation Joint Endeavor, a NAI might be something more abstract like the frequent meetings of local faction leaders.
While focused on Operation Joint Endeavor, USAREUR intelligence still stayed current on developing world situations. For example, missions supported by the USAREUR Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (DCSINT) and the 66th MI Group during the same time frame as Operation Joint Endeavor included support to USASETAF operational deployments to the Great Lakes in Uganda and to Liberia, TF Able Sentry in Macedonia, the Khobar Towers bomb site in Saudi Arabia, and other worldwide indications and warning events.
In the end, the NATO-led IFOR shared intelligence to an unprecedented degree in order to accomplish its mission. Achieving a coalition-shared intelligence picture required a major shift in the intelligence-sharing paradigm for coalition operations. In previous coalitions, the U.S. national level provided intelligence support to the operations by sending primarily NOFORN products and reporting via U.S.-only intelligence channels. Since U.S. intelligence personnel in the theater often needed operational intelligence in a releasable format in order to conduct coalition operational planning and force protection, intelligence officers in theater continually had to contact the originating intelligence producers for permission to disclose or release intelligence to the coalition. As a result, in past operations U.S. intelligence sharing in theater would often be time-consuming and unresponsive. This changed for Operation Joint Endeavor.
There were a number of factors that contributed to the U.S. change. For example, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) commissioned a task force in early 1996 to examine the release and dissemination of U.S. intelligence in support of IFOR. Recommendations from this task force led to the enactment of a new DCI directive and concept of operation titled "Guidelines and CONOPS for U.S. Intelligence Sharing with IFOR." The intelligence dissemination principles in the 1996 revision of DCI Directive 1/7 placed greater U.S. emphasis on the direct dissemination of IFOR-releasable intelligence products and reporting from the U.S. national level. The intent of the directive was to ensure that the majority of U.S. theater-level operational and situational intelligence for force protection and threat warning was produced not only at the U.S. system high level but also at the REL NATO and REL IFOR level. Production at these levels would allow coalition-tailored products to be provided directly to the theater coalition command staffs at the ARRC and IFOR. Alternatively, products could be placed directly on the LOCE network or air-gapped to the Task Force Eagle IFOR independent LAN. As a result, the dissemination of releasable operational intelligence could be made directly to IFOR members without obtaining permission from Washington. Coalition intelligence support and threat warning could be near real-time, as the majority of initial sanitation and tailoring work was done at the U.S. national level prior to transmission.
Another influencing factor was the findings and actions taken on the recommendations of a U.S. Defense Science Board Bosnia Task Force. The task force visited the theater in 1995 and found numerous systemic barriers to achieving information dominance. Their recommendations focused on policy, organizational, equipment, and technology changes needed to make a dramatic improvement in force effectiveness and protection. Many of the recommendations were approved as part of an expedited implementation of the Bosnia Command and Control Augmentation (BC2A) initiative and the JBS. Less than a year later, the Task Force re-visited the theater, including visits to U.S. and IFOR command centers in Bosnia. The Task Force found impressive changes that dramatically improved force effectiveness and increased protection.
Although BC2A/JBS made a real contribution to improving the flow of information, more remained to be done to field high bandwidth connectivity to additional sites. Furthermore, improved information management tools and techniques were highlighted as being needed as well. Three broad tasks were cited for urgent consideration: (1) continue the process of getting information and tools down to the battalion level; (2) execute a paradigm shift where higher level intelligence centers become more proactive and push tailored products to lower level users via improved techniques for smart pull; and (3) organize collection management teams to integrate information from national, theater, and organic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and provide the warfighter with needed information. In the longer term, it was noted that information management deserved greater attention.
U.S. actions taken in response to these activities and other initiatives to improve intelligence sharing and dissemination had a significant impact on the coalition community. NATO, IFOR, and even U.S. units and officials in theater reported that they saw a fundamental shift at the U.S. national level to support intelligence sharing with IFOR and NATO. The United States was seen as disclosing unprecedented amounts of operational intelligence from the U.S. national to the theater level. U.S. and IFOR members noticed the change and were impressed not only by the revised U.S. intelligence disclosure policies regarding operational intelligence, but by the rapid implementation of these policies. In fact, U.S. intelligence sharing with IFOR was implemented on many levels. At the national level, sanitized tailored intelligence products and reporting were being placed on the EUCOM/NATO intelligence dissemination system, LOCE, directly from the National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the JAC, Molesworth, England. Tailored hard copy IFOR-releasable intelligence products were forwarded from the national intelligence producers and the JAC and were sent directly to EUCOM for further person-to-person dissemination as required.
The U.S. DCI CONOPS for IFOR was implemented across the theater. The U.S. "National Intelligence Pipe" was turned on at the IFOR-releasable level and produced a high volume of operational intelligence for the United States, NATO, and IFOR consumers. According to both IFOR operators and intelligence officers, the problem became one of not quantity or timely dissemination but finding the right intelligence in short order-an observation also made by the U.S. DSB Task Force. The U.S. intelligence community now needs to focus on filtering and fine tuning what U.S. intelligence is provided, in what format, and via what means.
