361. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin)
Washington, July 26, 1962.
//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Operation Mongoose--Phase I. Top Secret.
Mr. Martin: Attached is the combined report on Phase I./1/ Mr. Johnson has a copy.
/1/See Document 360.
I do not find Lansdale's covering memo particularly enlightening. The comments of DOD and the other agencies on the "four courses of action" are worth noting. You will be interested to read that DOD would like to see the Monroe Doctrine re-affirmed.
I think the essence of the positions lies in the following:
1. CIA believes that if assurances were given of US intervention, a revolt could be mounted by late 1963, but would be destroyed at best within a matter of a few days if it is not supported by substantial military force. No mention is made of the nature or magnitude of the revolt.
2. Defense states it needs eighteen (or perhaps twelve) days of preparation, although some units might be available in as soon as five days.
3. State believes it needs a virtual civil war situation in Cuba before intervention in Cuba with US military force might be considered politically feasible.
These three conditions do not appear to be easily reconciled.
362. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)
Washington, July 31, 1962.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7-3162. Top Secret; Noforn; Special Handling. An attached distribution list indicates that 11 copies of the memorandum were prepared and copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris, and Murrow/Wilson. One copy was kept by Lansdale.
Transmitted herewith is a copy of "United States Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)," which is submitted for your consideration. The plan has been approved by the Secretary of Defense and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This plan was developed as a result of reports in mid-June 1962 that the Cuban people were about to revolt against the Castro-Communist regime, without U.S. sponsorship, and the desire expressed by the Special Group that the U.S. be ready for such a contingency. The DOD/JCS representative was tasked by me to develop a plan with the assistance of Operation Mongoose representatives from participating departments and agencies. The DOD/JCS representative did so, and the attached plan is the result.
Memorandum for Representatives of State, Defense, CIA and USIA, from Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, subject: "Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning", dated 14 June 1962/1/
Department of State
Department of Defense
Central Intelligence Agency
US Information Agency
a. The purpose of this plan is to define the courses of action to be pursued by affected agencies of the US Government in the event that a decision is made that the United States undertake military intervention in Cuba.
b. The assumed situation in Cuba is open, wide-spread revolt. This contingency may be a non-US initiated situation, similar to that rumored as being activated for mid-June 1962. US actions to exploit the situation include the use of US military force.
c. It is assumed that this plan would be implemented under the following conditions, and would be considered for implementation under situations less severe. An internal revolt has created a chaotic situation in Cuba where:
(1) The revolution is open and threatens the Communist regime;
(2) Areas are taken and held by the revolutionaries, and;
(3) Leadership of the revolt, unable to overthrow the government or sustain the revolution indefinitely requests assistance from the United States and/or the Organization of American States (OAS).
d. The United States may, or may not, be able to determine that a rebellion is imminent before actual outbreak. However, it is unlikely that the assumed situation will occur all at once and without notice. More probably it will evolve from a localized revolt which will provide some advance notice and the opportunity to initiate necessary diplomatic, propaganda, covert and military preparations.
e. The strength, morale, disposition and equipage of unfriendly forces will be assumed to be as described in current estimates of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).
The United States will support and sustain the rebellion in Cuba through all its resources including the use of US military force to assure replacement of the Communist regime with a new Cuban government acceptable to the United States.
a. Concept of Operations.
(1) When the likelihood or emergence of a Cuban revolt becomes apparent to the US intelligence community it will be immediately brought to the attention of the 5412 Special Group (Augmented) through the Officer of the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose. Evaluation of the situation by the Special Group will determine whether or not the President's decision should be sought to implement this plan.
(2) The initial stages of a spontaneous revolt will be supported by the United States through propaganda, covert operations and other actions as necessary, but maintaining the appearance of non-US involvement should the revolt fail. In the event that the revolt spreads as a popular movement against the Communist regime, the United States should be capable of rapid military action to forestall a concerted and drastic reprisal program in the interest of humanity and the mission of this plan.
(3) US Military Reaction.
(a) With no prior warning and with eighteen (18) days of preparation a coordinated airborne-amphibious assault could be executed which, it is anticipated, would gain control of key military installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba within ten (10) days and result in minimum US and Cuban casualties.
(b) A requirement to reduce significantly the pre-assault period would necessitate incremental commitment of US forces as they could be assembled and employed. Under this circumstance the time required to gain essential US military control of Cuba could be appreciably extended. However, reduction of US military reaction time may be of overriding importance. [8 lines of source text not declassified]
(4) Execution of this plan will be in two (2) phases:
(a) Phase I. After Presidential decision, this phase will be undertaken by the Department of Defense supported by other agencies of the government. It will be initiated by overt US military assault on Cuba under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will be terminated at such time as essential military control is gained over the island. The operation is to be conducted as rapidly as possible, quickly to confront Cuban forces with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond enemy capability to resist and to reduce risk to US units initially deployed, with a view toward early capitulation of Cuban military units and avoidance of needless loss of life.
(b) Phase II. Following the establishment of essential US military control of the island, this phase will be primarily concerned with the restoration of law and order and the establishment of a new Cuban government friendly to the US. US military efforts will be directed primarily to matters of civil affairs and military government in accordance with policy established by the Department of State. Military operations essential for the elimination of small pockets of resistance and restoration of law and order throughout the island will continue. Major US combat forces will be withdrawn as early as security may permit. Operational responsibility of the Department of Defense will cease at the time the Department of State assumes responsibility for civil administration of Cuba.
b. Department of Defense Operations.
(1) When directed by higher authority, or as the situation demands, the Department of Defense will initiate preparatory actions for US military intervention in Cuba. These actions may include pre-positioning forces and equipment by execution of current cover and deception plans.
(2) Upon final decision of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will direct execution of military intervention plans for Cuba.
(3) In concept, initial military operations commence with a blockade, concentrated air strikes and coordinated Naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy air power and to neutralize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy tank, armor, artillery, and anti-air capability.
(a) [12-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
(b) [6 lines of source text not declassified]
[1 paragraph (7-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
(5) At such time as essential US military control is gained in Cuba, matters of civil affairs and military government will be given priority and undertaken in accordance with policy established by the Department of State. This includes provision for a provisional military government prepared to assume full legislative, executive, and judicial control until such functions can be turned over to other authority on direction in an expeditious and orderly manner. Remaining resistance elements of the Communist Cuban government, armed forces or other groups will be isolated, contained and destroyed or captured as rapidly as possible. US military combat units will be scheduled for early return to the United States consistent with security considerations.
c. Department of State Operations.
(1) Phase I. The Department of State will seek to place the United States action in as broad a multilateral context as possible.
(a) Immediately sound out Latin American Governments to determine whether the United States can count upon a 2/3 majority decision authorizing the use of military forces under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty.
(b) If 2/3 majority is available, request the Council of the Organization of American States to convoke immediately a meeting of foreign ministers under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and obtain Organization of American States (OAS) decision authorizing use of force.
(c) Seek agreement from at least two Latin American nations (preferably not Nicaragua or Guatemala) to provide token forces to join United States forces.
(d) If 2/3 majority cannot be mustered, recognize the anti-Castro forces as the Government of Cuba and, in response to its appeal for help, come to its assistance with United States military forces and whatever foreign token forces have been made available.
(e) Keep key members of Congress informed of significant developments.
(f) Inform all friendly governments of our actions and the reasons therefor; obtain public expressions of their support and of their sympathy for the anti-Castro forces. Warn them to expect communist directed violence and offer them assistance.
(g) Notify the OAS and the United Nations (as appropriate) of our actions and be prepared to defend them in these international bodies.
(h) Engage in all-out psychological warfare and propaganda stress-ing the morality of United States action designed to assist the Cuban people throw off the bonds of communist enslavement.
(2) Phase II--(Post Invasion)
(a) Provide immediate emergency economic and other assistance to the civil populace.
(b) Turn over as rapidly as possible to the Cuban Government for administration the territory taken by United States troops and assist that government to the extent feasible as it requests.
(c) Make preparations to provide the Cuban Government with long range economic assistance.
(d) Take measures to assist the Cuban Government to control entry into and exit from Cuba.
(e) Re-establish the United States country team in Havana.
d. Central Intelligence Agency Operations.
(1) CIA operations against Cuba are controlled by a component of CIA Headquarters, Washington. Operational elements are located in the vicinity of Miami, Florida, with sub elements at other Florida locations.
(2) In the event of localized revolt, CIA will give covert support to the revolt through introduction of communications, arms, equipment and trained personnel as appropriate and feasible.
(3) When US Military intervention is directed and contingency plans are implemented, CIA will fully support the military actions in accordance with the JCS/CIA Command Relationship Agreement,/2/ whether it is implemented or not.
(4) Liaison and communications will be established prior to implementation of CINCLANT and subordinate plans.
(5) CIA will support military operations by clandestine intelligence, counter intelligence, propaganda, political and paramilitary operations.
(6) After the initial assault and during the subsequent consolidation and occupation phase, CIA will designate selected personnel from CIA Headquarters and/or CIA operations base, Florida, to proceed to Cuba and conduct clandestine operations in support of US forces and objectives. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
e. United States Information Agency Operations.
(1) The Agency will provide complete, but strictly factual and impartial informational coverage to a spontaneous revolt in its initial phase. The purpose of such coverage will be to keep the people of Cuba, and of the hemisphere, fully informed of developments, and to set the stage for possible subsequent courses of action. Extreme caution will be taken to avoid the appearance of US involvement during this phase so as to nullify possible later charges of US intervention (by Cuba or other Latin American governments) should the revolt fail. In this context, the Agency during this phase must carefully refrain from a type or tone of coverage that might be construed as incitement to riot.
(2) In the event of direct US involvement, the Agency will:
(a) Assign informational specialists to work with Defense Psywar units during combat operations.
(b) Staff up a regular USIS unit to move into Havana with the Department of State contingent at the time and place to be decided on by the Department.
(c) Prepare for immediate shipment all physical equipment and resources necessary to support a USIS operation in Cuba.
(3) Basic considerations in Agency informational support of direct US military action:
(a) Medium wave radio should receive priority attention for any overt combat operation in Cuba. Immediately upon securing any beachhead or other enclave on the island, and perhaps immediately prior to or concurrent with such action, massive medium wave broadcasting should begin. A beefed-up Guantanamo transmitter, leased U.S. Florida facilities, floating transmitters and, as soon as possible, captured Cuban station(s) should be assigned to this task. Short wave facilities will also be increased to provide necessary backup.
(b) The messages of this initial phase should be simple and direct, reassuring the people of their personal safety and the protection of their individual rights, instructions on the maintenance of public order, the distribution of food and medical attention, all done hopefully in a Cuban context and with only the minimum of reference to US military forces and power necessary to maintain order and to assure credibility of the inevitability of Castro's rapid and complete defeat.
