Title: More on Islamic Jihad Trial Confessions  

Document Number: FBIS-NES-1999-0309
Document Type: Daily Report
Document Title: FBIS Translated Text 
Document Region: Near East/South Asia 
Document Date: 07 Mar 1999
Division: Arab Africa 
Subdivision: Egypt 
Sourceline: MM0903103099 London Al-Sharq al-Awsat in Arabic 7 Mar 99 p 6 
AFS Number: MM0903103099 
Citysource: London Al-Sharq al-Awsat 
Language: Arabic 
Subslug: Part two of a three-part report by Khalid Sharaf-al-Din from Cairo: 
"Fundamentalists' Leaders Formed Bogus Organizations To Confuse the 
Security Organs" 

[FBIS Translated Text] Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of the Egyptian Jihad 
Organization, is at present living somewhere unknown to his colleagues in 
the international fundamentalist organization or even the Egyptian 
security services or those that cooperate with it. But according to the 
defendants' confessions, he is certainly leading this Organization and 
sending his instructions to his followers by telephone, fax, or e-mail. 
Al-Zawahiri is keen to keep the Organization in the form of separate 
cluster groups, each one composed of a limited number of persons led by a 
trusted member. Each group is trained to carry out specific and small 
tasks. When a major operation is undertaken, the Organization's leader 
distributes the tasks among the various groups in total secrecy. The aim 
of this precise distribution of roles is to avoid having the 
organization's members uncovered all at once. Should any of the groups be 
seized, its members cannot give any detailed information other than what 
they know about their colleagues in that group only. But it appears that 
when al-Zawahiri laid down this security plan, he did not take into 
account the possibility that one of the most important cadres would fall 
into the trap and give details about all the groups and their tasks all 
over the republic. According to the bill of indictment in the case, Ahmad 
al-Najjar's main tasks were to contact his followers in Egypt and 
supervise the Organization's actions inside the country. All its cadres 
fell when he fell into the hands of Egyptian security. His confessions 
revealed the nature of the Organization's role abroad and enabled the 
Egyptian security services to arrest a number of fugitive members who 
were living in Albania and some Eastern European countries. Al-Najjar 
revealed another leader living in Albania, defendant Ahmad 'Uthman 
Isma'il, and defendant 'Isam 'Abd-al-Tawwab who lived in Bulgaria before 
his arrest. Al-Najjar also revealed the Organization's wing in the United 
States. His confessions led to the arrest of Khalid Husayn Isma'il and 
'Adil 'Alawi, both of whom carry US citizenship. He also revealed the 
role of 'Ali Abu-al-Sa'ud, an American of Egyptian origin who remains at 
large, in building the Organization and helping it with funds and media 


We go back to the Albanian network, where the confessions of defendant 
Ahmad 'Uthman Isma'il, who was arrested in Albania too and handed back to 
the Egyptian security services, show that the Organization's group that 
resided in Albania for four years did not receive instructions to get 
involved in the war between Kosovo's Albanians and the Serbs, specially 
after their experience in the Bosnian war which uncovered a large number 
of the Organization's members. Bosnia was an open field for the arrest of 
many Jihad and Islamic Group [IG] members when they tried to turn Bosnia 
into another Afghanistan at heart of Europe and to move the phenomenon of 
Arab Afghans to it. The most prominent leader arrested there was Tal'at 
Fu'ad Qasim, the former official spokesman of the IG, which is banned in 
Egypt. He was arrested in Croatia as he was crossing into Bosnia in 
August 1995. According to IG sources, he was extradited to Egypt but the 
latter's security authorities categorically denied this. The Egyptian 
security services' memorandum, which was added to the defendants' 
confessions in the case now being tried before the Higher Military Court, 
said that the purpose of the emigration was to collect the necessary 
funds for financing terrorist actions, exploit the loopholes in European 
laws in order to carry out acts hostile to the Egyptian regime, and 
provide a secure environment for the Organization's leaders so as to 
facilitate their communications with their elements inside Egypt and 
arrange armed acts of violence to achieve their Organization's 
objectives. The case papers said that the defendants were planning to 
undermine stability in Egypt by threatening its interests and 
installations abroad. Members inside the country were given the role of 
