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                                                         S. Prt. 110-20
 
                       EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE
                   SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
                 TOGETHER WITH JOINT SESSIONS WITH THE
                    SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
                          (HISTORICAL SERIES)
=======================================================================

                               VOLUME XIX

                               __________

                           NINETIETH CONGRESS

                             first session

                                  1967


                            MADE PUBLIC 2007

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations




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                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                      90th Congress, First Session

                   J.W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama               CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana              EUGENE J. McCARTHY, Minnesota
WAYNE MORSE, Oregon                  BOURKE HICKENLOOPER, Iowa
ALBERT GORE, Tennessee               GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
FRANK J. LAUSCHE, Ohio               FRANK CARLSON, Kansas
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho                  JOHN J. WILLIAMS, Delaware
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri           KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut          CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
JOSEPH S. CLARK, Pennsylvania        JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
                       Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                     110th Congress, First Session

                JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut     RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts         CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin       NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California            BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida                 GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois               JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey          LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania   JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia                   DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
                   Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
            Kenneth A. Meyers, Jr., Minority Staff Director

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                      90th Congress, First Session

                 RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia, Chairman
JOHN STENNIS, Mississippi            MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri           STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington         JACK MILLER, Iowa
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina    JOHN G. TOWER, Texas
HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada             PETER H. DOMINICK, Colorado
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
STEPHEN M. YOUNG, Ohio
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
THOMAS J. McINTYRE, New Hampshire
DANIEL B. BREWSTER, Maryland
HARRY F. BYRD, Jr., Virginia
                     Charles B. Kirbow, Chief Clerk
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                     110th Congress, First Session

                     CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts     JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island              PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
BILL NELSON, Florida                 SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
EVAN BAYH, Indiana                   SAXBY M. CHAMBLISS, Georgia
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York     LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
MARK J. PRYOR, Arkansas              ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
JIM WEBB, Virginia                   JOHN CORNYN, Texas
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
                                     MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
                   Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
                  Mike Kostiw, Minority Staff Director

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                  Pages
Preface..........................................................    IX
Future Hearings, January 11......................................     1
The World Situation, January 16..................................    39
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Subcommittees and Hearings Procedures, January 24................   113
Minutes, January 24..............................................   129
Minutes, January 25..............................................   130
Minutes, January 26..............................................   131
The Situation in Indonesia, January 30...........................   133
    Testimony of Marshall Green, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia
Background Briefing on Disarmament Problems, February 3..........   159
    Testimony of Richard Helms, Director of the Central 
      Intelligence Agency
Status of Development of Ballistic and Anti-Ballistic Systems in 
  U.S., and Briefing on Non-Proliferation Treaty, February 6.....   193
    Testimony of Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense 
      Research and Engineering; and Hon. William C. Foster, 
      Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Military Assistance to Latin America, February 6.................   217
    Testimony of Gen. Robert Porter, Southern Military Command
Strategic Implications of Antiballistic Missile Defense 
  Deployment/Limitations on Use of Chemical and Bacteriological 
  Agents in Warfare/Sales of Military Equipment by the United 
  States, February 7.............................................   245
    Testimony of Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and 
      John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
      International Security Affairs
Minutes, February 27.............................................   274
Minutes, February 28.............................................   275
Minutes, February 28.............................................   276
Minutes, March 1.................................................   277
Sales of Military Equipment by United States, March 2............   279
    Testimony of John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of 
      Defense for International Security Affairs
Policy Implications of Armament and Disarmament Problems, March 3   289
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; and Adrian S. 
      Fisher, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament 
      Agency
Minutes, March 6.................................................   311
Minutes, March 13................................................   312
Arms Sales to Iran, March 14.....................................   313
    Testimony of Henry J. Kuss, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
      Defense for International Logistics Negotiations
Minutes, March 16................................................   330
Minutes, March 20................................................   331
Briefing on Africa, March 28.....................................   333
    Testimony of John Palmer II, Assistant Secretary of State for 
      African Affairs
Minutes, March 30................................................   366
Minutes, April 3.................................................   367
Additional Military Assistance to Pakistan, April 5..............   369
    Testimony of William J. Handley, Acting Assistant Secretary 
      of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Minutes, April 6.................................................   391
Minutes, April 13................................................   392
Minutes, April 13................................................   393
Minutes, April 14................................................   394
Minutes, April 18................................................   395
Minutes, April 19................................................   396
Minutes, April 20................................................   397
Minutes, April 21................................................   398
Minutes, April 24................................................   399
Minutes, April 25................................................   400
United States Troops in Europe, April 26.........................   401
    Testimony of Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense; and 
      Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Acting Secretary of State
Minutes, April 26................................................   414
Briefing on Yemen and Greek Situations, April 28.................   415
    Testimony of Lucious D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of State 
      for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Minutes, May 2...................................................   442
Minutes, May 2...................................................   443
United States Troops in Europe, May 3............................   445
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; and Eugene V. 
      Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Minutes, May 4...................................................   457
Discussion of Military Assistance to India and Pakistan, May 5...   459
    Testimony of Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Defense 
      Intelligence Agency
The Situation in Poland, May 15..................................   471
    Testimony of John A. Gronouski, U.S. Ambassador to Poland
Discussion Regarding the Secretary of State's Testimony, May 16..   505
Minutes, May 16..................................................   520
Minutes, May 16..................................................   521
Briefing on Deployment of Antiballistic Missiles and Non-
  Proliferation Treaty, May 18...................................   523
    Testimony of Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, Arms Control 
      and Disar- mament Agency
United States Foreign Policy With Respect to the Middle East and 
  Vietnam, May 23................................................   539
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Briefing on the Middle East Situation, June 1....................   587
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; and Robert S. 
      McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Minutes, June 5..................................................   624
Minutes, June 5..................................................   625
Briefing on the Middle East Situation, June 7....................   627
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, June 8..................................................   657
Briefing on Vietnam, June 8......................................   659
    Testimony of William J. Porter, U.S. Ambassador to Korea
Briefing on the Middle East Situation, June 8....................   697
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Briefing on the Middle East Situation, June 9....................   705
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, June 20.................................................   729
Military Assistance to India and Pakistan, June 22...............   731
    Testimony of Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Deputy Secretary of State 
      for Politico- Military Affairs
Minutes, June 22.................................................   738
Minutes, June 27.................................................   739
Briefing on Glassboro Talks, June 28.............................   741
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, June 29.................................................   775
Minutes, July 10.................................................   776
Minutes, July 11.................................................   777
Briefing on the Congo Situation, July 11.........................   779
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, July 12.................................................   825
Minutes, July 13.................................................   826
Minutes, July 25.................................................   827
Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, July 26..........................   829
    Testimony of Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Minutes, July 27.................................................   854
Minutes, August 1................................................   855
Minutes, August 22...............................................   856
Minutes, September 12............................................   857
Minutes, September 22............................................   858
Minutes, October 2...............................................   859
Minutes, October 6...............................................   860
Minutes, October 10..............................................   861
Minutes, October 11..............................................   862
Minutes, October 23..............................................   863
Minutes, October 23..............................................   864
Minutes, October 31..............................................   865
Minutes, October 31..............................................   866
Minutes, November 1..............................................   867
Minutes, November 2..............................................   868
Need for Open Hearing with Secretary Rusk on U.S. Policy Toward 
  Southeast Asia, November 7.....................................   869
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, November 16.............................................   926
Briefing on the Vietnam Situation, November 16...................   927
    Testimony of Elsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador to South 
      Vietnam
Minutes, November 17.............................................   972
Motions Regarding Testimony by the Secretary of State, November 
  30.............................................................   973
Minutes, December 7..............................................   991
Minutes, December 8..............................................   992
Minutes, December 12.............................................   993
Briefing on Greece and the Middle East, December 14..............   995
    Testimony of Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of State 
      for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Briefing on News Stories on the NLF in Saigon and the U.N., 
  December 14....................................................  1027
    Testimony of Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Acting Secretary of 
      State
Minutes, December 15.............................................  1065

                               APPENDICES

A. Committee on Foreign Relations Publication for 1967: Hearings, 
  Committee Prints, Senate Documents and Reports.................  1067
B. Volumes Published to Date in the Historical Series............  1071
                                PREFACE

                              ----------                              

    ``You certainly are getting more than your share of 
crises,'' one senator commiserated with Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk during an executive session of the Foreign Relations 
Committee in 1967. Although national attention necessarily 
focused on the war in Vietnam, where the United States had sent 
a half million troops and spent billions of dollars to fight a 
war that had come to seem endless, foreign policy crises were 
erupting around the world that year at an alarming rate.
    Members of the Foreign Relations Committee displayed 
mounting skepticism about Vietnam, discounting the overly 
optimistic reports they received from the State Department and 
from U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Elsworth Bunker. 
Increasingly, committee members looked toward a negotiated 
settlement as more likely than a military victory in Vietnam. 
Because of such attitudes, the administration of President 
Lyndon B. Johnson kept the committee at arm's length on 
anything related to the war. Secretary Rusk cancelled scheduled 
appearances to testify so often during the year that Senator 
Albert Gore, Sr., complained of seriously impaired 
communications between the committee and the State Department. 
Instead of Vietnam, therefore, the committee devoted its 
hearings to the state of the world, from a coup in Greece to a 
war in the Middle East and a rebellion in the Congo. However, 
members always kept in mind the potential connections between 
the Vietnam war and events occurring elsewhere.
    Committee members worried that America's preoccupation with 
Vietnam could serve as an invitation to troublemaking in Asia, 
Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. Committee chairman J. 
William Fulbright cited involvement in Southeast Asia as having 
hindered the United States' response to the ``Six-Day War'' 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors. ``I do not hesitate to 
make a decision that the Middle East is far more important to 
the security of this country than Vietnam,'' Senator Fulbright 
lectured Secretary Rusk--who earlier that year had assured the 
committee he did not foresee a war in the Middle East. In his 
own explanation of the world situation, Secretary Rusk insisted 
that the United States was fighting communist aggression where 
it existed, not communism as an ideology in the abstract. He 
wanted to assure the committee that despite the war, the 
Johnson administration sought detente with the Soviet Union, 
but committee members remained dubious. By the year's end, 
Senator Claiborne Pell chided an assistant secretary of state 
that the administration seemed to see everything that happened 
anywhere as ``one vast Communist plot, and that what went on in 
any part of the world had its effect in any other part of the 
world because the strings are all being pulled from one 
place.''
    Through its hearings, the committee also demonstrated 
concern over the ``militarization'' of U.S. foreign policy. 
Subcommittees devoted a great deal of time to examining arms 
sales in the Middle East and in the Indian-Pakistani 
territorial disputes, and followed closely the development of 
anti-ballistic missile systems and the negotiations for nuclear 
non-proliferation. Senator Eugene McCarthy complained that the 
Johnson administration had embraced an arms sales philosophy 
that unless the United States sold arms to other countries it 
would lose its influence over the policies of those countries.
    Vietnam and its larger implications caused committee 
members to ponder the Senate's constitutional responsibilities 
over foreign policy. When President Johnson sent planes to the 
Congo, Senator Fulbright raised the possibility of the 
president sending as many troops as he wanted without 
congressional authorization. ``I do not see that it would be 
entirely inconsistent with Vietnam or any other place,'' the 
chairman said to Secretary Rusk. ``How many did you send to the 
Dominican Republic? You sent 22,000. You could have sent 
100,000 if you wanted. I do not know why you could not sent 
100,000 or 200,000 into the Congo if you thought it 
desirable.'' He added, ``I do not know where you draw the line 
here.'' During another closed committee meeting, Senator 
Fulbright complained to his colleagues: ``I get fed up with 
being told we are committed to something all the time,'' simply 
because the president said the nation is committed. That was 
not what he meant by commitment, Fulbright asserted: ``I think 
the commitment is something that is taken by the Congress and 
the Executive, not just a unilateral action.''
    Committee members of both parties agreed that a Republican 
Policy Committee report had asked the single pertinent question 
of the year: what is our national interest in Southeast Asia? 
For all their efforts, the committee could never get a 
satisfactory response from the Johnson administration. 
Admitting his mistake in supporting the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution and his assumption that President Johnson had not 
intended to widen the war, Fulbright lamented that the war had 
``grown so gradually that we never have been able quite to get 
the full impact of where we are going.'' That sense of drift 
and helplessness pervades these hearings.
    The selection of transcripts for these volumes represents 
the editor's choice of the material possessing the most 
usefulness and interest for the widest audience. Subheads, 
editorial notes, and some documents discussed in the hearings, 
are added to bring the events into perspective. Any material 
deleted (other than ``off the record'' references for which no 
transcripts were made) has been noted in the appropriate 
places, and transcripts not included are represented by minutes 
of those sessions, in chronological sequences. Unpublished 
transcripts and other records of the committee for 1967 are 
deposited at the National Archives, where they are available to 
researchers under the access rules of that agency. Some 
transcripts may require further declassification procedures.
    In accordance with the general policy of the series, 
portions of the volumes were submitted to the Departments of 
State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency for 
review and comment.
    The Foreign Relations Committee extends its appreciation to 
the Senate Committee on Armed Services for its cooperation in 
approving the release of those sessions in which its members 
participated.
    This volume was prepared for publication by Donald A. 
Ritchie of the Senate Historical Office.
                                       JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.


                            FUTURE HEARINGS

                              ----------                              


                      Wednesday, January 11, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:20 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) 
presiding.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse, 
Gore, Church, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, 
Aiken, Carlson, and Mundt.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr. 
Henderson of the committee staff.
    The Chairman. I think the committee will come to order. We 
have a quorum here.
    Congratulations to everybody and the committee in 
particular. We have a quorum the first morning.


                   reduction of u.s. forces in europe


    Well, gentlemen, the main purpose of this is just to 
discuss a variety of things. One of the letters I suppose we 
ought to take up first is Senator Mansfield's. I have a letter 
here signed yesterday addressed to me about Senate Resolution 
300 which was introduced last summer regarding how a 
substantial reduction in U.S. forces permanently stationed in 
Europe can be made without adversely affecting either our 
resolve or agreement to meet our commitments under the North 
Atlantic Treaty.
    This letter was addressed to me personally, asking if I 
wished to join in its sponsorship, but the reason I bring it up 
here----
    Senator Mundt. Who wrote the letter?
    The Chairman. Mike Mansfield. He introduced the resolution 
last summer.
    The reason I am bringing it up here is not whether I should 
sign it or not but is about its procedure. He proposes, I 
think, to take this up on the floor without any committee 
dealing.
    Now, when this matter was considered before on increasing 
from two to six, we had extensive hearings. This committee and 
Armed Services.
    As a procedural matter it seems to me very bad not to send 
this kind of resolution to some committee because, well from 
your point of view, no Republicans participated. This came out 
of the Democratic Policy Committee. If we start the precedent 
of resolutions going direct to the floor from the Policy 
Committee, it seems to me it is very objectionable.
    What I thought, if the committee thought well of it, was 
for the committee to authorize me to write a letter requesting 
that it be submitted to this committee.
    Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a very 
brief comment that I have prepared on this matter. It is my 
hope that we can confirm the Mansfield resolution relative to 
troop assignment to NATO----
    The Chairman. Speak a little louder. I cannot hear you.
    Senator Morse. It is my hope that we can confirm the 
Mansfield resolution relative to troop assignments to NATO and 
that it will be referred to this committee. Since the committee 
held extensive hearings last year on NATO, additional hearings 
may not be necessary although there have been rather dramatic 
changes in Germany and in German attitudes toward Eastern 
Europe since our hearings. In any case, I think the resolution 
should be referred to this committee and reported out before it 
goes before the Senate.


                      role of the policy committee


    The Party Policy Committee should not become a substitute 
for a standing legislative committee, and I agree with the 
Chairman that I think that a resolution of this importance 
should be submitted to the committee first and not go to the 
floor of the Senate.
    As you know, that has been my position for many years in 
the Senate, that committees should not be by-passed. You always 
have the protection, if it becomes necessary, of sending a 
legislative matter to a committee under instructions and you 
always have the protection of discharging a committee if the 
committee seeks to bury the legislation.
    But I speak respectfully, I think if this is still the 
position of the majority leader, and I am surprised it is, 
because I thought I read in the paper some time ago a statement 
attributed to him that he was not insisting on the matter going 
directly to the floor.
    The Chairman. I make it clear this letter does not insist 
on it. But I thought it was his idea before that it do that, 
and I was anticipating this question and that is why I brought 
it here. He did expect it to be taken up, I think, last summer 
without going to the committee.
    Senator Morse. He did. He made this argument, but I only 
want to say, and I close, that I would support the suggestion 
of the chairman that the letter be sent to the majority leader 
advising that it go to the Foreign Relations Committee to hear 
it.
    In fairness to the Armed Services Committee, I want to say 
it may very well be that it should go to the Foreign Relations 
Committee and then to the Armed Services Committee or possibly 
that we have joint hearings on it, but I do not think that the 
Foreign Relations Committee should give up what I think is its 
right to pass on this resolution because of its clear foreign 
policy import.
    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I fully agree with what has 
been said, with what you say and what Senator Morse says.


                      problems with joint hearings


    Personally, I would just like to see it referred to this 
committee with the idea that we could act on it and then refer 
it to the Armed Services Committee, if we felt proper, rather 
than having joint hearings. Those hearings were pretty painful 
proceedings.
    The Chairman. There are too many people.
    Senator Sparkman. Yes, and if it is authorized I will make 
a motion to the effect that the chairman be instructed to 
follow that course.
    The Chairman. Yes, that is in order.
    Is there any further discussion?
    Senator Hickenlooper?


                       military v. foreign policy


    Senator Hickenlooper. I have some reservations on this. 
First, I thoroughly agree that under no circumstances should 
this--if we can prevent it--resolution go directly to the floor 
from a strictly party committee such as the Republican Policy 
Committee or the Democrat Policy Committee, or anything else. I 
think it is a terrible practice.
    Number two, I would like to hear a little bit more 
justification why it should go to this committee rather than 
the Armed Services Committee. I think maybe it should, at least 
we should have something to say about it, but it seems to me 
that the question of the reduction in force in Europe under an 
alliance agreement, and that is what it is over there, that is 
primarily either a professional area or a top executive area 
discussion on national defense.
    Senator Morse. Would you yield, Bourke, on that point?
    Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, I just want to have some 
discussion, I am not committed.
    Senator Morse. I only make a one sentence comment. The 
original commitment came from this committee. The original NATO 
commitment was a Foreign Relations Committee matter.
    Senator Hickenlooper. We do not handle the military conduct 
of the war; we may sign a treaty.
    Senator Morse. But there is no question of military under 
this treaty because it is the relationship to foreign policy.
    Senator Sparkman. I think this is wrapped up in foreign 
policy implications.


                           a political matter


    The Chairman. I think so, too. To me this is not a war. 
This is political judgment as to the relationship between 
Western Europe, ourselves, and Russia. The reason for NATO 
really was fear of invasion of Western Europe by Russia and 
this entails, in my view, essentially a political judgment as 
to what those relations are now and whether or not there is 
justification for the continuation of, well, NATO as such, and 
certainly how much you do in pursuance of NATO.
    I would think as between the two this is far more a 
political matter at this stage than it is military.
    Frank was the NATO man last year. What do you say?
    Senator Church. Well, I would agree with that, Mr. 
Chairman, particularly inasmuch as the level of troops to be 
maintained there turns on political considerations fully as 
much as military considerations. In fact, the major arguments 
for retaining so large a force had been based in recent years 
not upon a military assessment, but rather upon the political 
consequences of reductions, particularly West Germany, and of 
course the whole Gaullist attitude toward the disposition of 
American forces is a political one.
    It seems to me that it is all inextricably bound into 
foreign policy considerations.
    Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. The Senator from Pennsylvania.

                        INTERNAL SENATE POLITICS

    Senator Clark. I would certainly support this motion, but I 
am a little bit concerned about the internal Senate politics of 
this and wondering whether we cannot get off on perhaps a 
little better foot in this session than we have sometimes in 
the past. Whether it would be desirable for the chairman before 
he writes a letter to sit down with Dick Russell and Senator 
Mansfield and see if some amicable arrangement agreeable to all 
three could be worked out.
    Now, Stuart is not here; he wants to come. Maybe I am not 
as good a mind reader as I think I am, but he is on both Armed 
Services and this committee, and I suspect that he would be a 
little bit upset if we were to assert sole jurisdiction.
    John Sparkman will remember that at that meeting of the 
NATO Parliamentarians in Paris in November, which he and I both 
attended, there were a couple of pretty belligerent fellows 
from the House of Representatives who really kind of took the 
point of view that NATO is primarily a military alliance. They 
were not much in favor of any efforts to get a better 
relationship either with de Gaulle--you remember at that 
briefing, John, those fellows gave Chip Bohlen and Cleveland 
such a bad time, and I know that the NATO Parliamentarian group 
is kind of split on the political committee which would rather 
switch than fight and the military committee which wanted to 
relieve tensions. I believe it might be worthwhile to see if we 
cannot work out an arrangement with the Armed Services.
    I agree that joint hearings are kind of rough. There are 
too many people. But maybe some sort of genius can come along 
which would work out a friendly relationship, either refer it 
here first and there second, or get some kind of an agreement 
that a committee of the two committees should sit, just in the 
interests of hoping that the 90th Congress will not get off on 
yackety yack between the Armed Services and the Foreign 
Relations Committees which we are going to have on Vietnam 
anyway.
    The Chairman. That is a good suggestion. I would like to 
work it out, and I do not think you meant to be exclusive.
    Senator Morse. Not at all. I made the point maybe we ought 
to have joint meetings.
    The Chairman. I would object because they are unwieldy and 
difficult to conduct when you have got that many people. And I 
would think it would be better to have it here and then Armed 
Services.
    What do you think about that? I think Joe has a point.
    Senator Sparkman. I think it is a good idea.
    The Chairman. I do not want to have a row and have a 
contest right off the bat. Do you think it would just be better 
I talk to Mike Mansfield about it? But I would like to be able 
to say the committee feels it ought to come here.
    Is there anybody who does not feel that way?

                         ADVISE THE LEADERSHIP

    Senator Morse. I think, Mr. Chairman, that you ought to 
talk to Mike and also talk to Everett Dirksen and probably the 
two of them together. I am sure they do not agree but 
nevertheless I think that it is important that the minority 
leader be advised, too.
    Senator Clark. Do you not think you ought to talk to Dick, 
too?
    Senator Morse. I think that was agreed.
    The Chairman. How do you feel about that? I do not want to 
say. Do you feel they ought to come here?

                    USURPATION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES

    Senator Hickenlooper. I feel we have an interest in it, but 
I feel that probably 60 percent of the interest is in the Armed 
Services Committee or should be, and I go a step further. We 
have noticed in the last year or two or three the usurpation of 
certain fields of activity that ought to be in the Foreign 
Relations Committee taken up by other committees, and we get 
our tail over the dashboard a little bit on that. I guess there 
is not much we can do about that. But we can, of course--this 
may be the committee's area of responsibility, but we are 
getting into other fields, I suppose. I just feel that 40 
percent of it is probably here and 60 percent belongs to Armed 
Services Committee. I think both committees ought to take a 
look at it, but not with a joint meeting. I agree it is almost 
impossible to get any satisfactory results.

                        CREATE TWO SUBCOMMITTEES

    Senator Morse. It is possible, Mr. Chairman, to have one of 
Joe's suggestions where you can have two subcommittees or a 
subcommittee of each of the two committees hold the hearings 
and report to their full committee.
    The Chairman. That is a possibility. What does the 
committee think about that?
    Senator Clark. Why do you not explore it with Mike and 
Dick?
    The Chairman. I will be glad to explore it. I wanted an 
expression of how you feel about it. Do you all, Karl, do you 
think we have an interest?
    Senator Mundt. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think in this 
particular instance we have a better claim to jurisdiction than 
the Armed Services Committee.
    The Chairman. That is what I wondered.
    Senator Mundt. What Frank says is exactly right. It is the 
political implications we are going to listen to mostly. They 
are not going to talk about the fear of an immediate invasion 
from Russia. If there have been any military affairs 
implications it must be connected with the war in Vietnam in 
some way, about the deployment of troops. But I do not want to 
get into a quarrel with the other group either.
    I would think we could pass some kind of a resolution 
saying that the Foreign Relations Committee feels that there 
should be hearings, whether we want to have participation or 
something, and I do not know how far we have to go in 
nursemaiding the Armed Services Committee on these matters.
    It is perfectly all right to consult, but I think you would 
be fortified if you went there and said, ``We are going to have 
them. We didn't want to have a quarrel. Do you want to have 
subcommittees, joint committees?''
    Do you want them to come in tandem or how, but I definitely 
feel we ought to have a hearing.
    Senator Carlson. I agree with the chairman on it.
    Senator Aiken. We ought to look it over. The military 
aspect, as Karl says, will probably relate to deployment of 
troops that might be taken out there.
    The Chairman. It is just more what you do with the troops, 
whether or not you go here or over to Vietnam. That is a matter 
which is military.
    Senator Aiken. We have a political and economic situation 
involved.
    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I think this idea of having 
two subcommittees could work, but I think it would be 
preferable to have it before the full Foreign Relations 
Committee, although that could be explored.
    The Chairman. Well, then, if I understand it correctly I 
will take it up and talk to the majority leader about it, and I 
assume we will probably then talk either with him or separately 
with Dick Russell and the Republican leader.
    Well, that disposes of that.

                      TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY RUSK

    I think you have already had notice that the Secretary, 
Secretary Rusk, has agreed to come in executive session on 
January 16 and in open session on January 23. He called me and 
asked, requested, that our hearings not go longer than a full 
morning, that is when it is in open, because of the strain and 
the lights and so on. He is assuming there will be television--
I do not know whether there will or not. I guess there will; 
there usually is when he appears. And I said that I thought 
that was a reasonable request. He said he would rather, because 
of the strain and the lights. So I said we would agree to have 
it run one day up until 1 o'clock, say.
    Mr. Marcy brings up a question that is always a difficult 
one. He says that Senator Symington cannot come on the 16th. He 
wishes it to go on the 17th, and this creates a problem that if 
we wanted to run over in executive session--what I said about 
going in the afternoon applies only to open session with lights 
and all that. It does not apply to executive session. He would 
not be free on the afternoon of the 17th.
    Senator Pell. Excuse me, I would like to bring up a point 
here, too, if I can.
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Senator Pell. And that is I realize it is a good idea for a 
few people questioning because it goes through with greater 
ease, but when meetings are scheduled for Monday morning at 10, 
it is very difficult sometimes for those of us who, if we have 
a speaking engagement--I may be in the minority on this, I do 
not know if anybody else shares the same view, and as a matter 
of routine when we have the choice and initiative, could not 
meetings be scheduled for Tuesday mornings and not Monday 
mornings?
    The Chairman. Well, Tuesdays are our regular meetings for 
the conduct of our regular business such as I have got--I have 
got several other items I am coming to; for example, the 
consular agreement mentioned last night. Katzenbach came and 
said he wanted us to take it up, and we have hearings. If you 
mean we will not just utilize Monday, it is going to make it 
very difficult. That means Friday, too.
    Senator Pell. Fridays it does not mean because people do 
shove off, they shove off in the afternoon but maybe I am the 
only one, in which case I withdraw my point, but----
    The Chairman. I would like to accommodate the members. How 
do you members, all of you, feel about Monday? We are going to 
have an awful heavy schedule because there are a number of 
things I am going to mention in a minute.
    Senator Mundt. I would rather have Monday than Friday.
    Senator Hickenlooper. We have other meetings and it could 
be Tuesday.
    Senator Aiken. Get it over with.
    Senator Pell. I am in a minority so I withdraw.
    The Chairman. You do not live far away so you cannot get 
back on Monday.
    Senator Pell. I made two speaking engagements that day.
    The Chairman. You do not speak on Sunday, do you?
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Pell. So I am in the same condition on the 23rd 
where I probably will not be able to be here.
    The Chairman. Well, you know, as big a committee as this 
is, there is going to be somebody, I think, nearly every day, 
and we just almost have to proceed in some way.
    Senator Pell. Yes.
    The Chairman. With that understanding, the executive is on 
the 16th and open on the 23rd.

                         SIZE OF THE COMMITTEE

    By the way, did the Steering Committee take action on the 
size of the committee?
    Senator Clark. Yes; this has to still be off the record.
    [Discussion off the record.]

                    APPEARANCE BY SECRETARY MCNAMARA

    The Chairman. McNamara, we have contacted McNamara. His 
position is simply that he would like to appear before Armed 
Services before this committee, and I wrote to Russell and he 
feels that way. So he will appear there first and the date has 
not been set, has it, Marcy, you have not heard any further 
about it?
    Mr. Marcy. No, sir.
    The Chairman. It is not that he does not want to come, but 
simply he would like to appear in public before that committee 
and then we will have him as it is agreeable after that.
    I mentioned the consular agreement. The President, as you 
know, mentioned it last night. Katzenbach has already----
    Senator Hickenlooper. He mentioned so much last night I 
must have missed that.
    The Chairman. It was buried down----
    Senator Sparkman. With east and west trade.
    The Chairman. But Katzenbach came up and said they are 
anxious to proceed with it.
    The question is what do you think about hearings? We have 
had some hearings. It is my understanding that--in fact, I have 
some letters here, limited to official use, from Douglas 
MacArthur referring to Mr. Hoover's attitude toward this, and I 
understand Mr. Hoover feels that his former testimony may have 
been--I do not know whether you would say distorted a bit. He 
is not adamant against this at all. If I understand it 
correctly he simply made the observation that it would entail 
additional surveillance, I guess you would say. But he is not 
of the view that it should not be done is the way I understand 
it. You can look at it if you like.

                   MISINFORMATION ON CONSULAR TREATY

    Senator Carlson. I want to say on this consular treaty, our 
people may be getting misinformed. I am getting a lot of mail 
and we ought to have some additional hearings.
    The Chairman. The Liberty Lobby has mounted a strong 
campaign against it, relying I think primarily on the former 
testimony of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover.
    Senator Carlson. If we have a hearing, it may clear up some 
of this.
    The Chairman. I think we should, too. Does everybody 
believe that?
    Senator Sparkman. I do.
    The Chairman. Any objection?
    Senator Clark. If I may make one very brief comment, when I 
was in Russia in November and before I went, when I talked with 
Dobrynin\1\ in a briefing, the Russians really could not care 
less about this consular treaty because they think it is so 
much more to our advantage than it is to theirs, with which I 
agree, that they are not pushing particularly hard. I think it 
is very much to our advantage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Chairman. I do, too. I think it is to our advantage.
    Senator Sparkman. I think it would ease a lot of pain if 
you could get a modification of Hoover's statement because it 
has been----
    Senator Dodd. Is this on the troop commitment to Western 
Europe?
    The Chairman. We have discussed that. We wanted to bring it 
up after you got here. We discussed that at some length.

                     SENSE OF THE POLICY COMMITTEE

    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I almost mentioned in the 
caucus yesterday but I did not, the Democratic caucus, that I 
am fairly certain that it was the sense of the majority, if not 
all of the members of the Policy Committee, that this should be 
referred to a joint committee of the Armed Services and Foreign 
Relations Committee, and when the majority leader did not bring 
it up, I mentioned it to somebody who was sitting there, who 
was on the Policy Committee, and he said he understood 
Mansfield was going to take it up with you as to what would be 
the preference. But I know that my feeling, as the only member 
of both committees, was that it should go before a joint 
committee of Armed Services and Foreign Relations.
    It is clear that it involves both committees very 
fundamentally and very definitely, and in their mission, you 
might say, so I hope it would be agreeable to this committee.
    The Chairman. We have just discussed it. It is agreeable, I 
mean in the sense of jurisdiction. There was quite a strong 
sentiment if you got both full committees together it is 
unwieldy. We suggested that it either go to the committees 
successively, one and then the other, or a joint subcommittee 
so you do not have so many people at one time where it is 
unsatisfactory.
    Senator Symington. I only wanted to report to you the way 
it was left in the Policy Committee.
    The Chairman. What would you think of it going to this 
committee first and then that committee?
    Senator Symington. I think that would be wrong. I would 
rather see a joint subcommittee.
    The Chairman. You would rather have a joint subcommittee.
    Senator Symington. Yes, because there is so much work 
involved.
    The Chairman. Take eight or ten of this committee and join 
with them together.
    Senator Symington. That is right; this committee has a 
tremendous amount of work and we have this draft law, as well 
as appropriations and authorizations. There was some 
resistance, I think it is fair to say, to doing it at all 
because of the amount of work involved. This time I think we 
ought to either fish or cut bait, because of these tremendous 
expenses abroad. They are absolutely incredible under the 
circumstances in the amount of money they are asking for in the 
Far East and the amount of bodies they are asking for.

                        A PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIER

    Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, may I say--Tom and Stu were 
not here--I would much prefer the joint subcommittee to going 
to one committee or the other first because, let us face it, 
there is a psychological barrier there, people being what they 
are, and if it comes here first, people on the Armed Services 
Committee, some, will psychologically be disturbed. If it is 
the other way, there will be some here. I think a joint 
subcommittee would be much better than going to one committee 
first and then the other. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that 
having a joint hearing of the two full committees is very 
unwieldy. I do not think it is necessary
    After all, each full committee will take it up on the basis 
of the report of their subcommittee.
    Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, can I put in a plug, in 
passing, for a more frequent use of subcommittees, either ad 
hoc or the standing subcommittees, in order to expedite our 
work?
    The Chairman. Mr. Marcy and I have been talking about that 
and we will talk about it further, I mean with the committee. I 
think you are right, we ought to use that more. If I understand 
it and everybody is agreeable to the Senator from Missouri's 
suggestion preferring the joint subcommittee meeting.
    Senator Morse. On Joe's subcommittee comment, I would like 
to say that later in the morning I have on my agenda to raise 
with the committee a subcommittee matter. I will cover it then, 
and I quite agree with Joe.

                RESCHEDULING SECRETARY RUSK'S TESTIMONY

    Senator Symington. Can I bring up something you passed on? 
I have a very important engagement next Sunday, almost as 
important as the U.N. organization in 1945, when the Kansas 
City Chiefs are going to show the National Football League they 
have got the thing sewed up as much as they think they have. 
With that premise, I was hoping that perhaps Secretary Rusk 
could come on Tuesday. I talked to Carl about it and I talked 
to the Secretary about it, because it is impossible for me to 
get back here in time in the morning. I just thought, I would 
hope, that you could because there is no way I can get back at 
10 o'clock on Monday morning. I could get back in the 
afternoon, but I would hope--the Secretary said it would be all 
right with him if it would be all right with you. He did on the 
17th. I spoke to him and he spoke to Carl, and I asked Carl to 
speak to you.
    Senator Pell. I subscribe, for the reason I already said, 
to what Stuart said. Monday morning at 10 is very difficult. 
Friday mornings at 10 we are around. But Monday morning is very 
difficult.
    Senator Symington. I am going to try to hold all my 
engagements to weekends the way this thing happened last year, 
but this makes Monday morning difficult.
    Senator Aiken. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me any member of 
this committee who cannot be here Monday morning can afford to 
buy a Sunday paper and learn everything that we will be told 
Monday morning.
    Senator Sparkman. Did you see Bart Starr's picture, you 
know, big color?
    Senator Symington. I would like to ask this question. If it 
is going to be a question that he could come back in the 
afternoon on Monday but he could not do it on Tuesday, then if 
I can get here in time for Monday afternoon, could we have an 
agreement that he will be back Monday afternoon?
    The Chairman. Oh, sure.
    Senator Symington. I withdraw my objections.
    The Chairman. That was one of the main reasons we preferred 
Monday was the fact he could be here in the afternoon because 
it is likely we would not get through with him in any case.
    Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, could I be the devil's 
advocate for just a moment?
    The Chairman. Yes.

        SENATORS ACCOMMODATING THEMSELVES TO COMMITTEE SCHEDULE

    Senator Morse. I am very fond of the Senator from Missouri, 
as he knows. I am talking now of any relationships to any 
requests that have been made. It is my opinion that the 
efficiency of this committee was greatly interfered with last 
year because of the generosity of our chairman in trying to 
accommodate the personal requests of members of the committee. 
I think this is the time for us to adopt a procedure policy at 
the beginning of the session as follows: Namely, that although 
we would like to have people at our meetings that cannot be 
there, we have just got to accommodate ourselves to the 
committee schedule, and, if we cannot be there, we cannot be 
there. But I do not see, Mr. Chairman, how you can run this 
committee if you never knew whether or not a date you have set 
is one that you are going to be able to carry out.
    I would like to suggest that as a matter of policy, we 
decide this morning that if we cannot be at the meetings, that 
if just too bad, but we are going to have to accommodate 
ourselves to the schedule.
    Senator Symington. There is one point about that if the 
Senator will bear with me, because a great many of this 
committee are members of the Finance Committee on both sides of 
the aisle, which I am not, and I find there is a great deal of 
adjustment of the dates on the Finance and Foreign Relations 
Committees. Inasmuch as I am the sole member on Armed Services, 
I hope my beloved friend from the State of Oregon will not 
object to working it out. Even when I am here, I get badly 
stuck between two----
    Senator Morse. You missed my point. My point is that the 
chairman has got to work out what should be our schedule of 
hearings. He has to do it with other committees and find out 
what our membership and conflict is with other committees. But 
my point is he has to work out a schedule and we have to follow 
the schedule.
    Every time you get an exception, may I say, for X or Y on 
this committee, you inconvenience A and B. They may not say 
anything, but every time you change it A and B are discommoded 
and I think we have to have a schedule to follow.

                    CONFLICTS WITH OTHER COMMITTEES

    The Chairman. May I say I talked to Marcy at length about 
this. One reason for Monday is that it is one of the days where 
practically no other committees meet and we thought--Tuesday is 
a favorite day for all committees, and you run these conflicts 
you are talking about, membership in other meetings.
    Take Senator Gore. He is a very high ranking man on 
Finance. He likes to be there, and I like to have him there 
because I cannot go to it. They always meet on Tuesday, is that 
not correct, practically always, on other days. Mondays was one 
of the reasons why it looks inconvenient from your point of 
view. It is free from those other conflicts more than most days 
of the week.
    Senator Pell. The only question that comes to my mind is 
the planning ahead. Sometimes you want to make one day in your 
home area; should it be a weekday, should it be a Monday, or 
should it be a Friday? We have to weigh these things. As a rule 
I thought--I have always got the feeling that Monday was 
probably the better day to choose as opposed to Friday. Monday 
morning, as happens in Senator Symington's case, is the 
earliest to get back.
    The Chairman. He is only going to be out there once. He 
will be very disillusioned about that.
    Senator Pell. Friday, on the other hand, people may leave 
but they always leave in the afternoon.
    Senator Morse. We have to cancel some meetings. I canceled 
a meeting up in George Aiken's state. I was supposed to lecture 
up there in the university. I notified them I could not do it 
and I canceled it.
    The Chairman. I would like to do the best I can with the 
committee. I need guidance. We thought this was an idea. I will 
do anything that the consensus believes in.
    Senator Carlson. I just want to say this. I want the 
chairman to set the meetings. I am going to have to miss some. 
But I do not want anything to interfere with this meeting next 
Sunday in San Francisco. I want the Senator from Missouri to be 
there and bring back the bacon.

                     PROBLEMS TRAVELING TO THE WEST

    Senator Mundt. I think what Wayne said makes a lot of 
sense. I would like to add one little codicil. If you will 
follow the practice of what you have done here of giving us a 
little advance notice, like a week, we can adjust to your 
schedule. I agree you cannot change your schedule for an 
individual member without interfering with some other member. 
We have an altogether different problem out West from what Clay 
has. He cannot be back Monday morning. I cannot get back home 
unless I leave Friday morning, so it varies. Set it and give us 
a week or so notice and we will adjust, like Wayne canceled a 
meeting.
    The Chairman. I am certainly open to suggestions, and Mr. 
Marcy has been around here a long time. He sort of thought 
Mondays and Tuesdays--Tuesdays are our regular days and Monday 
would fit in as well as any day with anybody. But I do not want 
to be arbitrary about it. As far as I am concerned, it is about 
half dozen of one and six of the other.
    Senator Symington. One more point I have following Karl's 
point, too. If we do try to go out on weekends, which is what I 
am going to do this year, then I respectfully say because of 
the problem of getting back from your state and my state that 
Tuesday and Wednesday would be better than Monday and Tuesday. 
If you come back Sunday, you fly all day Sunday night which 
cripples you a little bit and you can get back sometime Monday, 
and then Tuesday and Wednesday it gives you a chance to get out 
Friday. It takes you a little longer than it does me.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Are you establishing a Tuesday to 
Thursday club?
    Senator Symington. Thursday is Armed Services.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    The Chairman. I will talk to Mr. Marcy further. Personally, 
it does not make much difference to me. I am perfectly 
agreeable to any way. I would just like to accommodate as many 
as possible and get as many people here. We did pretty well 
last year.

                            THE SPACE TREATY

    Let me go over a few other things. The space treaty is one 
which we anticipate will be signed this month and they will, I 
know, they have already mentioned it, want it acted on quickly 
because of their--they think it is psychologically important. 
Katzenbach has mentioned it, and so that is another matter 
which I am sure we will have hearings on. This is what I meant 
a moment ago. We are going to have to utilize more than Monday 
and Tuesday. This is just starting with Rusk. I think we are 
going to be Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday very likely when you 
get into these other matters that I mentioned.
    [Discussion off the record.]

