Air Force
Intelligence and Security Doctrine


Information Security


This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 31-4, Information Security Program, and supplements Department of Defense (DoD) Regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security Program, 7 June 1986; DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5240.11, Damage Assessments,
23 December 1991; and, DoD Directive (DoDD) 5210.83, Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI), 15 November 1991. It describes how to protect and handle classified information and UCNI. Chapters 6 and 14 contain punitive provisions.


This is the initial publication of Air Force Instruction (AFI) 31-401, substantially revising Air Force Regulation (AFR) 205-1, Air Force Information Security Program. It does not include DoD requirements. It empowers commanders to determine the method of oversight; delegates authority to approve access for agencies outside the executive branch; allows commanders to evaluate threat conditions before applying additional safeguards; rescinds use of "Limited Dissemination (LIMDIS)" within the Air Force; removes guidelines on special access programs and refers to the appropriate governing directives.


Chapter 1--General
Responsibilities 1.1
Classification Authority 1.2

Chapter 2--Classifying Information
Classification Planning 2.1
Challenges to Classification 2.2
Limitations on Classification 2.3
Damage Assessment 2.4
Subsequent Extension of Duration of Classification 2.5
Notification 2.6

Chapter 3--Declassifying and Downgrading Information
Air Force Declassification and Downgrading Officials 3.1
Declassification and Downgrading Actions 3.2
Submission of Requests for Mandatory Declassification Review 3.3
Appeals 3.4

Supersedes AFR 205-1, 28 April 1987.
Certified by: HQ USAF/SP (Brig General Stephen C. Mannell)
OPR: HQ AFSPA/SPI (Mr Kenneth M. Saxon) Pages: 20/Distribution: F
Chapter 4--Marking
Improper Markings 4.1
Removable Automatic Data Processing (ADP) and Word Processing Storage
Media 4.2
Documents Produced by ADP Equipment 4.3
Dissemination and Reproduction Notice 4.4
Marking Foreign Government Information 4.5

Chapter 5--Safekeeping and Storage
Storage Containers 5.1
Classified Storage 5.2
Other Storage Requirements 5.3
Removal of Classified Material During Non-duty Hours 5.4
Care During Work Hours 5.5
Emergency Planning 5.6
Security of Meetings and Conferences 5.7
Safeguarding Classified Equipment on Aircraft 5.8
Inspection Procedures and Identification 5.9

Chapter 6--Compromise of Classified Information
Definitions 6.1
Responsibility of Discoverer 6.2
Appointing Preliminary Inquiry Officials 6.3
The Purpose of Inquiries and Investigations 6.4
Closing Preliminary Inquiries 6.5
Handling Preliminary Inquiry Reports 6.6
Formal Investigations 6.7
Final Approval Authorities 6.8
Damage Assessment 6.9

Chapter 7--Access, Dissemination, and Accountability
Policy 7.1
Standard Form 312, Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement (NdA) 7.2
Access by Individuals Outside the Executive Branch 7.3
Access by Visitors 7.4
Security Reviews 7.5
Information Originating in a Non-DoD Department or Agency 7.6
Limited Dissemination (LIMDIS) 7.7
Top Secret Control Officers (TSCO) 7.8
Secret Information 7.9
Confidential Information 7.10
Working Papers 7.11
Restraint on Reproduction 7.12

Chapter 8--Transmitting Classified Material
Top Secret Material 8.1
Secret Material 8.2
Confidential Material 8.3
Transmitting Classified Material to Foreign Governments 8.4
Transmitting Classified Material by Pneumatic Tube Systems 8.5
Envelopes or Containers 8.6
Preparing Classified Material for Transmission 8.7

Chapter 9--Disposal of Classified Material
Destroying Classified Material 9.1

Chapter 10--Security Education
Initial Training 10.1
Recurring Training 10.2
Foreign Travel Briefings 10.3
Termination Briefings 10.4
Unit and Staff Agency Security Manager Training 10.5

Chapter 11--Foreign Government Information
Applying North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Protection Standards 11.1

Chapter 12--Special Access Programs
Special Access Programs 12.1
Code Words and Nicknames 12.2

Chapter 13--Program Management
Request for Waivers 13.1
Field Program Management 13.2
Appointing Security Managers 13.3
Semiannual Security Inspections 13.4
Management Information System (MIS) Reporting 13.5

