Secretary Terasaki Established
Net in South America
As a result of the conference of Mr. Terasaki with the Japanese
Ministers of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, Tokyo was informed on
August 22, 1941 that the establishment of an intelligence network
in Latin America had been proposed to secure information in the
United States. Spies would be placed within the United States, American
propaganda as revealed in printed matter and radio broadcasts would
be analyzed, and intelligence secured from sources in Latin America
would be collected and evaluated.
21 August 1941
To: Buenos Aires #62.
(Part 1 of 3) (Message to Tokyo #230)
The results of my conference with the Ministers to Brazil, Argentina,
Chile, and_ _ _ _are as follows:
1. We propose an (intelligence) set-up in Latin America in order
that we might secure intelligence on the public opinion of the United
States, her situation militarily and diplomatically. The method
by which this is to be accomplished is roughly as follows:
a. We propose the establishment of spies within the United States.
From these we shall obtain secret intelligence.
(1) This set-up shall perform the duties of collecting and evaluating
information obtained from the offices and personnel of American
ministries in Latin America.
(2) It shall study the effectiveness of the propaganda contained
in American and Latin American printed matter and radio broadcasts.
(3) It shall collect and evaluate intelligence secured from persons
with whom they are in close contact, as well as the offices of third-powers
in Latin America.
(4) It shall collect and evaluate intelligence secured from individuals
and government offices in Latin American countries.
2. Though we plan for the organization of an intelligence net and
the distribution of agents necessary for the operation of these
proposed steps, in light of current affairs when anything of great
importance arises, we, of course, will put every detail into operation
with the effectiveness with which it is carried out in spy stories.
Japanese Espionage Network
In line with the establishment of an efficient Japanese spy organization
in South America on 22 August 1941 by Mr. Terasaki, the Japanese
intelligence coordinator for the Americas, all Japanese offices
in North America were ordered to give their immediate attention
to the selection of qualified espionage agents. Among the spies
was a seaman who was to be placed with some prominent steamship
company servicing North American ports.
Foreseeing difficulties in selecting reliable individuals and in
checking information derived from foreign countries, Mr. Terasaki
emphasized the necessity of Japan's spending vast sums to procure
men and administer the whole intelligence network. Combating American
counterespionage activities presented a problem since FBI agents
were known to be attempting to gain the confidence of those employed
in the office of the Axis nations. He urged, therefore, that all
Japanese agents be selected with care.
Each Japanese office in South America was to be equipped with radio
sets capable of receiving US domestic broadcasts. Moreover, a central
listening post would be located possibly in Brazil, where a secretary
proficient in English shorthand would be on duty at all times. It
was learned later that American broadcasts would not reach beyond
1,000 miles. This made it impossible to establish a post either
at Buenos Aires or Rio de Janeiro to listen to broadcasts made in
the United States.
Subscriptions to American papers and magazines were to be procured
in the name of a South American for analysis by trained Japanese
agents. Important spy centers were to be located in Brazil, Argentina,
Chile, and Colombia, the latter country was of importance because
of the nearness to the Panama Canal. It would be necessary, therefore,
to enlarge the telegraphic sections of all Japanese offices and
to use the intelligence sources supplied by the local Domei news
agency, special correspondents, and Spanish and Portuguese language
correspondents. Japanese merchants would be employed to keep the
organization informed of economic conditions in the United States.
If the Axis diplomatic staffs were ordered out of the country before
the Japanese, their German and Italian informants would be hired.
Not only were Latin American spies to be used, but also those who
lived in Spain and Portugal, since it would be possible, should
Mexico enter the war, to relay information from Mexico to Spain
where it could be retransmitted to Japan.
17 September 1941
To: Washington #65.
(Circular.) (In 3 parts _ _complete.)
Santiago to Tokyo #261.
Regarding paragraphs 1 to 3-a of my message #231.
All of our offices in North America should give their immediate
attention to the selection of spies. They should choose only those
who are best qualified for the job and have them go to work on collection
of information and, if possible, liaison. The offices in Latin America
shall accept those reports from them in which they can place credence.
If it is possible to obtain the services of an informant who has
been a seaman, it might be a good plan to try and get him a job
in a steamship company. (There is one who falls in this category
in New York. It would be very much to our interest if a job could
be found for him in some steamship company which as a North American
It must be borne in mind, of course, that it is exceedingly difficult
to select individuals who can be reliably utilized. Moreover, it
is very difficult to check any information from a foreign country.