                          HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

    The Chairman. Then we have a few other things. These things 
bother me, no end. I wonder what you all think or should we 
just forget about them. I get these letters all the time. They 
come here you know, there are--I mean on the human rights 
things, what do you all think about those? Should we forget 
them or should we act on them? You have been to the U.N.--by 
the way, I think we ought to have a time set aside--I want to 
hear what the Senator from Idaho has to say about his 
experience in the U.N. But this is a matter particularly 
relating to the U.N. What do you think about it?
    Senator Church. Of course there is a good deal of feeling 
up there that is adverse to the United States on this matter 
because although we have voted finally for the approval of 
these conventions, we have never ratified any of them. As time 
has passed, more and more comment, adverse comment, has 
developed against us on the ground that we are not really for 
these conventions and the proof of it is that, although we go 
through the motions in the U.N. where they have been approved 
by very large majorities, we have failed to ratify these 
conventions and make them a part--make them binding treaties.
    I have not studied the conventions very carefully, but I 
think with the possibility of certain reservations that may be 
necessary, we could proceed with hearings, obviously secure the 
ratification of some of the conventions without any difficulty.
    Senator Dodd. Is the Genocide Convention one of those?
    Senator Church. Yes, it is one of those. But I think if we 
were to move on any one, perhaps the one that would encounter 
the least difficulty, it would be helpful to us with the U.N. 
We really do not care about these and we know the African and 
Asian countries are quite--they put a lot of store in these 
conventions.
    Senator Sparkman. When you refer to the human rights 
convention, is that an old one or was it passed in the U.N. 
either this or last year?
    Senator Church. This relates, it relates back several 
years.
    The Chairman. It is an old one, the one I had in mind.
    Mr. Marcy. There are three of those that have been up here 
since, in the Kennedy regime--yes, they came July of '63. There 
is one on the convention of political rights for women. There 
is another one, the convention concerning the abolition of 
forced labor. There is a third, a supplementary convention on 
the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, an institution of 
practices similar to slavery, and then there is the genocide 
convention, which has been with us since 1949.
    Senator Sparkman. Those three that you mentioned 
specifically though, they are relatively new.
    Mr. Marcy. They are, yes.
    Senator Sparkman. I think they were adopted in that 
preceding session of the General Assembly. The genocide is old, 
and I think there is a human rights with it also, adopted way 
back in '57.

        DIFFICULT FOR OTHER NATIONS TO UNDERSTAND U.S. POSITION

    Senator Church. Just a reading of these, particularly 
reference to slavery and women's rights and that kind of thing, 
it is very difficult for many of these countries to understand 
why the United States with all our talk of democratic rights 
and individual liberties and equality and so forth cannot find 
it possible to ratify conventions against slavery.
    Senator Hickenlooper. One reason they do not understand 
some of those things, they do not understand the American 
system of government. They do not understand these treaties can 
abrogate or replace under certain conditions some of the 
provisions of our Constitution.
    Senator Church. I know.
    Senator Hickenlooper. For one I am not for letting the 
African countries run this country through emotion or 
otherwise. They have been doing it for a little while, and I 
think it is time we stopped letting them be influential on 
these things.
    May I say most of these conventions, I think, can be worked 
out, as Frank said, and made satisfactory.
    Senator Sparkman. I was going to ask if we should act 
favorably on these last three, and I understand or from what I 
have heard about them, they are more or less--they are more or 
less unobjectionable. Would that ease your situation?
    Senator Church. John, I think anything that would break the 
ice to show that we are prepared to follow through, and we will 
hold hearings, and I think ratification of one or two of these 
would be extremely helpful to the United States.
    Senator Sparkman. I think a couple of them could be done, 
maybe three of them if I heard correctly about them. But so far 
as the old human rights and the genocide, those old ones, there 
are about three of them are there not, two or three, I just do 
not believe there is any chance.
    Senator Church. Forget the old ones and take the three most 
recent ones.
    Senator Church. We have some constitutional problems, as 
Bourke said, and we have to look at them. But there is a 
possibility of ratification of some of them.

           THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

    Senator Pell. I would like to also, Mr. Chairman, having 
had some contact with the U.N., put in a strong plug of support 
for Frank's view, and I would like to particularly hope we 
would not put out a hand on considering the genocide convention 
because I think it is the most important one in the whole 
crowd. I think the genocide convention is as important as it 
was when it was considered in the late forties, and I would 
hope very much indeed we would consider it.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Have you studied what it will do to 
the Federal Constitution?
    Senator Pell. I studied it, I read it, and I realize the 
problems.
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is what has been holding it up 
all these years.
    Senator Pell. I am well aware of it.

                         SUBCOMMITTEE SITUATION

    Senator Morse. I think here is the place where you could 
assign to a subcommittee the consideration of this matter to 
report to the full committee, for example, under the direction 
of Senator Church. Let us face it, you cannot begin to handle 
all the things that are going to come before this full 
committee, if the full committee retains jurisdiction over all 
of them. I think this is as good a place as any for me to renew 
my proposal of last year that the full committee should approve 
and authorize a program of activity for its subcommittees. The 
Mansfield resolution, the Vietnam hearings, the outer space 
treaty are items that will occupy the full committee, along 
with others. The final report of the Committee on the 
Reorganization of Congress shows this committee held far more 
full committee hearings in the 88th Congress than any other 
Senate committee. We held 196. The next high number was the 
Commerce Committee with 127. But Foreign Relations had only 33 
subcommittee meetings in the 88th Congress whereas Commerce had 
116.
    The full committee will have a heavy schedule of major 
business in 1967. But I do not think our activity should be 
limited to what the full committee can handle.
    The arms races in Latin America and the Middle East are 
possibilities for such a subcommittee. So is a full review of 
the Alliance for Progress and many other items that could be 
handled either under existing subcommittees, or special ad hoc 
committees.
    Mr. Chairman, let us face it with the kind of a setup we 
have in this committee for your subcommittees, they are going 
to be appendages, in my judgment, with very little 
effectiveness. I speak most respectfully because of my high 
regard for our staff, but this staff cannot handle full 
committee business and subcommittee business.
    This committee has, in my judgment, unlike most committees 
in the Senate, never sought to get the financial support, the 
staff support, that a Foreign Relations Committee ought to 
have. I renew my suggestion that you take these subcommittees, 
you recognize that their staffs be enlarged, that they be given 
staff, under the supervision of the chairman and the 
professional director of the staff, Mr. Marcy.

                      LATIN AMERICAN SUBCOMMITTEE

    But let me as a special pleader tell you about my problem 
in the Latin American subcommittee. I cannot possibly carry on 
what needs to be done on the Latin American subcommittee if I 
am going to have to rely on the existing staff. Carl Marcy and 
Pat Holt and Lowenstein and the rest of them cannot possibly 
give to me the professional assistance that I need to conduct 
the kind of hearings that ought to be conducted on Latin 
America. Alliance for Progress ought to be gone into.
    I want to say that I have already had two conferences with 
Assistant Secretary Sol Linowitz, who by the way, has made a 
tremendously favorable impression on me. He talked to me before 
the President sent him to Latin America. He talked to me after 
he came back. I want to have an early meeting of the 
subcommittee in the late afternoon in which I would invite the 
full committee, to which I would always invite the full 
committee if I am given jurisdiction to conduct some of these 
things, and have him brief us. I think he is terrific in his 
understanding already of Latin American policy.
    But I want to say, Mr. Chairman, we are just kidding 
ourselves if you think that these subcommittees of this 
committee are more than facades. We have no real jurisdiction. 
We have no staff, we have no financial resources, and I would 
propose a complete reorganization of the subcommittee setup, 
under the control of the Chairman, but with authority for us to 
go ahead and conduct the studies that the full committee will 
never get around to conducting.
    I think what is needed, Mr. Chairman, we cannot do it this 
morning, but you ought to get Carl Marcy and his staff to work 
with some of us on various plans for a reorganization of 
subcommittees. I would like to see not only my committee, but I 
would like to see the NATO committee, I would like to see the 
other subcommittees, start subcommittee hearings this year that 
amount to something.
    Senator Clark. Would you yield for just a second?
    Senator Morse. I am all through. I yield.

                     COMPARISON TO LABOR COMMITTEE

    Senator Clark. I would like you to comment to the chairman 
about the experience you and I both had with the Labor 
Committee where we could not possibly get through the workload.
    Senator Morse. That is probably why it makes me a biased 
witness. We have on the Labor Committee real jurisdiction given 
to the subcommittees. We have our staff, and I think, for 
example, you check them for security, you approve of them on 
this committee, but you give these subcommittees the needed 
staff they need to do this job.
    Let us face it. Marcy and his associates just cannot be of 
service to these subcommittees and be of service to the full 
committee to the degree that we are going to need their service 
unless you are willing to make the fight to enlarge the 
subcommittee staffs with some jurisdiction given to the 
chairman of each subcommittee under your direction, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Sparkman asked to comment. He has to 
go. Did you want to comment on it?
    Senator Sparkman. Well, I merely say this. I have always 
inclined toward as many meetings by the full committee as 
possible for the consideration of matters. But I realize there 
is a lot of truth in what the senator says, particularly with 
reference to the time element and also with this problem that 
we have of getting a quorum present because of conflict with 
other committees.
    But any way we go at it we are going to have our hands 
full.
    Senator Morse. Sure.
    Senator Sparkman. That is all I care to say.
    The Chairman. Senator Gore?

                      THE DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

    Senator Gore. I wanted to raise a question about a 
subcommittee, the Disarmament Subcommittee, of which I happen 
to be the chairman. The most interesting and entreating 
paragraph in the president's speech last night was the one 
which seemed to me to be addressed directly to the Soviet Union 
rather than to us, and that is on the antimissile program. Here 
is a disarmament question per se, and if it would be agreeable 
with the subcommittee, with the full committee, I would propose 
to have some hearings on this. However, it is matter of such 
overweening importance, I would not wish to go into it if the 
full committee wishes to do so. If the full committee can find 
time to do so, fine. But it seems to me here is something of 
mutual interest to the United States and to the Soviet Union, 
the two countries being the only ones with the technological 
competency to create such systems, and yet this has been a 
decision that has been procrastinating now for many, many 
months. How long it can safely be postponed without reaching 
some agreement is a matter, I think, of urgency.
    Of course in my view it would be far preferable that the 
United States and the Soviet Union mutually agree to abstain 
from such a costly and wasteful expenditure, but it is very 
dangerous to this country, in my view, to procrastinate until 
the Soviet Union may suddenly have a fait accompli and we are 
left second.
    So it seems to me this is a subject which either the full 
committee or the subcommittee should examine. I am willing to 
see either done, and I want to submit it to you.
    Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, I would like to support Albert 
as a member of this subcommittee. I think this is probably the 
most important single foreign policy matter that confronts us 
today, a good deal more important than things that are 
considered to be vital.

                     ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

    If we get ourselves into another escalation of this arms 
race by the placement of antiballistic missiles around Moscow, 
Leningrad, and Washington, and New York, the total cost is 
going to be well over 20 billions of dollars.
    Senator Symington. Eight months of the Vietnamese war.
    Senator Clark. It is absolutely and fully for either 
country to do it, and I think a skillful agreement pushed by 
this committee could get us off the hook because it is not 
outside of the Soviet's interests either.
    The Chairman. That is one thing that pleased me last night 
because he decided two things. From the intelligence community 
it is my best information they do not believe that the Soviets 
are very far along on this ABM at all. The only one that is 
being currently pushed is around Moscow. It has very limited 
possibilities and it is the only one, and I think he is quite 
right in taking a further look. It is my impression that is 
what he has in mind in the meantime, to do the best he can 
diplomatically to try to----
    Senator Gore. I raise no critical comment. I say this is 
just a matter of such overweening importance that either this 
committee or the subcommittee should go into it.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I say a word?

                           THE AMOUNT OF WORK

    First I agree without any reservation of any kind with the 
position taken by the Senator from Oregon. In fact, the Chair 
will remember I presented this to him sometime back.
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Senator Symington. Because in my opinion this is the most 
important committee, so long as it does not get subordinated to 
the executive branch, in the Congress of the United States.
    Now knowing Senator Gore, I think it would be a wonderful 
thing if he could really get his teeth into this disarmament 
thing.
    You can do it as well as anybody around, but you have so 
doggone much else to do.
    The Armed Services Committee is a very important committee, 
especially because it authorizes well over 60 percent, I think, 
now of the budget, the United States budget. We could not do 
anything that really meant anything if we did not have some 
major subcommittee like Stennis's Military Preparedness 
Subcommittee and Jackson's Military Construction Committee. The 
Military Preparedness Subcommittee has a complete staff, with a 
great many members, and they are all excellent people.
    Now, everything is done just like when we testified. I used 
to testify from the executive branch to committees. The 
chairman of the committee is always the chairman of any 
subcommittee, if he wants to be there. At times the chairman 
would come in. If Mahon has a meeting and Cannon would come in, 
he immediately would chair the meeting.
    But from your standpoint, your health, the amount of work, 
the way the world is today, I just do not think you can take it 
and at the same time do a good job without impairment to your 
health. I just could not be more serious about this.
    One other point; just before I left, Doug MacArthur came 
down to see me, and he was very upset about the Middle East. 
That is the little subcommittee I happen to be the chairman of, 
and he told me all about it and he said he felt that the 
Israelis made a very serious mistake.

                        VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST

    Well, I came back from the Far East last week through the 
Middle East, and putting it mildly, in my opinion, they sure 
did make a serious mistake. I spent a couple of days with Luke 
Battle in Cairo, who is a very bright fellow and seemed to be 
fully up on it, and has an excellent staff and then I went up 
and had a long talk with Hussein in Jordan, who in my opinion 
fully expects to be assassinated. He is our one great friend we 
have out there.
    I talked to Levi Eshkol and I did not pull any punches, and 
I said, ``This is going to hurt you a lot more than anything 
you have done since the state was formed in 1948.''
    I talked to Abba Eban, I talked to General Moshe Dayan who 
is out, the military hero.
    I then stopped to talk in Athens--I spent a good many hours 
with Walworth Barbour, the ambassador to Israel.
    I went to Athens, and I had another break. In Athens is an 
ambassador, a seasoned fellow who was formerly an assistant 
secretary of state. Phil Talbot, our ambassador, and I spent a 
good many hours with him, and he said, ``You see, the story 
going around the Middle East and based on my experience is just 
plain murder,'' he said. ``The Israelis attacked Jordan because 
they knew Jordan was a friend of the U.S., but they did not 
attack Syria or UAR, especially Syria, because they felt they 
were friends of the Soviets,'' and also my impression was very 
definitely that the UAR is moving quietly but definitely into, 
further into, the Soviet bloc.
    Well, these things are the kind of things, just thinking 
out loud, if you could have some hearings on and just to get 
information, because I noticed since I have got back that 
everything that I did in Israel was very well covered by the 
press, pictures in my own home town paper and that kind of 
stuff, whereas there was none of it, you might say, on the Arab 
side.
    I am not choosing up sides. I do think they made a bad 
mistake on this and their arguments are very specious as to why 
they did it. I do think if we have any friend in the Arab 
world, it is Hussein, and I do think he is in very serious 
trouble.
    So these are the kinds of things that if you held some 
hearings, I think you could bring out and get a better grasp 
of.
    Just like I would sure like to see Albert get into this 
disarmament thing and have some hearings about this situation, 
because actually, without violating any security or anything, 
the hearing that you, Bourke, and I went to the other day, I 
was impressed with the fact that the information we got was not 
coordinated or was not the same as the information released 
recently by the Secretary of Defense to the American people on 
that particular subject.
    So you just have a lot of information floating around, and 
if you do not fragment this committee into subcommittees with 
some authority and some staff, always subject to the approval 
of you and the full committee, I just do not think you can do 
the job the way the world is today. End of statement.

                    COMMITTEE'S USE OF SUBCOMMITTEES

    Senator Morse. I would like to have further discussion of 
it at our meetings after the evidence is brought in. I want to 
stress what Stu said in his last statement. My proposal does 
not involve any independence of the subcommittees. My proposal 
involves your approval in your capacity as chairman, and it 
involves the approval of the full committee with regard to the 
subject matters taken up. But once assigned to the 
subcommittee, then the subcommittee will do what it does in 
other committees, it acts for the full committee and reports 
back to the full committee.
    You know I never have hearings without sending each one of 
you a letter inviting you to come to the hearings. I have not 
talked to the staff. I have my information from other sources, 
so I do not think it would be proper for me to involve the 
staff in the inquiries that I have made. But I would like to 
get all sides of it and all the facts.
    I think you will find that of the major committees of the 
Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee is the most 
understaffed. The Foreign Relations Committee in a sense has 
sort of a closed staff, a very small number of people, highly 
qualified. There is no reason why a subcommittee should not be 
authorized to select a subcommittee staff of two or three 
people representing--serving both the majority and the minority 
of the subcommittee as qualified as the people on the full 
committee staff, with an expertise on the work of that 
subcommittee, in the jurisdiction of that subcommittee.

                      SIZE OF THE COMMITTEE STAFF

    My question to you is: Why is it that the Foreign Relations 
Committee maintains as small a staff as we maintain when we are 
up against the State Department and the Pentagon building with 
almost unlimited staff to draw on? Why have we kept this staff 
as small as we have kept it in comparison with other staffs? 
Take the Labor Committee. We far exceed this committee, Armed 
Services Committee, Stu has already stated.
    I just want to say part of our problem is we do not have 
the assistance that we need as members of this committee to do 
our job, and I think we ought to change the staff policy of the 
committee.
    The Chairman. Well, I am very glad to hear this discussion. 
What do you think over here on this side about it, Bourke and 
George?
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think you run a tremendous danger 
just like other committees have run. I think a lot of these 
committees have run just clear out of the reservation on their 
subcommittees, vast staffs that they have set up, and they 
become autonomous subcommittees practically. I think it is hard 
to justify it except to give a lot of jobs to a lot of people 
and a lot of autonomy to a lot of folks.
    That is just the practical answer. You have asked me and I 
tell you.
    The Chairman. I want to know----
    Senator Symington. Would you feel that way about it if you 
had a Republican President and were chairman of this committee?
    Senator Hickenlooper. I had thought about it during eight 
years of the Eisenhower Administration.
    The Chairman. George, what do you think?
    Senator Aiken. Mr. Chairman, I try to practice what I 
preach. I find in my own office that if they pushed up a little 
bit to get their work done, they do a whale of a lot better 
work than they do if there are too many people in the office. 
Nobody wants to do it if they have one too many. But if they 
are pushed up they take it and go and do it.

               REPORTS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN SUBCOMMITTEE

    Senator Hickenlooper. What Senator Morse said about his 
Latin American Subcommittee, I have been on that subcommittee. 
I have been on it ever since it was set up. I read every report 
Pat Holt has put in about the investigations of these countries 
in Latin America. I think they are more profound and more 
penetrating than any subcommittee hearing that we could have 
here on that subject.
    Now, I don't mean to say we should not----
    Senator Morse. But those very reports ought to be the basis 
for a thorough and intensive study and investigation of the 
subcommittee.
    Senator Hickenlooper. He is very thorough and his 
observations over the years have been very accurate.
    Senator Morse. With all due respect to Pat Holt, he is no 
substitute for the Senatorial responsibilities of the members.
    Senator Hickenlooper. No.
    Senator Morse. That is what you are going to make it if you 
are going to turn the investigation over to the staff members.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Not until there is reason to think 
the staff member is inaccurate.
    Senator Morse. But the point is he doesn't begin, his 
reports don't begin to cover the type of study I am talking 
about.

                 BACKGROUND ON STAFF AND SUBCOMMITTEES

    Mr. Marcy. Senator, I might just remind the committee on a 
little background on this.
    In 1958, a subcommittee was created, of which Senator 
Sparkman was chairman, to look into the whole staff problem. At 
that time the committee, that is the subcommittee, recommended 
to the full committee, that the present structure continue to 
exist. At that time, it pointed out that the staff had six 
professionals and eight clerical employees. The final 
conclusion, except insofar as the subcommittee recommended the 
addition of one employee to assist in the coordinating 
functions in connection with the visits of distinguished 
foreign visitors, that is Miss [Milrae] Jensen, it did not 
believe that there should be any additions to the staff at the 
present time.
    Now, that was in 1958.
    Senator Clark. Nine years ago. The world has sure changed 
since then.
    The Chairman. May I say, last year we utilized, I thought 
very effectively, five ad hoc subcommittees, assigning certain 
jobs to them, and they did a lot of work and reported a lot of 
bills. The tax conventions, in particular, and claims 
convention, legislation under Senator Sparkman.
    I think we have got to move in some degree in this 
connection. It is a question of how much, in my opinion, and 
also it is not easy to get good qualified staff people. You 
look around here and it is hard to get them, the ones that are 
really qualified for this kind of work like our professional 
staff.
    Senator Pell?

                  BRINGING STAFF TO COMMITTEE MEETINGS

    Senator Pell. There is another problem here along the line 
of what Wayne said, which is that this is the only--it maybe a 
very good idea, I haven't made up my own mind--but this is the 
only committee, I believe, in the Congress where you can't 
bring your own staff people in with you, and so when you have a 
continuing responsibility on a specific subject that you are 
following it leaves you a little scattered, because there is no 
staff man you can talk to.
    The Chairman. Harry Byrd never allowed one of my staff to 
go to the Finance Committee. I don't think they do under any 
circumstances.
    Isn't that right?
    Senator Dodd. We don't in Judiciary.
    The Chairman. It is the custom.
    Senator Dodd. We don't do it in Judiciary.
    The Chairman You do not?
    Senator Dodd. No.
    The Chairman. I don't think it is peculiar at all.
    Senator Pell. I am sorry.
    The Chairman. Senator Dodd?

                  FOCUS ON BIG PROBLEMS AS A TOTALITY

    Senator Dodd. I don't know whether it is improper or not 
but I would like to hear from the staff, what they think about 
this.
    The Chairman. Sure, it is not improper. We have talked 
about this before.
    Go ahead.
    Mr. Marcy. Well, Senator, this, as the members know, comes 
up about every two or three years and it seems always to boil 
itself down to a very fundamental question as to whether the 
committee wants to focus on fairly big kinds of problems as a 
totality, which is the way the committee has generally done, or 
whether it wants to break up into sort of a series of 
subcommittees, each going in sort of a different direction.
    Senator Symington. That is not so.
    Mr. Marcy. I might say that the staff has for some time 
thought that it might be advisable to set up one or two, we 
thought mostly in terms of one, one subcommittee which would be 
kind of a continuing thing with a separate staff. It would be 
assigned to specific kinds of things.
    I think, for example, the problem would be illustrated if 
we tried to hold hearings during the next two months on, say, 
the subject of the Middle East, disarmament and the Alliance 
for Progress. I think they need to be approached in sort of 
separate way.

               AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEES HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL

    Senator Church. Mr. Chairman, I am generally in sympathy 
with the position of the Senator form Oregon and the Senator 
from Missouri. I think the experiment of the ad hoc committees 
has been a rather successful one.
    Furthermore, I don't think this committee is getting its 
work done functioning as it has been functioning over the 
years. I think that is quite evident in terms of the things we 
haven't taken up, and in terms of the extravagant amount of 
time we have had to spend on foreign aid and that sort of 
thing.
    So that we are not really penetrating many of these 
questions as thoroughly as we should.
    I think that in light, and this is no reflection on the 
staff, I think this is the finest professional staff that I 
know anything about, but in light of our experience with the ad 
hoc committees, I don't see why we couldn't retain for the full 
committee the most important things that we want to look at as 
a whole committee, and give some of these subcommittees 
assignments of a substantive character. Let them conduct 
hearings; let them bring in their recommendations, and print 
hearings for the full committee to review.
    Senator Morse. Certainly.
    Senator Church. And the full committee has the final say. 
Set it up in such a way that we won't proliferate all over the 
place. Establish the limits and give the chairman of the full 
committee the final say concerning the work of the 
subcommittees which they would take up.
    Senator Morse. That is all I have asked for.
    Senator Church. I mean this is a perfectly reasonable 
request.
    Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment?
    The Chairman. Yes.

                    COMMITTEE HAS GAINED IMPORTANCE

    Senator Gore. I think we are picking ourselves to pieces 
here. I think introspection is good, but I would like to call 
attention to one thing. We had a quorum this morning. Two years 
ago the Chairman was complaining nobody ever attended meetings. 
This committee has attained an importance in the last year that 
it hasn't had in a long time. I think hearings before the 
American people not only rehabilitated this committee in its 
importance, but did more than anyone thing has done in a decade 
to restore the co-equal status of the Legislative Branch with 
the Executive. The public hearings we had, whether you agree 
with what was said here or there or disagree, had an impact on 
the American people no other committee of either house of 
Congress has done since I have been a member of the body, which 
has been 28 years now.
    So I think that while we are finding fault with ourselves, 
let us recall that what the committee as a whole did last year 
was the single most important thing that this or any other 
committee, in my opinion, has done in a long time.
    So let us improve through ad hoc, through subcommittees, 
through staff, but let us not forget that the most important 
thing is this committee as a whole, playing its constitutional 
function in the open before the American people.
    Senator Church. I agree with that.

                HAVE A SUBCOMMITTEE HANDLE NATO MATTERS

    The Chairman. Let me say one thing. Last year I was more 
than willing to have a subcommittee handle NATO and we got to 
talking about it and it looked like we were downgrading NATO if 
we don't have a full committee.
    Remember that?
    Should it be a full or subcommittee? I was for it and I 
intended it for it. You went over there and when we got down 
there they put it up to me, ``If you do that, it will look as 
though you are not really interested in NATO,'' so they put the 
pressure on me. I had to do it. That is what happened. I was 
all for it.
    Senator Church. That may have been a subject----
    The Chairman. I mean this is what you often run into. On 
these other things, the things I mentioned, there were five 
subcommittees. No one thought those were so important that it 
had to be full, and they went off very well and you did the 
work well.
    We can do that more. I am perfectly willing to do it. We 
have already talked about this morning a subcommittee to meet 
with Armed Services on these troops in Europe. I am all for it. 
I think it would be a good idea.
    Senator Church. I just wanted to say one thing. I should 
think some of these U.N. conventions, for example, could be 
taken up by a subcommittee.
    The Chairman. I do, too.
    Senator Church. And hearings held and printed hearings 
distributed.
    The Chairman. I do, too. I am all for this.
    I do think if we move in this direction--last year I said 
we will try these ad hoc and see how they work and if they work 
well, we will do more of it.
    I am all for it. I think we do have a couple of more staff 
men, but they are hard to get. The committee did look over a 
lot of them and you would be surprised how difficult it is to 
get good ones.
    Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make two 
points.

                      EXERCISE OVERSIGHT FUNCTION

    First, I would thoroughly agree the committee is not 
getting its work done as expeditiously as it could and I think 
the ad hoc device is an excellent thing, two or three members 
well-informed and then report to the full committee for action. 
So, as Senator Mansfield pointed out to all committee chairmen 
including you, he believes this is a session where we ought to 
exercise our oversight function, and a large part of this 
committee is not legislative but oversight--Vietnam. NATO 
hearings are an example.
    The Chairman. That is an example.
    Senator Clark. You cannot carry on more than one or two of 
those things a year if you are going to have the full committee 
do it, if you, Mr. Chairman, have to be the fellow out there in 
the front all the time.
    Now, it is true, the argument is made and to some extent it 
is downgraded. But I call on my colleague from Oregon to point 
out whenever they have a problem involving education they go to 
the Senator from Oregon and not to the chairman of the 
committee, Senator Hill, who is a wonderful magnificent 
committee chairman I serve under. When they went to go to the 
man on manpower problems, they come to me. But in the course of 
a not too long period of time, you get the press oriented to 
the fact the committee is organized so that most of the 
committee work is done at a subcommittee level.
    When you come to the full committee you have the most 
gracious and able man in the Senate, of course present company 
excepted, but we have to break down so the subcommittees can 
have more status than they have now. It won't be done 
overnight.

                         INACTIVE SUBCOMMITTEES

    I have one more point. I serve on three subcommittees--
Disarmament, Economic Institutions and Tom Dodd's economic aid 
problem. Those subcommittees have been pretty darned inactive 
during the last two years I have been on the committees and why 
have they been inactive--to some extent because the chairmen 
have been too busy, but to a very large extent they have no 
staff to organize witnesses, to handle it.
    I think if you take those three subcommittees, 
International Institutions, Disarmament, and Financial and 
Economic Interests Overseas, one good staff man could start off 
serving those three subcommittees as a start.
    Now, Mr. William Bader has competence in that particular 
area, and if we find that he can't do it by himself with those 
three subcommittees maybe we ought to get more staff.
    I don't have a shadow of a doubt that Wayne Morse has got 
to have at least one man and maybe more to handle this Latin 
American problem because Pat Holt can't do it.

                GIVE FOREIGN AID BILL TO A SUBCOMMITTEE

    The Chairman. Let me make one observation. You know the 
Foreign Aid bill is long with this committee. What percentage 
of those hearings were on foreign aid, you mentioned a great 
number. About 30 or 40 percent. And it has disrupted this 
committee for years. You know how much time it takes.
    Senator Dodd. Couldn't you give that to a subcommittee?
    The Chairman. Well, it has always been considered so 
controversial and so difficult that the full committee handles 
it. I would be perfectly willing to try a subcommittee.
    Does everybody think that could be done with a 
subcommittee?
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say, 
first, my remark to Bourke was pretty fresh and I didn't mean 
it that way and I regret saying it that way. I think he knows 
how I feel.
    I want to apologize for that crack. It really wasn't a 
crack.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Then there is no need to apologize 
for it.
    Senator Symington. Well, bless your heart.
    The thing that worries me is, I am not a lawyer and nearly 
everybody else here is, but I used to have a lot of experience 
in management. For a good many years of my life, I went into 
sick businesses and tried to work them out and they are still 
going, if I may make that immodest remark.

                         ORGANIZATIONAL GROWTH

    There comes a time when anything you do grows to a point 
where you have to make major basic changes in organization, and 
I say organizational structure along with it, functional 
structure. You have to have an organization, reorganization of 
your chart, and then you have to have a functional 
reorganization. I know that they put a book out, the 
Metropolitan Club had its 100th Anniversary and it said all the 
members of the State Department were founders of it, and I 
think 37 was the total members of the State Department in 
Washington.
    When my wife's grandfather was Secretary of State, John 
Hay, at the turn of the century, there were just over a hundred 
people in the State Department at that time.
    The Chairman. The whole department?
    Senator Symington. The whole department.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They did pretty well.
    Senator Aiken. That is good.
    Senator Symington. We had the two greatest allies the world 
has known, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, too.
    But to me it just seems as we watch the growth by hundreds 
and hundreds of thousands, I think millions would be fair, of 
the administrative branch and nobody has more respect for this 
staff than I do and I always get a good rapid answer from Carl 
Marcy or anybody else on the staff. It isn't that at all to me. 
It is just a case of getting organized to handle the workload 
which is infinitely more today, plus what Albert said about the 
interests of the people.

         THE COMMITTEE GOT PEOPLE INTERESTED IN FOREIGN POLICY

    The one great thing that this committee did last year, it 
got the people interested in the foreign policy of the United 
States to an extent that they never even dreamed about, in my 
opinion, that is when I get back to the hustings. It is going 
to be much more, it is not going to be less, because now the 
people are really interested in it and there is a lot of doubt 
about this tremendous ground war in Asia, and a lot of 
nervousness about this situation in the Middle East, and a lot 
of work which has been done incidental to our occupation in 
Europe and so on.
    I know it is hard to get staff people, but I would say it 
is a lot easier to get staff people into this problem today 
than three or four years ago because there is a lot of interest 
in it and good people follow where the interest goes. And I 
hope this could be considered not as a criticism of the staff 
and not as a criticism of the committee and, above all, not 
criticism of you because you are the one more than anyone else 
in the United States who has gotten the American people 
interested in foreign policy.

                          A MANAGEMENT PROBLEM

    I would hope it would be recognized on a management basis. 
There is nobody I respect more than Bourke. He is your ranking 
member, people like George Aiken next to him, nearly all over 
there feel the way you do about most of these problems, the 
senior members of the committee. We just have a management 
problem on our hands and it was the kind of thing I was deep 
in, it was my life's work 20 years ago, and I think we have got 
to face up to the management problem.
    The staff situation, a lot of things that could be done, 
you could approve, have people, final approval, you could have 
the top of your own staff consulted with your own final 
decision on members of the subcommittee staff. Just thinking 
off the top of my head it might be an excellent idea not to put 
the subcommittees on television. God knows I wouldn't like to 
try to get some real facts and dig in on the Arab-Israeli 
problem on television and so forth and so on.
    The Chairman. That would be explosive.
    Senator Symington. There are a lot of ways that you could 
bind this thing and the way the thing ran. This isn't the 
committee with the least staff by any means, with all due 
respect to my friend from Oregon.
    The Agriculture Committee is a committee that has got for 
my money much the least staff as against the money involved and 
so forth and so on.
    The Chairman. Finance has had no staff until this year.
    Senator Symington. My experience on the Agriculture 
Committee, I mean on the steering committee, and I know, Joe, 
they spend their time up there, instead of fighting to get on 
the committee, they spend their time fighting not to get on the 
Agriculture Committee.
    The Chairman. George wanted to say something. He has been 
waiting here.
    Senator Symington. I am all through now. But I think it is 
a management problem here we are discussing today at least as 
much as anything else.
    The Chairman. George?

                       AD HOC VERSUS AD INFINITUM

    Senator Aiken. I have been listening very attentively to 
the discussion relative to ad hoc committees and the staffing 
of ad hoc committees, and I am sure if they were well staffed 
they would have some very interesting staff meetings.
    But I also have a great regard for the intelligence and 
education of my chairman and I wanted to ask him what is the 
distance between ad hoc and ad infinitum.
    Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, getting back to the overall 
thing----
    The Chairman. I don't know.
    Senator Gore. I guess you assigned me more ad hoc duties 
last year than anyone.
    The Chairman. I think more individual bills you handled 
than any of them.
    Senator Gore. Well, some of them we reported and the 
committee acted upon in the Senate and some of them we reported 
on unfavorably, and I think events have sustained us. I am 
willing to do whatever you want me to do in that regard.

                      PROVOKING PUBLIC DISCUSSION

    But, again, I repeat, the overall function of this 
committee, as Stu Symington said, touched the American people. 
It stimulated an awareness and a study. It provoked study and 
discussion groups all over the United States.
    I would like to see us conduct another hearing of a level 
that would challenge the intelligent and public spirited people 
of the country.
    For instance, what are the valid indices of the great 
decisions today of a preeminent world power. Are we stuck with 
shibboleths, are there abstractions that have emotional and 
political appeal on which we should not base decisions? Where 
are we? What is our position in the world, and why?
    It seems to me if you could get some of the eminent 
scholars of the country once again, not to examine whether we 
should or should not be in Vietnam, that is past, but to 
examine the position of this country in the world of today's 
technology, that we could once again play an important role in 
public education and once again assert the constitutional 
importance of the Senate.

         STATE DEPARTMENT OPPOSITION TO AN EFFECTIVE COMMITTEE

    Senator Morse. I want to say the Senator from Oregon is not 
going to take the rap that he gets from certain quarters 
because the subcommittee on Latin America is not conducting the 
hearings it ought to be conducting. They should be conducted 
and conducted under your jurisdiction. I am not asking the 
subcommittee appoint staff but asking that you and the full 
committee appoint them. I am pointing out that nothing I have 
heard this morning justifies keeping the staff at its small 
number. We can get people. Sure it is hard to get them. Sure we 
can enlarge the staff by getting qualified people and we should 
do it.
    I want to say no member of this staff in my judgment can 
serve as a substitute for the responsibilities of the 
committee. Pat Holt makes very fine reports, but those reports 
ought to be conducted under the direction of the subcommittee 
and they ought to be subject to review by the subcommittee, and 
we ought to be able to call people in and determine whether or 
not they stand up.
    I think they will stand up. But the State Department would 
love to have some of these subcommittees continue to be 
ineffective.
    The last thing Rusk and Rostow and Gordon want is a vital 
working effective subcommittee on Latin America, but you had 
better keep your eyes on Latin America, may I say to this 
committee, because you have got great problems and trouble 
stirring themselves up in Latin America, and the subcommittee 
should do the job on the subject and not Pat Holt, in effect 
operating somewhat independent of the subcommittee. All I am 
asking for is that you enlarge your staff, that you can take 
complete jurisdiction over the subjects that will be taken up 
by your subcommittee and that we get on with the job of doing 
what--let's face it, this full committee is never going to do 
in regard to the Latin American problem because you haven't got 
time to do it, but the subcommittee can.
    You would know when we would have our meeting, we wouldn't 
be interfering with your jurisdiction. I would have them at 
night, if necessary, but we would do the work.
    But I only want to say as chairman of this subcommittee 
that the full committee is letting down the subcommittee, in my 
judgment, speaking as its chairman. I don't care how many 
members on the subcommittee want to let the present 
arrangements continue. It is not a good arrangement, and you 
are not going to do the job on Latin America and you either get 
a new subcommittee, if you want to get a new chairman, go ahead 
and get him, but I want to say I am going to continue to 
express why this subcommittee is not doing its job. It is not 
doing the job because it isn't properly staffed.

               AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITIES AS A GREAT POWER

    The Chairman. Well, I certainly am glad to have this 
discussion, and I will talk with the staff and see if we can 
come up with some concrete suggestion and maybe look into the 
matter of getting some more.
    I don't want to go too far, but I certainly think we ought 
to move in this direction and we will do it better.
    I want to make a comment here, Senator Gore brought up a 
question which was the last item on my agenda and the time is 
almost running out.
    The staff and I have been discussing this during this 
interim and I think you are quite right. We had a general 
subject that we are talking about called American 
responsibilities as a great power, a general subject to survey 
in some open hearings--of course we expect to start out in the 
usual way with whatever the administration wishes to say on 
this with Secretary Rusk and McNamara and others, that is the 
foreign policy prospects for '67. In that anything may be 
discussed, and this subject, general subject would be involved.
    I wanted to raise this question with you, a subject, for 
example, of this which we kicked around here at some length, 
the nature of our commitments, this nature of our being 
committed all the time.
    A number of these treaties, the President last night 
referred to them, and he is going to live up to all of them. We 
made a great many treaties during the 50's, a review of this as 
a part of this overall review of our relations as the greatest 
power in the world today and what that means.
    Another one was this man Edwin Reischauer is back. I have 
been thinking about, I would certainly personally like very 
much to have him. He ought to be as well qualified as anybody, 
for example, to discuss our relations with the whole Pacific 
area, not just Vietnam but he is especially qualified, it seems 
to me, to testify about our relations with Japan, China, the 
whole area of which Vietnam is simply one part.
    Senator Symington. I couldn't agree with you more.

                  AN EXAMINATION FOR OUR OWN EDUCATION

    The Chairman. This is the way we have been thinking about 
it and it is what I wanted to bring up.
    What does the committee think about it?
    I think it is on all fours with what the Senator from 
Tennessee stated. I completely agree with that. This is an area 
in which the full committee----
    Senator Gore. But an examination----
    The Chairman. That is correct. My own view is not at all we 
are attacking anybody. This is an examination for our own 
education, our own benefit as well as the public as to what 
kind of a role should the United States play under these 
present circumstances, and this is a complicated matter. It 
sounds vague but it is very real.
    Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, could I make one brief 
comment?
    The Chairman. Does this appeal to you?
    Senator Symington. Yes.
    Senator Clark. It appeals to me very much.
    I would like to make one brief comment to my very good 
friend Carl Marcy for whom I have the most profound admiration 
as a magnificent chief of this committee, but I hope when he 
starts to look around for a new staff man, Carl, we won't have 
as one of the criteria a timid little Ph.D. who is prepared to 
wipe the dandruff off the shoulders of members of this 
committee. I think that is what you mean.
    The Chairman. I don't know what you mean. Maybe Mr. Marcy 
does.
    [Discussion off the record.]

                  A COMBINATION OF ACTUAL EXPERIENCES

    Senator Symington. I think it would be a wonderful thing to 
get Reischauer. I stayed twice with him in Tokyo.
    The Chairman. He is an example. I hope we can get other 
people.
    You necessarily, when you get outside of the government, 
are going to be confronted with the difficulty of getting 
people who have a combination of actual experiences, as he has, 
plus a sufficient historical, political, social background and 
so on, and that he can relate it to us. This is difficult to 
get those people.
    Senator Clark. We have no finer fellow on the staff than 
Jim Lowenstein, with whom I spent a month with in Europe who is 
absolutely terrific. He came to this committee from a good spot 
in the State Department because he thought he could be more 
useful here.
    The Chairman. We have a new one we haven't used much who 
will turn out the same way, and he is Bader. He was in the 
State Department and it was partly because of Jim Lowenstein 
and everyone seemed to agree.
    Senator Pell. I came in and became a Senator. [Laughter.]

                  TESTIMONY FROM LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS

    Senator Morse. Bill, I don't know whether you can get--
whether protocol stops you or other restrictions do, but I wish 
we could get in Edward E. Rice, who is our consul general in 
Hong Kong, if our State Department will come and let him 
testify in executive session.
    The Chairman. It is a great problem.
    I would like to have some of these lower level people. The 
State Department seems to take the view the Secretary ought to 
talk for them. They don't want their underlings to testify. I 
hate to embarrass the underlings because they might fire them. 
I would like to do it, personally. I agree with you.
    Senator Morse. Carl Marcy can tell you if you get a 
briefing that we got in Hong Kong from Rice, it is far 
different from what the Secretary tells you when he comes in 
here.
    The Chairman. Well, I have the same feeling.
    What can we do about it, as a practical matter?
    Senator Symington. I can tell you what we can do about it. 
We ran into exactly the same thing in the Armed Services 
Committee, and I think I was the one who suggested first that 
we put the witnesses under oath. Then we had the Preparedness 
Subcommittee, under John Stennis, an able, fair, efficient 
fellow, and these fellows come in and we tell him who we want 
as witnesses. We don't let them tell us who we want as 
witnesses, and we pull in two or three fliers in Vietnam and 
they are under oath so they can go right back and say, ``You 
don't want me to perjure myself, do you?'' And they come up 
there and they give us more information in less time as against 
all this stuff that we get from the Joint Chiefs, you see.
    We really begin to cut the mustard as to what the facts 
are.

