

TC 53-03.1

**TACTICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
DETACHMENTS AND TEAMS GUIDE**

FEBRUARY 2024

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site (<https://armypubs.army.mil>) and the Central Army Registry Site (<https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard>).

TACTICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS DETACHMENTS AND TEAMS GUIDE

Contents

	Page
Preface	v
Introduction	vii
CHAPTER 1	1
ORGANIZATION	1
Overview.....	1
Detachment-Level Operational Environment	2
Tactical Competence.....	3
Composition and Configuration	4
Duties and Responsibilities	4
Equipment.....	7
Allocation	7
Training.....	8
CHAPTER 2	11
EMPLOYMENT	11
Overview.....	11
Supported Operations	11
Deep Operations	12
Offensive Operations.....	12
Defensive Operations	12
Stability Operations	13
Security Cooperation	14
Reachback.....	15
Augmentation.....	15
CHAPTER 3	17
MOVEMENT	17
Methods.....	17
Dismounted Movement.....	17

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Mounted Movement 18

Protection 18

Navigation 19

Communication 19

CHAPTER 4.....20

MESSAGE DELIVERY 20

 Fundamentals of the Loudspeaker 20

 Proficiency..... 24

 Employment 24

 Application..... 25

 Directing A Broadcast 26

 Environmental Considerations 32

 Aerial Message Delivery 33

CHAPTER 5.....35

ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES 35

 Information Collection Support..... 35

 Information and Intelligence Integration..... 40

 Adversary Information Analysis and Countermeasures..... 41

 Questioning versus Interrogation 42

 Negotiations 43

 Advising..... 43

 Targeting 45

Glossary 49

References 51

Index 53

Figures

Figure 1-1. Example of Psychological Operations team composition 4

Figure 1-2. Example of Psychological Operations unit allocations 8

Figure 4-1. Example of vehicle-mounted loudspeaker 20

Figure 4-2. Example of loudspeaker system..... 21

Figure 4-3. Simplified example of loudspeaker broadcast adjustment for wind direction..... 23

Figure 4-4. Soccer fields stacked to gauge distance 27

Figure 4-5. Directional determination zones 29

Figure 4-6. Angular and radial velocities..... 30

Figure 4-7. The Long Range Acoustic Device model 500x during test 32

Figure 4-8. Assembly of the static line box for leaflet drop 34

Figure 5-1. Notional populated location with blocking terrain 37

Figure 5-2. Appropriate advising skill..... 45

Tables

Table 1-1. Psychological Operations team leader internal responsibilities	5
Table 1-2. Psychological Operations team leader external responsibilities	6
Table 1-3. Assistant team leader responsibilities	6
Table 1-4. Psychological Operations sergeant responsibilities	7
Table 4-1. Time-to-range targets	27
Table 4-2. Effects of terrain and weather on target appearance	27
Table 5-1. Notional reconnaissance objectives categorized as operational variables	38
Table 5-2. Notional reconnaissance objectives categorized as mission variables	38

This page intentionally left blank.

Preface

TC 53-3.1 is a new, complementary publication for understanding the capabilities, organization, and employment of Psychological Operations forces conducting tactical operations across a range of military operations within hostile, denied, and politically sensitive environments. TC 53-03.1 provides considerations for employment of influence capabilities during elements of conventional and irregular warfare (and stability operations) to support the application of the instruments of national power.

The principal audiences for TC 53-03.1 are Psychological Operations (PO) Soldiers serving on tactical teams and detachments, commanders, staffs, and company operations centers. This TC, in combination with Army tactics and techniques and Combined Arms Training Strategies, provides teams with practical references necessary to conduct training for tactical-level influence and security cooperation activities, and for the Psychological Operations companies to develop training opportunities and execute critical tasks to standard.

This publication details how Psychological Operations forces plan, prepare, and deploy on a regionally or globally aligned mission in support of civil authority information, defense support for civil authorities, security cooperation, security assistance, and security force assistance. In addition, it provides guidance to enhance the training activities of detachment and team functions and to improve planning and coordination for deployments. TC 53-03.1 also addresses mission execution as part of tactical-level operations in support of or supported by the core activities of the conventional and special operations forces of the other Services.

The principles addressed in this publication are linked to higher-level Army doctrine described in FM 3-53. This publication incorporates information extracted from existing joint and Service doctrine publications and directives, joint and Service lessons learned, subject-matter expert input, and other identified best practices.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Service members operate in accordance with the law of armed conflict and the rules of engagement. (See FM 6-27 for legal compliance.)

TC 53-03.1 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. When first defining other proponent definitions in the text, the term is italicized with the proponent publication designator and number at the end of the definition. Following uses of the term are not italicized.

TC 53-03.1 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard or National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve (USAR), Psychological Operations forces. This TC may be useful to U.S. Marine Corps Psychological Operations forces.

The proponent for TC 53-03.1 is the United States Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. The preparing agency is the Doctrine Division of the Psychological Operations Commandant's Office. Send comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK POD, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Liberty, NC 28310-9610 or submit an electronic DA Form 2028 to AOJK-POD@socom.mil.

This page intentionally left blank.

Introduction

TC 53-03.1 is a new publication that provides information and training guidance to assist the Psychological Operations unit of action tasked with executing influence activities in either an unfavorable or hostile environment. This publication expands upon and complements the forthcoming publication of ATP 3-53.6, *Psychological Operations Detachments*.

Note: ATP 3-53.6 is a new forthcoming publication that is not included in the references section.

This TC focuses on the basic and intermediate level tactics, techniques, and procedures of tactical Psychological Operations team (TPT) actions and activities. This publication is deliberately unclassified; therefore, it is not inclusive of all tactics, techniques, and procedures relevant to Department of Defense (DOD) influence activities. This is a general guide to its users and does not preclude the need for well-written and practiced standard operating procedures (SOPs). It is intended for the Psychological Operations companies and detachments to develop and conduct team training and rehearsals continuously.

TC 53-03.1 explains the roles and functions of the tactical Psychological Operations detachment and TPT in support to conventional forces and special operations forces during stability operations, combat operations, and humanitarian support. It includes details about how Psychological Operations forces support and interact with the information and influence related activities of other joint Services. This guide represents training standards for United States Army Psychological Operations forces to conduct and execute missions associated with influence activities from the operational to tactical levels.

The contents of this publication are also useful to those Marines assigned to a United States Marine Corps Psychological Operations forces and can help establish a dynamic level of interoperability between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marines.

The following is a summary of chapter contents.

Chapter 1 addresses the how tactical Psychological Operations elements are organized. This includes the duties and responsibilities of detachments and teams assigned to execute influence activities at the tactical level of warfare. This chapter also details the significance of training to achieve a high degree of technical and tactical competence.

Chapter 2 provides guidelines on how to employ the capabilities of Psychological Operations forces from the operational to tactical level during combat operations and through stability operations. Psychological Operations forces provide an influence capability to support joint Services, interorganizational agencies, allies, and partner nations.

Chapter 3 highlights atypical tasks and important tactics and techniques used for movement of troops during combat operations. In addition, this chapter provides an updated understanding of the requirements needed for the planning and execution of training prior to deployment.

Chapter 4 describes the most common methods for message delivery that the TPT consistently utilizes. This guide covers the details of only two primary means of message delivery: loudspeaker and aerial message delivery. Emphasis on the fundamentals and techniques of these two means of message delivery ensure understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of their use and promote technical proficiency.

Chapter 5 outlines supplemental activities the detachment or team will encounter and execute while deployed. This chapter provides generalized techniques for essential activities to build upon during pre-deployment training to establish a robust SOP.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 1

Organization

The smallest grouped element of the Psychological Operations detachment is the detachment team. PO Soldiers assigned to teams are tasked with conducting activities that involve direct contact with individuals and groups in the operational environment (OE). TPTs provide direct links to audiences in an area of operations, gather information directly from the OE, serve as two-way conduits for information and messages, and plan and execute influence activities. Teams are flexible in both organization and employment, and readily adapt to missions across the range of military operations.

OVERVIEW

1-1. Tactical necessity requires Psychological Operations forces be able to execute their skills and capabilities in conjunction with a variety of missions during combat operations, peacetime operations, and foreign humanitarian assistance. Psychological Operations forces have become well-suited to a broad spectrum of military operations as a result of intense adaptive training, cultural understanding, and access and placement. This spectrum of military operations ranges from competition, through crisis, to armed conflict and encompasses military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence (in times of relative peace) up through large-scale combat operations.

MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS

1-2. These operations require teams to engage with allied counterparts to increase interoperability and coordinate mutual activities with U.S. forces or to collaborate to inform activities in a country after a natural disaster. To facilitate military engagements, maneuver commanders require Soldiers skilled at questioning and negotiation, skills that Soldiers acquire through experience and rehearsal.

SECURITY COOPERATION

1-3. Such missions may consist of building a partner nation's influence capability to deter a threat. It may also entail advising and training a partner nation's security forces to ally with the development of influence activities so that the partner nation may use it to complement and shape their foreign defense.

1-4. According to JP 3-20, military engagement and security cooperation activities are executed continuously to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation. These activities—

- Influence the behavior of adversaries and allies.
- Develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.
- Improve information exchange and intelligence sharing.
- Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.
- Positively affect conditions that prevent or deter crisis.

COMBAT OPERATIONS

1-5. TPTs consistently operate with conventional and special operations forces to defeat enemy forces and frustrate adversary objectives. Due to the inherent risks of combat zones and other high-risk environments, teams require mission-specific tactical training to lower risk, increase operational proficiency, and operate in a manner parallel to the supported units.

1-6. Regardless of mission type, the team is an important asset for the gaining commander to obtain current, first-hand information about relevant actors in an area of operations and the psychological factors influencing their mental processes and driving their behaviors. TPTs are a fully capable contributor to planning influence activities, assessing the behavioral trends of the OE, and advising the commander and staff on psychological effects of planned operations.

1-7. For Psychological Operations forces, each team member has the capacity to conduct most of the face-to-face (F2F) communications—historically the most effective means of influence, but also one of the most

difficult to do. F2F enables teams to collect information and deliver influential messages. It is common for team members to engage key leaders (such as religious figures, political or military leaders, and community and tribal heads) in an area of operations to develop a rapport and influence them to act in ways that support U.S. objectives. To increase team proficiencies, Psychological Operations units emphasize regional expertise, cultural capability, and behavior analysis techniques to enhance the ability of the detachments to communicate more effectively and build trustworthy relationships.

DETACHMENT-LEVEL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-8. The *operational environment* is the aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0) The OE determines the nature of operations for a unit or element because the OE affects planning and execution. During operations, detachments focus on physical factors of the OE (terrain, population, the physical results of combat operations) and enemy forces and capabilities. However, this does not mean the team ignores social, cultural, and other aspects that affect how individuals and groups can be influenced. Most of this analysis takes place during pre-mission training at home station, with continuous assessments conducted in theater.

1-9. The TPT is tasked to verify key assumptions about the OE and the relevant actors in it and can significantly increase the amount of available information that Psychological Operations analysts, intelligence organizations, and others require for situational understanding, planning, and assessment. An operational and mission variable analysis approach integrates people and processes by using multiple information sources, collaborative analysis, and evaluation to build a common, shared, holistic knowledge base of the OE.

1-10. At the tactical level, PO Soldiers can use three analysis tools to develop situational understanding of the OE. For a comprehensive understanding, planners and analysts focus on the operational variables of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT). Another option is the mission variables of METT-TC (I): mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations. To assist commanders in refining their understanding of the operational variables and mission variables within the area of operations, a civil considerations analysis identifies the key and decisive civil considerations of areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE).

1-11. The team focus is detailed, local understanding of the immediate OE that incorporates relatively short-term planning for missions rather than campaigns. Therefore, it is necessary to provide a multidimensional approach toward situational understanding with regards to civil considerations. The PMESII-PT-ASCOPE crosswalk provides an in-depth solution for clearer operational picture. For more information on variables, refer to FM 5-0.

1-12. From an information collection perspective, analyzing the OE provides the supported commander answers to the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs). CCIRs address information that a commander deems necessary to visualize an OE and make critical decisions. Detachments specifically focus on the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) category of CCIRs. PIRs are information the commander must know about the threat and other aspects of an OE. The continuous and in-depth contact with a wide variety of individuals and groups allows the team unique access to information that can be crucial to operations, but which are difficult to obtain.

1-13. Since any staff section can recommend PIRs, a detachment member participating in the planning and targeting processes has access to both the operations and intelligence staff sections. Coordination with those sections can facilitate inclusion of Psychological Operations intelligence requirements in the list of recommended PIRs. In addition, teams can provide information that may aid in combat identification that differentiates adversary and enemy forces in the OE from nonthreat forces. This enables more precise targeting and minimizes potential non-combatant casualties and collateral damage. For more information about information collection, refer to ATP 3-55.4.

1-14. Psychological Operations forces are particularly suited to conduct preparation of the environment. Preparation of the environment aims to understand the OE (particularly the information environment) and the relevant actors in it and contribute to setting the conditions for operational success by cultivating relationships, establishing networks of partners, and laying the groundwork that will facilitate the conduct and sustainment of future operations. For additional information, see FM 3-05.

Circular Tasking

A frequent occurrence for teams is receiving a circular tasking. An example of circular tasking is one in which the TPT places a request for information with intelligence or other staff sections (S-2 or G-2). This request then becomes a PIR that is assigned to the team as a tasking to fulfill. This means the team is tasked with fulfilling its own request for information. There are several ways to prevent circular tasking. First, correctly articulating and identifying the specifics of the request can help avoid circular tasking. Some other preventative measures include ensuring proper development of requests for information and informing the staff of the supported unit about Psychological Operations information requirements.

TACTICAL COMPETENCE

1-15. Soldiers that participate in tactical operations require specific key capabilities. TPTs acquire enhanced tactical skills by training with weapons, weapon systems, and battle drills according to mission requirements and the requirements of the units they support. TPTs should obtain the specific tactical SOP of the supported unit and train to that standard during pre-mission trainings.

1-16. TPTs have the opportunity to participate in small unit tactics; site exploitation; open-source research; parachuting; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape; and additional techniques and procedures in line with unit mission requirements. Those TPTs performing duties within a tactical Psychological Operations detachment continuously plan and execute training and validation exercises to maintain their proficiency and to provide mentorship for junior leaders.

1-17. Influence-specific skills acquired during institutional training provides team members with interpersonal communication skills, increased cultural and regional awareness, foreign language abilities, and negotiation and mediation techniques. Complementary additional training (such as tactical combat casualty care, combatives, mounted vehicle tactics, defensive driving, antiterrorism, and personnel protection) can also supplement Soldier development.

1-18. In terms of operations, a detachment contributes to the planning, developing, and execution of influence activities and, most importantly, the delivery of influential messages to affect local target audiences (TAs) in ways that contribute to achieving overall objectives. Potential targets for influence include key leaders and figures that can be persuaded to support friendly objectives. Detachments are also capable of planning and coordinating the execution of tactical deception (TAC-D) to disrupt, confuse, redirect, and deter targets. Institutional training should provide team members with information collection and analysis skills that address psychological factors in the OE and also enable them to help answer CCIRs, PIRs, and other commander's information requirements.