Therefore, it is of primary importance that we make up our minds
to spend vast sums of money.
It is a known fact that the F.I.B. (F.B.I.?) is making a practice
of trying to get its men into the confidence of those in the offices
of the Axis nations. Please note this point carefully and exercise
the utmost caution in making the selections.
The matter contained in (b) of the above referred section, would
be next to impossible to put into effect. However, if there is one
with whom very close relations have been maintained in the past,
it may be that he could be utilized.
With regard to (c) of the same section, each office should be equipped
with good radio sets of the middle wave band. They shall be used
to listen to domestic broadcasts in the United States. The central
listening post shall be located, let us say, in Brazil, where one
who is proficient in shorthand of English shall be on-duty at all
The leading U.S. newspapers and magazines shall be subscribed to
now in the name of some foreigner. These shall be thoroughly perused
(even to the society columns) and carefully analyzed.
The intelligence officers referred to in section 4 of the same
message shall be stationed in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia,
(the last mentioned is looked upon as a very important post by our
Army and Navy, with a view to obtaining information about Panama,
as you are already aware), and Mexico.
To fulfill all of these duties, the telegraphic section of all
of those offices concerned will have to be considerably enlarged.
This is at present the most important actual step to be taken.
As sources of supplies for the above mentioned intelligence personnel,
the present sources of Domei news agencies and others of our special
correspondents shall be utilized. We shall also make indirect use
of the Spanish and Portuguese language correspondents.
Since it will be of interest to keep abreast of the economic conditions
in the United States, we shall maintain close contact with our merchants
who in turn will keep themselves advised through local native merchants
who have access to the information in the United States.
Should the German and Italian diplomatic officers be ordered out
of a country before the Japanese, we shall make arrangements to
take over their informants.
The informants referred to above shall not be limited to Latin
Americans but shall also include those who reside in Spain and Portugal.
(Should, for example, Mexico get into the war, our informants in
Mexico shall relay their information to those in Spain and Portugal
who in turn shall pass it on to Japan.)
Relayed to Washington. Mailed to Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires.
From: Buenos Aires (Tomii)
26 September 1941
To: Washington #15
Re #261 sent from Chile to the Foreign Minister.
According to what the specialists say _ _ _ _broadcasts do not
reach any point beyond 1000 (miles?). I understand that even with
a good receiving set it is impossible to listen in here or in Rio
to broadcasts made in the United States.
Japanese Naval Officials
in Mexico Disapprove of Furnishing General
To Foreign Minister Togo's inquiry whether the office in Mexico
had begun the work of furnishing general information, Ambassador
Miura replied that he had discussed this matter with his Naval Attaché
and had subsequently wired the Chief of Special Service Section
of the Naval General Staff. Although at present they were waiting
a reply, he pointed out that because of the necessity of maintaining
the security of the "L" organ, the naval authorities disapproved
of furnishing general information. He asked that the Japanese Foreign
Office discuss this matter with Navy and subsequently wire its decision.
Eight days later Foreign Minister Togo declared that general intelligence
was to be distinguished from naval intelligence in that it was used
for reference purposes by the Foreign Office. He was instructed
to reorganize his office immediately for the collection of general
28 October 1941
To: Mexico #218.
Have you begun the work of furnishing general information? Please
wire me the results.
From: Mexico (Miura)
28 October 1941
To: Tokyo #427.
Re your #218.
After talking the matter over with the Naval Attaché here,
we wired #57 to the Chief of the Special Service Section of the
Naval General Staff, and we are present waiting for a reply. Since,
for reason of the necessity of maintaining the security of the "L"
organ, the naval authorities are not in favor of furnishing general
information, will you please take the matter up again with the Navy
and wire me the reply.
5 November 1941
To: Mexico City #225
Re your #427.
General intelligence in contradistinction to Naval intelligence
is used for reference purposes by the Foreign Office. Therefore
please reorganize your office immediately along the line of my communication
From: Mexico City (Miura)
5 November 1941
To: Tokyo #432.
Re your # 225.
Your communication No. 953 has not arrived. Please wire the gist
of it immediately.
