U.S. SECURITY (Senate - March 05, 1992)

[Page: S2874]

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, the collapse of the Soviet empire has fundamentally changed the nature of the security threat to the United States.

In the place of an ideologically hostile superpower bristling with weapons of mass destruction, the new threat to American interests comes from a range of international criminal activities.

Terrorism, narcotics, and money-laundering, Mafia-like international cartels, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and weapons technologies have replaced communism as the principal foreign threat to our way of life.

At the same time, the global march to democracy is still impeded or blocked in many countries by oversized military establishments whose main role is one of internal security--the persecution of internal enemies--rather than national defense.

The subordination of local police forces to the military in many of these countries virtually ensures two unhappy results.

The police become demoralized and professionally frustrated because their institutions are run by men who may also be in uniform, but who cannot really speak their language.

And the military inevitably become politicized given their hegemonic participation in internal security--a role we have wisely prohibited our own military here in the United States.

United States efforts to strengthen the administration of justice can help to promote the demilitarization of societies whose armed forces often constitute--even in countries such as Venezuela, with more than three decades of democratic experience--the greatest threat to democracy.

The failure of host country law enforcement discourages needed international investment, as foreign corporations face concerns of physical security and the ability to enforce contracts.

Mr. President, despite this important challenge, U.S. efforts to strengthen international law enforcement efforts are woefully underfunded--particularly when compared to U.S. military assistance programs. They lack a coherent rationale and strategy, and are badly mismanaged.

Mr. President, these conclusions can be drawn after a careful reading of a GAO report, `Foreign Aid: Police Training and Assistance,' which my office is releasing today.

The report provides an in-depth review of the training and assistance given to foreign law enforcement agencies and personnel. If focuses on three main issues: the legislative authority for training and assistance, the extent of U.S. activities, and experts' opinions on the management of these programs.

The GAO report should be a bucket of cold water on any illusions that U.S. security policy is up to the task of promoting American security interests in the post-cold-war era. Among the GAO's most important findings:

Despite legislation--section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act--passed by Congress in 1974, designed to stop U.S. aid to foreign police committing massive rights abuses, there are a dozen exemptions that have been granted to allow some U.S. training and assistance of foreign police, thereby calling into question why section 660 remains on the books.

In fiscal 1990, five U.S. cabinet level departments trained and assisted police from 125 countries at a cost of approximately $117 million. In 46 countries two or more U.S. programs are operating.

Experts consulted expressed concern about the lack of guidance and coordination of U.S. police assistance activities. These concerns included the lack of a clear position on the role of police aid in new and emerging democracies, an absence of clearly defined program objectives and authorities, and a determination of how individual training efforts contribute to overall U.S. interests.

The administration was even unable to offer data on the exact extent or cost of assistance to foreign police.

Nobody knows exactly what we are doing; exactly what we are spending.

Mr. President, these findings call into question the entire cast of U.S. security assistance efforts.

Clearly, programs without clearly defined program objectives and authorities cannot provide the best assistance to foreign legal authorities.

The very dispersion of U.S. efforts--spread out among no less than five Cabinet-level departments--means that needed coordination in this increasingly complex arena is a very ad hoc sort of thing.

It is also clear that the section 660 provision of the Foreign Assistance Act, prohibiting police aid, has become a virtual Swiss cheese of exemptions, and its only real value appears to be as a brake on Department of Defense efforts to hold onto its budget by getting into law enforcement.

As one of those who fought--and would do so again if conditions did not change--to get such a restriction in place in the bad old days of the cold war, I can say that section 660 no longer serves its purposes and issues it addressed then cry out to be dealt with in a more affirmative way.

Liberals and conservatives alike have to rethink old dogmas in this field, and work together to craft programs which meet American security needs and promote democratization.

Mr. President, the report comes as part of a larger request made by my office, and those of the Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar], the Senator from New York [Mr. Moynihan], the Senator from Washington [Mr. Adams], and the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Daschle].

The findings of this first study show that old orthodoxies in the security field are not only irrelevant, they are helping to leave the United States without the tools to promote international law enforcement and global demilitarization.

Mr. President, as the GAO notes, while U.S. aid to foreign police forces began in the 1950's, it was greatly expanded in the early 1960's, as concerns grew among U.S. policymakers about rising levels of Communist insurgent activity in the developing world.

Channelled mostly through the AID Office of Public Safety, by 1968 we were spending $60 million annually to train police in 34 countries. With the expansion of such assistance came accusations that the programs turned a blind eye, or worse, to violation of human rights, such as torture and summary execution, by recipient security forces.

`Hidden Terrors,' a well-documented book on U.S. police training efforts in Latin America by former New York Times Saigon bureau chief A.J. Langguth, provided a searing indictment of these programs and the men who ran them. In 1979, the New York Times quoted Jesse J. Leaf, a former chief CIA analyst in Iran, as saying that CIA training of the Shah's SAVAK secret police was `based on German torture techniques from World War II.'

Mr. President, careful analysis of that period suggests that there were six major flaws in U.S. training.

First, training was provided to so-called friendly anti-Communist regimes, without regard to whether they were dictatorships or not.

Second, law enforcement efforts were subordinated to U.S. counterinsurgency goals. As the GAO noted, U.S. training included such topics as counterinsurgency techniques, weapons use, and Communist ideology. This also meant, in practice, reinforcing the control of recipient countries' militaries over the police.

Third, and this is clearly borne out in the Langguth book, U.S. trainers were not always the best America had to offer.

Fourth, U.S. intelligence agencies were given an important role in the development and execution of these programs.

Fifth, police training was not placed in the broader context of administration of justice, with its emphasis on judicial and prison reform.

And, finally, human rights was rarely a factor in policy considerations at the time.

Spurred by reports that United States trained and equipped police in Iran, Vietnam, Brazil, and other countries were involved in torture, murder, and the suppression of legitimate political activity, I and others in Congress prevailed and we banned foreign aid to police forces in 1974.

This ban remained virtually ironclad until 1985, when Congress authorized the President to support `programs to enhance investigative capabilities conducted under judicial or prosecutorial control' in functioning democracies in the Western hemisphere.

As a result, the Department of Justice--together with the State Department and the Agency for International Development--established the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program [ICITAP]. Operational responsibility was left entirely to ICITAP under the supervision of officials in the Deputy Attorney General's office, with policy guidance provided by the Department of State.

With an annual budget of less than $8 million, ICITAP has trained thousands of police, judges, prosecutors, and other criminal justice personnel from 17 Caribbean island states, 6 Central American nations, as well as Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay. It is important to point out that, under the direction of David `Kris' Kriskovitch, a former FBI special agent, ICITAP has steered clear of any hint of the kind of problems that plagued the old AID Office of Public Safety.

Many observers credit ICITAP with spreading a consciousness of the need for civilianized law enforcement in new and emerging democracies in the region, and the recently agreed-to Salvadoran peace treaty--with its emphasis on the role of a civilianized police force in internal security--is proof of the soundness of this approach.

Unfortunately, the ICITAP Program remains underfunded, overextended, and relegated to playing only a regional role. As we see from the GAO report, it may provide the only bright spot in an area characterized by administration ineptness and neglect.

Mr. President, Will Rogers once remarked that Americans are great at winning wars, but less successful at keeping the peace. Our winning of the cold war has given us an important opportunity to help mankind live in free societies under the rule of law. Democratic governments are natural allies of the United States and free market systems cannot exist unless there are judicial authorities that enforce its rules.

For all the money spent and all the sacrifices made during more than four decades of cold war, the Bush administration has failed to export an institution which lies at the very heart of our success as a democracy--our system of justice.

The new democracies of the world need our expertise and our help in learning how to enforce the rule of law through the professionalization of police departments, prosecutors' offices, the courts system and the prisons. In helping them establish law enforcement and judicial infrastructures, we give them the tools to help them rid their societies of oppression and the virus of militarism.

Whether the issue is the promotion of community-police dialog in South Africa's transition to multiracial democracy or the establishment of a civilian-run police force in war-torn El Salvador, people from those countries look to the United States for leadership, models, and technical assistance.

The relatively small number of renegade or outlaw nations--those engaged in terrorism, drug smuggling or weapons proliferation--in the world means that United States and multilateral efforts in international law enforcement can give a big bang for a relatively small buck.

In doing so, we can also help provide for American security interests in a world which has seen a quantum leap in the internationalization of crime.

Sophisticated international crime is far outpacing the ability of new democracies whose law enforcement institutions are weak, inexperienced, and already overextended by the struggle against ordinary crime.

One of the fastest-growing crime syndicates in the United States is a Russian-controlled organization whose local chiefs are expatriates living in New York.

The recent Bank of Commerce and Credit International [BCCI] scandal shows the difficulties of monitoring the operations of a multinational bank which used the most sophisticated modern business techniques and communications equipment and operated unmolested in dozens of countries.

Both the Italian Mafia and the Colombian drug cartels have found in the cash economies of the newly emerging democracies and their newly private enterprises opportunities for money laundering on a vast scale.