1-19. Tactical-level capabilities include the following:

- Execute tactical influence objectives in all types of environments.
- Advise supporting unit commander on psychological impact of actions.
- Execute TAC-D to deceive the enemy.
- Conduct reconnaissance actions.
- Prepare the OE for introduction to friendly forces.
- Conduct F2F engagements.
- Utilize regional expertise.
- Engage with interpreters.
- Use loudspeakers and related platforms to affect relevant actors in the OE.
- Analyze and assess adversary information.
- Collect and analyze relevant information to support targeting process.
- Operate with mounted or dismounted maneuver units.
- Participate in airborne or amphibious operations.
- Advise and train partner nation security forces on influence activities.
- Assist with humanitarian and civil-military operations.

COMPOSITION AND CONFIGURATION

1-20. A Psychological Operations detachment consists of three or four tactical teams (not including the headquarters element). Each team has three Soldiers; however, there is flexibility for expansion depending on mission type. The category and scope of the operation determines the required team composition and allows for flexibility. For example, peacekeeping operations may only require five-Soldier teams that allow them to operate independently of external units while maintaining force protection requirements. However, in major combat operations, three Soldiers typically fill a team as they operate with another unit, such as an infantry platoon, special operations, and others. A likely possibility could be a member of a TPT operating as the singular influence expert attached to a larger force.

1-21. Regardless of number, the team leader, is the senior experienced noncommissioned officer and has a competent noncommissioned officer as an assistant team leader. All positions provide the Soldier with valuable experience and increased knowledge that are vital when serving in non-tactical positions in the branch. Figure 1-1 depicts an example of team composition.




Figure 1-1. Example of Psychological Operations team composition

1-22. While mission requirements and availability determine the number of personnel and their placement, a three-member team typically operates as a unified element when dismounted with a conventional ground force. When supporting special operations forces elements, three-member TPTs typically split up to provide support for several operational detachments—alpha or Ranger platoons concurrently across their assigned area of operations. TPT members fulfill multiple duties related to rank, experience, assigned duty position in the team, and role on a mission at any given time. The positions are—

- Team leader.
- Assistant team leader.
- Psychological Operations sergeant or specialist.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1-23. Division of labor can sometimes enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the TPT. The different duties and responsibilities reflect the types of requirements at each level within the team during missions. While the detachment leadership is responsible for planning and directing many team operations, the team leader may serve as a planner on a staff and an operator in the field leading Soldiers during missions.

1-24. Due to the administrative requirements of the team leader, an assistant team leader is vital to supervising the conduct of routine team functions such as equipment maintenance, provisioning, mission preparation, and so on. Therefore, the assistant team leader frees the team leader to devote limited time and energy to planning while the team is encamped or otherwise not conducting operations.

1-25. Typically, the junior Soldier may hold responsibility for conducting the majority of tasks that enable the team to operate. This Soldier does so under the direction, guidance, and supervision of the team leader at times, but more often, the assistant team leader. Tasks of the Psychological Operations sergeant sustainment, such as equipment maintenance, obtaining resupply, and mission preparation. The following paragraphs detail specific duties for each position on the team.

TEAM LEADER

1-26. The team leader has many of the same responsibilities as a staff planner and a unit commander, but at the team level. Consequently, the team leader may spend a good deal of time in tactical operations centers, joint operations centers, or equivalent command centers. In addition, the team leader also leads Soldiers on missions in area of operations. This requires technical and tactical proficiency, especially when leading a team during combat operations or other high-risk activities. Whether encamped or during missions, the team leader mentors and guides the other Psychological Operations sergeants in preparation for assuming greater responsibilities and duties as part of advancing in the ranks. Table 1-1 and table 1-2, page 6, highlight some encamped and mission responsibilities for the team leader.

Table 1-1. Psychological Operations team leader internal responsibilities

<i>When the team is encamped, team leader responsibilities include the following:</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integrate with gaining unit staff. • Utilize intelligence data. • Conduct planning. • Determine available assets. • Assess threat information capabilities. • Integrate influence objectives into operations. • Integrate influence into targeting. • Coordinate with complementary capabilities. • Monitor morale and health of team. • Request higher echelon support for— <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Distribution. ▪ Dissemination. • Conduct liaison. • Conduct initial SCAME. • Evaluate series effectiveness. • Employ interpreters. • Develop Soldier and leader engagement plan. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supervise interpreters. • Advise on influence factors in the area of operations. • Communicate accurate and timely situation reports. • Communicate sustainment requirements. • Account for personnel, equipment, and supplies. • Counsel, coach, and mentor Soldiers. • Ensure Soldiers maintain all equipment. • Plan tactical deception. • Recommend targets. • Recommend potential target audience lists. • Recommend additional SPOs and IPOs. • Determine team requirements for higher consideration. • Develop influence-focused priority intelligence requirements and intelligence requirements. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct information briefs. • Understand the mission at the detachment and company levels. • Employ team. • Plan psychological actions. • Determine countermeasure requirements. • Execute or coordinate psychological actions. • Report information across and up echelons. • Supervise loudspeaker message development. • Supervise team activities. • Review pre-test guidance. • Review post-test guidance. • Plan message delivery. • Plan face-to-face communications.
<p>Legend:</p> <p>IPO intermediate psychological objective SCAME source, content, audience, media, and effect SPO supporting psychological objective</p>		

Table 1-2. Psychological Operations team leader external responsibilities

<i>During missions, team leader responsibilities include the following:</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lead Soldiers on missions. • Command the team vehicle. • Control vehicle fires and issue fire commands. • Plan face-to-face communications. • Conduct face-to-face communications. • Conduct troop leading procedures. • Deliver persuasive messages. • Coordinate with unit of attachment during mission. • Maintain accountability of team equipment. • Develop and rehearse vehicle recovery plan. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinate psychological actions. • Collect Psychological Operations-related information. • Manage information collection. • Maintain communications. • Serve as secondary operator of speaker system. • Maneuver the team for best employment. • Navigate correctly, whether aided or unaided. • Request, control, and synchronize support. • Standardize vehicle configuration and load plan according to standard operating procedures. • Coordinate boundary crossing with other units.

ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER

1-27. The assistant team leader has specific duties that complement the duties of the team leader and that serve as the bridge between the team leader and the Psychological Operations sergeant. In addition, the assistant team leader may assume the duties and responsibilities of the team leader, if the team leader unable to do so. This requires the assistant team leader to be familiar with staff processes and sections, as well as tactical and technical proficiency. Table 1-3 highlights some encamped and mission responsibilities for the assistant team leader.

Table 1-3. Assistant team leader responsibilities

<i>Internal Tasks</i>	<i>External Tasks</i>
When the team is encamped, assistant team leader responsibilities include the following:	During missions, assistant team leader responsibilities include the following:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advise the commander. • Review pre-test guidance. • Review pre-test guidance. • Supervise the Psychological Operations sergeants. • Compile information and report to the team sergeant. • Maintain ability to execute all Psychological Operations Soldier tasks. • Assist in— <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Integration. ▪ Coordination. ▪ Planning. ▪ Targeting. ▪ Preliminary target audience list refinement. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Serve as primary gunner. • Serve as secondary driver. • Collect information. • Serve as team security. • Operate weapons systems. • Serve as primary operator of loudspeaker systems.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SERGEANT OR SPECIALIST

1-28. As the junior Soldier on the team, the Psychological Operations sergeant bears primary responsibility for taking care of and maintaining team equipment and general tasks. The responsibilities in table 1-4 cover both encamped and mission tasks for the PO Soldier.

Table 1-4. Psychological Operations sergeant responsibilities

<i>Internal Tasks</i>	<i>External Tasks</i>
When the team is encamped, Psychological Operations sergeant responsibilities include the following:	During missions, Psychological Operations sergeant responsibilities include the following:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct vehicle maintenance (preventative maintenance checks and services, fueling, and so on). • Conduct radio fills (communications security) and communications checks. • Resupply of water, food, and ammunition for missions. • Provide for interpreters and escort them. • Update route maps and threat levels. • Maintain product inventory (storage). • Prepare products for the mission. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Serve as primary driver. • Serve as secondary gunner. • Conduct radio operations and be proficient in radio procedures. • Be proficient in combat lifesaver techniques. • Keep frequencies and call signs readily available to other team members. • Maintain vehicle security. • Collect information.

EQUIPMENT

1-29. The tactical Psychological Operations detachment possesses a variety of equipment and weapons for operations and personal protection, based on operational requirements. Detachments and teams should always train with and utilize all available equipment that serves best for the mission it is intended for. As new technology emerges, it aids in these tactical missions. Therefore, Psychological Operations forces must remain familiar with and competent on any emerging technology or capabilities that may assist the TPT in achieving their objectives.

1-30. Psychological Operations companies and detachments of the deploying team have established SOPs to prepare the TPT to conduct pre-mission training, other pre-deployment activities, and all procedures internal to the TPT during deployment. The TPT should make all available efforts to integrate techniques, tactics, and procedures of the supported unit prior to arrival in theater, preferably during their pre-mission training live training exercises.

1-31. Aside from uniforms, gear, and weapons, the key equipment the team possesses are the mounted and dismounted loudspeaker system. While several variants exist and are in use, the basic functions and setup have little effect on its operation, nor have the employment methods drastically change. Variants and upgrades include the ability to link with other like systems and utilize Wi-Fi or Bluetooth signals to transmit recordings.

1-32. Another unique equipment capability is an audio-visual recording system. Like the speaker system, the recording system goes through periodic updates and replacements to enhance capabilities, but the basic purpose remains the same. The system records sights and sounds occurring in the OE for use in reports (footage of demonstrations, pictures of graffiti, night letters, and so on) or message development.

ALLOCATION

1-33. A Psychological Operations company is organized and trained to conduct operations in support of conventional forces for the brigade combat team echelon and below and for the special operations task force. Figure 1-2 depicts the range of attachment for Psychological Operations forces conducting tactical operations.

Note: This does not include North Atlantic Treaty Organization-directed or peacekeeping operations, as those teams may often be retained at the brigade level and attached to various elements in direct support for the duration of that operation.




Figure 1-2. Example of Psychological Operations unit allocations

TRAINING

1-34. To be an effective fighting force, the PO Branch must produce technically and tactically proficient members. Therefore, training occurs across the institutional, operational, and individual levels. Psychological Operations companies and detachments typically plan and develop their training based on parent unit mission requirements to meet standards associated with those mission-essential tasks, weapons qualifications, and influence process tasks. Depending on the mission type and the requested influence capability, training is also integrated with the supported unit prior to deployment. Training and rehearsals are inherent to the TPT fieldcraft to effectively—

- Assess the OE and TA.
- Coordinate with the staffs of supported units.
- Advise commanders on relevant influence activities.
- Conduct F2F engagements.
- Operate and employ their weapon system (including the loudspeaker) within a high stress environment.

1-35. Training is the primary method for the teams and individuals to gain proficiency and confidence. The required skills and techniques are significantly enhanced during live training events such as certification exercises, combat training center rotations, and the task force trainer exercises. These events allow detachments and teams the opportunity to rehearse and integrate their tactical skills and military occupational skill-specific tasks during maneuver training. Detachments then refine SOPs upon completion of training and exercises to capture observed and identified variables.

1-36. Implementation of SOPs enhance effectiveness and flexibility. SOPs standardize routine or recurring actions that do not require the commander's personal involvement. SOPs may also include procedures to address rare events that could cause mission failure. They provide a common base of understanding for the staff and subordinate commanders and ensure each team member knows how to execute routine (and sometimes rare) actions. The detachment develops initial SOPs from doctrinal sources, applicable portions of the higher echelon headquarters' published procedures, the commander's guidance, and techniques and procedures acquired from experience.

1-37. Task mastery requires complete comprehension of a task and its components, underlying principles, importance, and support to the larger mission. Therefore, preparation to be an advisor and training and certifying Soldiers to be trainers, advisors, and observers must ensure qualified leaders become subject matter experts and can perform all tasks to standard. There are six available training methods:

- **Live-fire training.** This involves movement and maneuver and employing weapons systems in a live training environment. It includes battle tasks, drills, and mission-essential tasks.
- **Simulations.** There are times when conducting training in a strictly live environment is impossible or impractical. Simulations allow unlimited sets and repetitions to train and retrain skills allowing individuals and units to enter live training at a much higher level of proficiency and competency.
- **Battle drill.** This is a collective action in which Soldiers and leaders rapidly process information, make decisions, and execute without a deliberate decision-making process.
- **Lane training.** Lane training is a company and below training technique designed to practice, observe, and evaluate individual tasks, collective tasks, and battle drills.
- **Opportunity training.** Also referred to as hip-pocket training, this training involves small teams training during windows of opportunity on the training schedule.
- **Sergeant's time training.** Sergeant's time training is standards-based and performance-oriented and supports unit mission-essential tasks and battle.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 2

Employment

A tactical Psychological Operations detachment is the primary formation within the Psychological Operations company that conducts tactical missions. As such, it is the element most in contact with local nationals in an area of operations. Consequently, team members add value through their capacity for direct and in-depth communications with individuals and groups. In doing so, they can become one of the most important sources of information about the OE.

OVERVIEW

2-1. Because Psychological Operations forces are a purpose-built influence capability, the focus of the detachment is primarily the execution of influence-related tasks. This is the determination which drives organization, training, and equipment issue. To ensure effective employment, it is vital that the senior team member integrates into the staff and planning processes of the supported unit. Psychological Operations staff planners and the company and detachment leadership can enable Psychological Operations team integration by coordinating with the respective supported units on behalf of the team. In addition, as with any joint or interorganizational mission supported by Psychological Operations forces, the team or detachment must always generate and maintain a solid relationship with those they support. Such initial preparation can enable the team to shorten integration efforts and rapidly begin planning and executing missions in the area of operations.

2-2. A key factor in proper employment of the team is the team leader's participation in command and staff planning. Therefore, when not on missions, the most important place for the team sergeant is the tactical operations center or joint operations center. Continuous and constructive interaction with the staff sections allows the team to build and maintain close working relationships with key command staff and allows for direct exchange of information. Whether the team conducts operations with conventional or special operations forces during peace or war, the essential influence tasks are the same. For more information on integration, refer to ADP 5-0.

SUPPORTED OPERATIONS

2-3. An *operation* is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1, Volume 1). Operations can occur in all kinds of physical environments and can change factors in all dimensions (physical, human, and information) of the OE.

2-4. During combat operations, the TPT is part of the overall fighting force employed to achieve military objectives. Therefore, team members require the necessary training to function as an integral part of the supported unit outside of the influence capability-specific tasks they need to conduct. For example, team members maintain proficiency on combat formations, movement techniques, navigation, communications, familiarization with various weapons systems, offensive and defensive tasks, and other skills specific to the mission and the supported unit. In addition, teams can contribute to the targeting process, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities.