(c) Care must be exercised, particularly with the anti-Castro Cubans, to avoid alienating possible support by immediate talk of vengeance, or of indications of possible loss of any gains (housing, land, social benefits) which might have accrued to the peasant and worker groups during the Castro regime.
(d) Given the relatively high rate of literacy in Cuba, wall posters and leaflets reiterating the themes of the broadcasts should also be available and utilized as soon as practical, the leaflets by air drop ahead of military action where deemed advisable.
(e) Any provisional military government must also have a news bulletin for factual news summaries and instructions to the civilian population.
(f) In all psychological planning, special attention should be given to avoiding in so far as possible any indications of plans to return to the status quo ante, all information output should be designed to reassure the populace that the US supported movement is designed to carry forward the realization of the social and economic aspirations of the Cuban people.
f. Department of the Treasury
Department of Justice
Department of Health, Education and Welfare
Department of Agriculture
Federal Aviation Agency
Bureau of the Budget
Supporting functions will be undertaken to assist, expedite and promote the efforts of Task Agencies:
a. As requested by Task Agencies, prior to plan implementation, and
b. As requested by Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, when plan is implemented.
4. Coordinating Instructions.
a. Implementation of this plan will be as directed by the President.
b. Military operations, including clandestine and paramilitary activities, will be conducted by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The administration of military government activities in Cuba will be conducted by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with policy established by the Secretary of State.
c. Political, psychological and economic operations will be accomplished in accordance with policy established by the Secretary of State.
d. Supporting plans are required from all Task Agencies. Direct coordination between agencies should be effected for planning purposes. One copy of supporting plans is to be provided Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, and maintained in current status.
e. During implementation of the plan the Chief of Operations,
Operation Mongoose, will act as the coordinator for the 5412 Special
Group (Augmented) on inter-Agency activities. The coordinating
office will be established in the Pentagon, Office of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Room 2 B 913, telephone extension 59710.
363. National Intelligence Estimate
Washington, August 1, 1962.
//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, McNamara Briefing Notebooks, 12 Jan. 63. Secret. A covering note indicates that this estimate, submitted by McCone, was prepared by CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate on August 1, except the representative of the AEC, who abstained on the grounds that the topic was outside his jurisdiction.
/1/This estimate is designed to bring up-to-date NIE 85-62, "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba," dated 21 March 1962. The background information contained in that document remains generally valid. [Footnote in the source text. For NIE 85-62, see Document 315.]
To analyze the situation in Cuba and to estimate the prospects over the next year or so, with particular reference to Castro's relations with the Communists and to the potential for resistance to his regime.
A. Fidel Castro has asserted his primacy in Cuban communism; the "old" Communists have had to accommodate themselves to this fact, as has the USSR. Further strains may develop in these relationships, but they are unlikely to break the ties of mutual interest between Castro and the "old" Communists and between Cuba and the USSR. (Paras. 1-10)
B. By force of circumstances, the USSR is becoming ever more deeply committed to preserve and strengthen the Castro regime. The USSR, however, has avoided any formal commitment to protect and defend the regime in all contingencies. (Para. 11)
C. The Cuban armed forces are loyal to the personal leadership of the Castro brothers. Their capabilities have been and are being greatly enhanced by the Soviet Bloc's provision of military equipment and instruction. Cuban military capabilities, however, are essentially defensive. We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with the capability to undertake major independent military operations overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate. (Paras. 12-19)
D. The Cuban armed forces are well able to intimidate the general population and to suppress any popular insurrection likely to develop in present circumstances. They are probably capable of containing and controlling any threat to the regime through guerrilla action and of repelling any invasion short of a direct US military intervention in strength. (Paras. 22-23)
E. The Cuban economy is in deep trouble, in part because of the US embargo and a consequent shortage of convertible foreign exchange, in part because of agricultural and industrial mismanagement. Despite remedial measures, it is unlikely that agricultural and industrial production can be significantly increased within the next year or so. The expected increase in capital imports from the Bloc is unlikely to produce a net growth of the economy before the end of 1963. (Paras. 30-35)
F. The Castro regime retains the positive support of about 20 percent of the population, but disaffection is increasing. This trend is manifested in growing passive resistance and in occasional open demonstrations of resentment. Few, however, dare to accept the risks of organized active resistance in present circumstances, for fear of the regime's massive apparatus for surveillance and repression. (Paras. 36-41)
G. If arms and supplies became available and if confidence were created in the likelihood of outside support for a major Cuban uprising, resistance activity and potential would increase. Even so it is unlikely that the regime could be overthrown unless events had already shaken the regime and brought into doubt its capacity for survival, and unless substantial outside support for the insurgents were forthcoming. (Paras. 42-51)
H. The Castro regime still seeks to lead the "inevitable" revolution throughout Latin America, but its preoccupation with domestic problems tends to limit its activity in this respect. In Latin America there is widespread disillusionment regarding the Cuban revolution. Nevertheless, militant pro-Castro groups exist in several countries, and Cuban subversive activity could prove effective in certain unstable situations: e.g., in Guatemala or Venezuela. The appeal of the Cuban example will increase in Latin America if reform lags there and hopes and promises remain unfulfilled. (Paras. 52-59)
[Here follows the Discussion section of the Estimate. For text,
see the Supplement.]
364. Paper by the President's Military Representative (Taylor)
Washington, August 1, 1962.
//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk, McNamara, Robert Kennedy, Johnson, Gilpatric, McCone, Lemnitzer, Taylor, and Lansdale.
/1/See Document 371.
A. Consideration of special NIE on Cuba./2/
Responsible Agency: CIA
*B. Discussion of the effects of the existence of the Castro Government during the past year on the United States, Latin America,and the USSR.
Responsible Agency: State
C. Explanation of the distinction between the four proposed courses of action./3/ Responsible Agency: General Lansdale
/3/See Document 360.
*D. Discussion of a possible stepped up Course B as to content, implication and difference from present course of action.
Responsible Agency: General Lansdale
E. Pros and Cons of the precommitment proposed in Course C.
Responsible Agency: State, Defense, USIA
*F. Consequences of military intervention to include cost (personnel, units and equipment),effect on world-wide ability to react,possibility of a requirement for sustainedoccupation, the level of national mobilizationrequired, and Cuban counteraction.
Responsible Agency: DOD, JCS
G. Future courses of action to be recommended to higher authority.
Responsible Agency: All
*It is requested the responsible agencies for the topics marked with asterisks above circulate papers to the members of the Special Group (Augmented) by 8 August.
/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
365. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)
Washington, August 6, 1962.
//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Mongoose Operations. Top Secret; Sensitive.
"Gusano Libre," Symbol of Cuban Resistance
1. The term "Gusano" (worm) was first applied by Fidel Castro to counter-revolutionaries. Since then it has been used proudly as a symbol by the opposition to the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba. CIA plans a coordinated campaign to popularize, exploit and encourage the use of "Gusano Libre" as the symbol of resistance to the Cuban regime. So as to give the impression that adoption of the symbol is a spontaneous internal development and not an exile one, CIA controlled outlets will refer to instances of use of the symbol inside Cuba rather than calling on Cubans to adopt the symbol.
2. We intend to use the occasion of the next "Voice of Free Cuba" submarine operation planned for mid-August 1962 to announce that the "Gusano Libre" has become the symbol of popular resistance against the Castro regime, calling upon the people of Cuba to show their defiance of the government by scrawling this symbol in public places. The "Gusano Libre" campaign will expand upon this broadcast.
3. In order to give meaning to the symbol a declaration of principles will be announced./1/ The declaration will cover such points as what the "Gusano Libre" stands for:
/1/A marginal note at this point, in an unknown hand, reads: "This declaration will not be made."
a. Defeat of Castroism and Communism.
b. Establishment of a truly democratic government based on the Constitution of 1940.
c. A system of agrarian reform carried out under provisions of fair compensation to former land owners.
d. The private ownership of property.
e. A free trade union movement with the right of the worker to engage in collective bargaining with his employer.
f. A minimum wage law, unemployment compensation, a social security system which ensures workers the prospects of a tranquil retirement.
g. Social justice in which every individual has the right to obtain an education and work.
4. The general declarations will be followed by more specific pronouncements as to what the "Gusano Libre" stands for and says. In addition to publicizing "El Gusano Libre" through the use of radios, newspapers, and mailing operations, actions will be taken to provide the people in Cuba with pictures of "El Gusano Libre" as well as instructions on how to draw "El Gusano Libre" on walls and other public places. A small bulletin titled "El Gusano Libre" will be prepared for inside distribution. Gusano Libre pins, armbands, seals, pencils, balloons, etc. can also be produced for inside distribution via mail, legal travelers and propaganda balloons.
5. Once the "Gusano Libre" symbol is established "Gusano Libre" actions will be broadened to include such targets as the G-2 and Soviet/Satellite personalities.
6. Much of the "Gusano Libre" propaganda cartoons, and related material is already developed and will be put into production and distributed following the "Voice of Free Cuba" broadcast announcing the adoption of the "Gusano Libre" as the symbol of Cuban Resistance.
William K. Harvey/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
366. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Central Intelligence Agency Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey)
Washington, August 6, 1962.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Noforn; Special Handling.
CIA Draft Operational Plan B+/1/
/1/See Document 367.
As requested by you in our meeting Monday afternoon, I have read your draft operational plan. In reading it in the light of making recommendations to higher authority, I found little basis to say that these were either additional or possible within the context of contributing to the mission as stated. The policy level must have proposals which have been assessed as do-able in the current state of foreign affairs and likely to contribute to the desired goal.
Rather than go down point by point and page by page, let me point out three items you list as appropriate possibilities:
a. III A 1, paragraph 1 on page 2: Helping State with use of OAS for Mongoose goals. In the first place, you know that State sees little hope of further use of OAS for our goals, so why be "pie-in-the-sky"? One of our original aims, as you know, was to activate operations from individual Latin American countries. [1 line of source text not declassified] Why is this not proposed as desirable and do-able?
b. Item III B 3 on page 2: You note an economic blow by causing the diversion of Cuban resources from production. If it is possible, why isn't this being done now? It needs no new policy approval to my knowledge.
c. IV B on page 6: You suggest that raising the noise level is needed for you to generate strikes inside Cuba. Can CIA actually hope to generate such strikes? I recall discussions on this very point when you felt that it was impossible to get to the action groups, such as labor unions, to obtain such results. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] If we have no assets inside Cuba, then why is this now called a possibility?
For my use, the most helpful thing as I make proposals to higher authority would be to have you initial each of the items in your paper which you, as the DCI's representative in this field, believe is really possible (do-able and sensible). I would appreciate such an indication from you by noon today, since I plan to pull together the team proposals this afternoon, for your further comments and suggestions./2/
/2/On August 7 Lansdale sent a handwritten note to McGeorge Bundy
relating to the Mongoose planning exercise in which he wrote,
in part: "It's no easy thing to make the big organizations
come up with practical answers, although I'll keep trying."
(Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda
Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62)
367. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)
Washington, August 8, 1962.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that 16 copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, Murrow, Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris, and Wilson. Two copies were kept by Lansdale.
Stepped Up Course B
You requested a paper on "a possible stepped up Course B as to content, implication and difference from present course of action."
Course B was described in our 25 July team review of Operation Mongoose, as a course of action possible under present U.S. policy. It read: "b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, without overt employment of U.S. military." The major difference from Phase I of Operation Mongoose would be in removing the restriction, in the 14 March policy guidelines,/1/ which kept our actions "short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area."
As a practical way of getting a meaningful paper to you, for consideration prior to the policy meeting, I held working sessions with the Operational Representatives: Mr. Hurwitch (State), Gen. Harris (Defense), Mr. Harvey (CIA), and Mr. Wilson (USIA). After benefit of discussion, each was tasked with writing a specific section of this paper. The thinking reflects those of responsible representatives, rather than completely staffed positions from participating departments and agencies.
The papers from each representative are attached. The major contribution is from CIA, since CIA would have the main burden in a stepped up Course B. The State, Defense, and USIA papers are essentially reflective of companion roles to CIA's covert activities. USIA has added a "think piece" on anticipated world-wide psychological reaction to a stepped up Course B.
In our Operational Representatives discussions, it was generally acknowledged that a widespread revolt of the Cuban people against the regime might well lead to an open appeal by Cubans for help by U.S. military forces, as the regime's security forces attempt to crush the revolt. The CIA operational people, who would implement a stepped up Course B as Phase II of Operation Mongoose, do not believe this course of action by itself would bring the overthrow of the regime in Cuba; they believe that the use of U.S. military force in the final stage must be anticipated, for success.
At the close of the attached CIA section on "covert activities," there is a list of policy approvals deemed required. It is suggested that this be read in context with the CIA operational suggestions as outlined in the section. It is noted that authority would be required for overflights (resupply, leaflet drops, infiltration, exfiltration), use of U.S. submarines for infiltration and exfiltration, major sabotage operations, stepped up psychological actions (including propaganda balloons and establishing a medium-wave Radio Free Cuba), training Cubans on U.S. bases, some operational use of Guantanamo, and more flexibility in the composition of paramilitary groups (selection of Cubans in U.S. forces and strengthening with non-Cubans).
In the "covert activities" section, it is noted that CIA would support State in any feasible action to develop individual Latin American country support and would provide covert support to the CRC and appropriate Cuban groups, to assist in the achievement of the goal of Operation Mongoose.
My own comment is to urge that you give the fullest possible consideration to the concept of actions by Cuban groups, and actions from and by Latin American countries, to achieve the goal of Operation Mongoose. Consideration of this concept is urged, since it alone could offer making the responsibility for initiative and actions reside in groups and countries other than the U.S. If a support concept is possible which would permit U.S. assets to assist such non-U.S. operations, with reasonable assurance of mutual objectives and methods, then this would be the most desirable concept for winning our goal.
Washington, August 7, 1962.
/2/Top Secret; Sensitive.
William K. Harvey, CIA Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:
A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action which would be required by the Central Intelligence Agency to fully implement course of action "b" in General Lansdale's memorandum to the Special Group (Augmented) dated 25 July 1962./3/
B. The intelligence estimate for the period of this plan is contained in the National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62./4/
C. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are made:
1. Conclusion #D of the National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62 is invalid. (This assumption is not in our opinion valid, but this operational plan is not a valid plan for the overthrow of the Castro-Communist government unless this assumption is made.)
2. Soviet troops will not be present in Cuba in force.
3. Passive resistance can be changed to active resistance through aggressive, provocative propaganda plus aggressive small-scale open resistance and through fortuitous circumstances existing at the time. It cannot be manipulated on a "time table" basis.
"Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt U.S. military commitment"
1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop active OAS and individual Latin American country support for the overthrow of Castro.
2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.
3. Provide covert support to the CRC and to such other Cuban political groups as appropriate.
4. Develop contacts in the "power centers" of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime.
5. Induce the population to engage in militant mass action such as demonstrations, slow-downs, work stoppages, and sabotage.
1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution.
2. Conduct maximum possible sabotage of major Cuban industries and public utilities with priority attention being given to transportation, communications, power plants, and utilities. No sabotage would be undertaken against food supplies, medical facilities, or directly against the population of Cuba as such. At the present time, and for the predictable future, major sabotage at least in part probably would have to be conducted by raider type teams using hit and run tactics.
3. By aggressive deception and other operations, cause the diversion of Cuban resources from productive purposes.
4. Induce the population to conduct continuing widespread minor acts of sabotage.
1. Strengthen and maintain an atmosphere of resistance and revolt in the general population.
2. Recruit, train, and supply small clandestine resistance cells in the major cities and in other selected areas of Cuba.
3. Cache arms, ammunition, and other supplies in maximum feasible amounts, in areas accessible to the resistance cells and in potential resistance areas.
4. Be prepared to provide covert liaison and communications with leadership elements to any significant internal uprising.
5. Be prepared to covertly provide personnel and logistics support to any significant internal resistance group or uprising.
6. Harass local elements of the Cuban government by hit and run raids against selected targets such as local G-2 offices, militia posts, telephone centrals, etc.
7. If feasible and authorized, initiate an internal uprising.
1. Strengthen, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro-Communism.
2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere, and elsewhere.
1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:
a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.
b. Activities of Cuban G-2.
c. Soviet activities in Cuba.
d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.
e. Militia morale.
f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the "power centers" in the Cuban government.
To undertake the above listed tasks, CIA would be required to develop and carry out the following program (which constitutes a substantial expansion of the current program, particularly in fields other than intelligence).
A. Intelligence (FI):
The current build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified and expanded. No additional policy approvals are needed. The following types of actions will be maximized:
1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally established Cubans in Cuba or in Cuban government posts abroad. Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secure communications will become more critical as police state controls increase.
2. Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals resident in Cuba.
3. Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have potential access to significant information.
4. Expansion of communications intelligence, particularly in the G-2, police, and militia nets. (This is primarily an NSA problem.)
B. Psychological Warfare (CA):
The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban population. It will have to provide aggressive and provocative propaganda as well as the milder themes. Clear authority to engage in "high noise level" types of propaganda operations calling for work stoppages, slow-downs, sabotage, and other forms of militant mass action and widespread overt resistance is required.
The following psychological warfare activities are considered essential:
1. The establishment of a sufficiently powerful Radio Free Cuba located in Southern Florida or other appropriate area. When this is in operation, the Swan Island operation will be terminated. Policy approval to establish this is required.
2. A maritime propaganda balloon launching capability and appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations.
3. Policy approval and authorization to conduct aircraft leaflet dropping operations using U.S. and other contract crews.
4. Intrusion on live Cuban TV channels with video and audio transmissions from airborne and seaborne platforms. Policy approval is required.
5. Continuation and expansion of the "Voice of Cuba" submarine broadcasting operations in collaboration with the Navy.
6. Continue and expand the present propaganda operations infiltrating material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers, or couriers.
7. Intensify propaganda activities utilizing political, professional, cultural, student, and other groups which have a potential for getting their message to their counterparts inside of Cuba.
To date, the paramilitary program against Cuba has been limited. Experience plus continually tightening security controls has demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and maintaining "black teams" in the target country for an indefinite period, nor has any method yet been devised by which infiltrated "black teams" can be effectively legalized with adequate documentation. Therefore, the PM program must increasingly emphasize team infiltrations, spotting, recruiting, and training legal residents, caching and exfiltration of the original teams. This must be paralleled by an aggressive psychological warfare program which will maintain the will to resist and revolt and will provide "the spark of hope." Without this, it will be impossible to recruit and train the necessary legal residents.
To accomplish the required tasks, the following program and support is considered essential:
1. Commando/Raider Teams--Ten to fifteen such teams of approximately twelve men each should be available for unilateral caching operations, selected major sabotage operations, and hit and run commando raids. Authority should be granted to strengthen these teams with non-Cuban contract personnel. Ultimately, when an internal uprising of strength develops they could be landed either as a diversionary effort or for augmentation of selected pockets of resistance. These teams should be trained primarily for hit and run commando raids. It is believed specialized Marine Corps training would be especially appropriate for them. If this is not possible, then Army Ranger type training should be given. It is estimated that ten to fifteen 12 to 15 man teams would be the maximum that could be recruited, trained and utilized during the foreseeable period. They should have a minimum of four-months training, for which Department of Defense facilities and instructor personnel are required. Policy approval is required for the use of non-Cuban contract personnel and DOD facilities and personnel.
2. Urban Resistance Cells--Two to five man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the major Cuban cities to recruit and train small "legal" compartmented resistance cells. Upon the completion of training, the infiltrated team will be withdrawn if endangered or if its continued presence jeopardizes the "legal" residents. Initially these cells should be intelligence producers with the secondary mission of selecting, casing, and formulating plans for sabotage of key targets. (The sabotage to be done either by other individuals or at the time of any major uprising.) A third mission would be to establish small caches of arms and supplies for use in the event of major uprising. It is estimated that within a year at least twelve urban cells could be established. At least 25% of these probably will be lost due to enemy counteraction or from other causes. Spotting, recruiting, and training of the teams to infiltrate can be accomplished within Agency facilities and existing policy approvals.
3. Rural Resistance Cells--Three to five man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the rural areas to recruit, train, and arm small "legal" compartmented resistance cells. The infiltrated trainers will be withdrawn if they are endangered or pose a threat to the security of the resident rural cell. These resident rural cells would have limited intelligence functions until called into action in the event of an uprising. It is estimated that twelve to fifteen such teams could be in place within a year. Forces lost due to attrition are estimated at 25%. Selection and training of the infiltration teams can be accomplished by Agency facilities, but they should be augmented with DOD Special Forces instructors.
4. Guerrilla--Five to eight man teams equipped with W/T communications would be infiltrated into rural areas to live black, recruit, train, and lead (or participate in) "hit and run" guerrilla bands and/or remnants thereof. These groups will require both maritime and aerial re-supply. Attrition will be high. The psychological warfare program in support of this effort must be aggressive and hard-hitting if recruits are to keep flowing to the guerrillas. It is estimated that within a year twenty small groups of guerrillas can be activated. It is not possible to predict what the rate of attrition will be, but approximately 50% appears probable. The teams to be infiltrated should have at least four months Special Forces type training at DOD sites with Special Forces instructors. The trainees could be handled in groups of fifty with two groups in training at a given time.