Ambassador Nomura Sends
Representatives to "America First"
Ambassador Nomura informed Tokyo that he had rushed Secretary Terasaki
to New York on October 30 for the meeting of the America First Committee.
There the intelligence agent has met_____(Comment: DoD withheld
name). Secretary Terasaki asked _____ (Comment: DoD withheld name)
to tell Colonel Lindbergh, who was for "America First,"
that the United States was about to fight with Germany concerning
its policy of "Britain First" in the Atlantic, and with
Japan under its policy of "China First" in the Pacific.
He commented on the fact that a crisis was at hand between Japan
and the United States and that the American people did not understand
the reason for such a war, although, fundamentally, it would be
due to the China problem. Secretary Tarasaki had further stated
on this occasion that it was a mistake to think that Japan would
give in if it were driven into a tight corner by the United States.
It was necessary to view realistically the situation in the Orient,
since it was most inconsistent to fear a southward push by Japan
and at the same time to cut off her petroleum supplies.
From: Washington (Nomura)
1 November 1941
To: Tokyo #1027.
Secret outside the Department.
As the American First Committee was meeting in New York on the
night of 30 October, I rushed Terasaki up to New York on that date.
He met with (an associate of officials of the Committee). (As the
American First Committee is being watched by the F.B.I. this must
be kept strictly secret.) After commenting on the fact that a crisis
is right at hand between Japan and the United States he told _ _
_ _that he would like to have him tell Colonel Lindbergh, who is
for America first, that, while the American people do not understand
the reason for such a war, it has to do with the China problem,
that the United States is about to fight with Germany over her policy
of Britain first in the Atlantic, and with Japan over her policy
of China first in the pacific. _ _ _ _consented and later the same
evening he said that he had told him.
On this same occasion Terasaki also strongly asserted that it is
a mistake, based on a misunderstanding of the Japanese psychology,
to think that Japan will give in if she is driven into a tight corner
by the United States, and that even as the United States is adopting
a realistic policy in regard to Central and South America, it is
also necessary to take a realistic view of the situation in the
Orient, and that it is most inconsistent to express fear of a southward
push by Japan, while at the same time cutting off petroleum supplies.
Relayed to New York.
From: San Francisco (Muto)
9 November 1941
To: Washington Circular #282.
San Francisco to Tokyo #285.
The F.B.I. investigation of _ _ _ _(who was president of the committee
concerned last year, at the time when the organization was dissolved)
and others connected with the organization is being continued.
The F.B.I. has seven able investigators on this job, so that it
would seem as though they considered the case an important one.
Although judging from the type of investigation, it would seem
as though they were most interested in gathering evidence to be
used against _ _ _ _and
_ _ _ _, it also is apparent that the Department of Justice feels
the necessity of looking into this case, due to the numerous statements
being made by the Dies Committee regarding Japanese propaganda in
the United States. It also may be that they hope to make this the
excuse for demanding recall from the United States of all Japanese
Consuls-Generals and Consuls to Japan.
2. A rigid investigation of _ _ _ _ is being carried on. As he
is officially registered as a foreign correspondent for the _ _
_ _, there is little danger of his being indicated (prosecuted).
During the examination he will no doubt have to prove that he was
hired by the _ _ _ _at $350 per month. Therefore, please arrange
matters there so that if _ _ _ _should wire to "GO" of
the _ _ _ _for a confirmation of the above, "GO" is to
wire back to _ _ _ _this effect.
of Ship Movement is Left to
Discretion of Consul
Since intelligence reports of battleship movements were made once
a week, and the vessels could have traveled far from the vicinity
of the Hawaiian Islands in that interval, Consul Kita was instructed
by Tokyo to use his own judgment in reporting such movements. In
addition, the Consul was asked to note the entrance or departure
of capital ships and the length of time they remained at anchor.
This dispatch of November 28 was translated on December 8, 1941.
According to a dispatch transmitted on November 29 and read by
United States translators on
December 5, Tokyo requested that, in addition to giving reports
on ship movements, Japanese officials in Honolulu report even when
there were no ship movements.
From: Tokyo (Togo)
28 November 1941
To: Honolulu #119.
Secret outside the Department.
Intelligence of this kind which are of major importance, please
transmit to us in the following manner:
1. When battleships move out of the harbor if we report such movement
but once a week the vessels, in that interval, could not only be
in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, but could also have traveled
far. Use your own judgment in deciding on reports covering such
2. Report upon the entrance or departure of capital ships and the
length of time they remain at anchor, from the time of entry into
the port until departure.
