|USAF INTELLIGENCE TARGETING GUIDE
AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 14- 210 Intelligence
1 FEBRUARY 1998
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7.2. Force Application Levels/ Timelines. Force application may be conducted at different levels for different purposes.
7.2.1. Theater . At the theater or joint task force level, commands use force application techniques to conduct Deliberate or Crisis Action Planning. A theater commander often uses deliberate planning to determine if he has sufficient forces to conduct a campaign and evaluate "what if" warfighting options. This evaluation is often called "wargaming." Another important area where force applica-tion supports deliberate planning is in determining target material (TM) production requirements. By knowing the types of targets and weapons systems used against those targets, TM production agencies can tailor their products towards supporting the warfighters.
7.2.2. Component . The force application process is at the heart of component level planning. That is, it's the "Operational Art of Warfighting." At this level, almost all of the daily decisions an air com-mander makes are influenced by the force application process. At times, scarce resources may dictate the commander determine which trade- offs to make when employing his forces-- an important force application function. Force application is also used extensively to develop longer range plans, outline the time to complete a particular phase of an operation, depict how some targets may be attacked, or provide a picture of the best ways to integrate and use various weapons.
184.108.40.206. In the Air Force, operational level planning occurs at the Air Operations Center (AOC). Targeteers prepare the target intelligence portion of plans and are instrumental in air tasking order (ATO) preparation. They work closely with operations and logistics planners to match targets with available weapon systems, munitions, or possible non lethal force options. Force sizing is then optimized in light of operational realities. Targeteers also assist in attrition analysis or calcu-lations for possible friendly force losses to enemy defenses; attrition analysis impacts delivery tac-tics and force sizing.
220.127.116.11. As the focal point of the air component commander's control system, the AOC is con-nected to operations centers of higher and lateral commands, subordinate units, and subordinate Theater Air Control System (TACS) agencies. The AOC provides centralized control with decen-tralized execution through its subordinate agencies (i. e., Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) and the Control and Reporting Center (CRC)). The AOC prepares and issues orders for force 61
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7. 2.2.3. The Combat Plans Division oversees the evaluation of the overall air plan. They also consolidate requests for air missions (not targets). This results in an apportionment recommenda-tion to commit available air resources, which is sent to the CINC for approval. Based on this com-mitment an ATO is prepared and issued.
18.104.22.168. 1. In making this recommendation, operations and targeting personnel must work together. Considerations for the apportionment recommendation include enemy intentions and reactions to our operations, threat, and objective achievement. The sub assessments of combat assessment are very important to the force application process once operations start. Munitions effectiveness assessments (MEA) drive weapon and tactics selection. Battle dam-age assessments (BDA) provide indicators of the enemy's capabilities. Mission assessments (MA) detail how well the assigned missions are being performed.
22.214.171.124.2. Targeteers also work closely with the Combat Operations planners on weaponeer-ing and weapon selection. Additionally, they furnish targeting data for reconnaissance and surveillance plans along with ensuring the BDA is efficiently collected.
126.96.36.199. The Combat Operations Division supervises the detailed execution of the ATOs. Through the use of the TACS, it coordinates and integrates all air operations and provides for cen-tralized control in response to designated objectives and the current tactical situation. Targeteers are an integral part of the Combat Operations Division. They monitor ATO execution and recom-mend alternate targets when necessary. Normally target changes are due to bad weather, BDA, or the discovery of a higher priority target. The ability to quickly recommend good alternate targets is very important to the flexibility of airpower. Combat Operations Division targeteers should have all the significance statements for the targets on the current ATO, the theater and air compo-nent objectives, all guidance, ROEs, and weaponeering lookup tables as appropriate.
7.2.3. Unit . Targeteers at the wing are responsible for doing specific weaponeering for their tasked missions. They should tailor this to the capabilities and tactics of their aircrews. Targeteers at the unit should be familiar with their unit's weapons and tactics to include which delivery conditions they nor-mally use and which are not in their units playbooks. The weaponeering planning factor should be published by the AOC so units can ensure they comply with guidance. Wing and squadron command-ers are often called upon to make force application assessments for missions that are tasked to the unit level. The mission planning cell reviews the changing threat, weather, munitions effectiveness assess-ments and can modify munitions load or even the number of sorties tasked against a target to maxi-mize their combat effectiveness. They can also request changes to aimpoints. If unit adjustments can reduce sortie requirements and extend munitions stocks by judicious planning, the benefit is obvious. When a unit wants to make changes to the plans, they must notify the AOC. This minimizes the effect on future planning. For example, if planners assume a unit attacked a particular aimpoint, when in fact they did not, the objective of the attack may not be met.