Overseas Chinese criminal enterprises are forming closer ties with United States-based Chinese crime groups, particularly as Chinese syndicates flee Hong Kong to escape China's planned takeover of the crown colony in 1997. The growth of these international criminal organizations requires a coordinated professional response not only in the United States, but from abroad as well.

Despite the unhappy history of U.S. police training programs, there is a growing consensus that improved international law enforcement must become a key U.S. policy objective, both to strengthen the process of democratization abroad and to make Americans more secure at home.

The U.S. model, with its emphasis on the critical distinction between internal security and national defense and progressive concepts such as community-based policing, can and must be aggressively advertised if new and troubled democracies around the world are to survive and prosper.

The 6-year record of ICITAP, which has operated in several difficult situations without a hint of scandal, suggests that police training, when carried out as an integral part of the overall strengthening of the justice system, can enhance local law enforcement efforts abroad; contribute significantly to the process of democratization by putting the police under the control and at the service of the community, and--over time--provide the contacts, good will, and expertise in other countries required to bolster Americans' sense of security both at home and abroad.

Mr. President, current U.S. efforts in strengthening global respect for the rule of law are woefully inadequate. The administration has focused its law enforcement efforts primarily in antiterrorism and antinarcotics assistance. A growing body of literature, of which the GAO report must be seen as a part, suggests these efforts will fail unless they are coupled with assistance to strengthen the justice systems of recipient countries as a whole.

The administration's peculiar insistence on a `military' strategy for the misnamed Andean drug war, a position from which they have seemed to back down from in the San Antonio drug summit, shows the bankruptcy of any course that does not include the justice system as a whole.

It is important to note that, as the GAO report bears out, there is no single agency that is in overall charge of U.S. international administration of justice efforts; there is no single articulate policy or objective that unifies these programs, and the proliferation of programs under several agencies has led to duplication of efforts and complications in implementation. The section 660 provision banning police aid is observed in the breech, and no longer serves the purpose for which it was intended.

Mr. President, as I have consistently pointed out on this floor, the administration's failure to provide leadership in this area has been particularly egregious in the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. U.S. administration of justice efforts have been limited to a paltry $750,000 Rule of Law Program administered by the U.S. Information Agency [USIA].

A recent request for help in 19 separate areas by Polish Interior Minister Henryk Majewski was finally filled after an ad hoc interagency meeting was held at the State Department at which those attending had to pledge support from money out of their existing budgets.

There is no centrally coordinated effort to meet the needs of these countries, there is virtually no money available to meet their needs, and oversight appears to be planned on a similarly improvised basis.

Yet, the countries of Eastern Europe desperately need help in ridding themselves of the vestiges of the police state organizations left behind by the KGB and the Stasi. They need our support in changing the reality and the perception of the police as institutions of political repression, to that of organizations dedicated to the community's security and the eradication of crime.

Failure of the U.S. Government to develop a comprehensive program of coordinated support has meant that several Eastern European nations have sought help from private law enforcement entrepreneurs operating outside the control or direction of American policymaking and financed by private interests.

Mr. President, clearly greater efforts can and should be made, not just in Eastern Europe, but in the republics of the new Commonwealth of Independent States, in Latin America, Africa, and Asia as well.

I believe that there are four essential caveats which need to be made in order that--in developing programs for the future--the abuses associated with past U.S. police training programs do not happen again.

First, no assistance should be offered to any nation whose leaders have not been democratically elected, or which is not undergoing a meaningful transition to full democracy.

Second, there should be no intelligence agency participation in such training.

Third, those participating as trainers or instructors should be the best available from their professions.

And finally, all police training programs should take place within the context of a larger effort to improve recipient country administration of justice.

To conclude, Mr. President, the growing internationalization of crime requires a commensurate effort by the United States for strategies and programs to combat it. The post-cold-war era will see the emergence of new definitions of security and of threats, and police forces--well trained, well, equipped and conversant with U.S. standards and practices--must provide the first line of defense of both democracy and the safety of the individuals who reside in it.

I believe an office needs to be set up within the Justice Department that would be responsible for oversight and coordination of all U.S. administration of justice programs, including police training, as well as to develop--in consultation with the State Department--the means to provide comprehensive technical assistance to new and emerging democracies.

It should also be U.S. policy that all security assistance programs reflect the essential distinction embodied in the principle of posse comitatus, whereby civilianized police forces are given the primary responsibility for the maintenance of internal order in the United States. U.S. help in establishing and strengthening of justice systems in these new and emerging democracies must also be conditioned on adherence to international standards of human rights.

Finally, increased efforts in the administration of justice area should be accompanied by a hard look at the rationale for U.S. military assistance programs, to ensure that the armed forces of a recipient country are not competing for control of law enforcement with local civilian police forces.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the GAO report be printed in the Record, as well as several letters on this important issue.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

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Foreign Aid: Police Training and Assistance

U.S. General Accounting Office



Washington, DC, March 5, 1992.

Hon. Alan Cranston,
U.S. Senate.

Hon. Richard Lugar,
U.S. Senate.

Hon. Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
U.S. Senate.

Hon. Brock Adams,
U.S. Senate.

Hon. Thomas A. Dashle,
U.S. Senate.

This report partially responds to your request that we review U.S. training and assistance provided to foreign law enforcement agencies and personnel. This report provides information on (1) the legislative authority for providing assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies and personnel, (2) the extent and cost of U.S. activities, and (3) experts' opinions on the management of these programs.


The United States began assisting foreign police in the 1950s. The level of assistance expanded in the early 1960s when the Kennedy administration became concerned about growing communist insurgent activities and established a public safety program within the Agency for International Development (AID) to train foreign police. By 1968 the United States was spending $60 million a year to train police in 34 countries in areas such as criminal investigation, patrolling, interrogation and counterinsurgency techniques, riot control, weapon use, and bomb disposal. The United States also provided weapons, telecommunications, transportation, and other equipment. In the early 1970s, the Congress became concerned over the apparent absence of clear policy guidelines and the use of program funds to support repressive regimes that committed human rights' abuses. As a result, the Congress determined that it was inadvisable for the United States to continue supporting any foreign police organizations.


In 1973 and 1974, the Congress enacted legislation that prohibits U.S. agencies from using foreign economic or military assistance funds to assist foreign police, but it subsequently granted numerous exemptions to permit assistance in some countries and in various aspects of police force development, including material and weapons support, force management, narcotics control, and counterterrorism tactics. The 1974 prohibition did not apply to the use of other funds by agencies such as the Departments of Justice or Transportation to train or assist foreign law enforcement personnel.

We could not determine the total extent or cost of U.S. assistance to foreign police because some agencies do not maintain such data. However, we identified 125 countries that received U.S. training and assistance for their police forces during fiscal year 1990 at a cost of at least $117 million.

Former and current U.S. government officials and academic experts who have been involved with assistance to foreign police forces stated that there is only limited headquarters guidance and coordination of such assistance. Some believe that activities may not be efficiently implemented nor supportive of overall U.S. policy goals.


In the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, 1

the Congress prohibited the use of foreign assistance funds for police training and related programs in foreign countries. In December 1974, the Congress added section 660 to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to terminate AID's public safety program and expand the prohibition by stating that:

1 P.L. 93-189, sec. 2, 87 stat. 714, 716.

On and after July 1, 1975, none of the funds made available to carry out this Act, and none of the local currencies generated under this Act, shall be used to provide training or advice, or provide any financial support, for police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government or any program of internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any foreign government within the United States or abroad. 2

2 Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-559, sec. 30(a), 88 stat. 1795, 1804).

The amendment applies only to funds appropriated to carry out the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act, and does not apply to other agencies' appropriations. Also, the prohibition does not apply to any activity of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) related to `crimes of the nature of which are unlawful in the United States' or assistance to combat international narcotics
trafficking. According to DEA and FBI officials, the exemption permits these agencies to train foreign police. The act also permitted U.S. agencies to complete contracts for police assistance entered into before enactment of the amendment.

In 1981, the Congress began exempting additional activities or specific countries from the prohibition; for example, antiterrorism training, police investigative training, police force development in Panama, and military training to police in the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System. (See app. I for further information on exemptions to police training.)


Although some U.S. departments and agencies do not maintain data or regularly report on the extent or cost of assistance they provide to foreign police forces using their own appropriated funds, we identified 125 countries that received such training and assistance during fiscal year 1990 at a cost of about $117 million. U.S. programs providing assistance are the Department of State's International Narcotics Control ($45 million) and Antiterrorism Assistance ($10 million) programs; the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program ($20 million); and the Department of Defense's program to assist national police forces ($42 million). Two or more programs operate in 46 countries, with most of the funds spent for Latin American and Caribbean police. The Department of Justice also pays for police training from its own appropriated funds, but the Department was unable to identify the extent or cost of such training. (See apps. II and III for further information on assistance provided to foreign police forces.)