29 November 1941
To: Honolulu #122.
We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but
in future will you also report even when there are no movements.
Japanese Continue To Watch
From December 1 to December 6, 1941, Japanese intelligence dispatches
were transmitted regularly to Tokyo. On December 1 a significant
dispatch reported that ship maneuvers were held approximately 500
nautical miles southeast of Honolulu, with the battleships leaving
Tuesday and returning Friday or leaving Friday and returning Saturday
of the following week. It was noted that the fleet had never sailed
westward or headed for the "kaiui" straits northward;
the sea west of the Hawaiian Islands was not suitable for ocean
maneuvers. The estimate of distance was based on the fact that fuel
was plentiful, long-distance high speed possible, and the guns could
not be heard at Honolulu.
From: Honolulu (Kita)
1 December 1941
To: Tokyo #241.
(In 2 parts complete.)
Re your #119.
Report on the ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor:
1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical
miles southeast of here.
Direction based on:
(1) The direction taken when the ships start out is usually southeast
by south and ships disappear beyond the horizon in that direction.
(2) Have never seen the fleet to westward or head for the "KAIUI"
(3) The west sea of the Hawaiian Islands has many reefs and islands
and is not suitable as an ocean maneuver practice sea.
(4) Direction of practice will avoid all merchant ship routes and
official travel routes.
Distance based on:
(1) Fuel is plentiful and long distance high speed is possible.
(2) Guns cannot be heard here.
(3) In one week's time, (actually the maneuvers mentioned in my
message #231 were for the duration of four full days of 144 hours),
a round trip to a distance of 864 nautical miles could be reached
(if speed is 12 knots), or 1152 miles (if speed is 16 knots), or
1440 nautical miles (if speed is 20 knots) is possible, however,
figuring on 50% of the time being used for maneuver technicalities,
a guess that the point at which the maneuvers are held would be
a point of about 500 miles from Pearl Harbor.
2. The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleship
is: leaving on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday
and returning on Saturday the following week. All ships stay in
port about a period of one week.
From: Tokyo (Togo)
2 December 1942
To: Honolulu #123.
(Secret outside the department.)
In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships,
airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter,
to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in
each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above
Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent
up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with
Mr. Fuji Changes American
Ship Maneuver Signals
On December 3, 1941, Ichiro Fuji informed the chief of the #3 section
of Military Staff headquarters that he wished to change his communication
signals for American ship maneuvers. Signal one would mean that
the battleship divisions included some scouts and screen units and
were preparing to sortie; signal two that a number of carriers were
preparing to sortie; signal three that all battleship divisions
had departed Hawaii between December 1 and 3; signal four that several
carriers had departed between December 1 and 3; signal five that
all carriers had departed between December 1 and 3; signal six that
all battleship divisions had departed between December 4 and 6;
signal seven that several carriers had departed between December
4 and 6; and signal eight that all carriers had departed between
December 4 and 6.
A house on Lanikai Beach would be used as a signal station and
would show lights during the night. One light in the window between
8 and 9 P.M. would denoted signal one, one light between 9 and 10
P.M. would mean signal two, and so on; two lights between midnight
and 1 A.M. would signify signal five, and so on. It was further
explained that if there was a star on the head of the sail of the
Star Boat it would indicate signal one, two, three, or four; if
there was a star and the Roman numeral III, it would indicate signal
five, six, seven, or eight.
Also used at night would be the attic window of the Kalama House,
located on the east coast of Oahu, northwest of Lanikai. A similar
system was to be used; for example, if the window was lighted between
1900 and 2000, it would indicate signal three, between 2000 and
2100 signal four, and so on.
In addition, signals would be transmitted through the regular broadcast
station in Honolulu. For example, if a radio advertisement read,
"Chinese rug for sale, apply P.O. Box 1476," it would
indicate signal three or six, whereas the advertisement, "Beauty
operator wanted, apply P.O. Box 1476," it would indicate signal
five or eight.
