DoD News Briefing with Deputy Assistant Secretary Stimson and Lt. Gen. Kimmons from the Pentagon
BRYAN WHITMAN (deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Public
Affairs): Good afternoon, and thank you for joining us. Our
briefers today I think you're familiar with, but it's Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs Cully Stimson and Army Deputy
Chief of Staff for Intelligence Lieutenant General John
Kimmons. They're here today to brief you on two documents that the
department is releasing today. The first is the Defense Department
Directive for Detainee Programs
and the second is the Army Field Manual
for Human Intelligence Collector Operations
. We have a limited
amount of time, so I'd like to keep it to those two topics. They
have brief introductions to introduce the manuals to you and then will
take some questions. But they do have another engagement, and I
know we started a little late. So I'll get out of here and let --
turn it over to Mr. Stimson, who will start with the
MR. STIMSON: Good afternoon, everybody. My name's Cully
Stimson. I'm the deputy assistant secretary of Defense for
Detainee Affairs, and today I'm pleased to announce the revised and
reissued DOD Directive 2310.01E
, or echo, entitled the Department of
Defense Detainee Program. This revised directive provides the
overarching DOD policy guidance on detention operations conducted by
This directive, which I'll refer to as 2310, represents the
culmination of over a year of discussion and debate within the
department and the U.S. government in developing a solid foundation
upon which to build future detention operations policy. It
represents the considered effort of many people in the United States
government and the various components of the Department of
It reaffirms our commitment in DOD to treat humanely those individuals
under DOD control.
The revision of 2310 took time, and it took time because it was
important to get it right, and we did get it
The directive -- this directive historically has defined how the
department conducts detention operations in a traditional war. The
revised version, the version before you today, sets forth the policies
and responsibilities for all detention operations conducted by DOD, but
provides the flexibility we need to fight any foe while, as I said,
affirming the values and practices that are at the heart of what we
This directive is the cornerstone of DOD detention policy, and
that's important to understand. The Army Field Manual, for
instance, falls under this DOD directive. It sets out policy
guidance for all DOD detention operations that is necessary and
appropriate to ensure the safe, secure, and humane detention of enemy
combatants, both lawful and unlawful, regardless of the nature of the
conflict. It consolidates existing direction and instructions of
the president and the secretary of Defense, and incorporates the
lessons we have learned over the past few years in waging the global
war on terror. It does so in a number of ways. It
incorporates key policy changes recommended in the 12 major
investigations conducted by DOD over the past two years. In fact,
by publishing this document and the Army Field Manual, we will have
addressed over 95 percent of the recommendations from those 12 major
investigations since Abu Ghraib.
I want to highlight five key elements of
First, and foremost, the directive describes the core policies
that this department believes are critical in ensuring that all
detainees are treated humanely, and that the laws pertaining to
detainee care and treatment are implemented. It incorporates the
prohibitions against cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment or
punishment of the Detainee Treatment Act, and articulates, for the
first time in DOD history, a minimum standard for the care and
treatment of all detainees. These minimum standards of care and
treatment can be found in Enclosures 3 and 4.
I would ask you to put the slide up.
Enclosure 3, which you should have in front of you and on the
screen, contains the text of Common Article 3 to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 verbatim. Enclosure 4
contains other requirements of the law of war we believe, as a
department, are essential to ensure humane care and treatment of all
detainees. Taken together, this is the baseline standard for care
and treatment for all detainees in the custody and control of the
Department of Defense.
In addition to the baseline standard of care and treatment
articulated in those two enclosures, some detainees -- obviously those
such as enemy prisoners of war, or others with protected status in the
Geneva Conventions -- are entitled to additional protections. However,
we sought to ensure that in this global war on terrorism, even when
fighting unconventional forces, the department articulated a minimum
standard of care for all detainees.
There are prohibitions in this directive, and they are as
follows: obviously, as I'd said before, cruel, inhumane or
degrading treatment or punishment; outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment; murder, torture,
corporal punishment, mutilation, taking of hostages, collective
punishment, execution without trial by proper authority; threats or
acts of violence, including rape or forced prostitution; assault and
thefts, public curiosity, bodily injury, and reprisals. Additional
prohibitions include: being subjected to medical or scientific
experiments, and being subjected to sensory deprivation.