2-5. TPT capabilities contribute to and complement the combat operations to which they are assigned. For example, while in movement, a Psychological Operations team may use sonic deception to mislead enemy forces about the number and location of friendly forces, possibly gaining an advantage during a critical time in combat operations. During non-hostile civilian contact, team members can be crucial in conducting F2F engagements. Intimate knowledge of how the supported unit operates allows the team to better plan and execute influence activities that enhance mission effectiveness, lowers risk and danger, and increases cohesion as a fighting force.

2-6. Offense, defense, and stability are inherent elements of conventional and irregular warfare. Divisions and higher echelons usually simultaneously perform some combination of all three elements in their operations. However, the lower the echelon, the more likely it is for that formation to be focused on one element at a time.

DEEP OPERATIONS

2-7. Deep operations are combined arms operations directed against uncommitted enemy forces or capabilities before they can engage friendly forces in the close fight. Deep operations also contribute to setting the conditions to transition to the next phase of an operation (for example, from defense to offense).

2-8. Deep operations focus on parts of an assigned area that are not in direct fire contact with the main body of the formation, but that may be in the future. The deep area extends beyond the forward line of troops to a distance that corresponds with the estimated reach of Army and joint capabilities. Commanders may also employ reconnaissance and security forces to conduct deep operations.

2-9. Psychological Operations detachments may have access to other joint capabilities such as deception; offensive cyber operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and targeting. Synchronizing these capabilities with influence activities and information collection can prevent the adversary from the effective employment of reserves, command and control nodes, logistics, and long-range fires.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

2-10. When the supported unit is concentrating forces prior to an attack on enemy forces, the attached team can execute sonic deception to mask or obscure actual locations of those friendly forces or even create a false perception of a location to cause enemy leaders to misdirect their forces away from the actual point of attack. Examples include coordination with higher Psychological Operations elements to execute leaflet drops with surrender messages or lethal aerial attacks at the false attack point.

2-11. The following paragraphs address the four types of offensive operations that describe the general sequence of the offense and the recommended formations.

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

2-12. The purpose of combat operations is to seek out and defeat enemy forces. Movement to contact is seeking out the smallest-sized enemy force to attack it at an unexpected time and place.

ATTACK

2-13. A key part of tactical team contributions to attack is a focus on the enemy. The use of portable loudspeakers in sonic deception is a vital tool because it can create enemy confusion, disorientation, and disordered withdraw. As mentioned previously, misleading the enemy about the time, location, and size of an attack can cause shock and surprise which negatively affect their defensive measures. In addition, sonic deception can take the form of an interpreter or other trusted native speaker calling out false orders, cries for help, and even the names of enemy soldiers (if known) to create confusion among enemy forces. If successful, false orders and call-outs can disrupt enemy defenses by creating dissension and distrust among organization members.

EXPLOIT

2-14. Exploitations seek to disintegrate enemy forces, so they have no alternative but surrender or retreat. During an attack, as friendly forces gain momentum and enemy losses and shock increase, influence efforts can be powerful. As friendly forces gain momentum, enemy losses and shock increase. This makes enemy forces increasingly susceptible to persuasive messages and psychological actions (PSYACTs). These persuasive messages and PSYACTs can further degrade the mental functions of the enemy through sleep deprivation, heightened stress and anxiety, and terror associated with combat.

PURSUIT

2-15. Pursuits entail rapid movement and decentralized control, operations designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape to destroy it.

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

2-16. When enemy forces are conducting successful offensive operations, TPTs can continue to conduct surrender appeals (and other influential messaging) and coordinate or direct PSYACTs. However, the TPT efforts could be less effective against enemies under these circumstances. Under such disadvantageous

circumstances, the TPT must have as much information as possible about potential enemy psychological vulnerabilities.

Chinese Army Vulnerability (1950)

During the Korean War, North Korean forces initially pushed South Korean and U.S.–United Nations forces into a small pocket at the southern tip of the peninsula (Pusan Perimeter). However, amphibious landings at Incheon and a subsequent drive north caused the collapse of North Korean resistance and a counterattack that drove North Korean forces all the way to the Yalu River that borders China.

At that point, communist Chinese forces joined the war to support North Korea. Their subsequent drive south pushed South Korean and U.S.–United Nations forces back down the peninsula. For a time, the Chinese seemed unstoppable; however, two key psychological factors caused them to falter.

First, Chinese logistics were not up to the task. They were ill-equipped with a mix of Soviet, surrendered Japanese, and captured U.S. material. In addition, there was inadequate food supply for the millions of Chinese troops. The hardships they endured due to inadequate logistics, harsh combat in rough terrain, and adverse weather severely impaired their combat effectiveness.

Second—and most effective for psychological warfare efforts—was that a large number of Chinese forces were former nationalist soldiers who had fought against the communist Chinese forces in their civil war as recently as a year before. These nationalists were sworn enemies of the communists who were forced into service and sent to fight in Korea against their former ally, the United States of America. Since many former nationalists had favorable attitudes toward Americans and negative attitudes about communism, they were highly susceptible to surrender appeals and other forms of influence.

2-17. During their offensive operations, the enemy likely has the advantages of momentum, higher morale, and greater resistance to friendly influence efforts. Therefore, TAC-D is an important tool for friendly defensive operations to confuse, disorient, and mislead the enemy. TAC-D can be very effective in blunting enemy operations and eroding their combat effectiveness when combined with exploiting enemy vulnerabilities (such as group oppression, economic disparities, mistreatment) to divide and subvert enemy ranks.

2-18. In addition to TAC-D, the loudspeaker can play the sound of approaching reinforcements, helicopters, tanks, and other weapons to create the impression of an impending counterattack. In situations where enemy forces lack such offensive capabilities or any effective defense against them, their fear of aerial weapons can be exploited to increase fear and disrupt their attacks. For more information on TAC-D, refer to FM 3-13.4.

2-19. In defensive operations, chemical and biological awareness level training is a good recommendation for personnel who are likely to be at risk of a chemical, biological, or perhaps radioactive attack. Further, all military personnel should receive training on chemical and biological weapons and awareness and the tasks associated with detection, reaction, notification, decontamination, and protection. STP 21-1-SMCT has more information on common tasks for Soldiers.

STABILITY OPERATIONS

2-20. Stability is a direct result of an area of operations that has functioning infrastructure, economic development, rule of law, accountable governance, essential services, and a capable indigenous military. Without those factors, a society descends into anarchy. Because of continuous contact with local populations, TPT can be instrumental during stability operations.

2-21. A *stability operation* is an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-0). These operations support governance by a host nation, an interim government, or a military government.

Stability helps in building relationships among unified action partners and promoting U.S. security interests. For more information, see ADP 3-07.

2-22. During stability operations, teams first provide on-the-ground assessments that support the accuracy of the partner force analysis. The assessments include important information useful to Psychological Operations staff planners and developers such as the issues that drive undesired behaviors among populations or the TA. Second, the team develops products (messages and actions) and pre-tests those products to determine their potential effectiveness. Feedback from pre-testing and surveys can aid in refining a military information support operations (MISO) series to enhance probability at achieving the intended desired psychological effects. Third, upon approval of the series, teams can deliver messages and conduct assessments to determine the efficacy of the series on the TA.

SECURITY COOPERATION

2-23. Security cooperation uses a combination of programs and activities by which the DOD, in coordination with the Department of State, encourages and enables countries and organizations to partner with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. Security cooperation is the activities that enable building security relationships, building partner capacity, and gaining and maintaining access. Security cooperation includes activities such as foreign internal defense, foreign humanitarian assistance, security force assistance, and civil-military operations.

2-24. Developing specific partner-nation capabilities and the capacity for security and defense addresses their internal security and their participation in or coordination with operations with U.S. forces or multinational operations. Psychological Operations forces have specialized skills that aide in developing a multinational and interorganizational work environment. As the subject matter experts in deliberate and planned influence activities, Psychological Operations forces have the resources, knowledge, and access to facilitate partnerships that support U.S. objectives. Gaining access to partner nations facilitates the U.S. defense posture, provides for freedom of movement, and supports freedom of action during military operations by enabling U.S. access to partner-nation territory, resources, and leadership.

2-25. Foreign internal defense is a legislatively mandated core activity of special operations forces, and Psychological Operations forces can adequately conduct security force assistance to support most foreign internal defense missions. Security force assistance support to foreign internal defense focuses on training and advisory assistance to partner-nation security forces—including collaborative planning with interagency and multinational partners and partner-nation authorities. The chief of mission in (or responsible for activities within) the partner nation leads the foreign internal defense effort on behalf of the Department of State and in coordination with the designated joint force command.

2-26. During foreign internal defense, Psychological Operations personnel use public information programs to execute influence activities in support of the commander and the chief of mission. The intent is to convey the United States Government (USG) narrative and assist the host-nation government and populace. Public information is important in all phases of a foreign internal defense mission. It is just as important to correctly portray the foreign internal defense effort to partner-nation personnel through influence activities as it is to employ an effective public affairs program to inform domestic audiences of the actions and objectives of current foreign internal defense actions.

2-27. Foreign assistance consists of several legally authorized programs that can be grouped into the general categories of development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. These all have the strategic purpose of promoting long-term partner-nation stability and regional stability.

2-28. Security force assistance is the set of DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capabilities of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Security force assistance can apply to a partner nation or an international organization.

2-29. Security force assistance activities that include MISO and building partner influence capacity can be conducted to organize, train, equip, rebuild or build, and advise the partner force to establish and conduct influence activities from the governmental or service level down to the tactical unit level. Security force assistance is most effective when carefully selected, properly trained, and well experienced personnel (trainers or advisors) conduct it.

2-30. TPTs may be afforded the opportunity to provide trainer or advisor assistance. This plan should be developed in conjunction with both the country team and with commanders of partner nation forces to ensure agreement on comprehensive objectives. There is no distinct boundary between training assistance and advisory assistance. Generally, training assistance is typically nonoperational in areas and under conditions where joint force personnel are not likely to be forced to engage any armed threat. On the other hand, advisory assistance may entail some operational advice and assistance beyond training in less secure areas. Security force assistance is one of the three approaches to indirect support. The other two approaches are joint and multinational exercises and exchange programs.

2-31. According to FM 3-22, assessment of the partner nation force prior to training often advocates a two-phased, incremental approach to training. Such an approach involves a transition to the partner force by either conventional or special operations forces using basic training in the first phase, and advanced training in the second.

REACHBACK

2-32. Aside from hosting product development personnel as augmenters, the team may employ a reachback capability to obtain specific assistance for messaging and product production that are better than what is available on ground. Typically, the detachment possesses limited equipment for messaging capabilities (with use of a portable broadcast system or loudspeaker). For production of printed and audio-visual messages, the detachments may rely on outside sourcing for product development. While Reserve Component Psychological Operations companies can provide an organic production capability, additional material or equipment may be required. At times a contracted vendor may be the more appropriate source for a capability that can provide a more relatable or authentic product that the TA can relate to. Depending on the criticality of the need, the request may route higher through to theater level command or directly to the Multimedia Operations Center at Fort Liberty, North Carolina.

AUGMENTATION

2-33. Team augmentation is based on need and availability and can take several forms. Typically, the command under which a Psychological Operations unit is nested uses a request for forces to designate or provide a Psychological Operations unit of action, or the capability requirement. The assigned Psychological Operations personnel provide support as needed on a rotational basis. During the deployment rotation, the augmentation may be a temporary transfer of personnel from other Psychological Operations teams or detachments in the same or neighboring theater for short-duration requirements. For example, a team requiring autonomous operation capability when there is a requirement for two-vehicle convoys when outside the safe zone can double in size by attaching another team for a total of five or six personnel and two vehicles. In that way, two teams can increase their communication reach and information-gathering abilities for a given location or situation while maintaining security. In another example, the team may augment their numbers with personnel for visual and audio-visual recording (such as combat camera personnel) to later create messages that are specific to a given location or area.

2-34. Teams can also augment their numbers through the temporary addition of support personnel for increased security, information gathering, and other tasks. For example, a team may pair with an intelligence element tasked with collecting data to answer requests for information. In doing so, the intelligence element can conduct active collection in conjunction with information collection, increasing overall usable information. Such interaction also builds working relationships between personnel from two distinct, but complementary specialties. In cases where increased mission security is the sole concern, there can be simple augmentation with infantry or other combat arms specialties. In many operations, a request to the operations section of a battalion (S-3) can produce a pool of willing and ready, non-Psychological Operations personnel to be officially authorized for missions. If unique capabilities are required for a specific need, then requests also route through the S-3 for fulfillment.

Combat Operations Augmentation

In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, TPTs in the Baghdad area established a habitual rotation of infantry Soldiers. These Soldiers would have otherwise spent their tour conducting essential, but less exciting basecamp duties. Team sergeants provided augmentees with briefs on team practices, dos and don'ts, awareness about requests for information, and other mission information.

The teams then employed the augmentees as drivers, gunners, and mounted security. The augmentees participated in activities they would not have experienced otherwise. The TPT gained increased security and additional capabilities for information collection. The key was obtaining command approval through a clear understanding of the benefits of augmentation.

Chapter 3

Movement

Tactical movement involves the movement of a unit assigned a mission under combat conditions and when not in direct ground contact with the enemy. The ordered arrangement or configuration of those units to move in the area of operations allow for the optimal opportunity to meet the specific intent of the mission. Movement battle drills can be conducted by including land navigation and route selection training and incorporating communications equipment and their associated tasks.

METHODS

3-1. Whether mounted movement or dismounted movement, the method employed during movement depends on the—

- Situation.
- Size and composition of the unit.
- Distance the unit must cover.
- Urgency of execution.
- Complexity of the terrain.
- Availability, suitability, and capacity of the different means of transportation.

DISMOUNTED MOVEMENT

3-2. *Dismounted movement* is a movement of troops and equipment mainly by foot, with limited support by vehicles (FM 3-90). Because of the nature of the dismounted movement, it can be either stealthy or openly acknowledged. In addition, movement by foot can be physically strenuous and dangerous, underscoring the need for increased physical readiness and training rehearsals for common tasks.

3-3. There are two primary influence-specific tasks for the dismounted TPT. First, the TPT coordinates actions and disseminates messages to influence selected foreign individuals and groups within the area of operations. The actions and messages can be narrowly focused for specific TAs, or broad to address issues and topics that numerous organizations, demographics, leaders, and key communicators may have in common.

3-4. Second, the TPT collects influence-relevant information. The information is local in nature and may not be relevant to the entire area of operations. The types of information include—

- Factors of interest for analysis within the OE (psychological factors).
- Specific feedback about the actions and messages of proposed series (pre-testing).
- Existing actions and messages (post-testing).

Attachment and Proficiency

No attachment is seamless, but tailored training allows the team to be better able to operate in the same manner as the unit of attachment. Having additional training enhances team functionality in dangerous situations where the unit of attachment would otherwise have to expend resources to protect and defend the team. Under such conditions, the attached Psychological Operations Soldiers do not diminish the organic capabilities of the unit of attachment, they potentially improve the security and survivability of the organization in dangerous and volatile situations.