Improved intelligence sharing and dissemination was one of the successes of Operation Joint Endeavor. The use of NICs was a major factor in achieving this success. At the ARRC in Ilidza, the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Greece, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden established national cells.
The United States was a major NIC contributor. The mission of the U.S. NIC at the ARRC was to provide U.S. theater and national intelligence to the ARRC commander and unique Intelligence support to U.S. senior leadership in Sarajevo. It also provided NATO I&W support, assisted the ARRC with collection management tasking of U.S. theater and national collection resources, and kept the U.S. theater and national intelligence agencies informed of the situation in Bosnia. In addition to the U.S. NIC at the ARRC, one also existed at the NATO CAOC in Vicenza, Italy. U.S. NIST were also deployed. These teams were composed of DIA, NSA, CIA, and other intelligence resources that were used to provide the supported commander's access to the entire DoD intelligence infrastructure. NISTs supported AFSOUTH (FWD) in Sarajevo, MND(N) headquarters in Tuzla, USAREUR (FWD) in Hungary, and the U.S. NICs at the ARRC and CAOC.
An IFOR Intelligence Coordination Cell (ICC) was established at the JAC and consisted of representatives from several NATO nations-participation was on a voluntary basis. The purpose of the ICC was to answer special theater requests for information (RFIs). If a command element down range could not find what they needed locally or on the LOCE network, they could send an RFI to the ICC for assistance via the LOCE network. Members of the ICC would then search for the required information using both NATO and there own national sources. ICC members were connected to their respective national intelligence organizations and could use this access to obtain additional IFOR-releasable information to answer an RFI. The national representatives were also used to clarify requests from members of their own armed forces down range (language differences). An intelligence product was developed in response to the RFIs and sent back to the requester via the LOCE network. The ICC was in a sense an "IFOR INTEL Help Desk." Other national IFOR-releasable products were also placed on the LOCE servers for broader IFOR-authorized user consumption.
Because the U.S. LOCE system was an accredited NATO system, there was means for disseminating, storing, and retrieving IFOR intelligence and information. The LOCE network was extended to IFOR, the ARRC, and the multinational division headquarters. A correlation center was established at RAF Molesworth where imagery, order of battle, and other intelligence information were placed on servers for access by and distribution to authorized users. The system also provided secure voice, e-mail, and bulletin board services. Multiple reporting of the same information was found on the LOCE system. This made it difficult at times to find and retrieve new, value-added intelligence products. National level, such as U.S. intelligence producers, needed to be made more aware of what was already available in theater before placing new products on LOCE. They were not always aware of whether information or reporting was being provided via other products, or if critical value added was being provided by the new products, or if time-critical information was being disseminated via LOCE e-mail.
On 15 December 1995, the COMIFOR gave collection management authority for aerial platforms to the CAOC. The CAOC was established during JTF Provide Promise as a NATO air space management and targeting center. It was under the NATO air component command (COMAIRSOUTH) for Operation Joint Endeavor and exercised tactical command (TACOM) over all Operation Joint Endeavor air space. As a result, air force personnel from various NATO nations were used to resource the CAOC. The CAOC used NATO collection management procedures outlined in the Collection Coordination Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM) system. By U.S. Army intelligence standards, CCIRM was predominantly an RFI management system rather than a collection management system. Within NATO, requests for information flowed through the chain of command to the CCIRM manager. CCIRM was designed as a reactive vice proactive system. Figure 4-5 shows how requests for information collection tasking flowed.
Figure 4-5. Requests for Information Collection Tasking Flow
The ARRC, a British-dominated headquarters, was multinational and deployed in Ilidza. Within the NATO structure, each MND transmitted requirements through the ARRC to the CCIRM manager at the CAOC. At the CAOC, the CCIRM manager determined the best platform to satisfy the requirement and either tasked a NATO TAC RECCE squadron or requested a national platform to satisfy the requirement. The CAOC controlled national TAC RECCE aircraft chopped to NATO. The CAOC also had TACON of the Predator and JSTARS (the United States actually controlled both of these platforms-the 16th Air Force Deputy Commander was dual hatted as CAOC director).
USEUCOM created the National Collection Management Cell (NCMC) to support the CAOC with collection management of U.S. aerial platforms. The NCMC was part of the U.S. NIC in Vicenza and acted as a forward element of USEUCOM J2's collection management division. However, the NCMC did not do collection management per se. Instead, it responded to requirements generated through the NATO structure or passed through U.S. channels via USEUCOM. When the CAOC determined that a requirement was best satisfied by a U.S. national platform, the CAOC requested that the NCMC task the appropriate organization. However, the NCMC had to clear all tasking with USEUCOM J3, Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC).
In an attempt to better manage the airborne RECCE platforms, NATO created within the CAOC an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Cell (ISARC) in January 1996. Initially, it was a single room in the CAOC where all sensor feeds available to do near real-time collection tasking were located. Later the ISARC terms of reference were expanded to include the CCIRM cell and process as well as the TAC RECCE platform managers. The NCMC was also made part of the ISARC. The NCMC members spent much of their time in the U.S. NIC coordinating U.S. theater RECCE platforms (U2, Rivet Joint, and P-3).