In case the light or broadcast signals could not be sent from Oahu,
the signals would be given by bonfire daily on Maui Island until
the Japanese "EXEX" signal was received. The signal bonfire
would be located at a point halfway between lower Kula Road and
Haleakala Road and would be visible from seaward to the southeast
and southwest of Maui Island. If the fire was seen between 7 and
8 P.M., it would indicate signal three or six; between 8 and 9 P.M.,
signal five or eight.
From: Honolulu (Kita)
3 December 1941
To: Tokyo #245.
From Ichiro Fuji to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.
1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the
a. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:
Meaning and Signal
Battleship divisions preparing to sortie:
1, including scouts and screen units
- A number of carriers preparing to sortie: 2
- Battleship divisions all departed between 1st and
- Carriers, several departed between 1st and 3rd
- Carriers, all departed between 1st and 3rd:
- Battleship divisions, all departed between 4th and
- Carriers, several departed between 4th and 6th:
- Carriers, all departed between 4th and 6th:
a. Lanikai Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:
- One light between 8 and 9 p.m.: 1
- One light between 9 and 10 p.m.: 2
- One light between 10 and 11 p.m.: 3
- One light between 11 and 12 p.m.: 4
- Two lights between 12 and 1 a.m.: 5
- Two lights between 1 and 2 a.m.: 6
- Two lights between 2 and 3 a.m.: 7
- Two lights between 3 and 4 a.m.: 8
c. Lanikai Bay, during daylight.
- If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the
Star Boat it indicates signals 1, 2, 3, or 4.
- If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates
signals 5, 6, 7, or 8.
d. Lights in the attic window of Qualm House will indicate the
- 1900-2000: 3 - 2200-23__:6
- 2000-2100: 4 - 2300-2400:7
- 2100-2200: 5 - 0000-0001:8
e. K.G.M.B. Want Ads.
A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal
3 or 6.
B. CHICH..GO farm etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or
C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal
5 or 8.
3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be
made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of
Kula Sanatorium at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala
Road (latitude 20-40N, longitude 156-19W), visible from seaward
to the southeast and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal
bonfire will be made daily until your EXEX signal is received:
Time and Signal
- From 7-8: 3 or 6
- From 8-9: 4 or 7
- From 9-10: 5 or 8
(COMMENT: This message was sent on December 3, 1941 but was not
translated by American cryptanalysts until after the attack on Pearl
USS Lexington Departs
Noting that three battleships had been at sea for eight days, Consul
Kita said that the vessels returned to port on Friday morning, December
5. On the same day, the Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port.
In port on the afternoon of December 5 were eight battleships, three
light cruisers, and sixteen destroyers, while four ships of the
Honolulu class were in dock.
From: Honolulu (Kita)
5 December 1941
To: Tokyo #252.
(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned
in my message #239 arrived here. They had been at sea for eight
(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same
(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:
3 light cruisers
Four ships of the Honolulu class and _ _ _ _were in dock.
(Comment: At sea near the end of the first week in December was
the carrier USS Lexington accompanied by three cruisers and
five destroyers on a combined search, which took them to the south
and westward. - Battle Report, p.8.)
Consul Kita Notifies Tokyo
Balloon Barrage Defenses
On December 2, 1941, Tokyo directed the Japanese Consul at Honolulu
to wire day-by-day reports concerning observation balloons above
Pearl Harbor, or any indication that they would be sent up. In view
of the present situation, the presence of battleships, carriers,
and cruisers was of utmost importance, Foreign Minister Togo declared.
He asked also that he be advised whether or not the warships were
provided with antimine (torpedo) nets. This dispatch was not translated
until December 30, 1941.
In accordance with these orders, the Consul informed Tokyo on December
6 that 400 or 500 balloons had been ordered in America and that
their use was being considered in the defense of Hawaii and Panama.
He reported, however, that, as far as Hawaii was concerned, no mooring
equipment had been set up at Pearl Harbor nor had the troops been
selected to man them. Furthermore, there were no indications that
any training for the maintenance of balloons was being undertaken.
In addition, it was difficult for him to imagine that the Hawaiian
defenses actually possessed any balloons. Moreover, there were limits
to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. He imagined that in all
probability there was considerable opportunity left for a surprise
attack against Pearl Harbor, Hickham, and Ford. He added that he
thought the battleships did not have any torpedo nets, but he would
investigate the details further.
6 December 1941
To: Tokyo #253.
Re the last part of your #123.