Current and former State Department and other government officials, and academic experts who have been involved in assistance to foreign police forces, stated that the U.S. government lacks (1) a clear policy on the role of U.S. assistance to police forces in the new and emerging democracies, (2) clearly defined program objectives, (3) a focal point for coordination and decision-making, and (4) a means for determining whether individual programs and activities support U.S. policy or contribute to overall U.S. interests. They noted that each program is managed individually, and the only place that coordination is occurring is at the U.S. embassy in the country. They expressed concern that in a country with more than one program, activities may be duplicative. One official expressed the opinion that the U.S. government needs to develop national policy guidelines for all police assistance programs to insure that cumulatively they support
common objectives. We are continuing to look at these issues in our on-going work (See app. II.)


We obtained information on U.S. training and assistance provided to foreign law enforcement personnel, reviewed the legislative authority for providing this training and assistance, and identified efforts to coordinate these activities. We did not review program implementation in recipient countries. We interviewed officials and obtained records from AID and the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, in Washington, D.C.; reviewed legislation and agency legal opinions on foreign police assistance; interviewed academic and legal experts on current U.S. assistance to foreign police; and reviewed literature published on foreign police assistance and AID's public safety program.

We conducted this review from August 1991 to January 1992 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. As you requested, we did not obtain written agency comments on this report; however, we discussed it with agency program officials and incorporated their comments where appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Administrator of AID, and appropriate congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request.

Please call me at (202) 275-5790 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. The major contributors to this report are Donald Patton, Assistant Director, Joan M. Slowitsky, Evaluator-in-Charge; and John Neumann, Evaluator.

Director, Foreign Economic
Assistance Issues.



Appendix I. Legislative Exemptions to the Prohibition on U.S. Assistance to Foreign Police

The Congress has granted numerous exemptions to the 1974 prohibition against assisting foreign police forces. The exemptions generally authorize activities that benefit a specific U.S. goal, such as countering the terrorist threat to U.S. citizens overseas or combating drug trafficking.

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The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 1

removed the section 660 prohibition on assistance to foreign police forces in Haiti and allowed such assistance for Haiti during fiscal years 1982 and 1983. The purpose was to help stop illegal emigration from Haiti to the United States. Subsequent acts continued this exemption for fiscal years 1984, 1986, and 1987.

1 P.L. 97-113, sec. 721(d), 95 stat. 1519.


With the International Security and Development Assistance Authorizations Act of 1983, 2

the Congress authorized an antiterrorism program to train foreign police in the United States. In 1990 Congress relaxed the section 660 restrictions to allow training outside the United States for 30 days or less if it relates to aviation security, crisis management, document screening techniques, facility security, maritime security, protection for very important persons, and handling of detector dogs. 3

2 P.L. 98-151, sec. 101(b)(2), 97 stat. 968, 972.

3 Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-604, title II, sec. 213(b), 104 stat. 3066, 3086).


With the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 4

addressed a series of police assistance activities. It expanded upon a 1984 act that authorized a judicial reform project in El Salvador and exempted assistance to Salvadoran police in judicial investigative roles from the section 660 prohibition. 5

The 1985 act expanded the judicial reform program and the police training exemption to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 1988 the Congress further expanded the judicial reform program to allow police assistance to promote investigative and forensic skills, develop law enforcement training curricula, and improve administration and management of law enforcement organizations. This act specifically prohibited the Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. armed forces from providing training under this program. 6

4 P.L. 99-83, sec. 712, 99 stat. 190, 244.

5 Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-151, sec. 101(b)(1), 97 stat. 964, 966 (1983)).

6 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for 1988 (P.L. 100-202, sec. 579, 101 stat. 1329-181 (1987)).

The 1985 act also exempted assistance for maritime law enforcement and other maritime skills from the section 660 prohibition, and removed the prohibition for any country that has a long-standing democratic tradition, does not have armed forces, and does not engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. The act permitted such countries to receive any type of police assistance.

Finally, the 1985 act authorized assistance to Honduran and El Salvadoran police for fiscal years 1986 and 1987, provided that the President determined and notified the Congress that those countries had made significant progress in eliminating human rights violations. This exemption permitted DOD to train and equip these countries' police forces to respond to acts of terrorism. The exemption was not renewed beyond fiscal year 1987.


This series of acts approved certain police assistance activities in Latin America and the Caribbean for narcotics control purposes. The International Narcotics Control Act of 1986 7

permitted DOD to provide training to foreign police in the operation and maintenance of aircraft used in narcotics control. The International Narcotics Control Act of 1988 8

expanded DOD's role and allowed it to provide training and weapons and ammunition in fiscal years 1989 and 1990 to foreign police units that are specifically organized for narcotics enforcement in eligible countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. This act also allowed economic support funds to be provided to Colombian police for the protection of judges, government officials, and members of the press against narco-terrorist attacks.

7 P.L. 99-570, title II, sec. 2004, 100 stat. 3207-60.

8 P.L. 100-690, title IV, 102 stat. 4181, 4261.

The International Narcotics Control Act of 1989 9

extended DOD's authority to train and provide defense articles to foreign police units in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru in fiscal year 1990, provided they are organized specifically for narcotics enforcement. This authority differs from the 1988 act in that it allowed DOD to provide, in addition to weapons and ammunition, other defense articles such as helicopters, vehicles, radios, and personnel gear.

9 P.L. 101-231, sec. 3, 103 stat. 1954.

The International Narcotics Control Act of 1990 10

authorized DOD to continue to train and equip police forces in the Andean region in fiscal year 1990. This act was similar to the previous acts in that it permits DOD to train police forces in the operation and maintenance of equipment and in tactical operations in narcotics interdiction and also allowed DOD to provide defense articles to these units. However, it also allows DOD to provide commodities, such as nonmilitary equipment or supplies, to narcotics control police forces. This act also continued the assistance to Colombia to protect against narco-terrorist attacks and extended this assistance to Bolivia and Peru for fiscal year 1991.

10 P.L. 101 623, sec. 3(d), 104 stat. 3352.


In 1990, after the U.S. intervention in Panama, the Congress significantly enhanced the U.S. role in the development of the new police force in Panama. The Urgent Assistance for Democracy in Panama Act of 1990 11

permitted training in areas such as human rights, civil law, and overall civilian law enforcement techniques. The act also permitted DOD, using prior year military assistance funds, to procure defense articles and related services for law enforcement forces in Panama.

11 P.L. 101-243, sec. 101(b), 104 stat. 7.


The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for 1991 12

amended section 660 to allow U.S. assistance to police forces of countries that are members of the regional security system of the Eastern Caribbean. With the exception of Antigua and Barbados, other member countries did not require this exemption to receive assistance because they were covered under the existing exemption that permitted assistance to police forces in countries with long-standing democratic traditions, and no armed forces. Antigua and Barbados have armed forces.

12 P.L. 101-513, sec. 594, 104 stat. 2060 (1990).


In addition to the exemptions previously discussed, there are other authorities that waive the prohibition on assistance to police forces of foreign countries. For example, the President may authorize foreign assistance when `it is important to the security interests of the United States'. 13

This allows the President to waive any provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, including section 660.

13 22 U.S. C. 2364.



Appendix II. U.S. Assistance Provided to Foreign Police


The goal of the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA) is to improve foreign governments' antiterrorist capabilities to better protect U.S. citizens and interests. In fiscal year 1990, the United States provided antiterrorism assistance to 49 countries at a cost of nearly $10 million. Sixty-two percent of the funds were spent in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Europe, and less than $500,000 was used to purchase equipment. Representative training included judicial protection, protection to very important persons, hostage negotiation, and antiterrorist operations. The Department of State manages the program and contracts with other U.S. government agencies, state or local police departments, and private firms to conduct the training. The Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and the U.S. Marshals Service are regular trainers. In compliance with legislative requirements, most training takes place in the United States.

In addition to training provided under the ATA program, the Federal Aviation Administration provides aviation security training to a limited number of foreign officials who attend their basic security training courses. The course deals in part with the role of law enforcement in support of passenger screening procedures and airport security programs.


One of the objectives of the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) international narcotics control training program is to strengthen host country enforcement and interdiction capabilities. During fiscal year 1990, INM provided a minimum of $45 million in training and equipment to foreign police, principally in Mexico, Jamaica, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, Pakistan, Thailand, and Turkey. These are all narcotics producing and trafficking countries.

INM reimburses other U.S. government agencies, primarily the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Customs, and Coast Guard, to conduct the actual training. DEA provides narcotics investigative training, Customs teaches air, sea and land port search procedures, and Coast Guard teaches courses in maritime interdiction. Other agencies may also be requested to train on a reimbursable basis in areas where they have specific expertise. For example, DOD provides helicopter training to police in drug trafficking countries. Training is conducted both overseas and in the United States and is reviewed and approved by INM.

