ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION DIRECTED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
This section examines the threat posed by other countries' economic intelligence collection initiatives to the United States and its industrial base. The collection of industrial proprietary information, economic information, and data on critical technologies by foreign intelligence services threatens the viability of U.S. industries and the national security of the United States. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) considers economic espionage activities by foreign intelligence services to be highly detrimental to national security and has included it as one of the seven National Security Threat List issues on which limited counterintelligence assets will be focused.
According to the FBI, research and development activities engaged in developing pharmaceutical and medical technologies, computer software development, chemical processes, electronic banking, optics, packaging, and telecommunications have been heavily targeted by foreign intelligence services and corporate intelligence activities. These activities have also targeted information concerning corporate negotiating positions, cost and price structures, marketing plans, contract bids, customer lists, and new products and services. The Department of Energy's national laboratories have also been heavily targeted by foreign collectors because of their emphasis on developing advanced prototype technologies.
The United States will remain a central target of such collection activities because of the openness of American society and huge investment that American industry has made in developing advanced technology. The objective of these efforts is to provide foreign industries with an edge that will allow them to be more competitive in the global market than American companies.
In discussing this topic, it is necessary to differentiate among economic intelligence, economic espionage, and industrial espionage. The term economic intelligence refers to policy or commercially relevant economic information, including technological data, financial, proprietary commercial, and government information, whose acquisition by foreign interests either directly or indirectly, would assist the relative productivity or competitive position of the economy of the collecting organization's country. Economic intelligence can be an important element in obtaining economic security for a nation. The vast majority of economic intelligence is legally gathered from open sources, involving no clandestine, coercive, or deceptive methods. In some cases, economic intelligence is collected through covert or illegal means. These activities are referred to as economic or industrial espionage.
Economic espionage is the use, or facilitation of illegal clandestine, coercive, or deceptive means by a foreign government or its surrogates to acquire economic intelligence. Economic espionage activities may include collection of information, or acquisition or theft of a manufactured item through clandestine means with the intent of using reverse engineering to gain proprietary or classified data. Foreign intelligence services, intent on economic espionage, may use any of the intelligence collection disciplines to gather information. The most commonly used disciplines are HUMINT and SIGINT.
Industrial espionage is illegal or covert intelligence collection sponsored by an individual or private business entity to gain a competitive advantage. These activities are focused on collecting proprietary materials or trade secrets. This definition excludes legal collection activity, such as collecting open source data. Industrial espionage is practiced primarily by foreign corporations operating in the United States, or against U.S. corporations operating overseas. Frequently, corporations engaging in industrial espionage are cooperating with their nation's intelligence service or are conducting operations on behalf of their governments. Industrial espionage by foreign companies has been largely directed against U. S. industries producing high technology goods. The objective is to obtain the information on which these leads are based without investing the sizable amounts of money necessary to achieve technological breakthroughs. The company that can obtain such information can enjoy a significant competitive advantage.
Targeted Information and Technologies
The importance of proprietary information concerning advanced technologies to the future of the United States has been recognized in both the National Critical Technologies List (NCTL) published by the Department of Commerce, and the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) published by the Department of Defense. The MCTL incorporates all of the technologies listed in the NCTL and includes additional technologies that have military significance. As a result, it provides an all-encompassing view of the range of technologies that are considered essential to the security of the United States. The MCTL was mandated by Congress under the Export Administration Act of 1970 and was supplemented by guidance contained in executive orders. The MCTL is organized into 15 technology groups that include over 200 different technology applications.
Among these groups are:
Composite Materials, Alloys, Superconductive Conductors
Automated and Robotic Production Technologies
Tecommunications Transmission, Switching, and Network Management Capabilities
Lasers, Optics and Power Systems Technologies
Composite Materials, Alloys, Superconductive Conductors
Advanced Electronic Devices, Components, and Circuits Optical,
Acoustic and Electro-Optic Sensors
Aerospace Structures and Propulsion Systems
Directed Energy and Kinetic Energy Applications
The majority of the technologies included in the MCTL and the NCTL are dual use, that is they can be used for both military and civilian applications. For example, advanced biotechnical techniques can be used for the developing new pharmaceutical products or more virulent biological warfare agents. As a result, the loss or compromise of proprietary or embargoed information concerning these technologies can affect both the economic and national security of the United States.