reviving the Jihad's organizational formations under the leadership of 
fugitive defendant Ayman al-Zawahiri and of preparing for instructions to 
stage a coup against the regime and disrupt the country's constitution 
and laws. The papers also revealed that the IG, whose spiritual leader is 
Dr. 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman, and the Jihad under Ayman al-Zawahiri had 
cooperated for the first time since a dispute erupted between them after 
President al-Sadat's assassination. But the confessions of defendants in 
the Returnees from Albania case, foremost of them Ahmad al-Najjar, 
confirmed that Muhammad Shawqi al-Islambuli, an IG leader now living in 
Afghanistan under the protection of armed groups, cooperated with this 
Organization and took part in some contacts to provide several services 
to its members abroad. According to high-level security sources, these 
confessions, which are mostly restricted to organizational and 
ideological matters, are a full indictment of the defendants and their 
leaders abroad and therefore they are liable to receive sentences ranging 
between execution and life imprisonment. The sources said that members of 
the defense panel are trying to derail the trial by claiming that the 
Organization's members were not involved in actual armed actions against 
the state and society. But the Egyptian security services say that they 
uncovered this Organization and began the trial of its members before 
they started any action damaging to Egypt's stability. The fact that no 
acts of violence had happened does not negate the charge of terrorism 
leveled against the defendants, who prepared plans and tried to reunite 
their members inside and outside the country. Activities of the armed 
fundamentalist groups and organizations also transcended borders and 
therefore it was reasonable to "globalize" the means of confronting them. 
This was done by establishing multinational search groups that consisted 
of the representatives and envoys of various security organs. That is 
clearly seen in one of the pits of international conflicts where violent 
fundamentalist groups prefer to operate. A panoramic reading of 
successive events among the violent fundamentalist groups points to a 
number of facts and signals that must be noted before detailing the 
confessions of the defendants in the Returnees from Albania case. The 
case involves several thousands of pages of the investigations conducted 
by the Higher State Security Prosecution Office in Egypt. 
Following the long strides made by the Egyptian security services in 
monitoring and containing the armed activities of the Islamic groups and 
organizations inside Egypt and cutting off their leaders's traditional 
sources of finances and secure sources of armament abroad, the fugitive 
leaders' chances of achieving their objectives inside Egypt diminished. 
These fugitives now do not have the opportunity to "declare war" on the 
Egyptian Government except through the media, the fax, and the Internet. 
The Egyptian security services describe these attempts as desperate with 
one aim only, namely to prove that they still exist. 


But what connections do these warring factions have with the acts of 
physical liquidation or the war of faxes and e-mail? What is their 
connection with the Returnees from Albania case now before the Egyptian 
judiciary? The answer can be discerned from reading these organizations' 
current situation in light of the confessions made by those who went 
through the experience of trans-border and continental violence. The 
image becomes still clearer from another angle when an Egyptian security 
source categorically confirmed that the number of the real fundamentalist 
leaders who are fugitives abroad does not exceed 40. The sources drew a 
picture of the scenario being played out by a number of ordinary members 
who had split from these extremist fundamentalist leaders. They announce 
the name of a nonexistent bogus group and then start to issue statements 
and publications in its name or in the name of the organization with the 
aim of gaining media fame. Or they do so as a result of splits within 
these groups' ranks or as part of a plan to deceive the security 
services, divert their efforts to know the source of these statements and 
publications, or prevent them from reading the map of alliances or splits 
within the terrorist groups accurately. The security organs lean at 
present toward the view that the media bodies abroad that represent the 
real groups are those managed by known fundamentalist elements. The most 
dangerous of these is the "al-Murabitun Office" of the banned IG in 
Egypt. This office was established and continued to operate in Denmark's 
