Major Mark E. Marek

Conference Group Nine

LtCol Sorrell

Dr. Jacobsen

18 April 1995

United States Marine Corps

Command and Staff College

Marine Corps University

2076 South Street

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068




It is clear from Operation Desert Storm that America's investment in tactical collection assets has not kept pace with the modernization of her military force structure.(1)

Although Gulf War critics generally agreed that overall collection efforts were very good, analysis received a mixed review and distribution received a downright failing grade.(2)

The impending operational capability of the Advanced Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance System (ATARS) should catapult the Marine Corps into the forefront of America's tactical reconnaissance capabilities and help fill the void of tactical collection assets. However, ATARS alone cannot fix our tactical intelligence vacuum. This vacuum transcends our lack of physical collection assets.

The Gulf War highlighted the larger lesson learned that the intelligence community, especially in the Marine Corps, needs to re-define its cultural mindset. Part of the problem is staffing, and part of the problem is equipment. Although new staffing goals and new collection platforms will help, they will not completely fix our intelligence shortcomings. More fundamentally, basic changes must take place if we are to break out of the mold of doing business the same way. Intelligence information must be "pushed" down to the operational units. If the Marine Corps fields new hardware unmatched by a new cultural mindset in the intelligence community, a mindset that actively promotes dissemination and utilization of its products, intelligence will continue to accumulate at the highest levels while frustration and dissatisfaction will prevail at the lowest levels.

National problems

The Marine Corps shares the blame for the poor performance of America's tactical intelligence capability. By retiring the RF-4B's of our only tactical reconnaissance squadron in August of 1990, we in the Marine Corps consciously acknowledged that a gap would exist in our ability to collect tactical imagery. What we did not consider was the wider gap that would also exist in the tactical reconnaissance capability of America's armed forces. In their report on intelligence successes and failures during Desert Shield/Storm, the House Oversight and Investigations subcommittee said:

...the services had retired intelligence platforms purely for budgetary reasons without providing sufficient means to fill in the holes in coverage... decisions to retire intelligence assets, or otherwise curtail intelligence capabilities, should only be madeafter the impact on intelligence has been fully considered.(3)

This myopic reasoning resulted in a short term single-service budgetary gain without considering the impact on the Department of Defense's overall warfighting capability. Senior intelligence personnel protested the retirement of the Marine Corps RF-4B but were overruled on the basis of the RF-4's prohibitive maintenance and upkeep costs. One positive outcome of this event was the creation of the Defense Aerial Reconnaissance Office (DARO) in 1993. The Department of Defense (DOD) formed the DARO to ensure that an executive level agency exists with the purpose of coordinating and supporting the warfighter's tactical, operational, and strategic needs. Theoretically, the DOD will make future decisions concerning reconnaissance in a unified and coordinated fashion. Nevertheless, during operation Desert Shield/Storm the result was that the combined efforts of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), CENTCOM/J-2, and individual service intelligence divisions were not enough to prevent Marine Corps pilots, in addition to the other military aviators, from going on combat missions without adequate photo intelligence support.(4)

The information available through national systems such as satellites, U-2/TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft, RC-135 Rivet Joint signal intelligence aircraft, and the new Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar Systems (JSTARS) aircraft generally did not trickle down to tactical commanders.(5)

Promises made by national agencies to fill the void of tactical collection assets by using national assets proved unfulfillable. Two problems served to limit the degree of support to combat commanders from the national intelligence community.

