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National Security  
Decision Directive 103

September 10, 1983

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STRATEGY FOR LEBANON (S)

Our objectives in Lebanon remain: (a) to restore the sovereignty of the Government of Lebanon throughout its territory, (b) obtaining the complete withdrawal of all foreign forces, and (c) ensuring the security of Lebanon's borders, especially the northern border of Israel. In support of our objectives, the mission of the U.S. contingent in the Multi-National Force is to support the Government of Lebanon in deterring hostilities by maintaining an active presence in the Greater Beirut area. (S)

In keeping with the discussion of the Lebanon situation at the NSC meeting of September 10, 1983, the following actions are approved:

- The U.S. Government should work closely and urgently with our MNF contributors and the Government of Lebanon to coordinate political and military efforts to promote our common objectives in Lebanon and present a united front.
- To this end the activities of the MNF contingents and supporting naval and air forces should be coordinated and mutually supportive to include response to hostile fire, intelligence, and reconnaissance activities. The concept of operations for these forces should be one of aggressive self-defense against hostile or provocative acts from any quarter.
- The U.S. contingent of the MNF should be prepared to assist in humanitarian efforts by the MNF and other international agencies under appropriate conditions to include a ceasefire, in relief of any beleaguered civilian entities in Lebanon. Our actions in this regard should demonstrate our impartiality in the confessional conflict.
- Our material and training assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces should be accelerated and expanded as feasible and we should provide timely tactical intelligence and reconnaissance support.

BY AMJ NARA DATE 11/5/05  
 Authority Ho Leary to Weinstein, 9/29/83  
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Authority S. Tilly, VSC (F87-1035) 5-17-91  
BY MSJ, NARA, Date 8/30/97

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- The USS NEW JERSEY (BB-62) will be deployed to the Atlantic and made ready to enter the Mediterranean on short notice. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will notify me if conditions warrant its deployment in support of the MNF.
- In the United Nations, we should be fully supportive of the Government of Lebanon's initiatives to obtain the participation of UN agencies in helping to resolve the current conflict.
- In our dealings with the Syrian Arab Republic Government, we should maintain a correct diplomatic posture and make clear our grave concern for continued Syrian interference in the efforts to promote national reconciliation. Our public affairs efforts should underscore Syrian complicity in the tragic state of affairs which exists in Lebanon. (S)

As the above actions are taken, the following topics should be analyzed on an urgent basis.

- Implications of U.S. action against Syrian forces both in terms of sustained U.S. military effectiveness and the U.S. position in the Arab world. The likely Soviet and Israeli responses should be included in the study.
- Whether the MNF should extend its perimeter of operations beyond the Beirut area, the proposed geographic area, and the forces that would be required to this end. This should include peacekeeping and interposition missions.
- A strategy which will help to restore Lebanon over the longer-term in a global context. (S)

*Ronald Reagan*

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September 11, 1983

Addendum to NSDD 103 On Lebanon of September 10, 1983

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It has been determined that occupation of the dominant terrain in the vicinity of SUQ-AL-GHARB by hostile forces will endanger Marine positions. Therefore, successful LAF defense of the area of SUQ-AL-GHARB is vital to the safety of US personnel (USMNF, other US military personnel in Beirut, and the US diplomatic presence). As a consequence, when the US ground commander determines that SUQ-AL-GHARB is in danger of falling as a result of attack involving non-Lebanese forces and if requested by the host government, appropriate US military assistance in defense of SUQ-AL-GHARB is authorized. Assistance for this specific objective may include naval gun fire support and, if deemed necessary, tactical air strikes, but shall exclude ground forces. ~~(S)~~

I further direct that the Secretary of State immediately inform and consult with other MNF contributor governments and appropriate Congressional leadership on this directive. ~~(S)~~

Ronald Reagan

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