                            DOVES AND HAWKS

    One thing I don't know and that worries me a very great 
deal, based on my relationship with this government, is whether 
there is any accuracy in the fact that essentially McNamara is 
a dove and essentially Rusk is a hawk and the degree of it. I 
do know that when I talk to Walt Rostow who is now in a 
protective position as part of the Executive Branch that he was 
pretty darned hawkish, you see.
    Well, I think it might be, I certainly would subscribe to 
what Neil Sheehan wrote in the New York Times the other day 
after this last trip of mine, not a dove but no longer a hawk.
    When these fellows come down like the JCS they can't cross 
a ``t'' or dot an ``i'' that isn't approved by higher 
authority.
    So it seems to me if we had a subcommittee operating on the 
theory of getting the facts from less important people, and you 
come in and run the committee any time you want to handle it 
and call the people in here, I think to call in some of these 
ambassadors from outside this country and if necessary put them 
under oath.

                       TESTIMONY FROM JOURNALISTS

    The Chairman. Let me ask you--I am glad to have this angle. 
The other angle that bothers me--I would like to have 
newspapermen. We went over this in the Dominican thing.
    Does the committee feel that this is unfeasible?
    Some of these people have more experience.
    Senator Symington. I don't know, but I know one thing. You 
have the right as chairman of this committee to ask anybody in 
this government because we put the money up.
    Senator Pell. I think you have the right to ask foreigners, 
too.
    The Chairman. We have never done it. These are the 
precedents which this committee has had long before I came 
here. It seems to me that we ought to have a little greater 
freedom to ask anybody who appeals to us.
    Senator Symington. I couldn't agree with you more.
    The Chairman. These have been traditions, and I thought it 
ought to be the decision of the committee.
    Do you think we ought to contemplate, I will certainly 
submit any of these changes to the committee, but shall we 
investigate it, for purposes of discussion?
    Senator Morse. I think so because we are entitled to give 
the American people the facts they are entitled to receive from 
any source.

                   JEOPARDIZING SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS

    Senator Hickenlooper. This is the old story with this 
committee and other committees to try to get in subordinate 
officials to try to get them to testify when their own necks 
are out eight feet. If they offend their superiors, they will 
get their heads chopped off and you just put them there and put 
them under the guillotine.
    Look at [Otto] Otepka, sitting there in the State 
Department being there for two years because he told the truth 
to the [Thomas] Dodd committee and they just, they have got him 
sitting over there, nothing to do and they are trying to get 
rid of him, but they don't have a case against him.
    You have got----
    Senator Symington. In 1948, I bucked the Secretary of 
Defense as Secretary of the Air Force. In 1949, Mr. Truman had 
a meeting in the cabinet room and he said, ``I want everybody 
here to support this budget whether they like it or not and if 
they don't want to support it I want them to say so now.''
    A lot of people in the room, but he looked at me the whole 
time he was saying it, and I said, ``I just want to ask you one 
question and then I will make up my mind. Are you asking me to 
go up on the Hill and perjure myself?''
    And he looked at me for about 15 seconds and he said, 
``Will you give me your word of honor you didn't instigate the 
question?''
    And I said, ``I will,'' and he said, ``Go up there and tell 
them what you believe.''
    If you get these fellows and put them under oath and put 
them--it is pretty tough if anybody above them, and we will 
know about it soon enough if they are castigated for perjuring 
themselves before this committee in order to follow a party 
line.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Stu, nobody knows better than you do 
it doesn't happen the next week after they do it. It happens 
two years later when they find themselves going down the hall 
and pretty soon the door opens and they fall off and you can't 
go back and prove it.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Gore. That has been a helpful session.
    [Discussion off the record.]

                         PROSPECTIVE WITNESSES

    The Chairman. I am going to ask Mr. Marcy to try to contact 
these people along these lines, if you have any suggestion 
about it. Some of them I mentioned, if this meets with your 
approval, the Communist world in '67, some hearing on this 
subject. I would like to have men like George Kennan and 
Schulman who are the recognized authorities on that subject.
    Does that suit you?
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    The Chairman. And Asia, the Pacific.
    Senator Gore. We not only need to examine ourselves in this 
world, but we need to examine our adversaries in this world.
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Senator Gore. In order to determine our place.
    The Chairman. And our relations to them, what they are like 
and our relations.
    Senator Gore. What are our dangers, prospects and 
limitations.
    The Chairman. For example, this subject has been suggested, 
Asia, the Pacific, and the United States, that type of thing 
may have a man like Reischauer, he is the best type of man I 
can think of to best describe what is presently the situation 
in Japan, the Far East. He is a long time scholar of China. If 
anybody could interpret that situation, it seems to me he would 
be as good as anybody.
    But that is the type of hearing.
    This is strictly educational, not intended to attack 
anybody at all, simply the information of what it is like out 
there, what these people think and what our relations to them 
ought to be.
    Does that make sense to you?
    Senator Gore. Yes.

           CHANGING AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN POLICY

    The Chairman. And on down, the changing American attitudes 
towards foreign policy. I mean what is going to here, our 
attitude, what we are afflicted with, what limitations and so 
on, and the nature of U.S. commitments.
    We talked about this last year. It seems to me we ought to 
clarify this matter.
    I get so fed up with being told we are committed to 
something all the time, which I don't think is so. What makes 
the commitment is having the President say we are committed, 
and I don't think that is what I mean by commitment. I think 
the commitment is something that is taken by the Congress and 
the Executive, not just a unilateral action.
    Senator Gore. SEATO committed us to confer.
    The Chairman. I think they absolutely misrepresent what 
SEATO is. He repeated it again. Of course that is what Rusk has 
been saying over the past couple of years. He didn't say it in 
the beginning, but he is saying it now.
    When you read what Dulles said SEATO meant it isn't what 
they now say it means.
    Senator Gore. It isn't what Rusk said at the beginning.
    The Chairman. Well, if I understand it, that is the way we 
will proceed. Who can we get on some of these? I would like to 
have James Gavin again on that----
    Senator Pell. Matthew Ridgway maybe.
    The Chairman. And Ridgway. Who we can get.
    Senator Pell. I think Ridgway is more coherent in his 
arguments.

                         SCHOLARS AND GENERALS

    The Chairman. Gavin we had, and I thought he did a very 
good job. It is perfectly all right to have them both. The 
reason I do is we naturally have to have so many scholars 
because they are available and I would like to use whatever 
generals we can to offset the attitude we are stacking these 
hearings and not having generals.
    Whatever generals that are called at all reasonably I would 
like to have them not because I have such respect personally, 
they are wiser than others, but to offset the emotional 
prejudice in some quarters against the scholars.
    Does that make sense to you?
    Senator Pell. Perfectly.
    The Chairman. The same with this fellow Griffith. He is a 
scholar. He was as good as you can find among the generals, and 
lived in China and he has a reasonable attitude. It offsets the 
criticism they offered toward people like Fairbank and Bartlett 
and others.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ John K. Fairbank, Professor of Asian History at Harvard, and 
Ruhl J. Bartlett, Professor of Diplomatic History at The Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Marcy. Do you want to mention----
    The Chairman. Did either one of you see Alf Landon's speech 
that he made in Kansas three months ago?
    Well, it is a remarkable speech. I couldn't believe it, and 
I am all for having him. I never dreamed of having a fellow 
like that but he made a speech I think you would thoroughly 
approve of, and I think it would be very good politically to 
have him sandwiched in among these scholars. The speech is 
available if either one of you have time to read it. I am sure 
you would approve it, and coming from that quarter it 
absolutely knocked me out of my chair.
    It is amazing, he is quite a fellow, at least from this 
speech.

                    INVITE SUGGESTIONS FOR WITNESSES

    Senator Gore. Why don't you invite all members of the 
committee to suggest possible witnesses. We would not be 
obligated to invite all, but out of the suggestions might come 
a very helpful suggestion?
    The Chairman. I have no objection other than the personal 
relations. They have a feeling if they submit some, we have 19 
members and if you don't take them they will be offended.
    Senator Pell. I think you are right.
    The Chairman. If they put in a friend or a fellow----
    Senator Gore. I withdraw it.
    In other words, I am asked to submit a man and then you 
didn't invite him. I withdraw the suggestion.
    The Chairman. You can get into awful serious trouble.
    Last year the way we did it was this way, Albert, after 
thinking about it. The way that was done--I didn't know a lot 
of the people--I asked Carl and the fellow Robertson who is the 
China expert in the Library, Far East, and Barnett of Columbia 
who is a recognized authority. I didn't have anything really to 
do with it. I didn't know most of those people. They got 
together, surveyed the situation and tried to fit the man to 
the subject and that is the way they were selected until the 
very end when Bourke said to me, ``I think we ought to have 
somebody on our side,'' and I said, ``These aren't on my side, 
they are supposed to be the best there are.''
    Well, anyway, that is the way we got the other three. It 
didn't work too bad in this sense, Albert, because after we got 
through these, then Bourke, we satisfied--he submitted those 
three names and he was satisfied.
    If we started out, I imagine we would have had 15 names, 
Mundt's and various ones, all of them had submitted them and we 
hadn't got them, I am afraid they would be mad.
    But those three satisfied him.
    What we want is not quantity but quality if we can get it, 
the very best that we can get. I don't want to get just one 
point of view. I would like to get people who have had 
experiences who can give both points of view or whatever points 
of view there are.

                       A NEW POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE

    Senator Gore. Well, just as last year, as more or less of a 
tangential effect of our Vietnam hearing, the hearing created a 
new political atmosphere in which the administration had some 
maneuverability with respect to China, it seems to me if we 
could get the proper erudition on the subject many of the World 
War II dogmas could be examined and I have an idea many of them 
are not very valid any more.
    The Chairman. I agree with you, I am sure.
    Senator Gore. And yet we need the study ourselves, but 
perhaps even more importantly for the American people.
    The Chairman. That is right. That is what I meant. We ought 
to be the forum for, the sounding board for these scholars and 
thoughtful people who have no other way of reaching the 
American people. I mean these people we had, Fairbank, nobody 
ever heard of him. He could write a book or article or write a 
speech and he wouldn't get beyond the 200 people who read him 
but with this forum, in a way he reached millions of people, 
and that is what I think we can do. It is a question of getting 
people who really know this subject. I thought we did pretty 
well: we had darned good people.

                        BUSINESSMEN AS WITNESSES

    Senator Pell. In this connection, most of the witnesses we 
had were scholars. I was able to get a passport validated for 
an American businessman from Textron, a friend of mine, a 
businessman. If he succeeds in getting in, somebody who can 
speak firsthand as a man with considerable intellectual 
curiosity, a lawyer, and he believes in opening up contacts 
there, that would have even more of an impact.
    The Chairman. You remember this man Blackie who was head of 
Caterpillar? We had him on East-West Trade. He was smart and he 
made a good witness. That is a top businessman in this country.
    Senator Pell. Even better than a general.
    The Chairman. He is one of the most successful businessmen 
in the country with worldwide business and he made a good 
witness on East-West trade. That is a thing which I think could 
well be involved.

                      EDUCATING THE ADMINISTRATION

    Senator Gore. Not only do we educate the American people 
and ourselves but again referring, adverting to the China 
hearings, I think the Administration got a little light on it 
as much as we did.
    The Chairman. The Administration needs it as much as we do.
    Senator Gore. I believe they welcomed the effect and 
reacted to it.
    The Chairman. They do on China. They got miffed on Vietnam 
because they thought it challenged their policy.
    Senator Gore. I mean China.
    The Chairman. I think that is correct.

                            TRIP TO CAMBODIA

    Senator Pell. Speaking on firsthand knowledge, too, is 
there any more on the trip to Cambodia? I talked to Carl about 
it. I don't think there was. As I understand it, we are waiting 
now a little bit on our dignity. Shouldn't we reactivate it?
    Mr. Marcy. The latest on that was that the Cambodians 
advised that we not press it, not respond affirmatively to 
their invitation to come until Prince Sihanouk was back from 
some medical treatment in Paris.
    The Chairman. That is right.
    He went to France.
    Mr. Marcy. He is still in Paris. They expect him back some 
time in February.
    Senator Pell. Late January.
    Mr. Marcy. I am sure we really can't get a reply from them 
until he really does get back, but in late January or early 
February it would be appropriate either for us or for them, I 
think, to open the question again. We can do it simply by 
telephoning New York.
    Senator Pell. The reason I wanted to raise it is just 
simply to get three senators to make plans to go two or three 
weeks. The best time would be in January during a slack period, 
and I didn't know.
    The Chairman. Can I try out another idea?
    Senator Pell. Couldn't we agree on this before leaving 
this? Would it seem agreeable about making a phone call before 
the end of the month?
    The Chairman. Yes, inquire as to when.
    Mr. Marcy. I think we ought to wait until the Prince is 
back, because what they will do is to fire off an inquiry to 
Cambodia.
    Senator Pell. Let's find out from the State Department so 
we will know when he is back.
    The Chairman. State Department when he is back, and then 
put the inquiry. Sure, that is right.

                        HAVE A HISTORIAN TESTIFY

    We had a subject here, changing American attitude toward 
foreign policy. This is kind of a historical thing, what do you 
think about a man like [Henry Steele] Commager or [Arthur] 
Schlesinger?
    Senator Gore. Change and the need for change.
    The Chairman. In connection with it. If it is not changing 
enough, how it ought to change. This is more or less a 
historical review type of thing in which I think is the process 
of self-analysis along the line you are thinking that in order 
to change, in order to see we have to analyze what we have 
thought as to how relative it is to present conditions and how 
it originated, the kind of a forum of self-analysis.
    Senator Gore. May I make a suggestion? Does this appeal to 
you----
    [Discussion off the record.]

              JUSTIFICATION OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

    The Chairman. Let me try another thing on you.
    I say this if we have these hearings you can't keep from 
appealing our involvements, and I think the issue for the 
justification about our involvement is still the crucial one. 
What bothers me and a lot of the people who don't like this is 
I don't feel there is valid justification for our ever having 
become involved and, therefore, the way they pursue it and so 
on just doesn't go down with me. I think we are in a false 
position, and the quicker we liquidate it in a reasonably 
dignified manner the better. I don't think it is a matter 
purely of manners, you might say, and dignity of a great 
country. You just drop it and get out. You have to have an 
acceptable form of negotiation to get yourself out, to 
extricate yourself. As far as the hearings, Albert, I don't 
want to announce them and don't want to say this is just 
another Vietnam hearing. I want that to be developed as a part 
of an overall examination of our relations and our 
responsibilities as the most powerful country in the world to 
the rest of humanity, is more or less the way I want it to come 
up.
    Does that make sense?
    Senator Gore. Yes, you can't ignore it. It is a part.
    The Chairman. It is a part but I don't wish to have it said 
we are just again attacking this problem because the 
administration will get its back up and the people will say I 
am trying to pursue an old vendetta.

                        A LITTLE SELF-CRITICISM

    Senator Pell. Couldn't we do it with a little bit of 
modesty and criticism and self-criticism by suggesting we are 
doing now what we should have done five years ago as far as 
Thailand goes by doing that saying we should have done this in 
Vietnam in '61 and didn't but we are going to do it, by God 
now?
    The Chairman. I have tried to be as contrite as I can in 
the Tonkin Gulf and others. I didn't realize what we are 
getting into, and I am quite willing to say I was shortsighted. 
I had no idea that we were going to go this way.
    Senator Pell. This would be a good opening.
    The Chairman. That is honest with me. I had no idea. I 
thought when I was on this and with this President, I thought 
he was just as determined as I was to keep out of a major war 
out there. That is what I believed in 1964.
    Senator Gore. I assume that what the President said last 
night--since we decided to send troops to Vietnam he was using 
an editorial ``we.''
    The Chairman. I think so. [Laughter.]
    Does that meet with your general idea of how we should 
proceed on this, on the people? I have got some others here. 
Hutchins is very outspoken on this. These are people. Bob 
Hutchins. This Eric Fromm has written a lot on this. Some 
people think he is a Communist, I don't think he is, but I 
don't know whether it would be safe to have him or not. He 
lives in Mexico.
    Senator Pell. Hutchins.
    The Chairman. We will try to see what we can do.
    [Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee recessed, subject 
to call of the chair.]


                          THE WORLD SITUATION

                              ----------                              


                            January 16, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) 
presiding.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, 
Mansfield, Morse, Lausche, Dodd, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, 
Aiken, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
    Also present: Senator McGee, Assistant Secretary Douglas 
MacArthur III, Deputy Assistant Secretary H.G. Torbert, Jr., 
Mr. Ernest Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of 
State, Major A.B. Outlaw, Department of Defense.
    Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Tillman, 
Mr. Jones, and Mr. Lowenstein of the committee staff.
    Mr. Chairman. Well, we will come to order.
    We are very pleased this morning to have the Secretary of 
State, but before we proceed, I want to welcome the new member, 
Senator Cooper, from Kentucky.
    We are very pleased, indeed, to have you on the committee, 
and we are sure you will make a great contribution to the 
deliberation of the committee.
    Senator Carlson. We are delighted.
    The Chairman. After seeing the new Republicans yesterday, I 
am bound to congratulate them on the quality of their new crop.
    Senator Aiken. We accept the congratulations.
    Senator Cooper. I am glad to be on the committee.
    The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we are very glad to have you 
and assume you would like to give us a kind of a rundown of the 
general situation before we have questions, if that is 
agreeable.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

    Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. I 
would like to start by paying my personal compliments to 
Senator Cooper. Not only has he had a very distinguished 
service as a Senator, but he was one of our great ambassadors 
in an earlier day, and I am proud to be associated with him on 
this committee.
    If it is agreeable, Mr. Chairman, I might comment fairly 
briefly on certain important developments that have occurred 
since the Congress adjourned and then go as promptly as 
possible into comments and discussions and questions.

                            TURMOIL IN CHINA

    First, I think perhaps the most important single thing that 
is happening in the world today is happening in mainland China. 
We believe that it is very important even though we do not know 
exactly what is happening there. It is the kind of ignorance 
which does not embarrass us too much because it seems fairly 
obvious that the leadership in China is not exactly clear on 
what is happening.
    But the combination of a struggle among individuals with 
regard to the succession to Mao and some ideological debates 
within the top leadership that occurred last summer that we are 
gradually becoming aware of, and perhaps some revival of 
regional difference and regional influences in China have 
created a situation of considerable turmoil.
    I would caution members of the committee about drawing too 
many conclusions too rapidly about the news, that is, the 
normal press dispatches, particularly those that are based upon 
posters in Peking, but we do know that there seems to be a 
considerable struggle between the apparatus of the Communist 
Party in China, or considerable elements of the apparatus of 
the party, and the so called Red Guards under the leadership of 
Mao Tse-tung, with the army playing a somewhat equivocal role, 
perhaps in between.

                      SHIFTS IN CHINESE LEADERSHIP

    Just to indicate the confusion that exists there reflected 
in our own lack of understanding of exactly what is happening, 
Lin Piao has not been heard from for about two months, since 
November, even though Mao had nominated him to be his successor 
and had highlighted his role up to this point. He has dropped 
out of the picture temporarily. I can be incorrect by the end 
of the day because he may reappear.
    There was a report this morning that Liu Shao-chi, who was 
demoted in the party, the chief of state, so-called, is out in 
western China. If this is so, this could be of some importance 
because we have had some indication that the regional armies 
are playing something of an independent role here. We are 
keeping this point in mind because Lin Piao has his army around 
Peking and presumably he would have had a considerable 
advantage in the Peking area. But Chen Yi, who was under attack 
by the Red Guards, has long connections with an army which is 
in the southwest of China, and the supposition is that he has 
at least some independence of position because he has the 
support of his own former army in another part of the country.
    We do know that Chou En-lai seems to be trying to play a 
mediating role among the different elements, and he is a fairly 
key figure to keep your eyes on in this situation. If he is 
able to bring Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi and some of these 
different elements in some standdown on hostilities, then it 
may be that the regime could be reconstituted, perhaps somewhat 
weakened, on the basis that it existed say two weeks ago. But 
the leadership, undoubtedly they are eyeing each other among 
themselves.
    We do know that there have been considerable acts of 
violence in different parts of the country, that railways have 
been interrupted, that factories have been shut down because of 
strikes, that very large numbers of workers seem now to be 
moving into Peking itself with divided loyalties, and almost 
anything can happen.

                      POSTPONEMENT OF WARSAW TALKS

    The most immediate impact upon us is that they have asked 
us to postpone our next talk in Warsaw for two weeks for what 
they call administrative reasons. It may be that the ambassador 
there is going back to Peking or has gone back for a visit. It 
may be there is some difficulty about what line he is to take 
in issuing his instructions.
    It is interesting to note that Peking's diplomats in about 
25 countries have been going home in considerable numbers in 
the last two weeks, indicating that they expected to be back in 
their post in about 60 days. We, of course, are watching this 
very carefully to see whether it might in any way be connected 
with some foreign adventure somewhere. But the pattern does not 
seem to indicate that, and it looks more like something 
connected with the cultural revolution, perhaps indoctrination 
of the diplomatic corps or purge of the diplomatic corps. We 
just cannot yet say. But we would expect to have our next talk 
with Peking in Warsaw in February. If that is postponed again, 
I think that perhaps will be a reflection of the disturbances 
going on in China.
    Senator Aiken. When was the last talk?
    Secretary Rusk. The last talk was, I think, in September.

                     NO ROLE FOR NATIONALIST FORCES

    There is one point that has come into public attention I 
would just mention in order to discount completely. That is, 
any suggestion that the Nationalist forces on Taiwan have any 
role to play here, or intend to play any role here, or have any 
capability of moving onto the mainland to interfere in this 
situation. This talk out of Taiwan is talk, and they have now 
said publicly in the last few days that they acknowledge the 
requirement of an agreement with us before they make any move 
under the security and arrangements we had with them in the 
middle of the fifties. They know we are not going to give them 
that commitment, and I think that that situation is more talk 
than anything else.
    We have not yet seen any direct connection between the 
events in China and in moves outward from China. There is 
always the possibility that people who are in that kind of 
trouble at home might try to unify themselves or try to divert 
attention from their own problems through some international 
adventure, but we do not see the displacement of military 
forces or other indications suggesting that they plan to 
intervene in South Vietnam.

               RISK OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM WAR

    I noticed over the weekend a report from a French editor 
that there was some sort of an agreement between Peking and the 
United States on the basis of which they would stay out of 
Vietnam, that is, if we would not attack China, that we would 
not ourselves invade North Vietnam and we would not bomb the 
dikes. I do not know of any such agreement. There has never 
been any exchange on that between ourselves and Peking.
    We have assumed that, of course, if we attack China we 
would be at war with China. We have assumed if we were to move 
land forces north of the 17th Parallel that that would raise 
very substantially the risks of a Chinese intervention, but for 
reasons of our own, including humanitarian reasons, we have not 
had the intention of bombing those dikes in the Red River 
Valley. They could cause very, very heavy flooding and ruin a 
great many civilians up there.
    But we have had the impression from time to time through 
third parties that Peking's basic attitude was if we leave them 
alone, they will leave us alone, and that certainly is all 
right with us, but we do not know to what extent we can rely on 
that.
    All I am saying on the merits is there is something in 
those three points mentioned by the French editor, but we are 
not aware of any agreement or any communication from Peking to 
that effect.
    The closest thing to it was a comment passed along by a 
third-country diplomat shortly after a press conference in 
which I had said that the idea of a sanctuary is dead. I was 
referring there to North Vietnam, but Peking said--told a 
third-country diplomat, in essence, that if the United States 
leaves Peking alone, they would leave us alone, but that was 
about a year and a half ago, and coincides somewhat in time 
with the events allegedly spoken about by the French editor.

                   EFFECT OF CHINESE EVENTS ON HANOI

    Now, on Vietnam, Mr. Chairman, we do not see that the 
events in mainland China have significantly affected the 
Vietnam situation with possibly two exceptions. One is that 
there seems to be some reaction in Hanoi against the events in 
China. The speculation is to the point as to whether events in 
China are giving Hanoi any larger freedom of action in this 
situation, whether that might open up possibilities for 
contacts that did not exist before.
    Secondly, we do have contacts and----
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Secretary Rusk. I cannot report----

                       HANOI'S READINESS TO TALK

    Senator Hickenlooper. May I ask the Secretary, has it not 
been characteristic of wars in the past when one side is losing 
and feels it is on the verge of collapse, then it wants to talk 
and is willing to talk? Is there anything significant in the 
fact that the rumblings out of Hanoi seem to be a little more 
conversational than they were in the past?
    Secretary Rusk. I would not want to leave the impression, 
Senator, that the contacts that have existed lately really are 
pointed toward a readiness or desire to talk. There are a good 
many things that have been put to the other side from our 
direction that have had no response. That might change at 
almost any time.
    There are those who think they may be somewhat more willing 
to talk, but we have not been able to dig that out in any fully 
satisfactory way, and, in general, the answer to your question 
is yes.

               WHETHER THE UNITED STATES REFUSED TO TALK

    The Chairman. How about our situation, we were told two 
years ago that you--we refused to talk because we were losing. 
It was just the opposite.
    Secretary Rusk. That is not correct, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Which is not correct, that we were told it or 
it was not true?
    Secretary Rusk. I mean what you were told was not correct. 
The full story of that is not on the record, and one of the key 
witnesses there is now dead, Adlai Stevenson. There were 
contacts before, during, and after that particular episode with 
the other side. We were misled as to the channels that were 
being used during that period.
    I was told, for example, that the Soviet Foreign Office 
knew nothing about this, that this was not known to the Soviet 
ambassadors and Mr. Gromyko and so forth. Then a year or so 
later I was told this had been actively discussed with Mr. 
Andrei Gromyko during a period when I was regularly in touch 
with him and the matter did not come up, and I was told under 
no circumstances should we raise it. Further, we did tell the 
Secretary General if he had a channel to go back and explore it 
and try to develop it further and see more about the situation 
with whom one talks and what about. Insofar as I know, he never 
did that.
    Adlai Stevenson, the week before he died, on the BBC in 
London said that he was never very clear about with whom the 
talks were supposed to be held and on what subject.
    Now the problem about surfacing that whole business is that 
it would get in the way of contacts through the Soviet Union. 
Hanoi has flatly and categorically denied it. The possibilities 
of channels of the sort that were discussed at that time have 
been further explored without results, and we prefer to deal 
with this kind of a question with regard to the future rather 
than trying to just rehash the past.
    But the story, as I knew it, is not the one that is 
generally talked about in regard to that episode.

                        CESSATION OF THE BOMBING

    The principal point that is being raised now in contacts is 
the question of a--is an unconditional and permanent cessation 
of the bombing. I point out those two words because this is 
rather different from what was said last autumn. Last autumn 
the suggestion was made in a number of quarters, including 
Communist quarters, that a suspension of the bombing for a 
period of time might make it possible to develop the basis of 
discussion of some more toward negotiations, and we suspended 
the bombing for twice as long as had been suggested to us by 
key elements on the other side, and without result.
    Now, the price has gone up very considerably. They are 
saying unconditional and permanent or they say unconditional 
and definitive or, in that Harrison Salisbury view, 
unconditional and for good. That is a rather different problem 
than a temporary suspension.
    The other side has told us that the temporary suspension is 
nothing but an ultimatum; that this matter has to be taken up 
on the basis of a complete and permanent stoppage.
    At the same time we are not able to get anything from the 
other side at all about what they would do if the bombing 
stopped, and we have been probing on that point, continue to 
probe it, are doing so now, as to what the effect would be.

                         U THANT'S THREE POINTS

    Secretary General U Thant has his three points. The first 
that we stop the bombing. The second, there be a mutual de-
escalation, and the third, there be negotiations with the Viet 
Cong.
    We have said so far as the first point is concerned, okay, 
what about the second point? On that there has been nothing, 
Hanoi has rejected U Thant's second point, mutual de-escalation 
of the violence, and has said with regard to U Thant's third 
point that the Viet Cong, the National Liberation Front, is the 
sole spokesman for the South Vietnamese people.
    Those who call upon us to accept U Thant's three points 
usually do not take into account the fact that Hanoi has 
already categorically rejected points two and three. We 
continue to try to find some sort of an indication or 
suggestion, informal or otherwise, private or public, as to 
what the result will be if we stop the bombing and no one yet 
has been able or willing to tell us what that could be.

                         FIVE YEARS SUSPENSION

    The fact that they are calling for a permanent stoppage of 
the bombing makes it a very serious problem, because we have 
had now, experiences with three periods in which there was no 
bombing, five years, five weeks, five days, and we know that 
the infiltration simply continued.
    Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary--Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Mansfield. What do you mean five years suspension?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, there was no bombing for five years 
from 1960 when they announced publicly they were going to seize 
South Vietnam. They moved the entire 325th Division of the 
North Vietnamese Regular Army into South Vietnam before we 
started the bombing. During that five-year period when there 
was no bombing of North Vietnam, we went to the Laos 
Conference, we made major concessions, as some persons saw it, 
took the Soviet nominee to be prime minister of Laos and 
accepted the coalition government worked out among the three 
elements there. We got no exchange for that, no performance 
whatever on the other side with respect to North Vietnamese 
troops in Laos or the use of Laos as an infiltration route to 
the south, or ability of the coalition government to function 
in Laos or the ability of the ICC to function in Laos. During 
all that period there were literally hundreds of contacts with 
the--in South Vietnam and there we did not see any peace in 
South Vietnam.
    Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary, I think you are going 
back a long way and stretching it pretty thin when you use the 
five years, five weeks, and five days analogy, because in 1960 
how many troops did we have in Vietnam?
    Secretary Rusk. We had----
    Senator Mansfield. Very few.
    Secretary Rusk. We had about 600 and a military aid mission 
there.
    Senator Mansfield. We had no air forces of any kind, and I 
am not at all sure we were even instructing the South 
Vietnamese air force. If my information is correct, and it is 
from the Defense Department, the organized cadres did not come 
down from the north until 1964. At that time they were 
identifiable, and I think I can reinforce those figures and 
that fact.
    Secretary Rusk. You mean organized units of the North 
Vietnamese Regular Army?
    Senator Mansfield. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, that is different than cadres, I 
think, Senator, because they were infiltrating cadres including 
North Vietnamese long before 1964. Organized elements of the 
North Vietnamese Army, I think I would agree with you.
    Senator Mansfield. Cadres and organized units and, if my 
memory is correct, the figure was 400 at the end of 1964, and 
that figure was supplied to me by the Department of Defense.

                   U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF SOUVANNA PHOUMA

    I note that you call Souvanna Phouma the Soviet nominee for 
prime minister of Laos who we decided to accept after we had 
rejected and kicked him out two years previously, which was a 
serious mistake on our part, as a result of the Geneva Accord 
on Laos.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Mansfield. Was Souvanna Phouma not our nominee, 
too?
    Secretary Rusk. He came to be when we accepted him, but 
there was another prime minister that the Eisenhower 
Administration had recognized in 1960.
    Senator Mansfield. That is true, and during that time I 
think we had a very large part to play in ousting Souvanna 
Phouma, undermining his position, and helping to create the 
situation which developed in Laos in those years, is that 
correct? I think your ambassador had something to do with it at 
the State Department.
    Secretary Rusk. I think there is something in that, yes.
    Senator Mansfield. That is all, Mr. Chairman. I will have 
something else later.
    The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Secretary.

                       STEPS TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS

    Secretary Rusk. Well, the key question in Vietnam at the 
present time is the question of whether we can get steps taken 
by both sides to move this matter towards a peaceful solution 
either at the conference table or through negotiations or de 
facto. And at the present time I cannot report to the committee 
we have had any indication from the other side what any 
reciprocal step might be, although there are many 
opportunities, many ways, many channels by which that could be 
taken up.

                            FRANCE AND NATO

    As far as that is concerned, there is a pretty clear 
understanding now between the 14 on the one side and France on 
the other as to where the dividing line is and those NATO 
matters in which France will participate and will not 
participate. The 14 have constituted themselves into a defense 
planning committee. France does not attempt to interfere in the 
activities of the 14, or to veto or obstruct what the 14 feel 
that they must do.
    France, on the other hand, does take part in the political 
discussions that go on in the council of the 15, and there 
seems to be a pretty clear understanding now as to just where 
one starts and the other leaves off.
    At our last NATO meeting it was a good business-like 
meeting, and I think we transacted our business more 
efficiently than we have for some time, the 14 dealing with the 
military and the 15 taking up the political matters.
    I think the most interesting thing is the full exploration 
which is being made by practically all of its members on 
relations with the east.
    We had before us at our last NATO meeting a report, I 
think, that has been made available to the committee, a report 
of contacts between members of NATO and Eastern European 
countries of a period of about six months, and there were about 
185 of those contacts in terms of exchanging visits or exchange 
of visits or exchange of delegations and things of that sort.

                       GERMANY AND EASTERN EUROPE

    It is quite interesting to see that the new government in 
the Federal Republic apparently has decided it is going to 
explore the possibilities of improved relations with Eastern 
Europe. There are delegations in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and 
Poland to look at that situation. They apparently have come to 
the conclusion that 20 years of harsh confrontation has not 
moved them any nearer reunification or settlement of the German 
question, and they are prepared now to explore the possibility 
of improved relations to see whether that might not reduce the 
fear of the Germans among some of the small Eastern European 
countries, open up better contacts between West and East 
Germans and perhaps bring about a political situation 
atmosphere in which some movement can be made in the direction 
of reunification.

                         SOVIET ROLE IN VIETNAM

    Let me say as far as we are concerned, we were interested 
that when Gromyko came to the United Nations Assembly last year 
and visited Washington briefly, as well as from contacts we 
have had with him since then, is that the Soviet Union has not 
taken the view that because of Vietnam there is nothing to 
discuss. They have been prepared to sit down and talk about 
particular issues with us despite Vietnam.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Secretary Rusk. If you want to refer to this problem on the 
public record, you can go back to the Bucharest communique of 
the Warsaw Pact countries in July in which the Eastern European 
countries called upon the U.S. to comply with the 1954 and 1962 
agreements. Our answer to them was, ``all right, we agree to 
that, let's get going.''
    The difficulty is that Moscow does not feel that it is in a 
position to take a public political initiative with Hanoi in 
such things as calling a conference or authorizing the ICC to 
take up some of the chores that we would hope it would take up, 
because it seems to be immobilized by the problem with China 
and also somewhat handicapped by its relative lack of influence 
in Hanoi itself.
    So we have felt that we ought to go ahead and try to 
discuss other subjects with the Soviet Union, to see whether we 
find other points of agreement.

                           CONSULAR AGREEMENT

    As you know, we did conclude a civil area agreement, We 
hope very much that the Senate will find it possible to approve 
the consular agreement during the present session. In passing, 
Mr. Chairman, let me repeat here, from our point of view at the 
present time what is important about that treaty is not the 
possibility that we might open up consulates. That we could do 
today under existing legislation, one consulate in one place 
and one consulate in another. Ninety-five percent of our 
interest in this treaty is in those provisions providing 
consular access and protection for American citizens traveling 
and living in the Soviet Union. I told the committee when we 
were discussing that earlier that as far as consulates are 
concerned, we would be prepared to consult further with the 
committee before moving to establish the consulates, but we do 
have need for consular access to American citizens. They are 
traveling in the Soviet Union in larger and larger numbers. 
Many of our tourists, despite certain education we try to give 
them before they go, do some of the things in the Soviet Union 
that tourists do in many countries such as manipulating 
currency and picking up souvenirs and things of that sort, and 
it makes it very difficult for us to give them reasonable 
protection without the formal agreements of a consular 
convention.
    Senator Hickenlooper. At that point, Mr. Secretary, if you 
would care to comment----
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir?

                GIVING RUSSIA MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS

    Senator Hickenlooper. With me, the one hurt under the 
saddle of this consular treaty is why do we have to give the 
Russians under the Most Favored Nations clause extend to all 
other countries, 20 or whatever it is, immunity from 
prosecution for crime by the employee nationals of a country. I 
could go as far as the consular official, something of that 
kind, although we do not do it to any other country. We will 
have to extend it under the Most Favored Nations clause, as I 
understand it. Why do we have to do it with the Russians?
    Secretary Rusk. I think the point on which a judgment will 
have to be made, Senator, is whether our interest in the 
reciprocal privilege is not stronger than their interest on 
this point. You see, our problem with our own employees in the 
Soviet Union is a far more severe one than problems we would 
have here, but this is one of those questions on which----
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is the thing that is unclear to 
me.
    I cannot rationalize that in my own mind nor can I quite 
understand the reason for it. Go ahead.
    Secretary Rusk. That is right. Let me get some material 
down on that in the terms of numbers and in terms of our 
interest on----
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think we have numbers on it. I 
think I have numbers in my files on the thing and that is what 
mystifies me. The more information I get, the more I am 
confused, so I do not know, maybe I had better just stay as I 
am.
    Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, I do think he ought to provide 
the rest of us, however, with the memorandum, because I do not 
have the figures.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. We had some figures, but maybe we ought to be 
brought up to date. We had some.
    Senator Morse. In the committee file?
    The Chairman. Yes, about the number of Americans going 
there and Russians here, showing in my view we had much more to 
gain than they did by giving this protection.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Also the number of immunities we 
grant. It is my understanding that there would be 400 and some. 
I do not mean to get into an extended discussion of it, but 
there would be 400 and some other employees.
    The Chairman. That could be mutually controlled.
    Senator Hickenlooper. By other countries which we would 
have to extend to consulate officials and employees who are 
nationals of the sending country.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, the point--I realize you do 
not want to go into that in great detail, but on the matter of 
Most Favored Nations treatment for other countries, that would 
only occur where they would be prepared to give us reciprocal 
arrangements. We know some of these other countries are not 
interested in giving us that privilege. Therefore, this would 
not come into operation. So, we will have to try to find out 
informally if we can----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Perhaps some of them would not ask 
for it.

                      GERMAN RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

    The Chairman. Were you going to say something more about 
the Germans?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    The Chairman. I thought you were going into this recent 
meeting of Kurt Kiesinger and Charles de Gaulle. What is your 
interpretation?
    Secretary Rusk. Our interpretation of that is that the new 
German government wants to find out whether it can get a more 
relaxed relationship with President de Gaulle. They felt that 
they were caught up--the Germans felt they were caught up in 
some sort of special bilateral issue between Paris and 
Washington. There probably were some feelings on President de 
Gaulle's part about the role of the United States in Europe as 
well as in other world affairs, but basically the issue was 
between President de Gaulle and the other 14.
    It is our impression that the new German government will 
try to move on those points where it can move with France, but 
within the limits of a basic commitment to NATO, and without 
creating a big gap between Bonn and the United States and some 
of the largest issues.
    We ourselves have told the Germans and the French that the 
United States has a basic interest in good relations between 
Germany and France. After all, two world wars came about 
because these two countries started fighting each other.
    We do believe that it is important that Germany improve her 
relations without going down the same route as President de 
Gaulle in certain subjects, particularly, for example, NATO, 
but we will have to see.
    I think the atmosphere at this last meeting was good, but I 
do not have the impression that the Germans changed underlying 
basic policy toward NATO.
    What was important, I think, Mr. Chairman, is that de 
Gaulle, as well as we, have encouraged the new German 
government to explore the possibilities of improved relations 
with the East on the ground that we have tried over a period of 
20 years another approach, the Adenauer approach in effect. Now 
another approach might be more promising for the longer range 
future, depending a good deal, of course, on what the reaction 
of Eastern Europe would be.
    I would like to come back to that from two or three 
different points of view, if I may, and I am going to try not 
to take too much of your time, but I think the committee would 
be interested in the present state of play of the 
nonproliferation treaty.

                    NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

    The parliamentary situation is that there is no agreement 
between the United States and the Soviet Union as yet on 
particular language for a nonproliferation treaty. However, 
there is some language which we think the Soviet Union would 
probably accept which might be acceptable to us, depending upon 
the consensus we might reach among allies. It is very important 
that you understand that we have not agreed with the Soviet 
Union, but that we are discussing this language with our 
allies.
    The language itself, and I will pass this around the table 
for anyone to see, the language itself stems right out of our 
own national legislation in this field. Each nuclear weapons 
state, party to this treaty, undertakes not to transmit to any 
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other explosive devices 
or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or 
indirectly.
    As I say, that is what our national legislation at present 
says.
    I think it is quite important that if this language becomes 
acceptable to note that a good deal of underbrush has been 
worked out and cast aside. For example, the Soviets agree that 
we are talking about warheads and we are not talking about 
delivery vehicles and that is a very important advance. 
Secondly, they agree that they are not talking about what 
happens in case of war, in which event a treaty of this sort 
disappears. The Soviet allies in Eastern Europe have delivery 
vehicles and, in the event of war, presumably warheads would be 
made available to them. The same thing would happen in NATO if 
that terrible situation ever came about. Third, they are not 
talking about how an alliance makes the overriding political 
decision to go to war, which seemed at one point to be part of 
the problem.

                          A METAPHYSICAL POINT

    We have discussed centering around an almost metaphysical 
point. Mr. Gromyko illustrated it with a little diagram in 
which he said that a nuclear power should not transfer nuclear 
weapons to a non-nuclear power.
    All right, no difficulty about that.
    Secondly, that a nuclear power should not transfer nuclear 
weapons to non-nuclear powers through an alliance.
    No problem on that.
    Then we got into difficulty when he said and cannot 
transfer weapons or control over them to an alliance itself, 
that is stopping there. And this got into all sorts of 
metaphysical problems about just what is the alliance apart 
from its members, and got confused with the question of the 
political decisions of an alliance, about whether to go to war 
or not and matters of that sort.
    This language here that I just mentioned seems to cut 
through that and concentrate on the hardware, the actual 
nuclear warheads.
    Now, we have discussed this and I would appreciate it very 
much if members of the committee would make no reference to 
this outside because we have discussed this with the four 
members of NATO who are members of the Geneva Conference, that 
is, the other three, Britain, Italy and Canada.
    We are also discussing it with the Germans, and we are also 
discussing it in a preliminary way with the Japanese.
    We will shortly be discussing it with the rest of the NATO 
members.

