*USFK Regulation 525-13



APO AP 96205-0010

USFK Regulation

No. 525-13

Military Operations


SUPPLEMENTATION. Issue of further supplements to this regulation by subordinate commands is prohibited unless prior approval is obtained from HQ USFK, ATTN: FKPM-S, APO AP 96205-0010.

1. PURPOSE. To establish Commander, United States Forces, Korea force protection policies, procedures, standards, and assigns responsibilities for the (USFK) Force Protection Program. Contents include DOD directed terrorist THREATCON terminology in addition to newly incorporated maritime and aviation related security measures, procedures and, definitions, travel security policy, and a standard installation anti-terrorism survey checklist. It provides --

a. Command and staff responsibilities for the protection of service members, civilian employees, family members, contract personnel, and USFK facilities/assets from any incident that threatens security (e.g., terrorist attacks, civil disturbances, labor unrest, etc.).

b. Procedures for responding to a heightened threat against USFK personnel, property or facilities to include escalating security measures during transition from armistice to hostilities.

c. Joint service planning guidance for the centralized interagency management and decentralized execution of the physical security, law enforcement, combating terrorism, personal protection, operations security, and intelligence components of force protection.

2. APPLICABILITY. This regulation applies to the United States Forces, Korea area of responsibility, all USFK installations, property, facilities, organizations, units, activities, agencies, visitors, and guests on USFK installations, and to all personnel assigned or attached to USFK.

3. REFERENCES. Required and related publications are listed in appendix A.

4. EXPLANATION OF SPECIAL TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS. Special terms and abbreviations used in this regulation are explained in the glossary.


*This regulation supersedes USFK Reg 525-13, 11 December 1989.


a. The Assistant Chief of Staff (ACofS), J1 has staff responsibility for--

(1) Ensuring force protection policies and procedures are incorporated in personnel and travel guidance, to include policies governing the permanent departure and temporary duty of USFK personnel to designated high and potential threat countries.

(2) Ensure service components establish procedures to ensure personnel designated for high risk billet are programmed to attend the Individual Terrorism Awareness Course or an equivalent prior to reporting to such designated positions.

(3) Serving as a member or providing a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

b. The Assistant Chief of Staff (ACofS), J2 has staff responsibility for--

(1) Developing policies, plans, and procedures for collecting, analyzing, reporting, and disseminating information on international and domestic threats to the command.

(2) Maintaining a full-time capability to conduct counterintelligence activities to collect, analyze and report time-sensitive information concerning terrorist activities and threats against USFK installations, personnel, and facilities. This capability includes proper liaison and intelligence information sharing with host nation, U.S., and DOD intelligence agencies.

(3) Including terrorist threat information in briefings on subversion and espionage directed against the USFK.

(4) Serving as a member or providing a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

c. The Assistant Chief of Staff (ACofS), J3 has staff responsibility for--

(1) Chairing the Force Protection Executive Council

(2) Appointing a Force Protection Officer, United States Forces, Korea to provide staff supervision of the force protection program.

(3) Developing policies and procedures for force protection which includes measures to deter, defend against, and counter any threat directed towards USFK personnel, installations, facilities and other assets. Force protection measures will include the requisite organizational equipment, training, and leadership needed to provide Special Reaction Team (SRT)/Emergency Service Team (EST) support to subordinate installations, facilities, and activities.

(4) Ensuring force protection measures comply with international and host nation laws and Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs). Coordinate plans with host nation and U.S. agencies such as the Department of State. Where practical, involve host nation intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies.

(5) In coordination with the Force Protection Executive Council (app B), assess and recommend threat conditions (THREATCONs) to the CofS, USFK. THREATCONs are described in appendix I.

(6) Present force protection requirements to the service components for consideration of inclusion in their respective programs and budgets. The Force Protection Executive Council will assist in this responsibility (app B).

d. The AcofS, J-4, has staff responsibility for--

(1) Providing logistical support in accordance with (IAW) current joint regulations and directives.

(2) Developing and coordinating logistics policies and plans in support of the USFK Force Protection Program.

(3) Serving as a member or providing a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

e. The AcofS, J-5, has staff responsibility for--

(1) Serving as a member or providing a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

(2) Ensuring that all deliberate plans incorporate force protection tasks and responsibilities.

(3) Synchronizing all deliberate plans to ensure they are mutually supportive of the USFK Force Protection Program.

(4) Coordinate force protection policies with CFC staff and review force protection measures to ensure they are in compliance with Status of Forces Agreements.

f. The ACofS, Engineer (FKEN), has staff responsibility for--

(1) Developing and disseminating protective design criteria and standards for USFK facilities.

(2) The security engineering aspects for force protection. In conjunction with the USFK Provost Marshal and service component engineers, the ACofS, Engineer, will exercise staff supervision over planning, programming, and management of force protection projects throughout the command and recommend security engineering techniques to deter or reduce the impact of potential terrorist attacks.

(3) Providing training for installation level planners focused on structural measures appropriate for potential terrorist tactics, weapons, tools, and explosives.

(4) Assisting subordinate/installation commanders in conducting physical security and force protection assessments.

(5) Serving as a member or providing a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

g. The AcofS, Resource Management (FKRM), has staff responsibility for --

(1) Coordinate with the Eighth United States Army, Resource Management (EUSA, RM), United States Air Forces, Korea (USAFK), and United States Naval Forces, Korea (USNFK) to determine component availability for their respective portion of force protection budget.

(2) Serving as a member or providing a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

h. The USFK PM has special staff responsibility for--

(1) Co-chairing the FPEC along with the Dep, ACofS J3, when the ACofS J3 is not present (see app B).

(2) Physical security, crime prevention, law enforcement components of force protection including planning, resourcing and conducting training and exercises.

(3) Providing 24-hour command-wide information services through the operation of the Joint Police Information Center (JPIC) at 738-8070/3688 and the Travel Information Program Line (TIPLINE) at 723-0115.

(4) Formulating and disseminating Force Protection advisories as necessary.

(5) Programming and budgeting for law enforcement equipment, training, and supplies.

(6) Appoint an officer to serve as the command’s antiterrorism officer responsible for all USFK antiterrorism matters.

i. The Commander, 19th Military Police Detachment (CID) has staff responsibility for--

(1) Collecting, evaluating, and disseminating to affected USFK staff and component commanders criminal and terrorist related criminal information within the provisions of applicable statutes and regulations.

(2) In cooperation with other U.S. Government and host nation agencies, investigating terrorist incidents on USFK installations and hostile acts directed against USFK personnel or facilities.

(3) Providing trained hostage negotiators to support the USFK force protection program.

(4) Providing personal security vulnerability assessments (PSVAs) for high risk personnel and their quarters/workplaces. Planning and coordinating personal protective services for designated personnel as directed.

(5) Conducting resident personal protection training for USFK personnel assigned to high risk billets.

(6) Ensuring the appropriate liaison between U.S. Government agencies, and the host nation police and security agencies.

(7) Serving as a member or providing a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

j. The USFK Judge Advocate (FKJA) has staff responsibility for--

(1) Providing legal advice regarding U.S. policies, foreign and international law, SOFAs, and other host nation or interagency agreements affecting USFK security.

(2) Serving as a member or providing a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

k. The USFK Public Affairs Officer (FKPA) has staff responsibility for--

(1) Ensuring all official information pertaining to matters of force protection originate from a single source and, in coordination with the ACofS, J-3, serves as the sole spokesperson for the commander. The PAO remains the sole spokesperson for the command unless responsibility is officially transferred to another Federal agency such as the Department of State or host nation security forces.

(2) Providing public affairs guidance and managing responses to queries seeking information concerning specific defensive measures in combating terrorism and force protection programs.

(3) Serving as the initial release authority for an incident or disturbance occurring on a USFK installation. During the course of an incident, USFK personnel are not authorized to comment on or speculate about possible U.S. reaction to an act of terrorism.

(4) Ensuring all public media requests to interview, film photograph, or record special operation forces (SOF) or other counter terrorism forces are processed through proper channels to the USSOCOM PA for approval.

(5) Serving as a member or providing a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

l. The Commander, USAFK, has responsibility for--

(1) Appointing a USAFK representative for all matters concerning force protection as they pertain to USAF personnel, installations, and assets.

(2) Service component responsibility for all USAFK force protection matters, including monitoring training and exercises.

(3) Ensuring all USAFK force protection actions and programs are coordinated with the USFK PM.

(4) Serving as a member or providing a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

m. The Commander, USNFK, has responsibility for--

(1) Appointing a USNFK representative for all matters concerning force protection as they pertain to United States Navy (USN) personnel, installations, and assets.

(2) Service component responsibility for all USN force protection matters, including monitoring of training exercises.

(3) Ensuring all USN force protection actions and programs are coordinated with the USFK PM.

(4) Serving as a member or providing a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

n. The, Commander, U.S. Marine Forces, Korea (COMUSMARFORK), has responsibility for-

(1) Appointing a COMUSMARFORK representative for all matters concerning force protection as they pertain to United States Maine Corps (USMC) personnel, installations, and assets.

(2) Service component responsibility for all USMC force protection matters, including monitoring of training exercises.

(3) Ensuring all USMC force protection actions and programs are coordinated with the USFK PM.

(4) Serving as a member or providing a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

o. The Commander, Special Operations Command, Korea (SOCKOR) has responsibility for--

(1) Appointing a SOCKOR representative for all matters concerning force protection, as they pertain to SOF personnel and assets.

(2) Component responsibility for all SOCKOR force protection matters, including monitoring of training exercises.

(3) Serving as a member or providing a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

p. Major subordinate commanders will ensure that installation commanders within their command--

(1) Coordinate with military intelligence, the police, and security agencies in developing a continuing assessment of the threats to individuals and property within their geographical areas of responsibility.

