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QAnd the other question is a different subject. Can you bring us up to date on the Pentagon review of Deutch's activities here? Do you have any reason to believe he had information about black programs on unsecured computers, and do you know the status of that information?
ADM. QUIGLEY: Sure. Let me review the bidding on that.
On a week ago Monday -- that's the 7th, I believe, of February -- we received information, paper, from the CIA that started a review here within the building. That review is taking two paths, looking at it with two different sets of eyes, if you will. One is content, and that's undergoing a review on what specific material was contained therein. The second is process, how could this have happened in the first place. Now, the first is in -- how could any classified information that we find have gotten onto that computer, and try to determine as best we can how that could have occurred.
QBut the --
ADM. QUIGLEY: The second one -- well let me finish. The second one is being done by the inspector general, and the inspector general -- our inspector general -- contributed to the CIA effort that was recently announced and completed. So it's kind of picking up where they left off, to some extent. So content, process -- that review continues.
QCould you be -- with apologies, could you please be much more specific about what DOD is doing? In other words -- content. Are you reviewing the three unsecured computers he had when he left the CIA? Are you reviewing computer material he worked on when he was here at the Pentagon? That's my first question.
ADM. QUIGLEY: We're reviewing paper that was provided to us by the CIA that they felt pertained to DOD equities. If it was a subject that we would care about, we were provided paper by the CIA -- says, "Here, this is what we know, this is what we found. You guys do with this what you will." And that is the material that we were given a week ago Monday.
QAnd is black program information included in there?
ADM. QUIGLEY: All material that they felt we would be interested in was provided to us -- classification level notwithstanding.
QI'm sorry, what does that mean?
ADM. QUIGLEY: You used the term "black programs." If it was something that was relevant to the Department of Defense at any classification level, that was provided to us for us to take a look and do a review of that material.
QDoes any of that material include black programs?
ADM. QUIGLEY: That review is continuing. We have not asked our reviewers for any interim reports, and their work is ongoing today. They're not done.
QDoes that material relate to his pre-CIA service at the Department of Defense or just his CIA service?
ADM. QUIGLEY: If it's DOD-related, Chris. There has been no attempt to put any sort of a time line on it, so I would say it would be all encompassing, dates notwithstanding. But if the subject would be relevant to the Defense Department, that would be material that we were provided.
Bob?
QWouldn't the time line be important? I mean, he served for two or three years here --
ADM. QUIGLEY: Oh, indeed, it could. But I'm saying that that's not a discriminator in our review of the material.
QSo it does include the time when he worked in the Pentagon?
ADM. QUIGLEY: (Inaudible.)
QYou are reviewing the contents on his computers at home during the time he worked at the Pentagon; is that what you're saying?
ADM. QUIGLEY: We are taking a look at, today, the material that was provided to us nine days ago, 10 days ago.
QBut can't you just answer my question?
ADM. QUIGLEY: I am not sure I understand the distinction.
QThe question is: Are you reviewing what content was on his home computer while he worked in the Pentagon?
ADM. QUIGLEY: I don't know that we have a discriminator on that at this point.
QDidn't Secretary Cohen, when he briefed us, say that one of the things he wanted to have happen -- unless I misunderstood -- that he wanted the Pentagon to go back and look at the records and also determine whether there might have been a similar situation during Deutch's service here?
ADM. QUIGLEY: We're taking a look first -- let me put it this way; do things in order, if you will -- we are taking a look first at the material that we received on the 7th.
QSo there is no review at the moment of Deutch's activities when he was at the Pentagon?
ADM. QUIGLEY: Yeah, and I am not ruling that out, either; it's just one thing at a time.
QCan you rule it in or out so that we can understand what you're -- (laughter) -- investigating, what you're looking at?
STAFF (?): It's everything --
ADM. QUIGLEY: First, we need to understand what the material that we received from the CIA contains. Where does that point us for future directions and courses of action? We just don't know yet until we are done reviewing that.