                         ACCEPTABLE TO GERMANY

    I am encouraged to believe that at least as far as the NATO 
countries are concerned, including Germany, this is probably 
going to prove acceptable and, therefore, I think we can 
assume----
    Senator Lausche. Did you say it will be acceptable to 
Germany?
    Secretary Rusk. That is the present indication. They have 
had some problems about such things as the European Clause, 
reserving a right for a unified Europe to have its own nuclear 
force. But it now seems clear to them that if a unified Europe 
comes about through the political consolidation of the present 
European members that it would be a nuclear power through 
direct succession from France and, say, Great Britain. That if 
there are other arrangements which may come 10, 20 years in the 
future that they could invoke the review clauses that would be 
in such a treaty or if necessary, actually withdraw from the 
treaty.
    Let me say, that we will be in consultation with the 
appropriate committees of the Congress on this before any 
agreement is given to any language that might be developed 
here.
    But I just wanted to let the committee know we think there 
has been some movement.

                  PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES

    But there are two other problems that are of major 
importance in the nonproliferation matter that you should know 
about. One is that the non-nuclear countries, such as India and 
Japan, are going to raise or likely to raise some very, very 
difficult problems. For example, both of them say, ``Well, now, 
it is all very well to get rid of nuclear weapons or for us to 
foreswear nuclear weapons, but we need to reserve the right to 
have nuclear explosives available for peaceful purposes.''
    Nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes is a bomb for all 
practical purposes. We hope to be able to work out among the 
nuclear powers, at least some of the nuclear powers, a 
procedure by which we can make peaceful uses of explosives 
available to non-nuclear countries, under some arrangements by 
which you make a judgment on its feasibility and desirability 
and so forth. So, if Mauritania wants a harbor and applies to 
the nuclear powers to explode a device there and dig them a 
harbor, there will be some way in which this can be done. 
Otherwise, some of the non-nuclear countries are likely to use 
this at least as a pretext for not coming into this treaty.
    Secondly, there is a very difficult question about 
safeguards. We feel ourselves that this non-proliferation 
treaty would be a very important instrument which to deal with 
the safeguards problem. When you look ahead over the next 
several years, with the rapid developments of nuclear power, 
there is going to be enough fuel lying around to make a 
considerable number of bombs a day within the next decade or 
so, or by 1980, and so a general application of a safeguard 
system is extremely important.
    The Soviets are more or less disinterested in safeguards in 
this situation. But they, I think, would take it, provided we 
could all take the IAEA safeguard, the Vienna safeguards.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ International Atomic Energy Agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          THE EURATOM PROBLEM

    Then we run into the Euratom problem because the five 
members who are members of Euratom are unwilling to accept IAEA 
rather than their own safeguard, worked out among them. In that 
matter France has a veto. So, I want to alert you to the fact 
even though we got agreement on Article I, there are tough 
problems remaining. We need to do something about.
    Senator Clark. Mr. Secretary, are all five of those 
countries strongly opposed to IAEA?
    Secretary Rusk. No, Senator, you are quite right. I think 
four out of the five would probably accept IAEA safeguards.
    Senator Clark. Are you sure France would not?
    Secretary Rusk. This is being tested, now. But the trouble 
is their attitude toward a non-proliferation treaty is frigid.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Secretary Rusk. The present indication is they would not 
now sign a non-proliferation treaty although they might do it 
at a later stage. They tell us they won't get in the way of a 
non-proliferation treaty, but that is about as far as we can go 
along this line.
    Mr. Chairman. I talked a little longer that I had planned 
to.

                          SITUATION IN ISRAEL

    The Chairman. Just one other subject before you go on. I 
wonder about Israel. There seems to be, from this morning's 
press, a very dangerous situation there. Could you say a word 
about it?
    Secretary Rusk. The issue at the present time centers along 
the Israeli-Syrian border. There are three elements in the 
problem in terms of repose in the area. One is the activities 
of a Fatah organization of terrorists, who we think are not 
directly and actively supported by any of the governments 
concerned. Particularly not by Jordan, who has been trying to 
operate against them but who use Syrian and Jordanian territory 
for acts of sabotage and terror over the Israeli border.
    On that particular point, Jordan and Israel have greatly 
increased their police action on their respective sides of the 
border to try to deal with that activity as a police matter.
    There is a more complicated matter between Israel and 
Syria. At the time of the armistice, Syrian forces were 
occupying a strip within the historical boundaries of the 
mandate. Under the armistice, Syrian forces withdrew from that 
strip under demilitarized regulations. Israel claims since this 
was territory within the mandate and is Israeli territory, and 
they claim to exercise sovereignty over the subject as to 
demilitarized regulations.
    The Syrians claim this has never been legally established, 
and so you have both Israeli and Syrian farmers in this strip. 
Arms are fired into the area from the Syrian side typically, 
with response from the Israeli side. Israelis patrol on 
occasion in this area with their own armored vehicles, so you 
have a continuation of this particular kind of struggle.

                       DO NOT EXPECT A MAJOR WAR

    I don't myself, think, sir, that this is likely to lead to 
a major war.
    The Chairman. You do not?
    Secretary Rusk. Athough--because I don't think, for 
example, the Syrians are particularly interested in it. We know 
the Israelis are not interested in a major war in this 
situation, but it is a very troublesome problem as to how you 
handle these repeated acts of terror back and forth across the 
border, particularly in that area.
    General Bull, the head of the U.N. force out there, is 
trying to make some arrangement--the Arabs would say, ``Let the 
U.N. forces take charge in this demilitarized area and provide 
the police forces,'' while the Israeli and Syrian farmers go 
ahead with their agricultural work. As a matter of fact, 
farmers on both sides apparently get along pretty well until 
somebody from outside the demilitarized zone starts shooting in 
from outside the area.
    But that is about the situation, Mr. Chairman. It is tense, 
but we don't----
    The Chairman. You don't expect a major war?
    Secretary Rusk. We don't expect a major war.

                    U.S. OBJECTIVES REGARDING CHINA

    The Chairman. I wonder, you started out on China and you 
said you thought it was probably the most important matter at 
the moment, I wonder if you could briefly say what our attitude 
or policy is toward China. What is our objective with regard to 
China at the moment or to put it another way, is our policy to 
continue nonintervention and to continue all possible means to 
exclude them from the U.N. and so on? Would you say just very 
briefly what our attitude is?
    Secretary Rusk. I think our principal problem we have with 
China is the one which a foreign minister of an eastern 
European country described as moving Peking to peaceful 
coexistence and the issue we have in trying to organize a 
durable peace in the Pacific Ocean basin.
    But as far as Peking is concerned, the key question turns 
out to be always the attitude toward Formosa. In our bilateral 
talks with them, as I have indicated to the committee, before 
they start and end with a statement by the Peking 
representative that ``There is nothing to discuss unless you 
are prepared to surrender Formosa,'' and when we say we can't 
surrender these 13 or 14 million people contrary to their will, 
then nothing else happens. That is, we have tried to talk about 
disarmament, tried to talk about Southeast Asia, exchanges, 
exchange of plant material, for example, relevant to the food 
problem and things of that sort, scientists, scholars, newsmen, 
and so forth.
    The same issue remains in the United Nations. The question 
of what to do about Peking is coupled with the question of what 
to do with the Republic of China. If we are not prepared to 
surrender Formosa, then Peking is not going to talk to us 
bilaterally about serious matters in any responsible sense. If 
the United Nations is not prepared to expel the Republic of 
China, then the problem remains about where it is.
    We are continuing our contacts with Peking, but it comes 
back to that question as to what you do about the 13 or 14 
million people there, as well as in the longer run, what their 
attitude is going to be toward what the Soviets call peaceful 
coexistence.
    The Chairman. You sum up there is no change in that 
situation, no movement?
    Secretary Rusk. No present change indicated.
    The Chairman. No present change.
    Secretary Rusk. For the reasons I stated.

                   U.S. OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

    The Chairman. Could you restate for the record the 
objectives of our policy in Southeast Asia? What is it we are 
seeking now to achieve there?
    Secretary Rusk. We should like to see an accord with our 
treaty commitments there through a situation in which in the 
first place our allies are safe and secure, in which the 
smaller countries of Southeast Asia are free to live their own 
national existence under what policies they wish, but living in 
peace with their neighbors across their frontiers. We have said 
many times we consider that as far as what used to be Indo-
China is concerned, we consider the 1954 and 1962 agreements to 
be an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia. That if the 
movement of men and arms from North Vietnam to South Vietnam 
would stop, we could work out the peace very quickly, and we do 
believe those '54 and '62 agreements do provide such a basis.
    But that the countries with whom we are allied in Southeast 
Asia, that means the Philippines and Thailand, ought to be free 
from molestation.
    We have no objection to their being non-aligned if that is 
their wish. We supported the non-alignments of Laos and of 
Cambodia, of Burma, any of those countries that want to be non-
aligned, but we are concerned about the stability of peace in 
the area.

                          THE FOURTEEN POINTS

    I have, Mr. Chairman, made a few notes on the so-called 14 
points that were used last year as they have developed during 
the course of the year, and I will be glad to pass those around 
for anyone who wishes to have a look at them.
    We have not released these to the press in their present 
form, although I think everything that is on these three pages 
has been said publicly at one time or another, but Mr. Marcy 
might want to have these.

                           SEATO OBLIGATIONS

    The Chairman. One reason I asked you that was because I 
heard a part of your appearance on that early morning show, I 
think a week or maybe ten days ago.
    Secretary Rusk. Today Show.
    The Chairman. Perhaps, and you correct me if I misstate 
this, you said one of the reasons we are there is in accordance 
with obligations in the SEATO Treaty. But beyond and above that 
is the necessity for stopping the, I think, tendency or 
inclination to aggression. Was that a correct statement or not? 
Do you remember how you put it?
    Secretary Rusk. I don't recall that I put it just that way. 
I did point out----
    The Chairman. You put it correctly.
    Secretary Rusk. I did point out that we ourselves have a 
very important stake in the organization of a durable peace in 
the Pacific. We have alliances with Korea and Japan and the 
Republic of China, Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New 
Zealand. And our interest in a stable peace in the Pacific 
compares to our interest in such a peace in the Atlantic.
    I would be glad to get--I don't happen to have a transcript 
with me, Mr. Chairman, but we have not set ourselves up to play 
the role of general policeman in the world. I think the last 
time we gave an account of various crises there were about 
seventy, and we took an interest in about six of them over the 
various years, but we do have specific commitments and we do 
feel these specific commitments are very important to the 
possibility of organizing peace.
    The Chairman. I thought perhaps I misunderstood you, that 
there was something beyond those specific commitments in the 
way of aggression that was, I thought you gave in detail. I 
could be wrong about that.

                    SECRET REPORT ON BOMBING POLICY

    Mr. Chalmers Roberts recently had a story from which I 
quote:

    There is a top secret report by the Central Intelligence 
Agency and Pentagon Defense Intelligence Agency casting doubt 
on the military efficacy of bombing.

    Is there such a report?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, that--there are many examinations of 
that question. I don't think there is a report that is looked 
at frequently.
    The Chairman. A recent report.
    Secretary Rusk. I think the key points that are made in 
these examinations is that the bombing has not stopped the 
infiltration, that it has not brought the other side to the 
conference table, but that from an operational point of view in 
terms of lines of communication and the capacity of the other 
side to sustain his effort, the expense to him of sustaining 
his effort, shows that the bombing does impose upon him a very 
substantial additional burden.
    The Chairman. Is that the principal reason for maintaining 
the bombing, the burden it imposes on the North?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, that is an important reason. I think, 
also, Mr. Chairman, that if you look at a situation where North 
Vietnam could be safe and comfortable, and undisturbed while it 
sends its armed forces and arms into South Vietnam, that the 
prospect that this war would last a long time is greatly 
strengthened.
    I don't know what the incentive would be for North Vietnam 
to stop doing what it is doing if it could be completely 
comfortable.
    The Chairman. It is an ideal situation for it to occupy, 
sit there safe without being afraid of any damage being done to 
them while our men and South Vietnamese men are being killed.

                 NOT FIGHTING COMMUNISM AS AN IDEOLOGY

    This question has been asked me on one or two occasions 
along this line: In the State of the Union Message the 
President used the word ``Communist'' six times in discussing 
the situation in Vietnam. But in talking about the Soviet 
Union, Eastern Europe, and China he did not use the word once. 
If it is United States policy to fight communism as an ideology 
in Vietnam, what is the position with regard to building 
bridges with Communists in Eastern Europe?
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think the point is that we are 
not fighting communism as an ideology. We are not undertaking a 
world crusade to do that. What we are doing, as we have done 
before, is resist aggression by these Communist countries 
against those with whom we have commitments and/or in whom we 
have a vital stake. I said that because we did go to the aid of 
Greece without a treaty obligation. We went to the aid of Korea 
without a treaty obligation.
    But this point arises, for example, in connection with the 
question as to whether we are at the front edges of a detente 
with the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. We think we well 
might be, we hope we are, and we will explore every possibility 
of contributing to that detente.
    But we didn't get there, we didn't get to this present 
position by giving away Azerbaijan or Greece to the guerrillas 
or the eastern provinces of Turkey or Berlin or Korea or the 
Congo and some of these other situations. It has been a long 
and difficult path to the point where there is considerable 
prudence on both sides.
    What we would hope to see is a corresponding prudence of 
the eastern wing, the Asian wing; of the Communist Party, which 
has isolated itself even within the Communist world, largely 
because of its excessive militancy, and there is some 
possibility of that when we see the shape of the second 
generation of leadership in Peking, and this may come sooner 
than sometimes we think, there may be a little more prudence 
there.

                    NEW GENERATION OF SOVIET LEADERS

    We do have a second generation now present in the Soviet 
Union. There is no longer an old Bolshevik in the government of 
the Soviet Union. Mr. Mikoyan was the last one.
    There seems to be some prudence there.
    I don't want to exaggerate that because when we look at 
what the Soviets are doing in Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and 
Somalia, we still have some problems, but we are prepared to 
contribute to that possibility of detente if we can manage it. 
So, this is not a general question of ideology. These are 
specific acts taken against countries with whom we have treaty 
commitments.

                          COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

    The Chairman. Is it fair to say if the North Vietnamese 
were not Communists that we would have intervened in this case? 
Do you think we would or would not?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I think when you gentlemen approved 
the Southeast Asia Treaty, when it was signed, it was made 
clear by the government at that time that treaty referred only 
to Communist aggression. I think the thinking behind that was 
that neighborhood quarrels across frontiers are not the 
problems that are going to inflame the entire world. We didn't 
get involved when Algeria and Morocco were shooting each other, 
and we haven't gotten involved in a lot of these neighborhood 
disputes, but where you have pressures outward from a regime 
which proclaims that it is going after the world revolution and 
supported by militant minds, then you have the possibilities of 
a momentum of aggression that deeply threatens the 
possibilities of the peace of the world.
    The Chairman. Do you think that this is realistic to apply 
to a country of 14 million people that were about to take over 
the world or even planning to?
    Secretary Rusk. It is not just these people. Their big 
brothers to the North have also announced they are going after 
some of these other countries, like Thailand.
    The Chairman. Then it is the Communists--what I am trying 
to clarify is, is this the overshadowing reason because they 
are Communists or not? Is this in your opinion, and the 
Department, or the government's opinion, the principal reason 
we are there because they are Communists and part of an 
international conspiracy?
    Secretary Rusk. That is what the SEATO Treaty----
    The Chairman. What do you think? I was trying to pick your 
brains.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I think, sir, there is a difference 
between those quarrels which have a built-in insatiable 
appetite on one side, and there is a world revolution----
    The Chairman. Is that characteristic of North Vietnam in 
your opinion?
    Secretary Rusk. And Peking, yes. I mean----
    The Chairman. Then, if you change it a little, then it is 
Peking, is this Peking's aggression we are dealing with? I am 
just trying to take one step at a time.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we haven't made a special point that 
this is Peking's aggression, but Peking's support of Hanoi in 
this matter is crucial to Hanoi's position, and if Peking 
showed the slightest interest in peace in this situation my 
guess is that peace could be arranged rather quickly.

                    CONFUSION OVER U.S. INTERVENTION

    The Chairman. But this is the point that I think is behind 
much of the confusion and perhaps the dissent that you--I 
think, the government objects to. If we can clarify it, I think 
it would be very useful to those of us who are called upon to 
clarify it nearly every day. To our constituents and otherwise, 
as to just why it is we are there, what makes this quarrel so 
important.
    You have already said you didn't intervene in these other 
areas, Tunisia, Algeria. You didn't intervene in other places, 
but you did here.
    Now, why is it that this is so peculiar?
    First, let me, let's eliminate it, it isn't because North 
Vietnam is so powerful that it threatens the peace of the world 
in itself as a country, is it?
    Secretary Rusk. It threatens the peace of Southeast Asia, 
Vietnam, Laos and Thailand.
    The Chairman. But if it wasn't Communist, what in your 
opinion would we have done, would we have intervened?
    Secretary Rusk. My guess is if it were not Communist it 
would not be doing what it is doing. If you look at the 
actions----
    The Chairman. Why would you guess that? I don't follow that 
at all. I mean, the Germans haven't resorted to force, but they 
certainly are eager for reunification of their country, and 
there are very substantial reasons. But here I think it would 
be natural that these people would want to reunify their 
country. Every country seems to want to do that.
    Secretary Rusk. And if the people themselves deciding these 
questions freely on their own in the two parts of the countries 
involved were to agree on reunification, we would not object to 
that.
    It is the attempt to impose reunification by force that we 
objected to, we would in Germany and we would in Korea.

                 U.S. OPPOSITION TO VIETNAMESE ELECTION

    The Chairman. We did object to an election in '56, didn't 
we? We objected to an election being held at that time, and I 
understood from what people have written about it because we 
thought if you had an election it would be reunified under Ho 
Chi Minh.
    Secretary Rusk. Incidentally, I have not been able to find 
in the record instructions to our embassy saying that we 
opposed elections out there. I have been trying to find what 
the instructions were during that period. But at that time, Mr. 
Chairman, it seemed to be obvious to everybody that there was 
no possibility of a free election in the North and, therefore, 
the question was do you have free elections in the South only 
with everything rigged in the North?
    General Vo Nguyen Giap in 1956, I think it is in your 
committee report, I have brought up at a public hearing last 
year, General Giap in 1956 described what was happening in the 
North during that period and the mistakes they made in terms of 
terror and intimidation and torture and things of that sort. He 
was very frank about it. And it was the judgment at that time 
in Saigon that under those circumstances a free election was 
simply not possible, apart from the problems they might have 
had in South Vietnam about free elections.
    The Chairman. That makes free elections, I guess--I don't 
know any other way, however, to bring this to issue.

                   GRADUAL NATURE OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT

    Senator Lausche. Will the chairman point out to me so that 
I will be able to better understand what he is aiming to prove, 
is it your position that we should pull out?
    The Chairman. No, I don't think that is feasible. I wish we 
never had been involved.
    Mr. Max Frankel said the other day, he is one of the people 
more or less sympathetic with our position there. He says if 
the matter was up today for our sending five hundred thousand 
troops from ab initio--from the beginning--to save Saigon, we 
wouldn't do it. The reason we are there is because of the very 
gradual nature of the involvement, a little at a time, a little 
more and a little more and finally we find ourselves there.
    This is his theory, and I was trying to really see if the 
Secretary could give me information that is better able to 
answer questions as to why we are involved here.
    Is it fear of Vietnam? No. Is it because of China, and if 
so, is there evidence China is a very aggressive nation, and 
should we be fearful of China and try to destroy her now? I 
don't know what we want to do with her. I just wondered.

                            A LARGER CONTEXT

    Secretary Rusk. I don't want to take up an undue amount of 
time, but I would just like to pull back a step or two and take 
a look at this in a somewhat larger context.
    The Chairman. I think that is good.
    Secretary Rusk. President Kennedy, President Johnson and 
their Secretary of State have not come to the Senate with 
additional alliances. President Kennedy came down here with a 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. President Johnson has concluded the 
Civil Air Agreement. He presented you the consular agreement, 
and he hopes we can present you with an East-West Trade 
Agreement. He presented you with a space treaty, and we hope we 
can present you with a nonproliferation treaty.
    But after the war during the 50's at a time when the 
Communist world was pressing almost on all fronts, and 
resorting to armed force and a number of circumstances, we made 
some alliances in the interest of building a stable peace in 
the world.
    Now, in the case of the SEATO Treaty, the administration at 
that time, and the Senate said that each party recognizes that 
aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area would 
endanger its own peace and safety and agrees it will in that 
event act to meet the common danger and so forth.
    Now, if this matter were presented afresh today, I mean if, 
say, yesterday there was the kind of an invasion of South 
Vietnam that occurred in Korea by organized divisions publicly 
and formally coming across the demarcation line, I am not at 
all clear that Mr. Frankel is right in saying that we couldn't 
do it. I think that is something that the President and the 
leadership would have to look at and look at in terms of what 
happens in the world if we fail to meet one of these solemn 
treaty commitments in the organization of peace.

                         WORKING TOWARD DETENTE

    I point out since 1947, we have spent something on the 
order of $900 billion in defense budgets and fantastic 
resources. And we have only barely by the skin of our teeth 
been able to come to a position where there may be some 
possibility of enough prudence on both sides to work toward 
some sort of a detente, say, between ourselves and eastern 
Europe. We are only four or five years away from a major crisis 
over Berlin and only five years ago from a most horrible crisis 
over Cuban missiles. It only has been a very narrow thing that 
we begin to see the possibility of something like peaceful 
coexistence with some sort of real content in the expression 
opening up here.
    I think the overriding question is how do you organize a 
durable peace. And it is not for me to be presumptuous, Mr. 
Chairman, but I think it is worth your committee's considering 
whether it might wish to address itself to that problem, taking 
into account such changes as might have occurred since 1945, 
since the United Nations Charter was signed, to see what the 
changes are, if any, what they mean and how these changes bear 
upon the general problem of organizing a durable peace in the 
world.

               APPREHENSIONS ABOUT ESCALATION OF THE WAR

    The Chairman. Well, of course, what bothers me is I think 
we are more apprehensive, I am today, than at any other time. I 
am more apprehensive than 20 years ago. I am apprehensive about 
this war and its escalation. I don't want to prolong this.
    I want to call on Mr. Mansfield. I want to again recall for 
the record in your own Department of State memorandum of March 
8, 1965 which was entitled ``Legal basis for U.S. action in 
Vietnam,'' that your own statement refers to the U.N. Charter 
and the Geneva Accords and didn't even mention the SEATO 
Treaty. This is what causes so much trouble with us, trying to 
understand it.
    It wasn't until recently that the SEATO Treaty has been 
given in justification for this involvement, and I am still 
very puzzled about it.
    Mr. Mansfield?

                            THE SEATO TREATY

    Senator Lausche. Will you re-read that SEATO Treaty 
declaring why these nations have joined in the compact? That is 
considered as a challenge to their own security.
    Secretary Rusk. In the preamble they said, among other 
things:

    Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and 
to uphold the principles of democracy and individual liberty 
and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well being and 
development of all peoples in the Treaty area, intending to 
declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any 
potential aggressor will appreciate that the parties standing 
together in the area, and desiring further to coordinate their 
efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace 
and security.

    But there was added by the United States the understanding 
in the treaty, that the United States, in executing the present 
treaty, does so with the understanding that its recognition of 
the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement 
with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only 
to communist aggression.
    The reason for that was that it was not the desire to 
become involved in other kinds of neighborhood disputes, 
particularly, for example, the Pakistan-India dispute and I 
gather Senator Mansfield may recall this better than I. And I 
gather when Mr. Dulles made it clear that this was the 
interpretation of the United States, that there was a period of 
24 hours or more when the Pakistan representative was very 
uncertain about whether Pakistan would sign it or not. That is 
my recollection of what the record shows.
    The Chairman. I don't think it was contemplated that we 
would intervene in a civil war on account of this, either.
    Senator Sparkman?
    Senator Sparkman. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have been in and 
out.
    I noticed some other items we have on this suggested agenda 
here,\2\ I don't know whether you have seen them or not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ MEMORANDUM
    Suggested Areas of Questioning for Secretary Rusk, January 16, 1967
    1. Vietnam
    a. Effectiveness of bombing in North Vietnam;
    b. Indications of willingness to negotiate on part of North Vietnam 
and National Liberation Front;
    c. Progress of pacification;
    d. Political developments in South Vietnam;
    e. United States military activity in the Mekong Delta;
    f. Basis for statistics on incidents, casualties, desertions, etc.
    2. Thailand
    a. Scale and targets of counterinsurgency efforts;
    b. United States role in counterinsurgency;
    c. United States military buildup on Thailand;
    d. Are Thai troops being sent to Vietnam?
    3. Significance of Current Uproar in China
    4. Prospects for a Non-Proliferation Agreement
    5. Soviet Deployment of a Limited Anti-Ballistic Missile System
    6. Prelimary Findings of the Tripartite Working Group on NATO Force 
Levels in Europe
    7. Reasons for Delaying Food Shipments to India and Estimate of 
Future Indian Requirements
    8. Situation in Rhodesia and Southern Africa Generally
    9. Implications of Military Aid and Sales in Latin America.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Secretary Rusk. I haven't seen it.
    Senator Sparkman. That I might ask you rather briefly 
about.
    First, have you asked questions about Thailand?
    The Chairman. No, I did not.
    Go ahead.

                       THE SITUATION IN THAILAND

    Senator Sparkman. I wonder if you can give us something 
about the Thailand situation, first of all. Just what are we up 
against there and what are the prospects?
    Secretary Rusk. At the present time, there are several 
hundred, rather than several thousand trained guerrillas 
operating in the northeastern part of the country. This is a 
rather remote area, and has been difficult for the government 
to organize its police and security forces on as tight a basis 
as would be necessary to deal with such small numbers of 
guerrillas.
    We also know in North Vietnam there is a training camp for 
Thais who have been trained in North Vietnam to enter Thailand. 
We know that Thailand is under pressure from its north and 
northeast, but we feel unless there is a major increase in the 
effort made by the North Vietnamese or the Chinese coming 
directly down from China that the Thais seem to have the 
capability of dealing with this. They have been very careful 
themselves not to have U.S. soldiers involved in their 
activities in the villages. We have helped them with 
transportation into the general areas on occasion through 
helicopter lifts. But beyond that, Thailand is a member of the 
SEATO Treaty, is supporting the effort in Vietnam, has made 
certain of its facilities available to us and to our armed 
forces, and is contributing certain forces to South Vietnam.
    On the internal side, they are doing reasonably well on the 
economic side. They are now working on a constitution 
acquisition that is led by Prince Huan, who served here once as 
ambassador. In the months ahead, it is possible they will 
promulgate that constitution and move toward a more elected 
government than they have at the present time.

              HANOI'S OPPOSITION TO U.S BASES IN THAILAND

    Senator Sparkman. I notice the New York Times had quite an 
article in a recent issue, as did the Washington Evening Star. 
The New York Times article is entitled ``Hanoi Demands Thai Ban 
on U.S. Use of Bases.'' Just how strong is their demand and do 
they threaten action in the event that----
    Secretary Rusk. Well, they are taking action at the present 
time within the limits of these guerrilla operations that I 
mentioned.
    Senator Sparkman. Are they under the direction of Hanoi?
    Secretary Rusk. Well they are being trained in North 
Vietnam.
    There is a Thai training camp there. We have taken pictures 
of it. We have prisoners who tell us where it is and what goes 
on there.
    They then apparently infiltrate through the northern part 
of Laos into the northeastern part of Thailand.

                           THE MEKONG VALLEY

    Senator Sparkman. Just as a matter of curiosity, I saw 
somewhere reference to that northeast section of Thailand along 
the Mekong River saying it was the poorest section of the 
country. I thought that was a very fertile valley.
    Secretary Rusk. The Mekong Valley itself is reasonably 
fertile. They were damaged by the heavy floods that occurred 
along that part of the Mekong this past year, both in Laos and 
in northeast Thailand. But I think one of the principal reasons 
for the backwardness of northeast Thailand when you look at it, 
is more generally, rather than just in the river valley where 
there is communication by river, is lack of communications and 
mountain jungle, undeveloped in the usual sense. I think it's 
the lack of communications that is the principal problem in 
terms of both development and security. It is somewhat like the 
northeast corridor of Cambodia in that respect where we know 
the Viet Cong are using Cambodian territory. We don't think 
with the approval or the permission of Prince Sihanouk but yet 
it is remote and rugged terrain into which his own security 
forces can't go to monitor the situation in any way.

                PRESS COVERAGE OF A HUSH-HUSH OPERATION

    Senator Sparkman. In that same issue of the The Star there 
was a headline ``14 million dollars annual savings possible by 
the B-52 use of those bases,'' Is that a pretty reasonable 
evaluation?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, there are some operations advantages 
in the short run compared with the several hours from Guam. The 
bases there are not at the present time fitted for B-52 
operations. This is a question for the future. No decision has 
been made. The Thais apparently would be agreeable but we 
ourselves have not made a final decision on that point.
    Senator Sparkman. Why have we had such little discussion 
publicly of what we are doing in Thailand? Is it a hush-hush 
operation? The papers seem to get hold of it somehow.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, there are two or three reasons. One 
is that we do not wish officially to talk about which 
particular operations go from which bases, but more importantly 
the Thais themselves feel that the settlement of the situation 
in Southeast Asia would be facilitated if these matters are not 
made major matters of public prestige and things of that sort. 
We are in Thailand. The Thai Government has a veto on that. We 
think they themselves will say more about this fairly shortly. 
But they have been very insistent upon not going into details 
because they say that in the Southeast Asian situation it is 
better to try to keep the Vietnam situation from a political 
point of view in as narrow channels as possible in order not be 
get the problems of a settlement too complicated.
    These are open secrets. The only problem is how far we go 
in confirming officially what goes on.
    Senator Sparkman. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. In order to avoid the Thai sensibilities.
    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I have lots of questions 
but everybody around the table wants a chance to ask, so I will 
pass.
    The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?

                         RESTRAINTS ON BOMBING

    Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, with reference to the 
question which Senator Fulbright asked you and which was 
discussed with respect to the bombing, whether or not that had 
any effect of lessening or diminishing the activities of the 
North Vietnamese, does the fact that we don't bomb a lot of 
military targets up there lessen the probability of quieting 
them down? In other words, the stories we get here are that 
Russian MIGs sit on the airfield up there and our pilots are 
forbidden to bomb those airfields or destroy those Russian MIGs 
sitting there.
    Then we get the argument which doesn't appeal to me very 
much, if we bomb these they will just move into the air bases 
in China and if we bomb those then the fat will be in the fire. 
Is it not a fact we are not bombing many targets in North 
Vietnam which would really hurt their military efforts?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, the list of important targets that 
could be called military targets that have not been bombed is 
really relatively small, Senator.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Quite important, though, aren't they?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I suppose in one sense the most 
important of these would be the Haiphong harbor and there are 
one or two plants inside the perimeter of Hanoi. For example, 
there is a steel plant, a cement plant which would have some 
direct relationship to their operations.
    We have kept the airfields outside of the immediate Hanoi 
area out of our operation because it takes a great deal of 
striking to do it, and the repair of an airfield is not too 
complicated a matter.
    Senator Hickenlooper. But the destruction of MIGs would be.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes. Actually, the MIGs have not been all 
that much of a problem in terms of our own forces. We have felt 
that, and I don't want to preclude what the future might hold 
in this in either direction, but we have felt we ought to try 
to keep the situation within certain limits, if we can find 
some possibility that the other side is prepared to talk sense 
about peace in this situation.
    You know we have had some recent MIG 21 engagements in 
which I think some nine MIGs were shot down. Which were at 
least about half of what they had there. The MIGs have not 
given us much trouble nor indeed have the SAM sites in the 
main. The principal problem has come from the conventional 
anti-aircraft scattered all over the place. There are other 
factors to be taken into account about the airfields. They are 
very, very heavily protected by anti-aircraft. The prospects of 
substantial losses on our side are pretty good, and the 
question is as to whether the losses would be larger if we held 
our hand and took on these follows in the air. But, again, 
these are tactical decisions the Commander in Chief would have 
to make at the end of the day, and I wouldn't want to foreclose 
the future.

                 TARGETS ARE AUTHORIZED FROM WASHINGTON

    Senator Hickenlooper. Are those decisions made in South 
Vietnam or are they made over here at the pentagon?
    Secretary Rusk. The principal fixed targets are authorized 
from Washington.
    Now, there are certain areas in what is called route 
reconnaissance authorized for the purpose of hitting trucks and 
barges and other things that are moving supplies to the south. 
But the principal fixed targets are authorized from here in 
light of the recommendation from the field and from the Joint 
Chiefs.
    One of the factors, I might add that are taken into account 
in regard to those fixed targets is the prospect of civilian 
casualties and one of the columns in which you take up these 
questions shows the probable civilian casualties, and there 
have been some targets which have been taken off the list 
because of the prospect of significance of civilian casualties.

                   IMPACT OF VIETNAM WAR ON INDONESIA

    Senator Hickenlooper. Let me ask you this question. I want 
to hurry on because I have a good many questions to ask here: 
Would you care to venture an opinion as to what would have 
happened by now in Indonesia under Sukarno's leadership if we 
had not stood fast in South Vietnam?
    Secretary Rusk. It is very hard to be precise about that--
--
    Senator Hickenlooper. I know you can't----
    Secretary Rusk. I am inclined myself, Senator, to think 
that there was a connection but not a decisive one, that in the 
event of October a year ago, in Jakarta this was a PKT 
operation with some Chinese help, that did not expect to rely 
upon the presence of Chinese armed forces from China. They 
almost succeeded and came within a gnat's eyelash of 
succeeding. They got six generals and had they gotten two more 
the thing would have been over.
    But I think the presence of U.S. and British forces in 
Southeast Asia, a combination of them there, did lead these 
generals to believe they at least would not be subject to major 
intervention from China. Now, saving Haidsah----
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Hickenlooper. Would you say if we had not been in 
South Vietnam, communism would have made tremendous strides in 
Indonesia.
    Secretary Rusk. That would be the implication of what he 
said, of his remark; but I would be inclined to discount his 
remarks somewhat.
    I do feel, Senator, that what is--that the stand we have 
taken in Vietnam has made a considerable difference to all of 
those free countries in Asia, the ten, for example, who met in 
Korea this past year and affirmed their support of South 
Vietnam and expressed their appreciation for those giving help, 
both Asian and non-Asian, and from Korea and Japan right around 
through, all the way to India, there is a confidence that, I 
think, would not have been there, that is making some 
difference as to how they comport themselves.

                        THE RHODESIAN SITUATION

    Senator Hickenlooper. I want to move on for just a quick 
question or two here: As you know, and I have talked to you 
about this, the Rhodesian situation troubles me very greatly, 
and I was greatly disturbed when the President signed the 
executive order of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia on 
January 5th.
    I fail to agree with him in my own mind. I suppose I can 
rationalize it if I go way-round rationalization, as to why did 
he undertake to attempt to destroy one of the most progressive 
and successful governments and economies in all Africa by this 
kind of action. I understand the sovereignty theory and all 
that that is being advanced. I don't happen to agree with it, 
but I understand it, I understand what it is. What are we 
trying to do there?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, first, Senator, we feel that this is, 
in the first instance, a problem for the Commonwealth, 
Britain----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Why did we get into it?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we didn't buy into it ourselves, on 
our own initiative. We didn't go around drumming up business on 
this one. It was presented to us in the first instance by joint 
action and joint position by some 18 members of the 
Commonwealth, and a reference of this question to the Security 
Council by the Commonwealth.
    Now we are sitting in the Security Council, and when it 
comes before the Council we have to ourselves decide what 
attitude we take. The United Kingdom introduced a resolution. 
We had to vote yes or no or abstain. We did help to fend off 
much more extreme resolutions in the Security Council, for 
example, the use of force, but we have felt that basically, 
quite frankly, that the attitude of the Commonwealth is sound 
in this situation, that the Rhodesian question is, in fact, a 
threat to the peace in the longer run unless there is some 
modification of view. What we have been hoping all along was 
that discussions would lead to a peaceful settlement of the 
situation. They came very close in the conversations on the 
cruiser Tiger between Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Ian 
Smith, but it broke down apparently on the issues as to which 
side was going to trust the other during the interim period of 
about three months.
    Now the hope is that when the present Rhodesian leadership 
looks down the longer range of the future, that they will 
become convinced that further negotiations and talk are 
required, and that the British would also take that view, 
although both sides have become very grumpy about further talks 
at the present time.
    This is not a matter which has to be settled overnight, but 
there surely has to be some movement toward a settlement with 
which the 4 million Africans in Rhodesia can live and with 
which their neighbors can live. Otherwise you are going to have 
a situation in which all sorts of people would be mobilizing 
themselves to try to prevent the movement into this part of 
Africa of an apartheid approach.
    The Communist world will seize these issues and exploit 
them to a very considerable extent. So we feel that the Ian 
Smith regime must make some adjustments here in order to get 
this on the track of peaceful settlement that its own 4 million 
majority can live with.

                  THE DESTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA

    Senator Hickenlooper. The net result of the British 
position and ours would seem to me to be--or would seem to me 
to be the destruction of Southern Rhodesia, that is, in other 
words, for a viable going economy to be turned over to the 
natives over there, who mentally are not capable of running a 
government with the same success that it is being run now.
    Secretary Rusk. Excuse me----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Go ahead.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, please.
    In the first place, Senator, I do not believe that the 
Africans either in Rhodesia or outside Rhodesia would require 
that the government of Rhodesia be required to be turned over 
overnight all of a sudden to blacks.
    Senator Hickenlooper. That has been the case in most other 
countries in Africa, has it not?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, that has been true--well, they have a 
white member of the cabinet in Tanzania; I think they have 
white members in Kenya, and Liberia, they have worked out 
relations between the races in a rather constructive fashion.
    One of the problems in the Rhodesian matter is that it is 
the kind of an issue that could destroy the working 
relationships between the whites and blacks in that government 
even in those countries where the working relationships are 
sound and in reasonably good order. But we do feel that--and 
this is the Commonwealth view--that there needs to be some 
movement in this matter. There are many interim steps to be 
taken which would bring more repose in this situation.
    Now, if Ian Smith were to permit some of those interim 
steps, the stake could be worked out.
    Again let me say that the Tiger agreement represented some 
of those interim steps and apparently the key point on which 
that broke down was the question of who would be responsible 
for law and order in the country during an interim period when 
a new constitution would be promulgated and on the basis of 
which Rhodesia would become independent. That constitution 
itself would itself have included interim steps rather than a 
final solution and apparently the cabinet in Salisbury would 
not agree to let the Governor General have control of the 
security forces of the country during that brief interim period 
before a new constitution might be promulgated and that is 
where it broke down.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think my time is up.

                            LEGAL MEMORANDUM

    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I have a brief memorandum 
here on some of the legal aspects and charter aspects. I might 
give this to Mr. Marcy in case any members of the committee 
might wish to have a look at it.
    The Chairman. Senator Morse.
    Senator Lausche. Could copies be provided of that legal 
memorandum?
    Senator Morse. The committee can provide them.
    The Chairman. The committee can make copies if you want 
one.
    The Senator from Oregon.
    Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, I shall confine my questions 
to certain problems that I think have arisen as a result of U 
Thant's proposals. I shall read this legal memorandum that you 
have just referred to with great care.

                        DISAGREEMENT OVER SEATO

    I only want to say in passing, by way of a caveat, of 
course, I do not share in any degree the State Department's 
position on SEATO. I think that the chairman has pointed out 
here the March 8, 1965, memorandum as to the administration's 
legal justification for its involvement with North Vietnam. It 
does not even whisper about SEATO within the realm of sound 
international law.
    I think all the rationalization, in my judgment--that is my 
characterization of the State Department on SEATO in recent 
times--is an afterthought, and I think completely unsound in 
international law, but I shall discuss that in further detail 
elsewhere.

                         CONFIDENCE IN U THANT

    But what does bother me, Mr. Secretary--and you can be very 
helpful to us in what I think is a growing confusion in the 
country in regard to our relations to U Thant, I do not sit 
here holding any brief for him. I want your help on it, 
however.
    We certainly took the position that we wanted him to be 
continued as Secretary General. We were one of those who urged 
it upon him, some would say did more than urge, but we urged 
it. He has been proposing variable formats for trying to pave 
the way for negotiations and every time he does, it seems that 
we get into controversy with him. It seems that we are the ones 
that get into controversy with him. I do not find any other 
nations that have been in controversy with him, at least it has 
not been reported. Perhaps you can tell us if they do, and that 
is one of the things I want to find out.
    If we have the confidence that we expressed in him when we 
urged his reappointment as Secretary General, why do we not 
take the position that if he will set up a procedure for 
triparty negotiations, we will look with great favor on it. Why 
do we take the position that, as you expressed again this 
morning, that we will not stop the bombing unless he can come 
in and give us assurance of some kind of reciprocal action on 
the part of North Vietnam? Is that a price that we should exact 
until we have first found out what he can do with cessation of 
bombing? I do not know whether he can deliver anything or not. 
But I seriously doubt whether a continuation of our bombing is 
justifiable on the basis of the argument you make this morning 
when U Thant is telling the world that the United States ought 
to stop bombing first.
    U Thant is telling the world now that he disagrees that 
Vietnam is of vital security interest to the United States. It 
seems to me he has put us in a pretty bad light in the world, 
and I wonder if the proper response is for us to simply reject 
him or reject his ideas rather than make a plea here again 
through the procedures of the United Nations for a United 
Nations' manifestation backing him up and assuming their 
peacekeeping obligations under the Charter.
    That is broad outline. I only want to raise----
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Morse [continuing]. The question so you can talk to 
this committee about why we are taking the attitude toward U 
Thant that the public statements of you and our Administration 
have been taking.