capital Copenhagen until its founder Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim disappeared in 
mysterious circumstances in Croatia in 1995. Muhammad Shawqi 
al-Islambuli, an IG leader and brother of al-Sadat's killer, then took 
over charge of the office and prepared the articles published by the IG 
on its special al-Murabitun Internet website []. The 
Jihad had practically split into a large number of organizations. There 
is a group that still follows the Organization's historic leaders, like 
'Abbud al-Zummar, who was sentenced to life imprisonment in the al-Sadat 
assassination case. Another group declared its loyalty to Ayman 
al-Zawahiri, who later established the Vanguards of Conquest 
Organization. Most of this group's members were arrested by the Egyptian 
security services in 1993 and 1994. Other groups split from al-Zawahiri 
and have restricted their activities to issuing statements in the name of 
bogus organizations, like the Muhammad Makkawi (known as the colonel) 
group. Some of this group's members are operating in Europe. Others 
emigrated to South American countries and Africa. They exploit the 
advanced communications technology and the Internet to send bogus 
statements, express their views, and fight their adversaries in the 


In his confessions during the investigations into the Returnees from 
Albania case which Al-Sharq al-Awsat had seen, defendant Sabri al-'Attar 
dispelled the ambiguity that surrounded the connection between these 
bogus media units, as described by the security sources, and the 
prominent names in the large fundamentalist organizations. He also 
uncovered their link with other fundamentalist groups and organizations 
which are carrying out their activities in a number of major world 
capitals and which have dozens of members from various nationalities, 
most of them Arabs. The trip of Sabri Ibrahim al-'Attar, a member of the 
Returnees from Albania group, is a long and arduous one that began in 
Egypt and ended in Albania after going through several stages that 
included Sudan, Yemen, and Afghanistan. During this long trip, he saw, 
heard, and took part in creating myth-like events. He related them in his 
confessions before Egypt's Higher State Security Prosecution Office 
before he and other members of the international Organization were 
referred to the Higher Military Court in Cairo. 
In addition to the official charges against him in the official 
documents, he was also charged in other cases. His trip with the Islamic 
groups and organizations started 13 years ago, specifically in 1986 when 
he used to go to the 'Ibad-al-Rahman Mosque in one of al-Jizah's suburbs. 
He became acquainted with Khalid al-Tahir who undertook the task of 
educating him in shari'ah. He studied a booklet called The Islamic Action 
Charter, regarded as the IG's organizational constitution. Al-'Attar then 
grew a beard, wore the Afghan dress, and became an active IG member. He 
was called Abu-al-Miqdad for his hard-line views and constant involvement 
in all the IG activities and even the plans it was preparing. 
Al-'Attar's trip with the trans-border organizations began in 1991. In 
accordance with the very traditional scenario that was followed at that 
time, he went at first to perform the minor pilgrimage. During his stay 
in Saudi Arabia, he met one of the Afghan Arabs for whom he was carrying 
a message from the IG leaders in Egypt. This person, alias Abu-Ahmad, 
later discovered to be one of Usamah Bin-Ladin's men, gave him a forged 
passport to travel to Afghanistan. Al-'Attar joined the al-Ansar House in 
Hayderabad and then moved to the Muslim Brotherhood's [MB] al-Khalidiyah 
camp where members were prepared militarily. He went from Afghanistan, 
where conditions were not agreeable anymore, to the Balkan at the end of 
1996. He arrived in Bosnia with the help of a Palestinian fundamentalist, 
a forged passport, and $5,000. He stayed for more than a year in Bosnia 
until he left, or tried to leave, for Albania but fell into the hands of 
the European and US intelligence services before he could so. 
Defendant al-'Attar made many and sensational confessions. He said: Mustafa 
Hamza, the prominent defendant who reportedly fled to Sudan before 
returning to Afghanistan according to the latest information available 
about him, admitted to him that he was responsible for the attempt to 
assassinate Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, in Addis Ababa. Al-'Attar 
also revealed the names of members of the IG's so-called Shura Council 
under Dr. 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman and also much about what went on inside 
the Khaldin [as transliterated] Camp in Afghanistan. 