The standard of humane treatment articulated in this directive
reflects U.S. law and policy and provides detainees protections that
reflect our values as Americans. And I'll tell you that in my
opinion, that our armed forces are doing a superb job handling
detainees, and the standard of care and treatment that appears in this
directive is actually second nature to them, and I should commend them
for the good job that they're doing.
Number two, this directive reinforces the requirement to account
for detainees by stating our policy to properly and timely register
detainees. And in that context, it reaffirms our policy that the
ICRC plays an important role in DOD detention
Number three, it requires that all persons subject to this
directive report possible, suspected, or alleged violations of the law
of war or our detention operations laws, regulations or
DOD has and we will continue to hold accountable those who violate the
law or our detention policies.
Fourth, it assigns responsibilities to components within DOD. For
instance, the undersecretary of Defense for Policy, or USDP, is
responsible for policy oversight of the DOD Detention Program. DOD
components are required to work with Policy to ensure review,
coordination of and approval of implementing policy or
guidance. In other words, everything flows into Policy, where I
It redesignates the Army as the executive agent who under this
directive is charged with ensuring that policies and procedures are
developed, and is also charged with ensuring that they are working
properly and being carried out.
The directive provides guidance to the combatant
commander. It gives them the guidance they need to promulgate
their theater-specific procedures and policies to ensure the safe,
secure and humane detention of combatants, be they lawful and unlawful
enemy combatants, or regular forces detained in traditional
international armed conflicts.
Also, the directive assigns responsibilities among several of the
other undersecretaries of Defense for things such as medical policy
development, ensuring our contracts include provisions regarding
detainee operations for contractors operating at DOD detention
facilities, training and instruction of those participating in
detention operations, and finally, intelligence-gathering operation.
And that list is by no means exhaustive. You can read the
Fifth and finally, this directive provides the key policy
guidance needed for detention operations. And I will note that the
Army is currently revising the Joint Service Publication on Detention
Operations, which around here is called AR 190-8.
As the DOD executive agent for administration of detention
operations, it is the secretary of the Army's responsibility to develop
regulations, training, tactics, techniques and procedures for the
conduct of detention operations. Likewise, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff are revising the appropriate instructions to ensure
implementation of 2310 in joint operations.
Now, when this process is complete, we will have revised from top
to bottom detention operations policy within DOD.
So we have accomplished a lot today by publishing 2310. It
reflects the lessons we have learned in the GWOT and Iraq. It complies
with the requirements of the law. It unambiguously articulates the
values and traditions of our nation, values that John Adams called "the
policy of humanity," which has been the cornerstone of the American
ethos of warfare.
More importantly, it provides our forces in the field the policy
guidance needed to ensure the safe, secure and humane detention during
armed conflicts, however those are characterized.
Now I'll turn the podium over to General Jeff Kimmons for his
prepared remarks regarding the Army Field Manual.
GEN. KIMMONS: Good morning. I'm Lieutenant General Jeff
Kimmons. I'm the Army G-2 senior intelligence officer within the
I will tell you that, by way of following Secretary Stimson, the
Army has taken pretty dramatic steps over the last two and a half years
to improve our human intelligence capabilities and capacity, to include
interrogation, but not limited to that. And by interrogation, I
really mean getting truthful answers to time-sensitive questions on the
battlefield. Also military source operations, which is leveraging
access which our foreign counterparts have within their own respective
societies and cultures, and analysis, really making sense of all of it
so that we an integrate it with other kinds of operations.
The Army is more than doubling the size of its human intelligence
capability, growing the HUMINT force, if you will, by more than 3,000
soldiers over the next several years. Our Combat Training Centers
now incorporate foreign role-players in realistic training exercises
and rehearsals to prepare our soldiers for combat operations in really
tough, complex environments. We have integrated battlefield
experiences into the courses of instruction on detention, interrogation
and other human intelligence training at our Military Intelligence
School, our Military Police School, our Legal, and even our Combat Arms
Training Centers. And cultural awareness and language training are
now integral parts of that process, and also the preparation of our
units as they get ready to deploy to combat.
There are probably over -- there are more than 500 interrogators
deployed around the world working seven days a week, 24 hours a day, to
accomplish the wartime mission -- over four-fifths of those are Army
soldiers -- to generate actionable intelligence of practical, tactical
relevance to our combat commanders. No service has greater equity
in a effective, doctrinal base or training program than does the
Army. And so it's appropriate that we be executive agent for this
purpose. The work which our interrogators do, of all the services
worldwide, saves lives, both U.S. lives, coalition lives, and innocent
civilian lives. And we're immensely proud of the accomplishments
of our interrogator workforce.