Chapter 14--Administrative Sanctions
Violations of Prohibitions 14.1

Chapter 15--Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI)
Program Implementation 15.1
Purpose 15.2
Responsibility 15.3

Forms Prescribed
AF Form 54, Classified Computer Card Deck Cover Sheet 5.5
AF Form 143, Top Secret Register Page 7.8.1
AF Form 144, Top Secret Access Record and Cover Sheet 5.5
AF Form 145, Certificate of Destruction of Material 9.1.4
AF Form 310, Document Receipt and Destruction Certificate 9.1.4
AF Form 608, Nickname Assignment/Change/Cancellation Request 12.2
AF Form 1565, Entry, Receipt, and Destruction Certificate 6.5.3
AF Form 2595, Classified Protection Insertion Sheet

6.1 Notifications 10

1 Attachment
Glossary of Acronyms 21

Chapter 1


1.1. Responsibilities:

1.1.1. SAF/AA. The Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force (SAF/AA), 1720 Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC 20330-1720:

1.1.2. SAF/IA. The Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs, (SAF/IA), 1080 Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC 20330-1080, oversees the release of Air Force classified information to foreign governments, individuals, and international organizations.

1.1.3. HQ USAF/SP. The Air Force Chief of Security Police (HQ USAF/SP), 1340 Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC 20330-1340, formulates, disseminates, and interprets policy.

1.1.4. HQ USAF/HO. The Air Force Historian (HQ USAF/HO), 170 Luke Avenue, Ste 400, Bolling AFB DC 20332-5113, approves or disapproves requests from historical researchers for access to classified information.

1.1.5. AFSPA/CC. The Commander, Air Force Security Police Agency (AFSPA/CC), 8201 H Ave SE, Kirtland AFB NM 87117-5664:

1.1.6. The Information Security Program Manager (ISPM):

1.1.7. Commanders. Commanders at activities without a security police unit either appoint an ISPM or arrange for support with the servicing Air Force ISPM.

1.2. Classification Authority:

1.2.1. The Secretary of the Air Force serves as the original classification authority (OCA) and may further delegate it.

1.2.2. Persons with original Top Secret classification authority may delegate Secret and Confidential authority.

1.2.3. Commanders send requests for delegating Top Secret classification authority to the Chief, Information Security Division (HQ USAF/SPI), 1340 Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC 20330-1340.

1.2.4. Unit commanders or staff agency chiefs:

1.2.5. AFSPA/CC keeps a master list of Air Force OCAs and disseminates informational copies for periodic validation to major commands (MAJCOMs), field operating agencies (FOAs), and direct reporting units (DRU) ISPMs.

Chapter 2


2.1. Classification Planning. Program managers must consider applying system security engineering during the conceptual, design, and configuration phases of a system or component according to AFPD 31-7, Integrating Security into the Acquisition Process.
2.2. Challenges to Classification. Personnel:

channels to AFSPA/CC.

2.3. Limitations on Classification. Originators send requests for reclassifying information through channels to AFSPA/CC.

2.4. Damage Assessment.

2.4.1. AFOSI. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) oversees the Air Force Counterintelligence program.

2.4.2. HQ USAF/SPI. HQ USAF/SPI serves as the Air Force member of the DoD Damage Assessment Committee (DoDDAC).

2.4.3. Damage Assessment Reports: OCAs send a copy of the damage assessment report to HQ USAF/SPI for information gathered through foreign espionage. HQ USAF/SPI sets up an Air Force Damage Assessment Committee to review and coordinate work on a case before forwarding it to DoDDAC.

2.5. Subsequent Extension of Duration of Classification:

2.5.1. OCAs send notices changing declassification instructions to all known holders of the classified information.

2.5.2. Holders who have further distributed the information must also notify the new holders.

2.6. Notification. OCAs classify upgrade notices at the same level as the upgraded information it reports. On each notice, OCAs include:

2.6.1. Classified By: "AFI 31-401, paragraph 2.6."

2.6.2. Declassify On: "When the OCA makes a determination according to DoD 5200.1-R, Subsection 2-210."

Chapter 3


3.1. Air Force Declassification and Downgrading Officials.

3.1.1. OCAs.

3.1.2. SAF/PAS. Chief, Office for Security Review, Office of Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force (SAF/PAS), 1690 Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC 20330-1690.