The CAOC had TACOM of airspace above 3,500 feet. All U.S. aerial reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence platforms (except the Pioneer and helicopters) flew above the 3,500-foot threshold. Therefore, flight tracks had to be coordinated with the CAOC. While the NCMC tasked an organization to perform the mission, air space management coordination with the CAOC was a unit responsibility. The establishment of recurring flight tracks took at least a week and sometimes as long as 3 weeks. Platforms could only fly in approved tracks and had to be in the Air Tasking Message (ATM). The ATM (sometimes referred to as the Air Tasking Order (ATO)) was the longstanding 48-hour planning and tasking vehicle to de-conflict air space. The ATM used in Bosnia differed from a standard U.S. ATO. It included in-theater friendly air movements (e.g., Red Cross and UN) but did not include army helicopter movement. Aerial platform organizations sent LNOs to the CAOC to assist in the education process and to enhance the air space management coordination process. The everyday interaction of the LNOs was crucial for developing an understanding between CCIRM, air space, and platform managers.
The ATM was formulated from a "target deck" developed by the CAOC based on requirements submitted by various organizations. There were some 1,500 targets in BiH that required periodic coverage (i.e., about every 3 days). In addition, there were approximately 200 one-time targets. The CAOC published a daily document that projected requirements out 7 days. This was the planning/forecasting mechanism used by the NATO reconnaissance squadrons and the NCMC. From this document, the collection managers built the 48-hour ATM.
Early in the deployment, an air defense threat threshold was established that impacted on the collection capabilities of some platforms, like the U.S. Air Reconnaissance Low (ARL)-a near real-time communications intelligence (COMINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) system-and UAVs. CAOC and NCMC representatives indicated that the threat established for the AOR by the JAC adversely affected the management of aerial platforms. The CAOC required ARL to fly above its optimal elevation specifications; thus, the product did not satisfy commander Task Force Eagle tactical needs. During the same time frame, NCMC and CAOC used Predator to look for threat air defense sites that were not Task Force Eagle or USAREUR (Forward) tactical requirements. The competition to have both theater and tactical requirements satisfied by scarce theater collection assets meant that the tactical commanders came to rely on those sources that responded to their needs.
Predator and other UAVs were surveillance platforms that could monitor a situation for a specified period of time. ARL was a reconnaissance platform that also flew surveillance missions and could downlink in real-time. Most real-time surveillance assets were downlinked to an operation and talked directly to an operator. UAVs were targeted against "spots on the ground." However, sensor packages on reconnaissance platforms, like the electro-optic U2, were on-line and accomplished some collection in route to or between the spots on the ground. Every Predator mission included a number of ad hoc tasking coordinated just prior to takeoff or while airborne that supplanted tasking in the ATM. The ability to do some dynamic re-tasking of these assets made them more flexible and responsive to the ground commander. The need to fly above 3,500 feet and incorporate tasking in the ATM limited the dynamic re-tasking options for the ground commander; it was not always clear 48 hours in advance where its use might be best applied.
The E-3A and to a lesser extent the E-2C were used continuously, both in prior operations such as Deny Flight and for Joint Endeavor. While the E-3 was primarily classified as a command and control platform, NATO used the E-3s employed in Bosnia as surveillance assets. No U.S. E-3s were employed in the Bosnia operation. Those used were supplied by NATO (the NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW)), the United Kingdom, and France. Two E-3 orbits were maintained. The aircraft were linked together and linked to the Airborne Command and Control (ABCCC) aircraft, the Navy fleet, a Control and Reporting Center (CRC) on the Italian coast, and the Italian (NATO) air defense radar. The CAOC was linked to this network through the CRC so that it had a continuous, real-time picture of all air activity over the Bosnia AOR.
While the geography (distances prevented direct UHF connectivity) and technical incompatibilities demanded some occasional ad hoc network architecture changes, the communications network (SATCOM, VHF/UHF, and HF radios; Tactical Data Links (TADIL-A and B), JTIDS, and LINK-1 data links) generally worked effectively. In addition, key U.S. intelligence platforms were directly linked into the tactical data links so that near real-time intelligence-derived tracks or track amplifications could be fed directly to the surveillance and C2 nodes. A less understood and usually ignored portion of the surveillance architecture was the simultaneous reporting by the intelligence platforms into the broadcast systems, i.e., Tactical Data Dissemination System (TDDS) and Tactical Information Broadcast System (TIBS). Both TDDS and TIBS were received in the CAOC and then fed into the RAP display that was maintained on a system called ADSI (Air Defense System Integrator). This caused some redundant reporting.
One interesting but somewhat frustrating aspect of the surveillance operation was the fact that the air situation picture or RAP was a NATO product coming primarily from NATO sensors (NAEW) and managed by the NATO CAOC. The NATO commanders consistently refused to provide the air picture to U.S. theater headquarters based on the logic that they would then have to provide it to all NATO capitals. This greatly frustrated some U.S. commanders and DISA engineers who wanted to implement a Common Operation Picture (COP) on the U.S. Global Command and Control System (GCCS) as part of the BC2A initiative.