First, some national intelligence organizations appeared unfamiliar with or unresponsive to the needs of the wartime commander.(6)

The primary design of these systems was to support the national command authorities, not fast moving tactical operations. Satellites are designed to monitor relatively static situations such as staging areas or strategic force deployments, not to meet tactical requirements that demand answers within hours or minutes.(7)

This serious shortfall resulted in the inability to provide imagery responsive to the ground commander's requirements.(8)

The killer instinct to "get the information to the trigger pullers" does not exist at the national level because it cannot exist at the national level. Just as any other bureaucracy far removed from the fog of war or friction of the battlefield, our national agencies were incapable of supporting the needs of warfighters in combat. Ironically, part of the reasoning behind termination of organic reconnaissance systems was that "national assets" would do the job in case of a crisis. Additionally, we rarely conducted routine training with national assets. We were once again trying to do something under wartime circumstances that we never even trained for in peacetime. General Powell has stated that theater and tactical commanders were frustrated "over the lack of coordination and timeliness in the dissemination of intelligence collected at the national level."(9)

The billions of dollars we spend on national collection assets are not worth a single penny if the intelligence they produce does not reach the people who need it most.

The only thing worse than not responding to a call for help in a crisis is to accomplish the work requested and not follow through with dissemination. If your customer does not receive your product, you have wasted your time producing it. Failure to follow through with dissemination has the same overall effect as never doing the work in the first place. A significant amount of target intelligence material generated by national level intelligence agencies and sent to the theater never made it into the hands of operational commanders. One after action report on lessons learned determined that, while there was no scheme to withhold necessary data, intelligence staffs in Riyadh shared a mind-set that they were better placed than the operators to determine what the operators needed.(10)

This type of mindset may be acceptable if the operating forces were inundated with tactical intelligence, but lessons learned during the war suggest that this was not the case. Many examples show that tactical commanders were literally starved for information. Brigadier General Myatt, then Commanding General of 1st Marine Division, repeatedly requested imagery of the defensive barriers and minefields that the 1st MarDiv would have to breach. He finally received detailed aerial photographs just days before the 1st Marine Division conducted breaching operations.(11)

Conversely, some combat commanders had little appreciation for the capabilities and limitations of U.S. intelligence systems. This lack of understanding limited the extent to which the vast amount of available intelligence data reached tactical commanders.(12)

Frequently, tactical units received finished estimates and summaries produced for senior commanders rather than the detailed intelligence needed to plan tactical operations.(13)

The intelligence community is responsible for the education of operational commanders regarding intelligence capabilities and shortcomings. To be sure, operational commanders must articulate their requirements. A common complaint by intelligence officers is that many commanders do not seem to know what they want of intelligence. In my experience, however, military commanders are mission oriented people, people who have absolutely no problem with giving orders and telling others what they expect of them. In a master's thesis, Major M.D. Kuszewski states, "The Marine Corps must recognize the fact that many commanding officers fail to accept intelligence as a personal, inherent, function of command."(14)

A Marine intelligence officer, Major Kuszewski asserts that the problems concerning intelligence revolve around the perceptions and expectations of the commander. Commanders who participate in the education and guidance of their intelligence officers, just as with other staff officers, will have a greater appreciation of intelligence capabilities and tend to be less critical of them. While I agree with Major Kuszewski, I have generally found that intelligence officers, even ones that are educated and guided, fail to have the "killer instinct" to get the job done. The killer instinct quality is one that inherently thrives on adversity. People who have it get the job done without questions or excuses. If a request cannot possibly be filled, the response should be, "I cannot get this for you, however I can get a suitable substitute." The word "no" is rarely, if ever, heard in this vocabulary.

USMC Cultural Problems

Even more damning than not being supported by national or theater assets is the inability of our own intelligence community to provide adequate support. Overall, tactical intelligence received by Marine Corps operational units was unsatisfactory.(15)

Many intelligence updates provided by Aviation Combat Element (ACE) intelligence officers during the Gulf war included dated information and were of limited use.(16)

Marine flag rank officers have not been shy relating their feelings on the performance of Marine Corps intelligence staffs during the Gulf War. Then Brigadier General Paul Van Riper stated:

In my opinion, we fail to establish an operational mindset in many of our intelligence officers. The majority appear to be focused inward on the "intelligence cycle." Many seem fascinated with systems and procedures rather than the product being (or more often not being) provided to the operator.(17)