1. On the American continent in October the Army began training
barrage balloons, but it is understood that they are considering
the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Insofar
as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in
the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment,
nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there
is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons
is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage
balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that
they have actually any. However, even though they have actually
made preparations, because they must control the air over the water
and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor,
Hick, Ford and We, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl
Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable
opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against
2. In my opinion, the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The
details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation.
Last Intercepted Intelligence
Report Before Pearl Harbor Attack Lists
Ships in Port
In an intercepted intelligence dispatch transmitted on December
6, 1941 from Hawaii, the last before the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor, the Japanese Consul reported that a number of battleships
and one submarine tender had entered port on the evening of December
5. Nine battleships, three light cruisers, three submarine tenders,
and 17 destroyers were at anchor, and four light cruisers and two
destroyers were lying at the docks. The heavy cruisers and airplane
carriers had left Honolulu. It appeared that no air reconnaissance
was being conducted by the fleet air arm.
(Comment: Berthed in Pearl Harbor were eight of the nine battleships
of the US Pacific fleet, nine cruisers, and a third of the Fleet's
destroyers. Battle Report, p 6.)
6 December 1941
To: Tokyo $254
1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered
port were and one submarine tender. The following ships
were observed at anchor on the 6th:
9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine
tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition, there were 4 light cruisers,
2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers
have all left).
2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by
the fleet air arm.
Inaccuracy of Japanese Intelligence
Since it was obvious at this time that Japan was attempting to
obtain a total picture of military and naval strength in the Philippines,
we well as last- minute information of ship movements and troop
allocations, the accuracy of their spy reports may be gauged by
comparing the information with an estimate of the strength of US
air forces in the Philippines on November 27, 1941, as released
by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Japanese agents
estimated that 1,283 military and 26 naval planes were based in
the Islands (the former was later very slightly raised). Since according
to the American estimate, 43 Navy planes and 298 Army planes were
based in the Philippine Islands, our air strength in the Islands
was greatly overestimated: there were 17 more Navy planes then were
reported but 985 fewer Army planes than were listed by Japanese
27 November 1941
U.S. AIR FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES NAVY
Type and Strength
- PBY-4 (Patrol): 14
- PBY-4 (Patrol): 14
- SOC-3 (Scout Observation): 4
- SOC-1 (Scout Observation): 2
- J2F-4 (Utility): 3
- SOC-1 (Scout Observation): 2
- SOC-2 (Scout Observation): 2
- 052U-2 (Observation): 2
Two squadrons of OS2U airplanes, 24 in all, are being sent to the
Philippines as soon as practicable. It is expected that they will
be shipped from San Pedro in January, 1942.
- B-18 (Heavy Bomber): 18
- B-17 C&D (Heavy Bomber): 35
- P-35A (VF): 52
- P-40B (VF): 30
- P-40E (VF): 117
- O-46A (VO): 7
- O-49 (VO): 3
- O-52 (VO): 10
- A-27 (Dive Bomber): 9
- A-39 (Combat): 1
- C-49 (Combat): 1
- P-26A (VF): 15
In addition to the above 57 type A-24 dive bombers have been shipped
to the Philippines this month, and further extensive reinforcements
have been approved for complete delivery by February, 1942.
From: Manila (Nihro)
1 November 1941
To: Tokyo #722.
1. The TON, MADDO, HON, 7 destroyers, 8 submarines and 3 minesweepers
entered port on the 31st. But the TON left again on the morning
of the 1st, destination unknown.
2. On the morning of the 2st the President Cleveland and President
Madison left port loaded with American soldiers whose time was up,
3. According to reports received from what we believe are reliable
sources the number of American military and naval plans in the Philippine
Islands is as follows:
(a) Military Planes
- Large, bombers, 29.
- Scout planes, 324.
- The same, B type, 62.
- Fighters, 317.
- The same, B type, 62131
- Pursuit planes, 302.
- The same, D type, 69.
- Training planes, 49.
- Total, 1283.
(b) Naval planes
- Large flying boats, 26.
4. Ships in port on the 1st: MAD, BAKE, PIES, HON, BEER, 9 destroyers,
3 submarines, WOHOTOSU, 3 minelayers. In Cavite: REI,
5. According to a report from the De La Rama steamship company
two of their ships, the Dona Estaban (1616 tons), and the MADBUKARU
(191 tons), had been requisitioned by the local American Army.
