News

USIS Washington 
File

08 January 1999

TEXT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARDS REPORT

(Study released 1/8/99 of East Africa bombings/security) (3230)



Washington -- Decades of neglect to adequately address security issues
at US missions around the world contributed to the bombing disasters
last year at US embassies in East Africa, according to a State
Department-mandated report.


Admiral William Crowe, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and US Ambassador to the Court of St. James, chaired the two
Accountability Review Boards that studied the circumstances
surrounding the nearly simultaneous August 7 bombings by terrorists of
the US embassies in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania and in Nairobi, Kenya. The
bombings killed more than 220 people and injured some 4,000 more.


According to the report, the boards "did not find reasonable cause to
believe that any employee of the United States Government or member of
the uniform services breached his or her duty."


The report did conclude that for the past decade the US Congress and
various administrations failed to adequately fund security
improvements at US missions worldwide.


Under the law, the State Department is required to respond within
three months to the recommendations contained in the final report made
by the boards.


(The full report of the Accountability Review Boards on the bombings
of the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on August 7, 1998 is
available at the State Department website:
www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/accountabilityreport.html.)


Following is the text of the Executive Overview:



(begin text)



Report of the Accountability Review Boards



Bombings of the US Embassies in

Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

on August 7, 1998



EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW



The near simultaneous vehicular bombings of the US Embassies in
Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7, 1998, were
terrorist incidents costing the lives of over 220 persons and wounding
more than 4,000 others. Twelve American USG employees and family
members, and 32 Kenyan and 8 Tanzanian USG employees, were among those
killed. Both chanceries withstood collapse from the bombings, but were
rendered unusable, and several adjacent buildings were severely
damaged or destroyed. In examining the circumstances of these two
bombings, the Accountability Review Boards for Nairobi and Dar Es
Salaam determined that:


1. The terrorists intended to destroy the chanceries; to kill or
injure US Government employees and others in the chanceries; and to
damage US prestige, morale, and diplomacy. Thus, according to
P.L.99-399, the incidents were security related.


2. The security systems and procedures for physical security at the
embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam as a general matter met and, in
some cases, exceeded the systems and procedures prescribed by the
Department of State for posts designated at the medium or low threat
levels. However, these standard requirements had not sufficiently
anticipated the threat of large vehicular bomb attacks and were
inadequate to protect against such attacks.


The Department of State, in fact, does not apply its security
standards fully. For far too many/1 of its overseas facilities it
implements them only "to the maximum extent feasible," applying "risk
management." For example, neither the chancery in Nairobi nor in Dar
Es Salaam met the Department's standard for a 100 ft. (30m)
setback/standoff zone. Both were "existing office buildings" occupied
before this standard was adopted; so a general exception was made. The
widespread use of such exceptions worldwide with respect to setback
and other non-feasible security standards reflects the reality of not
having adequate funds to replace all sub-standard buildings within a
short period of time. Thus in the interim before Inman buildings could
be constructed, exceptions were granted. In light of the August 7
bombings, these general exceptions to the setback requirement in
particular mask a dangerous level of exposure to similar attacks
elsewhere.


3. The security systems and procedures relating to actions taken at
Embassies Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam were, for the most part, properly
implemented. In Nairobi, the suicide bomber failed in his attempt to
penetrate the embassy's outer perimeter, thanks to the refusal of
local guards to open the gates. In Dar Es Salaam, the suicide bomber
likewise failed to penetrate the perimeter, apparently stopped by
guards and blocked by an embassy water truck.


However, neither post's Emergency Action Plan anticipated a car bomb
scenario. Nor were there explicit Department requirements for dealing
with such contingencies in EAP worldwide guidelines, despite clear
Inman Report recommendations. While car bombs are often immediately
preceded by some types of as was the case in Nairobi, personnel inside
embassies are not trained to react properly, nor do perimeter guards
have appropriate equipment.