I submit that the intelligence culture in the Marine Corps is inherently flawed. It is flawed due to a variety of circumstances. A primary reason is the lack of hardware in the form of organic USMC collection assets. Another reason is the result of inadequate staffing and low prestige afforded to those in the intelligence specialty. Both reasons combine to produce low morale and credibility. Although the Marine Corps Intelligence field is under equipped and under staffed, there still exists an intangible quality that is lacking in Marine Corps intelligence officers. I can only describe it as the "killer instinct". It has nothing to do with machismo or brute force. It has everything to do with a selfless dedication to duty that puts the team before self. Instead of continually reasoning why the "green door" to intelligence must be shut, someone with the killer instinct would find a legitimate way to open it.

While planning for numerous contingency combat missions over the course of five unit deployments my squadron repeatedly requested photo imagery support from the intelligence section of a higher headquarters. Our requests were repeatedly ignored or went unfulfilled under the pretense that the photos were "unavailable", the photos were available but not readily accessible. Ultimately we sent our squadron photo interpreter to a nearby Air Force Headquarters where he bartered for the photos himself. The responsibility to procure the photos lay with the higher headquarters intelligence officer, yet he could not be persuaded to do his job. This was not a single instance but part of a pattern repeated over a period of years. The problem did not lie with the fact that the photos did not exist or that an intelligence officer was physically not available to procure them. The problem was that the intelligence officer, whose job included providing target photo intelligence, did not have the will to go get them. He did not posses the cultural ethos, the killer instinct, to get the job done. It seemed as though the intelligence officer's mentality was that if he gave us what he had, or told us what he knew, we would subsequently value him less. Ironically, not producing the requested photos did have that effect. An additional reason for our poor intelligence performance during Desert Shield/Storm was the competition for the limited national collection assets available. For example when tactical commanders did get information concerning Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) it was not useful or required that operational planners make their own assessment on whether the attacks were succeeding and whether re-strikes were necessary. Lieutenant General William Keys, CG 2nd Marine Division, has stated, "At the strategic level, [intelligence] was fine. But we did not get enough tactical intelligence -- front-line battle intelligence."(18)

Wing, division, and brigade commanders' intelligence needs that could not be met with organic assets had to be validated and prioritized at higher echelons; many times their requirements, although validated , fell too low on the list to be satisfied by heavily tasked theater and national resources.(19)

It is pretty hard to imagine what has a higher priority for intelligence than real live Marines going into combat: the LAV company going on a raid of an enemy outpost, or that AV-8B pilot trying to plan for a Close Air Support (CAS) or Interdiction mission. Somehow our priorities have gotten all switched around. Tactical commanders and operators have grown so accustomed to working without adequate intelligence that they have given up trying to fix the situation. Our undermanned intelligence community relied on these outside sources for collection of tactical imagery and did not disseminate it sufficiently once they acquired it. This also was true for most Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings. One officer from an Air Force wing said:

My best sources of intelligence came from outside of CENTAF channels. I knew some people at the Army Intelligence Threat and Analysis Center (ITAC) in Washington and they became an invaluable resource in supporting the wing. I also tried to tap into the 544th at the Strategic Air Command in Omaha, but struck out. I was able to link up with the 480th at Langley AFB, but CENTAF would continually try to cut off this channel.(20)

The difference here is that this officer did what it took to get photo intelligence. Contrast the Air Force officer who was getting intelligence from Washington to the AV-8B squadron on the U.S.S. Nassau who could not get intelligence support from nearby carrier battle groups. The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) intelligence section felt it knew better than the aircrew actually flying the missions what photo intelligence they needed. The squadron had to actually "steal" photos from their own headquarters to accomplish their missions. In the opinion of one AV-8B pilot, poor intelligence support was a contributing factor in the loss of his wingman on a Desert Storm mission(21)

Those units that had their own reconnaissance assets, such as Carrier Air Wings with F-14D's capable of carrying Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pods, had better imagery support than those units that did not (e.g., Third Marine Aircraft Wing). As a result, few assets were available to collect BDA after artillery barrages or air strikes. A lack of hardware combined with a pervasive failure to practice BDA regularly on a large scale before the war--a failure shared by commanders as well as intelligence organizations--set the stage for its inadequacy during the war.(22)

As ever, [this goes directly to my argument that] missions or capabilities we fail to practice in peacetime have little chance of being accomplished well in combat. Combat operations will magnify our peacetime shortcomings, not cure them.