Intelligence agencies targeting economic information generally combine a number of collection techniques into a concerted collection effort. Many of the collection techniques used to gather economic intelligence are legitimate practices that do not involve illegal activity. However, they are important elements of a broader, directed intelligence collection effort. The National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC) examined the threat posed by foreign intelligence collection of economic information and determined the most used collection tactics. Representative collection methods are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Classic Agent Recruitment
Intelligence organizations have used recruitment techniques to develop agents within targeted companies. The agent, generally a trusted employee, can gain access to proprietary or classified information without raising suspicion. Often recruited agents are lower ranking personnel with access to a wide range of sensitive materials. Frequently, support employees such as computer operators, secretaries, technicians, and maintenance personnel have proven to be superior collectors for intelligence activities. Such personnel often resent their lower pay and lesser status in a corporation, making them prone to manipulation by an intelligence agency.
Frequently, personnel within a government agency or company volunteer to provide sensitive economic or proprietary data to a foreign intelligence activity. Employees who resort to stealing information and selling it to foreign intelligence operatives open exhibit the same motivations as spies in national security cases: illegal use of drugs, alcohol abuse, personal stress, significant indebtedness, or simple greed.
Surveillance and Surreptitious Entry
Economic and industrial espionage operations often involve breaking into an office and stealing desired information. Companies have reported break-ins where laptop computers, magnetic media, or documents have been stolen and other valuable items have been left in place. Often, these cases have been dismissed as simple break-ins without further investigation. Only subsequent or ancillary investigations have revealed foreign intelligence agency connections. These operations are particularly prevalent overseas, and many foreign intelligence agencies specialize in targeting U.S. business representatives visiting their countries. Rooms, cars, and meeting areas may also be bugged to obtain information from conversations.
Specialized Technical Operations
These techniques include computer intrusion, telecommunications targeting and interception, and exploitation of weak private sector encryption systems. According to NACIC, these activities account for the largest part of economic and industrial information lost by U.S. corporations. Because telecommunications are easily accessed--particularly international telecommunications they provide a lucrative and extremely vulnerable source for anyone interested in obtaining, economic or proprietary data. Because of the increased use of telecommunications systems for bulk computer data transmission, electronic mail, and transmission of facsimiles, monitoring and interception of telecommunications systems has become extremely cost effective for foreign intelligence activities. Over half of overseas transmissions are facsimile telecommunications, and, in many cases, foreign intelligence services are gaining direct access to these transmissions through government-owned telecommunication systems. Hackers and other computer intruders have become adept at avoiding computer access controls and gaining access to proprietary data.
Tasking of Foreign Employees of U.S. Firms
Foreign companies and governments have recruited or tasked their citizens to gather U.S. proprietary or economic information. Although similar to clandestine recruitment, in many cases no intelligence agency is involved, and the sponsor is a foreign company or non-intelligence government agency. The collector passes the information directly to a foreign firm or to government research and development activities.
Elicitation During International Conferences and Trade Fairs.
Foreign intelligence agencies use events such as trade fairs or international conferences as a means to gain access to concentrated group of specialists on a certain topic. Collectors target individual U.S. scientists or businessmen to gain insights into U.S. capabilities, preferably at conferences outside the United States. Depending on the circumstances, intelligence officers may attempt to use coercion, bribery, or subtle rewards to gain desired information. Often, targeted personnel are given sabbaticals in the collecting nation or are sponsored as speakers at national conferences. Their advice is then sought on areas of interest; frequently the targeted individual is re-contacted after his return to the United States.
Foreign Government Use of Private Sector Organizations, Front Companies, and Joint Ventures
A number of governments use non-government affiliated organizations to gather intelligence and provide cover for intelligence operatives. Examples of such nations include the PRC, Russia, Japan, and France. These activities are used to conceal government involvement in these organizations and present them as purely private entities to cover their intelligence operations.