                   U THANT'S POSITION ON THE BOMBING

    Secretary Rusk. Senator, first, on the question of stopping 
the bombing, bear in mind that the other side is now very 
specifically saying that this must be unconditional and 
permanent, and this is a major step. There are three divisions 
in and just north of the demilitarized zone today.
    Senator Morse. Does he agree with that?
    Secretary Rusk. Agree with that?
    Senator Morse. Does U Thant agree with that? Is that what U 
Thant means when he says we should stop the bombing?
    Secretary Rusk. We have said--but U Thant is not the man 
who makes this judgment. It is the other side who has to make 
the judgment.
    Senator Morse. He is the one who is making the proposals to 
both sides, and we immediately reject his proposal about 
stopping the bombing which I have not understood. If it is 
true, I would like to have you tell me.
    Secretary Rusk. I beg your pardon, we have not rejected his 
proposal of stopping the bombing. We have said, ``Okay, that is 
possible, what about point two,'' which is the mutual de-
escalation of the violence on both sides, and on that he has 
not had anything whatever from the other side.
    Senator Morse. I understand that.
    Secretary Rusk. And the other side says, ``It is none of 
your business.''
    Senator Morse. I understand that. But my point is you have 
to have a starting point here, and my point is when we say we 
are not going to stop the bombing until U Thant delivers 
reciprocity, we give the impression--I understand our points--
but we give the impression that we are the ones that right off 
the bat throw in a block that makes it impossible for him to 
act.

                   OPPOSITION TO U THANT'S PROPOSALS

    Secretary Rusk. You mentioned one point about other 
countries. The ambassadors of seven Asian nations, including 
Japan, Malaysia, Laos, called on him the other day to take 
strong exception to what he said in his press conference about 
the security significance of Vietnam in this present 
situtation. I might say they did that without any encouragement 
from us. We did not stimulate them to do that, and I gather 
that Australia and New Zealand are also doing the same thing 
when they heard about the Asian move.
    But Hanoi has rejected strongly U Thant's second and third 
points, second point, mutual de-escalation of the violence, 
and, third, on U Thant's point about the Liberation Front they 
have said the Liberation Front is the sole spokesman for the 
South Vietnamese.
    Now, Senator, it seems to me there are two, as far as peace 
is concerned, as it affects the United States. There are two 
most elementary facts in this situation. One is substantial 
numbers of the North Vietnamese regular forces in South Vietnam 
and our bombing in North Vietnam. All right, why can we not get 
rid of both of those at the same time, why can we not get rid 
of both of those together? We have not been able--and I can 
assure you, sir, we have scoured the earth on it--to get 
anybody to give us any indication as to what would happen. They 
do not even say they would come to a conference without doing 
anything on the ground. They do not--let me illustrate the 
point.

                          THE CHRISTMAS TRUCE

    Very recently, during the two-day Christmas truce, when the 
hour arrived, hundreds of vessels, most of them small, but 
about 18 of them fairly good sized, suddenly made a dash along 
the coast of North Vietnam to resupply their forces north of 
the DMZ. They were all loaded and ready to go, just as Olympic 
dash men at the starting point. They came down, they unloaded 
several thousand tons of supplies and then scattered again 
before the truce is over, you see.
    Now, we need to have some indication that that is not going 
to be the effect of stopping the bombing, that something is 
going to happen on the ground that moves this toward peace. 
Otherwise, we simply give them an unlimited and an indefinite 
capability of doing it the comfortable way of sending their 
people south and taking their time and being safe and secure 
and not have anything to worry about at home.
    This, I think, would be a very serious thing.
    Now, we are trying to find out the answer to a secondary 
question. If people cannot tell us what Hanoi would do if we 
stopped bombing, they at least can tell us what they would do. 
Moscow, Eastern Europe, U Thant and the rest of them, India, 
what they would do if we stopped the bombing. There is no 
response from the other side.
    I would be interested in your own view as to whether this 
would make any difference to your own position, Senator, if we 
stopped the bombing and there was no response. Quite frankly, 
we have not----

                  U.S. SHOULD NOT BE FIGHTING U THANT

    Senator Morse. You ought to take judicial notice that would 
make a difference with me. You ought to know me well enough for 
this. My difference with you is we are laying down conditions 
precedent that are not going to be accepted apparently even by 
U Thant, and if we are going to try to work through U Thant, we 
ought to give--make some attempt to see what he can deliver. If 
we have made a bad bargain on U Thant, if we are now already 
discovering that he cannot give us the leadership because of 
the conditions he imposes, then let us face up to that.
    I think we are getting a bad image created around the world 
in regard to our relationships with U Thant. I think we should 
not be fighting with U Thant at the present time.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, when U Thant says, for example, that 
he does not believe that the security of Southeast Asia is of 
strategic importance to the West, there is nothing in his 
present responsibility or his background of experience that 
makes his judgment on that matter of very much importance. He 
is not responsible for the strategic interests of the West.
    Senator Morse. He certainly comes from a country that sits 
on the front door of China, and Burma does not seem to be as 
concerned about China as we are.
    [Discussion off the record.]

                           THE DOMINO THEORY

    Secretary Rusk. Mr. U Thant also said that he does not 
believe in the domino theory. I do not believe in the domino 
theory myself, and I have said that many times. The theory is 
the theory of the world revolution pursued by militant means. 
He mentioned countries X, Y, and Z. Hanoi, with the help of 
Peking, has already named the countries X, Y, and Z. Vietnam is 
X, Laos is Y, and Thailand is Z. So, I personally do not feel 
when Mr. U Thant makes a statement of this sort by silence we 
indicate that somehow we agree with him. We supported him for 
Secretary General not because he and we would agree on every 
one of the hundred or more items that might be on the agenda of 
the U.N. or on an item like this which is not on the agenda of 
the U.N. and he opposes putting it on the agenda of the U.N., 
but because he has on the whole done a good job as Secretary 
General and the prospect was that he would be a considerably 
better Secretary General than any of the alternatives that 
seemed to be around.

                      ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

    Senator Morse. I will not take more time other than to make 
a comment on the last observation you made. Sure he is 
Secretary General of the United Nations, but he is not 
independent in his responsibilities to the organization, to 
both branches of the organization, and I repeat, I would like 
to bring this before the Security Council. After all, I think 
the Security Council ought to sit down and go over his 
proposals, because they relate to the image of the United 
Nations, but I think we, on the other hand, ought to insist 
that that Security Council stand up and be counted, either with 
a veto or with a vote, an affirmative vote. I want to get 
ourselves out of the position where we seem in many quarters to 
be giving the impression that we are holding the United Nations 
off. I would like to put the heat on that Security Council and 
get a vote up or down, and I think the Secretary General ought 
to be asked to sit down with that Security Council and go over 
these proposals of his. He sits there as Secretary General and 
makes these announcements that are going to affect the members 
of the organization, and then a nation individually and 
unilaterally, the United States in this instance, takes him on. 
I do not think we should be in that position. I think the 
United Nations, to whom he is responsible and of whom he is an 
agent, ought to be taking him on.
    Secretary Rusk. You know, I would not dispute that point 
with you too much, Senator. There is pending before the 
Security Council a resolution by which the Security Council 
would call upon the parties to engage in negotiations for a 
peace in Southeast Asia. It does not have the votes on the 
Security Council for a variety of reasons. The Soviets would 
veto. But there are others influenced in part by U Thant who 
say----
    Senator Lausche. Why not let the Soviets veto?
    Secretary Rusk. But there are others who say that since 
Hanoi and Peking say this is not the business of the United 
Nations, that if the Security Council takes up this question, 
and tried to get into it, that this would get in the way of a 
use of the machinery which Hanoi and Peking say is the 
appropriate machinery, namely, the Geneva machinery.
    When this point was made by the Soviet delegate, Mr. Arthur 
Goldberg said that is fine with us, let us use the Geneva 
machinery, in which case the Soviet ambassador said, ``No, no, 
we can't use that.''
    This matter has been one way or another before the United 
Nations at least a dozen times, and I have an up-to-date 
memorandum on this point which I will be glad to furnish Mr. 
Marcy for the committee.

                 A PERMANENT PRESENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

    The Chairman. Will the Senator yield for one clarifying 
thing?
    You said no one would be more alarmed than Burma, unless it 
be Thailand, if we pull out of Southeast Asia, which seems to 
imply that you feel we have a permanent presence there.
    Secretary Rusk. No.
    The Chairman. That is the interpretation of it.
    Secretary Rusk. No, I meant under present circumstances. I 
am not saying what you would do if we have peace. Our Manila 
declaration on that is quite specific on that point.

            FORMAL ACTION RATHER THAN BACK SCENE NEGOTIATING

    Senator Morse. You must not take more time on that, and if 
you will only pardon me, I want to make this observation. I 
just do not buy the argument that Hanoi and Peking should be 
telling the United Nations what to do. The Charter makes 
perfectly clear if there was a threat to the peace by a non-
member, the members, the signatories, have the job of enforcing 
the peace. It is the primary purpose of the Charter. All the 
other things that the United Nations do are ancillary to it. 
The real reason for it was to enforce the peace.
    I would put France and Russia, as the Senator from Ohio 
said--with a veto, if they want to veto it, let them do it. But 
the important thing is it would help clarify the situation. 
Instead of giving the impression that the United States is 
doing a lot of back scene negotiating, which isn't what the 
Charter calls for--the Charter calls for formal action under 
the juridical process thereof, and we ought to insist on it.
    Secretary Rusk. I have some sympathy with that point.
    The Chairman. Senator Aiken.
    Senator Morse. The sad part of it is if we could closet 
ourselves longer we might find ourselves in more agreement.
    Senator Aiken. First, let me say I agree with the Secretary 
that not only would Burma but every other country in Southeast 
Asia be alarmed if we pulled out completely from that area.
    My questions will be short and along a different line.

                        U.S. TRADE WITH CAMBODIA

    Mr. Secretary, to what extent is our trade with Cambodia--
to what extent has it been increasing?
    Secretary Rusk. I do not have the trade figures. Our 
tourism has been more or less holding up. I would have to get 
the figures on trade.
    Senator Aiken. And we are now supplying some oil to 
Cambodia?
    Secretary Rusk. American companies----
    Senator Aiken. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk [continuing]. Provide oil in Cambodia and up 
the Mekong River to South Vietnam.

                             CHINESE STEEL

    Senator Aiken. That is right. But in that connection I read 
last month the United States, through Bombay, had purchased a 
very substantial amount of steel manufactured in China for use 
in South Vietnam.
    Then about two weeks ago there was another news item to the 
effect that a freighter carrying steel from Bombay to the 
United States had gotten into trouble or been sunk or 
something.
    Are American companies buying Chinese steel through Bombay 
for use in this country?
    Secretary Rusk. No. We tried to look into that. I think the 
allegation was that this was a transaction through Singapore.
    Senator Aiken. No question--no one questions that.
    Secretary Rusk. But the information we have is that this 
did not occur; that the steel was resold at Singapore to known 
customers; these were not in Vietnam. I can't find any 
substance to that.
    Senator Aiken. The ship that got into trouble was 
reportedly headed toward the United States. I did not know that 
India had a surplus of steel.
    Secretary Rusk. This sounds--I had not put my attention on 
this shipping from Bombay to the United States.
    Senator Aiken. But isn't it true that Communist countries 
and Western countries do conduct considerable business with 
each other through third parties?
    Secretary Rusk. I think that is true.
    Senator Aiken. There is no question about that, and that--
--
    Secretary Rusk. Let us leave this off the tape.
    [Discussion off the record.]

                    ESTABLISHING A BASE IN THE DELTA

    Senator Aiken. I notice there was quite a lot made in the 
news lately about establishing a base in the Delta. Is that 
being constructed as a permanent base?
    Secretary Rusk. I saw a report this morning that one of the 
amphibious operations was off-loading to go back to its main 
base. I think there may be some U.S. forces at some point in 
the Delta.
    Part of the Delta is in the immediate Saigon area. For 
example, Long An Province, we have had some forces there for 
some time. But I think the major effort at the present time is 
in the Saigon area and particularly northwest of Saigon to try 
to break the flow of men and supplies that might be coming from 
the Delta up into the Third, Second and First Corps.
    I just do not know what the future will hold on this. There 
is no policy problem in my mind about doing in the Fourth Corps 
what we are doing in the First, Second and Third. But there are 
practical problems of how you best use your forces, under what 
circumstances.

                         GUANTANAMOS IN VIETNAM

    Senator Aiken. Isn't it quite likely when the situation 
over there quiets down--I do not mean comes to an end, but 
quiets down--or phases out, fades out somewhat, that we will 
have one or two Guantanamos along the Coast of Vietnam?
    Secretary Rusk. Oh, no. On that, sir, we have no interest 
in maintaining a permanent position in South Vietnam.
    This Cam Ranh Bay facility is a very substantial facility, 
but David Lilienthal is on his way over there now to help work 
out plans for conversion to civilian use in case of peace.
    We have no desire, and we publicly have committed ourselves 
to this many times, to maintain neither bases or troop presence 
in South Vietnam if there is peace there.
    Sentor Aiken. We have presence in Cuba. The difference is 
we do not try to run the Cuban government from Guantanamo.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Aiken. But why isn't a permanent base at Cam Ranh 
Bay or some other place just as logical as Guantanamo?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we have bases in the Philippines and 
in Okinawa, and we thought this might be a contribution towards 
the possibilities of peaceful settlement to make it clear we 
were not looking for a permanent position, a permanent 
presence, military presence, in South Vietnam.

             RUSSIAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS IN NORTH VIETNAM

    Sentor Aiken. Another thing that puzzles me somewhat is the 
fact that while the President is trying to get on friendlier 
terms with Russia, that we are furnishing the Russians with the 
most beautiful target practice they ever had in perfecting 
their new antiaircraft weapons, as I understand it. We have had 
nearly 600 planes shot down over North Vietnam. Don't we ever 
talk to the Russians about that?
    Secretary Rusk. Not very much about that precise point. The 
SAM missiles have been fired over 1,000 times, and I think that 
only 30 of them have effected a hit.
    Purely in military terms, I am not drawing any political 
implication from this at all. I think that technical or the 
tactical advantages, perhaps, are on our side in terms of 
learning how to handle surface-to-air missiles.
    Senator Aiken. Of course, if they only get a missile out of 
a thousand shots----
    Secretary Rusk. They have sent their top missile men out of 
Vietnam to find out what is the matter, and we know this is a 
major discovery they have made, and that is that their SAM 
missiles are not very effective.
    Senator Aiken. They must have fired 600,000 shots to get 
those 600 planes.
    Secretary Rusk. No. Most of the planes that have been lost 
have been lost to conventional anti-aircraft fire as the plane 
goes in for particular targets.
    Senator Aiken. Have the Russians been furnishing anti-
aircraft guns to them?
    Secretary Rusk. Some of it, and some come from China.
    Senator Aiken. And they have been perfecting their anti-
aircraft weapons without any risk themselves.
    Secretary Rusk. Possibly.
    Senator Aiken. I thought it might be well to speak to them 
about it quietly, in a soft tone of voice, maybe of what they 
will be doing wrong.
    Secretary Rusk. If they could translate their position 
there into influence on Hanoi, to get going on the 1954 and 
1962 agreements, there would be very substantial advantages to 
us.

                        INCREASE IN NATIONALISM

    Senator Aiken. There really is an increase in political 
nationalism throughout the world, is there not? Aren't the 
countries really more nationalistic than they have been for 
some time?
    Secretary Rusk. If you would look at the world as a whole, 
perhaps slightly, but I do not think it has changed too much 
over the decades.
    Senator Aiken. In most cases where it puts up barriers, 
international economics have a tendency to knock them flat, do 
they not?
    Secretary Rusk. That is right, sir.
    Senator Aiken. In other words, trade is important, and the 
greatest potential wealth of the world, the trading area of the 
world, is Southeast Asia, assuming that their purchasing power 
can be developed.
    Secretary Rusk. There has been a pretty steady growth in 
regional economic arrangements, not just in the Common Market, 
but in Central America particularly. Now they are talking very 
actively about a broader Latin American free trade. You get 
that same movement now among the free countries of Asia, so 
that you have that over against the national feelings.
    Senator Aiken. I have no more questions, but I have an idea 
it is going to take a while to get out of Southeast Asia as it 
did in the Philippines, and that was some time. We were there 
50 years officially.
    The Chairman. Senator Lausche.

                       THE THINKING BEHIND SEATO

    Senator Lausche. Mr. Secretary, I want to explore through 
questions and your answers what the predominating thinking in 
the fifties when we signed the various treaties related to 
Southeast Asia in inducing us to sign those treaties.
    Secretary Rusk. I think the most succinct statement--pardon 
me, excuse me.
    Senator Lausche. I begin with the Southeast Asia Collective 
Defense Treaty signed September 8, 1954. I understand, of 
course, my colleagues understand, that the President of that 
year, Eisenhower, sent that treaty to the Senate to be 
approved; is that correct?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Lausche. And that treaty contained Article IV which 
reads:

    Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed 
attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against 
any State or Territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement 
may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and 
safety, and agree that it will in that event act to meet the 
common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

    Senator Dodd. Is that the SEATO Treaty?
    Senator Lausche. That is the Treaty.
    Secretary Rusk. Article IV, paragraph 1.
    Senator Lausche. Yes. In other words, when that treaty was 
signed, the President of the United States, the Secretary of 
State, and the Senate declared to the world that our security 
was involved whenever armed attack was made upon any one of the 
nations that subscribed to that treaty, is that correct?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Lausche. And the nations that signed the treaty 
were the United States, Australia, France, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, Cambodia, 
Laos.
    Secretary Rusk. Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam were 
protocol states. They did not sign the treaty but were covered 
by the special protocol.
    Senator Lausche. I see, there is a note there.

                              ANZUS TREATY

    Now then, I go to the next treaty, and that is ANZUS, that 
is a treaty made with Australia, I suppose, New Zealand, and 
the United States?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Lausche. That treaty was signed in September 1951, 
and at that time Truman was President?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Lausche. Do you recall who was Secretary of State?
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Dean Acheson.
    Senator Lausche. And that treaty came up to the Senate for 
confirmation.
    Now, I read from Article IV of that treaty:

    Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific 
area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace 
and safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common 
danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

    In order words, in 1951 on September 1, it was the firm 
thinking of the Senate, President Truman and Secretary Acheson 
and, I suppose, the government in general, that our security 
was involved if any one of the signatories to that treaty were 
attacked. Am I correct in that?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.

                  MUTUAL COOPERATION TREATY WITH JAPAN

    Senator Lausche. I now go to the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan 
signed January 19, 1960, at which time Eisenhower was 
President. Who was Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles?
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Christian Herter.
    Senator Lausche. Herter.
    Secretary Rusk. In 1960.
    Senator Lausche. Article V of that treaty reads:

    Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either 
party in the territories under administration of Japan would be 
dangerous to its own peace and safety, and declares that it 
would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its 
constitutional provisions and processes.

    That was again a declaration of our interest in Southeast 
Asia and the relationship that it had to our own security.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, pardon me just a moment. I think 
in the Japan treaty, that was limited to attack on Japan. I do 
not think that treaty got into Southeast Asia, did it?
    Senator Lausche. Well, whatever it is----
    Secretary Rusk. I think so.
    Senator Lausche. That is the language. You are familiar 
with it.

                   MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH TAIWAN

    Now then, here is the next treaty, the Mutual Defense 
Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China. 
Article V reads:

    Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the West 
Pacific area directed against the territories of either of the 
Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety, and 
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in 
accordance with its constitutional processes.

    That was signed December 2, 1954; Eisenhower President, 
Dulles Secretary of State.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Lausche. I suppose the Senate, made up of members 
who are at this table today--and I will want the staff to put 
in the record how the votes were cast at that time----
    Senator Morse. I voted against it.
    Senator Lausche. Then you are consistent.
    Senator Morse. I did not want to put the staff to work.

                    MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH KOREA

    Senator Lausche. I now go to the Mutual Defense Treaty 
between the United States and the Republic of Korea, October 
1953, Article III:

    Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific 
area on either of the Parties in territories now under their 
respective administrative control or hereafter recognized by 
one of the Parties is lawfully brought under the administrative 
control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and 
safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common 
danger.

                   THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

    Now, I ask you, has there been a single treaty entered into 
with Asian nations and Southeast Asia that did not declare that 
our security was involved and that, therefore, we entered into 
those agreements?
    Secretary Rusk. That underlying concept is in each of the 
treaties we have in the Pacific Ocean area, in Asia.
    Senator Lausche. Now, Eisenhower was President under most 
of them. When Truman went into Korea, what was the motivation 
for going into Korea at that time? Did it have underlying it 
this same principle about the security of the United States 
being involved?
    Secretary Rusk. The basic view as to where the security 
interests of the United States lay was the same. It had not 
been put in treaty form at the time of the North Korean attack 
on South Korea.
    Senator Lausche. It was put into the treaty, in treaty 
form, after Eisenhower took office.
    Secretary Rusk. In 1953, yes, sir.

                   KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION AND VIETNAM

    Senator Lausche. Now we have Truman and Eisenhower, and I 
now come to Kennedy.
    When Kennedy became President, how many troops were in 
South Vietnam?
    Secretary Rusk. There were about 650 U.S. military there as 
a part of the military assistance mission.
    Senator Lausche. How many were there when he tragically 
lost his life?
    Secretary Rusk. Approximately 20,000, sir.
    Senator Lausche. Did he, by expanding the number of troops 
that were there, give indication of his judgment that we could 
not allow South Vietnam to be taken over by the Communists 
through aggression?
    Secretary Rusk. He did, sir. The first thing he tried to 
do, if I might take a moment, is to explore fully the 
possibilities of a peaceful settlement. He talked about this 
with Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961. It appeared that 
the two of them had reached agreement on Laos on the basis that 
everybody get out of Laos and leave this small land-locked 
country to take care of themselves.
    He was unable to get agreement on South Vietnam at the 
Vienna meeting, and you remember he sent some special missions 
out there, among them General Maxwell Taylor, to take a look at 
the situation to see what needed to be done in the light of the 
situation, and so when he examined it fully and he had on the 
one side no prospect that there was agreement with the 
Communist world on Vietnam, and on the other side our 
commitment, and the situation, he moved substantially to 
strengthen our participation there.
    Senator Lausche. So you have Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
and Johnson of the belief that our security and safety is 
involved in what happens in Southeast Asia.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Lausche. And you have Acheson, Dulles, Herter--was 
there any other Secretary of State----
    Secretary Rusk. No, sir.
    Senator Lausche. And yourself.

                       THE POSSIBILITY OF DETENTE

    Now then, that goes back 15, 20 years ago, what has changed 
since that time that should induce us to believe that our 
nation's security and safety have no relationship to what 
happens in Southeast Asia?
    Secretary Rusk. I think the principal changes in this 
regard have not yet been fully developed. But I would say there 
are the beginnings of the possibility of a detente and peaceful 
co-existence with the countries of Eastern Europe. That is one 
element of the situation which affects the problem.
    Secondly, the authorities in Peking are coming to the 
watershed of the transfer of power to the next generation, and 
have found that a policy of extreme militancy has isolated them 
within the Communist world, and that has had its repercussions 
inside China.
    Third is the development of nuclear weapons by Peking and, 
therefore, the increasing importance of stabilizing the 
situation and trying to organize a peace in the Pacific and to 
induce there some of the same prudence that we begin to see 
with our relations toward Eastern Europe. Those are the 
principal changes since that period.

                    UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES UNCHANGED

    Senator Lausche. All right. But with those changes can you 
take those changes as the basis of saying that all that was 
declared in these treaties by the Senate and by the President 
and the Secretaries of State was erroneous and that those 
reasons no longer exist for our being in Southeast Asia?
    Secretary Rusk. No, I do not think so. I think the 
underlying principles remain the same. They would, over time, 
Senator, be reduced in importance if there were some peace. In 
other words, the way not to have an alliance to come into 
operation is for nations to leave each other alone in 
situations of this sort.
    Senator Lausche. All right.

                       CHINA'S POLICY ON VIETNAM

    Now I go to just one more question and then I will close. I 
have the four points that have been submitted by Mao. Point 
number four:

    The internal affairs of South Vietnam should be settled by 
the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the 
program of the NFLSV.

    I suppose that is the National Liberation Front of South 
Vietnam.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Lausche. Has there been any yielding on that point 
four by Mao?
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think it might be avoiding 
confusion if we referred to that as Ho Chi Minh's point three, 
however it might have appeared there in what you have.
    Senator Lausche. All right.
    Secretary Rusk. We have not seen a revision of that, and if 
I could say this off the tape----
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Lausche. This final question.
    Senator Mundt. Will you yield? What has happened?
    Secretary Rusk. We have not had a reply on that particular 
point. We have offered them alternative language, and we have 
had no reply.

                         THE LAOTIAN AGREEMENT

    Senator Lausche. Now, the Laos Treaty or protocol, whatever 
you call it, was signed in 1962?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Lausche. The agreement provided for the withdrawal 
of all troops of all foreign nations?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Lausche. Specific points were designated where the 
departure was to be made so that the three countries, I assume 
Canada----
    Secretary Rusk. India and Poland.
    Senator Lausche [continuing]. Poland and India would be 
able to tell whether they had left.
    Have United States troops left Laos?
    Secretary Rusk. They left as soon as that agreement was 
concluded, sir.
    Senator Lausche. Have the Communists complied with that 
agreement?
    Secretary Rusk. No, sir. Our estimate is that the level of 
North Vietnamese forces in Laos never dropped below 6,000.
    Senator Lausche. That is all.
    Senator Pell. May I just interpolate to clarify the record. 
Aren't there still elements of American activity in Laos that 
are not of a formal military nature, that would balance that 
6,000?
    Secretary Rusk. As a matter of fact, we now carry out 
certain military operations in Laos, but the point is that we 
complied with that agreement and would be prepared today to 
comply with it 1,000 percent if we can get anybody else to.
    The Chairman. Did you give the alternative language to 
point three that the Senator asked you about?
    Secretary Rusk. No, sir; I did not, and I would prefer not 
to, Senator, if I may. As a matter of fact, what we suggested 
was very much like----
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Secretary Rusk. I call your attention, Mr. Chairman, to 
point six at the bottom of the first page where we have added 
to the original point, ``We will be prepared to accept 
preliminary discussions to reach agreement on a set of points 
as a basis for negotiations.''
    I think that is all we should say about that at the present 
time in order to keep open the possibilities they just might 
come back.
    The Chairman. Senator Carlson?

                         WHEN THIS WAR IS OVER

    Senator Carlson. Mr. Secretary, I shall be brief. I was 
interested in your comments in response to Senator Aiken's 
question about at the end of hostilities this war is over and 
our boys are coming home; we are moving out of Southeast Asia. 
Based on the past in Korea and Cuba, and our great investment 
in this area where we have now probably the finest docking 
facilities of any place in the Southeast Asia area except 
Japan--we have great airfields; great air bases, do you think 
the surrounding countries would permit us to move out any more 
than they would permit us to move out now?
    Secretary Rusk. The seven nations, Senator Carlson, which 
have forces in South Vietnam, said in the Manila communique 
that allied forces shall be withdrawn, after close 
consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the 
North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus 
subsides; that those forces will be withdrawn as soon as 
possible and not later than six months after the above 
conditions have been fulfilled.
    We have since World War II, or including World War II, had 
very large and important military facilities in connection with 
various enterprises that we have gone into, and we have 
demonstrated a capability of withdrawing from those facilities 
at the end of the period when they were needed.
    Our hope is that Cam Ranh Bay, for example, which is a 
spectacularly effective and beautiful natural harbor, could 
become a major port for the service of the upper two-thirds of 
South Vietnam, and it should be converted to civilian, 
industrial and trading purposes.
    Mr. David Lilienthal is going to be helping us on 
developing those plans. I think the seven nations who are most 
directly involved in this situation have agreed among 
themselves on this point.
    Now, if at some time in the future the assault on South 
Vietnam were renewed, then the governments at that time would 
have to decide what to do about it. But we want to make it 
clear that we are not after any special military position in 
Southeast Asia as far as we are concerned.

                   MAINTAINING U.S. FORCES IN VIETNAM

    Senator Carlson. With that last statement I fully agree, 
and I can see that we are not. But also I can see, looking 
further into the future, if we do not maintain substantial 
forces in that area, what is there to prevent the Red Chinese 
from going down and taking over the greatest facilities ever 
constructed in that area, and they could do it very easily?
    Secretary Rusk. The prospect that the United States would 
once again meet its treaty commitments and would join with 
others to prevent that occurring.
    Senator Carlson. That is the point I am making. We do not 
want to get committed to a position here where after a few 
years, after terrific loss of life and great expenditures of 
funds, we have to get back, and some day soon I trust we will 
reach agreement when that war will end, and whenever it does 
end, that decision is going to have to be made despite your 
Manila agreement.
    I think we have to look that one over because we have 
invested men and material in this operation, and it just looks 
to me, I think we are making a big mistake if we go out and 
tell the people of the United States--I know it was made, I 
read your Manila declaration--that we will soon move out of 
there. I do not think we should do that.
    Secretary Rusk. Under certain conditions.
    Senator Carlson. Well, those conditions, I think, will 
develop very rapidly after the conclusion of this war. I hope 
they do not, but I think we have again assumed the 
responsibility in Southeast Asia, I don't say whether we should 
or should not, but I think we are going to have to meet that 
issue, and I hope the administration and the government itself 
does not lead our people to believe on the day this war is 
over, six months after, the declaration says we are coming 
home. I hope we do, but I can see another issue.
    You know, I have been interested in the tone of the Hearst 
publications on this war, and they have been in thorough 
support of the President and in its operation. But in this last 
issue--and I assume you may have read it--they said they were 
fearful that world opinion is having too much influence on the 
operation of this war.

                        U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA

    I think there is some danger of world opinion, NATO--we 
have discussed all these projects, NATO, Rhodesia--I think we 
are in Rhodesia because of the African opinion, not because of 
Great Britain. I do not think we are obligated. I think we made 
a mistake, and I think if world opinion enters into this 
Vietnam situation we will be caught in a bind. I hope we are 
not.
    I cannot help but bring it up this morning because I am 
fearful of the future.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, perhaps what I said earlier was 
too broad on the Rhodesian matter. I believe that in the U.S. 
national interests and our own interests in the entire 
continent of Africa, as to what happens in that country, I 
think it was necessary for us to take a stand as we did on 
Rhodesia. I did not want to----
    Senator Carlson. I appreciate your position, Mr. Secretary, 
but you and I and the Commerce Department have had about 14, 
16, 18 months of discussion on some of our problems in South 
Africa when it comes to selling airplanes. I know you are 
familiar with it, selling planes for dollars to the Republic of 
South Africa, and it was finally resolved in favor of the 
United States, but only after, I would say, 18 months of 
bickering and discussions, and it was resolved because Great 
Britain was going to sell those planes and use U.S. engines.
    I appreciate the Secretary's action in this. I think it was 
right, but I know this situation, if we get involved and too 
carried away by pressure from other countries and forget our 
own nation, I do not like to say that, but we get carried away 
in this world opinion matter. I shall conclude, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Dodd.
    Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                      NORTH VIETNAMESE CONDITIONS

    I have two questions, Mr. Secretary. I thought I heard you 
say that North Vietnamese had proposed three different sets of 
conditions, unconditional with respect to the bombing, 
unconditional and for good, unconditional and definitive, but 
the third one escaped me.
    Secretary Rusk. These were three different ways of what 
appear to us to be saying the same thing, permanent, 
definitively, and for good. Whether these are differences in 
different translations of the same Vietnamese words I am not 
quite sure. Harrison Salisbury said in an interview 
unconditionally and for good. Another statement put in 
definitively. But the word ``permanently'' is the most frequent 
word they use in that regard. At all times they say 
unconditional.
    Senator Dodd. I see.

                        THE INDONESIAN SITUATION

    The second question I would like to ask is with respect to 
the Indonesian situation. I am not clear what your position is. 
I understood you to say that you would not go so far as to say 
our presence in Vietnam was decisive.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I would quite frankly be very 
comfortable about saying to you that what we are doing in 
Vietnam was the decisive influence on the events in Indonesia. 
I cannot in candor say that.
    Senator Dodd. Would you say----
    Secretary Rusk. But what I said was that I thought it had 
some influence. How much I am not quite sure. I did say that 
prominent officials of Indonesia said to us that it did have a 
decisive influence, but it is hard to answer that question 
accurately and specifically.
    I did not want to be in a position of exaggerating that 
particular point as far as we look at the situation. I have no 
doubt that it had some influence, and it might have had even 
more influence if the Chinese had attempted to send their own 
armed forces by sea to reinforce the PKI during that period, 
you see.
    The fact that the Seventh Fleet was there and the British 
Fleet was there, and so forth, this could have made quite a 
difference, of course.
    Senator Dodd. Would you say that a long term effort to help 
Indonesia in our aid program, in, I assume, other respects 
certainly helped those or, Ices in Indonesia to compel the 
efforts to overturn the government?
    Secretary Rusk. I think it proved in hindsight to have been 
very useful for the United States over the years to keep some 
sort of contact going and alive even though there were times 
when it was painful to do so.
    Senator Dodd. Yes, I was critical of it, so I am giving you 
an opportunity to get even. But I take it that it did pay off 
and that with our presence in South Vietnam.
    Secretary Rusk. I think it is just not on the military 
side, although that turned out to be useful, but our labor 
unions have had very important and constructive relationships 
with some of the labor unions in Indonesia, and our university 
people in the same way. There were times when it was very 
difficult to keep those going for reasons on both sides, some 
of which you will remember.
    But I think, on the whole, it has demonstrated that in that 
instance certainly patience and a little persistence turned out 
to be a good thing.

                 INFLUENCE OF VIETNAM WAR ON INDONESIA

    Senator Dodd. I put it essentially that it seems to me our 
policy with respect to Indonesia, and in continuing to try to 
give them assistance in all of the respects you have mentioned 
and others, and our presence in South Vietnam, did have a very 
strong influence on the outcome of the struggle in Indonesia 
between the Communist forces or pro-Communist forces, and those 
other forces more friendly to the West, is that right?
    Secretary Rusk. I think it has an important influence, 
Senator.
    I think it had an important influence.
    Senator Dodd. It certainly did appear to the people in that 
respect.
    Secretary Rusk. I think I ought to say when the moment of 
truth came in Indonesia, as it did, between these opposing 
troops, we were not involved in that in any way. Maybe these 
people would ask the question, ``If you were not, why weren't 
you?'' But there was a wholly Indonesian problem here, and we 
were not involved in it surreptitiously or otherwise, except 
for these overt reasons, the public reasons, we were in Vietnam 
and had maintained the contacts, and everybody would know we 
would be sympathetic if the Indonesians found a way to fend off 
the attempt of the PKI to seize power.
    Senator Dodd. It certainly would be fair to say, would it 
not, that all of the things we did do and tried to do in 
Indonesia itself, and our presence in South Vietnam, certainly 
influenced the thinking of the Indonesian people in this 
critical hour.
    Secretary Rusk. I think that is fair, sir.
    Senator Dodd. That is all I have.
    The Chairman. Senator Williams.

               U.S. AND BRITISH POLICIES TOWARD RHODESIA

    Senator Williams. Mr. Secretary, in general, I have been 
supporting your positions that you have taken in South Vietnam. 
It is a little hard for me to understand why we have just 
joined Great Britain in imposing economic sanctions on 
Rhodesia, but I noticed in the press the other day that Great 
Britain is selling fertilizer and chemicals to Castro, going to 
finance a plant, and also continuing to trade, as we 
understand, with both North Vietnam and China. How can we 
reconcile those two positions, particularly when Great Britain 
itself is one of the members of SEATO?
    Secretary Rusk. First, sir, on the Rhodesian matter, this 
is not a matter which was purely bilateral between us and 
Britain, a commitment by the United States in support of 
Britain because it was Britain. We have, in fact, at times had 
some margins of difference with Britain over the Rhodesian 
question, both in the direction of pursuing the talks more and 
in the direction of being careful about the general attitude of 
the African countries.
    We were acting in the Rhodesian thing as a matter of 
national interest in respect of the total continent there, as a 
factor over and above different from the attitude of Britain.

                       FLAGSHIPS OUT OF HONG KONG

    Secondly, Britain is not itself trading with North Vietnam, 
with the exception of an occasional flagship out of Hong Kong 
controlled by a company in Hong Kong.
    Senator Williams. Isn't that to a certain extent like some 
of our American companies owning under a Panamanian flag?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, it is possible, sir. But they do not 
feel they have the kind of control in that situation in the 
colony there and, Senator, one reason, since this trade is 
almost minuscule, one reason that I personally feel somewhat 
relaxed about it, is I do not want to have the question put to 
us if we do those things to Hong Kong which causes the people 
on the mainland to go after Hong Kong, is the U.S. going to 
help them in Hong Kong, and I do not want to have anything to 
do with that problem.
    Senator Williams. To the extent we understand, and I have 
seen this excuse before, but Great Britain has control over the 
ships going into Hong Kong.
    Do I understand these same ships, using the flag from Hong 
Kong, British-owned ships, can continue to trade with Rhodesia 
and not be subject to this blockage and Great Britain has no 
control over those companies and cannot stop them?
    Secretary Rusk. No, I do not think so.
    Senator Williams. It has stopped them in Rhodesia.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
    Senator Williams. And they would stop them in North Vietnam 
on the same basis if they wanted to, couldn't they?
    Secretary Rusk. It would require legislation, I believe.
    Senator Williams. It did not require legislation in 
Rhodesia.
    Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, it was an Order in Council 
with respect to Rhodesia.
    Senator Williams. Now, the fertilizer plant which she is 
financing for Mr. Castro.
    Secretary Rusk. We do not like that and other countries in 
this hemisphere do not like it and have expressed our views 
very strongly in London. Britain has a different policy than we 
do on this, and we haven't been able to prevail. That is the 
way it is. Here is a point in which we and they simply disagree 
on.

                        CHINESE STEEL SHIPMENTS

    Senator Williams. One final question. I notice it was first 
reported in the London Observer, in which these steel shipments 
to which another member referred----
    Secretary Rusk. Right.
    Senator Williams. I read that story and, as I read the 
story, we gave the official explanation that this steel was in 
short supply and that it had been purchased and we were going 
to stop it. Did we----
    Secretary Rusk. No.
    Senator Williams. Did we completely deny there was any such 
transaction at all and that story was false?
    Secretary Rusk. When something like that comes in we first 
try to find out what the facts are. We investigated this. The 
Singapore Government has denied it and has accounted to us for 
the steel shipments that they got out of China through Hong 
Kong, and where that steel went, and the record shows that the 
steel went to places other than Vietnam. So that my answer to 
you today is, to the best of our ability to proceed to find 
out, there was nothing in that story.
    Senator Williams. And it did not ultimately end up in South 
Vietnam at all?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir. I am not suggesting 
that all the trading that goes on there may not be some things 
brought out of China through Hong Kong that may not turn up 
anywhere, including this country, through a third or fourth 
country trading. But we did look into the steel matter, and we 
have been able to locate where that steel went. It did not go 
to Vietnam.
    Senator Williams. Thank you.
    Secretary Rusk. I will get the committee the details.
    Senator Aiken. It did not go to Wilmington.
    Secretary Rusk. Not to Wilmington. [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. Senator Clark.

                  THE ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SITUATION

    Senator Clark. Mr. Secretary, I would like to get your 
comments on the antiballistic missile situation with respect to 
the policy of the Department. Also, how much can you tell us 
about what Ambassador Thompson is up to, what you and Mr. 
Dobrynin have been able to achieve, and generally speaking 
whether you have read Roswell Gilpatric's article in the New 
York Times of yesterday, and whether you are generally in 
sympathy with the point of view he expressed, which is we ought 
to do everything feasible to prevent an escalation of the arms 
race by either Russia or ourselves of the ballistic missiles.
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, could we, perhaps, leave this 
part of it off the tape?
    [Discussion off the record.]

             TAKING OVER THE WAR FROM THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE

    Senator Clark. I would like to move into one more question. 
What is the rationale, Mr. Secretary, behind or, perhaps, are 
the press reports true, that we are committed to moving in 
force into the Mekong Delta in order to take over the 
responsibilities in that area that South Vietnam has hitherto 
attempted to carry on? What is the rationale behind the search 
and destroy massive maneuvers in the Iron Triangle? Are we 
still committed to an increasing policy of taking over from the 
South Vietnamese the conduct of the war in Vietnam, and what is 
our own view as to whether this will not result in casualties 
far beyond any productive results?
    Secretary Rusk. First, on the Iron Triangle, this has been 
an area near Saigon which has been a major Viet Cong 
headquarters and supply center for a long time, and out of that 
come raids and operations against communications as well as 
against the city itself.
    It is a relatively lightly populated area. As you know, we 
are moving the civilians out as the operation proceeds. But as 
far as the U.S. taking over the main battle is concerned, I 
just noticed in the daily military report this morning that I 
see every day, that the operations of battalion size or larger 
going on yesterday, I have the figure here exactly, I think 
there were 11 U.S., 2 allied, other allies, and something like 
18 or 20 South Vietnamese.
    The South Vietnamese are engaging in full operations. We 
are trying to get them moved toward pacification, which is 
something of a misleading term in this sense, that does not 
mean the South Vietnamese are going to take fewer casualties. 
This pacification effort is a very mean part of the war, but it 
is something the South Vietnamese may be better able and fitted 
to do than we in working in the villages and rooting out the 
Viet Cong from the rest of the population.
    The Mekong Delta, part of this is immediately adjacent to 
Saigon. We are interested very much in securing the Saigon 
area. The Delta is a source of rice and men for the Viet Cong 
in Corps One, Two and Three. I think it is a tactical matter as 
to which of the 43 provinces our forces operate in primarily, 
and which are primarily for the South Vietnamese forces.

                       A 100 PERCENT AMERICAN WAR

    Senator Clark. I would suggest, Mr. Secretary, it is much 
more strategic than tactical, and it is another obvious 
indication, if it is true we are moving in for the first time 
in force in the Mekong Delta, that we are slowly but surely 
making this a 100 percent American war, and I would like your 
comments on that.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, the record of operations, the record 
of casualties, the missions performed just do not show it, 
Senator. As I say, I have the figure here----
    Senator Clark. Well, they certainly did a few months ago, 
Mr. Secretary, when American casualties increased, and they 
have drastically increased all through 1966, and the South 
Vietnamese casualties for several weeks were less than ours.
    I would find it a little surprising if you would deny that 
we have been more and more involved in search and destroy 
operations in South Vietnam with an ever-increasing list of 
American casualties--that is true, is it not?
    Secretary Rusk. I did not say that. I was saying yesterday 
in operations of battalion size or larger there were 11 U.S. 
and 22 South Vietnamese. They were carrying on twice as many 
operations in numbers.