3.1.3. HQ USAF/SPI. Chief, Information Security Division, US Air Force Security Police (HQ USAF/SPI), 1340 Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC 20330-1340.

3.1.4. AFHRA/CC. Director, Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA/CC), 600 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6424, for Project "SAFE PAPER."

3.1.5. Chiefs of Security Police. Chiefs of security police when more than one office has a functional interest in the information.

3.2. Declassification and Downgrading Actions. Declassification and downgrading officials (See paragraph 3.1.):

3.3. Submission of Requests for Mandatory Declassification Review. Requesters:

3.4. Appeals. Requesters:
Chapter 4


4.1. Improper Markings. The holder of improperly marked classified documents asks the originator to correct them.

4.2. Removable Automatic Data Processing (ADP) and Word Processing Storage Media.

4.2.1. Holders mark classified removable ADP information storage media and devices with:

4.2.2. Originators mark both internal media labels and internal files with the highest classification of data the media contains.

4.2.3. Holders:

4.3. Documents Produced by ADP Equipment. The originator or owner of a classified computer product marks them with the appropriate classification.

4.4. Dissemination and Reproduction Notice. Document holders:

4.5. Marking Foreign Government Information. Document holders:

Chapter 5


5.1. Storage Containers.

5.1.1. Holders of material may not use containers without a General Services Administration (GSA) label unless a trained locksmith determines that the safe meets GSA standards.

5.1.2. Locksmiths note their findings on Air Force Technical Order (AFTO) Form 36, Maintenance Record for Security Type Equipment.

5.1.3. Commanders use military handbook (MILHDBK) 1013/1A, Design Guidelines for Physical Security of Fixed Land-Based Facilities, 28 Jun 93, as a guide when determining construction of vaults.
5.2. Classified Storage.

5.2.1. Installation Commanders:

5.2.2. The Air Force allows document holders to use existing steel filing and map or plan cabinets modified according to Technical Order 46A3-1-1, Installation of Lock-Bars on Steel File and Map/Plan Cabinets for Storage of Classified Materials.

5.2.3. Members may not store items susceptible to theft (such as controlled drugs) in any security container. EXCEPTION: The installation commander may waive this rule in emergencies.

5.3. Other Storage Requirements.

5.3.1. Supervisors designate lock and key custodians.

5.3.2. Lock and key custodians use AF Form 2427, Lock and Key Control Register, to identify and keep track of keys.

5.3.3. Installation Commander:

5.3.4. Couriers:

5.3.5. The installation commander must tell operations dispatch, passenger services, entry controllers, and billeting people where to find the repository.

5.4. Removal of Classified Material During Non-duty Hours. MAJCOM, FOA, and DRU commanders and the Air Force District of Washington commander (for secretariat and air staff offices) approve requests for removing classified material from designated work areas during non-duty hours.

5.5. Care During Work Hours. Top Secret Control Officers (TSCOs) removing Top Secret material from its storage area use AF Form 144, Top Secret Access Record and Cover Sheet, or AF Form 54, Classified Computer Deck Cover Sheet, instead of Standard Form 703, Top Secret Cover Sheet.

5.6. Emergency Planning. Units located in the 50 United States don't need emergency destruction plans. (See AFJI 31-404 for emergency plans for NATO classified material.)

5.7. Security Meetings and Conferences:

5.7.1. SAF/AA authorizes organizational and administrative support for classified meetings and conferences by nongovernment organizations.

5.7.2. Hosting officials send requests for approval for foreign participation in classified meetings and conferences to SAF/AA through SAF/IAD.

5.7.3. For science and technology related meetings, see AFI 61-205, Sponsoring or Cosponsoring, Conducting and Presenting DoD Related Scientific and Technical Papers at Unclassified and Classified Conferences, Symposia, and Other Similar Meetings (formerly AFR 80-43, Sponsoring or Cosponsoring and Conducting Unclassified and Classified Meetings).

5.7.4. For guidance for classified meetings scheduled at DoD contractor facilities, see DoD 5220.22-R, Industrial Security Regulation, Dec 85, and AFI 31-601, Industrial Security Program Management (formerly AFR 205-4, The Industrial Security Program).