As a result of these problems, the intelligence community has acquired a defensive cultural mentality that is not conducive to proactive participation, acquiring the information at any cost, and selflessly giving to the organization. What I call the killer instinct or the cultural ethos to push information to the commander does not prevail. This causes the intelligence community to suffer from a serious lack of credibility. Can we break out of this vicious circle? The two readily apparent factors contributing to our lack of tactical intelligence are understaffing and lack of organic collection assets. These two problems snowball into causing poor morale which in turn results in lack of a cultural ethos to get the job done. The ultimate results are negative impressions of the intelligence community and insufficient intelligence at the tactical level.

Manpower Solutions

In Marine aviation squadrons, lack of MOS trained intelligence officers makes it impossible for the squadron to train as it wishes to fight. The first step towards rectifying our tactical intelligence problem is to restructure the intelligence officer assignment policy, especially in the Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW). Prior to the war, and until the restructuring directed as a result of the recently completed Mission Area Analysis 12, intelligence officer billets were and will continue to be filled by squadron aircrew as a collateral duty in Marine aviation squadrons. The Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) of the MAW is the lowest level that staffs intelligence officers. That staffing consists of a major and a first lieutenant. Staffing of Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) trained officers at the squadron and battalion level will go a long way towards fixing the problem

The second step towards fixing our tactical reconnaissance vacuum is obviously to procure the tools to do the job. The hardware requirement is critical in that it can do more than provide imagery intelligence that has been missing in Marine aviation for the past five years. The new hardware potentially can serve as the catalyst towards re-energizing the role of tactical intelligence to the MAGTF commander. New hardware will permit tactical intelligence to actually drive operations.

Hardware Requirements

To fix the hardware requirement the operational commander must have a tactical reconnaissance system under his direct control. The system must be accessible, familiar, and functional. The U.S. Marine Corps needs a system that can provide the MAGTF commander imagery intelligence at the tactical, operational, and strategic level if necessary. The old saying, "If you want the job done right, do it yourself," still applies. Desert Storm has vividly shown us that war is a come as you are affair and that there will probably be no time for development of new weapons systems during the conflict. Another lesson learned is that if you have a requirement for a capability that your organization does not organically operate, the chances of that requirement being met are slim. This applies to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) or manned tactical reconnaissance platforms. The prioritization process for "shared" assets has shown itself to be unresponsive to the needs of commanders facing imminent combat. This applies from the CinC level on down to the MEF level. As General Schwarzkopf put it in Congressional testimony on June 12, 1991, "...we just don't have an immediately responsive intelligence capability that will give the theater commander near real time information that he personally needs to make a decision."(23)

General Moore, CG Third Marine Aircraft Wing during the Gulf War, stated:

Two days prior to the beginning of the actual ground campaign, we finally got pictures of the actual minefield breaching sites brought to us by two officers--one from the 1st Marine Division, one from the 2d Marine Division--we had sent to Washington. That ought to tell you that the flow of information just wasn't there. I am sure that CinCPac, CinCLant, and other commands had a lot of great photos, but they weren't getting to us.(24)

Organic capability will allow for direct flow of information from collection to warfighter via analyst. In certain fast moving situations, the requirement exists for intelligence information to go directly from collector to warfighter or in current parlance, "sensor to shooter". There is a need to field an All-Weather and under the weather reconnaissance system to provide Near Real Time (NRT) battlefield intelligence and Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) at long range.(25)

Data-Link capability will allow for NRT connectivity to any allied, joint, or Major Subordinate Command (MSC) possessing a Joint Service Imagery Processing Station (JSIPS). This requirement is being met by the procurement of the Advanced Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance System (ATARS).