Tasking of Liaison Officers at Government-to-Government Projects
During joint research and development activities, foreign governments routinely request the presence of an on-site liaison officer to monitor progress and provide guidance. Several allied nations have used these positions as cover for intelligence officers who are tasked to collect as much information about a facility as possible. These officers use their access to the facility and relationship with their U.S. counterparts to gain access to classified or restricted data and remove it from the facility.
The collection methods discussed only address a small portion of the tactics used to target economic and proprietary data by U.S. adversaries and allies. Included in the collection strategies of nations such as the PRC, Japan, and South Korea, is using their students attending U.S. schools as data collectors. Almost all of these nations also use open source data collection as a primary method for accessing critical information.
National Economic Intelligence Collection Efforts
The intelligence services of Japan, Germany, France, South Korea, and Israel collect proprietary and economic intelligence. These efforts use both traditional means of gaining information, such as HUMINT, SIGINT, and open source analysis, and newer techniques such as computer intrusion. Computer intrusion techniques are one of the more effective means for collecting proprietary data and economic information. Many of the targeted corporate computer systems are poorly protected and offer access to information that can provide significant advantages to national industries or government-sponsored private firms. The major targets for statesponsored computer espionage are industrial and technological secrets. Major European and Asian nations openly boast that their national intelligence services collect economic intelligence to benefit their industries at the expense of foreign competition. National intelligence agencies collect computer data overtly and covertly, legally and illegally. All of the national intelligence services of nations listed above have the capability to target telecommunication and information systems for information, or clandestine attack. In actuality, the potential for exploitation of such systems may be significantly larger. In a recent speech, Charles Washington from the Department of Energy's Office of Counterintelligence stated that 121 countries have the capability to use computer espionage techniques against the United States.
The Japanese have mounted a comprehensive economic espionage and economic intelligence collection effort directed against the United States. Because Japan has a very small government intelligence organization, most intelligence is collected by Japanese companies in coordination with the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Major Japanese multinational corporations such as Mitsubishi, Hitachi, and Matsushita have large corporate intelligence organizations that collect political and economic intelligence. The quasi-official Japanese External Trade Organization (JETRO) has also been used as an intelligence asset, collecting information and even supporting espionage activities. The Japanese have used HUMINT sources within U.S. corporations, have bribed corporate employees to purchase proprietary data, and have used Japanese graduate students to collect information from universities and research institutes. Japanese corporations have also made use of the Freedom of Information Act to obtain invaluable information from the United States Government. Within Japan, the Japanese government is believed to monitor all telecommunications traffic from U.S. corporations located in Japan. It is believed that 85 to 90 percent of intelligence collected by the Japanese government and Japanese industry is economic intelligence, much of it based on proprietary data.
The French General Directorate of External Security (DGSE) has targeted U.S. economic and proprietary data since at least 1964. The top priorities of the DGSE are combating terrorism and collecting economic intelligence. Service 7 of the DGSE has successfully conducted technical operations against telecommunications systems throughout the world and has gathered significant data through these activities. Reportedly, the DGSE targeted Loral Space Systems and Hughes Aircraft for information on telecommunications satellite technology, Lockheed Missile and Space Company for data on the MILSTAR military communications satellite system, TRW for military telecommunications technologies, and GTE Telecommunications Products for microwave technologies.
The South Korean government and South Korean businesses have also conducted operations directed at collecting U.S. economic and proprietary data. South Korea has centered its collection efforts on computer systems, aerospace technologies, and nuclear technologies. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, South Korean activities have included stealing information from computerized databases maintained by U.S. government agencies and the U.S. companies.
Germany has been accused of using computer intrusion techniques and SIGINT to gather information on foreign competitors to be passed on to German companies. There are no indications of a HUMINT effort against United States corporations, however, it is likely that German trade officers are collecting economic intelligence through open-source analysis. The German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) is alleged to have created a classified, computer intelligence facility outside Frankfurt designed to permit intelligence officers to enter data networks and databases from countries around the world. This program, code named Project RAHAB, is alleged to have accessed computers in Russia, the United States, Japan, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
Israel has an active program to gather proprietary information within the United States. These collection activities are primarily directed at obtaining information on military systems, and advanced computing applications that can be used in Israel's sizable armaments industry. Two primary activities have conducted espionage activities within the United States: the Central Institute for Intelligence and Special Activities (MOSSAD) and the Scientific Affairs Liaison Bureau of the Defense Ministry (LAKAM). The Israelis use classic HUMINT techniques, SIGINT, and computer intrusion to gain economic and proprietary information.