                     U.S. SUFFERING MORE CASUALTIES

    Senator Clark. I do not want to get into an argument with 
you. I have this map here. You remember the fuss I made about 
this matter a year ago. It looks like we have not any more 
ground, and we have suffered many casualties. The casualties 
are what bother me. We talk an awful lot about the strategic 
value. What gets me down is we are not really paying enough 
attention to how many American boys are getting killed.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, you are not more concerned with 
casualties than I am. I belong to that generation of young men 
who were betrayed into World War II because the governments 
refused to face the problem of organizing a peace in the world. 
I hate these casualties just as much----
    Senator Clark. Would you mind if I give my entire attention 
to you, and let your staff assistant postpone his comments?
    Secretary Rusk. I say you are not more concerned with 
casualties than I am. I belong to that generation of young 
people that was betrayed into World War II with tens of 
millions of casualties all over the world because the 
governments of that day, including the Government of the United 
States, refused to face the problem of organizing a peace in 
the world.
    Now, we have taken 190,000 casualties since 1945 all over 
the world, and it is bloody and difficult and burdensome, but 
the effort has been, and is beginning to show some signs of 
paying off that we can organize a peace before we let this go 
down the chute-the-chute to World War III. This is what it is 
all about, and these casualties being undertaken out there are 
highly relevant to the question of whether we are going to 
organize some peace, or whether most of the world is going to 
go up in flames one of these days.
    Senator Clark. Well, I think that is where you and I find 
ourselves in disagreement, and I do not think it desirable, Mr. 
Chairman, to pursue it any further at this point. I think we 
can organize the peace without getting all these Americans 
killed.
    The Chairman. Is that all?
    Senator Clark. Yes.
    The Chairman. Senator Mundt.

                    NUCLEAR WARHEAD DELIVERY SYSTEMS

    Senator Mundt. Did I understand you to say in this proposed 
proliferation or non-proliferation treaty, it would not include 
the delivery systems?
    Secretary Rusk. It concentrates on the nuclear warheads and 
does not try to deal with the question of delivery systems.
    Sentor Mundt. Why not?
    Secretary Rusk. Because the effect is to prevent the spread 
of warheads, whereas delivery systems can be everything from 
ordinary aircraft to artillery, to anything else, and it would 
be awfully hard to combine a delivery system into a non-
proliferation treaty.
    Senator Mundt. From our standpoint vis-a-vis, China isn't 
there a problem of getting a delivery system? They have got the 
bomb.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we would be interested in finding a 
way to keep them out of the ICBM business or IRBM business. But 
they have got delivery systems now, ordinary aircraft or the 
most shortranged missiles or presumably they will eventually 
develop atomic capability with artillery. So the delivery 
problem is a different problem from that of the warhead.
    Senator Mundt. The problem is they do not have a delivery 
system from their standpoint, but they are going to get one.
    Secretary Rusk. That is right.
    Senator Mundt. And I think a non-proliferation treaty that 
ignores that is good for others but no good for us.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I think the problem of delivery 
systems is a special and, in some respects, a more complicated 
question. For example, if you get into the delivery system 
business, should we go back to the Baruch proposals or not? 
This sounds these days like a rather wild idea, but would the 
security of the United States be enhanced if the world went 
completely conventional again? Now, if we say, no, we have got 
to have missile deterrence ourselves, then getting some control 
of these on the part of other countries is going to be 
extremely difficult.
    Senator Mundt. Don't you think we have to say yes to that 
question?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I think we ought to think about it 
more than we have thought about it in the last few years 
because we sort of have taken it for granted that somehow we 
have to have a nuclear force ourselves.
    I think one of the great tragedies myself was--well, so 
much has happened since--that the Baruch proposals were not 
accepted.
    Senator Mundt. I agree.

                      NO QUID PRO QUO WITH BRITAIN

    Like most of others who have commented on Rhodesia, I am 
rather completely disenchanted with the way we have been sucked 
into the situation over there. Let me ask you this direct 
question: Before we yielded so quickly to the persuasiveness of 
Great Britain, as if we were still a colony of theirs as we 
were before 1776, have we ever tried to make an agreement in 
which we would obtain a quid pro quo with her relative to this 
business in Cuba, with respect to the trouble in Vietnam?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we did not make a condition with 
respect to a quid pro quo. We have discussed this in relation 
to other questions where we would hope to get some more 
cooperation from them, and one reason for it is there are 
nineteen members of the Commonwealth involved in this, and the 
general membership in the United Nations, so a quid pro quo by 
a particular member would not be responsive to our national 
interests in dealing with problems in Africa or our problems 
relating to the very existence of the Commonwealth, or our 
interests as expressed in the United Nations.
    Senator Mundt. Except that they needed us for the sanctions 
program.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think if we had taken the other 
view on this that, perhaps, some of our friends in Britain 
would have simply used that to say, ``Well, you see, we were 
prepared to do this, but the Americans are not going to back us 
up,'' and they would have used it to get them off the hook.
    Senator Mundt. Do you really think in your own mind a 
program of sanctions, short of a military blockade, can ever 
bring Rhodesia to its knees?
    Senator Mundt. Well, I think, sir, the problem is not so 
much bringing them to their knees in that sense.
    Senator Mundt. Trying to get them to do what we want.
    Secretary Rusk. So much as bringing them into a discussion 
where they would be willing to make more sense than they have 
thus far.

                          ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA

    Senator Mundt. It seems to me the most you can hope for if 
our sanctions proceed is bringing a consolidation of South 
Africa and Rhodesia into a compact or making them one country, 
and then you magnify the problems.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Secretary Rusk. I do not believe South Africa is going to 
substitute itself for the rest of the world in Rhodesian trade. 
This is a very serious problem for South Africa. I do not think 
the Portuguese will do it. The Portuguese do say, if sanctions 
are applied, that they must apply them at the source and not 
try to use Portugal as the policeman simply because they have 
an adjacent territory.
    Senator Mundt. Do I interpret your statement that you 
believe South Africa is not going to send oil to Rhodesia?
    Secretary Rusk. The question is whether they will send oil 
in quantities additional to the normal flow, which was not 
particularly large, and that is the question.
    We had hoped South Africa would stay out of this so there 
cannot be raised the fairly serious problems of sanctions 
against South Africa. We objected to those at the United 
Nations.
    Senator Mundt. Do you think South Africa is going to 
continue or discontinue shipping oil?
    Secretary Rusk. I would be surprised if they cut off the 
oil below the levels which were going in before the sanctions 
were applied. I would be somewhat surprised on that. What I do 
not know the answer to is whether they would increase that 
supply of oil.
    Senator Mundt. If they continue at the same rate this is OK 
with Rhodesia. They got by before this.
    Secretary Rusk. Rhodesian oil is coming in through other 
channels, Mozambique as well.

                       SOME REDUCTION IN TENSIONS

    Senator Mundt. Let me ask you a hypothetical question. Just 
how do you define, let us say we have got countries A and B--I 
do not have to identify them--any particular countries who have 
been quarreling and are suspicious of each other, and you have 
a detente. What do you have?
    Secretary Rusk. I got trapped on that one in a press 
conference. They asked me that, and I said I did not think we 
could see a detente, but I can see some reduction of tensions, 
and one of the reporters looked it up in the dictionary and 
said that detente means reduction of tensions.
    But I think, in the first instance, the notion of detente--
to pull away from each other on those matters--that could mean 
war. That is in connection with which it was intended, and I 
think we are beginning to see some more prudent attitude in 
Eastern Europe, and I am speaking of the thinking of the 
smaller Eastern European countries, some.
    It takes a good many swallows to make a summer, and you 
have to probe this pretty carefully, but we would like to keep 
up with the possibilities on our own side----
    Senator Mundt. Let me put it this way: Suppose country A is 
at war with country C, and we are trying to get a detente with 
country B. Country B is hoping that country C defeats country A 
or kills country A's boys. Can we conceivably have a detente 
under those circumstances?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, it is applying that specifically to 
the Soviet Union and to North Vietnam----
    Senator Mundt. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. And the United States.
    Senator Mundt. And the United States.
    Secretary Rusk. Because if, as I think it would be true--I 
think the Soviet Union would be satisfied to see this South 
Asian matter settled on the basis of the 1954 and 1962 
agreements--then we have a more complicated situation than a 
more harsh all-out--I hope myself that attitude on the part of 
the Soviet Union can be translated into some effective 
influence or effective international action to help to bring 
this matter to a peaceful conclusion.

                      SOVIET AID TO NORTH VIETNAM

    I do not think we ourselves on our side should say that 
because the Soviet Union is giving assistance to North Vietnam 
and----
    Senator Mundt. She is supplying every sophisticated weapon 
they use in Vietnam.
    Secretary Rusk. Whatever sophisticated weapons they have, 
such as SAM missiles and MIG 21, radar----
    Senator Mundt. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk [continuing]. Those things particularly. I 
think it would be to our advantage not to let this get into a 
completely black and white, implacable hostility kind of 
situation and thereby reduce our room for some maneuver and, 
indeed, some assistance when the time comes. When the time 
comes----
    Senator Mundt. You have got, on the one hand, the theory, 
how well-grounded and how firm you never told us, that the 
Russians would really like this thing settled on the basis of 
the time before it started. That is the theory. How well-
documented it is I do not know.
    But the fact that they are continuing to supply every 
sophisticated weapon, that needs to be stubborn to the 
fulfillment of that theory. If the theory is sound, it seems to 
me, the Russians have it so easily available to sort of talk to 
Hanoi saying, ``We are about fed up supplying all these 
sophisticated weapons, we are going to reduce the supply or cut 
it off,'' and I see no support for the theory in terms of the 
action. I do not know where you get your theory. Maybe it is 
whispered in your ear by some diplomat, maybe he is sincere and 
maybe not. But I see no overt evidence at all.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, it is hard to get the overt evidence, 
Senator, and in dealing with these people one has to recognize 
that you can be wrong tomorrow morning at nine o'clock on a 
proposition like that.
    But one of the questions to which we have not got a full 
answer to is this pause in the cessation of bombing. If these 
people cannot deliver Hanoi and say what Hanoi can do, perhaps 
they can at least tell us what they can do, so it is in this 
context that your question comes up, and we have not found out 
what the answer to that is yet, but this is the kind of 
question we are working on all the time.

                   DIVIDENDS FROM THE WAR IN VIETNAM

    Senator Mundt. One other point. Speaking as a supporter of 
the State Department's foreign policy, I have been a little bit 
disappointed in your testimony today on two points. You have 
sort of shot out of the saddle two of the justifications which 
I have made publicly at home, which are in my own mind reasons 
for supporting the foreign policy and the war in Vietnam, and I 
was a little bit disappointed when you said that you did not 
believe that one of the dividends from our efforts in Vietnam 
was the rather salutary developments which have been occurring 
in Indonesia. I have said I thought they were connected.
    You have been very careful to point out you feel if there 
is any relationship it is very remote.
    The other disappointment is I supported reluctantly the 
plea that you made when you came into the Senate and to the 
House and said that Sukarno says, ``The hell with American 
aid,'' and they voted against it in the House, and you came 
here and said that we have to continue some of our aid to keep 
certain government functions going if we were either to prevent 
a Communist takeover from China or to get a good leader who 
would be more neutral from the standpoint of isms, Americanism 
and communism, if something happened to Sukarno and he died or 
was replaced.
    Now, you have told us that you do not believe that that aid 
that you induced us to give you--the Senate wrote some nice 
ambiguous language--could be continued.
    Now you tell us you do not think that was very important in 
building up the stable elements over there enabling them to 
survive and get some kind of government which is not controlled 
by Sukarno.
    You shot out of the saddle two of the bases of my support. 
I may not be as enthusiastic----
    Secretary Rusk. There may be some misunderstanding on your 
second point. I did not want to diminish the second point at 
all. I did add the comment that it was not in the military 
channels that these relations are productive, but through the 
trade unions and the universities.
    Senator Mundt. All of which could have gone on without your 
coming here and pleading with us to override the House of 
Representatives, that we were going to save the situation, we 
had better support it, and we did.
    Secretary Rusk. I had not supposed I had minimized in my 
discussions----
    Senator Mundt. I am sure you minimized it in my mind when 
you put it to what the labor unions and the cultural exchanges 
had done. You certainly minimized it to me.

                         A QUESTION OF EMPHASIS

    Secretary Rusk. On the first question, there is a question 
of emphasis. My own inclination on most of these questions is 
to be a little moderate about claiming direct results from 
particular things, particularly when the situation in Indonesia 
was very complicated.
    There was a connection. I am sure there was a connection. I 
am sure the present Indonesian leaders felt there was a 
connection. I just did not want to say to you that because--I 
do not believe that our being in Vietnam played a decisive role 
at the key time in Indonesia. There were good Indonesian 
explanations for much of this. I am sure that had a 
constructive and helpful influence, but at least as Secretary 
of State I ought to feel that I ought not myself to exaggerate 
this.
    Now, look at the possibilities. Sukarno is still there. We 
think that he is under control. We think that the new 
government will remain in power, but if that should change----
    Senator Mundt. Do you think our pulling out of Vietnam 
would enhance or decrease Sukarno's chances?
    Secretary Rusk. I think it would greatly enhance it; it 
would enhance it. Let me go back to my mood of moderation.
    Senator Mundt. That is all.
    The Chairman. Senator Pell?

                    U.N. ROLE IN RHODESIAN SANCTIONS

    Senator Pell. I think I sympathize with you when I see all 
the foreign policies represented around the table here.
    Is not our imposition of sanctions in Rhodesia basically 
the result of our membership in the United Nations?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Pell. I think this is a point which should be on 
the record. We have received many benefits, including the 
avoidance of civil wars through the U.N., and it involves 
certain responsibilities, too.
    I understand from press reports that a new Under Secretary 
of State for Administration will be appointed, and I would like 
to leave with you the thought, obviously in this executive 
session it can be said but not in the open session, perhaps--
that I would hope that the appointment would be a man of very 
broad gauge, not a professional administrator or a man in that 
line, but a man who could give to whatever changes are 
necessary the internal direction rather than relying for 
external direction.
    I did not know that that or if that would coincide with 
your views. I realize it may be a little premature to discuss 
this.
    Secretary Rusk. This is a matter that is under 
consideration by the President, and presumably a nomination 
will be coming forward in due course.
    Senator Pell. I would hope a broad gauge non-professional 
administrator would be chosen.

                   RESULTS OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

    Next, if we get to the conference table in Vietnam and 
reach an agreement with the North, and follow out our present, 
which I think are correct, intentions, withdrawing from 
Southeast Asia, would it not be a problem of fact that in 
several years Vietnam would be unified, probably under a 
nationalist, technically Communist leadership, and would that 
not be the probable result through peaceful means?
    Secretary Rusk. I would not think so, Senator.
    Over this period of time, the last twenty years, North 
Vietnam has become thoroughly consolidated as a Communist 
system. South Vietnam has rejected the Communist system for 
itself. You have the same problems in the two parts of Korea 
and the two parts of Germany.
    I think North Vietnam is not going to be interested in 
reunification on a non-Communist basis and, by and large, I say 
that may be an oversimplification, but I think that is true, 
and I think South Vietnam is not going to be interested in 
reunification on a Communist basis. These Buddhists and 
Catholics and Montagnards and Cambodians and northern refugees, 
apparently while disagreeing among themselves on many other 
things, seem to agree on that. So if this is left to the free 
choices of the people in the two parts of Vietnam, I think it 
is rather unlikely that there will be reunification any time 
soon.

                  LET PEOPLE DECIDE THROUGH ELECTIONS

    Senator Pell. You would not think some sort of government 
like that in Yugoslavia, where each side gives in the other 
direction, would probably emerge, and to my mind it would not 
be a bad thing from the viewpoint of American national 
interest.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, time factors, I can think if there is 
moderation of Communist organization and techniques and peace 
coexistence coming out of Mainland China and that sort of 
thing, that in the longest run you may have some drawing 
together, just as we hope that somehow the West Germans and the 
East Germans can find ways to draw together despite these large 
ideological conflicts. But I do not see that as anything that 
is going to contribute to the settlement of this present 
situation other than the willingness, as we have expressed it, 
to let that question be decided by the people themselves in 
their own way through free elections.

                      THE ADVANTAGE OF NEGOTIATING

    Senator Pell. Then would you believe there is any validity 
to the theory that the North Vietnamese really do not wish to 
come to the conference table, that they would see the 
possibility to achieving the objectives becoming, but that they 
consider their achieving the results of world revolution better 
by continuing the military level of activities, and it is to 
our advantage to get them to the conference table more than 
theirs?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, clearly they do not see much 
advantage to them in coming to the conference table because 
they have had hundreds of chances to and have consistently said 
no.
    Senator Pell. Excuse me, and also at least in my own view, 
the possibility of attaining success in coming to a conference 
table, from what their overt objectives are?
    Secretary Rusk. That is right. I do not believe they make 
the judgment if they came to the conference table they would 
get what they said they wanted to get in 1960. I think that is 
right.

                      DANGEROUS SITUATION IN CHINA

    Senator Pell. Do you believe the situation is extra 
dangerous in Vietnam now where we see in China the opposing 
forces struggling with the Mao forces, of an effort being made 
to divert the attention of the Chinese people from internal 
difficulties and to attempt external intervention such as they 
did in India several years ago?
    Secretary Rusk. This is a possibility one has to watch. 
Quite frankly, we do not see the situation in China developing 
that way at the present time, but we are keeping a very close 
eye on it. We do not see troop movements. We do not see 
statements from leaders, either privately or publicly, 
indicating that that is what they have in mind. But it is 
theoretically a possibility, and we are watching very closely.

                       NORTH VIETNAMESE MANPOWER

    Senator Pell. What would be the present proportions of new 
increments of manpower on the opposition side in South Vietnam 
of local recruitment versus infiltration? Would it be about 60-
40 ratio?
    Secretary Rusk. For the most recent three or four months, I 
would have to check the figures on that. I would think that 
probably 60-40 is not too far off.
    Senator Pell. Sixty local, forty from the North?
    Secretary Rusk. Probably.
    Senator Pell. And the weapons we have captured, are they 
divided up what percent between West and East?
    Secretary Rusk. I would have to check the latest figures on 
that. Most of the weapons we are getting now are Chinese 
manufactured, but I would have to check that.
    Senator Pell. The substantial majority would be, you say?
    Secretary Rusk. That is right. You see, the Liberation 
Front Forces and the North Vietnamese Forces unified their 
weaponry about a year ago, went to the same caliber. It 
happened to be caliber for which our ammunition is not 
suitable, so they not only brought in the weapons buy they have 
to continue to bring in the ammunition to keep them supplied. 
These are submachine guns, the rifles, the carbines, light 
machine guns, things of that sort.

                          CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

    Senator Pell. As you know, we have had some interest for 
some time in this question of civilian casualties, and I am 
well aware of the horrible tortures, murders of our friends in 
South Vietnam.
    Why has it proved so difficult to get anywhere near so 
general an estimate now for a year and a half, where we have 
been sparring on this question, as to the real extent of the 
civilian casualties in South Vietnam?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, one of the problems is we do not have 
exact information on who might be in a particular place when it 
is struck. For example, on a POL dump, there are no houses 
around it, and that kind of thing, who happens to be there at 
the time.
    Another problem is whom would you classify as civilians for 
this purpose? The truck drivers in a convoy coming down the 
road toward the South, a line of coolies bringing in packs on 
their backs, coming into the--toward the--South? If you hit a 
railway bridge and there are people there working on the 
bridge, are they Chinese construction engineer soldiers or are 
they civilians? There are some very difficult questions of 
classification.
    But I would comment, Senator, that I do not know that there 
has ever been any struggle anywhere in which such extraordinary 
efforts are made, both in the field and back here, to try to 
minimize or eliminate what might be called innocent civilian 
casualties.
    Now, they have occurred. But on the fixed targets, that is 
as compared with the route reconnaissance along the routes of 
infiltration, the fixed targets have produced a surprisingly 
small number of civilian casualties.
    Senator Pell. I would agree with everything you have said, 
but I think those of us who have been pressing this question 
really wanted education.

                       COUNTERPRODUCTIVE ACTIONS

    I noticed the latent hostility in Germany, what hostility 
there is to the United States, which is based on the effect of 
civilian casualties from raids, and it still remains a certain 
amount. It is never expressed.
    I am wondering if these casualties are large, as they would 
seem to be, if, perhaps, some of our actions are 
counterproductive, and to arrive at that, that we press for an 
estimate, merely in terms of thousands. But when we get a 
figure of 100 civilian casualties in a six-month period, there 
is obviously something a little off.
    Secretary Rusk. The only figure of that kind I heard was 
identifiable civilian casualties inflicted by operations of our 
own forces.
    Senator Pell. In South Vietnam.
    Secretary Rusk. In South Vietnam.
    Senator Pell. Even that seems modest.
    Secretary Rusk. That you can be somewhat more accurate 
about than what is happening in North Vietnam.
    Senator Pell. Thank you.

                         A REFERENDUM IN TAIWAN

    One final question, trying to see a way out of our present 
impasse in our relations with China: In your view, and you have 
much knowledge in this area in the light of your previous 
responsibilities and work--what would be the result of a 
referendum in Formosa or Taiwan between--an open referendum 
between--the Chiang Kai-shek government and some other 
government?
    Secretary Rusk. Some other government in Formosa?
    Senator Pell. A local Taiwanese government, Taiwan 
candidates. You know, the figures are about ten percent of the 
Taiwanese are represented in the Parliament, whereas they make 
up about 80 percent of the people, et cetera, 90 percent or 80 
percent.
    Secretary Rusk. I would think at some point such a 
plebiscite might indicate that the Formosans would like to have 
more of a Formosan control over their own affairs.
    As you know, the theory of the present government there is 
based upon the theory that it is a Mainland, an all-China 
government, in which the Formosan Province is one of the 
provinces.
    But my impression is that the purely Formosan Nationalist 
feeling, on the one side, and in its relation to the 
Mainlanders, on the other, is somewhat more relaxed in the ten 
years certainly than it was at the very beginning when there 
were some pretty harsh feelings there.
    I suppose about 80 to 90 percent of the enlisted personnel 
of the present armed forces, the present army, of the Republic 
of China are now Formosan personnel.
    Senator Pell. Might not this be one of the eventual 
approaches to getting us off our present wicket when the time 
comes, and there is need for a change of administration there 
anyway?
    Secretary Rusk. I do not think it would make the slightest 
difference to Peking.
    Senator Pell. It would not?
    Secretary Rusk. No. They want it and they just say, ``It is 
ours and we have got to have it.'' There never has been any--
and they won't even renounce the use of force in the Straits of 
Formosa. You remember the Eisenhower Administration in the mid-
fifties began talking with the Chinese and tried to get a 
mutual declaration of the renunciation of force in the Straits 
of Formosa. We continued that ever since. Never the slightest 
indication of Peking that they would be interested in that
    Senator Pell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Case.
    Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                  QUESTIONING THE CONTAINMENT OF CHINA

    Mr. Secretary, following Senator Pell's suggestion implicit 
in one of his questions as to whether the North Vietnamese and, 
presumably, the Chinese might be quite uninterested in 
negotiations because they expect to get more out of continuing 
their current operation than through any negotiations. It seems 
to me there is a relation between that possibility and the 
possibility that I have not heard our policy contemplate, that 
in the end it may not be what we hoped, Russia and the U.S. 
against China, but rather Russia and China against the United 
States, and that we are falling into, unfortunately--I am 
thinking of the broadest terms now--maybe a trap, if you will, 
maybe nothing as explicit as this, but this may be the 
consequence, and I am not at all sure that we are right.
    Even those liberals who say the ancient antagonisms between 
China and Russia are going to make everything all right for us, 
I am not at all sure that they are concerned about destroying 
the only obstacle to world Communism, the United States of 
America, that that may not override these things, at least in 
the short run or in the middle time.
    I wonder if you would just talk a little about this. Maybe 
we, in our own interests, including, of course, the interests 
of world peace, too, are on the wrong track here in thinking 
that containment of China, which I have supported, as you know, 
up to now, is a desirable thing, on the analogy to the position 
in Western Europe, defense against--I mean standing, creating 
the bulwark against expansion of Russia, believing as you have 
suggested too, with you, if we had done something about Hitler 
we would not have had World War II and all the rest of it.
    I wonder if I am right about this, and whether we may not 
be getting bogged down and trapped into doing a thing which is 
going to take more and more of our strength and render us in a 
position where we will be really vulnerable to this other 
combination which we do not contemplate.

                RECONCILIATION BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA

    Secretary Rusk. One of the real possibilities is an 
eventual reconciliation between China and the Soviet Union.
    Senator Case. I do not mean to just be happy with each 
other, I mean they would be after us.
    Secretary Rusk. I understand.
    The key point would be on what general basis of policy 
would that reconciliation occur. There are a good many in 
Eastern Europe who insist it would not be possible because of 
the dynamics between the Communist world for that 
reconciliation to occur on the basis of the militancy of 
Peking; that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would not and 
could not move in that direction. I am not so sure of that. 
That is a possibility.
    The other would be a reconciliation on the basis of what 
might be called the peaceful co-existence. Now, we just have no 
way of knowing these things.
    I do feel, Senator Case, that if Hanoi and Peking could 
demonstrate to the Communist world that the policy of militancy 
is the way to get ahead successfully with the world revolution, 
that we are in greater danger of having the combined Communist 
world getting together directly and fundamentally opposed to 
the interests of the free world. That would be a very dangerous 
situation.
    No, I limited my own remarks to what I believe to be the 
present attitude of the Soviet Union on Vietnam, and to a 
somewhat moderately optimistic view as to the possibilities of 
some further improvement of relations with Eastern Europe.
    But these other possibilities are very much there and very 
much in our minds.
    It seems to me that the possibility of a combination that 
is militantly hostile to the United States would be encouraged 
by a demonstration by one or another of these members of the 
Communist world that an aggression in the face of a security 
treaty of the United States can successfully be carried out.
    Senator Case. This is an effect.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, I know.

                 GETTING INVOLVED IN A PERIPHERAL AREA

    Senator Case. I just wonder if we are taking into account 
the other possibility sufficiently as to get ourselves more and 
more involved in this particular area that is rather peripheral 
to them and really not at all hurting them at all, not hurting 
Russia one bit. They are not much involved.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we have had some of the same 
considerations to deal with in connection with the Greek 
guerrillas and the Berlin blockade and other such issues where 
the combined weight of the Communist world posed a threat that 
we had very much in mind at that time.
    Senator Case. Indeed we have. But we never have gotten 
ourselves involved with a half million men or whatever the 
numbers.

                ANTAGONISM WITH THE TWO COMMUNIST POWERS

    The Chairman. Would the Senator yield there on that 
question of their policy. Wouldn't the obvious reason be their 
antagonism to us? That is the policy they could get together 
on, not on one of these ideological reasons.
    Senator Case. Yes indeed, and I think the Secretary 
understood that was the thrust of my remarks.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Will the Senator yield? Isn't their 
antagonism toward us generated by their political philosophy, 
that is, the international Communist philosophy? I do not think 
it is a personal antagonism generated from anything except 
their ideology.
    Senator Case. This is my belief. This is my concern, based 
on their desire to destroy the only real block in their way.
    Secretary Rusk. You see, if all the countries lived between 
us and these two Communist powers, were genuinely secure and 
were not living under fear, and some of them have not been 
subjected to attack by these countries, we would not have 
anything to fight these two countries about. We are not going 
to fight the Soviet Union over polar bears in the Arctic, and 
we are not going to set off missiles against each other merely 
because there are missiles over there.
    The principal issues on which we and the Soviet Union could 
get into a war under present circumstances have to do with the 
security of Western Europe.
    There are some in Western Europe who think they are somehow 
part of a third world that unfortunately has been caught up in 
a great controversy between us and the Soviet Union. To me, 
this is a great misunderstanding of the situation.
    If Western Europe were secure--Western Europe is the 
issue--if Western Europe were secure we would not have put $900 
billion in the defense budgets since 1947, and the same thing 
will be true of Mainland China.
    If Korea and Japan and the Philippines and these other 
countries had a reasonable chance of living peacefully next 
door to this giant there without being subjected to the 
pressures of the world revolution, and they are there, I think 
we ought not to decide prematurely that they are not there, 
they could live peacefully there and then we have no problems 
out in that part of the world except trade and other kinds of 
relationships.

                            WORLD REVOLUTION

    The Chairman. I get lost on that phrase ``world 
revolution.'' You tried to describe detente. What is the world 
revolution?
    Secretary Rusk. The Communist doctrine that the world 
should be and is going to be reorganized on a Communist basis 
under the leadership of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
    Now, you see a very primitive form of this out of Mao Tse-
Tung. It is getting to be more sophisticated in Eastern Europe, 
but these fellows still are pretty serious about this business.
    Now, this revolutionary force has lost, perhaps, some of 
its clan in Eastern Europe. They are a little more middle-aged, 
and have got more of a stake in what they have been able to 
build up, and they may be getting a little tired with the more 
military aspect of what they have been doing.
    Senator Hickenlooper. You mean they have two pigs?
    Secretary Rusk. They have two pigs. [Laughter.]
    But this is not true of the others, apparently these 
veterans of the Long March in China, although one would have to 
take into account they have been more prudent in action than 
they have been in their words and doctrine.

                IS WORLD REVOLUTION ACTIVELY THREATENED?

    The Chairman. What have they done to support your theory 
that the world revolution is actively threatened? What do you 
consider the Chinese have done? I do not wish to interrupt you, 
I do not know----
    Senator Case. I think we are probing really the same 
purpose.
    The Chairman. I am just trying to probe what this world 
revolution is that you have in mind. Is there any doctrine or 
any actions which have been taken in support?
    Senator Case. I would not want to take a chance that there 
is not. Frankly, I think there is. In general, I have a 
somewhat different view than you do as to the desirability of 
protecting ourselves about a Russian treaty.
    The Chairman. It is not what you are thinking about it, but 
it is what the Secretary is thinking about it.
    Secretary Rusk. You are not asking questions about the 
doctrine, at the moment, I mean----
    The Chairman. If I understood you, the world revolution 
here is a major reason for our involvement, that is the way the 
Senator put it. I was very intrigued by the way the Senator put 
It. We might be falling into a trap. This has occurred to us 
when we saw that article out of China some time ago in which it 
was said, ``We are very obliged to the U.S. for bringing their 
men and treasure. We couldn't get at them if they stayed at 
home. It is the only way we can get at them, their coming here 
and getting bogged down. We should be very appreciative to the 
government of the United States for giving us the opportunity 
to destroy it.''
    That is what reminded me of what the Senator said.
    Secretary Rusk. Is this Hanoi or Peking?
    The Chairman. That came out of Peking. It was a very long 
article which came out a couple of months ago. You saw it?
    Senator Pell. No, I did not. Who wrote it?
    The Chairman. It came out of People's Daily. It was picked 
up in the usual way. Don't you have that, Mr. Marcy? Anyway, I 
know we can find it.
    Senator Pell. I would like to see it. This is exactly the 
theory I was advancing.
    The Chairman. It was picked up from the People's Daily and 
reprinted in the New York Times. I thought that is exactly what 
you had in mind.
    Senator Case. I had this in mind.

                        AMERICAN OVERCOMMITMENT

    The Chairman. It has occurred to me. Are we being drawn 
into one place where we can be destroyed? This is what some of 
our witnesses said last year. Are we becoming overcommitted to 
where our great wealth and manpower are being bogged down in an 
area which, as the Senator so well said, is not costing the 
opposition any substantial manpower or money? It is a very 
serious question.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, when one looks back to some of 
these other crises, when the guerrillas were thirty miles from 
Athens in great strength from Athens, Greece, and the winter 
weather fell in on the Berlin airlift, and we were in that tiny 
perimeter in Pusan or even in the first week of the Cuban 
missile crisis, the situation is more manageable.
    Senator Case. It was said we only won that one because 
Yugoslavia took a turn.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, it took a turn. Maybe this one is 
going to be influenced by the presence of the problems in 
Mainland China.
    The Chairman. It did not take a turn by bombing but for 
entirely different reasons.
    Senator Case. I know. This is the only reason firmness 
suggests. I must profess that I am for all this. I want to be 
reassured we are not getting in so deep that we are in a bog.
    The Chairman. Well, you asked a very pertinent question.
    Secretary Rusk. I do not believe Peking is glad to see us 
in Southeast Asia. I do not believe that for a minute.
    Senator Case. In one sense, no.

                 NOT HAVE TREATIES DISRUPTED BY A BLUFF

    The Chairman. I am sure in one sense, no. But if they must 
have it out this is the way. If they are convinced we are going 
to attack them any way, this is a good way.
    Senator Case. I am sure what you did, Mr. Secretary, in 
answering this man from South Dakota, upset this man, and it 
upset me, too. I have regarded what we have done as pretty 
important to our success in holding the line all over the 
world, taking a stand here and making your position more 
credible with the Russians and with everybody else, and also in 
having some rather specific effects and giving tone to the 
whole free effort in an effort to keep the world free in 
Southeast Asia.
    Secretary Rusk. I hope I did not detract at all from that 
view. I certainly----
    Senator Case. Say it again because, you know, if you did 
detract.
    Secretary Rusk. No. I was commenting specifically about its 
relation to Indonesia.
    Senator Case. You mean just cause and effect, one, two, 
like that?
    Secretary Rusk. No. On the larger question as to what these 
great security treaties mean in terms of keeping the peace, to 
me the greatest danger in the world would be to have these 
treaties be interpreted by the other side as a bluff, because 
we have been tested at times when had they judged we were 
bluffing great catastrophe would have resulted. The Berlin 
crisis of 1961-1962, the Cuban missile crisis were two recent 
examples of this.
    The most utter dangers are involved in that problem, and we 
are all--we all have to approach them, it seems to me, on our 
knees because it is awfully hard to be absolutely certain on 
such questions.
    Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Cooper?
    Senator Cooper. Am I allowed to ask questions?
    The Chairman. Yes, sir.

               NORTH VIETNAM'S TERMS ON BOMBING CESSATION

    Senator Cooper. Mr. Secretary, my question goes to the 
declaration of North Vietnam that there must be a cessation of 
bombing of North Vietnam. I am not clear as to the exact 
wording of the declaration, if it is an exact wording. Did 
North Vietnam expressly state that there must be a permanent 
cessation of bombing or did it just state that there must be a 
cessation of bombing without the fixing of any limits upon the 
cessation of bombing?
    Secretary Rusk. The most--the usual phrase there is 
unconditional and permanent. Now in the phraseology that you 
get in different ways, public and private, the permanent part--
unconditional was always there. The permanent has been 
described another way as definitively which, I suppose, is 
permanent; and, as Harrison Salisbury in his interview put it, 
for good, which is the same thing, I suppose, as permanent. In 
other words, this framing of the issue has been put to us as 
unconditional permanent, and this is coupled with the excuses 
that were given to us when the thirty-seven-day pause was 
finished earlier this year, when nothing happened, when we 
paused for twice as long, as had been suggested to us that we 
pause.
    They said, ``Well, a suspension is an ultimatum. You can't 
expect people to pick up the question of peace under an 
ultimatum of that sort,'' and the general attitude now on the 
other side seems to be that unless it is unconditional and 
permanent, anything less than that as a stoppage of the bombing 
would be interpreted as an ultimatum.
    Now, of course, one can look at the question as to whether 
you simply stop without saying, but they would either insist 
upon a clarification of that point or would interpret for 
themselves as unconditional and permanent, and then if we found 
we had to resume the bombing for military reasons, then we 
could carry the burden of having acted in breach of faith, you 
see.
    So we feel that these are issues of such importance that we 
ought to have some indications on the other side as to what 
would happen if we stopped the bombing, and thus far we have 
not been able to get any.

                  VIETNAMESE REUNIFICATION BY ELECTION

    Senator Cooper. I will be brief on this question because I 
am sure you have developed it in sessions at which, of course, 
I was not present. But, as I understand it, the United States 
has said it would accept this basis of negotiation, the 
adherence to the 1954 Geneva Accords.
    As I remember, those accords called for general elections 
throughout all Vietnam two years later and, I assume, with the 
idea that a government would be established for all Vietnam.
    Beginning with the French and then with the United States, 
it seems to me, our course has been to establish a separate 
government for South Vietnam, and for many reasons. But how 
would the United States resolve that question when it now 
states that it would not adhere to the Geneva Accords? How 
would it resolve the question of the government for all of the 
South Vietnamese as distinguished from what would seem to have 
been our policy and the French policy before to establish a 
government in South Vietnam?
    Secretary Rusk. I think we have two elements there. First, 
we have said the South Vietnamese ought to have a chance in 
free elections to determine what their own government should 
be, and that the question of reunification should be decided by 
the peoples of the two parts of Vietnam through free elections 
or free choice.
    The 1954 agreements, by providing for elections on that 
issue, presumably meant that this was to be by consent of the 
peoples concerned.
    The same issue arises both in Korea and in Germany, where 
you have other divided countries.
    I do not myself think, Senator, that in terms of settling 
the problem that we now have in Vietnam that the question of 
reunification by peaceful means is likely to be the great 
obstacle to a possible settlement. The problem is whether we 
can get the other side to hold its hand in trying to bring 
about reunification by force.
    Senator Cooper. That is all.
    The Chairman. I have one or two questions.

                         THE QUAKERS IN CANADA

    Do you know, Mr. Secretary, about a case that was sent to 
me involving the Quakers in Canada, that the Treasury of the 
United States issued a circular to all the banks in the United 
States directing them not to honor a check payable to the 
Quakers of Canada? Are you familiar with that?
    Secretary Rusk. No sir; I am not. I had not heard of it 
before.
    The Chairman. Well, it came to me with a photostat of the 
order, and I wondered if there is any authority for such an 
order from the Treasury.
    Secretary Rusk. It sounds to me as though this might be one 
of the foreign assets control problems. If the Quakers were 
using these funds to send assistance to North Vietnam----
    The Chairman. That is correct. Is there such authority that 
the Quakers--well, the Quakers state they are sending it North 
and South. They do this--they are not involved in this 
political thing. They are doing humanitarian work, and a friend 
sent me the letter. I don't have the letter anyway. I forgot 
how it went--I wrote a letter to the Treasury, but have had no 
response. Is that as far as you know, within the power, the 
authority of the Treasury?
    Secretary Rusk. I would think so, sir, under the foreign 
assets control legislation.
    Sentor Hickenlooper. What kind of a check?
    The Chairman. I did not send a check. Anyway this person, 
an American citizen, writes a check on the First National Bank 
of Washington, sends it to the Quakers in Canada, and the bank 
here is directed by the Treasury not to honor a check payable 
to the Quakers of Canada.
    Secretary Rusk. I would have to look into the specific case 
because I just am not informed about it.
    The Chairman. I was a little surprised that we had that 
authority. I thought you could donate money to the Quakers.
    Secretary Rusk. I believe donations outside the United 
States are not income tax deductible in the usual case.
    Senator Pell. That is absolutely correct.
    The Chairman. Well, they are to Israel, aren't they?
    Secretary Rusk. That is a legal sense, that is to the 
organized charities organized in this country under the laws of 
this country.

                DRAWING THE U.S. INTO A LAND WAR IN ASIA

    The Chairman. In response to Senator Case's question--he 
has disappeared--but the staff just handed me an article \2\ 
which I had not seen, from the War/Peace Report of October 1966 
which says:

    \2\ ``Peking and the U.S. Are Both Winning.''

    It is frightening as well as paradoxical that almost 
identical political assessments are being made in Peking and 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Washington concerning the war in Vietnam.

    I won't read it all. It says:

    On the other side, well-informed U.N. Eastern European 
diplomats report the perception of the same reality is quite 
different when viewed from Peking. These observers state Maoist 
Peking has had, from the beginning, a three-fold strategy based 
upon the assumption of an ultimate inevitable war with American 
imperialism: First to draw the U.S. into a major land 
engagement in Asia, preferably not on Chinese soil (these 
observers believe Korea was China's, not the Soviet's 
initiative); second, to shift the American-Chinese 
confrontation to an American-Soviet confrontation; third, to 
use Vietnam and the underdeveloped world as a vehicle to change 
Russian foreign policy, or failing that, to discredit it.

    I had not seen it but it is on all fours with this other 
idea that this----
    Secretary Rusk. They said that Korea was on China's 
initiative and not the Soviets'?
    The Chairman. Just the opposite.
    Secretary Rusk. These observers believe----
    The Chairman. Yes, the observers believe that Korea was 
China's not the Soviets' initiative. I also had thought it was 
the Soviets'.
    Secretary Rusk. I do not believe that at all.
    The Chairman. But in any case, the first point, they feel 
since a conflict is inevitable, this is the best thing for them 
on the same theory as the Senator from New Jersey advanced.

                            DULLES ON SEATO

    The Chairman. I want to come back to one thing, one very 
interesting thing, you said. But before I do that I want to 
read a very short statement of Mr. Dulles.
    You had, and the administration, correctly I think from its 
point of view, is now dwelling upon SEATO, but this is what 
Secretary Dulles said to us, and it has some bearing on our 
interpretation of it, and I think the way you should use it now 
is saying what the Senate did. Here is a quote from Secretary 
Dulles.
    Secretary Rusk. Is that from your committee report?
    The Chairman. That is right.
    Secretary Rusk. What page?
    The Chairman. Page 8.

    We do not intend to dedicate any major elements of the 
United States military establishment to form an arm of defense 
in this area.

    He is speaking about SEATO.

    We rely primarily upon the deterrent of our mobile striking 
power. That we made clear to our associates in the treaty and 
that is our policy.
    It would involve in the opinion of our military advisers an 
injudicious over-extension of our military power if we were to 
try to build up that kind of an organization in Southeast Asia.
    We do not have the adequate forces to do it, and I believe 
that if there should be open armed attack in that area the most 
effective step would be to strike at the source of aggression 
rather than to try to rush American manpower into the area to 
try to fight a ground war.