Preliminary information from the file of the massive investigation conducted 
with him inside the Higher State Security Prosecution Office says that 
his full name is Sabri Ibrahim al-'Attar who obtained a 
technical-industrial diploma from the Technical Institute. He comes from 
a humble family and is the second of five brothers and sisters. Al-'Attar 
began to frequent the 'Ibad-al-Rahman Mosque in 1986. According to those 
who knew him, he stayed silent, did not speak to anyone, and left the 
mosque immediately after prayers until the day he joined the IG. The 
defendant said in his confessions: I minded my own business and was a 
religious fellow until I met someone called Khalid al-Tahir. He was a 
very religious man, had a beard, and wore a gelbab [Egyptian national 
dress]. I liked his personality and behavior. I knew that very religious 
people prayed in that mosque. He added: By the way, the jihad current was 
the prevailing one among the brothers 10 years ago. I went along at first 
with the peaceful Salafists and admired them. But I did not like their 
refusal to fight jihad for God. Their creed of loyalty and acquittal was 
very weak and therefore I thought of joining the IG. 
He went on to say that the IG first asked him to read its charter 
before he embarked on the trip of violence in 1991. 
He first traveled to Saudi Arabia during Ramadan to perform the minor 
pilgrimage. He met there a group of what he called mujahidin. He told 
them about his inability to find a job and to stay in Saudi Arabia. One 
of them, an Yemeni called Muhammad al-Ruwaysi, convinced him to take part 
in the Afghans' jihad. Al-'Attar said: This person sent me and another 
fellow, whose name was I believe Amin Muhammad Amin, to an Afghani fellow 
who was in Saudi Arabia but whose name I do not know. He told us that it 
was not easy for him to help us travel but he sent us to another person 
called Abu-Ahmad. We learned later that he was one of Bin-Ladin's men. I 
told him that I wanted to stay in Saudi Arabia until I had performed the 
pilgrimage or to go to Yemen to find a safe haven with brothers who were 
influential there. Abu-Ahmad immediately approved my trip to Yemen and 
then sent a friend of mine to Pakistan. He bought me a ticket to 
Islamabad and set the date for my travel from Yemen to Peshawar two weeks 
after the pilgrimage. 
His trip to Afghanistan began after his arrival in Yemen. A car was 
waiting for him when he arrived at Islamabad Airport and took him to 
Peshawar, where the al-Ansar House is located. He knew from those who 
accompanied him that Usamah Bin-Ladin was the one in charge of it. They 
asked him: Do you have any valuables? 
"I have only some little money, 50 Riyals only." 
The first lesson he was taught was the need to change his name and use 
an alias. He was called Abu-al-Miqdad. 
Continuing his confessions, al-'Attar said: Some young men from many countries 
were with me. We sat for days doing nothing, after which they gave us 
Afghan dress and sent us to a camp near the house called al-Faruq Camp. 
There I met an Egyptian called Abu-'Ubaydah. I trained for two months on 
the use of the Kalashnikov, the Gridov [name as transliterated], and 
heavy weapons like mortars. We also had theoretical exercises on the use 
of bombs for defense and attack. 
The trip did not end there. Whenever a round of training ended, he found 
himself starting another one that was as ambiguous as the others. After 
two months of constant training, he went with Abu-'Ubaydah to the Khaldin 
Camp on the Afghan-Pakistan borders. He stayed there around one month and 
a half during which he trained to carry heavy weapons. He then returned 
to the al-Ansar House. The training was so violent that he was hit by 
shrapnel in his back and treated at a Peshawar hospital. During that 
period, he met three Egyptians who had the aliases Abu-Majid, 
Abu-Ibrahim, and Abu-Islam. Al-'Attar had not yet at that time joined any 
specific group until an IG member asked him: How could you an Egyptian be 
present with us in the Khaldin Camp led by Palestinian Shaykh 'Abdallah 
'Azzam and not join our Group? 
Al-'Attar said: While in the IG house in Peshawar, I met with Shihab-al-Din, 
who was in charge. He took me and the IG members to a new house in the 
Hayatabad quarter. We sat and talked about the IG ideas. 