(2) Maintain close liaison with appropriate Republic of Korea (ROK) agencies, through U.S. military intelligence and police organizations, to keep abreast of the local threat situation and plan appropriate responses.

(3) Incorporate installation physical security initiatives into the Command Priority List. These initiatives should support; the reduction of installation/facility vulnerabilities in a manner that deters threat, reduce physical security program costs, and instill a level of confidence in the commander’s ability to protect personnel and assets.

(4) Identify high-risk personnel (HRP); provide them and their families with periodic briefings on current threats and precautions and harden their quarters and offices IAW appendix C.

(5) Establish and effective security awareness program to provide threat information and hostage survival techniques IAW appendix D. Inform newly assigned personnel of the local threat and recommended defensive precautions.

(6) Ensure that service component security and counter-intelligence training includes the nature of the terrorist threat, vulnerabilities of military personnel and their dependents to terrorist acts, and defensive measures to take against such acts.

(7) Identify facilities most likely to be targets of terrorist attacks. Take appropriate actions to harden these facilities and defend them during periods of increased threat IAW appendix E.

(8) Establish and maintain control of access to their facilities IAW appendix F and appropriate USFK and service component regulations.

(9) Establish installation crisis management plans (ICMP) that provide for swift, effective reaction to terrorist incidents, sabotage, or other major disruptions IAW appendix G. Ensure that ICMP include execution tasking for terrorist threat conditions (THREATCON).

(10) Coordinate ICMP with local ROK officials and sub-installation commanders. Provide copies of plans to the USFK, Provost Marshal, ATTN: FKPM-S, for U.S. Army -developed plans, to the Chief, 7th Air Force Security Police, for U.S. Air Force-developed plans, or to the Physical Security Officer for USNFK-developed plans.

(11) Train and equip special reaction teams (SRT) for U.S. Army installations and emergency service teams (EST) for U.S. Air Force installations IAW appendix H and as stipulated by service component regulations. These teams provide installation commanders with an enhanced capability to contain and counter any incident that threatens installation or personal security.

(12) Meet and maintain communication standards IAW appendix K.

(13) Plan, program, and budget for force protection programs IAW service component fiscal guidance.

6. CRISIS MANAGEMENT. When an incident occurs or when directed by the ACofS, J-3, a FPEC will be convened. The FPEC will be composed of representatives of selected staff agencies and subordinate commands as stated in appendix B. It functions as an analytical and advisory body to assess incidents, coordinate assistance requested by the installation commander, and recommends to the USFK Commander options available to neutralize or resolve incidents.


a. Installation commanders must notify the Command Center Seoul (723-3030/6000) and the Joint Police Information Center (JPIC) at 738-8070/3688 immediately (by secure communications, if possible) of terrorist incident or other major disruption on their installation. The initial report will conform with voice communication (VOICECOM) operational reporting (OPREP-3) or hard copy OPREP-3 format, including the time and location of the abductors, and an initial assessment. Reports will be rendered through the applicable major subordinate commander where appropriate.

b. The Commander, USFK, reports acts of terrorism and other major disruptions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific Command, identifying the time, location, and current status of the incident. Supplemental messages are transmitted electronically, as required.

The proponent of this regulation is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms), to the Commander, USFK, ATTN: FKJ3, APO AP 96205-0010.



Lieutenant General, USA

Chief of Staff


Lieutenant Colonel, USA

Assistant Adjutant General

14 Appendixes

A. References

B. USFK Force Protection Executive Council

C. High Risk Personnel Security

D. Intelligence

E. Mission Essential/Vulnerable Areas

F. Access Control

G. Operations/Plans/Training

H. Special Reaction/Emergency Service Teams

I. Threat Conditions (THREATCONs)

J. Not used.

K. Communications

L. Shipboard THREATCON Measures

M. Aviation Facilities THREATCON Measures

N. Antiterrorism Checklist





50 - FKPM

20 - FKJ3



AFI 31-201 (Hostage Management and EST Operations).

AFI 31-209 (USAF Resources Protection Program).

AFI 31-101v1 (Physical Security Program).

AFI 31-209 (Enforcement of Order at Air Force Installations, Control of Civil disturbances, Support of Disaster Relief Operations, and Special Considerations for Overseas Areas).

AFI 31-210 (USAF Antiterrorism Program).

AR 190-10 (Threats to the President and other Government Officials Reporting Requirements).

AR 190-11 (Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives).

AR 190-13 (The Army Physical Security Program).

AR 190-14 (Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties).

AR 190-16 (Physical Security).

AR 190-51 (Security of Army Property at Unit and Installation Level).

AR 190-56 (The Army Civilian Police and Security Guard Program).

AR 190-58 (Personal Security).

AR 500-50 (Civil Disturbances).

AR 525-13 (The Army Combating Terrorism Program).

AR 530-1 (Operations Security (OPSEC)).

CNFINST 5000.3H (Staff Organization and Regulation Manual).

CNFKINST 5510.8B (Security During Readiness and Defense Conditions).

DOD Directive 2000.12 (Protection of DOD Personnel and Resources Against Terrorist Acts).

DOD Directive 5200.8 (Security of Military Installations and Resources).

FC 19-152 (Special Reaction Teams Operational).

FM 19-30 (Physical Security).

MCO 3302.1A (Combating Terrorism).

MCO 5500.13 (Physical Security).

OPNAVINST 5530.15 (Physical Security).

SECNAVINST 3850.2F (Protection of Department of the Navy Personnel Abroad Against Terrorist Acts).

TC 19-16 (Countering Terrorism on US Army Installations).

USCINCPACINST 3850.2F (Protection of DOD Personal and Resources Against Terrorism).

USFK Memo 10-1 (Organization and Functions -- US Forces Korea).

USFK Pam 190-2 (Operation Safeguard).

USFK Reg 525-1 (USFK Combating Terrorism Program).

USFK Reg 550-6 (Civil Disturbances) (C).

USFK Reg 690-22 (Korean Employees -- Handling Disruptive Labor Actions).

USMC Order 3302.1A (Combating Terrorism).



B-1. PURPOSE. To establish the USFK Force Protection Executive Council (FPEC) for facilitating coordination of force protection programs and initiatives. The FPEC will review the status of USFK Force Protection programs, develop policies and initiatives, prioritize the funding of force protection projects, and make recommendations to the USFK Command Group.


a. ACofS, J-1, will serve as a member or provide a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

b. ACofS, J-2, will--

(1) Serve as a member or provide a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

(2) Provide current classified and unclassified versions of the theater threat assessment to the FPEC.

c. ACofS, J-3--

(1) Has overall staff responsibility for force protection.

(2) Acts as chairman of the FPEC or assigns the responsibility to the Deputy, ACofS, J-3.

(3) Ensures FPEC issues are fully coordinated among the USFK staff.

(4) Convenes the FPEC on a quarterly basis or more frequently as the threat situation requires, provides work space, and provides administrative support when required. Collocates the FPEC with the CAT at CC Seoul when the CAT is activated to facilitate interaction and coordination between staff counterparts on the CAT and FPEC. The FPEC will work closely with the CAT during transition from armistice to hostilities to ensure necessary force protection measures are taken commensurate with the established THREATCON and that all available intelligence/information is collected, analyzed, and disseminated appropriately.

d. ACofS, J-4, will serve as a member or provide a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

e. ACofS, J-5, will serve as a member or provide a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

f. ACofS, J-6, will serve as a member or provide a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

g. USFK, PM will--

(1) Serve as Deputy, Chairman of the FPEC and co-chair the FPEC with the Deputy, ACofS, J-3 when the ACofS, J-3 is not present.

(2) The Chief, Security Division will serve as the secretary of the FPEC, principal action officer for the FPEC and provide administrative support, as required, to assist the chairman and co-chairs of the FPEC.

h. ACofS, Engineer, will serve as a member or provide a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

i. ACofS, Resource Management, will--

(1) Serve as a member or provide a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

(2) Advise on resource management aspects of plans and programs to include potential impact on other missions.

(3) Provide advice on budgeting and sources of funds for force protection initiatives.

j. Commander, 19th Military Police Detachment (CID), will serve as a member or provide a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

k. Commander, USAFK, will serve as a member or provide a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

l. Commander, USNFK, will serve as a member or provide a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

m. Commander, MARFOR-K, will serve as a member or provide a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

n. Commander, SOC-K, will serve as a member or provide a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

o. USFK, PA will serve as a member or provide a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

p. USFK, JA will serve as a member or provide a senior representative as a member of the FPEC.

q. Secretary of the Joint Staff will relay matters of command interest related to force protection to the FPEC for resolution or referral to the appropriate staff agency.

r. Each FPEC member will--

(1) Have, at a minimum, a SECRET security clearance.

(2) Maintain a current roster of key personnel in their functional area of responsibility, to include counterparts in subordinate, lateral, and higher headquarters.

s. All staff agencies to be represented on the FPEC will identify primary and alternate members to ensure representation on a continuous basis.


a. The FPEC will meet at least quarterly at a place and time specified by the Chairman of the FPEC. The USFK, Chief of Staff, or the ACofS, J-3, will convene the FPEC as deemed necessary to address specific issues. During periods of increased threat, when an incident occurs, or when directed by the ACofS, J-3, the FPEC will convene. The FPEC will be composed of representatives of selected staff agencies and subordinate commands as stated in appendix B. It functions as an analytical and advisory body to assess incidents, coordinate assistance requested by the installation commander, and recommends to the USFK Commander options available to neutralize or resolve incidents. During transition from armistice to hostilities or as directed by the ACofS, J3, the FPEC will co-locate with the CAT at CC Seoul and interface with CAT counterparts to share intelligence/ information, coordinate issues, analyze and assesses ongoing force protection requirements, and make recommendations on the THREATCON and related security issues.

b. Additionally, the FPEC will provide oversight and guidance on the following force protection matters:

(1) Adequacy of current plans and programs on combating terrorism, antiterrorism, counter terrorism, physical security, and resource protection.