4. There was no credible intelligence that provided immediate or
tactical warning of the August 7 bombings.


A number of earlier intelligence reports cited alleged threats against
several U.S. diplomatic and other targets, including the embassies in
Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam. All of these reports were disseminated to
the intelligence community and to appropriate posts abroad, but were
largely discounted because of doubts about the sources. Other
reporting -- while taken seriously -- was imprecise, changing and
non-specific as to dates, diminishing its usefulness. Additionally,
actions taken by intelligence and law enforcement authorities to
confront suspect terrorist groups including the Al-Haramayn
non-governmental organization and the Usama Bin Laden (UBL)
organization in Nairobi, were believed to have dissipated the alleged
threats. Indeed, for eight months prior to the August 7 bombings, no
further intelligence was produced to warn the embassies in Nairobi and
Dar Es Salaam./1 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
investigation of the bombings is still underway but, thus far, has
uncovered no information indicating that the earlier intelligence
reporting could have predicted the time or place of the attacks.
Information from FBI and intelligence sources could yet be developed,
however, to implicate some of the individuals or groups cited in the
earlier intelligence reporting, or more likely, to further amplify
understanding of the UBL organization's role in the bombings.


5. The Boards found that both the intelligence and policy communities
relied excessively on tactical intelligence to determine the level of
potential terrorist threats to posts worldwide. The Inman Report noted
and previous experience indicates that terrorist attacks are often not
preceded by warning intelligence. The establishment of the Counter
Terrorism Center with an inter-agency team of officers has produced
tactical intelligence that has enabled the US to thwart a number of
terrorist threats./1 But we cannot count on having such intelligence
to warn us of such attacks.


6. The Boards did not find reasonable cause to believe that any
employee of the United States Government or member of the uniformed
services was culpable of dereliction of his or her duties in
connection with the August 7 bombings. The Boards did find, however,
an institutional failure of the Department of State and embassies
under its direction to recognize threats posed by transnational
terrorism and vehicle bombs worldwide. Policy-makers and operational
officers were remiss in not preparing more comprehensive procedures to
guard against massive truck bombs. This combined with lack of
resources for building more secure facilities created the ingredients
for a deadly disaster. Responsibility for obtaining adequate resources
for security programs is widely dispersed throughout the US government
as is decision making for determining security policies and
procedures. No one person or office is accountable for decisions on
security policies, procedures and resources. Ambassadors who are
specifically charged with responsibility for the security of US
diplomatic personnel assigned to their posts lack adequate authority
and resources to carry out this responsibility.


7. The Boards were especially disturbed by the collective failure of
the US government over the past decade to provide adequate resources
to reduce the vulnerability of US diplomatic missions to terrorist
attacks in most countries around the world. Responsibility for this
failure can be attributed to several Administrations and their
agencies, including the Department of State, the National Security
Council, and the Office of Management and Budget, as well as the US
Congress.


8. The US response to the August bombings was resourceful and often
heroic. However, in the absence of significant training and
contingency planning to deal with mass casualties and major
destruction from terrorist bombs, the response was occasionally
chaotic and marred by a host of planning and logistical failures,
especially in the area of military transportation. The Foreign
Emergency Support Teams (FESTs) arrived in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam
about 40 hours after the bombings, having experienced delays of 13
hours. There was disjointed liaison between the State Department, as
the lead agency, and the Defense Department, FBI and other agencies.
The personnel selection of the FESTs was ad hoc and not ideal. Medical
and other emergency equipment was not always ready and available for
shipment.


9. In the wake of these two terrorist acts, the Department of State
and other US government organizations focused quickly on the lessons
learned. They immediately reviewed the vulnerabilities of our
embassies and missions abroad and took steps to strengthen perimeter
security at all posts, to re-prioritize the construction and upgrades
necessary to bring our overseas US facilities up to what are referred
to as "Inman standards," and Congress appropriated over $1 billion in
supplemental funds.


10. This is only the first step in what is required to provide for the
security of Americans in embassies overseas. We must undertake a
comprehensive and long-term strategy for protecting American officials
overseas, including sustained funding for enhanced security measures,
for long-term costs for increased security personnel, and for a
capital building program based on an assessment of requirements to
meet the new range of global terrorist threats. This must include
substantial budgetary appropriations of approximately $1.4 billion per
year maintained over an approximate ten-year period, in addition to
savings from the closure of overseas installations where increased
capital and security costs outweigh the magnitude of overall US
interests. Additional funds for security must be obtained without
diverting funds from our major foreign affairs programs.