7.3. Force Application Process. The process of force application reviewed below is traditionally used at the operational (AOC) level to build the ATO. However, force application tasks are universal and are not tied exclusively to the ATO cycle or ATO production. This section is designed to provide a generic look at the flow and thought processes inherent in force application; it is not intended to dictate a particular way to conduct planning. There are five general steps in force selection planning: 62
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7.3.1. Compile Information. The first step is to gather the data needed for the selection process. The key to successfully conducting force application analysis is organizing pertinent data and information in a coherent format to guide planners towards logical and economic employment options. Experi-enced planners gather the data they will need well ahead of time and continually update and refine it. They do not allow the sheer volume of information coming into the AOC to overwhelm them. This should not be difficult if a worksheet has been prepared and pertinent intelligence collected on each potential target. The types of information needed include: target development results; weaponeering calculations; forces and operational constraints; and damage expectancy calculations. This data should be in RAAP if the documentation part of target development was done properly.
188.8.131.52. Target Development Results . This can be found in RAAP with information on target significance, contribution to the target system, and its relationship to other system components.
184.108.40.206. Weaponeering Calculations . Includes weapon effects estimates and damage criteria. An array of possible aircraft/ weapon combinations should also be included to allow flexibility for the planners. Calculations for nonlethal applications must also be factored.
220.127.116.11. Forces and Operational Constraints . Provided by operations, logistics, weather and legal personnel includes: data on aircraft, weapons and fuzing availability; tactics and employ-ment; objectives, guidance apportionment, ROE, LOAC; weather; and other operational con-straints and considerations (e. g., threat picture).
18.104.22.168.1. Aircraft/ Weapons Availability . Operations planners maintain this information, provided by logisticians in the Resource Management Center. Restrictions such as the number of precision- guided munition (PGM) qualified aircrews, maximum sortie generation rates, munitions buildup times, and crew rest all impact the number and type of weapons systems available for execution. Planners try to account for all of these considerations in their recom-mendations.
22.214.171.124.2. Friendly Tactics and Employment Procedures . A thorough understanding of unit tactics, capabilities, unique weapons characteristics, and requirements are essential to effectively plan for weapons employment. Planners must consider all factors in using a partic-ular weapons system or building a package, not just asset availability.
126.96.36.199.3. Apportionment Guidance . This guidance sets forth the JTF commanders' desired weight of effort, expressed as a percentage of the total sorties which will be assigned to a par-ticular mission type (CA, AI, CAS) or geographic area (II Corps, X Corridor) for a defined period of time. Combat Plans "allocates" assets as part of the force application process. The JTF commander must approve any large deviations from the guidance in the apportionment decision, although the JFACC staff is usually allowed some discretion.
188.8.131.52.4. Battle Damage Assessment . Intelligence planners track and monitor previous tar-geting efforts and update accordingly. Based on incoming BDA, targeteers working in Com- 63
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184.108.40.206.5. Threat Picture . A key objective for planners is to minimize risk to aircrew. Therefore, planners receive regular order of battle updates and have an understanding of enemy threats, particularly enemy doctrine and tactics (lethal and non lethal alike). Weapons selection focuses as much or more so on those weapons which allow for survivable delivery tactics against the anticipated threat as those weapons which give the best Pd. The challenge to planners is to balance desired Pd or weapons choice against the risky delivery parameters necessary to meet them.
220.127.116.11. Damage Expectancy (D E ) . D E for each target can be calculated using P d and P a , and further force selection computations should be based on D E rather than P d . The P a for different systems can vary considerably, and these factors should be reflected in the target analysis. The use of D E allows the analyst to compare the capabilities of each system and to select the best weapon system for the mission. D E is the product of P d and P a computed for a given single system attacking a single target (figure 7.1). Often the mistake is made of compounding probabilities of damage first and then applying P a , resulting in an incorrect answer. If more than one aircraft is attacking a target, D E should be compounded, not P d .