(2) Required manpower and dollar resources required to protect personnel, equipment, and facilities.

(3) Construction projects necessary to increase the security of bases and installations.

(4) State-of -the-art surveillance, intrusion detection, and other equipment to enhance the security of bases and installations or comply with regulations.

(5) Communications equipment necessary to provide an effective crisis management system and combating terrorism program throughout USFK.

(6) Prioritization of USFK force protection projects which require funding or additional manpower.

c. Outgoing messages or correspondence which might impact on USFK-wide force protection programs will be coordinated by the staff agency’s FPEC representative with the Chairman of the FPEC. (The Chairman of the FPEC may delegate this responsibility to the Deputy, Chairman of the FPEC). The Chairman of the FPEC will review the correspondence and concur, provide guidance, or bring the issue before the FPEC.

d. Any staff agency receiving correspondence concerning force protection issues which are not clearly the exclusive responsibility of that agency will refer the matter to the Chairman of the FPEC. The Chairman may bring the issue before the FPEC; assign a lead agency to prepare a reply for the ACofS, J-3 or refer the issue to a specific staff agency, if it is not considered an issued for the FPEC.

B-4. PROCEDURES. When structuring programs for the budgeting process, the FPEC will accomplish the following:

a. List requirements in the desired priority of funding within these categories:

(1) Training.

(2) Intelligence.

(3) Physical security.

(4) Personnel protection.

(5) Manning.

(6) Equipment.

(7) Other combating terrorism or physical security enhancements.

b. Identify projects by appropriation.

c. Ensure programs are executable in the fiscal year requested.

d. Identify the type of intrusion detection system (IDS) required, indicate funding to be used for installation and maintenance, and determine priority of funding.

e. Project TDY costs for student attendance at combating terrorism training courses and the cost of mobile training team support of combating terrorism training.

f. Identify requirements for vehicles, information systems, and training ammunition to support combating terrorism programs (to the program element of detail).




NORMAL 1. Installation Commanders will designate, in writing, who on the installation are high risk personnel (HRP).

2. A personal security vulnerability assessment (PSVA) on all HRP and their family members will be conducted upon arrival at the installation, and, as a minimum, annually thereafter. PSVA’s should be updated if the HRP changes duties or offices, has major renovation of his quarters, or if a specific threat is received.  Surveys will include, a minimum, procedures/measures employed at their quarters, offices, and work areas plus any identifiable routines.

3. Threat awareness briefing to family members of HRP should be conducted upon arrival at the installation and annually thereafter.

4. HRP itineraries will be FOUO. Itineraries for General/Flag Officers and GS-16 and above civilian personnel traveling to designated high risk areas will be classified CONFIDENTIAL.

5. Two contingency folders/personal packets on each HRP and his family will be prepared within 60 days of their arrival at the installation. Packets will be maintained separately, preferably one in the HRP office and the other one at the local security office.  Packets will be updated annually, unless required sooner and include, as a minimum, the following data:

a. Names, ages, and descriptions of family members.

b. Recent photographs of family members.  Photographs of aides, drivers, and domestic helpers are encouraged.

c. Information concerning family hobbies, activities and social activities, and foreign language capabilities.

d. Information concerning schools that family member(s) attend such as name, address, phone number, and teacher(s).

e. Names, addresses, and phone numbers of close relatives.

f. Names, addresses, and phone numbers of family doctors. Special medical problems and medicines should be identified.

g. Family crisis plan will include:

(1) Special alert/duress codes.

(2) Use of safe havens.

(3) Emergency escape routes.

(4) Location of wills, insurance policies, and bank accounts.

(5) Key telephone numbers.

h. Use of a videotape to record interior layout of HRP offices and quarters is encouraged. If not practical, photographs should be taken. Blueprints of quarters and offices should be included.

6. All on-post/base quarters, transient VIP quarters, and offices of HRP will be hardened (i.e., security measures will be applied to a degree that ensures maximum protection is provided, if required). While it is recognized that security measures employed will vary based on the wide disparity in types of quarters and offices, the following minimum standards will be met:

Quarters, offices, and transient VIP quarters.

(a) Doors:

(1) All entrance doors, including doors leading off the garage into the resident, will be either metal or solid core construction.

(2) A 120 degrees peep-hole or interview grill will be installed on all wood and metal entrance.

(3) Door frames on entrance doors will provide adequate resistance to forced entry.

(4) Door hinges on entrance doors will be heavy-duty and reinforced with non removable hinge pins and metal door pins.

(b) Windows.

(1) Windows will be properly installed, protected with adequate locking devices and designed to serve as a fire escape route, if applicable.

(2) All windows will have shades or Mylar security glazing.

(3) Windows installed within an arms reach of entrance door locking devices will be protected with decorative grills or bars.

(c) Miscellaneous entrances. Openings such as vents, fan enclosures, coal delivery chutes, mail chutes, and ones created by dismounting air conditioning units will be secured in such a manner to prevent intruders firm reaching through, using a tool to manipulate a lock, or crawling through.

(d) Locking Devices.

(1) Flush-type entrance doors will be protected using a mortised pin/tumbler lock assembly with a guard latch and an auxiliary keyless vertical dead bolt, installed with no less than 10 inches of vertical separation. The pin/tumbler lock will contain a minimum of five pins, and the bolt of each will be 1 inch long with a hardened steel core. (2) French-type entrance doors will be protected with a primary and auxiliary locking mechanism as described in a above. In addition, one of the two doors will be securely bolted, top and bottom, with keyless slide bolts or latches mounted within several inches of the seam between the doors in order for them to engaged the upper part of the door framed and the floor or doorsill.

(3) Sliding glass entrance doors will be secured by a lock assembly with a double cylinder and a vertical bolt along with an auxiliary vertical dead bolt. When the frame is inadequate to commodate these locking mechanisms, alternate locking assemblies will be utilized. There doors will also be secured with a charley bar and two sheet metal screws in the door’s track (directly over the door when it is in the closed position to prevent vertical movement).

(4) Dutch-type entrance doors (without glass panels) will have the doors protected by a mortised pin/tumbler lock and an auxiliary keyless vertical dead bolt. The bolt used to secure the door in which no lock is installed will be an auxiliary/keyless vertical dead bolt.

(5) Dutch-type entrance doors (with glass panels), will be secured in the same manner as Ditch doors without glass panels except all locking devices will be key operated.

(6) Double-hung and sliding glass windows will be protected by a key-operated lock, operable from the inside only, and a keyless latch.

(7) Jalousie, awning, hopper, and casement windows will be protected by a keyless latch.

(8) All locking mechanisms/systems utilized will meet safety/fire codes.

(9) All dead bolts will protrude into the jamb at least 1 inch, be square ended, and be of hardened steel.

(10) Jimmy plates will be utilized where appropriate.

(11) Padlocks used to provide security protection to critical areas will meet the following, as a minimum:

- A heavy shackle at least 9/32-inch hardened steel.

- A double locking mechanism that locks both the heel and toe.

- A minimum of five pin tumblers on tumbler locks.

(e) Intrusion detection. The use of an intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect unauthorized tampering and entry will be considered. However, body alarms duress alarms) will be available and issued when deemed necessary.

(f) Interior rooms. An interior room of the office and quarters will be identified for use as a safe haven. It will contain a means of communication to the MP/SP station. This could be a telephone or a duress system.

(g) Key-operated padlock. All water and gas utility shut-off valves, and electrical distribution boxes located outside the quarters will be secured with a key-operated padlock.

(h) Fire protection systems. A fire protection system will be installed and maintained.

(i) Lighting.

(1) Residence perimeter and driveway approaches will be illuminated to the degree that eliminates shadows and provides even transitional lighting between critical and dark areas. It will not be a glare hazard to persons in the residence or to vehicles in the driveway.

(2) Security lighting will be designed to expose low contrast targets that are only visible for a few seconds. Lighting must provide a minimum level of 2.0 feet candles horizontal llumination measured at 6 inches above the ground.

(3) Sodium vapor and quartz lamps will be utilized for security lighting. The circuits will be installed in such a manner that the loss of one lamp will not leave a totally dark area.

(4) Switches will be located inside the residence. Outside lighting may be controlled by staggered timing circuits or photo cells; however, interior switches will override external systems.

(j) Clear zones. Clear zones will be maintained around all shrubbery to prevent concealment.

(k) Door openers. Garages that are attached to the residence will be equipped with an electric (remote control) door opener.

(l) HRP/VIP offices/quarters offices and quarters of HRP/VIP that are in open view from the installation boundary (fence line) will be shielded from view by construction/attachment of material or shrubbery that restricts the visibility.

7. Installations will identify and train, in advance, the necessary number of personnel to perform personal security missions on HRP when deemed necessary. Coordination with USACIDC or AFOSI field offices will be conducted to receive technical assistance and guidance. Credentials for full-time U.S. Army protective service agents are authorized and issued IAW AR 190-58. Only full-time agents will be issued credentials.

8. When the threat merits such action, installation commanders will procure armored vehicles for use by HRP.

9. HRP drivers will be trained in evasive driving techniques and small arms marksmanship and receive periodic refresher training.


1. Brief HRP of threat.

2. Establish random security checks of quarters and offices by local law enforcement agency.


1. Discontinue use of general officer flags and star plates.

2. Minimize extracurricular activities.

3. Vary routes of movement and avoid routines.

4. Personal Security Detail (PSD) alerted and briefed.


1. Protective vest worn by HRP.

2. ARM aide and drivers.

3. Employ PSD during all off-post/base travel.

4. Issue duress alarms.

5. Discontinue parking in reserved spaces.

6. Remove name signs from quarters.


1. Secure HRP family.

2. Employ armed guards on quarters.





1. Installation Threat Statements will be prepared annually and updated as deemed necessary. Two copies of the threat statement will be forwarded to HQ, USFK, ATTN: FKJ2-IS-CI, NLT 30 Jun.

