Approval Date:

21 Feb 92


(NO. CCC 1.51)

1.  Defense Planning Guidance Element.  This Mission Need Statement (MNS) responds to the four foundations of National Defense Policy: Strategic Deterrence; Forward Presence; Crisis Response; and Reconstitution.  The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Master Plan (MMP) of 28 June 1991, capability numbers 3, 6, 34 and 38, documents the need for this capability.

2.  Mission and Threat Analysis

a.  Mission.  The Marine Corps deploys MAGTFs throughout the world.  These MAGTFs have a critical requirement for the timely flow of intelligence information.  Operating in the joint environment, MAGTFs must be capable of using those capabilities inherent in systems organic to other Services.  The organic intelligence collection capabilities of the U.S. Army's Corps sized units are significantly greater than those of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).  These Corps usually focus their intelligence gathering assets at targets which are of interest to our MAGTFs.  The GUARDRAIL COMINT collection aircraft is a specific asset which significantly extends radio line-of-sight over that of our ground-based collection systems.  Southwest Asia operations clearly demonstrated the need for extended COMINT collection range in support of tactical Marine forces and the advantages which can be obtained in this regard through direct connectivity to the existing U.S. Army GUARDRAIL system.  During those operations the Marine Corps received time-critical intelligence broadcast from the Integrated Processing Facility (IPF) associated with the GUARDRAIL system through terminal equipment borrowed from the U.S. Army.  In future operations the Marine Corps must be capable of achieving connectivity to other service collection assets in order to obtain optimal intelligence support.  The deficiency is identified in the CG FMFPac's Fleet Operational Need Statement of 15 January 1991 for a "U.S. Army GUARDRAIL Connectivity Capability" and identified in the Marine Corps Master Intelligence Plan (MCMIP) of 14 June 1991. Additionally, MAA 12, INTELLIGENCE, deficiency 2 highlights the MAGTF's lack of adequate capability to received tailored, near-real time intelligence from national, theater, Joint and Service sources; MAA 12, deficiency 10 highlights the unacceptable electromagnetic intercept capabilities of the MAGTF.  Initial operational capability required not later than FY93 with full operational capability by FY95.

    b.  Threat.  The current Marine Corps Mid-Range Threat
Estimate addresses global threat projection and the technical
threat for the next decade.  In addition, a worldwide threat overview is contained in the DoD Electronic Warfare Plan which discusses GUARDRAIL product improvements.  No threat has been identified that is specifically targeted against the ground terminal of the GUARDRAIL system; however, the system will be vulnerable to electronic warfare (EW) jamming, and operators will encounter the full range of battlefield threats such as artillery and rockets, air delivered ordnance, conventional and unconventional units, etc. The above threats are documented in various Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) general military and scientific and technical intelligence studies and handbooks.

3.  Nonmaterial Alternatives. The requirement is for a capability to rapidly disseminate intelligence data from an active collection platform to using units.  Consequently, the need is for equipment which provides connectivity with the collection system.  There are no doctrine, structure, or training changes which could satisfy this deficiency.

4.  Potential Material Alternatives

a.  We could pursue a non-developmental approach with one of the followinq systems:

(1) Tactical Commanders Terminal (TCT). TCT is a fielded system which is used by the Army to achieve connectivity with the ground processing facility associated with older versions of the GUARDRAIL aircraft. Aircraft which operate with the TCT are being replaced.

(2) Commanders Tactical Terminal (CTT).  CTT is also a fielded system. It allows for connectivity with the IPF associated with newer versions of the GUARDRAIL aircraft, i.e., the GUARDRAIL V and Improved GUARDRAIL. The CTT system will also operate with the GUARDRAIL Common Sensor, when that version of the aircraft is fielded.

b.  We could join research and development for the Commanders Tactical Terminal-Hybrid (CTT-H) with the U.S. Army. CTT-H is currently under development by the contractor who built both the CTT and the Tactical Information Broadcast System (TIBS).  This system will operate with those versions of the GUARDRAIL system supported by the CTT as described above.  Additionally, this system will allow users to receive intelligence data broadcast from processing facilities associated with certain theater and national collection assets.  The CTT-H is being designed to allow the user to receive two separate intelliqence broadcasts simultaneously.  Users will be able to choose which two channels to receive from a selection including the Tactical and Related Applications (TRAP) broadcast, TIBS broadcast and the GUARDRAIL broadcast.  The contractor expects to have CTT-H in production in FY93.

5.  Constraints

a.  Mobility.  The system must be capable of being transported in tactical vehicles currently in the Marine Corps inventory. Specifically, its size should be small enough for transport in a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV).

b.  Transportation.  The system must be transportable via all Marine Corps fixed-wing and rotary-wing transport aircraft and in all logistics support vehicles.

c.  Manpower.  The system should be operated by one Marine during normal operation, i.e., one Marine per shift in sustained operations.  The ability to allow this one Marine to perform multiple functions at the same time (e.g., monitor several different intelligence broadcasts) is desired. No new Military Occupational Specialties or changes to force structure will be required.

d.  Reliability.  The preliminary readiness objective is an operational availability of 0.95 with a mean-time-betweenonerational-mission-failures of 720 hours.

e.  Maintainability.  The system should be sufficiently simple to maintain so that third echelon maintenance can be performed by the owning unit with current organic maintenance personnel.

    f.  Operational environment

(1) Organizational concept.  The system will be employed to receive intelligence data broadcast from the GUARDRAIL IPF (and other processing facilities, if the CTT-H option is selected). This will allow intelligence users to receive information currently provided Marine units in electrical message traffic, thereby avoiding the significant time delays experienced in receiving such traffic during Southwest Asia operations. The equipment should be available to Marine intelligence personnel throughout the force so that the GUARDRAIL data can be effectively incorporated into their respective intelligence reports and estimates.  Routine employment of the terminal equipment (e.g., the TCT, CTT or CTT-H) is anticipated within the FMF Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Groups, and at the various MAGTF, Ground Combat Element and Aviation Combat Element headquarters. Where special circumstances dictate, terminal equipment should be available to the lowest level at which Intelligence Analysis System (IAS) equipment is assigned, i.e., the infantry battalion or aviation squadron.

(2) Performance characteristics.  The system must receive, process and display GUARDRAIL intelligence information received from the GUARDRAIL IPF.  The system must also operate with the IAS and the Radio Battalion's Technical Control and Analysis Center so as to allow GUARDRAIL data to be rapidly incorporated into the existing intelligence data files maintained on those systems.

(3) Environment.  The system must be ruggedized for field use by tactical units. It must be capable of deployment with various levels of forces down to front line battalions.  Mobility, as noted above, must be adequate for movement with the supported unit.  The system must operate in all weather conditions (i.e., rain, sleet, snow, etc.) in temperatures ranging from -49 to 124 degrees Fahrenheit.  The system must continue to operate in a NBC environment and controls, displays, etc. must be useable by personnel wearing NBC and/or cold weather gear.

g.  Training.  The system must be easy to use. On-the-job training is the desired means of training operators in system employment.

h.  Logistics.  The system will be designated a Critical Low Density item. Existing logistics support programs will be used for system support whenever possible. Dependence on non-military organizations for supply/repair is not desired.

i.  C4I interfaces.  The system must interface with the Radio Battalion TCAC and the IAS at all levels within the MAGTF (i.e., with the IAS Block Upgrade, IAS suites and IAS Workstations).

j.  Interoperability.  The system must specifically interoperate with the U.S. Army's GUARDRAIL aircraft. Interoperability with additional national and/or other service intelligence collection assets is highly desired.