5. Cuban Exile Forces--The recruitment and training of Cuban exiles by the U.S. Armed Forces should be pressed to the maximum. Upon completion of their training, arrangements should exist to permit the separation of selected individuals or groups to permit the formation of a "Cuban Freedom Fight" under responsible exile leadership which can quickly be used to augment any significant internal uprising. Non-Cuban, U.S., and other contract personnel should be permitted within the "Cuban Freedom Fighter" groups. Additional policy approval is required.
6. Infiltration/Exfiltration--The increased Cuban defensive capabilities plus the above outlined aggressive resistance program requires freedom to utilize all possible infiltration/exfiltration tactics as required, including:
a. Present and planned commercial/private maritime capability.
b. Submarines and other naval craft.
c. Aerial overflight with contract or USAF crews and aircraft.
Additional policy approval is required.
V. Support Required From Other Agencies:
A. From Department of Defense:
1. Ground Support: Three separate training facilities including all instruction and support.
a. Site A--commando/raider training
Provide a four-month training course on a repetitive basis for approximately 100 men.
b. Site B--Special Forces type training
Provide four-month course on a repetitive basis. Fifty men per course.
c. Site C--Special Forces type training
Provide four-month course on a repetitive basis. Fifty men per course.
2. Naval Support:
a. Submarine infiltration/exfiltration missions. Estimate maximum five per month first three months increasing to ten per month by January 1963. By the end of 1963 the requirement could be substantially higher.
b. Submarine radio broadcasts--"Voice of Free Cuba".
c. Naval surface craft support may be required at a later date but cannot be predicted now.
d. Installation CIA supply base at or in proximity to Boca Chica Naval Air Station.
e. Use of Guantanamo Naval Base for operational purposes, including infiltration and exfiltration of agents, support for clandestine maritime operations, operational reconnaissance, and holding and interrogation of Cuban agents and suspects.
3. Air Support:
a. Use of USAF crews and sterile aircraft in lieu of or to supplement U.S. contract crews, provide crews and aircraft for aerial re-supply, infiltration, and leaflet flights. Initially estimate five per month increasing to fifteen per month by January 1963. By the end of 1963 this requirement could substantially increase.
b. Support for CIA air program per existing arrangements.
Limited numbers of qualified personnel may be required to provide specialized instruction in CIA training programs, specialized support in connection with the CIA maritime program, and to provide communications support.
B. From USIA and Federal Communications Commission:
Assistance in the establishment of the Radio Free Cuba transmitter.
VI. Policy Approvals Required:
The following policy approvals are required to implement the foregoing program:
A. Authority to initiate and conduct aggressive psychological warfare operations including calling for work stoppages, slow-downs, sabotage, and other forms of militant mass action and widespread overt resistance.
B. Authority to establish and operate a medium wave transmitter by Radio Free Cuba.
C. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching.
D. Authority to conduct overflights of Cuba for leaflet dropping.
E. Authority to conduct major sabotage operations targeting against Cuban industry and public utilities, i.e., refineries, power plants, transportation, and communications.
F. Authority to use U.S. Navy submarines for infiltration/exfiltration.
G. Authority to use non-Cuban contract personnel to strengthen teams being infiltrated.
H. Authority to train CIA recruited Cubans on DOD bases using DOD instructors and support facilities.
I. Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltration/exfiltration missions using U.S. contract air crews or USAF crews.
J. Authority to separate trained Cuban officers and enlisted men from the U.S. Armed Services to permit them to join an exile sponsored group of "Cuban Freedom Fighters."
K. Authority to utilize Guantanamo Naval Base for operational purposes.
VII. Estimated Cost to CIA:
A. The total number of CIA personnel assigned full-time to Operation Mongoose would have to be increased to at least 600.
B. Estimated Budget:
Fiscal Year 1963--$40,000,000
Fiscal Year 1964--$60,000,000 (exclusive of reimbursement for DOD support which it is felt should be on a non-reimbursable basis)
Washington, August 7, 1962.
Robert A. Hurwitch, Department of State Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:
It should be recognized at the outset that short of the employment of U.S. military force the programs and actions of the U.S. aimed at the downfall of the Castro Government will probably be only marginal as compared to the policies and actions of the Castro Government itself and those of the USSR. Despite the preponderance of power presently at the disposal of the Castro Government, however, the deteriorating and mis-managed Cuban economy coupled with a generally discontented and volatile people whose lives are becoming increasingly regimented provide some of the ingredients of an uprising against the regime. U.S. actions may be in this unstable situation provide the necessary spark; they may not. Since there are no scientific means of determining which actions offer assurances of success, we can only probe and experiment. In so doing, however, we should avoid engaging U.S. prestige openly in operations, the success of which may be doubtful.
The present course of action with respect to Cuba involves the exercise of all feasible political, economic and psychological pressures, as well as limited covert activities within Cuba, designed to make the Castro Government's survival more difficult and to isolate Cuba from the Hemisphere, thereby detracting from its value to the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and reducing its capability to threaten the peace and security of the Hemisphere. This course of action has undoubtedly contributed to an advance toward these objectives over the past year.
Under a stepped up Course B, the actions that might feasibly be undertaken by the Department of State are limited in scope. The Department would continue to invest political capital in courses of action designed to weaken, isolate and eventually effect the downfall of the Castro Government whenever it reasonably appeared that the benefits from each course of action would outweigh the losses for the free world.
A stepped up Course B would appear to involve primarily an increase in covert activities which might stimulate the creation of organized internal resistance to the Castro Government. Of the variety of such covert activities a program of systematic sabotage warrants serious consideration. (Added note on page 4.)/6/
/6/The note is at the end of Hurwitch's paper.
It may be reasonably argued that a program of sabotage should not be undertaken until an organized base of political opposition already exists in Cuba. It may be equally persuasively argued, however, that a program of sabotage may contribute significantly to the creation of such a base of political opposition. Since organized political opposition does not now exist in Cuba, a program of sabotage may prove to be the means of developing one. This program is visualized as three-fold: supply of sabotage materiel to Cubans in Cuba who are not under U.S. control; supply of sabotage materiel and instructions as to targets to Cubans in Cuba under our control; and sabotage of targets by Cubans under our control who arrive in Cuba, destroy the target, and withdraw from Cuba. Priority should be given to targets of economic importance, the destruction of which would result in the minimum possible loss of life. Terroristic acts of sabotage should be ruled out.
A second area of covert activities which might contribute to the formation of organized opposition to the Castro Government is that of improved techniques of propaganda beamed to the Cuban people. Consideration should be given to seeking the establishment of a powerful, medium wave radio station in a friendly country on the Caribbean perimeter, operated by selected Cuban refugees.
There follow a list of overt political and economic actions which the Department of State might undertake under a stepped up Course B, with advantages and disadvantages briefly noted where pertinent:
A. Be prepared to initiate action or support another American Republic's initiative against Cuba in the OAS or subordinate inter-American organization, as the appropriate occasion arises.
Advantage: Such action would continue to place the Cuban problem in a multilateral context, thereby advancing the "Hemisphere versus Cuba" impression.
Disadvantage: If poor judgment were exercised and an inappropriate occasion chosen for OAS action, such action could place on public display sharp division among the OAS member states and could serve to weaken the inter-American system.
B. Continue and intensify, where possible and necessary, the diplomatic and political campaign to inform free world governments and peoples of the nature and activities of the Castro Government and urge them, as appropriate, to undertake all feasible actions which would undermine the Castro Government and demonstrate solidarity with the Cuban people.
Advantage: Continuance of this campaign, where successful, would serve to isolate and weaken further the Castro Government.
Disadvantage: If overdone, such a campaign could result in other nations and peoples regarding the U.S. as immature and neurotic with respect to the subject of Cuba, since, in many instances, they do not regard the existence of the Castro Government with the same degree of concern as does the U.S.
C. Encourage Latin American Governments to take steps to prevent their nationals from traveling to Cuba.
Advantage: This action would contribute to isolating Cuba and reducing its capability of subversive activities in the Hemisphere.
Disadvantage: Most Latin American nations do not have legislation which provides for control over travel of its nationals to specific countries. Attempts to obtain such legislation with respect to travel to Cuba could create serious local political problems.
D. Be prepared to exploit by diplomatic and other means, any indication of a split in the regime from which there may emerge significant anti-Castro-communist elements.
E. Continue and intensify where possible and necessary, U.S. efforts to strengthen the democratic sectors in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress program in order to improve their capabilities of countering Castro-communist threats to political stability and orderly economic and social development.
F. Continue the program of seeking hard evidence of Cuban subversive activities in the Hemisphere.
G. Exploit all feasible opportunities for denying markets in the free world for Cuban exports.
Advantage: This action, where successful, would exacerbate Cuba's already precarious foreign exchange position and further reduce its ability to purchase vital equipment in the free world.
Disadvantage: In some instances, Cuban exports are less expensive than are similar products from alternate sources. Under these circumstances, the U.S. might be compelled to subsidize the alternate sources, an operation for which funds are not currently available.
H. Exploit all feasible opportunities for preventing the shipment of critical spare parts and equipment from free world sources to Cuba.
Added note on sabotage
Distinction should be made between major and dramatic sabotage acts and those that might be characterized as irritants or harassment: for example, complete destruction of oil refineries or power plants as compared to temporary impairment of sugar refineries or cutting of power lines. With respect to the first category, such acts should not be isolated events but rather should be accompanied by other actions in Cuba which might have resulted from the particular act of sabotage or of which the act of sabotage might have been the result. Acts of sabotage of the second category might be isolated events.
Washington, August 7, 1962.
Donald M. Wilson, USIA Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:
Under stepped-up Course B there would be two psychological tasks:
1. Increase the flow of information to Cuba, exposing the weaknesses and perfidies of the Castro/Communist regime.
2. Improve the informational capability throughout Latin America to "isolate" Castro/Communism and build up support for pro-democratic Cuban elements.
1. Increase the flow of information to Cuba.
a. Where other access is denied us, radio is the best means to reach the Cuban people. It is USIA's new view that our short wave capability (VOA) is operating at the most efficient technical level, with nine hours of broadcasting a day in Spanish. Three of the nine hours are devoted specifically to Cuba, while the other six concern themselves with the rest of Latin America. All are heard clearly in Cuba and will be heard much more clearly in December, 1962, when our new transmitter in Greenville, North Carolina, goes on the air.