From: Manila (Nihro)
10 November 1941
To: Tokyo #746.
Re my #722, first part of part 3the number of large attack
planes, latest models, 4-motored B-19's, is 32.
Re my #727, the black soldiers are American Negroes.
Japanese Official Analyzes
Domestic and Foreign Strategy
On November 12, 1941, a Japanese intelligence official in Washington
sent Tokyo a report on the Roosevelt administration's method of
dealing with the Japanese-American situation. In an effort to aid
in the defeat of Germany, President Roosevelt had inaugurated military,
economic, and industrial measures, which would eventually lead America
into complete war. By assisting Great Britain, it had already entered
the conflict on the high seas. While the US Army was not yet equipped
to fight a war with Germany on land, for the present at least, the
US Navy could engage German warships on the high seas. Nevertheless,
in spite of the fact that President Roosevelt had almost dictatorial
powers in regard to Congress and the military officials, the American
people were not in complete sympathy with his policies. For example,
on 10 November 1941, the Times Herald had stated that Roosevelt
was as much a dictator as Hitler or Stalin. Furthermore, the American
First Committee was secretly working to impeach President Roosevelt.
On 30 October 1941 at Madison Square Garden, 8,000 members of the
America First Committee gathered as a demonstration against the
foreign policies of the present American Government.
In Washington, a former American Ambassador demanded that President
Roosevelt be forced to resign his position as President by means
of a referendum. He even went so far as to state that President
Roosevelt might easily die during this disastrous period in the
nation's history. This statement grew great applause from the audience.
Apparently, the Japanese intelligence official went on to say, the
move to impeach President Roosevelt was widespread and was initiated
by many varying factions. An editorial in the Times Herald
on November 4, 1941 warned that it would be impossible for Congress
to impeach President Roosevelt because of the whip he held over
the Army and Navy. Nevertheless, the editorial in this and other
papers did mention the possibility of President Roosevelt's being
impeached at some time, and the Japanese intelligence official believed
this to be extremely significant.
As an indication that the American people were not entirely behind
President Roosevelt's aid to Britain, the Japanese official cited
the occurrence in Detroit when Ambassador Halifax was pelted with
eggs. The American public as a whole had begun to view the prospect
of war in its unprecedented aspects and after the sinking of the
Reuben James, the country received a great shock. Although
President Roosevelt took advantage of this sinking to declare an
unlimited national emergency, in his speech on October 27, 1942,
he did not stress foreign questions but placed his emphasis almost
entirely upon America's internal problems.
From: Washington (Nomura)
12 November 1941
To: Tokyo #1077.
(Part 1 of 4.)
From the Intelligence Official.
1. The ROOSEVELT administration is dashing along the road of military,
economic, and industrial reconstruction with the object of defeating
So far as war on the sea is concerned, the United States has already
entered the conflict. Even if ROOSEVELT should now decide to leave
the Nazis be, he is already in too deep. Even though he tried to
do a 180 degree turn, his economic reconstructionists would not
let him. Therefore, it can be said that the United States is following
the one road to complete war.
2. It is true that the American army is not yet equipped, but even
if war were declared against Germany, no more than the present ocean
fighting would be necessary and, therefore, such a declaration is
possible. The reason why things are not going so well for the administration
in this connection, however, is because the people are not complete
ROOSEVELT has the full support of the government, the military,
and the Congress and is tantamount to a dictator (on the 10th, the
Times Herald said in an editorial that ROOSEVELT is a dictator in
no way less than HITLER or STALIN). The people, however, most certainly
do not support ROOSEVELT. During the last two or three weeks this
has been particularly evident. Let us look into some concrete examples:
According to reliable reports the leaders of the America First Committee
are secretly endeavoring with all their ingenuity to impeach ROOSEVELT.
The stronger government pressure against it becomes, the more belligerent
does this committee grow, and it may well be that the time will
come when they will resort to force. The pressure of the government
against the America First Committee is also becoming fierce. On
October 30 in New York, there was a meeting of this committee, but
they could not make any radio broadcasts. ROOSEVELT's own life is
in grave danger. On that night in Madison Square Garden, the immense
crowd totally 8,000 filled the building to overflowing.
From: Washington (Nomura)
12 November 1941
To: Tokyo #1077
(Part 2 of 4.)