Under the current counterintelligence guidance, the FBI has foreign counterintelligence responsibility in two areas directly related to industrial espionage. The first area of responsibility is implementing counterintelligence programs designed to protect technologies listed on the NCTL. Second, the FBI is tasked with investigating collection activities conducted by foreign intelligence services and industrial spies intended to gain access to proprietary data whose loss would undermine the strategic industrial position of the United States. The inclusion of these issue areas in the NCTL, based upon a Presidentially-directed review of Intelligence Community activities, demonstrates the changing threat faced by the United States in protecting its national interests.
The extent of the economic intelligence operations targeting U.S. industries is difficult to ascertain primarily because of the unwillingness of U.S. industry to admit to being targeted by foreign intelligence services or competitor intelligence organizations. Much of the evidence that is in the press concerning economic espionage is anecdotal and repetitive. However, this does not discount that such activities go on, or that they are harmful to the interests of the United States. The activities of countries or companies who wish to steal U.S. proprietary information will not stop. As a technology leader, the United States will continue to be a target for economic espionage.
Several high profile cases have involved industrial espionage. In separate cases representatives of Hitachi and Toshiba were prosecuted and convicted in Federal court for the theft of proprietary data from IBM. Proprietary information stolen included software for IBM portable computer systems and information on the design of mainframe computers. IBM also has been targeted by the French computer manufacturer Compagnie des Machines Bull, which acquired proprietary information on the design of IBM personal computers. IBM has also been subject to penetration by foreign intelligence services seeking data for their national industries.
Other companies have been victims of theft of proprietary information. Corning, Inc. was the victim of a effort by a French industrial spy to steal proprietary information on fiber optic technology. Honeywell Corporation was the target of an industrial espionage effort launched by 15 Japanese camera manufacturing concerns targeting Honeywell's single lens reflex autofocusing technology. Honeywell has been awarded over $400 million in damages to date by the Federal court system with a suit still pending against Fuji. Fuji is also involved in litigation brought by Eastman Kodak for the theft of proprietary information concerning Kodak's disposable 35-millimeter camera. The 3M Corporation has been the target of a sustained attack by the French corporation St. Gobain, which has sought to obtain proprietary data on 3M's abrasives and ceramics divisions. In this effort, St. Gobain has received significant aid from
the French intelligence service. In August 1993, the Iljin Corporation of South Korea was found guilty by a Federal court in Boston of stealing proprietary information from General Electric on the manufacture of synthetic diamonds. Iljin and other South Korean firms are suspected of using computer intrusion and other illegal activities to gain proprietary information from U.S. firms.
In 1984, Director of Central Intelligence William Casey stated that the espionage activities of certain Japanese computer companies posed a direct threat to the security of the United States. Casey stated the predatory practices of NEC, Fujitsu, and Hitachi threatened the stability of the U.S. computer industry and urged semiconductor and computer manufacturers to sever their relationships with these companies. At that time, the U.S. share of the semiconductor market was 57 percent and Japan's was 27 percent. By 1989, the Japanese portion of the global semiconductor market grew to 50 percent.
The continued loss of proprietary data in key high technology industries will, over time, threaten the national security of the United States, and result in the loss of jobs and economic opportunity. Many U.S. companies spend 25 to 30 percent of their budgets on research and development in hopes that they can develop products that will provide an edge in global markets. U.S. business cannot sustain these expenditures if their proprietary data are stolen, and their competitive edge in the marketplace is lost. As a result, research and development that is necessary for the production of improved military systems could decline or cease entirely.