3-5. Typically, the team operates together for quick communication, ease of employment, and other advantages. The assistant team leader and speaker operator could be placed elsewhere in the formation to provide quick responses for the lead, flanks, and rear of a formation. Placement of a team within column, in

line, file, wedge, and vee formations depend on METT-TC (I) factors and are subject to mission commander approval. For details on platoon and squad formations, refer to ATP 3-21.8.

3-6. In dismounted operations the limited ability of the team to transport organic equipment warrants consideration and critical decision-making from the team leader. When lacking the ability to transport all authorized equipment, the team leader should prioritize weapons systems (including the dismounted loudspeaker system) and survivability equipment over other equipment, especially if the other equipment is redundant to equipment transported elsewhere within the immediate supported unit.

MOUNTED MOVEMENT

3-7. *Mounted movement* is the movement of troops and equipment by combat and tactical vehicles (FM 3-90). Mounted movement provides detachments the ability to navigate over a variety of terrain and to travel long distances to infiltrate an area of operations. For Psychological Operations forces, mounted operations allow teams to—

- Reach and interact with populations and key leaders.
- Employ the loudspeaker system to deliver messages and information within an area.
- Observe patterns of life and influence-focused reconnaissance.
- Provide additional logistical support.

3-8. Mobility training improves the survivability of teams employed in moderate to high-risk environments during multiple mission types across large areas of terrain. Members must also be prepared to change to any course of action while remaining ready to engage hostile threats.

3-9. In many tactical situations mission variables may dictate use of supported-unit tactical vehicles (as opposed to the TPTs organic vehicle) either operating the vehicle directly or acting as vehicle crew. When available or directed, this poses new considerations for the team leader when conducting pre-mission planning and rehearsals, such as—

- Is the team trained and licensed on the equipment?
- How and will the team be able to accomplish its dissemination mission?
- If the team is split between vehicles how will this affect command and control and communication?

3-10. Some additional tasks to consider for survivability and risk mitigation during mounted operations include—

- Specific vehicle driving techniques.
- Vehicle recover procedures.
- Emergency bailout procedures.
- Danger areas and explosive hazards.
- General vehicle maintenance.
- Tactical medical care.

3-11. All TPT members must receive training as drivers, vehicle commanders, and gunners to assume the role as needed. Once trained, periodic and regular rotation of personnel through all positions increases their proficiency in the required duties. For more information on mounted movement techniques and formations, refer to ATP 4-01.45 and ATP 3-21.8.

PROTECTION

3-12. Survivability of the force and preserving combat power requires protection from threats and hazards. This is especially critical for tactical elements when conducting missions outside the security of a larger military installation and or a designated green zone that may be in a neutral or U.S.-controlled area.

3-13. Forces conduct area security tasks to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specific area. According to ADP 3-37, movement corridors, checkpoints and combat outposts, patrols, and convoy security are crucial tools of protection that also allow freedom of movement.

3-14. Regardless of the chosen techniques and formations, elements must be prepared to react to enemy contact. Consistent rehearsals of basic Soldier tasks while integrating unit level tactical SOPs can maximize the combat effectiveness of the team. Training on 360-degree security combines maximum visibility for situational awareness and protection.

3-15. Both static ranges and movement training lanes encourage weapons proficiency. Familiarization with interlocking sectors of fire and mutual support from adjacent weapons systems, build on additional force protection and defense actions.

NAVIGATION

3-16. For Psychological Operations teams abroad, navigation is a critical skill for all members whether in an urban environment or an austere environment. Orientation skills and map reading are essential to any military Service member. Updated intelligence reports and travel restrictions aid navigation by informing Soldiers about dangerous areas and hazardous conditions. In addition, satellite navigation systems provide accuracy and additional route planning capabilities; however, they should never be the sole source of navigation because electronic systems sometimes fail.

Note: Use of commercial global positioning system devices in a war zone is against Joint Chief of Staff policy unless a unit obtains a waiver from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Commercial global positioning system devices do not have anti-spoofing and anti-jamming capabilities like military ones.

3-17. Route planning and route reconnaissance are two essential tasks for pre-deployment and pre-mission training. Successful mission completion requires unrestricted freedom of movement. Freedom of movement is a result of understanding the physical terrain, weather conditions, and traffic conditions (which are also factors of safe movements).

3-18. It is important to identify civil considerations since communicating with host-nation law enforcement (and other host-nation representatives) may be a viable option for current hazard and traffic conditions that may affect navigation. Because civil considerations include cultural considerations, navigating with festivities or religious observances in mind also facilitates successful movement.

COMMUNICATION

3-19. Communications are required to—

- Control movement.
- Coordinate with friendly units.
- Report responses to enemy actions.
- Request and control supporting arms fires.
- Request support for medical and casualty evacuations.
- Report the progress of the convoy march to the headquarters.

3-20. The use of tactical radios (very high frequency modulation, frequency modulation and satellite communications) should be organic to the detachment. However, certain instances require equipment transfer from the supported unit to ensure complete interoperability. As with weapons system, communications systems trainings must be consistent to develop strong familiarization. The battalion or brigade signal staff (S-6) of the unit headquarters or support battalion has communications equipment subject matter experts. These experts can provide instruction and guidance to others on communications methods and procedures.

3-21. With the implementation of new technology capabilities, data communications is becoming the primary means of communication. As a baseline, the detachment must be familiar with the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (or similar system such as the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System). The TPT must also become familiar with the equipment and platforms of ally nations as this may be beneficial to detachment members. This is especially relevant when the detachment directly supports or conducts operations in conjunction with ally nations.

Chapter 4

Message Delivery

Psychological Operations forces use a variety of means to deliver messages directly to foreign populations. Although there are several media and messaging platforms available for dissemination, this chapter details two traditional means: conducting loudspeaker operations and dropping leaflets from aircraft. Loudspeaker operations serve a dual purpose of expanding F2F communication to large groups and as a means of replicating various sounds to achieve specific psychological effects. Leaflets have been a fundamental tool for the U.S. military since World War I and continue to be so in denied locations. This chapter offers a review of the tactics, techniques, and procedures for the team conducting aerial message delivery and loudspeaker operations in a deployed environment.

Note: With the introduction of portable broadcast dissemination platforms to the forces, companies will need to create tailored training methods to integrate into missions.

FUNDAMENTALS OF THE LOUDSPEAKER

4-1. The loudspeaker is a specialized piece of equipment that amplifies and projects sound. Loudspeakers serve an important role in enhancing volume and presence, examples include crowd control during civil unrest to callouts in support of direct action against hostile individuals. As a communication device, the loudspeaker communicates information and elicits desired behaviors. As a sound generator, it affects a target's perception about what is reality (as in sonic deception). Loudspeaker operations are a traditional part of TPT capabilities, and it is one of several activities a TPT can execute. Figure 4-1 depicts a vehicle-mounted loudspeaker.



Figure 4-1. Example of vehicle-mounted loudspeaker

4-2. Because loudspeaker operations allow the team to immediately and directly communicate with large groups in close proximity, they constitute large-scale F2F communication. This is a key factor that makes loudspeaker operations better than other means to reach targets and audiences in certain situations. People within earshot become captive listeners who must actively work to avoid hearing messages. Even if they do manage to avoid hearing the content of the message, they still experience some psychological effect just knowing the team is in close proximity. Furthermore, the TPT can observe many of the reactions to the broadcasts. Then, the team leader can determine the effectiveness of any messages or sounds and whether to adjust subsequent broadcasts. In addition, enemy countermeasures (such as weapons fire or noises intended

to drown out loudspeaker broadcasts) may be impact indicators. When enemies directly attack the source of a broadcast, it may be out of concern the broadcast will have an effect. Conversely, no reaction may indicate broadcasts are not having the intended effect.

ADVANTAGES

4-3. Loudspeaker operations provide specific advantages over other communication means as identified in the paragraphs that follow.

Mobility

4-4. The system and users are readily transported by air, land, and sea to the targeted group. This is particularly true of the portable next generation loudspeaker system (figure 4-2). Therefore, if the target moves the team can also move the system to maintain contact with the target. In some cases, the vehicle-mounted system can be remounted on another platform (such as a tank, boat, or other platform) to take advantage of more mobility or better armor.



Figure 4-2. Example of loudspeaker system

Unassisted Reception

4-5. Of all of the electronic means of communication, only the loudspeaker allows the recipient to hear messages without the recipient requiring special equipment, unlike radio, television, or internet-based messaging.

Literacy Irrelevance

4-6. Recipients do not need to be literate to hear and understand loudspeaker messages or noises. In fact, if large numbers of enemy combatants are illiterate, loudspeaker broadcasts can be a key means of reaching them.

Similarity to Interpersonal Communication

4-7. Loudspeaker messages most closely resemble F2F communication, which allows personalized and rapidly tailored broadcasts. Such direct communication also expresses messages more persuasively than less direct communication means.

Improved Targeting Accuracy

4-8. The operator aims a loudspeaker in a similar way as any other weapon system and tailors messages to each target. Because of the inherent speed in which loudspeakers can respond to opportunities, they can reach targets more quickly than other media.

Immediate Evaluation

4-9. Operators can assess the effects of a message or sound during and immediately after the broadcast by directly observing target response(s).

Organic to the Team

4-10. Loudspeaker systems (vehicle and portable) are organic to the team. This allows the team to largely control the specific message content and when and where they deliver messages without having to coordinate with higher echelons for employment. For radio, leaflets, and other messaging means, there is a substantial approval and coordination process to follow before message delivery.

DISADVANTAGES

4-11. The loudspeaker system also has inherent disadvantages that the team has to address during operations. The following paragraphs describe several disadvantages.

Range Limitations

4-12. Combinations of power output, portability, and ruggedness can limit the effective broadcast range of any system. The more designers emphasize one of these factors, the less attainable the other two factors are. For example, any adjustment of portability affects system output. The portable loudspeaker system has a lightweight amplifier, so its output is considerably less than a vehicle-mounted system. Because the vehicle-mounted system can carry a heavy amplifier and power it off the vehicle's batteries, output is considerable. Mission requirements determine which system is applicable, but OE factors determine how effective the systems will be in operation. Whichever system the team employs, they must train to account for external factors affecting loudspeaker operations. According to the inverse-square law, as a loudspeaker broadcast goes out, sound pressure decreases 6 decibels each time the distance doubles from the speaker to the target.

Technical Failures

4-13. Microphones, recorders or reproducers, and connectors are the three components with the highest failure rates. Although these parts are designed to withstand rugged conditions, operational realities continually test component durability. It is important that the operator conducts proper preventive checks and maintenance and has spare items readily available, when feasible.

Enemy Countermeasures

4-14. Enemy leaders attempt to prevent loudspeaker messages from affecting their forces. They may target loudspeaker teams and equipment to prevent others from hearing the message. Also, when U.S. forces use the long cables to place distance between the operator and the speaker, the enemy may cut the cable, then ambush Soldiers attempting to repair the break. If the operator uses a wireless feature, that presents another vulnerability the enemy could use to override a broadcast and hijack the system to broadcast their own message.

Vulnerability to Enemy Fire

4-15. Enemies may target loudspeakers to stop the broadcasts. There are several techniques to counter enemy efforts. First, the systems are designed to be mobile. If enemy counterfire is expected, survival and continued operation requires the team to move quickly after each broadcast. Second, operators can shorten the broadcasts. Finally, the systems have a built-in capability that uses either an extension cable linking to the speaker or wireless technology. In either case, the goal is to separate the speaker as the source of the sound

from the operator. If the enemy hits the speaker while it is in remote configuration, the team will survive to fight another day.

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

4-16. Environmental factors include aspects of the weather (such as temperature, humidity, and wind) and the variances in the terrain, which are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Weather

4-17. Weather conditions affect the range and clarity of the system as well as affect system function. Heavy rain and thunderstorms can create such loud noises that broadcasts of any significant range are impractical. In addition, rust, corrosion, and other conditions resulting from weather conditions could damage the system.

Temperature and Humidity

4-18. Dry air carries sound waves faster than humid air and sound travels further in cold air than in hot air. The fairly rare combination of cold, dry air is optimum for broadcasts (unless there is snow on the ground, which absorbs and muffles sound).

Wind

4-19. Wind also significantly affects broadcasting strength. Wind can be either an impediment or an exploitable factor. Operators who position themselves with the wind at their backs and blow towards the target exploit the wind direction and force to carry the sound farther (up to several hundred meters). However, broadcasting into the wind significantly decreases the range and clarity of the system.

4-20. The wind also deflects sound. Operators can compensate for this effect by aiming the speaker to the right or left in the same way a Soldier uses windage when firing a weapon. Figure 4-3 is a simplified depiction of offsetting a speaker broadcast to compensate for wind. Conversely, as wind speed increases, the broadcast range decreases such that winds exceeding 15 knots create turbulence that negates broadcasts beyond a very short range.




Figure 4-3. Simplified example of loudspeaker broadcast adjustment for wind direction

Terrain

4-21. The perfect terrain for peak audibility is across water or flat ground that lacks trees or thick brush, which would absorb or muffle sound. However, such terrain is rare. In places like Afghanistan, Colombia, and the Philippines, operations frequently occur in hilly and mountainous terrain. In such terrain, operators

place the loudspeaker cone on the forward slope facing the enemy. However, echoes are a frequent result of this terrain that make these environments more challenging since broadcasts can be deflected and bounced in unpredictable ways and make compensation for the deflection difficult. These echoes can also significantly reduce or completely erode broadcast clarity.

4-22. In built-up areas such as cities, buildings and other structures can interfere with or block broadcasts. Therefore, careful placement of speakers is necessary to maximize efficiency.

PROFICIENCY

4-23. Psychological Operations companies and detachments plan and develop their training to meet the standards associated with their mission-essential tasks, critical tasks, and weapons qualifications and familiarization. Depending on the mission of the assigned Psychological Operations unit, training should be integrated with the supported unit prior to deployment when applicable.

4-24. Consistent and frequent training and rehearsals with the loudspeaker are necessary for TPTs to effectively operate and employ the loudspeaker within a high stress environment. Understanding the capabilities and limitations of the loudspeaker systems aid TPT members in making timely decisions about the positioning, direction, and time on target to access the intended audience. Regardless of technological advancements, disseminating information through the loudspeaker system requires defined SOPs and consistent rehearsals for the TPT to master its equipment and communication techniques.

EMPLOYMENT

4-25. The portable and vehicle or aerial-mounted loudspeaker systems are relatively close proximity tools that fall within small arms range. Anything beyond that distance requires a different platform (such as radio and leaflets). Operators aim the loudspeaker system in a specific direction, tailor or choose the message or sounds for a specific type of target and assess any effects to determine if the target should be re-engaged.

4-26. The overarching principle of loudspeaker operations is that optimum employment of the system to achieve a psychological effect requires each use to be specifically tailored to a unique situation. The team employs the loudspeaker to either transmit a voice message or information to an individual or group or to re-create sounds (as in sonic deception) to confuse and mislead the target. Broadcasts should normally be short to keep listener interest, ensure listeners hear the full message (under counterattack scenarios it is necessary to make messages even shorter or break them into several logically sequenced shorter messages).