5.7.5. Installation commanders or their designees approve secure conference facilities.

5.7.6. For conducting security surveys, see AFR 205-14, Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Program.

5.8. Safeguarding Classified Equipment on Aircraft.

5.8.1. For Top Secret equipment installed aboard "Priority A" aircraft, installation or activity commanders satisfy the equipment's protection requirements by complying with AFI 31-101, The Air Force Physical Security Program.

5.8.2. For Top Secret equipment installed aboard aircraft without "Priority A" designations, installation or activity commanders may choose to:

5.8.3. For Secret or Confidential equipment installed aboard an aircraft with a priority code, installation or activity commanders use the same procedures as for any "Priority A, B, or C" aircraft (see AFI 31-101).

5.8.4. For Secret or Confidential equipment installed aboard a nonpriority aircraft, installation or activity commanders take no further security measures if the owner or user stay with the aircraft. NOTE: If owner or user don't stay with the aircraft, they must arrange for security police or law enforcement personnel to conduct periodic checks, no less than every 3 hours.

5.8.5. Local commanders may establish alternate procedures after taking into account the physical characteristics of the classified equipment and its location, such as: Local commanders must document these decisions.

5.8.6. Investigative and Clearance Requirements. For classified equipment not visible from outside the aircraft, only US citizens with favorable Entrance National Agency Checks or higher may watch over equipment and respond to emergencies. For classified equipment visible from the aircraft, only US citizens with clearance equal to the equipment classification may watch over equipment or respond to emergencies. See AFI 31-501, Personnel Security Program Management.

5.8.7. Protecting Classified Material at Non-US Air Force Bases or Airfields: For Top Secret material, see paragraphs 5.8.1 and 5.8.2. For Secret and Confidential material, use standard security procedures to protect aircraft located on non-US Air Force bases. EXCEPTION: If this is not possible, the wing commander must consider the physical characteristics of the classified equipment when developing alternate protective measures (see paragraph 5.8.5.) For aircraft with Secret or Confidential components located at a non-US Air Force base in an allied nation, the aircraft commander:

5.8.8. Emergency Landing. In the event of an emergency landing, the aircraft commander:

5.9. Inspection Procedures and Identification. Installation commanders designate personnel to conduct periodic checks for unauthorized removal of classified information at installation entry points.

Chapter 6


6.1. Definitions.

6.1.1. Security Violation. A violation of the information security program standards or procedures that may classify either as a compromise or a security deviation.

6.1.2. Compromise. A known or probable disclosure of classified information to unauthorized individuals. NOTE: In these cases, the originator must conduct a damage assessment.

6.1.3. Security Deviation. A security violation that can't be defined as a compromise.

6.2. Responsibility of the Discoverer:

6.2.1. Individuals who learn of a security violation must promptly report it to their security manager, immediate supervisor, unit commander, agency chief, or higher-level authority in their chain of command.

6.2.2. The unit commander or staff agency chief reports the incident to the servicing ISPM by the end of the first duty day. NOTE: See DoD 5200.1-R, Subsection 2-209, when the classified information appears in an open publication, the public domain, or in an otherwise unprotected document.

6.3. Appointing Preliminary Inquiry Officials:

6.3.1. The unit commander or staff agency chief appoints a preliminary inquiry official to conduct an inquiry according to this instruction. They may use AFI 90-301, Inspector General Complaints, as a guide for doing appointments.

6.3.2. When personnel notice a breach in security while transmitting classified material, the unit commander or staff agency chief of the sending activity appoints the preliminary inquiry official.

6.3.3. Inquiry officials coordinate their actions with the security police and staff judge advocate's office.

6.4. The Purpose of Inquiries and Investigations. The preliminary inquiry or investigation determines:

6.5. Closing Preliminary Inquiries:

6.5.1. When appointing authorities don't expect violations to damage the national security, they close the preliminary inquiries.

6.5.2. When appointing authorities expect damage to the national security, they may:

6.5.3. When a formal investigation is not warranted, the appointing authority closes the inquiry by:

6.5.4. The Servicing Security Police:

6.6. Handling Preliminary Inquiry Reports.

6.6.1. Commanders who decide not to initiate a formal investigation, see Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 37-139, Records Disposition - Standards, for disposition instructions.

6.6.2. Investigating officials include the preliminary inquiry report as an exhibit in the investigation report.

6.7. Formal Investigations. A formal investigation shows the extent and seriousness of a compromise in security and determines who caused it.