He asked me: Which of our publications have you read? 
I said: I have read The Islamic Action Charter. 
He asked me again: Why do you disagree with us? 
I answered: I do not disagree with the members who apply what The 
Islamic Action Charter says, specially on the issue of changing what is 
disavowed. I believed before that this should be done gradually. I was 
influenced in this by the MB. 
Thus the doctrinal debate continued with Shihab-al-Din about disavowal, 
loyalty, acquittal, labeling rulings and systems infidel, and many other 
pivotal IG ideas. More training started at the same time and in parallel 
with this debate. The training involved all kinds of weapons, including 
an explanation of how bombs were made, the use of dynamite, and 
protection of IG members. He added that he met at that time with a senior 
IG official called Abu-Hazim. He later learned from the Egyptian 
newspapers that his real name was Mustafa Hamzah. He also met another 
official called Abu-Talal al-Qasimi and found later that he was one of 
those who went through the experience with him. His real name was Tal'at 
Fu'ad Qasim. He said that he established close ties with Abu-Hazim or 
Mustafa Hamzah who helped him go to Yemen and then to Sudan and then 
brought him back to Afghanistan before al-'Attar left for Bosnia as this 
will become clear in his confessions later on. 


Al-'Attar's sensational trip continued. He said in his confessions: The first 
time I thought about going to Bosnia was around the middle of 1994. But 
when brother Abu-Hazim learned about this he talked to me on the 
telephone. He opposed the idea and asked me to think deeply before making 
my decision. But I was very enthusiastic and wanted to travel. A person 
called Abu-'Ubaydah al-Yamani proposed that I travel overland to Yemen. I 
went to Sanaa with a person called Hassan. Arrangements were made there 
with Abu-'Ubaydah al-Yamani for my travel to Bosnia. But Abu-Hazim spoke 
to me on the telephone and proposed the idea of traveling to Sudan. I 
agreed after he convinced me. The brothers in Sanaa helped me go to 
Khartoum where an Egyptian brother was waiting for us. He took us to a 
farm south of Khartoum which I later learned belonged to the IG and had a 
five-bedroom house. I met many members there who used aliases, like Jamal 
'Abd-al-Tawwab, 'Abd-al-Majid, Mahfuz, Tal'at, Sakhr, Samih, 
Abu-Hunayfah, Sami, Rabih, Majdi, Yasin, 'Abbud, Safwat, and many others. 
Continuing his confessions, al-'Attar said: On this farm, I learned how to use 
electric circuits in explosives and to operate the remote control. After 
being well prepared for jihad, it became our duty to carry out 
instructions without argument. We only had to listen and obey and carry 
out what our leaders wanted us to do. The first instructions came in 
March 1995 when the brothers proposed that I take charge of training the 
newcomers for jihad in preparation for carrying out actions to 
destabilize the regime in Egypt by dealing successive blows to the 
security organs and attacking tourists. This group included Muzfir, 
Hassan, 'Abd-al-Tawwab, Jamal, and 'Abd-al-Majid. They all used aliases 
and not their real names, which we were not permitted to use at all. 
He added: As Abu-Hazim gave me full responsibility for leading the 
mujahidin group that was to be sent to Cairo, I decided that I should 
personally pick the sites and the installations that each member or the 
group would attack, each according to his resources and abilities. The 
order came to send the group after completion of the training and 
religious preparations. That was in April 1995. Riding a Toyota pick-up, 
the group traveled for two days across the desert trails led by a car 
driven by a Sudanese guide whom no one was allowed to talk to. The group 
arrived at a certain area and there the guide asked them to walk a short 
distance, after which they would find themselves in the Idfu railway 
station. They carried forged identity cards. Al-'Attar confessed here: 
The group leader was carrying a forged identity card in the name of Samir 
Muhammad Sulayman and a card on which was written the Maritime 
Construction Company. The orders they were given by the 'amir [leader] in 
Sudan instructed them to separate as soon as they arrived in Egypt. I was 
the only one allowed to contact Abu-Hazim, Mustafa Hamzah, and the 'amir 
of this group. I blessed the brothers, prayed for them, and gave their 
'amir the telephone number of my cousin in al-Matariyah. I and brother 
Abu-Hazim contacted this cousin before the group arrived to tell him that 
the brothers were coming and might need his help. He expressed his 
readiness not only to help but to take part too. Then my cousin and the 
'amir set the dates for meeting the members. I had given each one of them 
a sum of money and kept for myself $2,000 so as to get married. When they 
learned about my marriage, some of them asked me for large sums of money 
so as to get married too. I gave some of them and promised the others 
that my cousin would look for good wives for them in Egypt. 