EXPLOITATIONS

4-27. When friendly forces defeat enemy forces or break through their lines, exploitation becomes vital to create and augment psychological effects. Surrounded, bypassed, and isolated enemy units are frequently confused, shocked, and vulnerable to sonic deception and messages that further undermine morale, erode unit cohesion, and otherwise decrease combat effectiveness. The TPT seeks to exploit the target's existing psychological vulnerabilities to push them beyond endurance and erode and affect their mental processes. In doing so, the team can affect enemy leader decision making, subordinate willingness to follow orders, and attitudes about continued resistance. Key goals are desertion, dissension, malingering, mutiny, and possibly surrender.

Note: the ultimate goal may not be surrender of enemy forces. Prisoners of war become a huge logistical issue with respect to confinement, guarding, housing, clothing, feeding, and provision of other basic needs. Instead, the goal may be to cause enemy forces to mutiny or desert. This could create a nightmare scenario for the enemy government that may have to address elements or entire units of their own forces which are demoralized, possibly hostile, and a potential threat.

RETROGRADE MOVEMENTS

4-28. During withdrawals and retreats, the team uses the loudspeaker to broadcast messages that help keep roadways cleared for military traffic, control the movement of displaced civilians, and warn against acts of sabotage. The team can also conduct sonic deception to mislead enemy forces into following non-existent

retreating forces. Finally, the team can use sonic deception to convince enemy forces there are more defenders than there are to delay an enemy from attacking a position and allow friendly defenders to escape.

4-29. During conflict, when U.S. and enemy lines have stabilized or combat operations are halted on both sides pending negotiations, the TPT still conducts loudspeaker missions to undermine enemy morale and erode combat effectiveness in preparation for possible resumption of combat operations. The team focuses enemy attention on personal values, economic issues, and anything with potential psychological effects, such as—

- Divisions and disputes between socio-economic classes.
- Political party rivalries.
- Ethnic, racial, and sectarian frictions.
- Dissension between enemy officers and enlisted soldiers.

4-30. In messages seeking to degrade the adversary will to fight, the TPT may emphasize nostalgic themes to make enemy combatants homesick and increase anxiety about events on the home front. The TPT may also use music and female voices to enhance the messaging effects. In addition, the team may broadcast factual news reports, especially information withheld from enemy forces. This last point is especially important if enemy forces can independently verify the accuracy of the reports. Since this increases the credibility of the team and may increase the targets' tendency to listen.

STABILITY OPERATIONS

4-31. During stability operations, the team broadcasts instructions and proclamations to civilians as part of general assistance to civil affairs efforts to control the population. In terms of control, loudspeaker messages can aid in—

- Crowd control.
- Operation of traffic control points.
- Road clearance.
- Channeling of displaced people.
- Announcement of the location of food, water, shelter, and other required information.

APPLICATION

4-32. The key advantage of a portable loudspeaker system is that it can be positioned anywhere the Soldier can go. In contrast, the vehicle-mounted system can only be placed on military vehicles with a compatible electrical system that can handle the power demands. Typically, the main hurdle with mounting the system on an unprepared vehicle is rigging a stable mount. The following sections address each system separately.

PORTABLE LOUDSPEAKER SYSTEM

4-33. Soldiers can employ the portable system almost anywhere, such as in friendly troop positions, observation posts, and other prepared locations. Because of its inherent portability, the system is highly mobile and can be repositioned rapidly or even used on the move.

4-34. Loudspeaker operations can be vital to friendly forces in contact with enemy forces. Such operations include the traditional surrender appeals and instructions, TAC-D broadcasts, harassment, and other uses to create confusion among enemy combatants. In combat scenarios, teams use long speaker wires and the remote capability to place some distance between themselves and the speaker assembly. Once the system begins broadcasting, enemy forces can target the source of the sound with everything from small-arms fire and grenades to mortar, rockets, and other artillery. Sometimes, the TPT can draw attention to the loudspeaker system by broadcasting a programmed wail. This is particularly useful if the goal is to draw enemy attention away from the location of a friendly force attack or to expose enemy fixed mortar or artillery positions by eliciting a response.

VEHICLE OR AERIAL-MOUNTED LOUDSPEAKER SYSTEM

4-35. The inherent flexibility of the vehicle-mounted system is that it can be placed on a variety of platforms, including armored vehicles. The presence of an armored vehicle among threat forces creates a strong psychological effect that the loudspeaker can both exploit and augment—particularly when threat forces lack comparable vehicles and/or a credible defense against armored vehicles.

4-36. A key advantage of the vehicle or aerial-mounted system is that the power output allows the broadcast sounds to overcome a lot of ambient noise. For example, the sound of light-weapons fire drowns out an unamplified human voice; however, the vehicle-mounted system that projects an amplified voice can be louder than other sounds in the immediate area. It is noteworthy that the system cannot overcome the noise that artillery or bombing creates, so the operator has to determine when system use is feasible and likely to be effective.

Fake Orders

Another type of sonic deception entails broadcasting fake orders to enemy formations in combat. In this type of scenario, U.S. forces close with an enemy formation. During the engagement, the TPT broadcasts live or recorded faked orders in the target language over the loudspeaker system to either cause enemy troops to follow the wrong orders or create confusion among them. In either case, the confusion can disrupt enemy force responses and inhibit their ability to fight effectively. The difficulty for the speaker operator is to raise the volume of the broadcast enough for the sound to rise above the surrounding noise of weapons fire while not so much that it is readily apparent the orders are coming from outside their own lines. In the stress of battle, enemy combatants may not have the clarity of mind to note the direction from which the orders are coming if the sound volume is comparable to what they expect to hear.

DIRECTING A BROADCAST

4-37. Key tasks for a TPT in unusual circumstances focus on the activities between occupying a broadcast position and actually broadcasting. There are several preparatory actions that increase the effectiveness of the broadcast from a measure of performance perspective.

4-38. Exact positioning is very dependent on mission variables of METT-TC (I) and accounts for poor observation, altered environmental conditions, and changes in enemy location and activities. The team sergeant coordinates changes in the loudspeaker positioning with higher headquarters to ensure clearance of indirect fires and other measures to avoid fratricide. The team may also need to employ ambiguous sounds to exfiltrate the area. For specific team training on occupying a speaker position and broadcasting, refer to STP 33-37F14-SM-TG.

ESTIMATE RANGE

4-39. Estimating range is an important factor in successful message delivery using the optimum output of the speaker system. Too much power output drains the batteries of the system unnecessarily and may create distortion and other noises that decrease audibility. Too little power output may not allow the target to hear the message. Accurate estimates of the range from the speaker array and the target allows the operator to optimize the output. In addition, familiarity with the system and practice in field conditions allows the operator to determine the appropriate output for a given range and its conditions more accurately.

4-40. An accurate way to determine distance to the target is using the soccer field method (an adaptation of the older American football field method). Figure 4-4 illustrates how imagining stacked soccer fields can allow the operator to visualize what 300 meters looks like. The operator estimates how many soccer fields lies between the speaker array and the target. A variation of this method is using a pop-up target firing range to visualize range to targets from 25 meters to 300 meters out.




Figure 4-4. Soccer fields stacked to gauge distance

4-41. A third way to determine range is to use the flash-to-bang method with weapons fire. Observe (watch) the weapons fire at a distance, then count how long it takes to hear the sound of weapons fire after seeing it to determine the distance to fires origin. If using this method, multiply the number of seconds by 330 meters per second (the speed of sound) to estimate the range from the sound source to the operator’s location.

4-42. For example, if an operator observes a distant muzzle flash and four seconds later hears the sound of fires, the calculation is 4 seconds X 330 meters per second = 1,320 meters. Table 4-1 provides some time-to-range figures.

Table 4-1. Time-to-range targets

Time (seconds)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Range (meters)	330	660	990	1,320	1,650	1,980	2,310	2,640	2,970	3,300

4-43. Just as terrain and weather can negatively or positively affect audibility, they can do the same to target appearance, thereby influencing the estimation of range. Table 4-2 correlates some terrain and weather conditions to their effects on visibility.

Table 4-2. Effects of terrain and weather on target appearance

Conditions Making Targets Appear Closer	Conditions Making Targets Appear More Distant
Bright, clear daylight conditions	Foggy, rainy, hazy, or twilight conditions
Illuminated targets	Silhouetted targets
Targets at higher elevations	Targets at lower elevations
Large targets	Small targets
Brightly colored targets (white, red, and yellow)	Darkly colored targets
Targets with color contrasts	Camouflaged targets
Targets viewed across a ravine, hollow, river, or depression	
Targets at sea	

DETERMINE WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION

4-44. A key part of broadcast preparation is determining wind speed and direction. For wind speed, military weather reports can aid in determining if a broadcast would be feasible. If surface winds are over 15 knots, a loudspeaker broadcast would likely be inaudible even if close to the target (a position that is infeasible except in only the most permissive environments).

4-45. Whenever possible, speaker operators coordinate either through their chain of command or the gaining unit to obtain weather information from the staff weather officer or comparable source. Weather information (such as used for leaflet drop calculations) can provide fairly accurate predictions of surface winds for monitored areas. However, if the area in which a team operates is not monitored, the speaker operator will have to estimate winds on the spot and adjust the broadcast accordingly.

CONSIDER HUMAN FACTORS OF EXPLOITING SONIC DECEPTION

4-46. In the chaos of combat, loud and continuous noise both captures a combatant's attention and scatters it. In the subsequent confusing flood of sensory input, a combatant must maintain awareness of the location of numerous targets lost in the noise of battle. At the same time, the combatant must track the location and actions of fellow combatants by using more subtle audio input (such as sound of movement and verbal communication) and remain aware of potential escape routes and vulnerable areas where the enemy could approach. The fighter must filter certain sounds to execute tasks and ignore or block others to prevent their interference. Consequently, the fighter unconsciously monitors a variety of sounds without trying to localize them. This can be especially true in the case of the human voice. Human hearing is capable of a specified frequency range. The combination of various frequencies and those nearing the limits of audible noise can create confusion whether it is coming from in front of or behind the listener. All these realities are exploitable vulnerabilities in sonic deception.

4-47. With these vulnerabilities in mind, TPTs can broadcast faked enemy leader verbal orders to enemy troops convincingly if executed using the right techniques that take advantage of conditions and human nature. The science that supports this effort and team-level experimentation in realistic training can help Soldiers achieve the necessary skills and techniques to exploit human factors and conditions.

The Science Behind the Brain and Sound

4-48. Target signal refers to sounds emitted in the OE that contain meaningful information or message content. Target signals can originate from sources in one or more locations and can be competing with or counteracting noise the listener hears. Irrelevant sounds that compete with purposeful sounds can be distracting noise that unpredictably influence an intended target or prevent the target from hearing a coherent or intelligible sound.

4-49. As differences in sound levels between the broadcast sound and environmental noise diminish, the broadcast sound is less distinguishable from background noise. To stand out from background noise, the broadcast sound level should be substantially higher than the noise level and should be physically separated from the noise source. Doing so helps ensure the target or listener can detect the broadcast sound, recognize it for what it is, and understand it (if speech) in spite of the background noise. According to *Measuring Directional Masking in a Sound Field Using Adaptive Threshold Procedures*, when directional noise is present in a background, a listener's ability to determine the location of a particular sound source degrades when the source originates from the rear rather than from along the frontal-horizontal plane.

4-50. Auditory spatial awareness is listener awareness of sound sources in the environment, to include source detection. Of all the human senses, hearing is the only directional sense with 360-degree coverage, and it is not dependent on the amount of light available. *Auditory Spatial Perception: Auditory Localization* states that in normal circumstances, this awareness allows even the average person to determine sound source direction, estimate its distance, and assess to what degree conditions in the immediate area affect how sound spreads. This phenomenon is exploitable in situations where there are structures or terrain features behind an enemy line that create echoes which can obscure or redirect sounds, obscure target signal source, and confuse auditory spatial awareness. This may also occur when enemy combatants wear helmets that can reflect sounds in such a way it seems to the listener the sounds originate from behind. These conditions create misdirection.

4-51. Keeping the messages very short in the form of barked orders that are too quick to focus on (such as, “Shift left!” or “Bound right!”) hinder enemy attempts to triangulate on the sound by moving the head to determine sound direction. By broadcasting quick, difficult to determine orders and shifting the speaker array to different areas of the enemy line, the loudspeaker operator can create confusion among enemy ranks and potentially lower combat effectiveness.

4-52. Usually, to determine direction, people are hard-wired to rely on the information at the beginning of a sound and the precedence effect (an unconscious mental process in which the listener makes an initial determination based on the first arriving sound and dismisses subsequent similar sounds from other locations). However, if the brain receives conflicting input from sight and hearing, vision typically overrides hearing and circumvents the precedence effect. *Auditory Spatial Perception: Auditory Localization* highlights that in this context, strong, learned expectations can override all of the brain’s “wiring”. For example, the sound of an eagle’s cry played on ground-mounted loudspeakers leads most listeners to look skyward. The precedence effect is exploitable when broadcasting the sound of helicopters at night, in mountains (difficult to pinpoint source with the echoes), or in urban terrain. The sound of something they fear can make enemy combatants distracted or panicked.

4-53. Misdirection also aids in confusing an enemy combatant’s ability to determine source. In general, the ability to identify a sound source location decreases proportional to a decrease in volume. Other factors can affect the general rule, such as source location, listener location, and the angle of separation between the two. As noted in *Measuring Directional Masking in a Sound Field Using Adaptive Threshold Procedures*, when the sound source is clear (not competing with other ambient sounds) and originates from directly in front of the listener or on an arc of 90 degrees on either side irrespective of separation distance, location identification can be fairly accurate.

4-54. Figure 4-5 depicts directional determination zones under ideal conditions based on the previous description. Consequently, obscuring the location of the loudspeaker itself removes the visual cue that would otherwise aid an enemy combatant in determining direction. An additional measure is adjusting the speaker volume to the lowest threshold to be clearly audible, while not too loud to be readily detectable as originating from in front of the listener. Finally, shifting the direction of the broadcast closer to the sides of the listener’s hearing can further obscure sound source.




Figure 4-5. Directional determination zones

Practical Application of Sonic Deception

4-55. In sonic deception simulating aircraft noise or other sounds, speaker operators exploit the characteristics of a moving sound source that have both angular and radial velocity cues. Angular velocity is the speed the sound source rotates around the listener, while radial velocity is the speed the sound source moves toward or away from the listener. Figure 4-6, page 30, depicts angular and radial velocities from the

listener's perspective based on the previous description. These velocities (in concert with the Doppler effect and sound intensity) provide cues as a listener detects changes in sound intensity and frequency that indicates movement of the sound source. An approaching sound source increases in frequency, while a receding sound source lowers in frequency. Research suggests listeners are predisposed to underestimate the speed of a sound source for short durations, but can be more accurate for longer durations. However, *Auditory Spatial Perception: Auditory Localization* identifies that numerous real-world examples also suggest listeners overestimate how close an approaching sound source is by a factor of two, such as when drivers fail to notice an ambulance with an active siren until it is about 100m from them.