The Field Manual 2-22.3, which, as the secretary mentioned, is
Human Intelligence Collector Operations, was recently approved for
distribution to our forces worldwide, and it replaces our 1992 Field
Manual on interrogation. The new manual is broader in scope and
incorporates hard-won wartime lessons learned since 9/11 across
operations, analysis, screening, debriefing, document exploitation, and
We have used straightforward language in the Field Manual for use
by soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. It is not written for
lawyers. The new Field Manual is wholly unclassified. It can
be shared with our coalition partners. And it establishes the
DOD-wide interrogation standard, consistent with law, the Geneva
Convention, and Department of Defense policy.
The new Field Manual incorporates a single standard for humane
treatment, as was alluded to, for all detainees, regardless of their
status under all circumstances, in conjunction with all interrogation
techniques that are contained within it -- and there are no others.
That is as a matter of law, to include the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005, in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, to include Common
Article 3, as well as Department of Defense policy and service
The Field Manual explicitly prohibits torture or cruel, inhumane,
and degrading treatment or punishment. To make this more
imaginable and understandable to our soldiers -- and I use that in a
joint context -- we have included in the Field Manual specific
prohibitions. There's eight of them: interrogators may not force a
detainee to be naked, perform sexual acts or pose in a sexual manner;
they cannot use hoods or place sacks over a detainees head or use duct
tape over his eyes; they cannot beat or electrically shock or burn them
or inflict other forms of physical pain -- any form of physical pain;
they may not use water boarding, they may not use hypothermia or
treatment which will lead to heat injury; they will not perform mock
executions; they may not deprive detainees of the necessary food, water
and medical care; and they may not use dogs in any aspect of
interrogations. As you know, dogs can be used legally by our
military police for security, but not as an adjunct part of the
The interrogation approach techniques in this Field Manual have
undergone favorable interagency legal review and been judged to be
consistent with the requirements of law, Detainee Treatment Act, and
the Geneva Conventions, as well as policy. The Field Manual was
reviewed and endorsed by senior DOD figures at the secretarial level,
by the Joint Staff, by each of the combatant commanders and their legal
advisers, by each of the service secretaries and service chiefs and
their legal advisers, in addition to the Director of Defense
Intelligence Agency and the Director of National Intelligence, who
coordinated laterally with the CIA. It's also been favorably
reviewed by the Department of Justice. The Field Manual contains
19 interrogation approaches. No other techniques are authorized
within the Department of Defense. Sixteen of these are traditional
interrogation approaches which were enshrined in the old Field Manual
Based on battlefield lessons learned, we have added two
additional approaches to the main body of the field manual, and those
are Mutt and Jeff, good cop/bad cop, and false flag, portraying
yourself as someone other than an American interrogator. Those
were added for general-purpose use across all detainee
Those 18 techniques are authorized for use Department of Defense-
wide and worldwide, regardless of status.
Our four-star combatant commanders also specifically requested,
based on battlefield experience, that we include one restricted
technique called separation, for use on a by-exception basis only with
unlawful enemy combatants. That is, it's not authorized for use on
prisoners of war and other protected persons.
Separation allows interrogators to keep unlawful enemy combatants
apart from each other as a normal part of the interrogation process, so
they can't coordinate their stories and so that we can compare answers
to questions that interrogators have posed to each other without there
having been collusion. It's for the same reason that police keep
murder suspects separated while they're questioning them, although this
is within an interrogation context.
Separation meets the standard for humane treatment, the single
standard that exists across DOD, and it is enshrined in this manual.
But the Geneva Conventions afford additional protections -- privileges,
if you will -- to legal or to lawful combatants above and beyond the
humane standard. It authorizes lawful combatants to receive mail
and send packages. It authorizes them to receive pay for work that
they perform. It also protects them from being separated from
their fellow prisoners of war with whom they were captured, without
their express consent.
These additional -- additional -- privileges above and beyond the
humane standard are not an entitlement which our unlawful combatants
And you can imagine, for practical reasons, why we would want to
keep unlawful combatants -- and who include terrorists -- separated
from one another, albeit within a humane environment.
Nonetheless, special interrogator training and certification is
required for our interrogators to use this restricted approach. A
very high level of command oversight is also required. Four-star
combatant commanders must approve the use within their respective
theaters of operation. A second general officer, or flag officer,
must review and approve each interrogation plan which incorporates the
use of separation. And typically, a number of techniques will be
included in any given interrogation plan.