The establishment of a medium wave capability would be desirable. It is indeed possible to broadcast a strong signal into Cuba, and USIA has made a study of ten possible sites to locate transmitters (reported separately). Our study also shows, however, that Castro has the ready capability to jam our effort with an extraordinarily high percentage of success. Faced with Castro's capability, should the U.S. undertake construction of a powerful broadcasting facility at an estimated cost of eight million dollars and an estimated building time of fifteen months? It is always possible that Castro would not utilize his jamming capability and the U.S. would therefore have a successful medium-wave operation into Cuba. Should an uprising occur, the opportunities presented by such a U.S. medium-wave capability would be great. Should there be an ultimate military action by the United States, the opportunities of such a capability would also be great. However, if none of these contingencies occur, we will have an expensive operation on our hands with small listenership to show for it.
b. Balloon deliveries. This capability under CIA direction has been discussed at a meeting of the Special Group and not acted upon. If activated, USIA would participate in the preparation of the propaganda material.
c. Aircraft deliveries. Also a CIA project. USIA would participate in the preparation of propaganda material.
d. Smuggling of printed materials. As the U.S. capability within Cuba increases, there is an improving possibility of making propaganda material available to the population. The desirability of this would have to be first determined on the basis of security to the personnel involved. An increase of printed material exposing weaknesses of the Castro regime would be desirable, and USIA would participate in the preparation of that material.
e. The greatest possible circulation to the "worm" (gusano libre) theme within Cuba should be implemented. This is a CIA project. However if it gains momentum, USIA will be able to pick it up for VOA exploitation into Cuba and the rest of Latin America.
f. We would continue to attempt to find a suitable musical theme that might stir the resistance forces in Cuba.
2. Improve the information capability throughout Latin America.
Our capability will depend on the availability of funds. The Latin American program was stepped-up 32 percent in Fiscal Year '62 and it will be stepped-up 26 percent more in Fiscal Year '63, so the availability of even more funds is a real problem.
Here are examples of current programming which could be augmented:
1) Radio. We could step up our production of packaged radio programs for placement on radio stations throughout Latin America.
2) Cartoon Books. The Agency has done six anti-Castro cartoon books (5 million copies) having a widespread impact over the area. This program could be stepped-up.
3) Motion Pictures. The Agency has produced an animated film on Cuban land reform theme and has two more films in the pipeline. An increased production of films, although expensive, could be instituted.
4) Television. Television reaches a growing audience in Latin America. The Agency has done one TV "Special" on Castro, and has acquired others from commercial producers. Currently the Agency is doing an anti-Communist TV series which will document the methods and results of Castroism. Vast new opportunities are available in this medium. For example, we could do a puppet series to poke fun at Castro, a device with vast appeal to Latinos.
5) Books. Our book program has several good anti-Castro titles although the circulation is small. We have already asked Congress for a supplemental appropriation to distribute five million books next year in Latin America. Some of these will have an anti-Castro theme.
6) Refugees. We could make an even greater use of the Cuban refugee story through all media. For example, we could do more TV shorts on Cuban refugees at work (in garages, driving taxis, clerking, and so on). We could more fully exploit the Negro defectors.
Following are some possibilities for new programming:
1. Contract for anti-Castro supplements to be printed and placed regularly in Latin American newspapers.
2. Subsidize a troupe of Cuban dancers, musicals, singers in one big show to tour Latin America. Ample talent is available among the refugees. Program content can be worked into the performance, or there could be a statement on the Cuban plight at intermission.
3. Organize a show by Cuban painters, cartoonists, sculptors on one theme--perhaps the executions--to be sent around Latin America.
4. Develop a speakers' bureau throughout Latin America to send lecturers before all types of groups. Provide these lecturers with anti-Castro giveaway materials and film slides.
5. Develop a series of hard-hitting exhibits on various anti-Castro themes, and get them displayed in key locations all over Latin America.
It is USIA's view that the most effective information program in Latin America must have a position theme. That is why the majority of our output is still devoted to support of the Alliance for Progress. Our anti-Castro output, being essentially negative in nature, still is relegated to a less important position. We believe this accent on the positive to be most desirable and should there be an increase in anti-Castro material we would believe it necessary to similarly increase our positive support material for the Alliance for Progress.
Advantages of Stepped-Up Course B:
a. It would raise the hopes of the anti-Castro Cubans and check their tendency to grow complacent and settle into U.S. ways.
b. It would tend to bring together the various Cuban anti-Castro factions.
c. It would call forth the heightened attention of the rest of Latin America to the Castro/Communist regime.
a. World opinion, particularly in Europe, would become suspicious of "intervention."
b. A higher noise level will be accompanied by a higher risk of exposure of the program.
Anticipated Reaction to Stepped-Up Course B
World reaction to a heightened propaganda-political action campaign against Castro would be significantly influenced by (a) the pace of the intensification, (b) the degree of overt identification with the U.S., and (c) the intensity of the Soviet propaganda response.
Assuming such a campaign were skillfully handled, however, we believe public reaction abroad would not be damaging to U.S. interests in any significant degree.
There has been increasing disenchantment with Castro throughout Latin America since early 1961. There would not be widespread negative reaction if our campaign were closely identified with a Cuban liberation movement and directed solely at Cuba, not throughout the area generally.
An overt, clearly U.S.-inspired campaign would bring varied reactions. Mexico, with its legalistic, moralistic approach to Castro, might react strongly to any implied violation of Cuban sovereignty. The press, however, would be less critical than the government. Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and possibly Ecuador, would deplore our action. Again, however, the press and public would be less critical than their governments.
Argentina is less predictable; probably the present regime would be less critical than Frondizi would be.
Governmental and public opinion of the smaller countries in and near the Caribbean would be with us. They feel the heat from Castro most, and are most eager to see him out of the way. In this category are Guatemala, Honduras, Dominican Republic, and to a lesser degree Panama, Nicaragua and Salvador. Colombia would be sympathetic to us. The Betancourt regime in Venezuela is, of course, openly anti-Castro; there would be hostility on the far left, however.
Assuming no sudden or dramatic moves which might alarm a war-wary public opinion, European reaction would be mostly sympathetic. The U.K., Germany, the Benelux, and center and right-wing elements in France and Italy would be particularly sympathetic. Enthusiasm would be restrained by the fact that European nations have benefited economically by the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba. They would dislike losing the market, which would be inevitable to some degree if Castro fell.
Spain and Portugal, which feel a Latin affinity with Cuba no matter who is in power there, would be critical despite their lack of ideological sympathy with Castro. Public opinion in Sweden and Austria might be moderately critical on moral grounds. The anti-Communist Finnish public would be favorable, though the government would straddle.
Communists and fellow-travelers would be sharply critical. It is unlikely, however, that they would stage demonstrations or make much noise except perhaps in Italy.
Canada, which has profited economically by U.S.-Cuban estrangement, would be critical, pegging its criticism on lofty moral grounds.
Eastern Europe-Communist China
The Communist Bloc and Yugoslavia would, of course, be sharply critical. There might be mass meetings; possibly some "demonstrations" outside American embassies. There would be an intensification of pro-Castro, anti-U.S. propaganda, and probably new assurances of Soviet support to Castro in the event of hostilities.
Near East and South Asia
The most serious repercussions in this area would be in India where Krishna Menon and his ilk would publicly condemn the U.S. and exploit the situation as further justification for their general anti-American line and the MIG purchases.
The extent of Indian reaction would depend in large measure on the intensity of the Soviet reaction. If the latter were sufficiently severe, U.S.-Indian relations could be damaged.
Reaction in Ceylon and Iraq would be similar to that of India.
There would be criticism by the pro-Nasser press in Egypt and throughout the Arab world, but the UAR Government--pleased with its improved relations with the U.S.--probably would remain silent. The Pakistani press, unhappy about our aid to India, might use Cuban developments as a peg for attacks on the U.S. despite their lack of ideological sympathy for Castro.
What little reaction might develop in Greece, Turkey and Iran would be mostly favorable.
Africa, like India, is particularly sensitive to any heating up of the Cold War. If Moscow's response is particularly vigorous, African political and opinion leaders are likely to become more skittish with a resulting slowdown in the pursuit of U.S. objectives in Africa.
The hostile neutrals (Casablanca Powers) would lead the negative reaction. It is unlikely we would suffer much except in Guinea (where Sekou Toure's disillusionment with the Communists might be slowed) and Ghana. Even in these countries, however, it is not probable that U.S. interests would be seriously damaged.
The independent and pro-Western nations (Monrovia Powers) would be neutral or quietly sympathetic except in the case of Nigeria where we might expect some hostility.
Except for the Philippines, Far Eastern nations have little interest in Cuba. The Philippines, with their historic and cultural ties with Cuba, would take note of events but not unsympathetically; they don't like Castro. Little notice would be taken in neutral Cambodia and Burma. The Sukarno regime might criticize us, but the Indonesian public would be indifferent. Communists and fellow-travelers might stage demonstrations in Indonesia and Japan, but with little effect.
Communist China, North Korea and North Viet Nam would, of course, exploit the situation in their broadcasting, but the impact would be little different than that caused by their current anti-U.S. propaganda.
Washington, August 7, 1962.
General Benjamin T. Harris, DOD/JCS Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:
1. Support: Within its capabilities DOD is prepared to provide all required support to CIA, State and USIA necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives of Operation Mongoose.
2. Military Readiness: If there is a decision to use US military force, execution of our military contingency plans for Cuba will be undertaken as rapidly as the posture of our forces will allow at the time the decision is made.
a. With no prior warning and with 18 days of preparation a coordinated airborne/amphibious assault could be executed which, it is anticipated, would gain control of key military installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba within 10 days and result in minimum US and Cuban casualties. This plan provides for confronting Cuban forces with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond Cuban capability to resist, to induce early capitulation of their units and to avoid needless loss of life.
b. A requirement to reduce significantly the pre-assault period would necessitate incremental commitment of US forces as they could be assembled and employed. Under this plan the time required to gain essential US military control of Cuba could be appreciably extended. However, reduction of US military reaction time may be of overriding importance. In such case, air and naval forces could attack with little delay from the time the decision is made. An air assault could be initiated within 8 hours; an airborne assault could be initiated within 5 days; and a Navy/Marine amphibious force could be committed 3 days later with a build up of the full scale effort to follow.
c. In concept, initial military operations commence with an air and naval blockade, concentrated air strikes, and coordinated naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy airpower and to neutralize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy armor, artillery and anti-air capability.
d. We are continuing our efforts to reduce reaction time through
plans for the prepositioning of forces and materiel. In this connection,
we have developed a Cover and Deception Plan which permits a certain
amount of prepositioning under the guise of training exercises
and places US forces involved in an advantageous position without
endangering security to an unacceptable degree.
368. Memorandum From the Department of Defense Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Craig) to the Special Group (Augmented)
Washington, August 8, 1962.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Noforn; Special Handling. On August 8 Lansdale sent a copy of this memorandum to McGeorge Bundy under a covering note that indicated it was a paper to be discussed at an August 10 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented). (Ibid.)