U.S. EAC capabilities provided continuous coverage of Bosnia and Hungary throughout the deployment, sustainment, and redeployment phases of Operation Joint Endeavor as seen in Figure 4-6. A combination of air-breather platforms and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) at theater level provided coverage in support of COMIFOR, COMARRC, and Commander Task Force Eagle requirements. (As noted earlier, the Commander, Task Force Eagle essentially had access to every conceivable national, theater, and tactical asset the United States could bring to bear to support the operation.) Also available to COMEAGLE were two organic airborne collectors: the Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS) fixed-wing aircraft and the QUICKFIX helicopter. GRCS was modified for the environment and effectively collected in the Balkans.
JSTARS is not just an aircraft. It's really two systems: the Air Force E-8 aircraft and the Army ground-station modules. JSTARSs first deployed to support Operation Joint Endeavor from 14 December 1995 to 27 March 1996. A second deployment began on 1 November 1996 with end-of-mission scheduled for 31 December 1996. Hence, JSTARSs operated during the IFOR deployment and redeployment phases only. For both of the missions, the JSTARS E-8 aircraft operated from and was supported by crews at the Rhein-Main AB, Germany. USAREUR provided the administrative and logistical support to the two ground-station modules (GSM) at the Intermediate Staging Base and the four within Bosnia-Herzegovina. There were high expectations for its use in Bosnia but heavy terrain masking in mountainous Bosnia precluded optimal orbit tracks. Friendly forces were intertwined and intermingled among the FWF, and JSTARS could not distinguish friend from foe. JSTARS, designed to meet wartime requirements of detecting opposing force movements, was less useful in Operation Joint Endeavor. The JSTARS's SAR did identify some convoys and trench-lines but could not provide the necessary resolution for required recognition. It was best used to queue other assets such as HUMINT and ground reconnaissance. A ferry site along the Sava River that was being used for moving military equipment in and out of Bosnia was identified as well as a railhead where armored vehicles were being loaded. Both of these success stories still required ground confirmation. Ironically, as IFOR's mission became more successful, the movement of civilian populations increased, and although this made JSTARS's task of tracking the military vehicles harder, it excelled at measuring this increased freedom of movement both quantitatively and geographically.
Figure 4-6. Theater Intelligence System
UAVs proved their value too because they were flexible, accurate, and available. There were two theater-level UAVs-Lofty View, a short-range asset that supported ARRC requirements, and the Predator which provided the long-range and long duration capability. Developed in the last 2 years, the Predator was first used in Bosnia for JTF Provide Promise. The Predator operated out of Tazsar, and provided support throughout Operation Joint Endeavor. It was a theater (not tactical) platform controlled by the ARRC and flown by the CAOC. There were a few cases where control was delegated to the division level for a period of time. The system was often used against point targets as a "mini-U2," even though it was best designed for active surveillance.
The Predator video was disseminated to all Bosnia C2 nodes over JBS once it became operational in May/June 1996. The Predator had both a line of site (LOS) and a SATCOM link back to its home base at Taszar, Hungary. From there it was forwarded to the JAC via a VSAT connection. The JAC sent it back to the JBS injection point in the United States over the DISN Leading Edge Service T-3 extension to CONUS. The CAOC then used the video display provided via JBS to direct the Predator operators to affect real-time tasking changes. JBS could not be used to disseminate P-3, ARL, or Lofty View video because these three platforms only had LOS downlinks. Furthermore, supporting multiple VSAT connections back to the JAC was prohibitively expensive, and a means to automatically hand off the data feed and route it to JBS as the platform moved in/out of view of the various downlink points was not available.
The Predator field experience of MND(N) suggested that the 10 hours "eyes on" for any given mission versus an advertised 16 to 20 hours did not meet the "sold as" expectations at the tactical level. The lack of pilots also limited its surge capability. In spite of this, the system was viewed as one of the most successful capabilities supporting intelligence efforts in MND(N). They used it successfully to provide coverage of lines of communications, rallies, demonstrations, and live operations in the Hans Pijesak area. For example, the Predator played a significant role in the Han Pijesak incident when an angry crowd of Bosnia Serbs confronted COL John R. S. Batiste, Commander of 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), and some of his soldiers. The Serbs thought the United States was going to arrest General Ratko Mladic. Predator monitored the situation and its high-resolution video camera exposed events as they were happening, downlinking images immediately, revealing the faces and numbers of those opposing U.S. entry to the town. COMARRC later tasked Predator against Han Pijesak for 30 consecutive days. This was viewed by some as an inappropriate use of the capability given that other platforms were better suited for point targets of this nature. Predator maintenance was scheduled in conjunction with poor weather forecasts so little to no noticeable operational time was lost due to maintenance.