2. Installation intelligence office and PMO/CSP will receive, review, and maintain, as necessary/required, the following documents:

a. DIA Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summaries (DITS).

b. USFK J-2 Terrorism/Internal Threat Summaries.

c. USFK Force Protection Advisories.

d. U.S. Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Center’s (ITAC):

(1) Monthly International Terrorism Summary (MITS).

(2) Threat Advisories.

e. U.S. Army Force Protection Messages.

f. The 501st MI Brigade Intelligence Information Reports (IIR) (as appropriate).

g. AFOSI Counterintelligence Collection reports (as appropriate).

h. Navy Anti-Terrorist Alert Center Messages.

3. All personnel traveling to high threat areas on leave, TDY, or permanent change of station will receive an area-specific threat briefing.

4. Installation intelligence officers will collect and analyze information concerning local elements that pose a direct threat to USFK. All sources of US and host nation law enforcement and intelligence information must be exploited.

5. Identify one person on the installation staff as the installation terrorism intelligence officer to serve as the primary Point of Contact regarding all terrorist intelligence information. Notify, HQ, USFK, ATTN: FKJ2-IS-CI, of the individual’s name, position, and AUTOVON number.

6. A semiannual terrorist threat briefing will be given to all commanders and key staff personnel.


1. Increase intelligence coordination, collection, analysis, and DELTA dissemination efforts.

2. Brief key personnel on threat.




NORMAL 1. Installation commanders will identify, in writing, and put in priority of security and resourcing all mission essential and vulnerable areas on the installation. Top priority will be given to automatic data processing facilities, power sources, command and control facilities, ammo storage areas, weapons storage areas, and POL storage areas/facilities.

2. Installation commanders will ensure all MEVAs are given a physical security inspection (PSI) IAW service component directives. All PSIs conducted will include antiterrorism considerations/requirements.

3. All required physical security measures/procedures concerning the MEVAs will be accomplished.

4. During the design phase of new MEVA construction, Master Planning Boards will ensure the following antiterrorism-related physical security measures are considered for incorporation consistent with the anticipated threat:

a. Protective barriers.

b. Security lighting.

c. Intrusion detection systems (IDS).

d. Lock and key systems.

e. Protective stand-off distances.

f. Access control procedures (vehicle and pedestrian).

g. Vehicle parking design.

h. Closed circuit television (CCTV).


1. Review all SOPs, plans, procedures and previous PSIs governing the security of all MEVAs to determine if the security measures in effect are adequate.

2. Secure and periodically check those MEVAs not in regular use.


1. Conduct a 100 percent ID check at all controlled- access Facilities/MEVAs.

2. Increase security checks during non-duty hours of all MEVAs.


1. Inspect all suspicious packages, mail, and material.

2. Increase security of intra-installation movement of weapons and ammunition.


1. Man all required security posts.

2. Restrict access to the MEVAs, as applicable. (Close area to unauthorized personnel).

3. Terminate shipment of weapons and ammunition.





1. IAW USFK Reg 190-7, installation commanders will develop and maintain policies and procedures to control installation access. Policies and procedures will include rules governing the entry into and exit from the installation and the search of persons and their possessions.

2. IAW appendix G, installation commanders will develop a plan for increasing vigilance and restricting access. The plan will be put into action in the event of --

a. A national emergency.

b. A disaster.

c. A terrorist threat.

d. A criminal action.

e. A civil disturbance.

f. Other contingency that would seriously affect the ability of the installation to perform its mission.

3. At main vehicular entry points/gates, adequate barrier material will be available to slow/stop and deny entry to the installation cantonment area. Stop and deny barriers will be designed to stop a 3/4-ton vehicle, weighing 6,000 lbs and traveling at 30 mph.

4. At secondary entry points/gates barrier materiel must be available to stop and deny entry to the installation cantonment area. Barriers will be designed to stop a 3/4-ton vehicle, weighing 6,000 lbs and traveling at 30 mph.

5. As a minimum, installation cantonment areas and those mission essential/vulnerable activities located outside cantonment areas such as ammunition supply points, airfields, and POL facilities will be fenced.  When cantonment area fences are determined by the installation commander to be impractical, illegal, or cost-prohibitive, a request for exception to policy will be submitted with full justification to HQ USFK, ATTN: FKPM-S.


a. Barrier materiel may be fixed or portable.  Fixed barriers will not be designed to present a “fortress” appearance.

b. Types and design of barriers employed may vary based on the wide disparity in the physical design of installation access points.


1. Spot check vehicles and randomly check identification of personnel entering the installation.

2. Increase security checks at secondary entry points/ gates.

3. Prepare to emplace necessary barrier materiel.


1. Increase the security at main entry points/gates to the cantonment area.

2. Increase spot checks of vehicles.


1. Reroute all delivery vehicles through separate access points and search each vehicle.

2. Close secondary entry points/gates.

3. Emplace barriers to slow all vehicles entering cantonment area at main entry points/gates.


1. Emplace barrier materiel necessary to restrict/deny access to cantonment area.

2. Search all vehicles and materiel entering cantonment area.

3. Verify identification of all personnel entering the installation. Allow only those personnel authorized entry to the installation. Suspicious personnel with valid ID cards will be required to produce other ID.

4. Establish secondary positions 50 meters inside main entry points/gates to react should main entrance be penetrated.





1. Installation commanders will establish Operations Security (OPSEC) programs which will includes, as a minimum:

a. Annual OPSEC analysis, updated as necessary, based on command mission and the hostile intelligence threat.

b. Threat and OPSEC awareness briefings annually or when necessary to maintain requisite levels of proficiency.

c. An OPSEC annex in all applicable orders and plans.

d. OPSEC awareness training during field training exercises.

e. Conducting OPSEC surveys as appropriate.

f. OPSEC briefings during the initial orientation for all newly assigned personnel.

g. OPSEC in the inspection program of their inspectors general.

h. Designating an OPSEC officer within operations or an operations-related staff element down to battalion/squadron-level and, as appropriate, designating OPSEC POCs in other staff elements responsive to the organizational OPSEC office.

2. Installation commanders will publish a written OPSEC plan. One copy of the plan will be rovided to HQ USFK, ATTN: FKPM-S.

3. An installation EOC or other designated facility will be established and will --

a. Be manned by one or more watch personnel 24 hours per day.

b. Maintain the same telephone number during non-duty hours as during duty hours.

4. IAW appropriate service component directives, installation commanders will develop an Installation Crisis Management Plan (ICMP) to facilitate response to any major disruptions on their installation to include bomb threats, civil disturbances, natural disasters, work stoppages, installation closure, and terrorist acts. The plan will --

a. Identify specific duties and responsibilities for key personnel.

b. Ensure individuals with specific duties and responsibilities are aware of their duties.

c. Include the local threat.

d. Define missions to be accomplished.

e. Identify resources available to perform missions, to include implementation of THREATCON measures.

f. Specify who on the installation has the authority to determine the THREATCON level.

g. Identify tenant unit responsibilities.

h. Be coordinated with supporting agencies.

i. Include host nation in contingency planning.

j. Be tested semiannually and reviewed and updated annually or more often as dictated by key personnel turnover. Written after-action reports of tests will be prepared and forwarded to HQ USFK, ATTN: FKPM-S.

k. Involve the installation commander and the staff in the semiannual test.

l. Include notification procedures for each THREATCON for all key personnel.

m. Be flexibly written to correspond with the variety of potential disruptive incidents.

n. Be forwarded to HQ USFK, ATTN: FKPM-S, for review NLT 1 Jun annually.

5. A Crisis Management Team (CMT) will be identified and prepared to operate during increased threat levels.  It will have a clear operational chain of command and will be comprised of special and primary staff personnel.  It will be chaired by the Deputy, Installation Commander (DIC) or Chief of Staff (CofS), if possible.

6. A Threat Management Force (TMF) will be identified for activation at all times. Forces to be identified in the TMF include the initial response force, inner and outer perimeter security element, SRT/EST and negotiation teams. The TMF will be commanded by the on-site commander.

7. Command Center Seoul (723-3029/3030) will be immediately notified upon activation or employment of the SRT/EST. Activations or employments of the SRT/EST for training purposes should not be reported.

8. Include terrorism awareness training in annual security/counterintelligence briefing. This training will include instructions on the nature of the terrorist threat, the vulnerabilities of military personnel and their family members to terrorist acts, and defensive measures that can be employed to deter such acts.

9. Conduct and document training of the CMT in crisis management procedures. Exercise CMT semiannually in conjunction with tests of the ICMP.

10. Conduct and document training for each element of the TMF to maintain proficiency. Exercise semiannually in conjunction with test of the ICMP.

11. The SRT/EST will be exercised quarterly IAW appendix H.

12. It is desirable that a representative from operations, law enforcement/security, and intelligence offices will have attended one of the following courses:

a. Combating Terrorism on Military Installations, U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Ft McClellan, AL.

b. Dynamics of International Terrorism, USAF Special Operations Center, Hurlburt Field, FL.

c. Intelligence in Terrorism Counter-action, U.S.  Army Intelligence Center, Ft Huachucha, AZ.

13. At a minimum, each installation SRT service member will have attended one of the following courses:

 a. Special Reaction Team (SRT) Training Course, USAMPS, Ft McClellan, AL.

b. USFK approved local SRT course that has the same or compatible program of instruction (POI) as subparagraph 6b above.