At a mass meeting in Washington, _ _ _ _, a former Ambassador,
made a scathing attack on the ROOSEVELT regime and demanded a referendum
against this deliberate drift toward war. On that occasion he said
that at this so fateful moment in the nation's history Roosevelt
might die. These were words of profound meaning and drew great applause
from the audience. The Times Herald in an editorial said that the
President holds the whip over the Army and Navy and has the full
support of the Government. Therefore, it will be impossible for
the Congress to impeach him. The editorial said, however, that some
believe that he will be impeached, in any case, later on. Now, for
papers in their editorials to use the world "impeach"
cannot be overlooked as something light. Furthermore, pickets in
front of the White House recently carried placards on which were
written the words "Impeach the President". Another thing,
some days ago in Detroit, Ambassador HALIFAX was pelted with eggs.
Again the sinking of the Reuben James gave the popular spirit of
this country a great shock and filled the people with a gloomy foreboding.
In his speech on October 27th, ROOSEVELT did not stress foreign
questions so much as he did internal matters. This is to be regarded
as a declaration of internal warfare whereby ROOSEVELT whipped from
its scabbard the sword of an unlimited national emergency.
From: Washington (Nomura)
12 November, 1941
To: Tokyo #1077.
(Part 3 of 4.)
2. The congress, as I said, is supporting ROOSEVELT. True enough,
the Senate approved the entrance of armed merchantmen into the war
zones; however, the actual figures were 50 to 37, and this could
not, by any means, be called a crushing defeat of the opponents.
This also may be regarded as a reflection of public opinion.
Things being as they are in he country, in order to dispel the
dilemma and to condition the people for a war against Germany, it
may be now that a counter-hand will be played. I mean to say, many
people in the United States fear the German war machine frightfully.
However, they know how we have fought so hard in China for four
years and figure that we are about worn out. They also figure that
we are weak in materials. They do not think that we could resist
them very much and optimize over how quick we could be to come to
If we scrutinize this psychology closely, we find that the ROOSEVELT
administration, although it does not want a two-ocean war, would
probably not do anything to prevent the outbreak of a war with Japan,
depending on how we Japanese act. Perhaps a point-blank declaration
of war might be made. Then the people's thirst for blood could be
stimulated, an unlimited emergency declared, the America First Committee
dispersed, and all opposition crushed. Then they figure the popular
mind might turn favorable for a war with Germany. In other words,
we Japanese would be merely the tool with which the American administration
prepares the way for coming to grips with the Reich.
4. What will happen if the United States and Japan come to blows?
Well, Germany now has a vast occupied territory and is in the most
favorable position to talk peace. England is already complaining
that the United States is not sending her enough help. Germany,
of course, does not want a long war, and she may suddenly, on unexpectedly
generous terms, conclude peace with England. I mean to say that
while the United States would be at grips with us, American aid
to England would naturally slow down and give Germany a chance to
make a separate peace with Great Britain. Germany will certainly
do her best to achieve this feat.
From: Washington (Nomura)
12 November, 1941
To: Tokyo #1077.
(Part 4 of 4.)
The New Deal failed, and the opposition to ROOSEVELT within the
country became unmanageable. Just then the European war took a more
lively turn through Germany's invasion of the Netherlands. ROOSEVELT,
who is well-versed in international questions, joined the war then
and there. It might be said that HITLER's attack on the Netherlands
caused ROOSEVELT to enter the struggle immediately. Japanese-American
relations are now at identically that same pass. I mean to say that
a war with Japan would put the people squarely behind ROOSEVELT
and make him a dictator. He knows fully that if he has to fight,
there will be a suitable opportunity which would not admit delaying
war. Furthermore, in view of Japan's foreign policy, it can be seen
that our relations with the United States have reached such a pass
that a decision on war is about the only thing that could raise
them from the dead. Judging from internal conditions in the United
States, for the foregoing reasons there is no hope for a thorough-going
pact at the present time. It would be better to devise some relatively
easy small-scale makeshift of a temporary nature laying stress on
economic matters. Germany will keep sinking American ships and the
President's position will become harder and harder, so as soon as
a show-down with Germany is inevitable, then we can get a full-fledged
pact. Again, if we do have to fight the United States, we could
do this much better after she is at war with Germany.
OF CHAPTER 2