ATARS Program background

Originally the USAF was the lead service responsible for procurement of ATARS and planned to equip their F-16C aircraft with an external ATARS pod. As unit costs kept increasing and total production quantities decreased, the ATARS program got in trouble. Under General McPeak's leadership the Air Force decided that manned tactical reconnaissance was not part of their overall mission. Furthermore, since the USMC would be the initial beneficiary of years of USAF developmental efforts, the decision was an easy one for the Air Force.(26)

After years of delays and cost overruns, the USAF and Martin Marietta agreed in June of 1993 to cease work on the ATARS system. By October of 1993 the Air Force terminated all involvement with the program. During November 1993 the Department of the Navy received Congressional direction to resume development of the ATARS program for its tactical aerial reconnaissance system. In January of 1994 the Marine Corps assumed management of the ATARS program as lead service.


The Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System Follow On (ATARS FO) is an airborne tactical reconnaissance system composed of an F/A-18D aircraft, electro-optical/infrared and radar sensor suites, a digital recording device, and a ground component called JSIPS. The system will not only provide Marine tactical commanders the organic capability to obtain imagery intelligence, it will also provide that imagery via data-link to any Joint or Coalition unit that has a JSIPS ground station.

The internal nose mounted sensor suite called the ATARS pallet contains several key components. The Low Altitude Electro Optical (LAEO) sensor provides imagery from direct overflight of targets. The Medium Altitude Electro Optical (MAEO) sensor operates from 3,000 to 25,000 feet and covers areas in a 220 swath at ranges of up to 5 nautical miles.

The primary use of these two sensors would be post strike bomb damage assessment (BDA) missions. The Infrared Line Scanner (IRLS) operates in two modes: wide and narrow. Both modes operate from 200 to 25,000 feet and require overflight of the imaged area. The IRLS will allow detection of tactical targets such as recently operated vehicles or generators through detection of their heat signature. Imagery obtained through the LAEO, MAEO, and IRLS systems can be data linked to a ground station if the aircraft is carrying an external data link pod. The Infrared/Electro-Optical Long Range Oblique Photography System (IR/EO-LOROPS) is a pod mounted system that will provide day and night long range stand-off imagery capability to the MAGTF commander. This system can see through haze and light cloud cover from oblique angles at medium and long range. The ability to "see deep" will help in battlefield shaping and strike planning. It will also provide for BDA at long range when direct overflight is not possible or desired. This externally carried pod also contains a data link that can down link EO-LOROPS imagery as well as the imagery collected by the primary internal systems of ATARS and the imagery obtained through the APG-73's reconnaissance strip map mode.

The Radar Upgrade (RUG) Phase II to each F/A-18's APG-65 multi-mode radar will provide true all-weather aerial reconnaissance capability. This upgraded radar will provide the ability to create both reconnaissance strip maps and more detailed spot maps with very small resolutions. This system basically creates a radar-generated picture of any ground area of interest to the MAGTF commander.

The aircraft will be able to record all imagery collected via an on-board digital tape recorder. Data link pods carried by the aircraft will be the primary means of transmitting imagery to the ground station. In time critical situations the data linked imagery could feasibly be in the hands of the MEF commander minutes after collection by the aircraft. The alternate method will be to manually process the data after the aircraft returns to its land base. Although this process is much slower than data link, it will provide a reliable back-up system in case of data link failure. The Marine Corps will have a Preliminary Operational Capability (POC) during FY-96 that will consist of limited ATARS capability for one squadron. By FY-00 the Marine Corps will have acquired 31 ATARS suites.