14. Individuals will be considered SRT qualified if they meet the following conditions:

a. They have successfully completed one of the courses identified in paragraph 13 above.

b. They have been assigned to an SRT position within the previous 2 years.

c. They have successfully passed their respective service physical readiness test within the previous 6 months attaining a score in the 90th percentile.

d. They have qualified expert with their assigned SRT weapon(s) within the previous year.

15. EST members will be trained and certified IAW AFI 31-201.

16. All drivers for designated HRP will have attended an evasive drivers courses.

17. One installation law enforcement agent will be a qualified hostage negotiator.


1. Review ICMP.

2. Reemphasize OPSEC to installation personnel.

3. Test communications equipment in EOC.

4. Place CMT on a 2-hour response.

5. Place TMF on a 2-hour response.

6. Immediately notify Command Center Seoul of any change in the current threat assessment or THREATCON level.


1. Brief CMT members on situation and place on a 1-hour CHARLIE response.

2. Man EOC 24 hours with key staff members from the CMT.

3. Man TMF on a 1-hour response.

4. Submit all requests for support to Command Center Seoul.

5. Same as paragraph 6, THREATCON ALPHA.


1. Convene CMT.

2. EOC manned 24 hours by the CMT.

3. TMF recalled and on standby in assembly area.

4. Same as paragraph 4, THREATCON BRAVO-CHARLIE.

5. Same as paragraph 6, THREATCON ALPHA.





1. Each major installation will have at least one fully trained and qualified SRT/EST, capable of responding to an incident within 2 hours, at all times.

2. SRT will consist of nine MP personnel. Team composition will be --

a. Entry element.

1 - Team Leader (E-6).

1 - Point man (E-4)

2 - Defense men (E-4).

1 - Rear Security (E-4).

b. Cover Element.

2 - Marksmen (E-4).

2 - Observers (E-4).

3. EST will consist of five SP personnel. Team composition will be --

1 - Team Leader (E-6).

2 - Scouts (E-4).

2 - Marksmen (E-4).

4. As a minimum, team weaponry will be US Government issue as prescribed by AR 190-58 and FC 19-152, appendix H, for SRT or AFI 31-201 for EST.

5. As a minimum, team member equipment will be IAW AR 190-58 and FC 19-152, pages 65-67, for SRT or AFI 31-201 for EST.

6. SRT/EST SOPs will be in writing and will cover, as a minimum, the followings:

a. Training.

b. Operational procedures.

c. Use of force.

d. Organization.

e. Equipment.

f. Alert notification procedures for each THREATCON.

7. A test to evaluate SRT/EST responses will be conducted quarterly. As a minimum, it will include an alert, assembly, issue of equipment, operational briefing, practical exercise, and debriefing. Written evaluations will be rendered IAW appropriate service component directives.

8. PM/CSP will conduct an after-action review of all tests, exercises, and missions. As a minimum, it will include a description of the sequence of events, authorization for the call-out, critique of each stage, and identification of strengths and weaknesses.

ALPHA/BRAVO SRT/EST will be briefed and put on a 2-hour response.

CHARLIE SRT/EST will be briefed and put on a 1-hour response.

DELTA SRT/EST will be assembled.



I-1. INTRODUCTION. Information and warnings of terrorist activity against installations and personnel of USFK components and subordinate commands will normally be received from U.S. intelligence or security authorities. Information may also come from local police forces, it may be received directly by a command or an agency as a threat or warning from a terrorist organization, or it may be in the form of an attack on a U.S. installation or on U.S. personnel. THREATCONs are DOD approved terms and definitions describing progressive levels of a terrorist threat to USFK facilities and personnel

I-2. AIM. This appendix outlines common THREATCONs for USFK components and subordinate commands to use in force protection and combating terrorism. Appropriate measures to be implemented during each threat condition and implementation criteria are also included.

I-3. DECLARATION OF TERRORIST THREATCON AND IMPLEMENTATION OF MEASURES. Declaration of a Korea-wide THREATCON remains the responsibility of Commander, USFK. The Chief of Staff, USFK will make the decision to change a THREATCON based on recommendations by Force Protection Executive Council (FPEC). Component commands, subordinate commands, and separate agencies within USFK will be advised by the most expeditious means (through CC-Seoul, JPIC, etc) whenever the THREATCON is changed. This is not intended to infringe upon the responsibility and authority of the on-scene commander to initiate whatever action is deemed appropriate for the security of the command. Subordinate commanders may declare a higher THREATCON for their installations/activities as needed, however, they may not declare a THREATCON level lower than the USFK THREATCON.

I-4. WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION. Local orders will include specific instructions on issuing weapons and live ammunition. These orders must comply with existing USFK policies and regulations.

I-5. THREAT ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES. These guidelines apply only to the assessment of terrorist threat against U.S. or DOD interests. These general guidelines provide for uniform implementation of security alert conditions.

a. Assessment factors are defined as follows:

(1) Existence. Applies when a terrorist group is present in an area of concern. Group need not have posed a threat to U.S. or DOD interest in the past.

(2) Capability. Applies when a terrorist group has the ability to carry out an operation against U.S. interests in areas of concern. This includes resources such as intelligence, mobility, personnel, and so forth.

(3) History. Applies when a group’s history of terrorist acts and behavior reflect an anti-U.S. stand or include previous attacks against U.S. interests.

(4) Trends. Applies if the group has, over the past year, displayed significant terrorist activity that appears to be continuing or increasing. Activity need not have been violent; that is, terrorist attack against U.S. or DOD interests could be rhetorical or threatening utterances or statements. This factor could be flexible I it is apparent that the group’s activity cycle is longer or shorter than one year.

(5) Targeting. Applies is there are known plans or confirmed intentions of a terrorist group to target U.S. or DOD interests. Targeting can be either specific or nonspecific. If targeting is not against U.S. or DOD interests, this factor should not be considered.

b. Combinations of positive answers to questions of applicability of any or all of the above assessment factors, as defined, will produce a threat level of either low, medium, high, or imminent.

(1) Low (THREATCON ALPHA). Factors of existence and capability must be present.

(2) Medium (THREATCON BRAVO). Factors of existence and capability must be present; history or trends should also be present. Current targeting of U.S. or DOD interests will not be present.

(3) High (THREATCON CHARLIE). Factors of existence, capability, trends, and U.S. or DOD targeting (not immediate, nonspecific) must be present. History may also be present.

(4) Imminent (THREATCON DELTA). Factors of group existence, capability, immediate/specific targeting of U.S. or DOD interests, and trends must be present. History is not required but could be present. (Assessment of imminent is rare.)


a. THREATCON NORMAL. Exists when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists and warrants conducting normal or routine force protection measures.

b. THREATCON ALPHA. This condition is declared as a general warning of possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, but circumstances do not warrant full implementation of THREATCON BRAVO. However, it may be necessary to implement selected measures from THREATCON BRAVO.

(1) Measure 1. At regular intervals, remind all personnel, including dependents, to be suspicious and inquisitive about strangers, particularly those carrying suitcases or other containers; alert for unidentified vehicles on, or in the vicinity of, USFK installations; and alert for abandoned parcels or suitcases or any unusual activity.

(2) Measure 2. At all times, keep available the duty security officer, or other appointed personnel who have access to plans for evacuating buildings and areas in use and for sealing off any areas where an explosion or attack has occurred. Keep key personnel who may be needed to implement security plans on call.

(3) Measure 3. Secure buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.

(4) Measure 4. Increase security spot checks of vehicles and persons entering installations and non-classified areas under military jurisdiction.

(5) Measure 5. Limit access points for vehicles and personnel commensurate with a reasonable flow of traffic.

(6) Measure 6. As a deterrent, apply one of the following measures from THREATCON BRAVO individually and randomly.

(a) Secure and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use. (Measure 14)

(b) At the beginning and end of each workday and at other regular and frequent intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious activity or packages. (Measure 15)

(c) Check all deliveries to messes, clubs, and so forth. (Advise dependents to check all home deliveries.) (Measure 17)

(d) As far as resources allow, increase surveillance of domestic accommodations, schools, messes, clubs, and other soft targets to improve deterrence and defense and to build confidence among staff and dependents. (Measure 18)

(7) Measure 7. Review all plans, orders, personnel details, and logistic requirements related to introduction of a higher THREATCON.

(8) Measure 8. Review and implement, as appropriate, security measures for high-risk personnel.

(9) Measure 9. As appropriate, convene the FPEC to review the threat and make recommendations on the THREATCON and appropriate security measures to take.

(10) Measure 10. TBD.

c. THREATCON BRAVO. This condition is declared when there is an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity even though no particular target has been identified. The measures in this THREATCON must be maintained for weeks without causing hardship, affecting operational capability, and aggravating relationships with local authorities.

(1) Measure 11. Repeat Measure 1 and warn personnel of any other potential form of attack to be used by terrorists.

(2) Measure 12. Keep all personnel involved in implementing antiterrorist contingency plans on call.

(3) Measure 13. Check plans for implementation of the measures contained in the next THREATCON.

(4) Measure 14. Where possible, cars and such objects as crates, trash containers, and so forth, are to be moved at least 25 meters from buildings, particularly those buildings of a sensitive or prestigious nature. Consider using centralized parking.

(5) Measure 15. Secure and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.

(6) Measure 16. At the beginning and end of each workday and at other regular and frequent intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious activity or packages.

(7) Measure 17. Examine all mail for letter or parcel bombs. (This examination is increased above normal.)

(8) Measure 18. Check all deliveries to messes, clubs, and so forth. (Advise dependents to check all home deliveries.)

(9) Measure 19. As far as resources allow, increase surveillance of domestic accommodations, schools, messes, clubs, and other soft targets to improve deterrence and defense and to build confidence among staff and dependents.