In addition, DOD used military assistance funds to train and equip narcotics enforcement police in several drug producing and trafficking countries. Documents provided by DOD show that in fiscal year 1990, DOD provided training and equipment with a value of at least $17 million to Mexico, $1.3 million to Bolivia, $10 million to Colombia, $1 million to Ecuador, and $1 million to Peru. DOD officials informed us that training and equipment valued at more than these amounts may also have been provided. However, documentation was not available at the Washington, D.C., agency headquarters level that specified the amounts for law enforcement activities. The equipment provided consisted of UH-1 helicopters and spare parts, ammunition, small arms, riot control equipment, radios, and miscellaneous personal gear.

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During fiscal year 1986, the Agency for International Development (AID) transferred funds to the Department of Justice (DOJ) to design, develop, and implement projects to improve and enhance the investigative capabilities of law enforcement agencies in the Latin America and the Caribbean region. This was part of AID's effort to reform judicial systems. Using these funds, DOJ established the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). Operating under State Department oversight, ICITAP has conducted criminal justice sector needs assessments in the region and has expanded its training to include basic police management and police academy development. In fiscal year 1990, ICITAP received $7 million from the Department of State for its regional program. It trained more than 1,000 students from the Caribbean, Central and South America and sponsored 7 conferences. Training includes police management, criminal investigation, crime scene search, and forensic medicine courses. Except for students sent to training programs in the United States, ICITAP training takes place overseas.

The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) also provides limited training for foreign law enforcement officials. Each year approximately 100 international police officials attend the 11-week college level course at the FBI National Academy that includes studies on management and forensic sciences. The FBI pays for the training and subsistence, but does not pay for the students' transportation. Over the last 10 years, more than 1,100 foreign police officials from 89 countries have graduated from this course.

The FBI also established two training courses for foreign police using its own appropriated funds. The first began in 1987 when FBI agents along the Mexican border began training Mexican police to better assist the United
States in its investigations. Mexican officers receive a 3-day course in basic law enforcement techniques to include crime scene management, collection and preservation of evidence, hostage negotiations, forensic science, and investigative techniques. Since 1987, over 400 Mexican border police have been trained. FBI officials stated that the FBI plans to establish a training school in Mexico during 1992 at an estimated cost of about $250,000 annually, excluding salaries.

The second course developed by the FBI for foreign police was to provide mid-level management training for police officials from the Pacific Island nations. The 4-week course includes first-line supervision, investigative techniques, and hostage negotiations. During 1991, 52 students graduated from the course held in Guam at a cost to the FBI of about $35,000. About 50 students are expected to attend this course during the spring of 1992.

The FBI also provides other training and assistance to foreign police as requested, but the cost is unknown. For example, the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime provided training to Canadian police. The Criminal Investigative Division conducted a training seminar for officers from Italy's three national law enforcement agencies on the use of sensitive investigative techniques such as the operation of confidential sources, undercover operations, and electronic surveillance. The FBI also furnishes on-the-job assistance to governments who request help during particularly difficult or sensitive investigations.


After the U.S. intervention in Panama in December 1989, ICITAP implemented a program to help develop the newly formed Panamanian Public Force using $13.2 million in fiscal years 1990 and 1991 foreign assistance funds. The goal was to develop a professional, civilian national police force that is fully integrated into Panamanian society, capable of protecting its people, and dedicated to supporting the Panamanian constitution, laws, and human rights. Since the program began, ICITAP has trained about 5,500 police officers and provided institutional development assistance, such as help in starting the National Police Academy, improved recruitment procedures, and creating an in-house self-monitoring organization. In addition, ICITAP has worked closely with U.S. Embassy and Panamanian government officials to develop plans and policies appropriate for a police force in a democracy.


DOD supplies a limited amount of military training and assistance to police officials. During fiscal years 1986 and 1987, DOD trained and equipped the El Salvadoran and Honduran police to counter urban terrorist activities. This assistance was authorized in response to the murder of U.S. Marines by terrorists in El Salvador and was managed and delivered by the U.S. Army Military Police. The assistance consisted of training in counterterrorism techniques and the supply of police vehicles, communications, weapons, and other equipment. This effort cost $19.8 million, of which $17 million was provided to El Salvador.

In fiscal year 1990, DOD spent $6.4 million in previously authorized but unused military assistance funds to purchase needed equipment and weapons for Panama's newly formed national police force. Items procured included police vehicles, communications equipment, small arms, and personal gear. This assistance was a one-time, emergency program.

DOD has an ongoing military assistance program to support Costa Rican police. In fiscal year 1990, DOD supplied $431,000 in military equipment and $232,000 in military training to the Costa Rican Civil Guard to help them carry out their responsibility to protect the border regions of the country. DOD provided equipment such as vehicles, personnel gear, and radios, and military training in areas such as coastal operations. Additionally, DOD conducted technical training courses in equipment maintenance and medical skills among others.

DOD, along with the United Kingdom, supports the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System that was formed after the U.S. intervention in Grenada. The Security System is composed of a few permanently assigned military officers, but largely depends upon island nation police officers who can be called up for military duty in case of emergency. The United States equips and trains these personnel to prepare them for such an eventually. In fiscal year 1990, DOD provided $4.2 million in military assistance funds that were used to purchase equipment such as jeeps, small arms, uniforms, and communications gear. DOD also provided $300,000 for training in special operations, rural patrol, field survival, and surveillance, as well as technical courses in communications, navigation, maintenance, and medicine.


We could not accurately determine the extent or cost of assistance to foreign police because agencies do not regularly report on assistance funded out of their own budgets, some double counting of students may be occurring and agencies may not be differentiating between assistance provided to police and assistance provided to the military. For example, in response to our request, DOJ began collecting information on its support of foreign police, including data on travel expenses, salaries, and expendable items such as course materials. However, the Department could not assign a dollar value to all of these activities. Other agencies may be conducting similar work of which we are unaware. There also may be some double counting of foreign police trainees. For example, the agency supplying the training and the agency paying for the training may both include the trainees in their reporting systems, such as when ICITAP pays for students attending the FBI academy.

Also, we could not always determine whether a student was a police officer or a military member because some agencies do not collect such data, DOD officials informed us that once they receive permission to train police in a specific activity they do not provide a further accounting breakdown. For example, training provided to the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System was for law enforcement personnel, although a few trainees may have belonged to military organizations.


High-level program officials, former U.S. officials, and academic experts identified several issues that they believe affect the effectiveness of foreign police assistance. Their views are presented below; however, we did not verify whether the problems they identified have adversely affected programs in recipient countries.


Officials with whom we spoke stated that overall police training policy guidance at the Washington, DC, headquarters management level was limited. A former U.S. Ambassador in Latin America said that because there is no U.S. policy guidance, each agency pursues its own program agenda, which may not be in concert with long-term U.S. interests. Thus, he said, the U.S. government lacks a mechanism for considering how the various activities contribute to a strategy of fostering democratic institutions or to serving other national interests.

Program managers informed us that each program is managed separately without a mechanism to insure that activities are coordinated and not
duplicative. The Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism informed us that the effect of the various pieces of legislation and resulting programs is that there is a lot of disparate police training and some interagency competition, but without anyone in charge. The coordinator believes that this does not serve U.S. interests. He stated that a Policy Coordinating Committee coordinates all antiterrorism assistance delivered by participating agencies such as the FBI and the State Department. He noted however, that the committee does not coordinate with agencies providing police training outside of the ATA umbrella. In addition, although INM, DEA, and the other agencies providing narcotics control assistance coordinate with each other, officials informed us that they do not routinely coordinate with ATA or ICITAP on police assistance activities.

The absence of centralized monitoring or management leaves the focal point for decision-making at the embassy level. However, one program official believed that embassy personnel may be unaware of the full range of programs and training available and may lack expertise in police training. Further, given the multitude of programs, there is no single individual or office within the embassy with the expertise or authority to manage all programs. For example, the ATA program generally is coordinated through the embassy's regional security officer, while ICITAP generally coordinates its activities through a political officer, or directly with the Ambassador, and DEA manages its programs through either an in-country attache or a special narcotics coordinator.

A former U.S. Ambassador in Latin America stated that by allowing so much decision-making authority at the embassy level, the degree of oversight and coordination of police activities is dependent on the priority the Ambassador assigns to these activities. He said that not every Ambassador keeps a close watch on all in-country activities, and that this suggests the need for greater coordination, monitoring, and supervision at the Washington, D.C., level.

[Page: S2880]


A State Department official said that because of the proliferation of programs and the overlap in objectives, U.S. agencies may be duplicating efforts. As a result, determining which agency will provide training may depend largely on whether an agency has the resources or takes the initiative. A program officer acknowledged that some foreign officials are receiving similar courses from different agencies and similar program objectives may also result in duplicative administrative and assessment functions. An ATA official stated that although ATA's charter limits its training to antiterrorism, the strategy and objectives of ATA's training parallel those of ICITAP; both want to improve law enforcement capabilities. DEA is also concerned about general enforcement capabilities as part of its drug interdiction activities. However, each agency conducts in-depth force capability and training needs assessments before commencing training.