Task Force Eagle received UAVs in direct support when U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) VMU-1 was attached to the 165th MI Battalion in June 1996. The deployment of the Pioneer UAV IMINT platform provided operational data on Army use of a tactical UAV at division- and brigade-task force levels during peacekeeping operations. The ability to quickly satisfy information requirements and dynamically re-task at the tactical level was demonstrated. Nevertheless, Pioneer's performance was often disastrous-five crashes were caused by engine, generator, rocket-assisted launcher, or on-board computer failures. Precipitation or clouds, line-of-sight problems, and an outmoded imagery dissemination system also imposed constraints. The line-of-sight radius for the video downlink was 30 miles, and even less in the mountainous Bosnia terrain. Maintenance was also a problem with a field-level perception that it was down more than it was up. Of the seven birds deployed, six were operational and the remaining one was used for spare parts.
U.S. national and theater special intelligence collectors flying in support of NATO and U.S. requirements reported directly to Task Force Eagle ACE and other intelligence centers. Tactical IEW systems were adapted to collect in the primitive environment in BiH.
Eagle Focus was the name of a collection and reporting effort conducted from sanctuary that was created to directly support Task Force Eagle. Eagle Focus combined U.S. national, theater, and remotely fielded collection operations in order to streamline and focus the intelligence efforts on Task Force Eagle requirements. Its successes provided valuable intelligence to the field commanders and demonstrated the simultaneous and synergistic possibilities of certain multiechelon intelligence operations.
ELINT and SIGINT were supplied by USAF RC-135s, the RAF Nimrod R2s, French C-160s, German Atlantiques, and U.S. RC-12 Guardrails based in Hungary. ELINT and SIGINT data were placed on the LOCE server for distribution to authorized IFOR consumers.
Task Force Eagle organic IEW assets were unable to fully exploit the environment. Part of the reason was that the go-to-war design of tactical intelligence units and capabilities were not tuned to the commercially oriented capabilities of the belligerents and other entities. The infusion of low-cost, state-of-the-art communications systems made predicting the threat very difficult. Guardrail could and did collect on the targets called for in the operation and was also a key source for direction finding. Ground-based assets were used to tip Guardrail and this worked very well. Since the ARRC only provided MND(N) limited visibility on NATO counterparts, Guardrail allowed some visibility on adjacent sectors.
QUICKFIX, used to locate and collect on tactical VHF communications, was of little value in the Bosnia environment since most of the critical targets were not in the VHF range. Some useful intercepts were produced but commercial radios placed on EH-60s would have provided a better capability. An AR8000 was placed in the QUICKFIX and this resulted in an immediate increase in performance. There were other possible contributing factors to the poor performance of QUICKFIX. It had no communications with a ground station and it was not well supported in country.
The AR8000, basically a fancy bearcat scanner, provided increased frequency spectrum over the MND(N) organic capabilities. Its portability allowed it to be used by convoys, inspection teams, force protection teams, and security patrols. In order to accommodate reporting requirements, there needed to be an accompanying secure radio to allow its use by convoys and force protection teams.
The Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal (MITT) was a very good processor for ELINT data and had the FWF not complied with the requirement to shut down their radar, this would have been a critical division asset. Its "frame-grabber" capability provided an unanticipated, but essential, capability to exploit AH-64 gun camera, Combat Camera footage, and amateur video. Unclassified, annotated, exploited images could be produced within 12 hours and provided to allies or the FWF without the hassle of requesting a classification downgrade. The lesson from MND(N) was that divisions need an organic imagery exploitation and production capability.
NSA constructed systems and components tailored to the specific requirements of the environment. The systems were called "purpose-built" systems. With these new capabilities, Task Force Eagle performed ground-based and airborne collection more effectively. In this way, national intelligence systems enhanced and directly supported the operational commander. Technical reporting-exploiting and deriving elements of collected information to reconstruct the target structure-was not accomplished well; consequently, long-term analysis suffered. Task Force Eagle was not doctrinally prepared or resourced to do this. They did, however, reorganize their ACE to include a SIGINT analytic cell. Strategic and theater (operational) capabilities provided solutions that significantly improved the ability to effectively inform the commander.
U-2R aircraft flying from Istres, France, provided imagery in support of IFOR. The U.S. Navy P-3C Orions based at Sigonella, Italy, with their Cast Glance/Cluster Ranger video-datalink systems monitored incidents in the Bosnia area.
Air Reconnaissance Low's (ARL) main operating base was Budapest, Hungary, for the first deployment and Taszar, Hungary, for the second. The ARL system consisted of one aircraft and 69 personnel. The ARL was a workhorse for Task Force Eagle, but it did manifest areas for improvement. The ARL downlink, called a remote vehicle terminal (RVT), did not always receive the video or selected images on the same day of the mission. Terrain masking limited the line-of-sight connection. It took two to three days to get the complete ARL video mailed or couriered to the Task Force Eagle ACE. COMEAGLE retained tasking authority over the IMINT assets assigned to Task Force Eagle. He directly controlled their use and their collection focus. These were the assets that provided the best IMINT returns to the commander. One of its successful uses occurred during the time frame that IFOR was trying to encourage the FWF to move into their barracks and cantonment areas before the D+120 deadline. In order to build confidence that all sides were complying, and to convince the FWF that IFOR was omnipotent, the ARL was flown during a Joint Military Commission meeting with all of the FWF in attendance and live video was downlinked to the site for viewing by them.