We've built mandatory safeguards for interrogation into all of
the interrogation approach techniques in the Field Manual to ensure
humane application. The Field Manual also includes many examples
of correct usage of these techniques. It tries to leave as little
to the imagination as possible without being overly prescriptive, and
we think we've done a good job.
The Field Manual clarifies military intelligence and military
police's roles, which are complementary, but discrete in some important
respects. Military police do not participate in
interrogation. They do not set conditions. They do not soften
up our detainees. That is explicitly written into the Field Manual
and will be trained.
The Field Manual also defines the roles and functions which
healthcare providers may perform within the context of interrogations,
which is very limited and essentially limited to normal precautionary
medical inspection and care as well as emergency services. But
they are not authorized to assist -- directly assist
The Field Manual reiterates the standard established by
Department of Defense Directive 3115.09 for strict control of access to
detainees by non-DOD personnel, other government agencies or other
foreign governments, and basically requires a Joint Task Force
commander or a theater commander to approve that access, and if access
is granted, the non-DOD agency must be escorted and observed by a
trained, certified DOD member, and also the non-DOD agency must agree
to comply with the safeguards provisions and use the techniques and
only the techniques enshrined in this Field Manual.
The Field Manual makes clear that commanders of forces which
conduct detention operations or interrogation operations are directly
accountable and responsible for humane detainee treatment in addition
to their other command responsibilities. It emphasizes the
responsibility of every service member to report observed, suspected or
alleged detainee abuse, and it tells them how to do it. It also
gives them guidance on how to report if they suspect their chain of
command is complicit.
The bottom line is, this is a very good field manual. Our
soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines need it to get this tough work
done, and we need to put it into their hands without further
What I'd like to do now is invite Secretary Stimson back up and
we'll take your questions.
Start over here.
Q Sir, are you concerned, as an
intelligent officer, that specifying exactly the 19 techniques that can
be used, and not having anything else classified, will hinder your
troops' ability to gather the intelligence that they need?
GEN. KIMMONS: That's a good question. And it's one that
we, frankly, wrestled with for several months. We initially
considered taking the additional techniques I described, the three new
ones, and putting them into a classified appendix of some sort to keep
them out of the hands of the enemy, who regularly reads our field
manuals as a matter of course.
We weigh that against the needs for transparency and working
openly with our coalition partners who don't have access to all of our
classified publications, and also the need to be as clear as we can be
in the training of these techniques to our own soldiers, sailors,
airmen and Marines as to reduce the risks of inadvertent migration from
a classified domain into a(n) unclassified text by virtue of them being
We also felt that even classified techniques, once you use them
on the battlefield over time, become increasingly known to your
enemies, some of whom are going to be released in due course. And
so on balance, in consultation with our combatant commanders, we
decided to go this route. We're very comfortable with it; so are
our combatant commanders.
Now, having said that, I'd just add, this manual is going to be
revised on -- or at least reviewed for revision on an annual basis.
That's no different than any other doctrinal publication. Based on
battlefields lessons learned, new policy which may come out, we may
revise this downstream, and so I think we have flexibility to make
adjustments as required.
Q General, why was the decision
made to keep these categories -- the separate categories of
detainees? You have traditional prisoners of war and then the
unlawful enemy combatants. Why not treat all detainees under U.S.
military custody the exact same way?
GEN. KIMMONS: Well, actually, the distinction is in Geneva
through the Geneva Convention, which describes the criteria that
prisoner -- that lawful combatants, such as enemy prisoners of war --
which attributes they possess -- wearing a uniform, fighting for a
government, bearing your arms openly and so on and so forth. And
it's all spelled out fairly precisely inside Geneva.
Geneva also makes clear that traditional, unlawful combatants
such as in the -- 50 years ago, we would have talked about spies and
saboteurs, but also now applies to this new category of unlawful -- or
new type of unlawful combatant, terrorists, al Qaeda,
They clearly don't meet the criteria for prisoner of war status,
lawful combatant status, and so they're not entitled to the --
therefore to the extra protections and privileges which Geneva
affords. MR. STIMSON: And let me jump in, too. It's
important to remember that for the first time in DOD history, here we
are establishing for all detainees, regardless of their legal status, a
baseline standard of care and treatment, and those are the standards
announced in and shown in Enclosure 3 and 4, so Common Article 3 plus
the additional protections articulated in Enclosure 4.