Al-'Attar went on to say in his confessions: After the Addis Ababa incident, I 
spoke to brother Abu-Hazim to assure him about us. I asked him about the 
incident and he told me that the brothers in the IG were responsible for 
it. But when I saw his photograph in the newspapers, I knew that he was 
responsible with it together with a person called 'Umar and a third one 
called Fathi who was reported to be the mastermind of the Addis Ababa 
operation. I later learned that his name was Muhammad Siraj. 
The investigator asked him what books he had read. He said: I read many 
MB books, like one written by Fathi Bakir in which he relates the MB 
members' suffering in detention camps. I also read the book "In Nasir's 
Prisons" in addition to The Islamic Action Charter, and other books and 
research papers. That was in addition to the books on jurisprudence, 
interpretation of the Koran, Islamic history, and other books. 
The investigator asked him again about the reason that prompted him to 
join the IG in particular and not any other group. 
He said: I checked this group's course and it became obvious to me that 
it was the group to which the Prophet's sayings applied. I admired their 
committed, firm, and uncompromising ideas and also their way of jihad. 
This depends to a large degree on the jihad revolution against infidels, 
polytheists, and those violating God's law and His Messenger's sunna. 
The questions and answers continued. Some of them went on as follows: 
[Question] What are the IG's means for reaching power? 
[Answer] The ideal means is to change the regime by force and the use of 
deterrent weapons. Hitting tourism would weaken Egypt's economy and 
therefore facilitate its replacement with an Islamic system. 
Additionally, tourism spreads vice and corrupts the youth. 
[Question] What was the organizational structure of the IG that you joined? 
[Answer] It simply started with the general 'amir, that is Dr. 'Umar 
'Abd-al-Rahman, then the Shura Council that consisted of 'Isam Darbalah, 
'Asim 'Abd-al-Majid, Najih Ibrahim, Usamah Hafiz, Abu-Talal al-Qasimi, 
and 'Abbud al-Zummar. There was also a military committee. Abu Hazim, 
Mustafa Hamzah, was in charge of it together with Shihab-al-Din and 
When the Prosecutor asked him about his training in the use of bombs and 
explosives and his travel to fight on one of Afghanistan's fronts, 
al-'Attar revealed many surprises which we represent as they appeared in 
the investigations: 
[Question] Were you trained in how to use bombs and explosives? 
[Answer] Yes. I was trained in the Khaldin Camp in the use of bombs. They 
came to us and one of the brothers would explain this and list them as 
either defensive or offensive ones. They also taught us how to throw 
[Question] What were the types of bombs you were trained to use? 
[Answer] Only two types, Chinese and Russian. An Algerian brother called 
Abu-al-Yasin trained us. He also trained us to use heavy weapons. 
[Question] How long did you stay in the camp? 
[Answer] Around one month and a half. Abu-'Ubaydah also trained and prepared 
us for the front in Afghanistan. 
[Question] Where did you go after completing your training in Khaldin Camp? 
[Answer] After successfully completing the training, I and two Saudis, three 
Yemenis, an Algerian, and others went to the al-Ansar House where we 
stayed for two weeks. We then moved to the al-Shuhada' House in 
preparation for our going to field training front which we later learned 
was called the 'Yaqoubi Front [as transliterated] near Khost. There was 
no heavy fighting there. 
[Question] Where is the 'Yaqoubi Front situated? 