Appendix III. Countries Receiving Police Assistance

Table III.1 shows the countries that have received assistance from the United States for their police forces during fiscal year 1990. The actual level of assistance varies significantly among countries. For example, a country listed as a recipient of INM counternarcotics assistance may have had as few as one participant in a training course, or received many millions of dollars in training and equipment. Assistance listed under the DOJ includes the FBI but not ICITAP. Although ICITAP is a DOJ program, it receives foreign assistance funds channeled through the Department of State. The ATA column includes only antiterrorism assistance managed under that program. The assistance listed under INM includes training provided by DEA, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Customs Service.

                                 ATA DOJ ICITAP INM DOD 
Botswana                                          X     
Burkina Faso                       X                    
Burundi                            X              X     
Central African Republic           X              X     
Chad                               X              X     
Congo                              X                    
Cote D'Ivoire                      X                    
Ethiopia                                          X     
Gabon                              X                    
Ghana                                             X     
Guinea                             X              X     
Kenya                              X              X     
Mali                               X                    
Mauritania                         X                    
Mauritius                                         X     
Mozambique                                        X     
Niger                              X                    
Nigeria                                           X     
Rwanda                                            X     
Senegal                            X                    
Seychelles                                        X     
Sudan                                             X     
Tanzania                                          X     
Togo                               X                    
Uganda                                            X     
Zaire                              X                    
Zambia                                            X     
Zimbabwe                                          X     
Latin America and the Caribbean:                        
Antigua-Barbuda 1                             X   X   X 
Argentina                                         X     
Bahamas                                           X     
Barbados 1                         X          X   X   X 
Belize                                        X   X     
Bolivia 2                          X          X   X   X 
Brazil                                            X     
Chile                                             X     
Colombia 2                         X          X   X   X 
Costa Rica                         X          X   X   X 
Dominica 1                         X          X   X   X 
Dominican Republic                            X   X     
Ecuador                            X              X   X 
El Salvador                                   X   X     
Grenada 1                          X          X   X   X 
Guatemala                                     X   X     
Guyana                                        X   X     
Haiti                                             X     
Honduras                           X          X   X     
Jamaica                            X          X   X     
Mexico 2                               X          X   X 
Nicaragua                                     X         
Panama 2                           X          X   X   X 
Paraguay                                          X     
Peru 2                             X          X   X   X 
St. Kitts & Nevis 1                X          X   X   X 
St. Lucia 1                        X          X   X   X 
St. Vincent 1                      X          X   X   X 
Surinam                                           X     
Trinidad & Tobago                             X   X     
Uruguay                                           X     
Venezuela                                         X     
East Asia and Pacific:                                  
Australia                              X          X     
Brunei                                            X     
Fiji                                              X     
Hong Kong                                         X     
Indonesia                                         X     
Kiribati                                          X     
Korea                                             X     
Laos                                              X     
Malaysia                                          X     
Marshall Islands                       X                
New Zealand                                       X     
Papua New Guinea                                  X     
Philippines                        X              X     
Samoa                                             X     
Singapore                                         X     
Solomon Islands                                   X     
Taiwan                                            X     
Thailand                           X              X     
Tonga                                             X     
Tuvalu                                            X     
Vanuatu                            X   X          X     
Europe and Canada:                                      
Austria                                           X     
Canada                                 X                
Cyprus                             X              X     
Czechoslovakia                     X              X     
Denmark                                           X     
England                                X          X     
Finland                                           X     
France                                            X     
Germany                                X          X     
Greece                                            X     
Hungary                            X              X     
Iceland                                           X     
Ireland                                           X     
Italy                                  X          X     
Malta                                             X     
Netherlands                            X          X     
Norway                                            X     
Poland                             X              X     
Portugal                           X              X     
Spain                                             X     
Sweden                                            X     
Turkey                             X              X     
United Kingdom                                    X     
U.S.S.R                                           X     
Yugoslavia                                        X     
Near East and South Asia:                               
Bahrain                                           X     
Bangladesh                                        X     
Egypt                              X              X     
India                                             X     
Israel                             X              X     
Jordan                             X              X     
Kuwait                                            X     
Lebanon                                           X     
Maldives                                          X     
Nepal                                             X     
Oman                                              X     
Pakistan                           X              X     
Qatar                                             X     
Saudi Arabia                                      X     
Sri Lanka                          X              X     
Syria                                             X     
Tunisia                            X              X     
United Arab Emirates                              X     
Yemen                                             X     

[Footnote] 1 These countries are members of the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System which received a total of $4.5 million in military training and equipment. They also received investigative and other training from ICITAP.
[Footnote] 2 Available data indicates that these countries received at least $5 million in police training and assistance.

U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, May 2, 1991.

Hon. Richard Thornburgh,
Attorney General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

Dear Dick: As you know, I have been very interested in the issue of designing U.S. security assistance programs for the post-Cold War period. Obviously, administration of justice and police training form part of the core of programs that might significantly benefit from a hard look at their future, with a view to making them more appropriate for the 1990s.

To this end I, together with four of my colleagues, recently asked the Government Accounting Office to look into both the way the system is currently working, as well as proposals for its reform. Among the issues we asked the GAO to address were the following: the intent and efficacy of current restrictions on civilian police training; the scope, structure and efficacy of existing administration of justice programs, and the compatibility of security assistance training with U.S. models of civil-military and civil-police relations.

I know you have given considerable thought to these issues, and that is my reason for writing to you today. I understand your office is receiving an increasing number of requests from abroad for help in the administration of justice area, particularly in police training and prison reform.

There appears to be a growing need for help in these areas, especially from the emerging democracies of Eastern and Central Europe. Our offices have been in contact on this particular issue before, and I thank you for your support for my bill, S. 552, the `Omnibus Eastern European Security Assistance, Act.' I would very much appreciate hearing your views in full on how S. 552 could help meet the need in the Eastern European region, and what more, if anything, needs to be done.

And beyond that, I would like to take this opportunity to get your views on several of the issues we posed to the GAO on the issue of administration of justice:

(1) In what ways might we improve the administration of justice, including police development, in new and emerging democracies?

(2) Concerning the effects of the restrictions mandated by Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act on international police training:

(a) How many exemptions currently exist to the Section 660 rule? Given various programs and exemptions, does this confuse recipient governments or agencies about the purposes of U.S. police training? For example, the International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP) is prohibited from teaching surveillance techniques, while other programs are permitted to give this type of instruction as part of their mission.

(b) How different is the context in which police training is currently carried out from that of the 1960s and 1970s? Related to this, what kinds of oversight mechanisms do you believe are necessary to prevent the allegations of abuse which occurred in the past? And how might police training programs be structured so as to anticipate effectively the objections to international police training which resulted in the passage of Section 660?

(c) Currently, most administration of justice programs carried out under Section 534 of the Foreign Assistance Act are administered by the Agency for International Development. The police training and assistance component under Section 534 has been re-delegated to the State Department which allocates funds to the Department of Justice to carry out such programs. There have been doubts expressed about AID's ability to carry out administration of justice programs. There have also been suggestions that all international justice assistance programs be placed under the supervision of the Department of Justice. What is your assessment about such proposals? If it is positive, how would Justice Department leadership in this field result in better and more effective programs?

(d) In your view, how successful a program is the International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program? Is ICITAP, as currently structured, capable of carrying out programs on a world-wide scale? If not what changes are needed to allow it to respond to growing demands for its services outside Central and South America?

(e) What is the current U.S. law enforcement presence in Eastern and Central Europe? How many legal attache posts are there in American embassies there? If there is a need for more, what mission(s) do you see them performing? How many legal attaches are there worldwide, and how do they acquire their expertise? What plans are currently being made to strengthen any perceived gaps in law enforcement efforts in the region by the administration?

(f) If the Department of Justice were to be given a larger role in the area of international administration of justice programs, what efforts do you foresee it making to help host countries make a transition from military-led to civilian-run law enforcement, given the fact that, as has been noted by Congress, the separation of the military from civilian law enforcement functions has historically been a critical element in sustaining democracies around the world?

(g) What role do you see for community-based policing techniques in future police training programs?

I very much appreciate the opportunity to share with you some of my concerns about this increasingly important subject. I look forward to cooperating with you on administration of justice issues as they affect Eastern and Central Europe, and other regions as well. If you have any questions about this letter, please do not hesitate to have a member of your staff call Martin Edwin Andersen, my legislative assistant for foreign policy and defense at 224-8114.

With every good wish, I remain,

Alan Cranston.



U.S. Department of Justice,
Washington, DC, September 19, 1991.

Hon. Alan Cranston,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

[Page: S2881]

Dear Senator Cranston: On behalf of the Department of Justice, I would like to respond to your letter which raises questions with regard to the administration of justice and police training in the post Cold War Era. I apologize for any inconvenience our delay in responding may have caused you.

Attorney General Thornburgh did experience a great growth in the incidents of requests for assistance and training from abroad. He also recognized a growing reliance by the Department of Justice on the cooperation of foreign law enforcement organization in combating terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering and international financial fraud. To facilitate this work, he formed an Office of International Affairs in the Department (a copy of his order is attached). We appreciate your interest in and support for our efforts to improve the effectiveness of international law enforcement.