So with respect to how they're treated at a minimum, there is no
difference. But people earn their rights in the certain categories
in the Geneva Conventions. And as the general said, an enemy
prisoner of war is a person who abides by, among other things, the laws
of war, fights for a country, open arms, wears the uniform, et
cetera. And -- but you have to differentiate between legal status
and then standard of care and treatment.
Q Does the directive change the
policy on detention operations or merely define it more
MR. STIMSON: The directive lays out the overarching policy
guidance to combatant commanders and the Department of Defense. It
clarifies the older, 1994 policy. The 1994 policy was written
mainly with enemy prisoners of war in mind, not this category of
non-state actors with global lethality, here unlawful enemy
combatants. And so it incorporates those lessons learned; it is
applicable to today, moving forward. So that's the answer to that
Q So follow up, it's no different,
it's just defined more broadly?
MR. STIMSON: The policy incorporates lessons learned, it
takes into consideration now that the foe that we're fighting today,
and perhaps in the future, will not be a -- will be a non-state actor,
such as a terrorist; and differentiates in terms of legal status those
categories, but articulates very firmly a baseline standard of care and
treatment for all detainees, regardless of legal status. And
that's the important aspect of 2310.
Q Sir, some legal experts on Common
Article 3 suggest that solitary confinement is against -- is banned by
Common Article 3 in the affront to human dignity, other
provisions. Are you confident that separation is permitted under
Common Article 3?
MR. STIMSON: Yes.
Q And the --
MR. STIMSON: Not only am I satisfied, because it doesn't
matter necessarily what I think, the service JAGs believe that, the
Department of Justice, also legal counsel, believes that, the combatant
commanders believe that through the advice of their legal counsel, and
the various departments within the United States government who have
looked at this also believe that.
Q Does separation mean solitary
confinement, or is it a different -- does it mean a different
MR. STIMSON: Separation does not mean solitary confinement.
Separation, as anticipated and announced in Appendix M of the Army
Field Manual, is a specific interrogation technique. And I'd ask
Jeff to sort of explain how we got there. GEN. KIMMONS: We
have always segregated enemy combatants on the battlefield at the point
of capture and beyond, to keep them silent, segregate the officers from
the enlisted, the men from the women, and so forth. That's
traditional; it goes back to World War II and beyond.
Once they get back to a point where they can be interrogated --
that could be fairly far forward or it could be further back in the
chain -- and an interrogator devises an interrogation plan to question
that person, it's no longer a matter of battlefield evacuation and
segregation. And so we chose consciously not to be cute with this
thing; we chose to bring it into the Field Manual as an explicit
interrogation technique so that we could train it to standard and we
could build in safeguards and a high level of command oversight, which
otherwise, if it wasn't addressed at all, would have been left up to
the discretion of people on the ground.
That does them a disservice, and it places the burden at a level where
it shouldn't be.
Q One follow-up. Several
months ago, the Defense Department was considering not including Common
Article 3 within the directive but just saying that it will adhere to
the principles. And I as told that there were some concerns that
the use of humiliating and degrading conduct could be used by detainees
to argue that they were being mistreated. What was the argument
within DOD? What were the concerns about Common Article
3? And how did you overcome them?
MR. STIMSON: I'm not going to do a rewind of the internal
discussions within the department or in the U.S. government regarding
of the development of 2310. Suffice to say that it was a robust
discussion, that there were people who believed that this war that
we're in was of an international character.
If I polled all of you a month before the Hamdan decision, I bet
most of you would raise your hand and say that this was a war of
international character. Well, the Supreme Court would have said
And so the debate was robust, it was important, and it produced
ultimately the document which is before you today, which obviously
embraces not only Common Article 3, which the Supreme Court said
applied to al Qaeda, but additional protections that are included in
Enclosure 4. So we have gone beyond what the Supreme Court said
with respect to al Qaeda in the Hamdan decision.
Q Does the manual set limits on the
use of separation, time limits? Or does it specify, you know, how
to ensure that this doesn't become long-term --
GEN. KIMMONS: Yes, it does. We have -- that was one of
the reasons we brought it into the manual. Not only does it
require a high level of command, four-star commander, general officer
review, but also it -- there are -- and you can read it for yourself --
I mean, there's limitations in terms of how long someone can be
separated and what the process and procedures and approval levels are
if you want to extend that as a function of military
MR. STIMSON: Josh?