6.7.1. Investigating officials must complete investigations within 30 days.

6.7.2. Appointing Investigators. The commander or staff agency chief appoints an official to conduct a formal investigation according to this instruction. They may use AFI 90-301 as a guide for doing appointments.

6.7.3. Investigation Reporting:

6.7.4. Required Notification. The appointing authority or other designated official:

Table 6.1. Notifications.
RULE If the Commander's Preliminary Inquiry Reveals (Note 1) Then the Commander or Other Proper Authority
Conducts Debriefing Takes
NotifiesOPR Notifies HQ USAF/
SPI (Note 2)
Notifies AFOSI (Note 3) Notifies MAJCOM/
1 A Noncompromise


Unauthorized Discosure to a Cleared person


Suspected Criminal or Deliberate Compromise (Not Espionage) or Requires Specialized Investigative Services
(Note 4)


Suspected Espionage
(Note 4)


Compromise of Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data or Unauthorized Disclosure to a Foreign National or Nation
(Note 5)
(Note 5)


Possible Publicity (Note 6)


Compromise of Non-DoD Information
(Note 7)


Compromise of NATO Classified Information
(Note 7)


All Other Compromises of DoD Classified Information Not Covered Elsewhere


Compromise of Special Access Information (Note 8)


1. If two or more rules apply, notify parties indicated for all applicable rules.
2. HQ USAF/SPI, 1340 Air Force Pentagon, Washington, DC 20330-1340.
3. Notify AFOSI Unit that services the Command or Activity.
4. HQ AFOSI Notifies DoD.
5. Send the report through SP channels to HQ USAF/SPI (Note 2) when the OPR is a non-DoD agency.
6. Send a copy to SAF/PA, 1690 Air Force Pentagon, Washington, DC 20330-1690.
7. Notify the OPR back through the same channels the Classified Material was transmitted. Provide a brief summary of violation. Do not include detailed facts or names of probably suspects. For NATO Classified, refer to AFJI 31-404.
8. Report violations involving sensitive compartmented information through Air for Intelligence Channels.

6.8. Final Approval Authorities.

6.8.1. The appointing authority closes preliminary inquiries unless MAJCOM, FOA, or DRU directives place such authority at a higher level.

6.8.2. MAJCOM and DRU Commanders and Secretariat or Air Staff Chiefs:

6.8.3. HQ USAF/SP processes closed reports through channels.

6.8.4. For all other investigation reports: MAJCOM and DRU commanders close reports themselves. Functional secretariat or air staff chiefs close reports for FOAs. MAJCOM and DRU commanders and FOA secretariat or air staff chiefs can delegate this authority to installation commanders.

6.9. Damage Assessment. OCAs set up damage assessment controls and procedures for their information. See AFI 31-401, paragraph 2.5, and DoD 5200.1-R, paragraph 2-210.

Chapter 7


7.1. Policy.

7.1.1. Air Force members or employees who possess or control classified information:

7.1.2. Supervisors must ensure that two employees work with top secret information during non-duty hours. The two need not see each other at all times in order to comply with the rule as long as they stay in the same general area. EXCEPTION: The two-person rule doesn't apply to local courier operations unless it's specified in other directives (such as the directive for Special Access Programs). Immediate supervisors may suspend the rule for limited, unscheduled, weekend, or other after-hours work required by a mission.

7.1.3. MAJCOM, FOA, and DRU commanders may delegate the authority to waive the two-person policy.
7.2. Standard Form 312, Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement (NdA). Unit commanders and staff agency chiefs or designated personnel ensure that individuals who need access to classified information sign an NdA. NOTE: Use DoD 5200.1-PH-1, Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement (SF-312), Mar 89, briefing pamphlet, to explain the purpose of this agreement. .

7.2.1. The following organizations keep NdAs for 50 years:

7.2.2. Unit commanders and staff agency chiefs may allow their people 30 days to sign an NdA.

7.2.3. Air Reserve and the Guard may allow their people 8 training days to sign.

7.2.4. When a person refuses to sign an NdA, the commanders:

7.3. Access by Individuals Outside the Executive Branch.

7.3.1. MAJCOM and DRU Commanders and Secretariat or Air Staff Chiefs: Authorize individuals outside the executive branch to access Air Force classified material after they have May delegate this authority.

