14 Mar 94
MISSION NEED STATEMENT
A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND HUMAN RESOURCES
EQUIPMENT PROGRAM (CIHEP)
(NO. CCC 11.24)
1. Defense Planning Guidance Element. This Mission Need Statement responds to two of the four foundations of the Regional Defense Strategy of the Defense Planning Guidance: Forward Presence and Crisis Response. It is further supported by Mid-Term Combat Development Priorities 6, 9, 18, and 28 in the Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP) 1994-2004, dated 21 July 1993.
2. Mission and Threat Analyses
(1) Fleet Marine Force (FMF) units have the requirement of being capable of performing tactical Counterintelligence and Human Resources Intelligence (CI/HUMINT) functions and tasks regardless of their location on the battlefield or type of operation being conducted. They must be able to effectively and reliably perform the following types of functions and tasks:
(a) Plan and direct tactical CI/HUMINT activities.
(b) Conduct offensive and defensive CI operations, to include: assisting in CI surveys; conducting Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM); and identifying and countering individuals and groups engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism.
(c) Conduct overt (e.g., interrogation and trans-lation services), sensitive, and technical (e.g., covert and surreptitious audio and video surveillance) tactical HUMINT collection activities.
(d) Receive and disseminate CI/HUMINT information, among defense, joint, and other Service activities and commands.
(2) Recognizing the need for a relevant, capable force, the Marine Corps has devoted much attention to ensuring it has an adequate CI/HUMINT capability. It participates in joint efforts, maintains units (e.g., counterintelligence teams and interrogator translator platoons), and outfits Marines with equipment and systems. While providing a limited but potent capability, these abilities regularly need to be improved and replenished. Targets are constantly changing and technology is continuously improving. The Marine Corps must anticipate, or at least match these changes and improvements to remain mission capable.
b. Mission Area Analysis. Mission Area Analysis #12 (Intelligence), dated May 1991, deficiencies 1, 2, and 9, support this requirement. Additionally, it is supported by other intelligence planning documents, to include: deficiency 92-18 in the Marine Corps Counterintelligence and Human Resources Plan, dated 28 August 1992; and the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Equipment Assessment on Mission Area 12, which provides further analyses down to the capability set level.
(1) Potential threats confronting the United States in the near-to-long range are described in the MCMP and the Mid-Range Threat Estimate 1992-2002, Parts I and II, dated November 1992 and May 1992. According to these publications, Marines will face a variety of threats across the entire operational continuum; as noted in Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-25, Counterintelligence, CI/HUMINT can help to avoid and defeat those threats.
(2) The threats against CI/HUMINT activities mirror those faced by all MAGTFs, with emphasis on deception, discovery, and electronic warfare. These threats are documented in many sources, such as Director Central Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Department of the Navy publications on foreign terrorist and threat estimates and the System Threat Assessment Report on the Marine Tactical Command and Control System (1992-2010), dated 16 December 1992.
d. Timing and Priority. Initial Operational Capability is required by Fiscal Year (FY) 96. Full Operational Capability is desired by FY 98. Afterwards, further improvements and replacements will be necessary to ensure continuous capability until FY 10-12. Moreover, new capabilities may be necessary to counter new threats or take advantage of opportunities that may suddenly emerge. Relative to other programs in Mission Area 12, CI/HUMINT programs are moderate priorities.
3. Nonmateriel Alternatives. Corrective actions are being pur-sued through several nonmateriel alternatives, such as the development of better concepts and doctrine and continual emphasis on education and training. Nevertheless, the nature of CI/HUMINT requires special equipment (such as monitoring and recording devices for surveillance, translation, and TSCM activities) and physical access to secure communications, which are only possible through materiel solutions.
4. Potential Materiel Alternatives. Materiel alternatives may be acquired as systems, components of systems, or stand-alone items.
a. Product Improvement Program. The Marine Corps could product improve its existing CI/HUMINT and related equipment/ systems.
b. Nondevelopmental Approach. The Marine Corps could procure CI/HUMINT and related equipment/systems in five ways.
(1) Purchase other agency, command, Service, or Allied existing or planned equipment/systems. One alternative being explored is the possible adoption of the U.S. Air Force's HUMINT Management System requirement.
(2) Purchase commercial off-the-shelf equipment/systems.
(3) Authorize FMF commanders to purchase small amounts of authorized equipment (e.g., table of equipment and special allow-ance) to replace, augment, or improve existing stocks of equipment/systems.
(4) The Marine Corps could borrow available CI/HUMINT equipment/systems from other agencies or Services.
(5) Use a mix of these alternatives.
c. Research and Development. The Marine Corps could conduct its own (or participate in other agency, command, or Service) research, development, and acquisition program(s) for CI/HUMINT and related equipment/systems.
d. Mixture of Materiel Alternatives. Use all the above alternatives.
a. Logistics Support. Although CI/HUMINT equipment includes critical, low-density items, it should be supportable by the logistics support procedures and techniques currently used for
the counterintelligence teams and interrogator translator platoons. The equipment should also be capable of being powered by worldwide commercial and standard FMF power sources.
b. Mobility and Transportation. CI/HUMINT equipment should be able to be transported by a mix of standard commercial, tactical, and strategic means. At times, this equipment has to be carried, clandestinely by a single Marine. No materiel alternatives should require any other special handling or
c. Manpower, Personnel, and Training
(1) The structure for CI/HUMINT is in the FMF's counterintelligence teams and interrogator translator platoons in both the active and reserve forces. CI/HUMINT equipment should not create any need for new structure.
(2) CI/HUMINT activities and support are performed by Marines from Occupational Fields 02 (Intelligence/ Counterintelligence/Interrogator Translator) and 28 (Data/Communications Maintenance). Additional manpower or new military occupational specialties are not needed.
(3) CI/HUMINT materiel shall be easy to use and support. No materiel alternative should generate any unique or excessive training requirements. Development, modification, or use of on-the-job and unit training is acceptable. All materiel alternatives should include means to develop, modify, and conduct training, before fielding.
d. Standardization/Interoperability. All CI/HUMINT equip-ment must be compatible and interoperable with, and integrated into, the MAGTF Command Control Communications Computers and Intelligence (C4I), special CI/HUMINT communications, and joint intelligence communications architectures. However, compatibility, interoperability, and integration with other nation's forces is neither necessary nor desired.
e. Operational Environment
(1) Conventional. CI/HUMINT equipment must be suitable to all conventional military deployments, operations, and exercises.
(2) Electronic. CI/HUMINT equipment should be usable in all types of electronic environments, without undue degradation from electronic interference and warfare.
(3) Environment, Terrain, and Weather. CI/HUMINT equipment should be capable of operation, maintenance, transportation, and storage under all climatic and environmental conditions, wherever a MAGTF may be deployed.
(4) Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC). CI/HUMINT equipment should be able to support Marines operating under NBC conditions, and allow the Marines using CI/HUMINT equipment to be as capable as the forces they support.
(5) Security. CI/HUMINT equipment must not expose Marines to detection, capture, destruction, deception, and other forms of enemy and terrorist CI.
6. Joint Potential Designator
a. U.S. Army: Joint interest.
b. U.S. Navy: Independent.
c. U.S. Air Force: Joint interest.