Q General and Mr. Stimson, the --
some of the tactics that were used in particular in Guantanamo Bay that
were considered by investigators to be abusive when used together
are now prohibited -- for example, the use of nudity, hooding, that
sort of thing.
In looking at those particular tactics and now not being able to
use them, does that limit the ability of interrogators to get
information that could be very useful? In particular, on one
detainee in Guantanamo Bay, those -- some of those tactics that are now
prohibited were deemed to be very effective in getting to that
Also, are there going to be safeguards to prevent whether it be
interrogators or commanders from interpreting the tactics that are
approved in ways that could be considered abusive, as those were --
some of those tactics were derived from standard interrogation
GEN. KIMMONS: Let me answer the first question. That's
a good question. I think -- I am absolutely convinced the answer
to your first question is no. No good intelligence is going to
come from abusive practices. I think history tells us that. I
think the empirical evidence of the last five years, hard years, tell
And moreover, any piece of intelligence which is obtained under
duress, under -- through the use of abusive techniques would be of
questionable credibility. And additionally, it would do more harm
than good when it inevitably became known that abusive practices were
used. And we can't afford to go there.
Some of our most significant successes on the battlefield have
been -- in fact, I would say all of them, almost categorically all of
them have accrued from expert interrogators using mixtures of
authorized, humane interrogation practices, in clever ways that you
would hope Americans would use them, to push the envelope within the
bookends of legal, moral and ethical, now as further refined by this
field manual. So we don't need abusive practices in
there. Nothing good will come from them.
MR. STIMSON: And Josh, let me add another piece to that.
Obviously, because of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, the Army
Field Manual now is in effect law, the law of the land. I can tell
you -- I'm not an interrogation expert, I'm just a lawyer who happened
to end up in a policy job -- but as a prosecutor, my former life, and
when I spend time in Guantanamo talking to the interrogators there,
they'll tell you that the intelligence they get from detainees is best
derived through a period of rapport building, long-term rapport
building; an interrogation plan that is proper, vetted, worked through
all the channels that General Kimmons is talking about, and then
building rapport with that particular detainee.
So it's not like Sipowicz from the TV show, where they take them
to the back room. You're not going to get trustworthy information,
as I understand it, from detainees. It's through a methodical,
comprehensive, vetted, legal -- and now transparent in terms of
techniques -- set of laydown that allows the interrogator to get the
type of information that they need.
about safeguards for interpretation, as again some of those tactics
originally were derived from very standard, straightforward
approaches? Is there something in the Field Manual that deals with
GEN. KIMMONS: We've infused into it a number of text
boxes. For example, there's one on impermissible coercion. I
can coerce you to stand in the corner. It's not impermissible;
it's authorized. So we try to describe those I guess what you'd
call gray areas as best we can. In fact, we've discussed back and
forth and polished the wording on those to make it as clear and crisp
and unambiguous as possible. And I think we've done a pretty good
Q General, going on that point,
where you're talking about making it as clear as possible, can you
touch on some of the approved interrogation techniques and how you put
it from lawyers' terms to soldiers' terms so they can understand
GEN. KIMMONS: Well, I mean, we have infused into this thing
I mean when we describe a technique, you will see repeatedly in the
Field Manual in the text where it says, "for example." Tells you,
you know, what to do and what's approved, and it describes the use of a
technique, and then it says, "for example," and then it talks to a real
world example of when something has worked, where it's been proven to
be effective and when it's -- or proven to be ineffective or
Q Can I get examples of the 16
techniques that are still approved?
GEN. KIMMONS: Oh, well all of the techniques that were in
the old Field Manual are still approved. There were 17; we
combined two of them into one. That's why there's 16 that were
carried forward. But if you have a copy of the old Field Manual, it's
exactly the same techniques. All we have done is expand on them
and make them a little more comprehensive, if you will. And then
we added those three that I described before.
MR. WHITMAN: We just have time for a couple more, I'm afraid
Q General, as an expert in
interrogations, do you believe that sensory deprivation was abusive, or
did it ever prove to be helpful in interrogation?
GEN. KIMMONS: Sensory deprivation is abusive and it's
prohibited in this Field Manual, and it's absolutely counterproductive,
in my understanding of what we have used productively. Sensory
deprivation, just to be clear -- and we define it in the Field Manual,
but basically, it comes down to the almost complete deprivation of all
sensory stimuli, light, noise, and so forth, and to the point
where it can have an adverse mental, psychological effect on a --
disorienting effect on a detainee.