C4 I Interface

The Marine Corps plans to interface this real time information to the ground component via a mobile JSIPS that is designated the Tactical Exploitation Group (TEG). The TEG will be located in the Surveillance Reconnaissance Intelligence Group (SRIG). The TEG is a highly mobile imagery ground station that is deployable in two or three High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV's). The TEG is interfaced to the JSIPS imagery hub which is a USMC asset located and operated at Camp Pendleton, Ca. The TEG can also be interfaced to the theater Joint Intelligence Center (JIC).(27) This system will provide timely imagery to the MAGTF commander for operational orientation such as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), strike or targeting assignments, and bomb damage assessment. The ability to look deep will assist the MEF's future operations planning section prepare for upcoming operations.

Under current plans each F/A-18D squadron will have an additional ground station for receiving data linked information. The Squadron Ground Station (SGS) will provide a back-up to the ground station located at the SRIG and allow the Aviation Combat Element commander to determine whether re-strike of Air Tasking Order (ATO) assigned targets is necessary. These squadron ground stations will also be able to provide an additional access point to Ground Combat Element (GCE) commanders who need imagery intelligence and may be closer to a squadron than the MEF's SRIG. High priority imagery can be air delivered by Marine organic helicopter assets if necessary. The most important concept here is that the squadron ground station gives us more flexibility in dissemination and subsequent utilization of ATARS imagery.

Human Solutions

The promise that all this high technology provides will be hollow if we neglect the human element surrounding its use. Mission Area Analysis 12 addresses the insufficient staffing intelligence officers in the MAW. The advent of ATARS addresses the hardware requirement necessary in returning tactical reconnaissance to the MAGTF. The Advanced Tactical Aircraft Reconnaissance System is machinery and nothing more. It must be operated by human beings and its products disseminated by human beings.

Our intelligence system must directly task the ability of the F/A-18D squadrons to provide imagery as a matter of routine. That system must collect, process, produce, disseminate information to any or all units of the MEF and interconnected Joint community. This system will provide the Marine Corps with the hardware necessary to reinvigorate the intelligence and operations team that has malfunctioned in recent years. When full operational capability of both ATARS and the TEG is achieved around the year 2000, the Marine Corps team will finally have the hardware to fill America's tactical reconnaissance vacuum.

The key to our success will be the familiarity of our aircrews and intelligence and imagery processing system to work together on a routine basis. We must exercise the capability provided by ATARS on a daily basis. Once it is fully on line, the process of tasking, collection, processing, analysis, and most importantly dissemination needs to work like a well-oiled machine within the MAGTF. If we expect tactical reconnaissance to work in the next war, we must exercise it every day in peacetime. Our imagination is our only limit to ways we can exercise this new capability, ways that can directly benefit us in the next war. One example might be to incorporate our F/A-18's into conducting a daily reconnaissance of congested surface roads in and around our current bases and air stations. We could accomplish this via overflight or stand-off imagery of the freeway systems of Southern California. Imagery data-linked to the Tactical Exploitation Group and distributed through the Imagery Analysis System and SIDS to Wing and Division units via Local Area Networks (LANS) could be viewed by tactical level units. Again, the key to the successful incorporation of this new technology is familiarity. The intelligence community must take a proactive role in pushing imagery intelligence downward. With ATARS we can break the stereotypical "I've got a secret" behavior that has existed for many years in the intelligence community. To do anything short of this will ensure that the intelligence vacuum at the tactical level continues to exist.


Time is a necessary ingredient when we as humans endeavor to change the way we behave, think, and act. Since ATARS will not be fully operational until the year 2000, the time to change is available, but we must start now. We cannot afford to take a 20th century mentality into the 21st century. As ATARS comes on line, the USMC/MAGTF intelligence community will have the tools to accomplish the job of imagery collection, processing, production, and dissemination. The key will be in dissemination. If the intelligence community fails to disseminate imagery it will not regain credibility, and ATARS will not fix America's, or the Marine Corps', tactical reconnaissance vacuum. On the other hand, if we exercise the procedures to obtain tactical imagery at all levels of the MAGTF and those procedures become second nature in peacetime, they have a chance of working in wartime. The hardware of ATARS is on the way. Will it be met by a new cultural mentality, or will it be business as usual?