Figure 4-6. Angular and radial velocities

4-56. Understanding how angular and radial velocities work on the human ear allows a speaker operator to better simulate sounds of moving objects such as helicopters, tanks, tactical vehicles, and troops on the move. For example, an operator uses the speaker's volume control to increase the sound of a tank moving to simulate its approach (radial velocity). To simulate angular velocity of a moving object, the operator swivels the speaker array in a steady arc from one side to another in a way that makes it mimic a helicopter moving across the sky. Such sweeping of the speaker array would be much faster for a jet airplane than for a slower helicopter. Realistic field training allows a team to gain the skills and techniques necessary to make the sonic deception believable and repeatable under a variety of conditions.

4-57. Under ideal conditions, listeners can reliably locate a sound source, but it becomes more difficult if the source is elevated and to the rear. The difficulty compounds when sounds rise and fall, as in speech, which listeners may interpret as sources changing location. The difficulty can increase even more in the form of reversal errors, in which the listener's determination of the sound direction is the opposite of the actual direction. Several factors causing or contributing to reversal errors can include reflections from nearby objects, the type of headgear the listener wears, and other competing sounds. The error decreases the longer the sound lasts as the listener turns the head to better determine direction, assesses the environment, and assesses numerous sound cues. *Auditory Spatial Perception: Auditory Localization* notes that more importantly for the speaker operator, the reversal errors are far more common for speech than non-speech sounds. The key lesson for operators is to typically keep messages short to prevent—

- Triangulation (as mentioned earlier).
- Filtering the broadcast sound from other noises.
- Determining how the environment affects sound.

4-58. Another consideration in speaker operations is the closer a broadcast sound is to background noise, the more difficult it is to detect its location. In addition, most of a broadcast sound may be clearly audible, but key portions at the higher frequencies that are necessary for the brain to determine location may be absent, so the perceived source location and the actual location may quite different. Sound increases as high as 20 decibels above the minimum level for detection may be necessary for a listener to identify what the sound

is (this means that at the minimum volume level for detection, a target may hear a sound, but not be able to identify it). If the listener is unfamiliar with a sound, the volume will have to be higher to permit locating the source. According to *Measuring Directional Masking in a Sound Field Using Adaptive Threshold Procedures*, if a sound source is not visible, listeners tend to perceive the source location to the rear.

4-59. From the operator's perspective, piggybacking on existing sounds is the ideal means to confuse targets since this obscures broadcast location. To do this, the broadcast sound should be 20 decibels above environmental sounds to be detected as a separate sound and identified for what it is intended to be. At that level, if the target does not recognize the sound, determining location may be delayed for several seconds as the mind focuses on identifying the sound first. Any increase over that 20 decibel threshold would likely allow the target to determine the location of even unfamiliar sounds.

Aerial Loudspeaker Employment

Previously, Army Psychological Operations forces fielded a pod-mounted aerial loudspeaker system for the UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter. However, the Army discontinued the program and Psychological Operations forces turned in all systems for disposal. The need for such a system remains in certain applications, such as during civil authority information support dissemination activities or other aerial loudspeaker missions in permissive or low-threat environments. In 2018, U.S. Air Force experimenters finalized testing a loudspeaker system for search and rescue missions and recommended approval as an official program. If approved and fielded, the configuration can easily be adapted for Psychological Operations aerial loudspeaker missions.

The Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) Model 500X Mobile Mount (MMT) loudspeaker system specifically mounts to the USAF HH-60G airframe (comparable to the U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhawk). The system is a separate, battery-powered (4 to 6 hours of continuous operation) loudspeaker array and control board an operator uses to conduct aerial broadcasts of messages and sounds. Unlike the old pod-mounted aerial system with an effective range of about 1800 meters (under satisfactory conditions), the LRAD 500X has an effective range up to 2000 meters over the aircraft noise. Also, unlike the obsolete, fixed pod-mount, the new system is internal to the aircraft with an integral mount that allows the operator to both pan and tilt the array for optimum aiming. This allows the operator to better aim the system rather than forcing the pilot to bank and circle to keep the sound output on the target location. Finally, from a cybersecurity perspective, the system does not pose a threat as all components are manufactured in the United States and remain low risk if operators use standalone DOD-authorized computers to load sound files to the loudspeaker system. Figure 4-7, page 32, depicts the LRAD 500X during testing.



Figure 4-7. The Long Range Acoustic Device model 500x during test

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

4-60. Aside from weather, there are many environmental conditions that affect loudspeaker broadcasts. Hills and tall buildings can deflect sound in unpredictable ways, at least at first. However, repeated loudspeaker operations can allow operators to learn how to take advantage of the acoustics of a location. For a TPT routinely operating in a city center with tall buildings, the team determines the best locations for clear broadcasts and learns how to use the acoustics of the buildings to amplify or increase the range of a broadcast, or to exploit echoes to make messages or noises appear to come from behind enemy lines of control. The following environmental conditions are some that TPTs consider when conducting loudspeaker broadcasts.

FOREST AND JUNGLE

4-61. Large groupings of trees, undergrowth, and so on absorb sound. Therefore, the broadcast distance must be shorter to ensure the sound reaches the target location.

ICE AND FROZEN GROUND

4-62. Cold conditions with significant icing of the ground or water bodies tend to reflect sound waves. Therefore, broadcasting parallel to icy or frozen surfaces, allows the sound to travel further and maintain clarity longer.

SNOW

4-63. Fresh or falling snow absorbs and muffles sound. If the snow blankets the ground and vegetation, the muffling effect compounds and makes broadcasting more difficult. However, if the snow partially melts and refreezes, the result is comparable to ice or frozen ground.

WATER

4-64. Still water creates the same effect as ice or frozen surfaces; it channels sound. If the water is choppy or wavy, the shifting surfaces of the waves deflect and scatter sound so much that the broadcast may not reach the target location or becomes garbled and inaudible.

URBAN TERRAIN

4-65. Urban terrain presents some of the most varied conditions an operator encounters because the artificial terrain can mimic several conditions described above. The presence of numerous high-rise buildings has similar effects as mountains. This means that sheer sides of the structure deflect, bounce, and swirl sounds in unpredictable ways when the wind blows. Asphalt parking lots and paved streets can channel sound much like frozen ground or still water. However, when the ambient temperature is high, the heat tends to dampen sound and limit its effective range across asphalt parking lots and streets. Parks and playgrounds absorb

sound (like forests). Therefore, the TPT must be highly adaptable in an urban environment since conditions vary significantly in any given radius.

AERIAL MESSAGE DELIVERY

4-66. Aerial delivery expands the range of capabilities available to a maneuver commander to engage TAs. Leaflet and aerial loudspeaker delivery are available options to reach targets that cannot be accessed directly and in conditions where lethal targeting is undesired. Leaflet delivery follows a three-part sequence: pre-mission preparation, mission tasks, and post-mission tasks. Following this sequence ensures the system performs as designed. Psychological Operations tactical elements conduct these activities to mitigate the potential for technical challenges during the mission.

4-67. Most leaflet delivery actions are deliberate targeting and are a part of an approved MISO series. This type of targeting uses themes and narratives from the MISO series or requires additional messages and actions before development and approval. Some considerations for the team include—

- Production capacity.
- Maneuver unit air assets and type.
- Determination for minimum and maximum leaflet densities.
- Determination of the optimum number of leaflets to disseminate.

4-68. GTA 33-01-003 is useful during training as it provides guidance and direction to tactical teams that determine the need for dropping leaflets to engage a TA. This training aid addresses the leaflet calculation worksheet, packaging math tables, safety considerations, and additional procedures.

4-69. When a proposed or planned leaflet drop exceeds the capabilities of the TPTs or supported units, delivery support from a higher echelon becomes necessary. This support is critical because air assets are not organic to maneuver units. This support could include fixed-wing aircraft (that are better suited to high threat conditions) or rotary-winged aircraft.

4-70. During the planning and preparation phase of the mission, the TPT consults with the crew chief of the aircraft and coordinates the flight path, time, and elevation values. The crew chief then determines additional in-flight procedures for securing the spent static lines once the boxes have been ejected from the aircraft. During execution, the TPT that conducts the drop coordinates with the aircrew to prepare for, conduct, and evaluate the effectiveness of the mission.

4-71. There are two types of tactical-level leaflet delivery, manual and static-line. The manual method is more expedient. In manual delivery, the leaflets are placed in a container (such as a garbage bag or meal ready-to-eat box). To deliver the leaflets, the Service member dumps leaflets steadily out of the open door or rear ramp of the aircraft, depending on the type of aircraft being used.

Note: The primary risk associated with the manual method is that leaflets not dumped far enough away from the aircraft body are often caught in the surface or door airflow and return uncontrolled en masse to the interior of the aircraft.

4-72. However, the static-line release method is the preferred method because of its ease of use and relative accuracy. The Service member attaches a kick-box containing leaflets to a parachute static line, then pushes the box (or tosses it) from the aircraft until the box reaches the end of the static line. The abrupt stop splits the partially scored corners of the box, turning it inside out and releasing a cloud of leaflets. Figure 4-8, page 34, provides detailed instructions for building a static line box.

Note: The term kick-box comes from the old practice of kicking the leaflet box out of the open doorway or ramp of an aircraft.




Figure 4-8. Assembly of the static line box for leaflet drop

Chapter 5

Additional Activities

TPTs conduct other activities in addition to message development and message delivery. Information collection and analysis are equally essential activities as message development and delivery. Teams or detachments collect large amounts of information that may have potential intelligence value. The volume and quality of information that teams provide make it valuable for analyzing the OE and the individuals and groups in it. In addition, the tactical team is the primary Psychological Operations element that can routinely conduct advising and reconnaissance activities. Those activities directly feed analytical and assessment processes for Psychological Operations forces and the staff planners and intelligence elements at the supported brigade or task force.

INFORMATION COLLECTION SUPPORT

5-1. The tactical team's primary task is not information collection. However, it is a habitual activity that is an integral part of a team's capability that supports joint force operations. Therefore, while the team may not be the intended supporting element for collection activities, it can be a contributing unit that adds to the data available for the commander's information requirements. Information collection support can occur through—

- Publicly available information.
- Soldier and leader engagement.
- Reconnaissance.
- Tactical site exploitation.
- Biometrics collection and analysis.
- Combat Camera.

5-2. Through debriefing, F2F engagements, and open-source research, TPTs can obtain information from a variety of human sources (such as friendly forces personnel, refugees, displaced persons, and law enforcement). In terms of surveillance and reconnaissance, the detachment develops and follows established processes that clarify and prioritize their collection efforts to obtain the most relevant and required information. These processes can be developed at the company level and built into the SOPs of the detachment.

5-3. During armed conflict, the routine means and methods of recognizing and obtaining information about the enemy and their country are permissible. However, commanders also coordinate with their assigned legal advisor and the country team to review pertinent host-nation laws and agreements between DOD and the host nation. The TPT may find it necessary to assert themselves in conducting activities such as gathering biometrics and document and media exploitation.

5-4. Support to information collection employs a variety of methods to identify, organize, and process information internally through the influence process and through the provision of information to the staffs of supporting units. The following paragraphs identify some ways in which TPTs can collect information.

PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION

5-5. Publicly available information is an all-encompassing term that covers a range of data found in various public sources. This type of information includes any public facing internet content, commercial data, and industrial assessments (whether available for free or by subscription or purchase). It is also information that a casual observer can see or hear by visiting or attending an event that is open to the public. Publicly available information tools, applications, and capabilities have become more readily available for those with a need for information collection.

SOLDIER LEADER ENGAGEMENT

5-6. A *Soldier and leader engagement* is interpersonal Service-member interactions with audiences in an area of operations (FM 3-13). Soldier and leader engagements create opportunities to obtain information to

satisfy requests for gaps in knowledge. Soldier and leader engagements are F2F activities that TPTs typically use to achieve specific effects via informing, influencing, and educating. These engagements also build relationships and help dispel incorrect information. To successfully engage in Soldier and leader engagements PO Soldiers must be culturally aware, adaptive, credible, and habitual in their engagements. Rehearsals and critical assessments of each Soldier's individual techniques are useful tools to enhance Soldier and leader engagements.

RECONNAISSANCE

5-7. *Reconnaissance* is a mission undertaken to obtain information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, geographic, and other characteristics of a particular area, by visual observation or other detection methods (JP 2-0). For Psychological Operations forces, reconnaissance focuses on population and communication infrastructure aspects of the OE, but other aspects may be a priority depending on mission requirements. In combat operations, a TPT does not operate independently. Instead, line units augment a TPT to facilitate operations when force protection measures require more than one vehicle.

5-8. Reconnaissance is not confined to combat arms. Units that operate tactically may be required to conduct reconnaissance due to METT-TC (I) and the higher command may specifically task them to do so, especially in times of dire need. The TPT is different from other Psychological Operations detachments in that reconnaissance is frequently a part of the TPT mission. The team collects information about a number of mission or operational variables to enable all phases of an influence effort—particularly analysis and assessment, as those phases are vital to the other phases. Teams conduct reconnaissance (mounted and dismounted) and typically focus on—

- Enemy, adversary, and threat formations, groups, and so on.
- Demographics.
- Populations (activities, reactions, and so on).
- Infrastructure (radio, television, antennas, towers, print facilities, and so on).
- Requests for information from higher echelons.
- METT-TC (I) factors.
- Responses to CCIRs.

Foundational Concepts

5-9. While it is not a dedicated reconnaissance element, the TPT habitually conducts reconnaissance. A key part of team operations is conducting visual observation to collect information about human activities and OE characteristics, both which embody the reconnaissance activity. In doing so, the team is the eyes and ears of Psychological Operations forces and the gaining unit. Constant and continuous observation and reporting provide a steady stream of information about the OE and relevant actors within.

Reconnaissance Objective

5-10. The *reconnaissance objective* is the most important result desired from that specific reconnaissance effort (FM 3-90). More specifically, the reconnaissance objective is a terrain feature, geographic area, enemy force, adversary, or other mission or operational variable (such as specific civil considerations) about which the commander wants to obtain additional information. The reconnaissance objective is the mechanism for focusing team reconnaissance efforts.

5-11. Commanders provide reconnaissance objectives for all elements conducting the activity. For most units and elements that conduct reconnaissance, their reconnaissance objectives frequently vary from mission to mission. However, the TPT frequently has reconnaissance objectives that are long-term and habitual, especially if those objectives involve individuals or groups in a specified area. The reason is that analysis and influence efforts require baseline data to establish current behavioral patterns and causes, then tracking any changes over time and the likely reasons for those changes (or obstacles that inhibit change).

5-12. For example, a reconnaissance objective could be an environmental factor which affects influence activities, such as hills blocking a radio signal (terrain feature). In this case, the team may attach to different units and elements to map out dead zones where radio station signals are unable to reach. Figure 5-1 illustrates

an isolated population center located in a valley. In such a situation, the findings of a reconnaissance could provide the most accurate information available to determine the accessibility to this population.