We'll take the appropriate steps, but we're just not to that point yet to say with definition, what that next step is until we finish reviewing the material that we received on the 7th.
QSo is it correct that the Department of Defense has still not seen or received a copy of the CIA-IG report?
ADM. QUIGLEY: We received information from that report that was relevant to the Department of Defense. If it was anything DOD-related, Barbara, that was provided to us on the 7th.
QYou have not asked for the full report?
ADM. QUIGLEY: I don't know that we necessarily have equities in something that isn't relevant to what we do on a daily basis. There are elements of that report, I am sure, that have nothing to do with the Defense Department. But we care about the parts that do pertain to the Defense Department, and that was what was provided to us on the 7th.
Pam?
QCould you characterize the heft of this document that you got? Is it one single-spaced typed page? Is it 20 pages?
ADM. QUIGLEY: No; I don't know. I don't know.
QAnd who is carrying out the review?
ADM. QUIGLEY: Two different elements. On the one side is the IG, as I mentioned, and their motivation is the process.
They are hampered somewhat by classification. In other words, the inspector general personnel that are accomplishing this part of the review don't necessarily have the requisite security classification, the security clearance, to review the material. And further, that's not their charter. They are the process side, and not the content so much.
On this side is the content. And they are not concerned with the process but what information is there. And we have people assigned to that, from within various elements of the DOD staff, that have all the requisite clearances to review all of it --
QGreat --
ADM. QUIGLEY: -- now not necessarily every person involved; that's not how the clearances work. But we have enough people with the requisite clearances to review a hundred percent of the information that we have been provided.
QWell, if the -
QCraig, this material that you've received, this is not just a CIA report on what he had. You have actual copies of what he had on his computer, right? You won't characterize the dates involved or the classification, but you have actual copies of what he had on his computer. They have provided you with that.
ADM. QUIGLEY: We have the supplementary information that went into the CIA report resulting from materials that he had on his computer, yes.
QAnd you have copies of the -- what he had on his computer.
ADM. QUIGLEY: Yeah. Yeah. Now, there may be more as well, Charlie. There was a variety of information again. That was the discriminator from CIA: if it was Department of Defense-relevant, then they would provide that to us for us to take a look at.
Barbara?
QJust to clarify -- I'm sorry, but just to clarify, you have CIA descriptions of the material, or the original content itself?
ADM. QUIGLEY: I have not seen it. I can't characterize it for you further.
QWould you take that question?
ADM. QUIGLEY: I'll try.
QAnd what exactly process, what process is DOD IG reviewing?
ADM. QUIGLEY: How could classified material have gotten onto an unclassified system, and the whole issue that you have heard about with the computer itself, how did this happen? Just how did that material get to where it got?
QIs this question did he download -- I mean, is the question you're looking at did he download secret information, like Wen Ho Lee, and put it on? Because, I mean, we can sort of answer that question ourselves: he put it on there, that process question -- How did it happen? He put it there. So is the question really did he download?
ADM. QUIGLEY: Well, I don't know as if I'd put any restrictors on our look at that process. We're trying very hard to understand how this happened. And that look will be as comprehensive as we can make it.
Yes.
QThe CIA has been criticized for the long time that lapsed between the time they found out about some of this mishandling of stuff and then the -- finally acted in August and took away his clearances, things like that. Now, I would think the first thing you would have done in August when the CIA came to this conclusion and saw it mishandled would be embark on just what you're doing now many, many months later. Why wasn't that done then? Did you not know about it?
ADM. QUIGLEY: I don't know that we had a full understanding at that point of what information may have been involved that was relevant to the Defense Department.
QAnd no one asked the question to the CIA, Was DOD material involved?
ADM. QUIGLEY: That's muddy, Chris. I'm not clear on that. But when this -- the material was in hand to start our process on the 7th of February. That I'm clear on.
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QThank you.
ADM. QUIGLEY: Okay.