7.3.2. Requesters allow 120 days for processing the request. Requests must

7.3.3. Individuals with approval must sign a NdA before accessing information. EXCEPTION: General officers need not sign another NdA if the original one is already filed in their retired file (see paragraph 7.2.1.).

7.3.4. Congress. See AFI 90-401, Air Force Relations with Congress, for guidance when granting classified access to members of Congress.

7.3.5. Representatives of the General Accounting Office (GAO). See AFI 65-401, US Air Force Relations with the General Accounting Office, for access requirements.

7.3.6. Historical Researchers. The Air Force Historian (HQ USAF/HO):

7.3.7. HQ USAF/HO:

7.3.8. Owners of classified information disclose it to foreign nationals, governments, and international organizations only when they receive either:

7.4. Access by Visitors.

7.4.1. Outgoing Visit Requests for Air Force Employees. When an Air Force employee visits:

7.4.2. Incoming Visit Requests. Air Force installation or activity commanders serve as the approval authority for visits to their activities. Installation or activity commanders receiving a visit request:

7.5. Security Reviews. See AFI 35-205, Air Force Security and Policy Review Program (formerly AFR 190-1, Public Affairs Policies and Procedures), for guidance on security reviews to keep people from publishing classified information in:

7.6. Information Originating in a Non-DoD Department or Agency. Holders allow access under the rules of the originating agency.

7.7. Limited Dissemination (LIMDIS). The Air Force doesn't authorize use of LIMDIS controls. EXCEPTION: The LIMDIS caveat used for message distribution.

7.8. Top Secret Control Officers (TSCO). Unit commanders and staff agency chiefs designate TSCOs.

7.8.1. Accountability. TSCOs:

1. TSCOs don't use AF Form 143 for Top Secret messages kept in telecommunications facilities on a transitory basis for less than 30 days. Instead, use message delivery registers or other similar records of accountability.

2. TSCOs don't use AF Forms 143 as a receipt for information received from or delivered to the Defense Courier Service (DCS). DCS receipts suffice for accountability purposes in these cases.

7.8.2. Serialization and Copy Numbering. The Air Force originator of information:

7.8.3. Disclosure Records. The TSCO uses AF Form 144 as the disclosure record and keeps it attached to the applicable Top Secret document. People assigned to an office that processes large volumes of Top Secret material need not record who accesses the material. NOTE: This applies only when these offices limit entry to assigned personnel identified on a roster.

7.8.4. Inventories. The TSCO appointing authority designates officials to conduct inventories every 12 months or when the TSCO changes. The TSCO appointing authority reviews Top Secret material annually, and along with action officials who use the information, decides whether to keep it. The TSCO appointing authority certifies this review when endorsing the inventory report.

7.8.5. Designated Inventory Officials:

7.9. Secret Information.

7.9.1. Unit commanders and staff agency chiefs set up procedures for internal control.

7.9.2. Document holders

7.10. Confidential Information. Individuals need not use a receipt unless DoD 5200.1-R, paragraph 8-202c requires it.

7.11. Working Papers. Originators must show their organization and office symbol on classified working papers.

7.12. Restraint on Reproduction. Unit commanders and staff agency chiefs designate people to exercise this authority in their activities.

7.12.1. Copier Clearing Procedures. Unless information management officials indicate otherwise, individuals must:

Chapter 8


8.1. Top Secret Material.

8.1.1. See DoD 5200.33-R, Defense Courier Service Regulation, Jan 89 for guidance.

8.1.2. Holders use the Department of State courier system when

8.2. Secret Material.
8.2.1. Air Force employees may use USPS Express Mail in addition to US Postal Service (USPS) registered mail between the United States and its territories. NOTE: To ensure that USPS never leaves the material unattended don't execute the "waiver of signature and indemnity" on the USPS Express Mail Label 11-B. For more information on protective security service carriers, see DoD 5220.22-R, and AFPD 24-2, Preparation and Movement of US Air Force.

8.3. Confidential Material.

8.3.1. Holders use the diplomatic pouch system when transmitting Confidential material to US defense attache offices.

8.3.2. Holders use USPS registered or certified mail to send Confidential material to the Defense Plant Representatives Office. Recipients of first class mail bearing the "Postmaster" notice, protect it as Confidential material.