Consequences of US Military Intervention in Cuba
1. On 2 August 1962 the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, requested the DOD/JCS Representative, Operation Mongoose, to prepare a paper for distribution to the Special Group (Augmented) on 8 August 1962. The specific requirement is to set forth "Consequences of (US) Military Intervention (in Cuba) to include cost (personnel, units and equipment), effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a requirement for sustained occupation, the level of national mobilization required, and Cuban counteraction." Pursuant to this request, the requirement has been divided into its separate parts.
2. Requirements (personnel, units and equipment).
a. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
b. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
c. Major units involved in the initial assault include: Two Army airborne divisions, an infantry brigade, and an armored combat command; one and one-third Marine division/wing teams; a Navy Striking and Covering force together with an amphibious task force; and 17 USAF tactical fighter squadrons and 53 troop carrier or transport squadrons.
d. Principal equipment includes:
(1) Army--Artillery units and armor (including about 275 tanks)
(2) Marines--[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
(3) Navy--[2 lines of source text not declassified]
(4) Air Force--[2 lines of source text not declassified]
3. Level of National Mobilization Required.
a. Army--None. In lieu of mobilizing Civil Affairs units from the active reserve, tactical forces, though not trained for this mission, will be employed to conduct Civil Affairs/Military Government operations.
b. Navy--For troop and cargo sealift, no rise in mobilization level would be required beyond the present authority held by the Maritime Administration to charter shipping.
c. Air Force--In order to land the maximum number of airborne troops in the minimum time, [2 lines of source text not declassified] however, CINCLANT and USAF have been requested to prepare alternate plans not involving any mobilization prior to D-day.
e. Further mobilization would be required if a concurrent political or military situation exists which would make such a precaution desirable in order to assure US military responsiveness to additional demands.
4. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React--The present basic contingency plan anticipates achieving control of key strategic areas in Cuba within [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] days. Subsequent to gaining such control of the island there will be a progressive withdrawal of forces as the situation permits.
a. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] It is estimated that the Army Airborne two division force would be available for other operations [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] after withdrawal from Cuba. Substantial Army forces from the on-call echelon will relieve the assault forces and remain on the island to perform counterguerrilla operations and conduct military government activities. This force will be progressively withdrawn as the new Cuban government increases in effectiveness.
b. [5 lines of source text not declassified] It is anticipated that most of these ships will be available for other commitments [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. About [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of the Pacific amphibious troop lift capability will be employed in the landings in the eastern end of Cuba. These ships would be available for other operations in the Pacific [1 line of source text not declassified]. In addition to the amphibious troop lift capability the initial requirements for sealift will include MSTS ships obtained through the Maritime Administration. Over-all requirements for shipping will diminish after the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of the operation.
c. [4 lines of source text not declassified]
d. For approximately ten days, CONUS MATS airlift would be fully committed.
e. CONAD air defense capabilities in southeast United States will be augmented by the additional Naval and Air Force forces brought into the area for this operation. Therefore, no redeployment of CONAD forces from other areas is anticipated.
5. Castro-Cuban Counteraction.
a. The military reaction will be determined in large measure by the will of the Cuban armed forces to resist, as well as by the weapons available to them and their proficiency in their use, at the time of US military intervention.
b. The military capabilities of Cuba are oriented primarily toward defensive activities. Cuban plans are believed to contemplate a strong initial resistance, followed by a determined defense of preselected keypoints, and finally by protracted guerrilla warfare.
c. Cuba has about 50 MIG fighters, some of which may be configured for carrying light bombs. Any of these that survive the US air strikes could be used offensively against targets in Florida. Also they have 11 B-26 aircraft some of which, if they survive the air strikes by US forces, could attempt to attack targets in the southeastern United States. All forces engaged in the operation, as well as the Continental Air Defense forces, however, would be alert to guard against any such attempts at retaliation.
d. In the future the Castro-Cuban capability for counteraction will improve if Soviets continue to provide the Cubans with additional military equipment and training. Thus, the urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities.
6. Possibility of a Requirement for a Sustained Occupation.
a. The duration of a US military presence in Cuba is contingent upon such factors as the will of Castro-Cuban forces to resist invasion, the degree of popular support a defeated Castro might receive for the conduct of residual guerrilla operations, and time required to reconstitute an effective friendly Cuban government.
b. Following the establishment of essential military control of the island, a substantial US military commitment may be required in Cuba for a significant period of time. Post assault tasks will include restoration of law and order and the conduct of counterguerrilla operations.
c. To achieve the objectives of subparagraph b above, it is planned
that the post assault military presence initially will consist
of substantial Army follow-on forces with such other sea and air
support as may be required. This will be reduced gradually in
size as the effectiveness of the new Cuban government increases.
Thereafter, a lengthy period of providing military assistance
369. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)
Washington, August 8, 1962.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that 14 copies of the memorandum were prepared and sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris, and Wilson. Four copies were kept by Lansdale.
Medium-Wave Broadcasting to Cuba
At a meeting with the operational representatives of Operation Mongoose, 1 August, General Taylor and the Attorney General asked about the possibility of strong medium-wave broadcasts into Cuba. In response, Don Wilson of USIA has sent me some thoughtful studies on this subject, after collaboration with State and CIA at the operating level, and noting an earlier memorandum from Ed Murrow about broadcasts from the U.S. (which Mr. Murrow discussed with the Special Group). These studies are attached,/1/ for your information.
The conclusions reached are:
a. Medium-wave broadcasts from stations in the U.S. are a possibility for short term tactical purposes. They would be illegal in terms of international agreement and could bring serious reprisals (Cuban interference with medium-wave broadcasts over wide areas of the United States).
b. Although it was believed that Swan Island broadcasts could be strengthened and possibly undergo a character change (becoming similar to Radio Free Europe) to gain Cuban listeners, further study concludes that no new medium-wave capability should be developed from Radio Swan (difficult and expensive logistic problems, coupled with April 1961 reputation).
c. A thousand kilowatt transmitter is in storage in the U.S. It is estimated that it would take about 15 months, at a cost of about $8 million, to install a transmitter of this power as rapidly as possible.
d. Ten locations around the Caribbean were studied as possible sites for a powerful transmitter, considering technical and political feasibility. Venezuela ranked first politically, tenth for technical reasons. The Dominican Republic would appear to present the best prospects from a political standpoint and ranks second technically. The political feasibility of establishing a transmitter on foreign soil in the other locations stud-ied appears remote.
e. Cuba could negate our medium-wave effort, if Castro so desired,
by using surplus transmitters in Cuba to broadcast locally on
the same frequency. (It is more difficult to jam short-wave broadcasts,
due to the capability for simultaneous broadcasts on multiple
370. Paper Prepared in the Department of State
Washington, August 10, 1962.
//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Mongoose Operations. Top Secret. The drafter of this paper is not identified on the source text. It is evident from internal evidence, however, that it was prepared in the Department of State. The only representatives of the Department of State who were privy to Mongoose planning were Rusk, Ball, Johnson, Martin, Goodwin, and Hurwitch. Since Rusk and Johnson are cited in the third person in the text, the paper was apparently drafted by Ball, Goodwin, Martin, or Hurwitch. The style suggests that of Hurwitch and the paper was probably sent to Martin.
/1/Reference is to the August 10 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented); see Document 371.
1. Dirty Tricks
I believe the Agency is under the impression that under present policy, it is not permitted to engage in such. This is not my reading of present policy. Although the Secretary indicated he thought he ought not to mention this subject, I think the question should be clarified--along the lines of Alex's distinction on sabotage, with the Agency given a free hand on the irritant, harassment type. In this connection, the Agency is prone to select individual exiles whom it controls and exclusively supply them with sabotage materiel. Control, security, and a sense of professionalism probably account for this practice. I should think that for this low-level type of sabotage, every exile group (except the Batistianos) that we have reason to believe has followers in Cuba, should be given a supply of materiel and turned loose. I should be inclined to give priority to the CRC but certainly not a monopoly.
2. Secretary's Approach
If the Secretary's suggested approach is adopted, we could undertake, together with the Agency, a careful scrutiny of all the "new" communists in the ORI directorate (who outnumber the veteran communists) in an effort to determine who among them have significant influence on Castro. Perhaps in working with Manolo Ray and other MRP leaders (the MRP is virtually the 26th July in exile) methods of approach to the selected directorate members could be evolved. This would of course have to be very discreet, with cut-outs, etc. I am not sanguine about success, but see this as an additional approach to those discussed yesterday./2/
/2/Secretary Rusk met off-the-record with Goodwin, Hurwitch, and Martin on August 9 at 5:11 p.m. to discuss the August 10 2:30 meeting. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)
If the Secretary's approach is adopted, I should think we would continue operations at about the present level: actions short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt. In this connection, the question of resistance symbols and declarations arises. The Agency is pushing ahead with its "Gusano Libre" theme (see attached)./3/ I doubt whether "worms of the world unite" will cause people to revolt; I should put it in the nuisance category at this stage. However, as indicated in the attached paper, the program may escalate considerably, and it is extremely difficult to know where to draw the line. The "Gusano Libre" theme will be carried on the submarine radio next week, and Castro's 26th of July declaration that overthrow of the despotism is legitimate will be quoted. I have approved the script, primarily on the basis that this radio broadcast has little listenership as yet.
/3/Not found attached. An apparent reference to Document 365.
3. Soviet Base in Cuba
General Lansdale called this morning to inquire whether we had done a paper on policy toward the establishment of a Soviet Base in Cuba. I told him not yet. He may bring this up. You will recall that it was decided that the possibility was too remote to waste time on. General Craig was supposed to bring in new evidence. The only "evidence" that General Lansdale circulated is the photostated intelligence report/4/ in the attached package. Paragraph 3 of the report speaks of a rumored submarine base.
/4/Not found attached.
371. Editorial Note
On August 10, 1962, a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) was held in Secretary Rusk's conference room in the Department of State. The meeting was chaired by Secretary Rusk and attended by Secretary of Defense McNamara, as well as the regular members of the Special Group (Augmented). The agenda for the meeting was circulated by General Taylor on August 1; see Document 364. Only fragmentary records of the discussion at this key meeting have been found. According to a chronology of the positions McCone took concerning Cuba, prepared for him on October 21, McCone maintained at the meeting that the Soviet Union had in Cuba an asset of such importance that "the Soviets will not let Cuba fail." To prevent such a failure McCone expected that the Soviet Union would supplement economic, technical, and conventional military aid with medium-range ballistic missiles, which they would justify by reference to U.S. missile bases in Italy and Turkey. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers) McCone confirmed that aspect of the discussion in a memorandum for the record he prepared on October 31, 1963. (Ibid.)