Q So could there be deprivation of
light alone for extended periods of time, as opposed to complete
GEN. KIMMONS: I think the total loss of an external
stimulus, such as deprivation of light, would not fit what we have
described here as -- for example, if you're hinting about separation,
separation does not involve the darkness or lack of that type of
wasn't the question, though. Would sensory -- would the
deprivation of light alone be permitted under the current manual, as
opposed -- because you described sensory deprivation as total
GEN. KIMMONS: That's correction.
Q -- of all senses. So
deprivation of light alone for extended periods would be
GEN. KIMMONS: I don't think the Field Manual explicitly
It does not make it prohibited. And it would have to be weighed in
the context of the overall environment. If it was at nighttime
during sleep hours, then it would make personal sense to turn the
Q You know what I'm talking
about. I'm trying to get at -- because you said specifically total
sensory deprivation -- so deprivation of any one sense might be
permitted. Like light, for example. They could be kept in the
dark for extended periods of time beyond the usual nighttime
MR. STIMSON: Jim, questions like this are good questions to
ask. And what's important to remember is that interrogation plans are
put together for a reason so that not just one person can decide what
he or she wants to do and then run off and do it. They're
vetted. It's laid out how they're vetted. General Kimmons
could go into that in exhaustive detail. Typically, there would be
a JAG, as I understand it, General Kimmons --
GEN. KIMMONS: That's correct.
MR. STIMSON: -- that would have to review that. It goes
up through various chains of command. And so, you know, types of
questions like this would have to be asked and then vetted through that
Q Okay. And so how does this
affect the attempt to gain real-time, actionable intelligence during,
like, for example, battlefield interrogations?
GEN. KIMMONS: Well, interrogations can occur at any level
where there's a trained and certified interrogator, and that could be
at the point of capture, although more commonly it's further back in
Every soldier, regardless of his skill set or military
occupational specialty, can perform direct questioning. So
infantrymen can perform direct questioning of someone they've detained
-- who are you, where did you come from, where's your family -- either
directly or in language or through use of an interpreter. That is
not considered to be interrogation. That is a battlefield practice
which all soldiers have the ability to do.
Well, if you get beyond that and into an interrogation plan
mixing any of these techniques involved, then you have to -- that
transcends, then, into interrogation.
one final, quick question. If any soldier violates any of these
guidelines, are they then subject to prosecution under the
GEN. KIMMONS: This manual is doctrine, so it's not a law
enforcement mechanism. But it forms the foundation for orders and
directives, which, in violating those, could subject a soldier, sailor,
airman or Marine to punishment under the UCMJ. And since this
enshrines law -- Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Geneva Conventions,
violation of those, to the extent that those are in contravention to
directives, SOPs and lawful orders, could result in
GEN. KIMMONS: Yes, ma'am?
Q Are there any --
MR. WHITMAN: This will be the last question,
Q It seems to me that this all got
rolling when folks down at Guantanamo were looking for exceptions to
the current standards. Does this Field Manual prevent that from
happening again? Wholly separate from the annual review that you
talked about -- is there any possibility that somebody can again come
to the secretary of Defense and say, look, we need a little bit more
GEN. KIMMONS: I'd defer to the secretary. There's no
provision for exceptions to this Field Manual.
Q Was there a provision for the
exception -- was there provision in the last Field Manual? And how
did we get here from there?
GEN. KIMMONS: Well, I think we got here, if you're talking
about the transgressions and mistakes that were made in the past, those
were not people complying with the old Field Manual, those were people
who were abusing prisoners, sometimes in conjunction with interrogation
and sometimes outside of the interrogation envelope, in a willful,
malicious manner. I mean --
Q But I think that they thought
that they were doing it not in a willful, malicious manner. They
went to OSD and said we need extra latitude.
MR. STIMSON: Remember, because of the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005, this Field Manual is law. And the directive and the Field
Manual have no provisions for waivers from the Detainee Treatment
Q And were there provisions for
waivers before? I'm just unclear as to what the status of this was
MR. STIMSON: I'm aware that waivers were asked for, but I
don't know the answer exactly to your question, how you phrased
MR. WHITMAN: Thank you.
GEN. KIMMONS: Thanks very much.