8.4. Transmitting Classified Material to Foreign Governments.

8.4.1. Holders may not ship US classified material from a US industrial activity to a foreign entity.

8.4.2. Air Force contracting officials ensure that US industrial activities have a government approved transportation plan or other transmission instructions.

8.4.3. For more information, see DoD 5220.22-R and AFI 16-201.

8.4.4. Receipts. Air Force personnel:

8.4.5. Transmitting Classified Material Approved for Foreign Military Sales. Air Force activities having primary management responsibility for processing foreign military sales cases ensure that personnel include transmission instructions with DD Form 1513, US DoD Offer and Acceptance. Foreign military sales processors work with servicing security police and transportation officials on transmission plans submitted by foreign purchasers before giving final approval.
NOTE: Transportation plans must contain all the security criteria outlined in DoD 5200.1-R, Appendix E. Depot and contract administration officials review lists of freight forwarders specified by the recipient foreign government to confirm that DoD 4000.25-8-M, Military Assistance Program Address Directory System, Oct 90, shows them as authorized to transport classified information.

8.4.6. Whenever possible, shippers should use military airlift for shipping classified to foreign recipients. NOTE: When Air Mobility Command airlift can't deliver, determine an alternate secure method of direct delivery to a designated representative on a case-by-case basis.

8.4.7. For Information on:

8.5. Transmitting Classified Material by Pneumatic Tube Systems. Installation commanders approve the use of pneumatic tube systems and ensure that the equipment and procedures provide adequate security.

8.6. Envelopes or Containers. Persons do not use an outer container when entering Secret and below material into the Base Information Transfer Center (BITC).

8.7. Preparing Classified Material for Transmission.

8.7.1. Holders:

8.7.2. If the material is for US personnel only, holders address it to the US unit of the command concerned.

8.7.3. Receipt Systems: Top Secret. Secret. Confidential. Senders trace receipts when they're not acknowledged: The recipient must immediately date, sign, correct, and return the receipt to the sender.

8.7.4. Hand carrying Classified Information.

8.7.5. General Restrictions. Each Air Force activity or unit that releases classified material to personnel for hand-carrying: Security managers or supervisors brief each authorized member hand-carrying classified material. Organizations may use AF Form 2595, Classified Protection Insertion Sheet, as a countermeasure for the possible threat posed by the chemical composition referred to as "Liquid Window."

Chapter 9


9.1. Destroying Classified Material.

9.1.1. Holders destroy classified materials that have served their purpose.

9.1.2. Installation commanders order an adequate supply of equipment to destroy classified information. NOTE: See the Air Force Table of Allowances (TA) 006, Organizational and Administrative Equipment, for a list of devices approved for pulping, pulverizing, and shredding classified documents.

9.1.3. TSCOs:

9.1.4. When a record must be kept of destroyed Secret and Confidential materials, holders choose from:

9.1.5. Base Communications Center (BCC) personnel destroy classified residue by-products as they would classified waste.

9.1.6. Stand-alone and remote communications systems use the same procedures as BCCs.

Chapter 10


10.1. Initial Training. Security managers or supervisors provide initial training.

10.2. Recurring Training.

10.2.1. Supervisors:

10.3. Foreign Travel Briefings.

10.3.1. Unit commanders and staff agency chiefs appoint personnel to conduct foreign travel briefings.

10.3.2. The servicing Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) activity may help unit commanders and staff agency chiefs.

10.3.3. For additional guidance, see AFR 8-5, USAF Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG) and, AFI 31-210, The US Air Force Antiterrorism Program, and AFI 31-501.

10.4. Termination Briefings.

10.4.1. Supervisors or Security Managers:

10.4.2. Refusal to Execute Termination Briefing Statement. When an individual refuses to execute AF form 2587 in the presence of a witness: Supervisors: The ISPM sends AF Form 2587 to 497 IG/INSA. See AFI 31-501 for more information and AFMAN 37-139 for disposition instructions.

10.5. Unit and Staff Agency Security Manager Training. ISPMs set up training programs for security managers to ensure that they understand their security responsibilities.

Chapter 11


11.1. Applying North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Protection Standards. See AFJI 31-404.

Chapter 12


12.1. Special Access Programs. (See AFPD 16-7, Special Access Programs.) The Office of the Deputy for Security and Investigative Programs (SAF/AAZ) administers special access programs for the Air Force. EXCEPTION: HQ USAF/IN controls SCI programs.