Figure 5-1. Notional populated location with blocking terrain

5-13. The map depicts an inhabited area of a valley surrounded by up to 12,000-foot mountains, suggesting the location is cutoff from most outside broadcast signals. A reconnaissance mission to the location can collect and verify a variety of influence-focused information, such as mapping any broadcast signals arriving at the location. The team can also conduct ground reconnaissance or aerial reconnaissance (depending on threat level) to assess transportation availability, road conditions, and so on.

5-14. To detect a designated radio station frequency, team members use a radio or a radio signal detection device in conjunction with a global positioning system to plot for specific reach patterns. This includes noting altitude when plotting signal reception since a signal may be clear at one altitude and spotty or undetectable a relatively short distance lower or higher. The team forwards the findings up the chain of command who determines if or how to address the lack of accessibility to the inhabitants.

5-15. Commanders assign reconnaissance objectives to answer PIRs that planners develop during intelligence preparation of the battlefield. All units or elements conducting reconnaissance use the objectives to determine priorities during their mission planning. Commanders frequently provide more detailed guidance in the form of specified tasks and priorities of effort, usually in the form of some type of order. Table 5-1, page 38, identifies some reconnaissance objectives as they relate to the operational variables.

Table 5-1. Notional reconnaissance objectives categorized as operational variables

Operational variables	Reconnaissance Objectives				
	Political	Attitudes	Local power figures	Influencers	Relationships
	Military	Nonstate forces	Supporters	Combatants	Opposition forces
	Economic	Structure	Output	Weaknesses	Illegal Activities
	Social	Demographics	Religions	Languages	Cultural norms
	Information	Accessible media	Information sources	Preferred media	Underserved areas
	Infrastructure	Existing	Construction	Availability	Utilities
	Physical Environment	Terrain	Climate	Weather	Hazards
	Time	Cultural views	Usage	Key dates	---

5-16. At lower (tactical) echelons, PMESII-PT may not be the basis for determining daily reconnaissance objectives. While not as thorough or comprehensive as PMESII-PT or as readily translatable, METT-TC (I) may apply. Table 5-2 identifies some reconnaissance objectives as they relate to the mission variables.

Table 5-2. Notional reconnaissance objectives categorized as mission variables

Mission variables	Reconnaissance Objectives				
	Mission	Taskings	Commander's critical information requirements	Priority intelligence requirements	Planned targets
	Enemy	Local support	Capabilities	Targets and audiences	Actions and messages
	Terrain and Weather	Terrain features	Obstacles	Temperature and humidity	Visibility
	Troops and Support Available	Augmentees	Tasked units	Types of units	U.S. or partner nation
	Time Available	Assembly time	Deployment time	Maneuver time	Operational tempo
	Civil Considerations	Infrastructure effects	Influencer actions	Organizations	Population groups

Note: There are no reconnaissance objectives provided for the (I) in METT-TC (I). According to FM 5-0, this is because, "Informational considerations, represented with (I) has been added to the familiar METT-TC mnemonic. Informational considerations are expressed as a parenthetical variable in that it is not an independent variable, but an important component of each variable of METT-TC that leaders pay particular attention to when developing understanding of a situation."

Psychological Operations Detachment Reconnaissance in Force

During the early stages of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, a U.S. Psychological Operations detachment attached to British forces conducted a reconnaissance in force after an accident. In this event, personnel sustained injuries when a light-medium tactical vehicle rolled over on road as part of a small U.S. logistics convoy.

Local nationals mobbed the overturned vehicle and looted the food, water, and other supplies while personnel in the remaining vehicle evacuated the injured, leaving the wrecked vehicle behind. Higher U.S. echelons wanted the vehicle recovered due to a shortage of cargo transport and a need to return the vehicle to service or as a source of spare parts. A key concern for British forces (the incident site was in their sector) was that Iranian-backed militias could repair the vehicle and use it to infiltrate friendly forces or to transport an explosive device.

The team assigned to the area and familiar with the location where the wreck occurred took the lead for the detachment in moving to the location. Upon arrival, the element found the vehicle missing. All personnel took an aggressive posture as they quickly secured the area and followed drag signs and a trail of spilled fluids to an abandoned warehouse that held the stripped remains of the vehicle. The team had previously reported no signs of significant militia activity in the area, and the condition of the vehicle suggested locals stripped the vehicle to obtain anything useful (the diesel engine could be repurposed as a generator, for example). Consequently, the detachment commander declared the vehicle a combat loss, per established theater rules. Before returning to their basecamp, the detachment destroyed any remaining items of use (tires, transmission, and so on).

Later, higher command ordered the recovery of the remains. Two teams and a British recovery truck returned to the warehouse and retrieved the stripped hulk that they then transported to Kuwait. In the end, the vehicle was dumped in a boneyard for scrap as virtually everything useful had been stripped or rendered irreparable.

Special Reconnaissance

5-17. *Special reconnaissance* is reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces (JP 3-05). Like the other reconnaissance types, special reconnaissance focuses on collecting information in the OE, such as enemy activities, geographical characteristics, potential or probable local national response to U.S. operations in the area, and area assessments.

Note: Psychological Operations forces contribute to four special reconnaissance tasks: environmental, armed, post-strike, and target and threat reconnaissance. Their communication skills and understanding of different foreign environments and experiences enable them to collect reliable and accurate information firsthand in the operational area. Their situational awareness, regional expertise, and ability to assess potential targets and environmental conditions contribute significantly to assembling information that contributes to other special reconnaissance actions to support special operations and conventional missions.

5-18. The team supports special reconnaissance for a variety of reasons, such as when conducting assessments and other information collection to determine psychological effects. Team-level special reconnaissance activities can provide or verify information that may have operational and strategic implications, especially when planning actions to achieve specific psychological effects. Typical team employment in this activity occurs in permissive and semi-permissive, but politically sensitive environments.

5-19. However, if part of other unit operations, the team can conduct special reconnaissance activities in hostile (or even denied) environments. In the latter situation, when team special reconnaissance activities are

a primary effort, the other unit provides enhanced security and firepower to allow the team to execute its assigned tasks during the mission. During special reconnaissance, detachments focus on selected targets and populations to elicit relevant and timely information. The collection and analysis of information on target locations, activities, and potential actions enhance planning. For more information on special reconnaissance, refer to JP 3-05.

Note: Combining a TPT with a dedicated reconnaissance element increases both of these special capabilities with minimal pre-mission training. Each type of element typically has similar goals and objectives with training that complement each other.

TACTICAL SITE EXPLOITATION

5-20. PO Soldiers may receive opportunities to participate in action to detect, gather, and process information and materials from a physical site. Tactical site exploitation identifies information and materiel at or near a specific location following an operation such as a raid or a cordon and search. These activities may result in pertinent, reliable information and can establish facts to be acted on immediately. These facts provide critical information or indicators that may support answering specific information requirements or evaluating the effectiveness of a series. Unit SOPs, previous education, training, and experience determine the extent to which individual units conduct tactical site exploitation during military operations.

BIOMETRICS COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

5-21. Analysis of biometrics enables the confirmation of personal identity. Use of biometric tactical collection devices capture measurable physiological and behavioral characteristics (fingerprints, facial images, and iris scans). Identification of a migrating populace can provide relevance to audience analysis for mitigating effects or developing contingency influence plans.

5-22. Familiarization of the operation of biometric collection devices and the potential for the information received can enhance the ability of the TPT to successfully engage with locals during military operations. Psychological Operations units have the capacity to source tactical collection devices during training events when the need is articulated and developed into SOPs.

COMBAT CAMERA

5-23. The 55th Signal Company, known as combat camera, has the equipment, facilities, and skills to coordinate the planning, acquisition, creation, transmission, replication, distribution, storage, and preservation of visual information created during joint operations. Combat camera is a dynamic capability that supplements the efforts of the TPT by providing a repository and on request for audio-visual products.

Note: For more on information collection among populations, refer to ATP 3-55.4.

5-24. Upon collection of information, teams must report the information. Daily reporting and most reconnaissance reporting primarily use the standard situation report (SITREP). After a mission, the team leader compiles all the relevant information and forwards the completed report to the required recipients. First, the team leader sends the report up an information activity reporting chain—most likely the Psychological Operations detachment commander or associated task force J-2 and J-3. Then, the detachment leader compiles the team's report with other team reports and forwards the consolidated report to the supported commander and staff. For example, if team X is attached to infantry battalion Y, the team forwards the SITREP to a designated point of contact in the battalion S-2 and S-3 staff section. These two parallel reporting chains are typical for most operations or missions. Other potential recipients are mission-specific or to the relevant country team.

INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION

5-25. All data in the OE can become information of interest, but information does not necessarily become intelligence until processed and verified as accurate and combined with other information. Joint intelligence describes the relationship, in broad terms, as collection yields data, processing of the data yields information, and analysis of the information yields intelligence. ADP 2-0 provides greater detail about intelligence.

5-26. Team members collect information in the OE, process it within the limits of their ability, and send their finished analysis and the raw collected information to the higher echelon intelligence section of the supported unit for further analysis and processing. Prearranged access to the intelligence elements of the supported unit promotes overall efficiency.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE TEAM

5-27. The intelligence staff is an invaluable asset to the TPT because it provides a wide variety and large quantity of information. Some of this information includes route status reports, threat information, and analyses of a variety of topics that can be vital for mission success and force protection.

5-28. The team leader routinely interacts with the intelligence element of the supported unit. Those interactions synchronize information collection with unit requirements, disseminate processed information, and build confidence between the team and intelligence personnel. Once information requirements are officially approved as command requirements, intelligence personnel provide support to the TPT through coordination of specific intelligence collection tools and capabilities to assist the team in collecting information from the OE.

5-29. The team also utilizes intelligence staff to acquire information that impacts planned influence activities. Intelligence provides essential information that gives insights into local attitudes, beliefs, customs, trends, and other relevant information that allows the team to conduct activities that can affect the mental processes of targets and audiences. For example, the team requests information about insurgent fears and finds numerous reports that insurgents fear U.S. AH-64 Apache attack helicopters such that the sound of the aircraft flying sends insurgents into a panic. This knowledge could be helpful in missions like cordon-and-search missions, in which the broadcast of Apache sounds (sonic deception) could flush insurgents out of hiding or disrupt their ability to mount any kind of coherent defense.

TEAM SUPPORT TO INTELLIGENCE

5-30. The team supports the intelligence community with information collected in the OE and analysis of the collected information. The team's exposure to populations and other factors in the OE allow the team to gather information first-hand that only few other capabilities are able to obtain. TPTs' access to populations can also provide opportunities for intelligence personnel to join a team mission to gather information. The information the team provides typically comes in the form of spot reports, SITREPs, or other relevant reports.

ADVERSARY INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND COUNTERMEASURES

5-31. Effective processes and procedures can enhance speed and reaction time. The analysis of adversary messaging may focus on the near-term and local issues. The near-term time horizon and local focus of the team directly shapes how the team members address adversary and enemy vulnerabilities and requirements.

5-32. U.S. Psychological Operations forces have established two analytical methodologies to assess adversary and enemy messaging. One methodology is the source, content, audience, media, effect (SCAME) and the other is the message, audience, reaction, carrier, origin (MARCO).

5-33. The SCAME method is a longstanding, detailed, and deliberate analysis tool that higher-level Psychological Operations units and organizations use to—

- Examine specific messages.
- Aid in forecasting potential actions and messages.
- Determine likely targets and audiences, objectives, and other key information.

5-34. In contrast, the MARCO method is a quick analysis tool whose format allows the team to determine the originator and how the originator delivered the message. This format also rapidly analyzes a message to determine if an event or reaction will soon occur that the team will have to mitigate. This assessment addresses the following about the message:

- What it says.
- Who it affects or targets.
- What the likely reaction will be.

5-35. The difference between the MARCO and SCAME is not only the reordering of tasks. The true contrast is similar to the differences between a spot report and a SITREP in the level of detail, depth of information, and purpose. STP 33-37F14-SM-TG provides task steps and performance measures to integrate into detachment training plans.

MARCO Origins

In 2007, B Company, 9th Psychological Operations Battalion tactical teams began pre-mission training in preparation for an upcoming overseas deployment. Internal discussions about issues with the existing reporting formats led several team members to contact the Psychological Operations Doctrine Division at the United States John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School for assistance in tailoring a team-level analysis tool.

Working in close coordination with the team members, a doctrine developer tailored the SCAME format to meet the mission requirement while being careful to avoid losing the essential content. After development, the doctrine writer provided training on how to use MARCO based on the specific mission parameters for the area of operations to which the teams were deploying. Over the course of the deployment, B Company provided in-depth feedback and lessons learned to the Doctrine Division to fine tune the MARCO format to its present configuration. This process and interaction between doctrine development and the end-user also illustrates a time-tested method of developing a doctrinal tool to meet the needs of operators in the field.

QUESTIONING VERSUS INTERROGATION

5-36. TPTs frequently use conversational and tactical questioning to obtain information. Conversational questioning consists of the typical interactions between team members and local nationals in which the team talks to individuals or groups in an area of operations, asks questions, and collects any information resulting from the discussion. The information could be very general about the area of operations and the people in it, or it could be very specific. By creating a positive conversational tone, these questions can help transition to topics more closely related to the collection requirement, often without the person realizing that the topic has changed. The distinguishing features of conversational questioning are that the local national is free to refuse to talk and can leave at any time. This contrasts with tactical questioning that involves a detainee (also referred to as a person under control) who may refuse to speak and will not be released.

5-37. *Tactical questioning* is the field-expedient initial questioning for information of immediate tactical value of a captured or detained person at or near the point of capture and before the individual is placed in a detention facility (JP 3-31). Generally, designated members of patrols perform tactical questioning; however, any appropriately trained DOD personnel can carry out tactical questioning.

5-38. Application of appropriate techniques and responsibilities for the TPT include—

- Wash site planning and identification.
- Control and lead wash site activities.
- Manage the documentation of persons under control with capture tags or person under control tags.
- Conduct the 5Ss (search, silence, segregate, safeguard, speed). See FM 3-63.
- Identify and report the threat to force and confirm numbers of persons under control.
- Document captured materials (pocket litter).
- Collect relevant information through direct questioning.
- Ensure the humane treatment of detainees.

5-39. According to DODD 3115.09, tactical questioning is limited to direct questioning. Tactical questioning is not interrogation and does not use the techniques approved for interrogations. Interrogation rules apply once the detainee moves to a holding facility and becomes the focus for trained interrogators. If allowed to observe an interrogation, TPT members may be able to provide questions based on mission requirements. However, this is dependent on interrogator approval and does not include direct involvement in the interrogation process. GTA 90-01-023 provides additional information on tactical questioning.

5-40. For the TPT, information collection (whether conversational or tactical) can be what comes out of talking to local nationals or detainees. However, requesting or directing local nationals to collect specific information encompasses source operations and exceed authorized influence activities and training. These are prohibited activities for untrained and uncertified Soldiers. For more information about information collection with details about questioning, refer to ATP 3-55.4.