Key Recommendations



The 1986 Omnibus Diplomatic and Anti-Terrorism Act established the
legal basis for the Accountability Review Board and specifically
requires that acts of terrorism against US diplomatic installations
abroad, wherein the loss of life or significant property damage
occurs, be investigated with a view, among other factors, toward
determining whether security systems and procedures were adequate and
were implemented. After addressing these issues in this report, the
Boards will propose and elaborate on a number of recommendations aimed
at improving security systems and procedures. We provide a listing of
the recommendations below./1 The bulk of them are necessitated by the
use of large vehicular bombs, a threat that has not been fully
appreciated in recent years. The first 15 recommendations deal with
adjustments in systems and procedures to enhance security of the work
place. The final six recommendations address how to improve crisis
management systems and procedures. All are directed toward achieving
the objective of saving lives. They are urgent and need to be acted
upon immediately. No single measure will accomplish the objective but,
taken together, they should substantially improve the security for US
personnel serving abroad.


Three additional recommendations deal with intelligence and
information availability, matters the Boards are also enjoined to
address under the law./1 (Details and rationale for all of the
recommendations are contained in the classified version of the
report.)


I.  Improving Security Systems and Procedures



A.  Work Place Security Enhancements



1. Emergency Action Plans for all posts should be revised to provide a
"special alarm signal" for large exterior bombs and duck-and-cover
practice drills in order to reduce casualties from vehicular bombs.
Special equipment should be provided to perimeter guards./1


2. Given the worldwide threat of transnational terrorism which uses a
wide range of lethal weapons, including vehicle bombs, every post
should be treated as a potential target and the Department of State's
Physical Security Standards and policies should be revised to reflect
this new reality.


3. For those US diplomatic buildings abroad not meeting Inman
standards, essential physical security upgrades should be made
immediately and should include a number of specific measures involving
perimeters and counter-surveillance./1


4. The Secretary of State should personally review the security
situation of embassy chanceries and other official premises, closing
those which are highly vulnerable and threatened but for which
adequate security enhancements cannot be provided, and seek new secure
premises for permanent use, or temporary occupancy, pending
construction of new buildings.


5. Demarches to all governments with whom we have relations should be
made regularly to remind them of their obligation to provide security
support for our embassies. For those governments whose police forces
need additional training to enable them to provide more adequate
protection, the Department should provide training under the
Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program. The Department should also
explore ways to provide any necessary equipment to host governments to
upgrade their ability to provide adequate protection. Failure by a
host government to honor its obligations should trigger an immediate
review of whether a post should be closed.


6. The Department of State should radically reformulate and revise the
"Composite Threat List" and, as a part of this effort, should create a
category exclusively for terrorism with criteria that places more
weight on transnational terrorism. Rating the vulnerability of
facilities must include factors relating to the physical security
environment, as well as certain host governmental and cultural
realities./1 These criteria need to be reviewed frequently and all
elements of the intelligence community should play an active role in
formulating the list. The list's name should be changed to reflect its
dual purpose of prioritizing resource allocation and establishing
security readiness postures.


7. The Department of State should increase the number of posts with
full time Regional Security Officers, seeking coverage of as many
chanceries as possible. The Department should also work with the
Marine Corps to augment the number of Marine Security Guard
Detachments to provide coverage to a larger number of US diplomatic
missions.


8. The Department of State should provide all Regional Security
Officers comprehensive training on terrorism, terrorist methods of
operation, explosive devices, explosive effects, and other terrorist
weapons to include weapons of mass destruction such as truck bombs,
nuclear devices and chemical/biological weapons./1


9. The Department of State should define the role and functions of
each of the US embassies abroad for the coming decade with a view
toward exploiting technology more fully, improving their efficiency,
ensuring their security, and reducing their overall cost. The
Department should look specifically at reducing the number of
diplomatic missions by establishing regional embassies located in less
threatened and vulnerable countries with Ambassadors accredited to
several governments.