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the

Armed Forces of the United States, Washington, DC: GPO 1993

Cureton, LtCol Charles H. USMCR U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With The 1st Marine Division In Desert Shield And Desert Storm . Monograph. History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Washington, DC: 1993.

Department of Defense, Conduct of The Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress April 1992, Washington, DC: GPO, 1992.

Department of the Air Force. Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report, Washington, DC: GPO, 1993.

Herrmann, Major Kevin G. Student at USMC Command and Staff College and AV-8B pilot aboard U.S.S. Nassau during the Gulf War. Interview by author, 13 March 1995.

Krauss, LtCol Henry J. ATARS program manager, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. Interview by author, 9 January 1995.

Kuszewski, Major Michael D., USMC. Intelligence: A Personal, Inherent, Function of Command. MSSI Thesis. Monterey, Ca: Naval Postgraduate School, June 1992.

Leygraaf, Commander Gerard, USN (Ret) "Alone, Unarmed...and Unavailable". Proceedings. September 1994

Moore, LTGen Royal N., USMC "Marine Air: There When Needed". Proceedings. November 1991

Naval Strike Warfare Center, Warfare Analysis Department. Facsimile to HQMC Code APW 81. Subject: "Advanced Air Reconnaissance System Follow On system description." 9 May 1994.

U.S. Congress. House. Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives. Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm. 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993. Committee Print

Van Riper, BGen Paul K., USMC "Observations During Operation Desert Storm". Marine Corps Gazette. Quantico, Va.: June 1991

1. U.S. Congress, House, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993,Committee Print, 7.

2. Ibid 28.

3. Ibid 9.

4. Major Kevin Herrmann, student at USMC Command and Staff College and AV-8B pilot aboard U.S.S. Nassau during the Gulf War, interview by author, 13 February 1995.

5. U.S. Congress, House, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993,Committee Print, 6.

6. Ibid 6.

7. Proceedings, "Alone, Unarmed...and Unavailable", (Washington DC: Sep 1994), 39.

8. Department of Defense, Conduct of The Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, April 1992, (Washington, DC: 1992), Appendix C 340.

9. Gen Colin Powell, Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: CJCS, Feb 1993), II-13.

10. U.S. Congress, House, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993,Committee Print, 17.

11. Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Cureton, USMCR, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With The First Marine Division In Desert Shield And Desert Storm, Monograph, History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (Washington, DC: 1993), 48.

12. U.S. Congress, House, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993,Committtee Print, 6.

13. Department of Defense, Conduct of The Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, April 1992, (Washington, DC: 1992), 342.

14. Major Michael D. Kuszewski, USMC, Intelligence: A Personal, Inherent, Function of Command, MSSI Thesis (Monterey, Ca: Naval Post Graduate School, June 1992), 286.

15. BGen Paul Van Riper, "Observations During Operation Desert Storm", Marine Corps Gazette (Quantico, Va. June 1991), 58.

16. Herrmann interview.

17. U.S. Congress, House, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993,Committee Print, 18.

18. Ibid 333.

19. Ibid 340.

20. Ibid 18.

21. Herrmann interview.

22. Department of the Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Washington, DC: 1993), 143.

23. U.S. Congress, House, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993,Committee Print, 30.

24. LTGen Royal N. Moore, JR., "Marine Air: There When Needed", Proceedings

(November 1991), 64.

25. Department of Defense, Conduct of The Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, April 1992, (Washington, DC: 1992), 247.

26. Ltcol Henry J. Krauss, ATARS program manager, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, interview by author, 9 January 1995.

27. Naval Strike Warfare Center, Warfare Analysis Department facsimile to HQMC Code APW 81, subject: "Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System Follow On system description," (Washington, DC: 1994), 4.