[Answer] Nearly north of Khost inside Afghanistan. It takes around four hours 
to travel on foot between it and the Khaldin Camp. It takes longer to 
travel by vehicle because the road is not level but passes through 
mountains and there are many narrow passes. 
[Question] What did you see on the 'Yaqoubi Front? 
[Answer] I saw mujahidin youths from many countries who carried all kinds of 
weapons. They were highly trained in their use. We were armed with all 
types of machine guns on the front. 
[Question] Did you recognize anyone during your presence on the front? 
[Answer] Yes. I met with the 'amir of the barracks, an Egyptian called 
Abu-Zayd. He was so cautious and kept silent that I started to believe 
that he did not belong to any group. He remained aloof but he was strict 
and apparently was a veteran expert in warfare. 
[Question] What was your role at the front? 
[Answer] To apply all that we had learned in the Khaldin Camp, such as the 
use of mortars and machine guns, sentry duty, and carrying out lighting 
strikes, which was called town wars. 
[Question] You said before that fighting on the 'Yaqoubi Front was not heavy. 
What did you mean by this? 
[Answer] I meant that there was no direct fighting with the communist enemy 
or the Afghan forces collaborating with him. We fired shells from our 
artillery on the enemy during training. The enemy retaliated in the same 
[Question] How long did you stay in the 'Yaqoubi Front? 
[Answer] Around one month and a half. We returned to the al-Ansar House when 
our stay ended. We stayed for around 10 days after which my ties with the 
al-Ansar House were cut off. We went to the al-Shuhada' House and then my 
ties with it were cut off too but my ties with the people there were not 
severed as we always met from time at several places on the Afghan front, 
most often by coincidence. 
[Question] What was your specific role on the Khost front? 
[Answer] I was with the BM gun position. I was on the first line of the 
confrontation with the enemy. But I was injured during the fighting one 
[Question] What happened after you were injured? 
[Answer] I was treated in one of Peshawar's hospitals. I do not recall its 
name now. I then left the whole country and went to Yemen as I had agreed 
with Abu-Hazim before. That was in preparation for my going to Sudan to 
train some mujahidin brothers from Egypt and teach them what I learned at 
the Afghanistan front. 
[Question] Were you able to go to Yemen after you were hit? 
[Answer] I asked for this from the officials in the al-Ansar House who 
refused to let me go until I had stayed for one year in Afghanistan. I 
then went to Yemen and from there to Sudan as I already told you. I 
returned to Afghanistan again and from there went to Bosnia with the help 
of a Palestinian brother who had good ties with the mujahidin there. 
[Question] What happened immediately on your arrival at the old IG house in 
[Answer] Abu-Islam and Abu-Ibrahim took me to Shihab-al-Din, alias 
Abu-al-Miqdad. They asked him to listen to me attentively. He spoke to me 
about many things. He was in his early thirties, of medium height, had a 
well built body, a white face, and a beard. I and brother Shihab-al-Din 
discussed the conditions of the IG in Egypt and the Islamic world. 
[Question] What happened then? Where did you go? 
[Answer] I discussed the matter with brother Abu-Hazim (Mustafa Hamzah) who 
used to travel a lot. I met him after my return from Sudan and the 
success of the brothers I had trained in their mission. I told him that I 
was not happy with what was happening in the Afghan arena. I also told 
him of my desire to fight jihad and not to stay in camps like women. He 
told me that I could go to Bosnia or Albania to fight jihad there but 
after an appropriate period of time. Conditions worsened between the Arab 
Afghans and the Taleban, which became the dominant movement in 
Afghanistan. But after more than a year, I met a mujahid from Palestine 
called Abu-al-Munzir who facilitated my travel with him from Afghanistan 
to Bosnia. I stayed there for almost another year during which I took 
part in the jihad with the Arab brothers under the command of a Muslim 
mujahid who had US citizenship but of Arab origin. But after the signing 
of the Dayton peace agreement, we the Arabs felt that our stay in Bosnia 
was not desirable anymore. CIA agents spread everywhere and we were 
compelled to flee to Kosovo. On the way there, I was arrested with others 
by the Serb intelligence services and I believe CIA agents. We could not 
check the identity of those who arrested us. All I remember was that they 
were very harsh and treated us inhumanely. We were held for about a month 
until I was handed over with others to the Egyptian authorities. 