I would like to respond to the particular questions you have raised.

1. In what ways might we improve the administration of justice, including police development, in new and emerging democracies?

Answer: The move to democratization requires reforms in most public institutions, including those charged with the enforcement and administration of justice. The rules of law and conditions for a democracy are such that effective administration of justice is essential if a new democracy is to survive. If crimes are seen as going unpunished for failure of effective investigation and criminals are perceived to act with impunity, the rule of law and conditions for democracy are undermined. Weak law enforcement institutions can threaten the viability of the democratization process. It is critical that the public have confidence in the criminal justice system of their country.

There are several major areas that can be addressed when determining ways to strengthen judicial systems and professionalize the police.

(A) Enhance judicial and prosecutorial capabilities:

(1) Improvement of the administration of justice depends heavily on judges, and prosecutors as well as police. Judicial training, court administration, and improved access to justice not only eases costly delays, but also builds the public's confidence in the judicial process.

(B) Improve coordination between judges, prosecutors, and the police:

(1) The institutional responsibilities of each of the judicial components must be carefully defined in a new democracy. Each component must learn more about the other and how they can better coordinate and interact. This is especially crucial in the investigation of a crime where lack of coordination can jeopardize an entire investigation.

(C) Improve technical skills of the police to deal with problems of crime prevention and investigation:

(1) In a democracy the public security task falls on the police. They must be seen as a protector of the citizens and not of the ruling authority. Because most of the public security responsibilities in emerging democracies were originally assigned to the military, who answered directly to the ruling authority, most police forces never received basic police instruction and therefore lack proper skills in investigation, especially criminal investigation.

(D) Design safeguards against human-rights abuses:

(1) A professional police force should inspire confidence in law enforcement officials and judicial institutions. These officials and institutions are responsible for guaranteeing fundamental rights, freedom and security. It is essential in the institutional development of every public security force in every democracy, that an instrument be created to ensure that allegations against the police are investigated and the citizenry is advised of the outcome of these investigations.

(2) Emphasis should be placed on respect for human rights during police training and emerging democracies. By doing so, police professionalism will increase and improve human rights records in these countries.

(E) Law enforcement institution building:

(1) Consideration should be given to the development and implementation of training programs in new democracies. This includes the development of curricula, and the creation of police academies separate from the military.

2. concerning the effects of the restrictions mandated by Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act on international police training.

(a) How many exemptions currently exist to the Section 660 rule? Given various programs and exemptions, does this confuse recipient governments or agencies about the purpose of U.S. police training? For example, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) is prohibited from teaching surveillance techniques, while other programs are permitted to give this type of instruction as part of their mission.

Answer: Nearly all assistance given by the U.S. Government to foreign law enforcement agencies must be exempted by Congress from Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Therefore, separate exemptions exist for each U.S. policy initiative designed to improve an aspect of policing in a foreign country. Examples are: Narcotics training, anti-terrorism training, criminal investigative training, past International Military Education and Training (IMET) for police in El Salvador and Honduras and current IMET for Panama and the Caribbean region, as well as general police training to Panama. The above is not a complete list of exemptions to Section 660, but does represent the majority of U.S. assistance to foreign police.

A great deal of effort goes into coordinating these programs both in Washington and in the various U.S. embassies; therefore, any new initiatives should be an expansion of the above programs, rather than a new exemption.

(b) How different is the context in which police training is currently carried out from that of the 1960's and 1970's? Related to this, what kinds oversight mechanisms do you believe are necessary to prevent the allegations of abuse which occurred in the past? And how might police training programs be structured so as to anticipate effectively the objections to international police training which resulted in the passage of Section 660?

Answer: A 1989 Congressional Research Service report stated the following concerning the Agency for International Development's Office of Public Safety (OPS), which provided police training during the 1960's and 1970's:

The U.S. based training programs targeted mid-level supervisory officers and senior policy and program personnel, whereas in-country programs trained lower ranking police officers. Although curricula differed according to the targeted trainees, most programs had the dual objectives of institution building and counterinsurgency training. The technical curriculum of the OPS program--emphasizing police management and operations--included training in logistics, police lab techniques, personnel, police community relations, recordkeeping, criminal investigation, patrolling, maintenance and interrogation skills. The counterinsurgency courses emphasized the nature of counterinsurgency, communist ideology, riot control, pistols and weapons use, photography and police communications, chemical munitions, and bomb disposal.

OPS also provided law enforcement equipment to foreign police units. Equipment transfers fell into four categories: telecommunications, transportation, weapons and riot control, and general equipment (e.g. textbooks, training aids, criminal investigation equipment). Most equipment transfers were communication and transportation items.

[Alan K. Yu. U.S. Assistance for Foreign Police Forces (Congressional Research Service)--Library of Congress, July 18, 1989.]

ICITAP's role since its inception in 1986 has been to provide assistance to countries in Latin American and the Caribbean in an effort to strengthen the administration of justice in those countries. Specifically, ICITAP develops and implements:

(1) Programs to enhance professional capabilities to carry out investigative and forensic functions conducted under judicial or prosecutorial control;

(2) Programs to assist in the development of academic instruction and curricula for training law enforcement personnel; and

(3) Programs to improve the administrative and management capabilities of law enforcement agencies, especially their capabilities relating to career development, personnel evaluation, and internal discipline procedures.

The heart of ICITAP's work is teaching basic techniques solely and immediately associated with the conduct of criminal investigations. In addition, ICITAP has developed courses for judges and prosecutors, with the objective of providing them a basic understanding of investigative techniques they can employ in directing investigations. Judges and prosecutors regularly participate in skills courses with the police, as well as receiving their own training from ICITAP. Another central effort is the enhancement of communication and coordination among the components of the criminal justice sector; the opportunity for high level discussions and exchange of views has been provided through regional and national conferences.

A major ICITAP theme in all the works undertaken is the value and necessity of physical evidence in the investigation and adjudication of crimes. The overall objective of ICITAP's forensic science development is to create full service crime laboratories, effective fingerprint repositories, competent forensic pathology, and equipped and proficient crime scene processing teams to support criminal investigations.

Institution building is an implicit benefit of improved criminal investigative ability and increased professionalism by the police and other entities within the criminal justice system. ICITAP's approach is to offer a gamut of courses directly linked to criminal investigations and offered in-country to all levels of officer corps police personnel and judicial and prosecutive professionals. Technical assistance, forensic internships, and equipment donations to police laboratories and crime scene processing units are focused on specific areas of forensic activity. Except in Panama, general policing matters are outside ICITAP's purview, as are any issues related to counterinsurgency or civil disorder control.

Past police assistance and training programs, most notably the OPS, fell victim to allegations of abuse in part because any police assistance program is automatically open to such allegations by the very nature of police activities--the bestowing upon an agency of government the right to use force when necessary to maintain order and public safety. In addition, because one of the stated goals of the OPS was the deterrence of activities deemed hostile to the interest of the United States--including the spread of revolutionary movements--resources and personnel were allocated to address a `counterinsurgency' aspect of police training, causing a public and media perception that OPS conducted intelligence activities.

In the current world situation where poverty and illegal drug activity overshadow ideology, the nature of police training and assistance programs has changed. Ideological objectives have been replaced by the need for professional, competent law enforcement. These programs must strive to be as accessible to States. Police assistance programs must be coordinated at a policy and procedural level with a single decision-making organ to avoid replicating some efforts while overlooking others.

In addition, these activities should be maintained in the hands of public institutions, such as an executive department, subject to full and complete Executive and Congressional review. Periodic accountability reviews conducted by the department's own internal audit/inspection service and the General Accounting Office are required to ensure that the stated mission and actual practice are the game. Above all, such programs must be conducted in the full light of day with full regard for the human rights aspect of policing.

(c) Currently, most administration of justice programs carried out under Section 534 of the Foreign Assistance Act are administered by the Agency for International Development. The police training and assistance component under Section 534 has been re-delegated to the State Department, which allocate funds to the Department of Justice to carry out such programs. There have been doubts expressed about AID's ability to carry out administration of justice programs. There have been suggestions that all international justice assistance programs be placed under the supervision of the Department of Justice. What is your assessment about such proposals? If it is positive, how would Justice Department leadership in this field result in better and more effective programs?

Answer: Both the Department of Justice and the Agency for International Development (AID) can point to historical accounts of criminal justice training. AID managed the Office of Public Safety and The Law and Development Program. Within the Department of Justice, the FBI has trained foreign police officers at its academy since 1936 and DEA has had a strong narcotics training program for foreign officers for the past two decades.

The Department of Justice takes pride in having worked with the Department of State and AID in the Administration of Justice program and stands ready to make available the many in-house resources it has to strengthen criminal justice systems in developing nations. These include the Office of International Affairs, the FBI, DEA, ICITAP, Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Marshals Service, the Advocacy Institute, Immigration and Nationalization Service, Border Patrol, the Bureau of Justice Administration, the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the National Institute of Justice.