Memoranda prepared by McCone and William Harvey also indicate that the issue of the assassination of Cuban political leaders came up during the discussion. According to an August 14 memorandum from Harvey to Richard Helms, the issue was raised during the meeting by McNamara. Harvey recorded: "It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record." Harvey added that he took careful notes on the comments made at the meeting on this issue, "and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point." (Ibid.) See the Supplement. On April 14, 1967, McCone sent a memorandum from his retirement to Helms, who had become Director of Central Intelligence, in which he wrote of the discussion at the August 10 meeting: "I recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro. I took immediate exception to this suggestion, stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the USG and CIA were concerned and the idea should not be discussed nor should it appear in any papers, as the USG could not consider such actions on moral or ethical grounds." McCone added that immediately after the meeting, he called on McNamara and reemphasized his position on the issue. He noted that McNamara "heartily agreed." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers)
Harvey's August 14 memorandum to Helms bears out McCone's recollection
that it was the sense of the meeting that no discussion of the
assassination of Cuban leaders should be put in writing. Harvey
wrote that in light of the discussion at the August 10 meeting,
he called General Lansdale's office and pointed out the "inadmissibility
and stupidity" of including the words "including liquidation
of leaders" in an August 13 memorandum discussing Alternate
Course B that Lansdale circulated to Harvey and other action officers
for Operation Mongoose. Harvey noted that he had strongly urged
that the phrase be deleted from all existing copies of the memorandum.
Lansdale's August 13 memorandum, with the requested excision,
is printed as Document 372.
372. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)
Washington, August 13, 1962.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8-1362. Top Secret; Noforn; Special Handling. General Benjamin Harris replaced General Craig as Department of Defense Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose following Craig's reassignment.
William Harvey, CIA
Robert Hurwitch, State
Gen. Benjamin Harris, Defense
Don Wilson, USIA
Alternate Course B
In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B for submission. The CIA paper "Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)"/1/ will be used as the starting basis.
/1/An apparent reference to the CIA attachment to Document 367.
Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy guidance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the headings of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military.
We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in my office, at 1400 hours, Tuesday, 14 August, to complete the outline paper for submission. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of completed assigned work to this work session, to permit each of us to work from a full set of drafts.
Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting:
Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Economic (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.
Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and Economic. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.
Gen. Harris: Economic (limited deception), Paramilitary (limited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.
Mr. Wilson: Psychological (including covert). Also, any suggestions
for inclusion in other sections of the paper.
373. Memorandum From the Department of State Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Hurwitch) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)
Washington, August 13, 1962.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8-1362. Top Secret.
Alternate Course B
Your memorandum--August 13, 1962/1/
I--Statement of Objectives:
A. The ultimate objective of the United States with respect to Cuba is the overthrow of the Castro Government and its replacement by one which shares the objectives of the free world.
B. As steps toward the ultimate objective, the following intermediate objectives have been established for Phase II (which should be attained as rapidly as feasibility, prudence and a comparatively low noise level dictate):
(1) Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations.
(2) Discredit the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere.
(3) Maintain maximum [moderate]/2/ economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuba economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources. [Conduct limited, secure, viable covert resistance and action operations.]
/2/Bracketed portions contain original Agency language. Unbracketed language (except for item 6) reflect the Agency's interpretation of the sense of the policy meeting. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]
(4) Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements.
(5) Take steps to inspire a split in Cuban leadership and a split in Cuban/Bloc relationships and be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising.
[Be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising, split in Cuba leadership, or split in Cuban-Bloc relationships.]
(6) Be prepared to exert special pressures on Cuba in the event of a Berlin blockade.
II--Comments and Courses of Action:
A. "Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations."
(1) State would carry out those actions described in the Department's contribution to General Lansdale's August 8, 1962 memorandum./3/
(2) As an additional means of isolation, covert attempts to intefere with important Cubans who travel in the Hemisphere might be undertaken. Specific policy approval in each instance would be required.
B. "Discredit the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere."
(1) Emphasis should be placed upon discreditation in the Hemisphere as part of the isolation process. The more we succeed in discrediting the Castro Government in the Hemisphere, the less likely are we to experience adverse reaction in the Hemisphere to the regime's disappearance. Inside Cuba, the people will support or oppose the regime, primarily depending upon actual conditions, not upon United States or exile propaganda. To the extent we can covertly effect deterioration of conditions and/or stimulate overt acts of opposition, however, such actions would serve to discredit the regime both in Cuba and abroad.
C. "Maintain maximum economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuban economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources."
(1) The two main Cuban exports to the USSR are sugar and nickel. Disruption of the sugar industry (for internal reasons as well) and the Nicaro nickel plant should, therefore, be among the high priority targets. Policy approval would be required for each sabotage operation.
(2) Sabotage materiel should be made available to any Cuban exile group (except Batistianos) that has assets inside Cuba and desires such materiel. Although the CRC should be given priority, it should not be given a monopoly. General policy approval would be required.
D. "Maintain maximum coverage of intelligence requirements with respect to Cuba."
E. "Take steps to inspire a split in Cuban leadership and a split in Cuban Bloc relationships and be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising."
(1) A thorough study of the backgrounds of the ORI Directorate members who were formerly with the 26th of July should be undertaken to determine who among them have the most influence on Castro. Through the MRP leaders (who probably retain some influence among the 26th of July leaders) we should seek to influence selected ORI Directorate members toward splitting Cuba from the Bloc.
(2) We would investigate the possibility of enlisting the assistance of a friendly government to attempt to entice Cuba away from the Bloc.
F. "Be prepared to exert special pressures on Cuba in the event of a Berlin blockade."
State would initiate a plan for this contingency.
374. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)
Washington, August 14, 1962.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that 16 copies of the memorandum were prepared and sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, Murrow, Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris, and Wilson. Two copies were kept by Lansdale.
Alternate Course B
In compliance with the desires expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, the Operational Representatives have worked out the attached outline of an Alternative Course B, for your consideration. More detailed planning can be undertaken when guidelines are firmed for future activities.
National objectives for the purpose of this planning are assumed to be:
a. Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations.
b. Discredit the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere.
c. Maintain maximum economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuba economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources.
d. Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements.
e. Take steps to inspire splits in Cuban leadership or split in Cuban/Bloc relationships.
f. Be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising.
The mission will be to accomplish the above objectives as rapidly as feasible through a balanced program of overt and covert activities. Accomplishment probably will raise the noise level above that in Phase I of Operation Mongoose. It should be recognized that the activities described in this outline are not in themselves designed to overthrow the Castro/Communist regime.
Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:
1. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.
2. Activities of Cuban G-2.
3. Soviet activities in Cuba.
4. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.
5. Military and militia order of battle and morale.
6. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the "power centers" in the Cuban government.
8. Cuban subversive activities in the Hemisphere.
The past build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified and expanded. No additional policy approvals are needed. The following types of actions will be maximized.
1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally established Cubans in Cuba or in Cuban government posts abroad. Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secure communications will become more critical as police state controls increase.
2. Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals resident in Cuba.
3. Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have potential access to significant information.
4. Expansion of communications intelligence coverage particularly in the G-2, police, and militia nets.
1. Continue and intensify active OAS and Latin American country support for the containment and undermining of Castro/Communist regime.
2. Develop post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.
3. Support the CRC and such other Cuban political groups as appropriate.
4. Develop contacts in the "power centers" of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime.
5. Investigate the possibility of enlisting assistance of a friendly government to attempt to entice Cuba away from the Bloc.
1. Be prepared to initiate action or support another American Republic's initiative against Cuba in the OAS or subordinate inter-American organization, as the appropriate occasion arises.
2. Continue and intensify, where possible and necessary, the diplomatic and political campaign to inform free world governments and peoples of the nature and activities of the Castro Government and urge them, as appropriate, to undertake all feasible actions which would undermine the Castro Government and demonstrate solidarity with the Cuban people.
3. Encourage Latin American Governments to take steps to prevent their nationals from traveling to Cuba.
4. Be prepared to exploit by diplomatic and other means, any indication of a split in the regime from which there may emerge significant anti-Castro/Communist elements.
5. Continue and intensify where possible and necessary, U.S. efforts to strengthen the democratic sectors in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress program in order to improve their capabilities of countering Castro-Communist threats to political stability and orderly economic and social development.
6. Continue the program of seeking hard evidence of Cuban subversive activities in the Hemisphere.
1. Encourage minor acts of sabotage throughout Cuba.
2. To the extent practicable, cause the diversion of Cuban resources from productive purposes.
3. Conduct selected sabotage principally of major Cuban industries and public utilities with priority attention being given to transportation, communications, power plants and utilities. No sabotage would be undertaken against food supplies, medical facilities, or directly against the population of Cuba as such.
4. Exploit all feasible opportunities for denying markets in the free world for Cuban exports.
5. Exploit all feasible opportunities for preventing the shipment of critical spare parts and equipment from free world sources to Cuba.
1. Use covert psychological media to induce mass Cuban undertakings in minor sabotage (nails in road, sugar in gas tanks).
2. Commando/Sabotage Teams: A pool of 20 to 50 most carefully selected men highly trained in commando-sabotage tactics should be maintained. From this group, especially constituted sabotage teams will be selected for specific sabotage assignments per para. III.C.3 above. Except for occasional specialized training (such as possibly parachute), all spotting, recruiting and training can be done by CIA facilities.
1. Develop, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communism.
2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere.
Operations on these objectives will be divided first into two general categories--overt, i.e., those activities which are attributed or attributable to the U.S. Government and which are the primary responsibility of the U.S. Information Agency; and covert, those activities which cannot or should not be attributed to the U.S. Government and which would thus be under the primary control of the Central Intelligence Agency. These two categories must be subdivided according to whether the operations are primarily directed at target groups within Cuba or at groups outside Cuba, either in the hemisphere or elsewhere.
Concerning operations in all these categories care should be exercised to avoid overplaying purely psychological or informational operations. Information programs can be effective only so long as they accompany and support political and/or material action. They should never be allowed to become substitutes for action and they should not anticipate or prejudice policy.
It is also important to avoid over-emphasis on the purely anti-Castro or anti-Communist aspect of the program. Wholly negative programs of any sort do not wear well with any audience. The Alliance for Progress as the real promise of fulfillment of the aspirations of the common people of the Americas must remain as the keystone of our general Latin American information policy. And a positive approach must also be included in a substantial portion of our materials pointed directly at the Cuban people. This should include material which will provide a basis for reassurance and hope for a new Cuba after the fall of Castro, a Cuba which will truly provide for a realization of the reforms and a fulfillment of the aspirations which motivated the Cuban revolution.
Note: USIA concurs with CIA's conclusion that the expense of establishing and operating a medium-wave broadcasting facility is not justified under the present plan. As previously pointed out, the facility would cost approximately 8 million dollars and take 15 months to build and there are very serious obstacles (notably an extensive Cuban jamming capability) to its success. State and USIA recommend that CIA continue the Swan Island operation at its present level.