Of course, al-'Attar's confessions contained lengthy details about the 
conditions of the Arabs in the fundamentalists' training camps, the 
violent organizations in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Albania, the struggles 
between the organizations' leaders, and the fax and e-mail battles 
between the first and second generations of the fundamentalists and these 
groups' leaders. This is something significant which these confessions 
underline. We reach one single conclusion from either the defendants' 
confessions or from information provided by the security services that 
monitor the moves of these groups and their leaders. It became evident 
during the past two years that the fundamentalist groups' leaders abroad 
were obviously isolated and having a real crisis in their ranks. Their 
members began to fall one after the other into the hands of the security 
services, starting with the Returnees from Afghanistan and ending with 
the Returnees from Albania. It also became obvious that a state of 
apprehension, suspicions, and lack of communications between these 
fugitive leaders had clearly upset the performance of the fundamentalist 
groups' media machine on which they had greatly depended in the past. The 
daily routine was established of issuing a statement through the fax or 
on the Internet site announcing the banned Jihad Organization's 
responsibility for certain stands when another statement by the same 
group was issued almost simultaneously refuting what the first statement 
This imbalance and confusion in turn revealed many signals and raised 
more questions about these organizations' future. They are suffering from 
successive crises and being pursued everywhere. This is prompting their 
leaders or the opportunist elements to act in a way that does not reflect 
their true size, specially to Western observers and intelligence 
services, which most often exploited these entities until they had 
exhausted their purpose. The international chase of these trans-border 
and transcontinental human bombs is continuing. Investigations, 
monitoring, and analyses most frequently reach a very simple fact, namely 
that many of the (very big) names in the extremist fundamentalist 
organizations, specially those operating in Europe and the United States, 
are just false entities that do not really exist, or are not at least as 
sizeable as their statements, faxes, and internet sites try to depict and 
which have become the preferred and "safe" game for these organizations, 
leaders, and those who split from them. 
In the security organs' view, a correct reading based on an 
understanding of events, the organizations' thinking, and correct 
monitoring of the statements signed by various groups abroad shows that 
there is nearly 28 Egyptian fundamentalist groups operating in several 
European capitals and US cities. The sharp language used in these 
statements gives a first impression that the groups have armies and 
resources that enable them to reach their objectives within few hours. 
But the security organs also underline the fact that these statements are 
issued by some minor leaders of the terrorist groups in an attempt to 
convince public opinion that they still exist. The danger they represent 
does not exceed the limits of the fax that carries this statement to the 
news agencies or some newspapers. Most of these bogus statements and the 
conflicting statements that carry the name of Islamic Jihad or the 
Vanguards of Conquest Organization are issued from the British capital, 
London.(more) 7 Mar irbib/ bennett 
Balkan Arabs continue to fall into the hands of the multinational security 
services in this region. Two other Egyptians were recently arrested in 
Tirana. According to Egyptian sources that helped monitor these elements 
in the Balkans in coordination with the local security organs there and 
several international security services, including the FBI and the CIA, 
these two were IG members. The two Egyptians arrested were Muhammad Najib 
Yasin and 'Abd-al-Mun'im Na'im who were part of a group that was planning 
to carry out violent acts in Tirana. The two were also suspected of 
organizational links and were accused in the past in a number of violent 
acts perpetrated by the IG in Egypt during the past years. Some of the 
defendants in the Returnees from Albania case who are now being tried by 
the Higher Military Court in Egypt spoke about some of these acts. 
The sources said that these two persons met Bin-Ladin in Tirana in April 
1994 during the latter's secret visit there at the head of a delegation 
of the heads of the armed fundamentalist groups who came from 
Afghanistan, Kashmir, the Philippines, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, and other 
countries. This was confirmed by reports leaked by the US intelligence 
services that were operating as part of the international team in that