The USAF Eagle Vision system operating at Ramstein AB, Germany, provided access to a direct downlink from the French commercial satellite imagery system, SPOT. The SPOT provided lower resolution broad area coverage.
New sources of imagery appropriate for ground commanders emerged from Operation Joint Endeavor. Specifically, Combat Camera products, gun cameras, UAV video, hand-held digital cameras, and video cameras were highly productive. However, effective methods to exploit, catalogue, archive, and maintain registries of such images did not exist. An exploitation cell was deployed to Taszar, but they were not tasked to do these functions. Meanwhile, the JBS sites recorded Predator video on VHS tapes. Doctrine and CONOPS to guide and assign of responsibility for overall video collection management, archiving, and dissemination was lacking.
Some images found their way to the imagery servers at the JAC, but much of the imagery from TRRIP never found its way to a theater-level server. The Predator ground-station module did a good job of capturing still images from the motion sequences and images were loaded on the LOCE imagery server at the JAC. One problem associated with this was that imagery from the Predator had to be manually manipulated to move the image to the appropriate collateral server at the JAC. Automated capabilities were not networked. Improvements were underway to provide secure guard gateways at the JAC so that imagery could be moved between servers at all classification levels (SCI, U.S. Secret, and NATO Secret). Elements using and developing low-level imagery such as TRRIP and other hand-held sources did not establish adequate techniques and procedures for use, integration, and distribution of their products. Hence, it is understandable that collection management of video platforms was difficult.
An unintended consequence of exploiting visual sources such as gun camera video in the benign environment of the Bosnia peacekeeping operation was that fighter pilots could obtain video on all of their potential targets. These videos were put together into target folders that allowed the pilots to do target studies and see exactly how the target would appear on their cockpit display.
Finally, the U.S. IMINT tasking and processing cycle was a problem. A process developed to support maneuver warfare was not responsive enough to meet COMIFOR demands for the peace operation. Work-arounds were required to meet the response time expectations of COMIFOR requests. The adverse weather conditions in Bosnia also affected national-level IMINT operations. UAVs were somewhat helpful in filling the gap but they too had their limitation since they were designed for shoot-look-shoot not look-look-look.
The G2X was established at the Task Force Eagle to give the commander priority emphasis on his requirements. The G2X provided mission management and coordinated the CI and HUMINT effort within the Task Force Eagle area of operation. The Allied Counter Intelligence Unit and the Joint Forces Intelligence Teams were combined organizations assigned to the ARRC. The allied teams that operated in the Task Force Eagle area coordinated their missions with the G2X. The DHS (Defense HUMINT Service) and the CIA representatives on the G2X accepted HUMINT tasking directly. The NIST handled straight RFIs. When an operation in the Task Force Eagle area was required, it was first de-conflicted at the G2X. The USAF Office of Special Investigations also had teams in the area that coordinated with the G2X. Three or four-person operational control elements were formed at each brigade, plus one at Task Force Eagle headquarters to manage CI and HUMINT tasking, control the teams, and maintain quality control of the product. Quality control of the product was an area that needed improvement as tactics, techniques, and procedures, and feedback to the collectors were handled by teams in a decentralized manner. As with other intelligence operations, the JDISS was the EAC system that connected Task Force Eagle with DHS. Important imagery was sent to DHS and put on the DHS HUMINT imagery server with an IIR.
A significant number of intelligence capabilities were applied to force protection. Force protection teams were formed and displaced throughout the area of operation. These teams consisted of two counterintelligence agents, an interrogator, and a driver. They were required to operate in uniform and in four-vehicle convoys. In April 1996, COMEAGLE relaxed the convoy requirement to two vehicles for the force protection teams. A force protection information report (FPIR) was written at the team level and transmitted via TRRIP to the brigade operational control element. Because of its digital camera capability, the TRRIP allowed FPIRs to include still images of the people they were interviewing. The FPIR also fed the UCIRF's force protection database BLACKBIRD. The BLACKBIRD database was eventually modified to archive hand-held produced imagery. The allied partners at first did not trust the omnipresent force protection teams assigned to them. Later in the operation, they praised their value. The technology and the quality of the soldiers impressed them. The Army and USAREUR benefited greatly from the perceived goodwill and information sharing that was realized from the force protection team activities. The information these teams provided became the cornerstone for determining and recommending force protection actions.
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) was not widely practiced in intelligence circles prior to Operation Joint Endeavor. The 165th MI Battalion's document exploitation team at Camp Lukavac provided this unique service by producing a daily newsletter called the Night Owl. A U.S. military editor with eight contract linguists staffed the Night Owl and exploited and translated Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian television, radio, and newspaper reports of events in the area of operation. The newsletter was available on the Internet and hundreds of its articles were included in the Task Force Eagle databases. Of noteworthy mention were its incisive accounts of public reaction to IFOR's presence. Avid supporters and users of the newsletter included the U.S. embassy and the IFOR Information Campaign staff at IFOR headquarters in Sarajevo. An important and new contribution to the intelligence effort, the Lukavac team paved the way for future OSINT operations.
Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor Systems (REMBASSs) provided a valuable collection asset for Task Force Eagle. The REMBASS provided early warning and treaty compliance data throughout Operation Joint Endeavor. The initial emplacement of these systems monitored the withdrawal of the FWF from the ZOS and confirmed FWF reports of departure. As the factions withdrew, the systems were moved to monitor critical areas of concentration of FWF equipment, suspected areas of treaty violations, and force protection around base camps. REMBASSs provided wide area coverage without the need to physically man a given area, had a 15 kilometer range, and were used for perimeter security.
However, some problems were encountered in logistics maintenance, minefields, and training areas that limited their potential use. Logistics shortfalls stemmed from the fact that REMBASS and I-REMBASS (Improved-REMBASS) were not organic to the 1st Armored Division, but were obtained on loan. Loan agreements did not include maintenance support, so resupply had to come from depot maintenance in the United States.
Because REMBASS was not organic, Task Force Eagle staffs initially were unaware of its capabilities, employment techniques, and requirements for a comprehensive reconnaissance and surveillance plan. Furthermore, emplacing REMBASS in a mine environment is not taught at the intelligence school nor is it included in REMBASS doctrine found in FM 34-10-1. All these factors combined to limit the potential use of REMBASS.
Ground surveillance radars (GSRs) were useful as surveillance devices in Operation Joint Endeavor, but their full utility was hampered by a poor logistical repair system and the age of equipment and technology. Ranging to 10 kilometers for people and 15 kilometers for vehicles, these radars detected day and night movement. Throughout the Task Force Eagle sector, the AN/PPS-5C GSRs were used to monitor named areas of interest, cantonment areas, and intersections, and to provide force protection to base camps. In some cases, radar teams positioned on top of high areas had excellent line of sight and early warning. However, terrain masking was a great limitation in Bosnia. In addition, radars broke down after extended use. The lack of timely transportation to evacuate and return the GSRs from Germany severely hampered their potential use at Task Force Eagle. More observation posts were required to monitor the same number of named areas of interest as these assets decreased.
Historically, weather has had a significant impact on military operations; Operation Joint Endeavor was no exception. The mission of the USAF 7th Weather Squadron (WS) and USAREUR weather office was to provide accurate, timely, and relevant weather intelligence. Headquarters, 7th WS, began supporting Operation Joint Endeavor in April 1995 by gathering climatological data for the IPB and by conducting briefings on weather in the anticipated AOR. On 10 December 1995, 7th WS commenced daily briefings to both the USAREUR CAT and the DCSINT. Briefings included satellite weather imagery of the Central Region and the AOR, 24- and 48-hour forecasts, and potential weather impacts on operations. Also in December 1995, 7th WS deployed personnel to Taszar, Hungary, to provide staff support to USAREUR (Forward), the NSE, and the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB). Weather operations included integrating weather intelligence into the planning process, establishing and refining procedures for the dissemination of weather warnings and weather advisories, and overseeing USAF weather assets in Hungary. As part of the ARRC, a 7th WS officer deployed 20 January 1996 to Sarajevo to provide staff weather support. The Unified Weather Forecast (UWF), the official Operation Joint Endeavor forecast from which all other Operation Joint Endeavor weather products were based, was issued twice a day by the AFSOUTH SWO.
When Task Force Eagle deployed to Tuzla, an 11-person weather team from Detachment 2, 7th WS, deployed with the unit and established Task Force Eagle weather operations at Tuzla Main. The detachment provided staff weather support to the Task Force Eagle commander as well as weather support (flight weather briefings, warnings and advisories, observations, upper air soundings, etc.) to units in the MND(N). In order to increase weather coverage at areas near chokepoints, COMEAGLE tasked 7th WS to provide weather forecasters and observers at several base camps. The 7th WS weather personnel deployed forward and established mobile weather operations at camps such as Doboj, Zenica, Uglivek, and others, depending upon seasonal and mission requirements.
Operation Joint Endeavor did not provide a rationale for ignoring the conventional combat and major theater of war role of the ground force component. It did reveal, however, some experiences that have intelligence operations implications. NATO and the nations need to consider these implications as they prepare for the future. Some general observations that may become lessons learned follow:
ú Commanders need to gain a more complete understanding of the integrated operations/intelligence process and how to leverage intelligence in support of peace operations-the Information Age is forcing a paradigm shift.
ú IFOR intelligence operation clearly demonstrated the ability and will of member NATO nations to cooperate and leverage their resources in support of a common NATO mission.
ú Doctrine, CONOPS, TTP, and IPB need to be adjusted to accommodate peace operation requirements.
ú Tactical intelligence capabilities designed to fight battles need to be adjusted to accommodate peace operation requirements.
ú For peace operations, tasks need to be defined with a clear end-state for meaningful IPB to occur.
ú Strategic to theater to tactical intelligence systems interoperability continues to be a problem as well as coalition interoperability. The proliferation of intelligence systems at all levels is also an issue. Multilevel security is a means to an end in solving many of the related issues.
ú IFOR to a large extent and the United States in particular achieved information dominance.