Short wave radio must continue as our principal medium of communication with the Cuban people. Nine hours of daily broadcasting in Spanish with three hours specifically beamed at the Cuban audience will continue to be the basis of this. In December USIA's new Greenville facility will be operational with a resulting substantial increase in signal strength. Programs will continue to be built around hard news and commentary, dramatic, historical, sports, and agricultural features and Cuban local happenings, particularly items not carried in the Castro/Communist media. All of these programs carry in some form or other material supporting our objectives.
Particular attention is recommended to a project to plan a well spaced series of moderate statements by U.S. officials and other U.S. non-official spokesmen which would support policy objectives of developing and maintaining the will to resist within Cuba without leading to over-optimism or too inflated hopes.
At the same time carefully documented programs on the failures of the Castro/Communist system must be stepped up to help maintain a firm and material subjective basis for disaffection among the Cuban people.
Strong emphasis will also be given to programming which points up negative reactions to, or repudiation of the Castro/Communist regime in other parts of the hemisphere.
Once the "gusano libre" theme has been established through Cuban or other non-U.S. assets, USIA programming could give it special and continuing play, maintaining, of course, strong emphasis on its Cuban origin.
Overt--To the hemisphere and other free world targets:
All media can and will be utilized in support of Operation Mongoose, although USIA has very difficult budgetary problems. Monetary support from other USG sources might well be necessary for full implementation of some of these projects.
Specific program adjustments made in support of Mongoose include:
There will be increased production and distribution of packaged programs particularly soap operas and commentaries stressing anti-Castro themes.
2) Cartoon Books
USIA's six book series (5 million copies) has been widely distributed and accepted. More could be projected with special stress on Mongoose themes with a minimum delay. Funds here also might be a limiting factor. The new ones would not necessarily be factual but rather the "thriller-killer" type with a Cuban background.
This is unique to Latin America. It is a book utilizing specially-posed photographs with captions to tell a fictional story. A medium of particular importance in reaching the adult, blue-collar worker and housewife neo- and semi-literate groups, this is a field which we have not yet entered. Development of a USIA potential in this field is under consideration and anti-Castro materials would have a priority in any production.
4) Motion Pictures
An animated film on the failures of Cuban land reform has been produced and distributed and two more films on children and labor are now in the pipeline. Contingent on the availability of funds, further productions of this nature could be arranged. More emphasis can be given to providing film clips on Mongoose themes to indigenous newsreels.
A medium of rapidly growing importance in Latin America's urban areas which we have not utilized too widely yet in support of Mongoose objectives. USIA has access to some excellent producers of commercial puppet shows (such as the producer of the Wilkins Coffee commercials) and satirical anti-Castro materials could be easily developed for area use. Further exploitation of the Cuban refugee talent available in the Miami area could also be arranged.
Larger scale editions of books already used and of other similar materials might be arranged in order to provide rebuttals to the pro-Castro volumes already circulating widely in the area. Particular emphasis should be placed on the development of books by non-U.S. authors.
This is one field we have not developed well in support of our Cuban exhibits. USIA could develop and produce quantity paper exhibits of a two-dimensional nature which could be widely distributed in Latin America.
The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban population, the political and military power centers and selected individuals inside Cuba. Its purpose will be to maintain morale and increase the will to resist. Initially the following themes and general guidance will be emphasized:
1) Expose the betrayal of the original aims of the Revolution.
2) Expose the contradictions between past and current promises and performance of the Castro regime.
3) Expose the encroachment of Bloc Communists into the domestic affairs of Cuba and increasing foreign domination of Cuba by Soviet imperialism.
4) Stimulate disaffection in the leadership and ranks of the supporters of the Castro regime, principally among the militia, the government bureaucracy, organized labor, youth and students, farmers.
5) Inspire tensions between Cuban leaders and Bloc representatives.
The following psychological/political warfare activities are considered compatible with and essential to the operational plan:
1) Stimulate and guide the propaganda and political action activities of the Cuban exile political, professional, student, cultural and other groups and individuals which have an existing or potential capability for communicating with and influencing the behavior of their counterparts inside Cuba. Also utilize these groups and individuals for propaganda activities in Latin America and other critical areas.
2) Continue and expand operations involving the infiltration of propaganda material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers or controlled couriers.
3) Establish a propaganda balloon launching capability with appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations. (CIA proposal, questioned by State and USIA)
4) Continue and expand the "Voice of Free Cuba" submarine deception broadcasts in collaboration with the Navy.
1. Strengthen and maintain an atmosphere of resistance in the general population.
2. Recruit, train, and supply small resistance cells in the major cities and in other selected areas of Cuba.
3. Cache arms, ammunition, and other supplies in areas accessible to the resistance cells and in potential resistance areas.
4. Be prepared to covertly provide personnel and logistics support to any significant internal resistance group or uprising.
The program will aim primarily for the development of controlled intelligence sources and small resistance cells for use in the event of any significant uprising. Experience plus continually tightening security controls has demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and maintaining individuals or "black teams" in the target country for an indefinite period. Nor has any method been devised by which infiltrees can become "legalized." Therefore, the PM program must increasingly emphasize infiltrations, spotting, recruiting, and training legal residents, caching and exfiltration of the original infiltrees. The program will be developed to the extent that proves feasible and possible in the light of existing circumstances, including Cuban security controls, morale and motivation of agent material, and the Cuban population's willingness to support infiltrees. To accomplish the required tasks, the following program and support are considered essential:
1. Urban Cells: Two- to five-man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the major Cuban cities to recruit and train small "legal" compartmented intelligence and/or resistance cells. Upon the completion of training, the infiltrated team will be withdrawn if it is seriously endangered or its continued presence jeopardizes the "legal" residents. Primarily, these cells will be intelligence producers. A second mission would be to establish small caches of arms and supplies for use in the event of a major uprising. Spotting, recruiting, and training of the infiltrees can be accomplished within CIA facilities and existing policy approvals.
2. Rural Cells: Three- to five-man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the rural areas to recruit, train, and arm small "legal" compartmented cells. The infiltrated trainers will be withdrawn if they are seriously endangered or if they pose a threat to the security of the resident rural cell. These resident rural cells would have limited intelligence functions until called into action in the event of an uprising. Spotting, recruiting, and training of the infiltrees can be accomplished within CIA facilities and existing policy approvals.
3. Commando/Sabotage Teams: (Described in the Economic section above.)
1. DOD continue to develop and refine contingency plans in order to take advantage of any unforeseen breaks.
2. DOD continue to support CIA and other agencies to the full extent of DOD capability as required.
IV. Policy Implications
The policy implications of the activities outlined above include:
A. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching (State and USIA questioned).
B. Authority to use U.S. Navy submarines for infiltration/exfiltration.
C. Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltration/exfiltration missions using CIA aircraft with U.S. or other contract crews.
D. Authority to conduct selected sabotage principally against major Cuban industries and public utilities, i.e., refineries, power plants, transportation, and communications.
E. Authority to utilize Guantanamo Naval Base for limited covert operational purposes including agent infiltration/exfiltration, support for clandestine maritime operations, and for holding and interrogating Cuban agents and suspects who enter the base. (The scope of the proposed operational use of Guantanamo would not provide the Cuban government with additional issues to enable them to increase their already existing or planned pressure on the U.S. retention of Guantan-amo.) State and Defense representatives disagreed to CIA proposal.
F. Authority to occasionally utilize DOD facilities to provide
specialized training for the commando/sabotage teams when such
training cannot be duplicated at CIA facilities.
375. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin)
Washington, August 15, 1962.
//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret. Martin passed this memorandum to Johnson on August 15, under cover of a note in which he stated that it might prove useful background information for the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) scheduled for August 16. (Ibid.)
Observations on Operational Potential with respect to Cuba
The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize my impressions gained from discussions in the Operations Group of what we can reasonably expect might be accomplished covertly in Cuba under Course B or any other course which is conditioned upon a comparatively low noise level.
Radio to date has proved of limited value. Short-wave does not reach many people because of shortage of receivers. Medium-wave broadcasting from Swan Island has a small audience, due in part to the low power of the facility. CIA recommends that these broadcasts cease. USIA and we prefer that they continue. None feel that the investment entailed in a more powerful facility would be justified. Enlargement of the Swan Island facility or establishment of a new powerful facility elsewhere would, of course, attract a great deal of attention. The submarine radio will probably improve somewhat, although its approximate 25 mile range is a basic limitation.
Dissemination of propaganda to Cuba through the open mails is underway and will probably improve, unless the Cuban Government's censorship tightens.
Infiltration of Cubans with some propaganda materiel is accomplished, although the maritime operations appear to be increasingly difficult. I have inquired about the possibility of infiltrating small portable presses for underground publications--CIA says that they are looking into this possibility.
Other means of communication, i.e., dropping propaganda from balloons or aircraft would probably be attributed to the U.S. rather noisily.
Our means of communicating with the Cuban people are limited and will probably remain so.
The limited state of communications directly affects the success of sabotage operations. Reports indicate that some, apparently very limited, nuisance sabotage (sugar in gas tanks, etc.) does occur. Our ability to persuade the Cuban people to engage in more widespread activities of this nature is handicapped by our limited ability to communicate and the difficulty in landing and distributing sabotage materiel, such as plastic explosives, incendiary fountain pens and similar devices. The Agency's reaction to turning such materiel over to exile groups that are known to have organized resistance groups in Cuba (as stated in the NIE)/1/ is: whenever a reasonable plan is presented by an exile group, the Agency has provided such assistance and is prepared to continue to do so. A complicating factor appears to be that unless such materiel remains under Agency control until the last minute, its existence in the hands of exiles becomes known to the FBI which then, apparently, becomes unhappy. Further, the Agency is fearful that supplying materiel to selected exile groups in blanket fashion and not based on exile plans which the Agency approves, may result in the sabotage of major installations, thereby raising the noise level considerably above that which the Agency understands to be desirable, since the U.S. would be charged by the Cuban and Bloc Governments with complicity and responsibility.
A significant amount of sabotage in Cuba during the next year appears unlikely, unless approval is given for the destruction of major installations by carefully selected and trained Cuban teams infiltrated for such purpose and for the noise level to be raised substantially.
Air and Sea Support of Infiltrated Teams
While maritime means, including the use of submarines if necessary, would continue to be the primary means of infiltration/exfiltration/re-supply, occasions may arise where re-supply can only be accomplished effectively by air and with U.S. citizen crews. Teams that have moved inland may find that only with considerable danger can they reach the coast again for re-supply. Agency experience with Cuban pilots on air re-supply missions has not been good (they are not accurate) and U.S. citizen personnel may have to be used.
[end of document]
to Foreign Relations of the U.S., Vol. X, Cuba.