In testimony before the House Judiciary Committee Kenneth G. Ingram, Director of Product Development at AT&T, stated that his corporation spends in excess of $3 billion per year on research and development and has been subject to numerous attempts to steal proprietary data. These attempts included hackers trying to access and obtain information from proprietary databases. He also noted that any information transmitted through international carriers, especially in the areas of the Pacific Rim, Russia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Japan is subject to electronic commercial interception, and that such information is likely to be compromised. He stated that there was a significant need for exportable commercial encryption systems for protection of intellectual property.
There is growing evidence of the use of electronic intrusion techniques by industrial spies. Hackers have reported that they have been offered substantial sums of money to gather information on corporations. There is evidence that technical intelligence officers from Eastern European foreign intelligence services, in particular the former East German Ministry for State Security, are selling their talents to the highest bidder. Scott Charney, Chief of the Computer Crime Unit, General Litigation and Legal Advice Section, U.S. Department of Justice summarized the problem:
High-tech spying is becoming common place, and hackers/spies are being actively recruited. When such a hacker strikes, he or she is often weaving through the telephone network and it may be extremely difficult to tell where the hacker is coming from, what the motives are, who he or she is working for (if any one), and what locations have been attacked...ln a recent survey of 150 research and development companies involved in high technology industries, 48 percent indicated they had been the target of trade secret theft. The use of computers in developing and storing trade secrets has made such secrets more susceptible to theift.
Computer intruders can move freely without reference to state borders, and they can perform their tasks without gaining physical access to the system under attack. These factors make it more difficult to detect the theft of information, and when intruders are detected it may make it difficult, if not impossible, to track down and prosecute those involved. Computer intruders have demonstrated the ability to enter commercial data networks and access data. At a recent meeting of electronic data processing auditors, every member present reported repeated intrusions into corporate networks. One auditor representing a Fortune 50 company stated that corporate research and development databases had been copied and sold to a competitor, costing the corporation millions of dollars in lost sales opportunities. In 1991, a U.S. automobile manufacturer lost an estimated $500 million when its automobile design information was extracted from computer databases, and sold to a competitor. AT&T believes that several of its bids for large international telecommunications contracts may have been compromised, and that adversaries with knowledge of AT&T's pricing arrangements used this information to underbid them. The information may have been obtained through a human source or through intrusion into computer or telecommunications networks.
The theft of commercial data by computer intruders is a serious problem that must be dealt with or corporations will continue to be victimized. Aside from stealing information, a computer intruder could also introduce a virus into a competitor's computer system to sabotage their operations. With the growing use of the public switched network (PSN) and the Internet for commercial and financial transactions, more opportunities will be available for the computer intruder. In the case of the Internet, computer intruders continue to take advantage of many of the same vulnerabilities that they have used for years because senior corporate managers and security personnel have failed to institute security countermeasures necessary to protect their computer systems. While no security system is guaranteed to provide absolute protection for proprietary information, additional efforts in the area of information security could prevent loss of a significant amount of proprietary information.
Estimates of losses suffered by U.S. industry vary greatly. R. J. Heffernan Associates, in a study involving 246 of the Fortune 500 companies, stated that 49 percent of the companies said that they had been victims of industrial espionage. The study estimated that the United States may be losing up to $20 billion in business per year as the result of such activities. In a separate study, the American Society for Industrial Security's Committee on Safeguarding Proprietary Information estimates that the 32 largest U.S. companies lost data valued at over $1.8 billion in 1992. The study observed that 70 percent of the information lost was compromised by former or current employees. In one FBI counterintelligence investigation, the loss of two proprietary technical manuals by a major U.S. high technology firm resulted in the loss of billions of dollars of potential business for the firm and hundreds of jobs.
1 - Federal Bureau of Investigation, The FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Program, Washington, DC: FBI Intelligence Division, 1993.
2 - Address by Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation to the Executive's Club of Chicago, February 17, 1994.
3 - The definitions used above are derived from Samuel D. Porteous, "Economic Espionage: Issues Arising from Increased Government Involvement with the Private Sector," Intelligence and National Security, 9:4, October 1994, pp. 735-752.
4 - Under Secretary of Defense, Militarily Critical Technologies List, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1992.
5 - Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, Washington, DC: NACIC, July 1995.