(d) In your view, how successful a program is the International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program? Is ICITAP, as currently structured, capable of carrying out programs on a worldwide scale? If not, what changes are needed to allow it to respond to growing demand for its services outside Central and South America?

Answer: ICITAP has proven to be a very successful program. It began in FY 1986 with a budget of $1.5 million and a permanent staff of four; now a permanent staff of 31, contract staff of 40, and some 60 consultants carry out a 20 million dollar program throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. ICITAP's accomplishments have been praised by officials of the State Department and foreign governments.

The current structure provides ICITAP with the flexibility to expand or contract quickly in response to international developments. For example, three months after the Justice Department received its initial allocation of funds from State for the Panama program, ICITAP had a staff of six working out of the U.S. Embassy in Panama City implementing a detailed operational plan that ICITAP had developed. ICITAP takes justifiable pride in being an unbureaucratic, quick-response team of professionals, and could successfully employ its proven techniques in other regions of the world if authorized to do so.

(e) What is the current U.S. law enforcement presence in Eastern and Central Europe? How many legal attache posts are there in American embassies there? If there is a need for more, what mission(s) do you see them performing? How many legal attaches are there worldwide, and how do they acquire their expertise? What plans are currently being made to strengthen any perceived gaps in law enforcement efforts in the region by the administration?

Answer: There is currently no U.S. law enforcement presence in Eastern Europe. In Central Europe the law enforcement presence (sworn officers) is as follows:

Austria: DEA (3), Customs (2).

Germany: DEA (7), Customs (7), FBI (5).

Switzerland: DEA (3), FBI (2).

There is a greater need for additional legal attache posts in Eastern and Central Europe as well as in other parts of the world. As technology and modern transportation render an `ever shrinking world,' it is increasingly important that DOJ be represented in the major foreign capitals in order to effectively counter international crime and terrorism.

In connection with the FBI's international mission and due to its standing within the international law enforcement community, the FBI continues to receive numerous requests for assistance on investigative, training, and technical issues. Many foreign government officials, including those of former Eastern bloc nations, have expressed an interest in having permanent FBI representation in their countries to enhance both the level of cooperation and their own agency's professionalism.

Currently there are 18 FBI Legal Attache (Legat) posts located in major U.S. embassies worldwide. These posts are staffed by 46 Legats and Assistant Legats and 41 office assistants. With regard to Europe, the State Department has recently approved a Legat post for Vienna. It is envisioned that this would be a regional post with responsibility also for Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

All Legats are experienced FBI agents with managerial and operational expertise. This expertise is derived primarily from their work-related background in foreign counterintelligence, counterterrorism, drugs, organized crime, and white collar crime. They receive additional training as needed before they leave for their posting, such as language training and State Department briefings.

The Department of Justice is currently examining law enforcement issues in Eastern Europe in an effort to determine how the U.S. can better assist these countries and establish viable civilian law enforcement agencies which will observe the rule of law. Last December the Attorney General visited Hungary and Bulgaria. He also had a number of meetings in Washington with his counterparts from Eastern Europe. We still have much to learn, but these meetings have provided valuable insights to the problems these countries are facing with law enforcement and the evolution to the rule of law. The parallels between Latin America and Eastern Europe are evident and the ICITAP model is ideally suited to be utilized in fostering this evolution.

(f) If the Department of Justice were to be given a larger role in the area of international administration of justice programs, what efforts do you foresee it making to help host
countries make a transition from military-led to civilian-run law enforcement, given the fact that, as has been noted by Congress, the separation of the military from civilian law enforcement functions has historically been a critical element in sustaining democracies around the world?

Answer: If the Department of Justice were given a larger role in the international administration of justice programs, it could bring considerable expertise to those programs, over and above the criminal investigation expertise that has been provided for the past five years. As you know, the Department of Justice has substantial expertise in additional areas such as judicial protection; prosecution; witness protection; corrections; civil litigation; immigration; resolution of racial and ethnic conflicts; juvenile justice programs; justice statistics, etc.

In addition, outside the aegis of administration of justice as it is currently structured, the Department of Justice has expertise in drug enforcement and counter-terrorism. Also, it is currently providing some training and assistance which is funded by the State Department's International Narcotics Matters and Anti-Terrorism Assistance program.

(g) What role do you see for community-based policing techniques in future police training program?

Answer: Most of the countries in which ICITAP works are emerging democracies with a legacy of military domination and subsequent involvement in policing activities. There is a general distrust of the police because of their connection with the military, be it direct or indirect. The police tend to be authoritarian and lack social sensitivity, frequently incurring allegations of human rights abuses. For the most part, community/police relations are non-existent and the police lack credibility. ICITAP has found police services are incident-driven, with little thought or consideration given to crime prevention and reduction.

In general, because many police organizations are incident-driven, they react to crime rather than seeking the reasons why crimes occur. With the advent of community-based and problem-solving policing, departments in the United States have begun to explore and implement `proactive' policing techniques (a departure from traditional methods which have isolated the police from the community and narrowly defined their focus). Both community-based and problem-solving policing ideologies promote methods to prevent crime and address the issues that cause crime which is an important consideration in third-world countries where financial and human resources are scarce. Through its programs, ICITAP has attempted to instill a greater awareness for the development of programs which will enhance the relationship between the police and the community and create mechanisms that will enable the police to take a more proactive stance in addressing crime. These changes require a fundamental decentralization of authority and a greater awareness of the underlying conditions which cause crime, including the characteristics of the people involved (victims, suspects, public-at-large; the social setting) in which these people interact in the physical environment and the way the public deals with these conditions in general.

Most police organizations are not prepared to accept change or to implement programs aimed at crime prevention and reduction because this constitutes threat to the status quo and a perceived loss of power and control. However, there is a growing tendency to involve the community in policing to gain broader public support, develop information regarding trends and patterns within a community, and thus anticipate potential problems. Police organizations are slowly recognizing that to effectively carry out their mandate and thus survive as an institution, they must have a supportive public. An example of this can be found in Panama where the National Police are in the process of changing the traditional stationary guard positions to police beats in order to get the police on the streets where they can interact with the public. Also, community relation offices have been created within metropolitan Panama City precincts to encourage better relations with the community. Neighborhood Watch Programs are also being considered. As a result of these programs, ICITAP is beginning to look at its total program with a view toward adapting community-based techniques to other areas.

This, however, involves a substantial change from current practice requiring broad-based public involvement. To strike a balance between the mission to provide police services while protecting and respecting civil liberties, ICITAP courses and technical assistance programs promote respect for human rights and the needs of the community. Since the community-based and problem-solving policing require closer contact with the community it serves, public confidence in the police must be instilled in order for this to work. Ultimately, successful implementation of community-based and problem-solving techniques will render the police more efficient and effective in its efforts to reduce crime. For this to occur, those persons in positions to effect change must agree that changes are necessary and also the challenge and the difficulties involved in strengthening the ties between the police and the community.

Again let me express the Department's gratitude for your interest in supporting international law enforcement assistance and training. If my office may be of further assistance to you or your staff please let me know.


W. Lee Rawls,
Assistant Attorney General.

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U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, April 12, 1991.

Mr. Charles A. Bowsher,
Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Office, Washington, DC.

Dear Charles: We are writing you today to ask that your office conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. security assistance programs in the post-Cold War period. The world-wide democratic revolution and the collapse of Soviet expansionism make this effort both timely and significant. As a recent State Department policy paper noted:

`For over forty years the specter of international communism weighed heavily on the structures and priorities of United States economic and security assistance. This global threat to world freedom has finally collapsed. In its wake is the spreading world-wide recognition that freedom can only be sustained by governments whose legitimacy rests firmly on the expressed consent of the governed; that are themselves agents and protectors of individual rights; and that are capable of sustaining an environment conducive to equal economic and political opportunity for all citizens.'

This fast-changing world context provides a framework with which our international security assistance must be evaluated. The global democratic revolution has put increased emphasis on issues of civilian control of the military and the need to provide clear-cut and achievable missions for a nation's security forces.

There are several areas of interest we would like the GAO to examine. These include: the mission, purpose and administration of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program; the intent and efficacy of current restrictions on civilian police training; the career development of U.S. military personnel assigned to international security assistance programs; the scope, structure and efficacy of existing administration of justice programs; the compatibility of security assistance training with U.S. models of civil-military and civil-police relations, and human rights concerns.

In preparing the report we encourage your office to consult civilian governmental agencies, legislative committees, and non-governmental organizations with expertise in the areas of security issues, civil-military relations, police training, administration of justice and human rights in several key countries.

The following are the specific questions we would like to see addressed on each issue:


To what extent have U.S. security assistance programs been subject to changes in the past decade to reflect changing world realities such as the end of the Cold war; the importance of world-wide trends towards democratization; the primacy of civilian political control over the military and security forces, and the emergence of new international criminal networks such as the drug cartels? Is military assistance channeled through civilian authorities, rather than relying on military-to-military relationships as we have in the past? If so, how have these changes been effected? Do security assistance programs reflect fundamental strengths of the U.S.'s own successful experience in civil-military relations, such as the difference between internal security and national defense?