10. The physical security standards specified in the State
Department's Security Standards and Policy Handbook should be reviewed
on a priority basis and revised as necessary in light of the August 7
and other large bombings against US installations.


11. When building new chanceries abroad, all US government agencies,
with rare exceptions, should be located in the same compound.


12. The Department of State should work within the Administration and
with Congress to obtain sufficient funding for capital building
programs and for security operations and personnel over the coming
decade (estimated at $1.4 billion per year for the next 10 years),
while ensuring that this funding should not come at the expense of
other critical foreign affairs programs and operations. A failure to
do so will jeopardize the security of US personnel abroad and inhibit
America's ability to protect and promote its interests around the
world.


13. First and foremost, the Secretary of State should take a personal
and active role in carrying out the responsibility of ensuring the
security of US diplomatic personnel abroad. It is essential to convey
to the entire Department that security is one of the highest
priorities. In the process, the Secretary should reexamine the present
organizational structure with the objective of clarifying
responsibilities, encouraging better coordination, and assuring that a
single high-ranking officer is accountable for all protective security
matters and has the authority necessary to coordinate on the
Secretary's behalf such activities within the Department of State and
with all foreign affairs USG agencies.


14. The Department of State should expand its effort to build public
support for increased resources for foreign affairs, and to add
emphasis on the need to protect US representatives abroad from
terrorism, without sacrificing other important foreign policy
programs.


15. The Department of State, in coordination with the intelligence
community, should advise all posts concerning potential threats of
terrorist attacks from the use of chemical, biological or nuclear
materials, should establish means of defending against and minimizing
the effect of such attacks through security measures and the revision
of EAP procedures and exercises, and should provide appropriate
equipment, medical supplies, and first responder training.


B.  Better Crisis Management Systems and Procedures



1. Crisis management training for mass casualty and mass destruction
incidents should be provided to Department of State personnel in
Washington to improve Task Force operations to assure a cadre of
crisis managers.


2. A revitalized program for on-site crisis management training at
posts abroad should be funded, developed, expanded, and maintained.


3. The FEST should create and exercise a team and equipment package
configured to assist in post blast crises involving major casualties
and physical damage (while maintaining the package now deployed for
differing counter terrorism missions). Such a new configuration should
include personnel to assist in medical relief, public affairs,
engineering and building safety.


4. A modern, reliable, air-refuelable FEST aircraft with enhanced
seating and cargo capacity to respond to a variety of counter
terrorism and emergency missions should be acquired urgently for the
Department of State. Clearly defined arrangements for a backup
aircraft are also needed.


5. The Department of State should work closely with the Department of
Defense to improve procedures in mobilizing aircraft and adequate
crews to provide more rapid, effective assistance in times of
emergency, especially in medical evacuations resulting from mass
casualty situations. The Department of State should explore as well,
chartering commercial aircraft to transport personnel and equipment to
emergency sites, if necessary to supplement Department of Defense
aircraft.


6. The Department of State should ensure that all posts have emergency
communications equipment, basic excavation tools, medical supplies,
emergency documents, next of kin records, and other safety equipment
stored at secure off-site locations in anticipation of mass
destruction of embassy facilities and heavy US casualties.


II.  Intelligence and Information



1. In order to enhance the flow of intelligence that relates to
terrorism and security, all such intelligence should normally be
disseminated to concerned levels of the policy and analytic community;
compartmentalization of such information should be limited to
extraordinary situations where there is a clear national security need
for limited dissemination.


2. The Department of State should assign a qualified official to the
DCI's Counter Terrorism Center; and


3. The FBI and the Department of State should consult on ways to
improve information sharing on international terrorism to ensure that
all relevant information that might have some bearing on threats
against or security for US missions or personnel abroad is made
available./1


(Note: Passages here and elsewhere in this document marked with an
asterisk (/1) indicate more details can be found in the classified
version of the report.)


(end text)