(10) Measure 20. Make staff and dependents aware of the general situation in order to stop rumors and prevent unnecessary alarm.

(11) Measure 21. At an early stage, inform members of local security committees of any action being taken and why.

(12) Measure 22. Upon entry of visitors to the unit, physically inspect them and a percentage of their suitcases, parcels, and other containers.

(13) Measure 23. Wherever possible, operate random patrols to check vehicles, people, and buildings.

(14) Measure 24. Protect off-base military personnel and military transport in accordance with prepared plans. Remind drivers to lock parked vehicles and to institute a positive system of checking before they enter and drive a car.

(15) Measure 25. Implement additional security measures for high-risk personnel, as appropriate.

(16) Measure 26. Brief personnel who may augment the guard force on the use of deadly force.

(17) Measures 27. As appropriate, convene the FPEC to review the threat and make recommendations on the THREATCON and appropriate security measures to take.

(18) Measure 28-29. TBD.

d. THREATCON CHARLIE. This condition is declared when an incident occurs or when intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action against USFK personnel and facilities is imminent. Implementation of measures in this THREATCON for more than a short period will probably create hardships and effect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.

(1) Measure 30. Continue all THREATCON BRAVO measures or introduce those outstanding.

(2) Measure 31. Keep available at their places of duty all personnel who are responsible for implementing antiterrorist plans.

(3) Measure 32. Limit access points to an absolute minimum.

(4) Measure 33. Strictly enforce control of entry and search a percentage of vehicles.

(5) Measure 34. Enforce centralized parking of vehicles away from sensitive buildings.

(6) Measure 35. Issue weapons to guards. (Local orders should include specific orders on issue of ammunition.)

(7) Measure 36. Introduce increased patrolling of the installation.

(8) Measure 37. Protect all designated vulnerable points (VPS..) and give special attention to VPs. outside military establishments.

(9) Measure 38. Erect barriers and obstacles to control traffic flow.

(10) Measure 39. Consider closing roads and facilities that make the installation more vulnerable to attacks.

(11) Measure 40. TBD.

e. THREATCON DELTA. This condition applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location is likely. Normally, this THREATCON is declared as a localized warning.

(1) Measure 41. Continue or introduce all measures listed for THREATCONs BRAVO and CHARLIE.

(2) Measure 42. Augment guards as necessary.

(3) Measure 43. Identify all vehicles already on the installation within operational or mission support areas.

(4) Measure 44. Search all vehicles and their contents entering the complex or installation.

(5) Measure 45. Control all access and implement positive identification of all personnel.

(6) Measure 46. Search all suitcases, briefcases, packages, and so forth, brought into the complex or installation.

(7) Measure 47. Take measures to control access to all areas under military jurisdiction.

(8) Measure 48. Make frequent checks of the exterior of buildings and of parking areas.

(9) Measure 49. Minimize all administrative journeys and visits.

(10) Measure 50. Consider closing public (and military) roads and facilities that might make installations more vulnerable to terrorist attack.

(11) Measure 51. TBD.


[Not Used]





1. A communications system will be installed at each USFK installation and will:

a. Be located in the EOC/MP/SP station manned 24 hours per day.

b. Have a communications console with a capability to interface with the EOC, MP/SP patrols, also, fire department, ambulance, EOD, engineers, and host nation law enforcement agencies, if possible.

c. Have the capability to interface and control base stations in both coded and clear mode, including capability for manual or automatic phone patch.

d. Have telephone and radio functions which will interface through one headset to provide ease of operation for the dispatcher.

e. Have AC back-up power or DC battery/power for consoles and base stations to support continuous operation for a minimum of 8 hours.

f. Each SRT/EST member will be equipped with a portable radio that has hands-free capability.

2. Installation high risk personnel will have a “call-party-hold” telephone system installed in their office If within the telephone company’s capability.

ALPHA-CHARLIE Conduct communication checks of TMF, CMT, and SRT/EST net.

DELTA Open all CMT nets.



1. Measures outlined below are for use aboard vessels and serve two purposes. First, the crew is alerted, additional watches are created, and security is increased. Second, these measures display the ship's resolve to prepare for and counter the threat. These actions convey to anyone observing the ship's activities the ship is a prepared, an undesirable target, and the terrorist(s) should look elsewhere for a vulnerable target. The measures outlined below do not account for local conditions and regulations or current threat intelligence: The ship's command must maintain flexibility. As threat conditions change, the ship's crew must be prepared to take actions to counter the threat. When necessary, additional measures must be taken immediately. The simple solution to THREATCON CHARLIE or DELTA is to get underway, but this may not always be an option.

a. THREATCON ALPHA (see Appendix I for definition).

(1) Measure 1. Brief crew on the threat, ship security, and security precautions to be taken while ashore.

(2) Measure 2. Muster and brief security personnel on the threat and rules of engagement.

(3) Measure 3. Review security plans and keep them available. Keep on call key personnel who may be needed to implement security measures.

(4) Measure 4. Consistent with local rules, regulations and status of forces agreement, post qualified armed fantail and forecastle sentry. Rifles are the preferred weapon.

(5) Measure 5. Consistent with local rules, regulations, and SOFA, post qualified armed pier sentry and pier entrance.

(6) Measure 6. Issue two-way radios to all sentries, roving patrols, quarterdeck watch, and response force (RF). If practical, all guards will be equipped with at least two systems of communication (e.g., two-way radio, telephone, whistle, or signal light).

(7) Measure 7. Issue night vision devices to selected posted security personnel.

(8) Coordinate pier and fleet landing security with collocated forces and local authorities. Identify anticipated needs for mutual support (security personnel, boats, and equipment) and define methods of activation and communication.

(9) Measure 9. Tighten shipboard and pier access control procedures. Positively identify all personnel entering pier and fleet landing area---no exceptions..

(10) Measure 10. Consistent with local rules, regulations, and SOFA, establish unloading zone(s) on the pier away from the ship.

(11) Measure 11. Deploy barriers to keep vehicles away from the ship. Barriers may be ship's vehicles, equipment, or items available locally.

(12) Measure 12. Post signs in local language(s) to explain visiting and loitering restrictions.

(13) Measure 13. Inspect all vehicles entering pier and check for unauthorized personnel, weapons, and/or explosives.

(14) Measure 14. Inspect all personnel, hand-carried items, and packages before they come aboard. Where possible, Screening should be at the pier entrance or foot of brow.

(15) Measure 15. Direct departing and arriving liberty boats to make a security tour around the ship and give special attention to the waterline and hull. Boats must be identifiable to ship's personnel night and day.

(16) Measure 16. Water taxis, ferries, bum boats, and other harbor craft cause special concern because they can serve as an ideal platform for terrorists. Unauthorized craft should be kept away from the ship; authorized craft should be carefully controlled, surveyed, and covered.

(17) Measure 17. Identify and inspect work boats.

(18) Measure 18. Secure spaces not in use.

(19) Measure 19. Regulate shipboard lighting to best meet the threat environment. Lighting should include waterline illumination.

(20) Measure 20. Rig hawsepipe covers and rat guards on all lines, cable, and hoses. Consider using an anchor collar.

(21) Measure 21. Raise accommodation ladders, stern gates, Jacob ladders, etc., when not in use. Clear ship of all unnecessary stages, camels, barges, oil donuts, and lines.

(22) Measure 22. Conduct security drills to include bomb threat and repel boarders exercises.

(23) Measure 23. Review individual actions in THREATCON BRAVO for possible implementation.

(24) Measure 24. To be determined.

b. THREATCON BRAVO (see Appendix I for definition).

(1) Measure 25. Maintain appropriate THREATCON ALPHA measures.

(2) Measure 26. Review liberty policy in light of the threat and revise it as necessary to maintain the safety and security of the ship and crew.

(3) Measure 27. Conduct divisional quarters at foul weather parade to determine the status of on-board personnel and to disseminate information.

(4) Measure 28. Ensure an up-to-date list of bilingual personnel for the area of operations is readily available. Ensure the warning tape in the pilot house and/or quarterdeck that warns small craft to remain clear is in both the local language and English.

(5) Measure 29. Remind all personnel to:

(a) be suspicious and inquisitive of strangers, particularly those carrying suitcases or other containers.

(b) to be alert for abandoned parcels or suitcases.

(c) be alert for unattended vehicles in the vicinity.

(d) be wary of any unusual activities.

(e) notify the duty officer of anything suspicious.

(6) Measure 30. Remind personnel to lock their parked vehicles and to carefully check them before entering.

(7) Measure 31. Designate and brief picket boat crews. Prepare boats and place crews on 15-minute alert. If the situation warrant's, make random picket boat patrols in the immediate vicinity of the ship with the motor whaleboat or gig. Boat crews will be armed with M16 rifles, one M60 with 200 rounds of ammunition, and 10 concussion grenades.

(8) Measure 32. Consistent with local rules, regulations, and SOFA, establish armed brow watch on pier to check identification and inspect baggage before personnel board ship.

(9) Measure 33. Man signal bridge or pilot house and ensure flares are available to ward off approaching craft.

(10) Measure 34. After working hours, place armed sentries on a superstructure level from which they can best cover areas about the ship.

(11) Measure 35. Arm all members of the quarterdeck watch and SAT. In the absence of a SAT, arm two members of the SDF.

(12) Measure 36. Provide shotgun and ammunition to quarterdeck. If the situation warrants, place sentry with shotgun inside the superstructure at a site from which the quarterdeck can be covered.

(13) Measure 37. Issue arms to selected qualified officers to include Command Duty Officer (CDO) and Assistant Command Duty Officer (ACDO).

(14) Measure 38. Arm Sounding and Security Patrol.

(15) Measure 39. Muster and brief ammunition bearers or messengers.