    I always put it in the record to show that some of us who 
were here and voted for those treaties voted for them in view 
of the interpretation given to us by the Secretary of State at 
that time which, I thought, and I know others must have been 
influenced by the idea, that it was not an engagement to put in 
a land army in a big war on the land. This was about the same 
time that some of our leading military authorities were also 
saying, such as Gen. Douglas MacArthur, that the last thing we 
ought to do is mount a big land war on the Continent of Asia.
    So I would submit that the conditions are very different 
today in what we are doing from what many of us legitimately 
understood was involved in that treaty.

                   ALTERNATIVE TO MASSIVE RETALIATION

    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, may I comment briefly on 
this?
    Mr. Chairman. Yes, you may. I was just trying to put 
another point of view, but go ahead. You may comment.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, that discussion, it seems to me, goes 
to the point as to whether, as in NATO, it was proposed in 
SEATO to build up standing forces of the alliance in the area 
in time of peace, and it was pointed out not.
    Secondly, I would point out that at that time the 
alternative defense notion was massive retaliation, and had 
that been explored more fully at the time, I would suspect that 
the alternative Mr. Dulles had in mind as to the kind of thing 
we were doing here was massive retaliation, which we have 
stayed away from in this present situation.
    The Chairman. That may be, but the point is to me that 
those of us who were here in voting for this, our judgment, I 
feel, certainly mine, was influenced by the representations as 
to what we were engaged in, what undertaking we were actually 
making.

                  COMPARISON TO TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION

    I would say the same way with the Tonkin Gulf thing. I 
think the changes, as today, the circumstances are very 
different from what they were then. We had a very small group. 
Today we have nearly approaching, I guess, 400,000 to 500,000 
men in the area. It is costing $20, $25 billion, and so forth. 
I think the change in the circumstances today as of the time of 
the Tonkin Gulf are very dramatic indeed, and I, for one--I 
have already confessed my error--was influenced very greatly by 
the political situation at the time, and I was supporting the 
President, who was the then candidate for 1964, and that he was 
then advocating a policy of not enlarging the war and, 
therefore, I supported his recommendation on the Tonkin Bay.
    You are legitimately correct in saying, yes, you supported 
it. It is legitimate to respond that I certainly did not 
anticipate doing what we are doing. I do not particularly like 
to have this always thrown up, ``Well, look, you voted for 
this.'' I do not consider we did vote for what we are doing now 
at all. The circumstances were very, very different.

                          U.S. TROOPS TO NATO

    Senator Hickenlooper. If the Senator will yield to me, I 
will call his attention to the fact when we were considering 
the NATO organization we were told very emphatically, and the 
word ``emphatically'' was used in the testimony, that we were 
not going to send any troops to Europe or anything like that.
    The Chairman. I think that is correct.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Within four months, we had four 
divisions on the way.
    The Chairman. Yes. But we did right after that, the very 
question of whether we should send additional forces was 
submitted to the Senate, and the Senate had a long and thorough 
and acrimonious debate on the subject and specifically 
authorized it. You remember that.
    Senator Hickenlooper. After the troops went.
    The Chairman. Well, they at least paid some attention to 
the constitutional idea that we participate in these things.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I am just saying these things happen 
at times.

        PRESIDENT JOHNSON DID THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT WAS EXPECTED

    The Chairman. I do not particularly like the Tonkin Bay 
being thrown up at this time that that is the authority for you 
to do what you are now doing. In fact, I thought in supporting 
the President as of that date in August of 1964, that I was 
supporting a man who was going to do exactly the opposite. Now 
he is doing precisely what his opponent said he would do, and 
this is a very curious turn of fate. There is not much I can do 
about it publicly, at least, but anyway that is a fact of the 
matter.
    Secretary Rusk. One of the key elements, of course, in that 
problem is what the other side is doing all the time. These 
fellows keep marching down from the North. At some point 
somebody has to make a decision that ``You get out of the 
way,'' or you shoot them.

                 A GENERATION BETRAYED BY WORLD WAR II

    The Chairman. These are interesting subjects you brought 
up. I think the one Senator Case brought up is very interesting 
and worth further thought. Here is one you make. I think this 
is what you said a moment ago. You belong to a generation that 
was betrayed into World War I----
    Secretary Rusk. World War II.
    The Chairman. World War II, I am sorry, because the 
governments refused to organize the peace of the world.
    The question, however, it seems to me, is, the big 
question, does this war, as we are now prosecuting it, does it 
obstruct or does it promote the organizing of peace. You assume 
that this war is an essential and important part that is 
designed to organize the peace of the world. Well, my own 
feeling is in view of developments that were beginning to take 
place when this war got really hot, that it more likely would 
prove in the light of history to obstruct the detente that you 
mentioned, certainly with the Russians, and detente generally 
in Europe as between Western Europe and the Russians, not just 
between us, and the very question is, you assume it, I think 
the question at issue is, does this war, as we now prosecute 
it, does it help organize the peace.
    You say the reason you are so interested in pursuing this 
is you felt betrayed, and you do not want to do that again. I 
think you are assuming the question at issue.
    Secretary Rusk. I do not think it is an assumption that was 
just pulled out of the air. In 1961, Chairman Khrushchev said 
to President Kennedy, in effect, ``Get your troops out of 
Berlin or there will be war,'' and President Kennedy had to say 
to him, ``Well, Mr. Chairman, then there will be war,'' and it 
was extremely important that Mr. Khrushchev believe the 
President of the United States on that point, otherwise we 
might well have had war.
    The same thing at the time of the Cuban missile crisis 
where it was necessary to say to Chairman Khrushchev, ``The 
missiles will have to go, Mr. Chairman. We hope they can go by 
peaceful means, but they must go.''
    If the Chairman, if Chairman Khrushchev had not believed 
President Kennedy in that situation, we could have had an even 
greater catastrophe than in the Berlin matter.
    Now, it is a very serious thing to create the impression 
that our mutual security treaties are bluffs.

              HOW ARE CUBA AND BERLIN RELEVANT TO VIETNAM?

    The Chairman. But there are two cases that I think most of 
us--I never did question your correctness in both cases because 
there was a valid reason for it. Now, go ahead, here is South 
Vietnam. Why is it relevant? Why is what you did in Berlin 
relevant as to the case in Vietnam? I do not see the relevancy. 
I believe they do not believe you because you are in there on a 
false basis. They respected what you said in Cuba and in 
Berlin. Why is it they do not do it in Vietnam?
    Secretary Rusk. The relevance, the first instance, it seems 
to me, Mr. Chairman, that if you make a commitment like the 
SEATO Treaty, and then demonstrate that it is a bluff, there is 
a great risk that they will consider as bluffs your attitude in 
these other crises.
    The Chairman. You see, you are assuming the question at 
issue again. The Senator from Oregon and myself and a lot of 
other people do not believe the SEATO Treaty covers this case, 
and neither did you until the last two years.
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I beg your pardon. If you 
want the full record on this----
    The Chairman. Well, the State Department did not. I just 
gave you the reference.
    Secretary Rusk. I am talking about what was said at every 
SEATO Ministers meeting since I have been Secretary of State 
and the communiques of the SEATO Ministers and the statements 
made by President Kennedy. I have not looked at that memorandum 
that you referred to of March 1965.
    The Chairman. This is a State Department memorandum, not 
mine.
    Secretary Rusk. I understand. There were a good many other 
memoranda in which the SEATO Treaty was talked about along the 
way and in public statements and in communiques, and in press 
conferences of President Kennedy, and so forth, and there was 
certainly no possibility of doubt that in the case----

                         CLIENT STATES IN SEATO

    The Chairman. Isn't it odd that the other SEATO Members do 
not agree with you as to its applicability here? None of them 
have felt obliged because of this SEATO Treaty to come and 
discharge their duties. Are we the only people who have respect 
for our international----
    Secretary Rusk. Five of them are there, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. I admit outside of our clients, I mean the 
independent countries.
    Secretary Rusk. If you call the clients those that agree 
with us, and non-clients those that do not agree with us----
    The Chairman. I call a client the ones you put so much 
money in them that you dominate their policies and they will do 
anything to continue to get enormous aid from you, that you 
buy. That is what I call a client.
    Secretary Rusk. We have not bought Australia and New 
Zealand. They are not client states.
    The Chairman. They are not paid very much either. I am 
talking about Korea in which you paid vast sums, and I am 
speaking of the Philippines in which you not only gave them 
very large commitments but I was told two days ago you are now 
coming up for a new item for the Philippines in the AID program 
and, of course, Thailand, in which you are simply covering them 
up with gold. Those are the client states, and they are the 
ones that are doing most of the burden.
    Secretary Rusk. But they are also the states that live 
under the gun of danger out here and have the greatest interest 
in resisting what is being done there by Hanoi.
    The Chairman. I suppose India and Japan are not interested. 
They are not in danger, if there is a danger.
    Senator Aiken. I do not understand why you call them 
clients. They do not pay us for our services. We pay them. I 
would say they are beneficiaries instead of clients. 
[Laughter.]
    The Chairman. Well, it is both ways. They dominate our 
policy, I guess. We are the captives of the government of the 
Philippines, Thailand and Formosa.

                       HOW TO ORGANIZE THE PEACE

    Well, I wanted to get to--I got diverted--what is your idea 
of how to organize the peace today?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, that is a very long subject, but in 
essence I would say look at Article I of the United Nations 
Charter where it talks about the necessity for suppressing acts 
of aggression and breaches of the peace, settling disputes by 
peaceful means. Article II, the next paragraph, goes on to talk 
about self-determination. Surely, if we draw anything at all 
from our experience in the last decade, it is that those who 
start a process of aggression develop the momentum of 
aggression if it is not checked. And no one has been able to 
demonstrate to me that the things which these events have in 
common are irrelevant.
    Now, everyone knows that every human action has its unique 
aspects. One burglar is John Doe, and another burglar is 
Richard Roe, and each action is unique in some respects. But it 
is what they have in common that puts them in prison.
    The Chairman. I was hoping you would say the U.N., and I 
would hope that we would rely on the U.N. But what we are 
really doing is going on our own. These are our own programs. 
It is not the U.N. The U.N. has nothing to do with it. This is 
a big difference between this and Korea.
    One reason, I think, there was little dissent about Korea 
is that it was a collective action. It is true we furnished 
most of the sinews because we had it, but we had the support 
and approval of the United Nations. That is the only idea I 
have about organizing the peace is the U.N. But this does not 
seem to be in accord with that policy. That is one of the 
things why I asked that question.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, again the Korean matter was unique in 
the U.N. system because of the accident that the Soviet Union 
was absent from--they were absent from the Security Council 
when the decisive decisions were taken there.
    The Chairman. But the Soviet Union has not vetoed any 
action here.

                   DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SEATO AND NATO

    Secretary Rusk. But NATO is not subject to formal action by 
the United Nations. If there is an attack on a member of NATO--
--
    The Chairman. But, Secretary Rusk, Mr. Dulles specifically 
distinguished this from NATO. He said it is not like NATO.
    Secretary Rusk. But not in every respect. It was 
distinguished from NATO in the formulation that was used for 
these later treaties, and I think you will find in the record 
that he says that the differences are insignificant; that the 
difference in the wording arose out of the issue raised, I 
think, by Senator Taft and others as to whether the language of 
the NATO treaty itself would, in effect, repeal the 
constitutional processes here, that an attack on one is an 
attack on all, and in order not to have that occur, they went 
to the formulation, which Senator Lausche read in these other 
treaties, which was somewhat different from the NATO language. 
But Secretary Dulles in one of these hearings indicated that 
the difference was insubstantial.
    The Chairman. Well, I will stop with one last thing. I 
wondered, because I am always asked this, and I am always asked 
by the press, what is the response to the question, are you 
optimistic or pessimistic about the situation? They will ask 
it. They always do, nearly the first question, when they say 
was the Secretary optimistic or pessimistic. How did he feel 
about this?
    Secretary Rusk. Usually at press conferences when that 
question is put to me I usually do not answer it in those 
terms.
    The Chairman. What do you say?
    Secretary Rusk. Because it is much too complicated a 
situation altogether.

                    A REQUEST FOR PUBLIC INFORMATION

    Senator Morse. I have one question and one request for 
information and, Mr. Secretary, it may involve a matter of 
policy and, as you know, if it does I follow your decision on 
policy.
    Before I make the request, we can certainly have it on a 
secret basis, I would like to get it on a public basis, if 
possible, because we cannot avoid the fact that in public 
discussion among our people in this country these days great 
concern is expressed over whether this is becoming 
predominantly an American or an Asian war. In fact, there are 
certain political points of view within the ranks of the 
Republican Party that it ought to be turned over to the Asians.
    I have not taken that position completely, but I do think 
the American people are entitled to the information that I now 
would like to have you supply for public discussion, but if you 
decide after consultation with the administration that it 
cannot be supplied publicly, at least I would like to have it 
made a part of this record, and I would like to use it for the 
public, if possible.

                        STATISTICS ON CASUALTIES

    What were the Vietnamese casualties in 1964, 1965 and 1966, 
including their fatalities and their wounded?
    What were the U.S. casualties during the last three years?
    Supply the number of Vietnam infiltrating in 1964, 1965, 
1966.
    Four, the number of Viet Cong recruited in South Vietnam in 
1964, 1965, and 1966.
    Five, the desertion rates from the South Vietnamese army in 
1964, 1965, and 1966, compared with the Viet Cong's desertion 
rates.
    Now, we have some of these figures provided to the 
committee by the Defense Department, but they are classified. 
They show that in 1966, and this is the point Senator Clark was 
talking about, that the number of Americans killed in action 
quadrupled while the number of Vietnamese killed in action was 
less by way of 20 percent, and that despite bombing North 
Vietnam infiltration almost tripled in 1966.
    Of course, these figures also have to be compared in 
relationship to the number of personnel in the American forces 
and the South Vietnamese forces, and what is known about the 
number of personnel in the Viet Cong forces.
    The thrust of my request is obvious. I would like to have 
the statistical material bearing on the question of great 
public concern these days as to whether or not the United 
States is taking over the war and the South Vietnamese, as far 
as fighting is concerned, are being let out more and more of 
responsibility, because if we are going to have a drive for the 
war to be taken over by Asians, an all-Asian conference, as has 
been proposed by some, I think the American people ought to 
have the statistical material that I asked for.
    Secretary Rusk. We will see what we can do on that. I think 
we have much harder information on certain of those points than 
we have on the others. For example, on the defections from the 
Viet Cong, we can count somewhat more than 20,000 in 1966 who 
come in to get their cards in the Chiu Hoi program and go on to 
get resettled and get jobs.
    They tell us for every one who comes over officially, maybe 
three or four others simply go off to their farms, and the 
desertions are not desertions from the South Vietnamese to the 
Viet Cong, but simply people who go back to their farms, 
people, like people in this country during the Civil War at 
frequent intervals. But we will try our best to get you the 
figures and see whether we can make them public. I think a good 
many of these figures can be made public. Some of them are 
public, but I will try to pull them together for you.

                         THE U.N. AND RHODESIA

    Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question: If I 
understand when we were talking about Rhodesia you were stating 
that was not a bilateral action, that we were pulled into 
Rhodesia because of our obligations under the U.N. charter; is 
that right?
    Secretary Rusk. I said it was not just a bilateral matter, 
that we had important national interests of our own involved in 
this question under the charter in relation to the United 
Nations structure, in relation to our own interests in Africa, 
as well as our interests in the Commonwealth.
    Senator Mundt. How do you respond to Dean Acheson's 
statement--I know you have read this--in which he said that 
such a situation in the U.N. charter is plain. Chapter I, 
Article II, paragraph 7 applies unequivocally that the United 
Nations shall not intervene in matters which are within the 
internal jurisdiction of any state.
    Secretary Rusk. I gave--did I give you that, Mr. Marcy--
that memorandum on the legal--I think the key point here is 
that Article II, paragraph 7, the charter provision does not 
brand as illegal intervention. The action of the Security 
Council taken at the request of a member state concerned, in 
this case the United Kingdom--from a legal point of view, the 
responsibilities for Rhodesia continue to rest with the United 
Kingdom. No one has recognized Rhodesia. I do not think any 
country in the world including South Africa has recognized 
Rhodesia as an independent state, and Article II, paragraph 7--
--
    Senator Mundt. It says any member state or does he say any 
state?
    Secretary Rusk. Article II, paragraph 7--do you have a copy 
of the Charter--expressly provides that the principle of non-
intervention contained in that article shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under chapter 7. So from 
the Charter point of view there seems to be little doubt about 
that, but I will leave this memorandum for you to study, 
Senator. You may not agree with all of it.
    Senator Mundt. I hate to see student and teacher disagree.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, it is a matter of some pain to me, 
Senator.
    Senator Mundt. Probably more to you than to me. It has 
raised a lot of questions in my correspondence, but I cannot 
answer them.
    The Chairman. Any other question?
    Senator Mundt. No.
    Secretary Rusk. I am talking about the last sentence.
    The Chairman. I guess that is all.

              INDONESIAN VIEWS ON BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

    One thing I did have, I do not know whether it is 
important. Maybe you can clear it very quickly. You mentioned a 
prominent official of Indonesia. Did he express himself on the 
bombing in the north? What was it you said about him?
    Secretary Rusk. It had to do with whether our being in 
Vietnam had any bearing on the situation in Indonesia.
    The Chairman. You said he did.
    Secretary Rusk. He said it was a very important thing.
    The Chairman. Didn't I see where he thought it would be 
very wise to suspend the bombing in the North? Is that correct 
or not? I thought he did.
    Secretary Rusk. It is possible. I have not noted what he 
said.
    The Chairman. He denied that he said it. It was reported, 
was it not, in the press?
    Secretary Rusk. Could we check that point, Mr. Chairman?
    The Chairman. That is all, unless you have anything further 
to say.
    Secretary Rusk. No, sir.
    The Chairman. All right.
    I believe you are scheduled to come in open session next 
week, Monday, is that right?
    Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen.
    The Chairman. All right. The committee is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 2:35 o'clock p.m., the committee was 
adjourned.]


                 SUBCOMMITTEES AND HEARINGS PROCEDURES

                              ----------                              


                       Tuesday, January 24, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                     Washington, DC
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:00 noon, in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) 
presiding.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, 
Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, 
Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr. 
Lowenstein of the committee staff.

                      CONFIRMATION OF NOMINATIONS

    The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
    First, is there any motion on the people we just heard,\1\ 
that is----
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The Committee heard in open session the following nominations: 
Clarence A. Boonstra to be Ambassador to Costa Rica; John F. Henning to 
be Ambassador to New Zealand; David S. King to be Ambassador to the 
Malagasy Republic; Robert L. Payton to be Ambassador to the Federal 
Republic of Cameroon; William B. Buffum to be Deputy Representative to 
the U.N.; and Arthur E. Goldschmidt to be Representative to the 
Economic and Social Council of the U.N.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I move that from small a to 
small f inclusive be recommended for confirmation.
    Senator Morse. Second it.
    The Chairman. You heard the motion and the second. Is there 
any discussion? Any questions? All in favor of the motion say 
``aye.''
    [Chorus of ``aye.'']
    The Chairman. Opposed, ``no.''
    [No response.]
    The Chairman. The ``ayes'' have it.
    As I said, we will take the other two tomorrow. We have Mr. 
William S. Gaud. I will announce that the committee will meet 
tomorrow at 10:30. We do not think it will take too long, but 
we had already agreed. Mr. Gaud has a matter to present to the 
committee.
    There are two or three other matters.

                ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE STAFF AND EXPENSES

    First, on the committee.
    Mr. Marcy, will you present the bill. It has to be approved 
and get on its way to go through the procedures.
    Mr. Marcy. Yes.
    Normally at this time of the year the committee approves a 
sum for additional staff and expenses for the balance of this 
year.
    Last year, the committee approved and the Senate approved 
$200,000 for committee expenses. Of that $200,000, the 
committee spent $144,289, so we have a balance of $55,000 left.
    This would mean that the committee could get along next 
year on the same amount, $200,000, but if there is any 
inclination for special kinds of activities to be undertaken, 
the committee might want to request $250,000.
    The Chairman. The reason for that was the discussion that 
took place at the last meeting where there were several people 
who desired that we try to find some extra staff members. They 
do not have to spend it, but if you want to leave it, I mean 
make available an amount we could use, and if we possibly can 
find somebody, why, we will.
    Senator Lausche. Carl, was the full appropriation for the 
whole fiscal year $200,000?
    Mr. Marcy. That is correct.
    Senator Lausche. And we got along with $200,000?
    Mr. Marcy. That is correct.
    Senator Lausche. Now you say we can get along the next year 
unless we expand our staff and services.
    Mr. Marcy. That is correct.
    Senator Mundt. Did I misunderstand your word, Carl, I 
thought you said we got along with $160,000.
    Mr. Marcy. That is correct. We have $55,000 unexpended at 
the end of the year.
    Senator Lausche. Where do you get the money for the next 
six months of the fiscal year?
    Mr. Marcy. We do not operate on a fiscal year.
    Senator Sparkman. We are on a calendar year, January 30 to 
January 30.
    Senator Lausche. You have $50,000 left?
    Mr. Marcy. That is correct.

                     MONEY TO HIRE ADDITIONAL STAFF

    Senator Church. You mean by that, Carl, there is room in 
the present budget to hire additional staff people without 
enlarging it over the amount we spent last year?
    The Chairman. It depends on the hearings and the travel. It 
was lower last year than usual, but there was such vigorous 
complaint the other day that I said if the committee means what 
it said we would give them some leeway. We do not spend it 
anyway. Mr. Marcy, I think, has been extremely careful. I do 
not know of any major committee that spent as little as this 
one.
    Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, could I raise two questions?
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Senator Morse. Carl stated we had some left. We do not have 
any left, do we? Didn't that revert?
    Mr. Marcy. That reverts.
    The Chairman. That reverts. What he meant is we did not 
expend it. That is correct.
    Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, there is going to be an 
effort----
    The Chairman. Senator Morse. He was about to say something.

                      EXPANDING THE SUBCOMMITTEES

    Senator Morse. I want the attention of Senator Clark and 
some others who expressed to me an interest in expanding the 
programs of some of our subcommittees.
    I have pending--I won't have time to take it up this 
morning--my first draft of a proposal for doing some work on 
the Subcommittee on Latin America that I think we have got to 
do or we are going to be open to two problems.
    One, you have got other committees of the Congress doing 
it; you have got a jurisdictional problem here. I do not want 
to go into that now, but we have some other committees in the 
Congress that, in my judgment, are invading the prerogatives of 
the Foreign Relations Committee in Latin America; and, second, 
I think we ought to do it as a matter of Senate duty.
    I do not think you can let this Latin American area go 
without more interest being expressed in it by the Foreign 
Relations Committee, and I certainly would not favor our 
spending any money that we do not need to spend.
    On the other hand, whatever you ask for now is the maximum 
that you are probably going to get. I do not think we ought to 
come in later supplementarily, and asking for more money, and I 
would suggest that to play safe we ask for $250,000.
    The Chairman. It does not commit us to spend it. We have 
not spent it for last year or any year previously, but if we 
need it, it is there. There is no commitment that you have to 
spend it.
    Senator Morse. No.

            A REASONABLE PRESENTATION TO THE RULES COMMITTEE

    Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, Senator Pell and I are on the 
Rules Committee, and these money appropriations come up there.
    Senator Pell. Senator Cooper also.
    Senator Clark. Yes, Senator Cooper. I thoroughly agree with 
Senator Morse, but before we go in for $250,000, which we may 
not spend, Carl ought to have a reasonable presentation to the 
Rules Committee as to how we spend it, otherwise there will be 
criticisms.
    Senator Morse. My only feeling is we can probably do it on 
$200,000 in view of what we did not spend last year. We 
probably could do it on $200,000.
    At the same time, I would not want to ask for $200,000 and 
then in the next few meetings of this committee, the committee 
agrees there ought to be increased staff of the subcommittees.
    Senator Clark. would like to see Mr. Marcy make up a 
presentation which can be presented to the Rules Committee.
    Senator Marcy. I do have such a budget here, but it will 
not deal with the particular investigation. For example, last 
year of the full amount of $200,000, the committee budget 
showed $163,000 for salaries; employee contributions $21,000; 
reimbursement payments to agencies $4,000; travel $6,000; 
witnesses for hearings $6,000; office expenses $4,600; and 
another amount of $3,000.
    That was for the full amount of $200,000.
    Now, actually, the way the amounts were expended, I will 
just give you a few illustrative amounts here. While we asked 
for $163,000 for salaries, we spent $118,000. While we asked 
for $6,000 for travel, we actually spent $17,000. That was 
because at the time that the committee appropriated the funds 
or authorized the amounts last year, the committee had not 
decided to hold hearings on Vietnam, NATO, and China.

                        AREAS FOR INVESTIGATION

    Senator Clark. Of course, Mr. Chairman, we really ought to 
make the basic decision as to what we want to do with the 
committee this year before we prepare the bill, which is 
probably going to be impossible to do in this meeting in ten 
minutes.
    I would certainly like to strongly endorse the position of 
the Senator from Oregon that we ought to have a pretty 
comprehensive look at Latin America. I believe Senator Gore, 
the chairman of the Disarmament Subcommittee, and I certainly 
agree with him, think we ought to take a good hard look at the 
Disarmament Agency, and I have no doubt there are other areas 
of countries as a result of my trip to Eastern Europe and the 
Middle East. Some Senators will feel we ought to be conducting 
much more effective oversight than we do at present. But my own 
point is we ought to make this policy decision and then ask 
Carl to make up a budget. We have the cart before the horse, 
and since we have to do it this way, I would rather see us ask 
for $250,000, and if we do not have to spend it, we will not 
spend it.
    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, may I say just this: It may 
be the cart is before the horse, but it is just something that 
cannot very well be avoided because this present fund expires 
January 30, and we need to get action before the end of the 
month.
    Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman.

                       CAREFUL HANDLING OF FUNDS

    Senator Sparkman. Wait a minute.
    Now, the experience of this committee in the past, I think, 
and Carl will bear me out on this, has been one of very good 
husbanding of the funds that we have gotten. I think it will 
show that some years we have turned back a very large amount. 
Other years it has been a lesser amount. You cannot predict it 
with any precision. But what we do not spend goes back into the 
Treasury, so it seems to me that certainly we can trust the 
careful handling of the funds, but that we ought to allow 
ourselves elbow room so that we can do what we decide we ought 
to do in this committee and, therefore, I would recommend the 
larger amount. If it is in order, I would like to make a motion 
to agree on that.
    The Chairman. Senator Lausche.

                           SUBSTITUTE MOTION

    Senator Lausche. I offer a substitute, and that is that the 
amount be kept at $200,000. We are faced with the 
responsibility of answering to the people of the United States 
whether we are going to keep expenses at present levels or 
reduce them, on the one hand; or extend them, on the other, and 
impose new taxes.
    When the time comes for imposing new taxes, the probability 
is that there will be a wave of opposition to it. My belief is 
that we ought to begin with the committee's indicating that we 
are exerting every effort possible to escape the obligation of 
imposing new taxes, or if we have to do so, impose them in the 
least amounts possible.
    We had $200,000 last year; we spent $150,000. That would 
indicate to me that there is a latitude of $50,000 with which 
to do the work that might be in excess of what was done last 
year.
    I make this proposal also because it has become thoroughly 
apparent that if there has been neglect, and I am not saying 
that it prevails in this committee, because another committee 
on which I serve has increased its amount by $200,000 in the 
last three years. We should begin here, and that is where I 
propose to begin.
    The Chairman. You heard the motion. The substitute motion 
is to ask for $200,000. Is there any further discussion?

                    GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE

    Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I was late for this committee 
because I was detained in the committee presided over by your 
distinguished colleague from Arkansas, Mr. John McClellan.\2\ 
The staff had prepared a proposed spending program, and by 
unanimous action our committee there, operating pretty much on 
the philosophy that Frank Lausche has mentioned, cut it down.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Government Operations Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Senator Morse. How much is the total?
    Senator Mundt. It is a big committee, a quarter of a 
million dollars. They asked for about $1,250,000, and we cut it 
down.
    Senator Morse. It is the very committee, may I say most 
respectfully, which, in my judgment, is planning some work in 
Latin America that ought to be subordinated to the Foreign 
Relations Committee.
    Senator Mundt. Not that I know of. They never mentioned it. 
You are thinking of Vietnam.
    Senator Morse. You have the Judiciary Committee with 
$2,600,000 plus, with some of the subcommittees with $500,000.
    Senator Mundt. I am talking about Government Operations.
    Senator Morse. I know, but I also bring in the other 
Committees.
    Senator Mundt. So far as I know, they are not talking about 
Latin America. There is a possibility of investigating AID in 
Vietnam.

                        WHOSE OX IS BEING GORED

    Senator Cooper. Mr. Chairman, you remember--I am rather 
reluctant to give my views on this--but serving on the Rules 
Committee we do have this experience: when the committee 
chairmen come in for additional funds, if they are supported by 
a plan of what is intended to do, I think the Rules Committee 
is very generous in approving their request. But I think if 
some budget is not made out, there will be a tendency to cut it 
out somewhat, and that has been our practice in the Rules 
Committee. So I would say if you are going to ask for $250,000, 
it ought to be supported by some plan.
    The Chairman. May I ask you members of the Rules Committee, 
are you likely to cut back? If he only asked for $200,000, are 
you going to cut it back along with everybody?
    Senator Cooper. Not $200,000.
    The Chairman. Because this committee asked for very little. 
For example, the committee he mentioned was $1,000,000.
    Senator Clark. I would like to say something about the 
tactics, if you do not mind. It depends on whose ox is being 
gored. There are certain committees which are absolutely 
sacrosanct, and they get whatever they want, and other 
committees do not get what they want. This does not represent 
my philosophy, but it does that of the Rules Committee. I think 
this committee's requests are extremely modest.
    The Chairman. I think so, too. The Judiciary Committee is 
$2,670,000. And they have subcommittees: the Subcommittee on 
Antitrust and Monopoly asks for $560,000; Constitutional 
Rights, $205,000; Internal Security, $437,000; Juvenile 
Delinquency, $260,000.
    Senator Clark. Which is not within their jurisdiction.
    The Chairman. They total $2,670,000. I do not want to do 
anything outrageous.

               CONDEMNING OTHER COMMITTEES' EXTRAVAGANCES

    Senator Lausche. The weakness of our position is that in 
this room we condemn this, but when we go to the floor nobody 
utters a word. I think that we can justifiably and honestly 
defend our position. I think that that expenditure is 
completely unjustified, and it sort of corroborates the 
extravagance in the committees.
    Senator Pell. No one had the gumption to say so.
    Senator Lausche. No one complains. We consider each 
committee sacrosanct. Allen Ellender goes up on the floor and 
makes the argument, and only the walls listen to him.
    Senator Church. Mr. Chairman, the question here is how much 
money should this committee have. I think that it is perfectly 
clear that we did not have the kind of staff help we could 
efficiently use in the various subcommittees, and we are not 
getting the job done that we should get done. I mean there is 
no reason why we should limit ourselves with a staff that is 
inadequate.
    The Chairman. If the committee will have order. I was sorry 
to arouse such a big controversy. I did not know there would be 
such a big row. We did not spend the $200,000. Obviously we 
have room there. If people feel so strongly about it, I would 
rather go on $200,000, and if we need it, why, we can ask for a 
supplemental. I think the Rules Committee people--I am 
perfectly willing to abide by what your advice is because we 
can ask for more. I have asked the staff to try to follow out 
what was suggested here the other day to look for some people 
and see--we have already appointed two new subcommittees, and 
we are going to try to staff them and get some people. We are 
moving in that direction. If you think this is outrageous, I am 
perfectly willing to stay with it.
    Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, let us vote.
    The Chairman. All right, let us vote.

        SUBCOMMITTEES NEED A COMMITMENT FROM THE FULL COMMITTEE

    Senator Morse. One minute, before you vote. I would like to 
have one minute.
    We have started a discussion, and a very fruitful 
discussion in this committee about expanding the work of the 
subcommittees.
    The Chairman. That is right.
    Senator Morse. Because we feel they ought to be expanded. 
You cannot expand the work of the subcommittees unless the 
chairman of the subcommittees can get some commitment from this 
full committee as to what the budget is going to allow them. 
You are not going to be able to do that on the basis of the old 
judgment, in my opinion, because your $153,000 expenditure last 
year was low for the reason we did not undertake the type of 
program in the subcommittees that ought to have been 
undertaken. I certainly think that if you just ask for $200,000 
you are going to encourage encroachments upon the jurisdiction 
of this committee from other committees, and I think we ought 
to ask for $250,000 or $225,000. You ought to go before that 
committee and make the case before the Rules Committee. This is 
what we intend to do that we have not been doing, and that 
ought to be done. If you do not do that, you are going to be in 
a position where they would be justified in cutting back on 
your budget.
    If you say you were going to ask for no more money, and we 
are going to do a larger program, the Rules Committee would 
have a basis for cutting back. I think you ought to ask for the 
$250,000 and make your case before the committee.

                    DEFEAT OF THE SUBSTITUTE MOTION

    The Chairman. All right, let us vote on it.
    Senator Cooper. Let me say this, if I can.
    I am on both committees. If this committee does appear and 
sustain its request for $250,000, of course, I will vote for it 
today. I just will say that.
    The Chairman. Do you want to call the roll?
    Senator Pell. What are we voting on exactly?
    The Chairman. The substitute of the Senator from Ohio. He 
wishes to stay at $200,000.
    Senator Pell. If you want it $250,000, you vote no.
    The Chairman. You vote no.
    Senator Pell. Thank you.
    Senator Lausche. And when you do that you are mistaken.
    Senator Pell. I often am.
    The Chairman. Call the roll.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Sparkman.
    Senator Sparkman. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Mansfield.
    Mr. Morse.
    Senator Morse. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Gore.
    Mr. Lausche.
    Senator Lausche. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Church.
    Senator Church. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Symington.
    The Chairman. I will vote Symington no. He did leave his 
proxy.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Dodd.
    Mr. Clark.
    Senator Clark. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Pell.
    Senator Pell. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. McCarthy.
    Mr. Hickenlooper.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Aiken.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Carlson.
    Senator Carlson. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Williams.
    Mr. Mundt.
    Senator Mundt. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Case.
    Senator Case. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Cooper.
    Senator Cooper. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Ten nays and four ayes.
    The Chairman. The substitute failed.

                         ADOPTION OF THE MOTION

    Now can we vote. Do we need a roll call or can we go by a 
voice vote?
    Senator Lausche. I wanted to be registered as voting no.
    Senator Carlson. Mr. Chairman, in view of my vote, I want 
to state this. The Post Office and Civil Service Committee, 
which really is a small committee, and I am a member of it, is 
asking for $225,000, and I just could not conceive that this 
committee should get less.
    The Chairman. We won't spend it unless we need it.
    Senator Lausche. Will you assign someone to work for me 
especially with this extra $50,000 as the chairman of the 
Southeast Asia Subcommittee, a very important one?
    Senator Morse. You bet it is.
    The Chairman. I have some other questions here now.
    Ambassador Goldberg----
    Senator Clark. We did not vote.
    The Chairman. All in favor of the motion of the Senator 
from Alabama say aye.
    [Chorus of ``aye.'']
    The Chairman. Opposed, no.
    Senator Lausche. No.
    Senator Hickenlooper. No.
    The Chairman. The record will show the Senator from Ohio 
votes no.

             INVITATION FOR THE COMMITTEE TO VISIT THE U.N.

    Ambassador Goldberg--let me go back. Mr. U Thant sent me an 
invitation inviting the committee to come to New York and have 
lunch with him, and so on.
    Goldberg came here right after that and we had a 
conversation about it. He strongly recommends that it be 
enlarged rather than just go for a luncheon with U Thant. He 
would like for the committee to agree to come up there and he, 
if I understood him correctly, offered to make the arrangements 
for transportation, and to spend a day and to meet with a 
series of delegations or people from various parts; in other 
words, perhaps two or three from Western Europe, and two or 
three or more.
    He is going to undertake to set this up, if we agree. He is 
going to manage this for us, with the idea of giving us an 
opportunity to hear the views and exchange views with people 
from various parts of the world. Latin America would be a 
group; one from Western Europe; one from Eastern Europe; the 
Middle East, and so on. I cannot give you all the details.
    What I wanted to do today is to find out whether or not the 
committee is interested. It would entail going up and spending 
the day, all day, in these various meetings, among other 
things, as I understand it, a luncheon with Mr. U Thant.
    The suggested period would be--and this has got to be 
subject, of course, to negotiation, but I could not be very 
specific because I had not had an opportunity to ask you--March 
15th to 16th or the 22nd and 23rd. I just wanted to know 
whether the committee is interested or not. I do not want to 
get out on a limb and say we are, and not have but one or two 
go.
    What is the sentiment of the committee?
    Senator Morse. I think we ought to have the advice of Case 
and Church first.
    The Chairman. It is purely for our information.

                             A USEFUL TRIP

    Senator Church. I am strongly, I am very favorably, 
disposed. I think that the more this committee can learn as a 
committee about the situation in New York, the more familiar we 
are with the U.N. and with our own mission, and with the 
Secretariat and with U Thant, with the views that are so 
pervasive there on matters that are critical to our own 
national interest, the better. Since I think this is the most 
appropriate way to do it and the most effective way to do it, I 
would hope that the committee would be interested in Goldberg's 
invitation.
    I have told Goldberg I am strongly in favor of this. I 
would hope that as many members of the committee as possible 
would go. I think it would be useful.
    The Chairman. I sort of felt that unless as many as ten 
wanted to go it would not look right. If as many as ten wanted 
to go--not everybody has to go.
    Senator Clark. I wonder if we would not want to ask the 
members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee also.
    The Chairman. Then you get too many if they all went.
    Senator Case. They will take care of that.
    The Chairman. What do you think about the idea? Do you wish 
me to work out a day, and would you say as many as ten would 
go?
    I would like all of them to go, but I do not want to just 
have three or four go and have all this sort of trouble.

                        INVITATION FROM U THANT

    Senator Lausche. From whom is the principal invitation? Is 
it from U Thant?
    The Chairman. It started with U Thant. I had a letter over 
there. It came some time ago. He would be glad to have a 
luncheon, invite us all to luncheon, and this kind of grew out 
of it.
    Senator Lausche. I do not want to dignify U Thant, and 
especially on the basis of what Senator Morse said the other 
day, of his statements around the world, and if we are going to 
go----
    Senator Morse. What statements?
    Senator Lausche. The other day in our discussions you 
pointed out that U Thant is our choice and he was making 
attacks upon us.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I cannot hear what you are saying, 
Frank.
    Senator Case. He is everybody's choice, Frank, is what you 
are saying.
    Senator Lausche. U Thant has been making statements that 
are not helpful to our cause in the world as it stands today, 
and I do not want to dignify him by going to New York with him 
being the principal inviter. I look upon it differently if the 
principal invitation comes from Goldberg.
    Senator Church. May I say something on that?
    My understanding on that is the principal invitation comes 
from our Ambassador to us.
    Senator Lausche. If we go there we ought to put U Thant in 
the background.
    Senator Church. Yes. During the fall, a group of 
Congressmen did come up at Goldberg's invitation. They did come 
to the American Mission for briefings. They then lunched with U 
Thant, and went through the Secretariat and visited the 
principal U.N. buildings, and this is what Goldberg has in 
mind.
    The Chairman. That is my understanding, that it would be 
one of a whole series of meetings that would take place 
practically all day. My guess would be we would want to leave, 
we will say, around 8:00 or 8:30. We would come back that 
night. We do not spend the night there. You do not have to 
register in hotels or anything else is the way I understand it 
is to be done.
    Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave. I am in favor 
of the idea, and I will go.
    Senator Pell. So am I.
    The Chairman. Let me have a show of hands of who would be 
willing to go who are here.
    [There was a showing of hands.]
    Senator Case. Could I just say one thing. I suggest we keep 
down the social side of it.
    Senator Mundt. You are going to have to adjust to the 
Senate schedule.

                  THE TEN-MINUTE RULE FOR QUESTIONING

    Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, I move that in the open 
public hearings that there be applied the ten-minute rule. I 
will not discuss the issue, and let this whole body act upon 
it.
    The Chairman. Of course, I am perfectly willing for the 
committee to act on it. We tried it last year and we have also 
had two meetings this year without it, and in my view it worked 
better without it than it did with it. Yesterday the total time 
consumed was less than an average of ten minutes for everybody 
there. Now practically everybody was there yesterday, and I 
would prefer to try it without it. If it becomes intolerable, 
why, we can revert to it.
    We also tried it when the Secretary was here and it went 
very smoothly, which is the normal way. But if you wish----
    Senator Lausche. What did you mean yesterday when you said 
to me in private that you had so many complaints about the 
application of the ten-minute rule----
    The Chairman. You were one who complained last year about 
how unsatisfactory it is in circumstances that you only have 
ten minutes.
    Senator Lausche. No, I never complained about that.
    The Chairman. Last year you did and so did others.
    Senator Lausche. No, I did not.
    The Chairman. But anyway if you wish to vote on it----
    Senator Morse. I think we ought to have discussion on it. I 
am a great believer in self-discipline.
    The Chairman. That is what we tried yesterday, and I would 
prefer to go that way.

                      THE MINORITY NEEDS MORE TIME

    Senator Case. I think, as a matter of fact, Frank, you 
spoke to me about this before. There are times when you are in 
the minority and you would need and require more than the ten 
minutes that would be attributable to one member to present 
that minority position fairly, and I think this is a good idea.
    Senator Lausche. I will not argue the matter. Each one 
knows how he has--the juniors how much they sit back and 
finally leave the meeting because they never get to them.
    Senator Case. Sometimes we ought to start at the bottom. 
That is the only change.
    Senator Pell. Maybe we could have a compromise. The 
chairman could present a little bell to us and ring it after 
ten minutes. We do not have to stop, but at least we would not 
forget that ten minutes had gone by.
    The Chairman. I thought yesterday everybody was very, 
very----
    Senator Lausche. Yesterday there was self-imposed adherence 
to the rule.
    The Chairman. That is right. So was their----
    Senator Lausche. Are you recommending a substitute?
    Senator Pell. No. I was being flip.
    Senator McCarthy. What is the substitute?
    Senator Lausche. Let us have the question.
    Senator Pell. Do you want a vote, really?