12.2. Code Words and Nicknames. Unit commanders or acquisition system program directors:

Chapter 13


13.1. Request for Waivers.

13.1.1. Commanders send requests to waive provisions of DOD 5200.1-R and AFPD 31-4, Information Security Program, through MAJCOM or DRU channels, to HQ USAF/SPI.

13.1.2. FOAs send requests through their functional secretariat or air staff chief.

13.2. Field Program Management. The ISPM (See paragraph 1.1.6.) manages information, personnel, and industrial security programs for the activities they serve. ISPMs:

13.3. Appointing Security Managers. Unit commanders or staff agency chiefs:
13.4. Semiannual Security Inspections. Unit commanders and staff agency chiefs ensure that personnel conduct semiannual security self-inspections to evaluate information, personnel, and industrial security program effectiveness. EXCEPTION: Activities with a small volume of classified material may work with the ISPM to conduct inspections annually.

13.5. Management Information System (MIS) Reporting.

13.5.1. AFPD 31-4 requires that all activities, send measurement data, through channels, to HQ USAF/SPI via RCS: HAF-SPI(Q)9222, The Information Security Measurement Report.

13.5.2. Activities report at the end of each fiscal year quarter on the:

13.5.3. Activities categorize each type of violation. Label these as: When a violation falls under two categories (for example, when it qualifies as a breach in transmission and an unauthorized access violation):

Chapter 14


14.1. Violations of Prohibitions.

14.1.1. Military or civilian personnel who are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) may be prosecuted under Article 92(1), UCMJ.

14.1.2. Air Force civilian employees are subject to disciplinary and adverse actions as outlined in AFI 36-704, Discipline and Adverse Actions, or other civilian personnel directives. NOTE: Personnel may deal with serious violations under the provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code.
14.1.3. ISPMs send reports to AFSPA/CC when someone knowingly, willfully, or negligently discloses classified information to unauthorized individuals as specified in Executive Order 12356, National Security Information, 2 Apr 82.

14.1.4. Air Force commanders and staff agency chiefs report unauthorized disclosures of classified information that violate criminal statutes to their servicing AFOSI office.

Chapter 15


15.1. Program Implementation. DoDD 5210.83 gives policy guidance for DoD UCNI. This chapter gives procedures for implementing that DoDD and supplemental policies within the Air Force.
15.2. Purpose. The DoD UCNI directive establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for identifying, controlling, and limiting the dissemination of unclassified information on the physical protection of DoD special nuclear material (SNM), equipment, and facilities.

15.3. Responsibility:

15.3.1. The Chief of Security Police (HQ USAF/SP) implements this directive within the Air Force.

15.3.2. Personnel authorized to identify and deny release of DoD UCNI are: UCNI Approving Officials:
Chief of Security Police

ADP Automatic Data Processing
AF Air Force
AFI Air Force Instruction
AFMAN Air Force Manual
AFOSI Air Force Office of Special Investigations
AFPD Air Force Policy Directive
AFR Air Force Regulation
AFSPA Air Force Security Police Agency
AFTO Air Force Technical Order
ASCAS Automated Security Clearance Approval System
BCC Base Communications Center
BITC Base Information Transfer Center
CONUS Continental United States
DCS Defense Courier Service
DoD Department of Defense
DoDD DoD Directive
DoDDAC DoD Damage Assessment Committee
DoDI DoD Instruction
DoE Department of Energy
DRU Direct Reporting Unit
FOA Field Operating Agency
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
FRD Formerly Restricted Data
GAO General Accounting Office
GSA General Services Administration
HQ AFISA Headquarters Air Force Intelligence Support Agency
HQ USAF Headquarters United States Air Force
IAW In Accordance With
IFF Identification, Friend, or Foe
ISPM Information Security Program Manager
LIMDIS Limited Dissemination
MAJCOM Major Command
MILHDBK Military Handbook
MIS Management Information System
NAC National Agency Check
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NdA Nondisclosure Agreement
NOFORN Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
OCA Original Classification Authority
RD Restricted Data
SAF Secretary of the Air Force
SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information
SF Standard Form
SNM Special Nuclear Material
TDY Temporary Duty
TSCM Technical Surveillance Countermeasures
TSCO Top Secret Control Officer
UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice
UNCI Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
USPS United States Postal Service
WWMCCS Worldwide Military Command and Control System