(16) Measure 40. Implement procedures for expedient issue of firearms and ammunition from small arms locker (SAL). Ensure a set of SAL keys are readily available and in the possession of an officer designated for this duty by the Commanding Officer.

(17) Measure 41. Load additional small arms magazines to ensure adequate supply for security personnel and response forces.

(18) Measure 42. Inform local authorities of actions taken as the THREATCON increases.

(19) Measure 43. Test communications with local authorities and other U.S. Navy ships in-port.

(20) Measure 44. Instruct watches to conduct frequent random searches under piers, with emphasis on potential hiding places, pier pilings, and floating debris.

(21) Measure 45. Conduct searches of the ship's hull and boats at intermittent intervals and immediately before it puts to sea..

(22) Measure 46. Move cars and objects such as crates and trash containers 100 feet from the ship.

(23) Measure 47. Hoist boats aboard when not in use.

(24) Measure 48. Terminate all public visits.

(25) Measure 49. Set materiel condition YOKE, main deck and below.

(26) Measure 50. After working hours, reduce entry points to the ship's interior by securing selected entrances from the inside.

(27) Measure 51. Duty department heads ensure all spaces not in regular use are secured and inspected periodically.

(28) Measure 52. If two brows are rigged, remove one of them.

(29) Measure 53. Maintain capability to get under way on short notice or as specified by SOP. Consider possible relocation sites (different pier, anchorage, etc.). Rig brow and accommodation ladder for immediate raising or removal.

(30) Measure 54. Ensure .50 caliber mount assemblies are in place with ammunition in ready service lockers [..50 caliber machine-guns will be maintained in the armory, pre-fire checks completed, and ready for use].

(31) Measure 55. Prepare fire hoses. Brief designated personnel on procedures for repelling boarders, small boats, and ultra light aircraft.

(32) Measure 56. Obstruct possible helicopter landing areas in such a manner as to prevent hostile helicopters from landing.

(33) Measure 57. Review riot and crowd control procedures, asylum seeker procedures, and bomb threat procedures.

(34) Measure 58. Monitor local communications (e.-g., ship-to--ship, TV, radio, police scanners).

(35) Measure 59. Implement additional security measures for high-risk personnel as appropriate.

(36) Measure 60. Review individual actions in THREATCON a CHARLIE for possible implementation.

(37) Measures 61 and 62. To be determined.

c. THREATCON CHARLIE (see Appendix I for definition).

(1) Measure 63. Maintain appropriate measures for THREATCONs ALPHA and BRAVO.

(2) Measure 64. Cancel liberty. Execute emergency recall.

(3) Measure 65. Be prepared to get under way on one hour's notice or less. If conditions warrant, request permission to sortie.

(4) Measure 65. Muster and arm SAT, BAF, and RF. Position SAT and BAF at designated location(s). Deploy RF to protect command structure and augment posted security watches.

(5) Measure 67. Place armed sentries on a superstructure level from which they can best cover areas about the ship.

(6) Measure 68. Establish .50 or .30 caliber machine gun positions.

(7) Measure 69. If available, deploy Stinger surface-to-air missiles IAW established ROE.

(8) Measure 70. Energize radar and establish watch.

(9) Measure 71. Ships with high-power sonars operate actively for random periods to deter underwater activity. Man passive sonar capable of detecting boats, swimmers, or underwater vehicles. Position any non-sonar-equipped ships within the acoustic envelope of sonar-equipped ships.

(10) Measure 72. Man one or more repair lockers. Establish communications with an extra watch in DC Central.

(11) Measure 73. Deploy picket boat. Boats should be identifiable night and day from the ship (e.g., by lights or flags).

(12) Measure 74. If feasible, deploy a helicopter as and observation or gun platform. The helicopter should be identifiable night and day from the ship.

(13) Measure 75. Activate anti-swimmer watch. (Portions of watch may already be implemented by previous THREATCON measures).

(14) Measure 76. Issue weapons to selected officers and Chief Petty Officers in the duty section (i.e., CO, XO, Department Heads).

(15) Measure 77. Issue concussion grenades to topside rovers, forecastle and fantail sentries, and bridge watch.

(16) Measure 78. Erect barriers and obstacles as required to control traffic flow.

(17) Measure 79. Strictly enforce entry control procedures and searches--no exceptions.

(18) Measure 80. Enforce boat exclusion zone.

(19) Measure 81. Minimize all off-ship administrative trips.

(20) Measure 82. Discontinue contract work.

(21) Measure 83. Set materiel condition ZEBRA, second deck and below.

(22) Measure 84. Secure from the inside all unguarded entry points to the interior of the ship.

(23) Measure 85. Rotate screws and cycle rudder(s) at frequent and irregular intervals.

(24) Measure 86. Rig additional fire hoses. Charge the fire hoses when manned just prior to actual use.

(25) Measure 87. Review individual actions in THREATCON DELTA for implementation.

(26) Measure 88. - To be determined.

d. THREATCON DELTA (see Appendix I for definition).

(1) Measure 89. Maintain appropriate THREATCONs ALPHA, BRAVO, and CHARLIE measures.

(2) Measure 90. Permit only necessary personnel.

(3) Measure 91. Prepare to get under way and, if possible, cancel port visit and depart.

(4) Measure 92. Post sentries with M60 machine gun(s) to cover possible helicopter landing areas.

(5) Measure 93. Arm selected personnel of the SDF.

(6) Measure 94. Deploy M-79 grenade launchers to cover approaches to ship.

(7) Measure 95. To be determined.



1. General. In addition to basic THREATCON procedures, a variety of other tasks may need to be performed at aviation facilities. This is particularly true for airbases located areas where the threat of terrorist attacks is high.


(1) Planning

(a) Review THREATCON ALPHA and BRAVO measures.

(b) Update THREATCON ALPHA and BRAVO measures as required.

(2) Briefing and liaison

(a) Brief all personnel on the threat, especially pilots, ground support crews, and air traffic controllers.

(b) Inform local police of the threat. Coordinate plans to safeguard aircraft flight paths into and out of air stations.

(c) Ensure duty officers are always available by telephone.

(d) Prepare to activate contingency plans and issue detailed air traffic control procedures if appropriate.

(e) Be prepared to receive and direct aircraft from other stations.

(3) Precautions inside the perimeter

(a) Perform thorough and regular inspection of areas within the perimeters from which attacks on aircraft can be made.

(b) Take action to ensure no extremists armed with surface-to-air missiles can operate against aircraft within the perimeter.

(c) Establish checkpoints at all entrances and inspect all passes and permits. Identify documents of individuals entering the area no exceptions.

(d) Search all vehicles, briefcases, packages, etc., entering the area.

(e) Erect barriers around potential targets if at all possible.

. (f) Maintain fire-fighting equipment and conduct practice drills.

(g) Hold practice alerts within the perimeter.

(4) Precautions outside the perimeter

(a) Conduct, with local police, regular inspections of the perimeter, especially the area adjacent to flight paths.

(b) Advise local police of any areas outside the perimeter where attacks could be mounted and that cannot be avoided by aircraft on takeoff or landing.

(c) Advise aircrews to report any unusual activity near approach and overshoot areas.


(l) Planning

(a) Review THREATCON CHARLIE measures.

(b) Update THREATCON CHARLIE measures as required.

(2) Briefing and liaison

(a) Brief all personnel on the increased threat.

(b) Inform local police of increased threat.

(c) Coordinate with the local police on any precautionary measures taken outside the airfield's perimeters.

(d) Implement appropriate flying countermeasures specified in SOPs when directed by air traffic controllers.

(3) Precautions inside the perimeter:

(a) Inspect all vehicles and buildings on a regular basis.

(b) Detail additional guards to be on call at short notice and consider augmenting firefighting details.

(c) Carry out random patrols within the airfield perimeter and maintain continuous observation of approach and overshoot areas.

(d) Reduce flying to essential operational flights, only. Cease circuit flying if appropriate. (e) Escort all visitors.

(f) Close relief landing grounds where appropriate.

(g) Check airfield diversion state.

(4) Precautions outside the perimeter:

(a) Be prepared to react to requests for assistance.

(b) Provide troops to assist local police in searching for terrorists on approaches outside the perimeter of military airfields.


(1) Planning

(a) Review THREATCON DELTA measures.

(b) Update THREATCON DELTA measures as required.

(2) Briefings and liaison

(a) Brief all personnel on-the very high levels of

(b) Inform local police of the increased threat.

(3) Precautions inside the perimeter:

(a) Cease all flying except for specifically authorized operational sorties.

(b) Implement, if necessary, appropriate flying countermeasures.

(c) Be prepared to accept aircraft diverted from other stations.

(d) Be prepared to deploy light aircraft and helicopters for surveillance tasks or to move internal security forces.

(4) Precautions outside the perimeter. Close military roads allowing access to the airbase.




NOTE: This survey form will not meet the requirements of all installations and should not be considered all-exclusive. Security surveys must tailored to meet the needs of the local command.



1. Is there an adequate perimeter barrier?

2. Are appropriate warning signs posted?

3. Are all openings in the perimeter barrier guarded or secured?

4. Is vegetation growth either side of the barrier controlled?

5. Is there adequate perimeter lighting?

a. Are there back-up electrical systems?

b. Are electrical supply systems exposed?

6. Have requirements for additional security systems (i.e. - CCTV. IDS) been evaluated?


1. Are only the minimum number of gates open?

a. Do gates open outward (against) traffic?

2. Are unused gates adequately barricaded?

a. Are unused gates permanently sealed?

3. Are gate guard houses sufficiently protected structurally?

4. Is there a duress alarm at each gate?

a. How does it work?

b. Is a rotary installed?

5. Are appropriate weapons readily available to the gate guards?

a. Users qualified?

b. What types of weapons?

c. What types of ammunition?