ú The IFOR Information Campaign had spotty success in adapting to the Bosnia consumer environment and countering the established Serb information campaign targeted against IFOR.
ú PSYOP and the information campaign need to make adjustments to more effectively accommodate the capabilities offered by global television and the Internet.
ú Military interaction with civil organizations (i.e., NGOs, PVOs, and IOs) was more than civil-military cooperation. These organizations were both providers and consumers of intelligence and needed to be incorporated into the intelligence planning.
ú NATO and national intelligence architectures need to be adjusted to meet the peace operations requirements.
ú Training continues to be an issue, especially as regards information systems operation and maintenance and intelligence analysis capabilities. Some functions-like collection management for peace operations in a coalition environment-required specialized knowledge and skills that were not adequately addressed in formal military training programs. The formal training system must re-emphasize basic intelligence skills while finding a methodology for dealing with an accelerating technology base and widely divergent areas of operations.
ú IFOR experienced more open sharing of information in spite of differing national polices on release and dissemination of intelligence. The United States had a more open policy on sharing.
ú There were too few military linguists to support the operation. It was necessary to use contracted linguist support.
ú Low-tech as well as high-tech solutions had high payoff at the theater and tactical levels.
ú Not all coalition partners use or can afford U.S. technology. The United States will not want to share all of its advanced technology with all elements of a coalition of the willing. This has interoperability, sharing, and operational effectiveness aspects that need to be dealt with.
ú CAOC had 3 years of experience with theater platforms and was operational at the outset of Operation Joint Endeavor. Developing collection management approaches to exploit the video systems of the UAV and ARL was difficult. The CAOC could manage the RECCE platforms but had little experience with managing the video sensors. The CAOC control of the theater platforms frustrated the tactical commanders and in their view, limited their tactical flexibility.
ú Doctrine and CONOPS to guide and assign responsibility for overall video collection management, archiving, and dissemination were lacking. There is a future use aspect that needs to be addressed as well.
ú U.S. systems such as Trojan Spirit, JWICS, UAVs, DISE, ASAS WARLORD, TRRIP, and others (including the innovative exploitation of Apache Gun Camera video, Combat Camera video, and hand-held video cameras using the freeze frame capabilities of MITT and commercial devices such as the SNAPPY) were key to enhancing the effectiveness of the intelligence operation. The efforts of the JAC (including its ICC), Task Force Eagle ACE, NICs, and NISTs were valued contributors as well.
ú Peace operation databases need to be more flexible than those used for conventional operations. Databases such as those for the U.S. ASAS need to be developed prior to deployment.
ú CI/HUMINT became the source of choice for the tactical commanders.
ú Extension of broadband communications pipes to lower echelons is still not adequate to meet tactical intelligence dissemination needs. Extension of Trojan Spirit II to the brigade level was a major step in the right direction.
ú For the United States it was necessary to rely on national-level agencies to provide technology and systems to respond to the Operation Joint Endeavor peace operations aspects of the environment. National agencies were able to design, procure, and field systems that dealt with environment-specific shortfalls more rapidly than they could have been acquired and deployed by the military. USAREUR, as a deploying force, recognized that it must maintain dialogue with U.S. national intelligence agencies to identify systems for environment-specific problems for collection, exploitation, and dissemination.
ú Sensor-to-shooter intelligence and maneuver warfare-oriented intelligence did not provide a foundation for long-range analysis and did not accurately target the intentions of low-tech belligerents.
ú The proliferation of new and prototype advanced technology systems at the analytic nodes, without additional manning, sometimes detracted from mission accomplishment and often increased the load on available resources.
ú The U.S. split-base support concept was not fully trusted at the tactical level, but trust is something that is earned over time. Brigades tended not to trust anything they did not produce themselves and there was a feeling that higher echelons did not understand how to package products for lower level use. Not as surprising was the fact that the coalition intelligence environment caused problems for U.S. forces when the United States was not in charge.
ú The U.S. Army concluded that it needed to review doctrine in light of coalition control of the intelligence process in a non-U.S. pure environment.
ú The division of tactical, theater (operational), and strategic has become less distinct and planning staffs and commanders at all levels will have to learn how to deal with this new environment.
ú Tailored response packages may eventually demand that only the essential capabilities be deployed forward with a correspondingly higher reliance on split-based support from a sanctuary.
ú The future operations and intelligence community will require leadership that is technology smart and flexible.
ú Innovation and intellectual creativity were keys to success.
The majority of intelligence that the United States produced was tailored, timely, and releasable to IFOR. The U.S. intelligence community consistently disseminated actionable intelligence without divulging sensitive sources and methods. The challenge for the future is to continue community advances in this expanding arena of intelligence support to coalition operations, by continuing to fine-tune the process, procedures, and capabilities. When U.S. and NATO consumers can find and retrieve the operational and tactical intelligence they need when they need it, the policy advances made to date will be further advanced. Refining the NATO and national, and the U.S. in particular, approaches with coalition partners will ensure that U.S. and NATO-led coalitions in the future will have a near real-time, easily accessible, common picture of the battlefield for all coalition partners.