18.104.22.168.1. P a Calculations. P a figures are developed by analysts using intelligence about the enemy defensive posture, capabilities, and intentions; and the anticipated routing to potential targets. Targeteers must provide these analysts an up- to- date target list as soon as practical. Although changes in the final force application process may require last minute adjustments, the P a figures should be relatively firm. However, they should be prepared as an array for the
various available vehicles and delivery tactics that might be encountered with any last minute changes. For nonnuclear weapons, weapon reliability is included in the JMEM methodology for determining probability of damage and should be excluded from the P a computation.
22.214.171.124.2. Other Considerations . Planners formulate, review, or modify employment pro-cedures based upon the tactical situation. Information operations, psychological operations, and tactical deception, et al., can be used to provide a synergistic effect or advantage to the execution of the ATO.
Figure 7.1. Damage Expectancy Formula.
D E = P d x P a NOTE: D E is based on attack by a single system against a single target.
7.3.2. Tentative Force Assignment. In this step, the target analyst tries to determine which targets will be attacked by which forces. The targeteer must use as much operational data as possible in per-forming this task. However, the specific forces and weapons can only be determined by operations personnel who actually select the targets. Operations personnel who make the final force application decisions will then adjust these recommendations. A targeting oriented solution is absolutely neces-
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7. 3.2.1. The targeteer must compare the expected effects of the tentative force selection to the stated daily operational and campaign objectives and adjust the input to the selected model and rerun, if necessary. If the tentative solutions do not satisfy the operational objectives, the targeteer should reexamine the data and alternative solutions to determine if there is a better solution. This may include additional target development. If the targeteer finds it is not possible to satisfy the stated objective (within reasonable bounds), the commander should be informed. The decision maker then can modify the objective or accept less than the expected results in the original plan. Ongoing testing of performance against objectives is an integral part of the targeting function and must occur in order to keep the decision maker informed and to help decide how future efforts will be applied.
126.96.36.199. The outcome is an initial flow chart or matrix showing the sets of aircraft or other forces assigned against one target. Each set is given a mission number. The unit, aircraft or weapons platform, weapons loads, and times- over target (TOTs) as well as, specific target aimpoints are also assigned to the mission. The flow chart may also identify the groupings of missions which can mutually support one another; that is, act as a mission package.
188.8.131.52. Tentative Package Development . To complete the mission packages framed in force assignment, planners conduct package development. Combat Plans assign the non- attack mission platforms (( i. e., air- air, Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), jamming, airborne control, tactical reconnaissance, air refueling, and CSAR aircraft)) which support the package ingress and egress. Planners next ensure the mission packages are deconflicted with other mission packages. This is accomplished primarily through the use of the Airspace Control Order (ACO).
7.3.3. Recommend Targets, Forces, Weapons, Fuzing, and Assessment Criteria. Targets, deliv-ery systems, weapons, fuzing, aim points, and assessment criteria are presented to the operations staff. Targeteers must provide much more information to the operations staff than just a list of targets. After making the recommendations, targeteers and operations planners must work closely to adjust the rec-ommendations as necessary. Presentation is important. Format should be tailored to the decision maker and staff present. The only constant is the targeteer must be ready to address the significance of the target list and know the munition effects of the recommendations.
7.3.4. Adjust Recommendations. Because the information available is fluid, when operations plan-ners apply specific sorties to specific targets, the recommended plan may need adjusting. The targe-teer, who should be readily available to assist, can best evaluate the impact of changes upon the entire targeting effort. The targeteer must also be aware of changes to update analysis calculations and pro-jected results.
7.3.5. Present Joint Recommendations to Decision Maker. The targeteer must be able to present a comprehensive briefing on the recommended plan that explains the reasoning behind the target selec-tion. If the analyst has prepared a thorough analysis of the target system and has good documentation, it should be easy to prepare a briefing. Generally, operations and intelligence each brief a portion of the recommended plan. 65
|USAF INTELLIGENCE TARGETING GUIDE
AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 14- 210 Intelligence
1 FEBRUARY 1998