Please analyze these questions as they affect Africa; Asia; Latin America and Eastern Europe.

Have security assistance programs been cost-effective? What reforms have been introduced, based on program monitoring to make these programs more cost effective?

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(a) Is there a coherent policy for improving the administration of justice, including police development, in new and emerging democracies?

(2) Please evaluate the effects of the restrictions mandated by Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act on international police training.

(a) How many exemptions currently exist to the Section 660 rule? Please list them. Given various programs and exemptions, does this confuse recipient governments or agencies about the purposes of U.S. police training? For example, International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP) is prohibited from teaching surveillance techniques, while other programs have to teach this to carry out their mission.

(b) How different is the context in which police training is currently carried out from that of the 1960s or 1970s?

(c) How might police training programs be structured so as to anticipate effectively the objections to international police training which resulted in the passage of Section 660?

(d) Do Section 660 restrictions on police training have the effect of encouraging a larger or more comprehensive internal security role by a nation's armed forces?

(3) Currently, most administration of justice programs carried out under Section 534 of the Foreign Assistance Act are administered by the Agency for International Development. The police training and assistance component under Section 534 has been re-delegated to the State Department, which allocates funds to the Department of Justice to carry out such programs. There have been doubts expressed about AID's ability to carry out administration of justice programs. There have also been suggestions that all international justice assistance programs be placed under the supervision of the Department of Justice or some other arrangement. We would like GAO to look at this debate and to make its own evaluation. Among the questions that should be addressed are the following:

(a) Does AID have sufficient personnel it can draw upon with experience in criminal justice or democratic development to address the growing demands for administration of justice programs worldwide? One criticism is that AID does not have staff skilled in prosecution; court administration; criminal case development and monitoring, and criminal and legal procedures. Does this affect their ability to develop and monitor such aspects of administration of justice?

(b) Related to question (3)(a), is AID equipped institutionally to handle sensitive political development issues such as administration of justice? One criticism that is sometimes heard is that AID does not report from the field on political, institutional and legal issues, limiting itself to accounting for disbursements made. Is this valid?

(c) Is AID able to react swiftly to breaking opportunities in the administration of justice area? Some critics complain that it took more than one year after Operation Just Cause for AID to develop and authorize a project paper for the justice sector in Panama. Thus, the criticism runs, while concentrating on project development, the antiquated and overloaded, Panamanian justice system received no technical assistance, training, etc.

(d) AID is also criticized for producing project papers that obligate the agency for five year periods and therefore do not allow for flexibility to take advantage quickly and effectively of new developments in the field. Is this accurate?

(e) To what extent are AID project managers sensitive to successful criminal justice development efforts in other countries? Do the project managers in the field have the technical knowledge required for justice sector activities?

(f) Are AID accounting and reporting requirements concerning institutional grants and loans suitably tailored to the possibilities of judiciary and justice sector ministries?

(4) What arguments might be made for transferring all administration of justice and police training programs to Justice Department jurisdiction? What are the pros and cons of doing so?

(5) How successful a program is the International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP)?

(a) What have been the comments made about ICITAP in on-going U.S. government reviews of programs in the criminal justice sector?

(b) What comments or criticisms have been made of the ICITAP program by:

(1) countries receiving ICITAP assistance, and

(2) local and international human rights organizations?

(c) Is ICITAP, as currently structured, capable of carrying out programs on a world-wide scale? If not, what changes are needed to allow it to respond to growing demands for its services outside Central and South America?

(6) What is the current U.S. law enforcement presence in Eastern Europe? How many legal attache posts are there in American embassies in Eastern and Central Europe? How many are there in Western Europe? How many are there worldwide and who do they acquire their experience? What plans are being made to strengthen any perceived gaps in law enforcement efforts in the region by the United States?


(1) What changes have been made in the IMET program to make it better reflect the changing realities of the post-Cold War world? Please include in the analysis changes in curriculum and those in the country selection process for IMET recipients. With a lessening of tensions in a world, a trend which is likely to continue for some times, what is the rationale for giving IMET to the number of countries that currently receive it?

(2) Current IMET training provides for coursework in civic action. Some have criticized U.S. efforts to promote civic action programs in foreign militaries, saying such training tends to politicize the military and makes it compete with civilian political leaders for scarce financial and technical resources. Please evaluate the appropriateness of these complaints in Africa, Latin America and Asia. How much civic action is taught to IMET recipients? Which countries' recipients receive such training? What evaluations have been made of the effectiveness of these programs in those countries participating in civic action programs?

(3) There have been proposals to extend training in defense and national security issues to qualified civilians in emerging
democracies through the IMET program. It is argued that by doing so, the ability of elected officials in these countries to oversee their own military establishments will be increased. What programs are currently offered in IMET, or through other U.S. government agencies, that seek to meet this goal? What are the advantages and the drawbacks of having the IMET program more involved in this area?

(4) To what extent, if any, does IMET training offer to its recipients explicit exposure to the following lessons in the proper management of civil-military relations in the United States:

(a) that the control of the military budget by Congress ensures a close collaborative relationship between civilian political authority and the leadership of the armed forces;

(b) that there is close interaction and contact between civilians and military, and between the four services, throughout our command and control structure;

(c) that scores of civilian-run non-governmental agencies help to inform and to shape military policy, and

(d) that the military has remained at the margins of partisan politics in part because its role in internal security has always been sharply circumscribed.

How are these lessons conveyed to IMET recipients?

Should foreign military sales (FMS) be shifted from the foreign assistance budget to the defense budget?


Some concern has been expressed that American military personnel assigned to security assistance posts suffer from morale problems relating to their jobs and career paths. One worry is a perceived hostility to security assistance programs in general by sectors of the armed forces. Related to this is a feeling of some working in the field that their participation in this area negatively impacts upon their possibilities for professional advancement. Who is selected for security assistance assignments, and how? What problems or career anxieties exist, if any, among military personnel carrying out these functions? What efforts are currently being made to assure security assistance personnel that their efforts are an important military task? How do career advancement patterns for those involved in security assistance programs compare with other career patterns in the four U.S. armed services?


The effect of anti-narcotics assistance on democratic institutions and practices in new and emerging democracies has also been questioned. This issue is of particular concern in the nations of the Andean region, as well as in Guatemala.

In Section 1009 of the Defense Authorization legislation for FY91 Congress made two findings on this issue: First, that the separation of military and civilian law enforcement functions has historically been a critical element in democracies around the world, including the United States. And second, that there is a need to determine whether the current policies of the United States unduly emphasize military assistance to Andean countries rather that aid to civilian law enforcement entities carrying out anti-drug efforts in those countries.

We would like the following questions addressed:

(1) How does the role of host country militaries differ from that of police forces in regard to narcotics enforcement? What efforts are being made to help host countries where the military is involved in anti-narcotics efforts make a transition to civilian law enforcement, given the fact that--as noted by Congress--the separation of military and civilian law enforcement functions has historically been a critical element in democracies around the world?

(2) In what ways are host country police forces unable to address specific changes that have been prompted by narcotics production and trafficking in each country?

(3) What kinds and amounts of police and military assistance are being offered to the governments of Peru, Colombia, Bolivia and Guatemala by third countries to help fight narcotics production and trafficking? In what ways does the U.S. government coordinate its efforts with the efforts of these other countries?

(4) What guarantees does the U.S. government require to ensure that U.S. material is used to further U.S. anti-narcotics goals, as distinguished from host country counter-insurgency goals? What is the relationship between anti-narcotics and counter-insurgency activities as carried out by the militaries of Peru, Colombia and Guatemala?

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Finally, the protection of human rights continues to be a primary concern in Congress when dealing with security assistance issues. Therefore, we would like the GAO to address the following questions:

(1) What has been the impact of U.S. military training and U.S. military assistance on the propensity of host country governments to investigate and prosecute violations of human rights by recipient government forces? To what degree have officers of host country security forces been punished for their crimes by competent government authorities?

(2) To what degree is training on humanitarian law--war crimes--incorporated into security assistance training programs? How many recipients of U.S. security assistance regularly teach humanitarian law to their own military and security forces? Given that in international and U.S. law human rights is a different concept than `humanitarian law,' how is this difference reflected in U.S. training programs, both of Department of Defense security assistance personnel and of host country trainees?

(3) To what degree are human rights incorporated in security assistance training programs and curricula? Please give specifics: time spent on the issue relative to total training time, content of human rights education, and training of Department of Defense personnel in human rights issues in preparation for teaching activities. Also, please differentiate the information on the human rights component of training aimed at Department of Defense security assistance personnel from that aimed at host nation trainees.

Thank you very much in advance for your attention to this request. We ask that you give this project a high priority given its importance as a national security issue. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to have a member of your staff call Martin Edwin Andersen at 224-8114.







Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I yield the floor.