6. Are both telephones and radio communications available at the gates?

7. Is there a capability at each gate to rapidly emplace temporary barriers in both in and out bound lanes?

a. Will they withstand vehicle assaults?


1. Is vehicle registration required?

a. Is vehicle registration randomly checked?

2. Has search procedures and the authority to search vehicles been established?

a. Are military working dogs used?

3. Is there an effective system for the control of vehicles and their contents into or put of the installation?

4. Are procedures established for identifying, admitting and controlling employees, visitors, contract personnel, vendors, etc.?

5. Is a visitor register maintained?

a. Does the visitor “check out” upon leaving?

6. Is there a positive package control system in effect?


1. Are there separate physical security plans for these areas?

a. Are security systems (fences, sensors, Lights, etc.) for high risk facilities given Priority on maintenance work orders?

2. Are there barriers around these areas?

3. Are there clear zones on both sides of the barriers?

4. Is parking prohibited immediately adjacent to these facilities?

5. Have measures been taken to eliminate conspicuously posted signs that would assist an attacker in locating these facilities?

6. Is these adequate area lighting?

a. Is these back-up lighting system?

b. Is reflective paving used?

7. Is there an adequate intrusion/detection system?

a. Is there back-up lighting system?

b. What kinds of back-ups?

8. Are there procedures for entry and personnel movement control?

9. Are unfamiliar personnel in the facility challenged?

a. Is there a personal ID tag that adequately describes person?

10. Are critical installation activities (Communications, explosives storage, fuel storage, command element, medical facilities, and security forces) separated by adequate distance or barriers?

a. Are positive control procedures established?

b. Are security education/motivation programs Established for workers in the areas?


1. Are all storage and other secured buildings provided with adequate locking devices?

2. Are adequate protective measures afforded to open storage?

a. Are there periodic reminder/refresher briefings?

b. Are there specific antiterrorism training Programs?

3. Are adequate records maintained on individual training?

4. Are personnel trained in the use of emergency equipment?

5. Do security personnel receive periodic refresher training?

6. Are security personnel required to fire annual basic weapons qualifications?

7. Are security personnel trained for emergency operations?

8. Are augmentation security force personnel assigned and trained?

9. Are training sessions monitored by supervisory personnel?


1. Is the communication system adequate?

2. List the equipment by:

a. Type

b. Number

c. Use

3. Is adequate equipment available for spreading emergency alarms?

4. Are there adequate security safeguards for the communications center?

5. Are security personnel familiar with communication equipment in use?

6. Is there a separate communication system for security personnel?

7. Is emergency power available for communication equipment?


1. Is there a comprehensive physical security plan?

2. Is there a comprehensive joint security plan with the hose nation?

3. Is there a mutual security plan with other U.S. installations in the area?

4. Have contingency plans been written to respond to any major disruption on the Installations?

5. Have the physical security and contingency plans been periodically tested to insure success?

a. Has the test been conducted within the last six months?

b. Was an After Action Report completed on the tested plans?

c. Was a copy of the After Action Report (AAR) furnished through the ASG CDR and the Area Provost Marshal to the USFK PM ?

6. Do emergency plans provided for personnel situation?

a. Is there more than one route?

7. Do emergency plans address first aid and medical facilities?

8. Do emergency plans address destruction of sensitive equipment/documents in correct sequence?


1. Is the senior U.S. security officer a member of appropriate U.S. civilian/military, and host nation security liaison organizations?

2. Is there a single point of contact for each security organization?

3. Are all available resources being effectively coordinated with?

4. Is all information properly received and disseminated to appropriate organizations and command elements?

5. Is all important information passed up and down the chain of command?

6. What are the host country’s responsibilities for U.S. security? (i.e. - subject area, response time, location, distance)


1. Are weapons available for contingencies?

2. List the weapons by:

a. Type

b. Number

c. Where stored

d. When used

e. Types of armor; where stored; when used?

3. Do personnel, who are required to use these weapons, participate in periodic familiarization firing exercises?

4. Is any soft body armor (i.e., protective vests, Coats, etc.) readily available? If so, what are the types, numbers, where are they stored And when are they used?

5. Are gas masks readily available? If so, how many are available, where are they stored and when are they used?

6. List other security equipment, if any, by type, number, where stored and when used.

7. Has an alternate armory for security forces been established and weapons dispersed for multiple response?



1. Was a security awareness program been established to advise assigned and visiting personnel (including family members) of the local terrorist threat and protective measures to take?

2. Are procedures, guidance and instructions developed and available to all personnel regarding personal, family residence, office/work area, and vehicle security?

3. Are personnel instructed to immediately report suspicious acts that may be related to espionage or sabotage?


1. Are new residences checked by appropriate U.S. security personnel prior to acquisition, to determine if the homes meet adequate security standards?

2. Are names and ranks prohibited from being posted on quarters?

3. Has a neighborhood watch program been established?

4. Is there a clear view of approaches?

5. Are trees and shrubs kept trimmed down?

6. Is there off street parking or an enclosed garage?

7. Are there adequate perimeter fences or barriers?

8. Is there good exterior lighting on all sides?

9. Do all exterior doors have on-way viewers and unexposed hinges?

10. Are there adequate locks on all doors and windows?

11. Are all windows covered with heavy opaque draperies?

12. Are windows made of LEXAN?

13. Is there an intercom system both internal and at the doors?

14. Is there an alarm system?

15. Is power separate from structure system?

16. Does it terminate at a security facility?

17. Is there a designated safe haven with adequate barriers, emergency supplies and communications?

18. Are there fire extinguishers positioned in Key locations?

19. Are there smoke detectors in key locations?


1. Are routes and times to/from office varied?

2. Are utilized vehicles of inconspicuous make and color?

3. Do vehicles have inconspicuous host License plates?

4. Is a walk around inspection made of the car before use?

5. Is vehicle equipped with inside hood latch and locking gas cap?

6. Are all vehicle doors, gas tanks, and storage compartments kept locked at all times?

7. Are any vehicles fully or partially armored?

8. Have all drivers received annual training in defensive driving techniques? If not, how often?


1. Are family members informed never to accept unexpected mail or packages that do not come through the APO system?

2. Are they trained to look for:

a. Unusual post markers?

b. Presence of a return address?

c. Excessive postage?

d. Abnormal size or weight?

e. Stains from within?

f. Protruding wires or strings?

g. Conflicting return address and postmark?

h. Bulges or lopsided letters?

I. Springiness?


1. Is office marked by name, rank or position?

2. Are both office and foyer doors lockable?

3. Do office windows have heavy, opaque draperies?

4. Is there a duress alarm system terminating at security facility?

a. What types?

b. Redundant?

5. Is there a policy to avoid marking office parking spaces by name, rank or position?

6. Is assigned of parking areas ever varied?

7. Are assigned vehicles ever randomly switched to different users?



AFOSI - Air Force Office of Special Investigations

CofS - Chief of Staff

CSP - Chief, Security Police

DIC - Deputy, Installation Commander

EOC - Emergency Operations Center

EOD - Explosives Ordnance Disposal

EST - Emergency Service Team

FOUO - For Official Use Only

HQDA - Headquarters, Department of the Army

IAW - In accordance with

MP - Military Police

NLT - Not later than

POC - Point of contact

SP - Security Police

SOP - Standing Operating Procedures

TDY - Temporary duty assignment

THREATCON - Threat Conditions

USACIDC - United States Army Criminal Investigation Command

VIP - Very important person

Section II. TERMS

Antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of personnel, family members, facilitates, and equipment to terrorist acts. This includes the collection and analysis of information to accurately assess the magnitude of the threat.

Civil disturbance (Korea). Any action taken by elements of the Korean civilian population in such a manner to threaten the accomplishment of the USFK mission. This includes any disruptive labor practice undertaken on the part of Korean national employees.

Combating terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism and counter terrorism, taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.

Counter terrorism. Offensive measures taken to respond to a terrorist act or the documented threat of such an act, including the gathering of information and threat analysis in support of these measures.

Crisis management team. A specially selected pool of personnel concerned with plans, procedures, techniques, policies, and controls for dealing with terrorism, special threats, or other major disruptions on USFK installation and facilities.

Force protection. Security programs designed to protect USFK military, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by counterintelligence and other security programs.

High risk personnel. Personnel who, by their grade, assignment, symbolic value, location, or specific threat are more likely to be attractive or accessible targets.

High threat areas for travel security. Those terrorist-threatened areas identified by either the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SO/LIC) Memorandum (Subject: Travel Security), the International Threat Analysis Center (ITAC) Monthly Intelligence Summary (MITS), or by the commander responsible for the area concerned.

Major disruptions on installations, units, and facilities. Acts, threats, or attempts to commit such acts as kidnapping, extortion, bombings, hijacks, ambushing, major weapons thefts, arson, assassination, and hostage taking on a USFK installation, unit, or facility.

Mission essential/vulnerable areas. Facilities of activities within an installation that, by virtue of their function, are evaluated by the commander as vital to the successful accomplishment of the installation’s mission. This category includes areas nonessential to the installation’s operational mission which, by nature of the activity, are considered vulnerable to theft, trespass, damage, or other criminal activity.

Special reaction team. A specially trained team of military/security police serving as the installation commander’s principal response force in the event of a major disruption of threat situation on the installation. The SRT is armed and equipped to isolate, contain, gather information, and if necessary, neutralize a special threat.

Terrorism. The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.

Threat conditions. A formal level of antiterrorist readiness directed by a commander in order to deter or prepare for a terrorist attack expressed in phonetic alphabet letters Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta in increasing levels of threat.

Threat management force. An action force from the installation that responds to major disruptions on an installation. The TMF should be of sufficient size to manage the disruption and usually will involve a command element, security element, negotiation team, SRT/EST, and logistical element.