6 - David G. Major, "Economic Espionage and the Future of U.S. National Competitiveness," Speech to the 39th Annual Seminar of the American Society for industrial Security, Washington, D.C., August 23,1993.
7 - William E. DeGenaro, "Steal This Country: How Foreign Spies are Destroying American Jobs," Presentation to the Fifth National OPSEC Conference, McLean, VA, May 1994.
8 - Wayne Madsen, "Intelligence Agency Threats to Computer Security," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 6:4, winter 1993, pp. 413-488.
9 - "Industry, Government Say Security Should Focus on Information," Security Technology News, July 1, 1994, p. 1.
10 - Peter Schweizer, Friendly Spies: How America's Allies are Using Economic Espionage to Steal Our Secrets, New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993, pp. 18-19.
11 - Arion N. Patakos, "Counter-Competitor Intelligence: Keeping Company Secrets Secret," The OPSEC Journal, Fall 1993, p. 39.
12 - Jeffrey T. Richelson, Foreign Intelligence Organizations, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988, pp. 159161.
13 - "Telecommunications, Satellites Said to be Targeted for Espionage by France," Common Carrier Week, May 17, 1993.
14 - Neil Munro, "South Korea Said to Eye U.S. Technology," Washington Technology, May 19, 1994, p. 1.
15 - Samuel D. Porteous, "Economic Espionage: Issues Arising from Increased Government Involvement with the Private Sector," Intelligence and National Security, 9:4, October 1994, pp. 735-752.
16 - Wayne Madsen, "Intelligence Agency Threats to Computer Security," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 6:4, Winter 1993. pp. 413-488.
17 - ibid.
18 - Federal Bureau of Investigation, Foreign Counterintelligence in a Changing World, 1993.
19 - Statement of Marshall C. Phelps, Jr., Vice President for Commercial and Industry Relations, IBM, before the House Judiciary Committee, Hearing on the Threat of Foreign Espionage to U.S. Corporations, April 29, 1992.
20 - Committee on the Judiciary, The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage to U.S. Corporations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1992.
21 - William E. DeGenaro, "Steal This Country: How Foreign Spies are Destroying American Jobs," Presentation to the Fifth National Operations Security Conference, May 1994.
22 - Neil Munro, "South Korea Said to Eye U.S. Technology," Washington Technology, 9:4, may 19, 1994, p. 1.
23 - "CIA Warns of Japan Threat," Computerworld Australia, May 4, 1984, p.1.
24 - David G. Major, "Economic Intelligence and the Future of U.S. National Competitiveness," Presentation to the Annual Convention of the American Society for Industrial Security, August 1993.
25 - Statement of Kenneth G. Ingram, Director, Product Development, American Telephone ct Telegraph, before the House Judiciary Committee, Hearing on the Threat of Foreign Espionage to U.S. Corporations, May 7, 1992.
26 - Sanford Sherizen, "The Globalization of Computer Crime," Computer Security Journal, 32, Fall 1992, pp. 13-20.
27 - Scott Charney, "The Justice Department Responds to the Growing Threat of Computer Crime," Computer Security Journal, 3:2, Fall 1992, pp. 1-12.
28 - Interview ASIS Committee on Safeguarding Proprietary Information, 25 July 1994.
29 - Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway, New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1994,p. 116.
30 - Letter from Kenneth G. Ingram, Director, Product Development, American Telephone ~ Telegraph, to Representative Jack Brooks, Chairman, Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law, House Judicialy Committee, dated September 15, 1992, included in Committee on the Judiciary, The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage to U.S. Corporations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1992.
31 - Interview Computer Emergency Response Team, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, July 22, 1994.
32 - Patrick Houston, "Easy Prey: Corporate Data is Vulnerable to Theft," Corporate Computing, 2:5, May 1993.
33 - The Role of the United States Intelligence Community and U.S. Economic Competitiveness, Statement of Dr. Mark M. Rosenthal, Congressional Research Service, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, August 3, 1993.
34 - David G. Major, "Economic Intelligence and the Future of U.S.
National Competitiveness," Presentation to the Annual Convention of the
American Society for Industrial Security, August 1993.