NEGOTIATIONS

5-41. Negotiations can resolve a conflict of interest (real or perceived) through conversation and agreements. Values, beliefs, behaviors, and norms provide a framework that indicates how to deal with others within our society and in other societies. As humans in group settings, we are constantly negotiating our needs and wants with others.

5-42. TPTs maintain these critical negotiation skills through enhanced cultural awareness and understanding as a result of their training and experiences. While deployed, team members have significant roles in cross-cultural negotiations, key leader engagements, and conflict management; therefore, cultural understanding of that host nation or TA is critical in negotiating and decision making. Critical thinkers rely on evidence, recognize personal prejudices and biases, and engage in more balanced thinking. GTA 21-03-012 provides additional information and techniques on negotiations.

ADVISING

5-43. Advising partner nation military forces and their institutions are essential to the success of security force assistance. Advising is beneficial to the partner nation and the USG. In advising, important focus areas for Psychological Operations elements operating with foreign counterparts is providing training, focused education, and mentorship to establish a new influence capability or expand an existing one.

5-44. Psychological Operations forces have and maintain advanced skills and capabilities (such as regional expertise and cultural capability) that enable them to conduct advisory missions with the partner nation for extended periods. These advanced skills may assist the partner nation forces to defeat internal and transregional threats to their stability, thereby limiting direct U.S. involvement. To successfully accomplish a security force assistance mission, advising requires specially trained Psychological Operations personnel who—

- Understand the OE.
- Provide effective leadership.
- Build credibility.
- Manage information.
- Ensure unity of effort and unity of purpose.
- Can sustain the effort.
- Can be adaptive problem solvers.

GENERAL

5-45. Use of the capabilities of U.S. Psychological Operations forces can enhance the effectiveness of DOD security cooperation activities. First, TPTs can be placed in positions to advise and assist partner nation forces in building an influence capability at an appropriate level to support partner nation military objectives. This can effectively integrate partner nation influence and information capabilities into U.S. operational level plans. Also, understanding foreign languages and cultural differences make Psychological Operations personnel uniquely qualified to advise and assist a partner nation to organize, equip, train, sustain, and employ tactical influence activities.

5-46. Psychological Operations forces support a U.S. foreign internal defense effort predominantly by training, advising, and, if necessary, accompanying partner nation personnel. This task often uses all the skill sets of a TPT member (such as first aid, weapons and weapon systems, and communications and communications equipment skills). A team member uses these skills to develop and reinforce influence capabilities in partner nation personnel to establish partner nation self-sufficiency.

5-47. With Psychological Operations forces, the role of a TPT as advisor is a critical contributor in the execution of security force assistance. Culture, regional expertise, and language capabilities provide

Psychological Operations forces with the means to effectively communicate directly with the TA and to train, advise, and assist host or partner nation military forces. Detachment training should review history, culture, religion, language, local politics, and cultural sensitivities. The Psychological Operations individual and collective tasks that focus on the influence process tasks (including TA analysis and assessments) should be incorporated into the company or detachment's pre-deployment activities.

5-48. PO Soldiers that are trained and validated to advise a partner nation are professional and competent in training and evaluating others. Those selected establish confidence in the training audience and build trust with the trainer and the USG.

5-49. The goal of advisors is to develop an opportunity for host-nation security forces to build legitimacy with the local population and to promote stability. Advisors, at all levels, must focus on building foreign security force legitimacy among the populace as they consider the impact of operations on local perception. Advisors are not commanders. However, advisors are responsible for the command and control of their own small team of U.S. advisors; they do not command or lead the foreign security force. Advisors provide expert advice and access to the foreign security force for U.S. commanders.

ADVISOR SKILLS

5-50. Advisor skills can be classified into two main categories-enabling skills and developing skills. Successfully employing enabling skills sets the conditions for advisors to advance their mission. Enabling skills include—

- Understanding human nature.
- Communicating across cultures.
- Building rapport.
- Influencing.
- Negotiating.

5-51. Advisors use developing skills to develop the capabilities of the foreign security force. Developing skills are the main advisor tasks of—

- Advising.
- Coaching.
- Teaching.

5-52. Then, there are situation-specific skills. According to ATP 3-07.10, these skills are determined based on the OE and the specific mission and include cultural and regional understanding and language.

5-53. Figure 5-2 depicts the relationship between the foreign security force's ability level and trust in the advisor.




Figure 5-2. Appropriate advising skill

ASSESSMENTS

5-54. Psychological Operations advisors assess the ability of the partner nation and its security forces to conduct effective influence activities and to design, develop, and conduct training that builds on an organic capability. Assessments help commanders determine their progress toward accomplishing the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. The TPT can identify gaps in training with equipment, facilities needed, or possibly funding required to achieve the end state. The USG may provide additional assistance for the procurement of compatible communication and broadcast equipment, either as part of broad security force assistance cases, or as specific identified requirements.

5-55. According to ATP 3-07.10, the partner nation unit assessment is a detailed report of what the advisor assesses as the capabilities and limitations of the foreign security forces' institutions. This information should be expressed openly to eliminate any assumptions that might be present. It should include logistics capabilities, maintenance, staff planning ability, information collection, and effectiveness of partner to think critically.

5-56. TPTs advise and teach on the types of equipment and processes required to facilitate interoperability and to effectively influence selected targets and audiences. This is part of developmental training that focuses on understanding the requirements and resources to achieve intended military objectives through conducting instructional classes. The practiced techniques of Psychological Operations forces include—

- Conducting analysis of engaged foreign leaders.
- Recommending talking points.
- Recording the discussions to ensure continuity of message, execution of promises, and fulfilment of any obligations incurred by foreign audiences.

TARGETING

5-57. *Targeting* is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). It is the analysis of targets relative to the commander's mission, objectives, and capabilities at his disposal. It identifies and nominates specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplish the commander's purpose by creating specific effects.

5-58. The joint targeting cycle portrays an analytical, systematic approach focusing on the targeting process that supports operational planning to achieve the objectives of the joint force commander. Targeting includes tasks associated with integrating and synchronizing the effects of the types of fires with the effects of other warfighting functions. JP 3-60 and JP 3-0 provide additional information on targeting.

TARGET ANALYSIS

5-59. Target analysis examines potential targets to determine their military importance, priority of attack, scale of effort, and weapons required to attain a certain level of damage, disruption, and lethal or nonlethal effects. It is a systematic approach to establishing the enemy vulnerabilities and weaknesses that can be exploited. It also determines what effects can be achieved against target systems and their activities. A target analysis must review the subsystems and interactions between components and elements of a target system to determine how the overall system functions and, subsequently, how to best attack that system so that it becomes inoperable or allows for achievement of the commander's objectives.

5-60. Psychological Operations forces provide the necessary subject-matter expertise to support targeting, execution, and assessment for nonlethal effects and synchronize with other influence activities. TPTs contribute to the targeting process by—

- Conducting information collection activities.
- Providing a more robust understanding of the OE to the intelligence staff.
- Identifying potential targets to be influenced.

5-61. Some responsibilities specific to the team leader include—

- Coordinating influenced-focused targeting with relevant staff sections.
- Developing related measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.
- Monitoring the effectiveness of those influence activities.

5-62. A TPT's understanding and application of observation and behavior recognition techniques require a solid unit training program that incorporates cultural and behavioral sciences. Use of these techniques help—

- Identify a target's pattern of life.
- Identify un-forecasted opportunities when that normal pattern is disrupted.
- Predict opportunities for prosecution.

TARGET CATEGORIES

5-63. A *target* is an entity or object that performs a function for the threat considered for possible engagement or other action (JP 3-60). Targets can be equipment, facilities, individuals, organization, or virtual (nontangible things such as in cyberspace).

5-64. There are two targeting categories—deliberate targeting and dynamic targeting. Deliberate targeting produces planned targets for future operations, whereas dynamic targeting is applied when a unit is inside its execution window (present 24-hour period) and is used to prosecute targets of opportunity.

Deliberate Targeting

5-65. Deliberate targeting prosecutes planned targets. These targets are known to exist in the area of operations and have actions scheduled against them. Examples range from targets on target lists in the applicable plan or order and targets detected in sufficient time to be placed in the joint air tasking cycle, mission type orders, or fire support plans.

5-66. There are two types of planned targets, scheduled and on-call. Scheduled targets exist in the area of operations and are located in sufficient time so that fires or other actions upon them are identified for engagement at a specific, planned time. On-call targets have actions planned, but not for a specific delivery time. The commander expects to locate these targets in sufficient time to execute planned actions.

Dynamic Targeting

5-67. Dynamic targeting prosecutes targets of opportunity and changes to planned targets or objectives. Targets of opportunity are targets identified too late, or not selected for action in time, to be included in

deliberate targeting. Targets engaged as part of dynamic targeting are previously unanticipated, unplanned, or newly detected.

5-68. There are two types of targets of opportunity, unplanned and unanticipated. Unplanned targets are known to exist in the area of operations, but no action has been planned against them. The target may not have been detected or located in sufficient time to meet planning deadlines. Alternatively, the target may have been located, but not previously considered of sufficient importance to engage. Unanticipated targets are unknown or not expected to exist in the area of operations.

This page intentionally left blank.

Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ATP	Army techniques publication
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
DA	Department of the Army
DOD	Department of Defense
FM	field manual
F2F	face-to-face
GTA	graphic training aid
JP	joint publication
MARCO	message, audience, reaction, carrier, origin
METT-TC (I)	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations
MISO	military information support operations
OE	operational environment
PIR	priority intelligence requirement
PMESII-PT	political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time
PO	Psychological Operations (referring only to Soldier or branch)
SCAME	source, content, audience, media, effect
SITREP	situation report
SOP	standard operating procedure
STP	Soldier training publication
TA	target audience
TAC-D	tactical deception
TPT	tactical Psychological Operations team
USG	United States Government

SECTION II – TERMS

dismounted movement

A movement of troops and equipment mainly by foot, with limited support by vehicles. (FM 3-90)

mounted movement

The movement of troops and equipment by combat and tactical vehicles. (FM 3-90)

operation

(Joint) A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1, Volume 1)

operational environment

The aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

reconnaissance

A mission undertaken to obtain information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, geographic, or other characteristics of a particular area, by visual observation or other detection methods. (JP 2-0)

reconnaissance objective

The most important desired result from that specific reconnaissance effort. (FM 3-90)

Soldier and leader engagement

Interpersonal Service-member interactions with audiences in an area of operations. (FM 3-13)

special reconnaissance

Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. (JP 3-05)

stability operation

An operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (ADP 3-0)

tactical questioning

The field-expedient initial questioning for information of immediate tactical value of a captured or detained person at or near the point of capture and before the individual is placed in a detention facility. (JP 3-31)

target

An entity or object that performs a function for the threat considered for possible engagement or other action. (JP 3-60)

targeting

The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 3-0)

References

All websites accessed 6 February 2024.

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

These documents must be available to the intended user of this publication.

DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. January 2024.

FM 1-02.1. *Operational Terms*. 9 March 2021.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS

Most joint publications are available online: <https://www.jcs.mil>.

JP 1, Volume 1. *Joint Warfighting*. 27 August 2023.

JP 2-0. *Joint Intelligence*. 26 May 2022.

JP 3-0. *Joint Campaigns and Operations*. 18 June 2022.

JP 3-05. *Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*. 22 September 2020.

JP 3-20. *Security Cooperation*. 9 September 2022.

JP 3-31. *Joint Land Operations*. 3 October 2019.

JP 3-60. *Joint Targeting*. 28 September 2018.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

Most Army publications are available online: <https://armypubs.army.mil>.

ADP 2-0. *Intelligence*. 31 July 2019.

ADP 3-0. *Operations*. 31 July 2019.

ADP 3-07. *Stability*. 31 July 2019.

ADP 5-0. *The Operations Process*. 31 July 2019.

ATP 3-07.10/MCRP 3-03D.1/NTTP 3-07.5/AFTTP 3-2.76. *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Security Forces*. 15 June 2023.

ATP 3-21.8. *Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad*. 11 January 2024.

ATP 3-55.4. *Techniques for Information Collection During Operations Among Populations*. 5 April 2016.

ATP 4-01.45/MCRP 3-40F.7/NTTP 4-01.6/AFTTP 3-2.58. *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations*. 26 March 2021.

FM 3-05. *Army Special Operations*. 9 January 2014.

FM 3-13. *Information Operations*. 6 December 2016.

FM 3-13.4. *Army Support to Military Deception*. 26 February 2019.

FM 3-22. *Army Support to Security Cooperation*. 1 July 2023.

FM 3-53. *Military Information Support Operations*. 4 January 2013.

FM 3-63. *Detainee Operations*. 2 January 2020.

FM 3-90. *Tactics*. 1 May 2023.

FM 5-0. *Planning and Orders Production*. 16 May 2022.

FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C. *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare*. 7 August 2019.

References

GTA 21-03.012. *Negotiations*. 1 July 2012.

GTA 33-01-003. *Aerial Delivery Operations*. 2 June 2014.

GTA 90-01-023. *Tactical Questioning*. 1 October 2010.

STP 21-1-SMCT. *Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, Warrior Skills, Level 1*. 16 October 2023.

STP 33-37F14-SM-TG. *Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide, MOS 37F, Psychological Operations Specialist, Skill Levels 1 through 4*. 28 August 2008.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Abouchacra, Kalb, and Letowski. *Measuring Directional Masking in a Sound Field Using Adaptive Threshold Procedures*. *Archives of Acoustics* 21 (1): 15-28. January 1996.

Letowski and Letowski. *Auditory Spatial Perception: Auditory Localization*. Army Research Laboratory. May 2023.

PRESCRIBED FORMS

This section contains no entries.

REFERENCED FORMS

Most DA forms are available online: <https://armypubs.army.mil>.

DA Form 2028. *Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*.

Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

A

advising, 1, 35, 43, 44, 45

B

behavior, 1, 2, 14, 16, 20, 43, 46

C

country team, 15, 35, 40
cultural awareness, 43
cultural understanding, 1, 43

D

delivery, vii, 3, 5, 20, 22, 26, 33, 35, 46

E

employment, v, 1, 2, 6, 7, 11, 12, 17, 22, 24, 31, 39

I

influence activities, vii, 1, 3, 8, 11, 12, 14, 36, 41, 43, 45, 46

L

language, 3, 26, 38, 43, 44
leaflet drop, 12, 28, 33, 34
loudspeaker operations, 20 through 22, 24, 25, 32

N

negotiations, 25, 43

O

operational environment (OE), 1 through 3, 7, 8, 11, 17, 22, 28, 35, 36, 39 through 41, 43, 44, 46

P

partner, vii, 1 through 3, 14, 15, 38, 43 through 45

S

security force assistance, v, 14, 15, 43, 45
standard operating procedure (SOP), vii, 3, 6, 7, 8, 18, 24, 35, 40

T

task force, 7, 8, 35, 40

This page intentionally left blank.

TC 53-03.1

16 February 2024

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

RANDY A. GEORGE

*General, United States Army
Chief of Staff*

Official:



MARK F. AVERILL

*Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army*

2403902

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve. Distributed in electronic media only(EMO).

This page intentionally left blank.