                            TABLE THE MOTION

    Senator Case. I move the motion be tabled for the time 
being.
    The Chairman. The Senator moves it be tabled for the time 
being.
    Senator Morse. Second.
    The Chairman. All in favor of the tabling say ``aye.''
    (Chorus of ``aye.'')
    The Chairman. Call the roll, Mr. Kuhl.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Sparkman.
    Senator Sparkman. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Mansfield.
    Mr. Morse.
    Senator Morse. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Gore.
    Mr. Lausche.
    Senator Lausche. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Church.
    Senator Church. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Symington.
    The Chairman. No--aye, I mean.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Dodd.
    Mr. Clark.
    Mr. Pell.
    Senator Pell. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. McCarthy.
    Senator McCarthy. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Hickenlooper.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Aiken.
    Mr. Carlson.
    Senator Carlson. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Williams.
    Mr. Mundt.
    Senator Mundt. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Case.
    Senator Case. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Cooper.
    Senator Cooper. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Eight yeas and five nays.
    The Chairman. The motion is tabled.
    Senator Lausche. All right, you poor junior, weep.

                  INVITATION TO JOURNALISTS TO TESTIFY

    The Chairman. I want to ask the guidance of the committee 
on this.
    There have been two members who raised this question, and I 
have raised it, too, about having some witnesses in Executive 
Session.
    What would be the committee's view about asking one or more 
of the three Americans, Harrison Salisbury, Harry S. Ashmore 
and William C. Baggs, who have been in North Vietnam, to come 
to executive session and answer questions and brief the 
committee?
    Are you interested or not? I can have them with coffee, 
without it, or does the committee wish to have it as an 
informal executive session without any publicity?
    Senator Pell. As one member I would strongly support it.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Who are the three?
    The Chairman. The three who have been there--Salisbury, 
Baggs and Ashmore. One is a former editor who is now working 
for the center, but Baggs is the editor of a Florida paper. 
Salisbury is on the New York Times. Ashmore has been on various 
papers, but is not presently on a paper. They are all 
newspapermen.
    Senator Lausche. Why do you want them in executive session?
    Senator Morse. Why in executive session?
    The Chairman. I do not care, but if you want it in open----
    Senator Morse. If you want them in executive session for 
security reasons, that is something else.
    The Chairman. I was personally curious to hear their 
reports and details, and minor details that they have not had 
in their reports. I have read what has been in the paper, but 
these are the only Americans of this caliber--there have been 
Women's Strikes for Peace, and so on, that I thought they might 
not have quite the same attitude.
    Senator Cooper. A minister.
    The Chairman. These people are trained observers. 
Regardless that their views may be on policy, they are 
observers, and I would be interested in hearing them. I want to 
know if the whole committee is interested, and should I ask for 
a--I can have either kind, whatever the committee wishes.

                     WITNESSES SCHEDULED TO APPEAR

    Senator Lausche. May I ask what witnesses you have 
scheduled to appear.
    The Chairman. In open?
    Senator Lausche. There are certain witnesses that will take 
one side. Those names I have seen scheduled. Now, what 
witnesses do you have other than the State Department 
representatives who will take the side affirming what is being 
done in South Vietnam now?
    The Chairman. Well, I don't know what side these people are 
going to take on that. The only two that are firmly set are for 
next Monday and Tuesday, Kennan and Reischauer.
    Senator Case. George Kennan?
    The Chairman. George Kennan, and former Ambassador 
Reischauer. They are both former ambassadors.
    Senator Lausche. Outside of the State witnesses.
    The Chairman. We have asked the Secretary of Defense, and 
the Secretary of State agreed to come yesterday, but then, you 
know about that, he wrote a letter and requested it be changed 
from that hearing to the one we had. He still is in the 
position of coming at a later date, and McNamara has asked to 
be delayed until after he had finished his other hearing.
    Senator Lausche. That is not an answer to my question. You 
have outsiders. Kennan, I know how he will testify.
    The Chairman. Well, I do not.

               DO THEY SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION?

    Senator Lausche. But what outsiders are there that you can 
know in advance they are supporting the government's position? 
We have not----
    The Chairman. I do not ask them, any of them, are they 
going to support the government's position. In fact, Mr. 
Reischauer is not testifying directly. I cannot control what he 
testifies to because I cannot control the committee's 
questions, but it is generally on our relations with the Far 
East, Japan and--well, the Far East. He has been a long-time 
scholar of China.
    Senator Lausche. Bill, may I suggest that you hold this 
over until tomorrow's meeting, the decision on these three men.
    The Chairman. On Salisbury, Ashmore and Baggs?
    Senator Lausche. Yes. I may want to offer other names to 
come in.
    The Chairman. Well, this is certainly not intended to be 
exclusive. These are just people who have been there.
    Senator Lausche. We can decide the whole thing tomorrow.
    The Chairman. Of course, these other hearings, there are 
several other names that are under consideration that have not 
been invited yet.
    Senator Lausche. Who are they?
    The Chairman. Mr. Alf Landon is one of them who I think 
might be----
    Senator Hickenlooper. When did Alf come back from South 
Vietnam?

               A BROADER SERIES OF HEARINGS THAN VIETNAM

    The Chairman. This is not on South Vietnam alone. These 
hearings, as I have tried to make very plain in the paper, are 
not just hearings on South Vietnam. They are on the overall 
general position of the United States in the present world.
    Now, some of them will be asked questions about Vietnam. 
But yesterday, much to my surprise, nobody asked the Secretary 
of State any questions on Vietnam, and it might be the same 
with other witnesses, but it is much broader, a much broader 
series of hearings than just Vietnam.
    But, as I say, I cannot guarantee that people won't ask 
about Vietnam. If they want to they can ask anything they like.
    Senator Lausche. I think it was a good thing nobody opened 
the thing up.
    The Chairman. It was all right with me. But when you say 
Vietnam, the subject matter with Kennan is not Vietnam. Now, 
you may ask him about Vietnam. The subject matter is the 
relations of this country with the Communist world. He has long 
experience in this area, and if you want to ask him about 
Vietnam, all right. But you do not have to.
    My main interest with Kennan is what is his attitude about 
how our relations with Russia, in particular, and the Communist 
world in general as they are developing, and what is our 
policy. Is it promoting it or not.

                            OTHER WITNESSES

    Senator Lausche. You mentioned Alf Landon. Who else?
    The Chairman. He is one who Senator Carlson----
    Senator Carlson. I want to say this for Alf Landon. We had 
a lecture series started under his name at Kansas University. 
We are going to have some outstanding people following him in 
the last two or three months. Alf made an excellent statement, 
and some day I want to put it in the record.
    The Chairman. I read it, and I want to endorse what you are 
saying. I thought it was a remarkably intelligent piece.
    Senator Carlson. I have asked Governor Landon about coming 
back here, and he called me just before I came back to 
Washington that he has had a bad back problem. I hope the 
Chairman won't invite him until later.
    The Chairman. Of course it would have to be at his 
convenience.
    Senator Case. I would like to ask for one more. I would 
like to hear McGeorge Bundy.
    Senator Pell. How about General Curtis Le May, to get 
another view, and an extreme view. I think it might be 
interesting.
    Senator Hickenlooper. He is no more extreme on his side 
than some of these people.
    Senator Pell. That is what I am saying.
    Senator Hickenlooper. We are asking a bunch of extremists 
to come in here.
    The Chairman. I sent a letter the other day asking the 
ranking minority member for suggestions of who he wanted for 
witnesses.
    Senator Lausche. Who else?

                            FORMER CIA AGENT

    The Chairman. There is another who came to see me. This is 
in the Executive record--I would just throw it out for your 
consideration. An unusual fellow as far as I am concerned, and 
I never heard of him before, but he was born in Korea. He came 
here in 1930. He is a naturalized American, and he spent 20 
years as a CIA agent largely in research, but he is in the CIA, 
or he was in the CIA, from 1946 to 1965. I have never before 
run into a man with this kind of particular experience, and he 
is a Korean by birth, but an American by naturalization.
    I was going to raise him just because I thought you would 
find him interesting; I did, because I never had seen a fellow 
with this kind of experience.
    Senator McCarthy. Can former CIA members talk to this 
committee?
    The Chairman. I asked about this. He asked to see me; I 
never heard of the fellow. He wrote me a letter a month ago and 
asked to come and talk to me. His name is Chowe.
    Senator Lausche. What is his name?
    The Chairman. Chowe. Anyway, there are a number of people 
of this kind. I think the fellow was very interesting. He can 
give you a different slant on many different things. He does 
not undertake to say you are right or wrong in Vietnam. I did 
not ask him about that. I asked him about a lot of other 
things. He volunteered them. As a matter of fact, he came and 
volunteered the story about a great deal of information I had 
never heard about in the CIA.
    Senator Lausche. Hold these over until tomorrow.
    The Chairman. These are not final decisions. I am asking 
for guidance. What I really wanted to know is, because the 
staff has to get in contact, whether the committee generally is 
interested in Salisbury because, if not, I do not want to 
invite him to the committee. If we have him at all I will have 
him to tea or lunch or something of that kind. That is all in 
the world I want to know. If you want him in open session and 
the committee feels that way, that is also possible.
    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I move that we have these 
witnesses that the chairman has mentioned, and that the 
chairman and Senator Hickenlooper do as they did last year, 
serve as a screening committee for any additional witnesses 
that anyone may suggest, and that you two decide on the type of 
people to have and set the time.
    The Chairman. It is not exclusive. If you want someone 
else, all you need to do is suggest him, Frank.
    Senator Lausche. I challenge the right to act on this at 
this time. We do not have a quorum.
    The Chairman. I do not know if that takes action, but that 
is all right. I was simply seeking the sentiment of the 
committee on these people.
    [Whereupon, the committee adjourned.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1967

                           U.S. Senate,    
             Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:04 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Morse (subcommittee chairman), Fulbright, 
Sparkman, Mansfield, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Cooper.
    The meeting was held to discuss proposed amendments to the 
OAS charter and the current treaty negotiations with Panama, 
and also to discuss the prospects for the OAS summit meeting. 
Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary for American Republics 
Affairs, accompanied by John N. Irwin, Special Ambassador for 
negotiation of Panama Canal Treaty; Sol Linowitz, Ambassador to 
the OAS; and Robert F. Woodward, Assistant to Ambassador Irwin, 
appeared before the group.
    For a record of the proceeding, see the official 
transcript.
    [The subcommittee adjourned at 5:55 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 25, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 12:30 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore, 
Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, 
Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
    The committee discussed whether to hold further hearings on 
Ex. D. 88/2, the Consular Convention with the Soviet Union. It 
was agreed that Mr. J. Edgar Hoover would be asked to come 
before the committee and also that time would be set aside to 
hear public witnesses.
    William S. Gaud, Administrator of AID, accompanied by 
Daniel Steiner, William C. Gibbons, and Charles D. Paolitto, 
testified on the subject: ``Presidential determination to 
increase the number of countries receiving development and 
technical assistance.''
    For a record of the proceedings, see the official 
transcript.
    [The committee adjourned at 1:30 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                       THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
                        Subcommittee on Disarmament
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m. in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Gore (chairman of the subcommittee), 
Clark, Pell, and Aiken.
    The subcommittee discussed the content of hearings to be 
held and possible witnesses.
    For a record of the proceedings, see the official 
transcript.
    [The subcommittee adjourned at 10:55 p.m.]


                       THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA

                              ----------                              


                        Monday, January 30, 1967

    [Editor's Note.--On September 30, 1965, junior level 
military officers staged a coup against the Indonesian high 
command, killing five generals and wounding the chief of staff, 
Gen. Abul Haris Nasution. Other military forces under Gen. 
Suharto suppressed the coup, blamed the uprising on the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and set about eliminating it 
in a bloody counter-coup. President Achmed Sukarno, who had 
ruled Indonesia since 1945, remained in office following these 
events, but in January 1967, the Armed Forces Information 
Center published an article accusing Sukarno of complicity with 
the Communist plotters. The Provisional People's Consultative 
Congress investigated the charges and on March 12, 1967 removed 
Sukarno's executive and ceremonial powers, making Gen. Suharto 
the acting president.]

                               U.S. Senate,
                Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:05 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Frank Lausche (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Lausche, Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, 
Gore, Pell, McCarthy, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, and Case.
    Also Present: Senator McGee.
    Carl Marcy and Norvill Jones of the committee staff.
    Senator Lausche. I think we might as well get started.
    Mr. Green, this is a meeting of the members of the 
Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs, and such other senators 
who will appear.
    We want to hear from you your observations on what the 
conditions are in Indonesia. If you will proceed with the 
presentation of your views, and later open yourself to 
questions, we will appreciate it.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE MARSHALL GREEN, UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR 
  TO INDONESIA; ACCOMPANIED BY H.G. TORBERT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 
             SECRETARY FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS

    Ambassador Green. Thank you very much, Senator. I 
understand I am speaking in closed session or executive 
session.
    Senator Carlson. Yes.
    Ambassador Green. Because I want to speak with candor.
    Well, I think as Senator McGee will testify--he has just 
been out there--there has been a tremendous change around in 
the past year. I was confirmed in the next room here in June, 
1965. I went out there the next month and at that time the 
whole country was slipping towards the Red camp. Some people 
thought it already had joined the Red camp.
    Senator Lausche. When was that?
    Ambassador Green. That was July 21st that I arrived in 
Jakarta.
    This was a time when they were stoning our consulates and 
Embassy and we were harassed at every turn. The communist power 
was growing. Sukarno on August 17, 1965, spoke about the 
Jakarta-Peking-Pyongyang-Hanoi axis. That is how far this thing 
had gone.

                        GREAT CHANGE IN ONE YEAR

    Well, the whole situation, of course, as you know, has 
changed in the course of this past year due to events which I 
will come back to, and today the Communist Party in Indonesia 
has been banned. The relations with Peking are almost at a 
breaking point. In other words, they share our assessment of 
Peking's menace to that part of the world. They have ended the 
confrontation. They have rejoined the United Nations. They have 
rejoined all of these specialized agencies of the United 
Nations. They are participating actively in the new regional 
community in Southeast Asia and they are looking for good 
relations with all the countries that can help them.
    Now, that means Eastern European countries as well as, of 
course, the Western countries and Japan. This has not been very 
easy in terms of their relations with the Soviet Union because 
they have banned the Communist Party. But the Soviets have 
helped them in the past, particularly in military assistance, 
and they hope to receive that assistance.
    So this has been the great change that has taken place in 
one year.
    I suppose that there is no place in the world in modern 
times where there has been such an abrupt shift around as there 
has been in Indonesia in the last year and a half. Certainly I 
say that on the basis of 23 years of working in the Far East.
    Now, the big event that changed all this, as you know, was 
the abortive coup that was launched by the Communists and some 
of their friends on September 30, 1965.

                            COMMUNIST ALLIES

    Senator Lausche. When you say by some of the Communists, 
whom do you mean?
    Ambassador Green. By the Communist Party, and I said some 
of their friends who were working on the outside.
    Senator Lausche. Who were they?
    Ambassador Green. Well, for example, Subandrio, who is not 
a declared member of the Communist Party but, according to the 
trials that have taken place now, he was involved in this plot.
    Senator Lausche. Were there any other outside nations 
involved?
    Ambassador Green. No. Well, Communist China may well have 
been involved. We have not proved it, But there is 
circumstantial evidence that points to involvement.

                             ABORTIVE COUP

    Now, what happened in this abortive coup was that the PKI, 
which is the Communist Party, moved swiftly in an effort to 
kill the top seven generals. They succeeded in killing five of 
them two of them escaped, General Nasution and General Suharto. 
That was a mighty lucky thing because these two surviving 
generals moved fast and brought in the Siliwangi Division which 
is the local division up there in Bandung, and they suppressed 
the coup in the Jakarta area within a matter of days.
    They then faced a tremendous task of how to move against 
the Communists who were all over the country. It was an 
enormously powerful party, as you know, the largest in the 
world outside of the Communist bloc or the Sino-Soviet 
countries, with the possible exception of Italy.
    They face an enormous task, but they have proven themselves 
capable of meeting that challenge.
    Now, in the course of the next month, month and a half, 
there now appears to have been a very bloody aftermath to this 
abortive coup. The pictures of the killed generals and how they 
were killed; the accounts of how they were tortured by the 
Women's Communist Organization; how their bodies had been 
heaved into the crocodile hole, which is up near the air base. 
These bodies then being exhumed. They were photographed and the 
photographs were sent all around the country and this touched 
off a very sharp wave of reaction in the local communities.

                      BLOODY AFTERMATH OF THE COUP

    As a result of this, the Moslems and others moved against 
the local Communist organization, the farm levels and villages, 
not so much in the cities and towns. This all happened in the 
countryside and I estimated when I came back here in February 
that 300,000 people had been killed in this bloody aftermath, 
which had been many times the number that have been killed in 
South Vietnam since the war started. Since that time, I think 
we would up that estimate to perhaps close to 500,000 people 
that have been killed in this aftermath. Of course, nobody 
knows. We merely judge it by whole villages that have been 
depopulated.
    The Island of Bali, for example, which is a small island, 
4,000 square miles, there were about perhaps 100,000 people 
that were killed there alone. There was something of a holy war 
reaction. In the case of Bali, it is not Moslem. It is Hindu. 
But they had a religious way of life. The Communists tried to 
secularize it and this was the reaction of the people once they 
realized the Communists were on the run and the army was on 
their side.
    In the case of East Java, it was the reaction of the 
Moslems more than any other religious group that resulted in 
this decimation. So the military had definitely gained the 
upper hand. It squashed the Communist coup effort and by 
November and December they were really in a position to take 
over the reins of government.

                         THE PROBLEM OF SUKARNO

    However, they had counted on President Sukarno moving over 
either on to their side or keeping quiet, moving into the 
background. But Sukarno at that time more or less thumbed his 
nose in their face and has been doing it ever since. So they 
were then faced with the problem, are we going to move against 
Sukarno and all the people that support Sukarno--you know, he 
has been called the George Washington of Indonesia--or are we 
going to move against him with all the consequences that might 
be entailed in a civil war?
    They decided they would not do so. They still hoped that 
the President could be brought around. Well, he wasn't. And the 
minute that Sukarno realized that Nasution and Suharto were not 
going to move against him, he was then emboldened to come back 
and begin to get back some more of his friends into the top 
places of government. As a matter of fact, in February of 1966, 
he dismissed Gene Suharto and he named one of the worst 
cabinets in Indonesia. Of course, there are no Communists, but 
it is nevertheless one of the worst cabinets that has ever been 
named in Indonesia. This started off, touched off, the large 
scale student demonstrations. Where there have been hundreds 
and thousands before, you know, there were tens thousands that 
were out on the street and that atmosphere.

                      SUHARTO GIVEN SPECIAL POWERS

    Then Suharto went to President Sukarno and said: I cannot 
be held responsible for the security of this country unless you 
give me broad responsibilities for handling all security 
matters in this country. He was given those special powers by 
Sukarno who had no choice.
    Since that time, Suharto has broadly interpreted these 
powers to run the country and he has done it just that way. The 
only thing he hasn't done is that he has not moved abruptly 
against President Sukarno. He has pressured him. He has reduced 
his powers. He has chipped away his power base and he has done 
it very successfully, but he hasn't totally eliminated it.
    Well, we are faced today with I would say two principal 
problems, one on the political side and one on the economic 
side.

                        POWER STRUGGLE CONTINUES

    On the political side is this power struggle that 
continues, or you could rephrase it, the problem of what to do 
with President Sukarno. His power is going down and down and I 
just saw a news ticker that indicates that the palace is 
surrounded with students at this moment. What they are going to 
do, I don't know. They apparently have switched the guards. 
This may be for the President's own protection rather than they 
are going to take any sudden movement against him. I do not 
think that General Suharto will move abruptly against the 
President, to arrest him or to exile him or to shoot him or 
anything like that. I think he will continue to pursue what he 
calls the constitutional course of action to get the MPRS, 
which is their super Parliament, to pass some kind of law 
against the President or to take some action against the 
President by impeachment, but he is not going to act outside 
the constitutional framework.
    The reason I think partly is because he wants to avoid 
civil strife. He doesn't want to start a tradition of coups and 
counter-coups. He wants to establish as far as possible the 
constitutional base and preserve that tradition in his country.

                       SUKARNO IS A COMMON TARGET

    But also I think that Suharto has been very wily. He 
realizes that as long as the President is around, that he 
becomes the target of the students, of their army, of the 
intelligentsia, of the commercial groups. He is the common 
target and this keeps the new order, as we might call the group 
around General Suharto--it keeps them together with a common 
focus. He can also make a scapegoat of the President. As long 
as he is around, everybody is critical of Sukarno for being 
responsible for the economic chaos of the country and this, of 
course, has happened. So he has his reasons for handling the 
job the way he does.
    In any event, the retention of Sukarno, although it does 
involve a number of problems, has not prevented the new 
government from moving ahead and doing the things that are 
required in the circumstances. He has been a drag. He has 
pulled the clock back sometimes, but the clock nevertheless has 
moved forward and a lot of things have been changed in 
Indonesia, almost all of them for the better.

                       QUESTION OF STABILIZATION

    This raises the second major problem that is facing 
Indonesia today, and that is the question of stabilization. The 
economic chaos left by 10 or 15 years of Sukarno's jingoism was 
one of the worst that I know of in modern history. They were 
left with a debt of $2.7 billion, about half of that owed to 
the Soviet Union, about $200 million or so owed to the United 
States.
    Of course, there are a lot of other creditor countries as 
well. The infrastructure of the country had deteriorated during 
this time. The roads, railroads, airlines are in miserable 
shape. Only about 30 percent of the shipping tonnage is 
operable today. Meanwhile, the cost of living has shot way up 
under runaway inflation.
    Between mid-1965 and mid-1966 the cost of living went up 20 
times, 2,000 percent.
    Senator Lausche. Since when?
    Ambassador Green. In that one year's time, between the 
middle of 1965 and the middle of 1966, the cost of living went 
up 20 times. The money inflated in that same period by 7\1/2\ 
times. The exports which had been $800 million a year back in 
1965 had all slumped down to about $500 million a year in 1965, 
over that 10-year span. Everything was running downhill. It was 
one of the few countries in the Far East, that and Burma, I 
guess, where there has been a deterioration in the per capita 
or GNP over the last 10 years.
    So this is the situation that General Suharto inherited.
    Now, he had the wisdom to turn to a group of first-rate 
economists who worked in the University of Indonesia. All of 
them I would say had been trained in the United States, three 
of them at the University of California, one at Harvard--he 
overcame that handicap. I went to Yale. And one from MIT.
    Now, these men are all first-rate economists. They gave him 
sound advice on how to approach the problem. One of the things 
they urged was that Indonesia should rejoin the International 
Monetary Fund and IBRD. They should get a team of IMF men out 
there to help out with their problems. This would be a sure way 
to restoring some confidence in Indonesia in the international 
banking and governmental circles.
    So Suharto turned to these people. They drew up a 
stabilization plan and I say that plan has been a first-rate 
plan in every sense of the word.

                      STABILIZATION MEANS HARDSHIP

    Now, this is not easy to accomplish because stabilization 
means hardship. It means stringencies and it always is 
accompanied by a certain political risk, particularly with 
Sukarno around, where he might be able to take advantage of the 
objections and feelings of the people and their political 
leaders. But that has not happened. The stabilization plan that 
calls for a balanced budget in calendar 1967 has passed the 
Parliament without any objections. They have instituted the 
plan now and, as a result of it, prices of foodstuffs have been 
level for the last 3\1/2\ months, even though----
    Senator Lausche. I think we had better go upstairs.
    Senator Sparkman. This is a roll call. We will be back in 
just a few minutes.
    [A short recess was taken.]

                         WILL SUKARNO BE TRIED?

    Senator Sparkman. Is there any likelihood that Sukarno will 
be tried?
    Ambassador Green. He will be tried in a certain sense. He 
may be tried in a certain sense by the MPRS which is sort of 
the super parliament, constituent assembly, in March. Whether, 
as I say, it will be impeachment proceedings or censure, 
whether it will be calling for the resignation of the 
President, whether it will be a call for his exile or not, no 
one knows. Nobody knows what action will be taken.

                     A SOUND PLAN FOR STABILIZATION

    Senator Lausche. You were discussing the economic 
situation, I think when we left.
    Amssador Green. Yes, I am not sure exactly at what point I 
broke off, but I was describing the fact that General Suharto 
had turned to a group of good economists as well as to the 
International Monetary Fund for advice. They came up with a 
sound plan for stabilization. They moved ahead with their plan, 
as a result of which the cost of food has stabilized. The cost 
of textiles has actually gone down. Some other costs have gone 
up. But that was anticipated because they were withdrawing 
subsidies--electricity, transportation--and, of course, that 
was passed on to the consumer. That was all part of the 
stabilization plan.
    Anyway, we think they are doing very well on this plan, 
moving ahead in a determined way, and obviously this relates 
very directly to whether or not other countries are going to be 
able to assist Indonesia, because people do not want to put 
money into any economy where it just goes down the rat hole of 
inflation.

                      INDONESIANS NEED DEBT RELIEF

    Now, assuming that the Indonesians continue to manage their 
economy well and there is the right managerial follow-through, 
which is always uncertain, they are still going to be dependent 
upon whether or not they can get adequate debt relief because, 
as I said, they built up this huge debt of $2.7 billion. If you 
service that debt in one year, that would be almost as much as 
their total foreign exchange earnings for that year. Therefore, 
they obviously have got to reschedule the whole debt.
    They have had meetings now, in Tokyo, in Paris, another one 
in Amsterdam. There seems to be general agreement among the 
Western creditors' group--that includes the United States, 
Japan, Holland, Germany, France, Italy, a number of other 
countries--that Indonesia should be given rather sweeping, 
almost standstill debt relief this coming year.
    Senator Aiken. Private creditors, too?
    Ambassador Green. The private credit has not yet been 
resolved, but presumably it will be along the same lines. Then 
at the end of this year, calendar 1967, there will be another 
meeting to see whether or not it has to be extended. It 
probably will. Meanwhile they will resolve the future long-
range debt by rescheduling over a longer period of time.
    Now, no one knows what the East European group will do, but 
it looks as though they will be giving them liberal debt relief 
as well. Therefore, if all goes according to Hoyle, as it seems 
to be going, that problem will be satisfactorily resolved.
    In addition to that, even if they get virtually total debt 
relief this year, this calendar year, they are going to need 
something between $170 million and $300 million--let us say 
$225 million of new net foreign aid in order to balance their 
budget. And our approach to this problem is that we want to be 
sure, first of all, that there is a liberal debt relief and, 
secondly, with regard to net aid, that other countries do their 
fair share.
    Now, what fair share is I don't know. But we will be 
talking in Amsterdam at the end of February about the general 
principles of future assistance. We will not probably go into a 
pledging session with them, but we will talk about the general 
principles that will guide us.
    So those are the two main problems--the political and the 
economic problems.

                      THE COMMUNIST MENACE IN ASIA

    I think sometimes that our focus is so much on the 
immediate problem, let us say on the Communist menace in some 
countries, or in the case of Asia, how you deal with Sukarno, 
that if you were to remove that immediate problem you would 
have beyond it another range of mountains. It would be a big 
and vast one and, in the case of Indonesia, once this problem 
of Sukarno is out of the way and stabilization programs move 
ahead satisfactorily, there will still be a lot of problems.
    The whole question of how you bring a traditional society 
into the modern age is involved here, problems of corruption 
and nepotism, what we call baptism, which is the adulation of a 
man like Sukarno, a charismatic personality.
    The problem of how to reach agreement--mushiwara--people 
talking back and forth and reaching a consensus, which is fine 
in the village council, but in the modern state is a rather 
painstaking, lengthy process. All those problems.

                       THE CIVILIAN-MILITARY MIX

    How is the new government going to establish a political 
base when two or three of the major parties now outlawed--how 
are they going to get back on the political scene? Will they 
become a part of the political base of this new government 
under General Suharto? The problems of how--what kind of a mix 
between civilians and military should you have in the 
government? These are all parts of this overall problem of 
moving from the traditional into a modern state.
    Now, if I could just touch on one of those problems, the 
problem of the civilian-military mix, this is a military 
government in many ways. General Suharto is the First Minister 
and he is obviously calling the signals. But he is drawing on 
the advice, as I just pointed out, now in the economic field of 
these economic specialists at the University of Indonesia and 
on outside consultants.
    General Suharto also turns to Adam Malik who is the Foreign 
Minister and head of the political section of the government. 
Adam Malik is in my opinion one of the outstanding leaders in 
East Asia today. There are other good civilian leaders, too.
    So what we have today is the best carburetorization between 
the civilian and military, just about the right mix, because 
the military are just enough involved in the government--it is 
not a junta government--just enough involved so that they take 
a responsible attitude towards the total operations of the 
government. Yet they are not so far in the government that they 
have taken it over and monopolized it themselves and have 
excluded good civilians which, of course, would lose for them 
the support of the students, the intellectuals, and some of the 
commercial types.
    Now, there are nevertheless problems, of course, for a 
government made up of civilians and military this way when you 
run into difficulties in the economic front, or when some of 
the politicians talk out of turn that oppose you. There is a 
natural temptation for military leaders to try to suppress the 
civilian segments. I don't think that General Suharto will do 
that. I think he recognizes the importance of maintaining this 
kind of mix that I just referred to now. So far these three 
leading men--we call them the Triumvirate--made up of General 
Suharto, General Nasution and Adam Malik, and the Sultan of 
Djogjakarta, make a good team indeed and General Suharto has 
the wide respect as a leader. Malik commands widespread 
admiration for his tactical brilliance and for how to get 
things done as well as for his general views and philosophy. I 
think the Sultan of Djogjakarta is widely liked if not beloved 
because he comes from central Java where indeed most of the 
resistance to the modernization takes place and where President 
Sukarno has most of his strength.
    Senator Aiken. He speaks for industry.
    Ambassador Green. He does, indeed, and he is a very nice 
gentleman and I think anyone here would agree. Together they 
make up a very good team, I think.

                      QUALITIES OF THE NEW LEADERS

    As far as our overall--I must just say one more thing about 
this team. One of the qualities that seems to me that they all 
have in common is that they are working for the country and not 
for themselves. In general, President Sukarno, if he is ever 
held up in the judgment of history, it will seem to me his 
greatest failing was that he was out for his own glory, a 
policy of self-glorification, and the people were the victims 
of this policy. These people are approaching their tasks not 
for their own personal gain, but for the gain of the country.
    Another thing about them is determination. Because there 
had been so many people killed in this last year or two in 
Indonesia, and because in a way there is a terrible retribution 
if the Communists or their friends ever get back again, they 
are more determined that they have to succeed. Human survival 
is at stake here.
    Another quality it seems to me is moderation, pragmatism. I 
have seen the same thing throughout East Asia in the last few 
years. It has been the movement from the ideological attachment 
of the first generation of revolutionary leaders to the 
modernists who are basically pragmatists and are concerned with 
the problems of modernization and development as opposed to the 
problems of a country winning its independence. This country 
has gained its independence now.
    These are qualities of leadership and to me they are very 
important ones. They are men we can talk with and deal with 
reasonably.

                     U.S. POLICIES TOWARD INDONESIA

    Now, as far as our own policies towards Indonesia are 
concerned, basically we believe exactly what the Indonesian 
leadership believes in. We believe in the unity of Indonesia. I 
started right out with that because there has been some 
question in the past. We believe in the unity. We believe in 
the progress and stability, political-economic stability, of 
Indonesia. These are basic policies. Those, of course, are the 
policies of the new government, too, and when we say why do 
Indonesians and Americans get along, it seems to me one of the 
basic reasons we get along with the new government is we are 
basically attached to the same objectives and principles.
    I think if I may say so, as a matter of personal judgment, 
very privately, of course, I think they appreciate what we are 
doing in Vietnam. Certainly they are deadly opposed to the 
Communists and they are opposed to Peking's policies. As far as 
the policies for carrying out these broad objectives are 
concerned, obviously they need assistance badly as I have just 
said.
    It falls principally in the economic sector. And also I 
think certain civic actions support, not with lethal weapons, 
but for certain spare parts and other things to help them get 
with the civic action program. These are going to be involved.
    Now, we have a great opportunity in Indonesia because we 
started with the tabula rasa--all the aid was practically wound 
up--of trying to approach our problems on as broad a 
multilateral basis as possible. This may not be possible the 
first year or the second year, but because we are already 
talking with these other creditor group countries in Tokyo, 
Paris, now Amsterdam, and since you have to approach the whole 
problem of the debt rescheduling and further assistance, really 
it is one single problem. We are getting more and more 
agreement on the principles involved in assistance to Indonesia 
and we want Indonesia to come up with the help of the 
International Monetary Fund, again part, you might say, of a 
multilateral approach, with what are indeed their most urgent 
needs, have these things carefully reviewed by the INF, and 
then these things put up to the other countries so they can 
decide in what ways they can assist Indonesia in the most 
meaningful way possible.
    I am very hopeful that this approach will work. If we do, I 
think we can avoid lots of the troubles and pitfalls of the 
past.

                           A SENSE OF MISSION

    I mentioned specific action just now. It seems to me that 
there is particular relevance to the needs for civil action 
programs in Indonesia because the military have all this 
knowhow. They have all this equipment, and, of course, they 
have the authority as well.
    Meanwhile they have ended confrontation. They had to 
mothball almost all this fleet they have got from the Soviet 
Union and a result of all that is that a lot of officers are 
without jobs. It is important that they have a sense of mission 
and that the mission relates the needs of the people, and they 
have turned to us and asked us for help in that regard. I have 
discussed this thing in Washington. I think there is increasing 
recognition of the importance of helping them out on a low-
cost, high-impact program, especially in central and Eastern 
Java where most of the people live.
    I might say that 70 percent of the Indonesian people live 
on the island of Java which you can see is but a small slice of 
the geography of the vast sprawling country, larger than the 
rest of Southeast Asia put together. And I think that we will 
have other advantages as well, tactical advantages, in our 
personal relationships with the military and of helping 
preserve the same kinds of approach and attitude.
    Well, if I could just wind up because I know you have lots 
of questions, Senator. I just wanted to end up by saying, as I 
said to you in the beginning before some of your colleagues 
arrived, it has been a tremendous year and a half of transition 
and the transition in my opinion has been almost uniformly for 
the good: the confrontation over; the rejoining of the United 
Nations; the launching of what so far has been an effective 
stabilization program; the banning of communism from Indo-China 
and, of course, it has problems, as I said, with their 
relations with the Soviet Union and for the overall; the new 
leadership and qualities of the new leaders; for those things I 
think we have much to be thankful. I think we have a good group 
we can work with. I don't think there is any group we can 
expect on the present scene or in the predictable future that 
will be as good as this one. I hope we will be able to give 
them the requisite help, along with other countries, doing it 
as much as possible with this multilateral approach that I know 
you have discussed in this committee.

                   AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL IN INDONESIA

    Senator Lausche. Thank you. I just want to put a few 
questions to inform those members who were not present when you 
began to testify about what you said.
    What is the significance of July 21st that you mentioned?
    Ambassador Green. That is simply the date I arrived in 
Indonesia, having been confirmed in the next room.
    Senator Case. What could be more pertinent?
    Senator Lausche. Now, then, you stated there was a 
tremendous and miraculous change between what you saw when you 
came and what the condition is now.
    Ambassador Green. For which I bear no responsibility.

                        CHINESE-INDONESIAN AXIS

    Senator Lausche. Now, then, you spoke about an axis. The 
Peking-Hanoi----
    Ambassador Green. Pyongyang-Jakarta axis.
    Senator Lausche. And that was in the making.
    Ambassador Green. Sukarno announced this on August 17, 
1965. He said that we had this axis. I am not sure it was ever 
worked out in any formal way, but he was boasting that there 
was such an axis.
    Senator Lausche. Peking-Hanoi,----
    Ambassador Green. The axis actually had five countries 
involved. Indonesia, China, Red China, North Vietnam, North 
Korea, and Cambodia. But I might say he never consulted 
Cambodia and Monsignor was quite angry when he heard about it.
    Senator Lausche. That was the axis that was being 
discussed.
    Ambassador Green. He announced it when Chen Yi was there as 
his distinguished advisor.

                            INDONESIAN COUP

    Senator Lausche. When did the coup occur?
    Ambassador Green. September 30, in the wee hours of the 
morning. Actually, October 1st.
    Senator Lausche. And the object of the coup was to 
eliminate the seven military leaders.
    Ambassador Green. That is right.
    Senator Lausche. They eliminated five, but two survived?
    Ambassador Green. Correct.
    Senator Lausche. And the survival of the two produced this 
encouraging situation that now prevails.
    Ambassador Green. If two generals had not survived, 
Nasution and Suharto, it is possible that no one would have 
moved rapidly and quashed the coup.
    Senator Lausche. Now, then, after that they took pictures 
of the hideous brutalities that were committed upon these five.
    Ambassador Green. Yes, sir.
    Senator Lausche. And the nation became informed about it 
and with that there was seething indignation and a purpose to 
eliminate the Communists. You estimate 300,000 were killed. The 
present calculation is that there were 500,000.
    Ambassador Green. Some people think there were 500,000. 
Some think there were more. Some think less. But I would up my 
estimate from 300,000.
    Senator Lausche. Now, there was economic chaos produced by 
Sukarno leaving a debt of $2,700 million.
    Ambassador Green. Right.
    Senator Lausche. The nations who are creditors have 
extended the time of the payment of debts, but in addition to 
that, there is need of $225 million of new foreign aid.
    Ambassador Green. That is right.
    Senator Lausche. And it is a purpose that that foreign aid 
may be provided by us and other nations of the world.
    Now, all right. Mike?
    Senator Mansfield. I have no questions.

                 U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA

    Senator Sparkman. Just a question. Is there any military 
included in that request? Military assistance?
    Ambassador Green. In that figure of $225 million? No, sir.
    Senator Sparkman. Does Indonesia look for military 
assistance?
    Ambassador Green. It does.
    Senator Sparkman. Ought we to give it?
    Ambassador Green. Now, I must correct my statement. When I 
said $225 million, if you are including in that figure 
assistance from the Soviet Union as well, which I believe it 
would be, the Indonesians would like to get some spare parts 
for military equipment that they had already received from the 
Soviet bloc. So that would be part of it. But not a major part, 
a small part.
    Senator Sparkman. Now, let me ask you----
    Senator Case. In this $225 million calculation--is that 
overall or just for----
    Ambassador Green. That is overall. And that $225 million, 
as I say, I was hitting between two outside figures of $160 
million to $300 million, something in that range. But $225 
million would be acceptable.

                         ROLE OF GEN. NASUTION

    Senator Sparkman. We used to hear a good bit about a man 
named Nasution.
    Ambassador Green. Yes.
    Senator Sparkman. What has happened to him?
    Ambassador Green. General Nasution, who was one of the two 
surviving generals----.
    Senator Sparkman. Is he one that you named?
    Ambassador Green. That is right.
    Senator Sparkman. He and Suharto were the two that 
survived.
    Ambassador Green. That is right. But Suharto has moved out 
into the No. 1 position and General Nasution is the president 
of this MPRS, constituent assembly, or super Parliament, 
whatever you want to call it.
    Senator Lausche. John, may I ask him to redescribe what 
they showed to the people of the country that infuriated them 
into taking the lives of these 300,000. You spoke about the 
bodies and the alligator pits and so on.
    Ambassador Green. Yes. What had happened was that these 
murdered generals--there were five of them--one or two had been 
shot and killed right at the beginning, but three of them at 
least were not dead when they picked them up. They took them up 
to the Halim Air Base and there these three surviving generals 
were tortured to death, slashed slowly to death by Gerwani, 
which is the Communist women's organization. When their 
lacerated bodies, which meanwhile had been dumped into the 
crocodile hole which is the name of sort of a pit down there, 
when they had been exhumed three or four days later, the army 
saw to it that pictures of this grisly scene were widely 
publicized all around the country. Meanwhile, in the 
countryside where the village folk had been living under the 
increasing pressures of the Communists, the atmosphere was 
already one of dry tinder and this was the spark that lit the 
whole thing and sent it into such violent conflagration.
    Senator Sparkman. Some of General Nasution's children were 
killed.
    Ambassador Green. His daughter was killed, and this is very 
material, Senator, because this produced something of an 
emotional reaction. This little girl was an innocent victim, 
shot to death.
    Senator Lausche. Frank?

                        FOREIGN AID TO INDONESIA

    Senator Carlson. Just one or two questions. How much 
foreign aid are we giving now, if any?
    Ambassador Green. We are.
    Senator Carlson. Grants in aid and loans?
    Ambassador Green. We are giving the Indonesians about $48 
million or $49 million in P.L. 480, Title V assistance. These 
are dollar sales.
    This represents mostly cotton, 225,000 bales plus 100,000 
tons of rice. This already has been agreed to. All of it hasn't 
arrived yet, but most of it is there by now.
    In addition to that, there is $10 million in a spare parts 
loan again, to be repaid in 20 years, I believe.
    In addition to that, maybe there is a million dollars or so 
in grant assistance for educational purposes as well as for a 
food-for-work program which is really grant in aid, although it 
is provided in the form of cracked corn and vegetable oil.

                         REASONS FOR SOVIET AID

    Senator Carlson. In view of the fact that so many of the 
Communists were killed during the blood bath, how can we expect 
the Soviet Union to give aid or continue to give aid?
    Ambassador Green. Because they have put such a tremendous 
investment in Asia I suppose they want it covered. It is a 
terribly important country, the fifth largest in the world. 
Some people say the third richest in the world. And the Soviets 
have, as I pointed out, invested $1.4 billion in aid. They want 
to cover that.
    Also I think they are hopeful that in the long run there 
will be a recovery of the Communist Party. Meanwhile they damn 
the Chinese for having driven the Communist Party in this 
direction and they sort of damn us in a very faint way for 
being imperialists, and maybe we are getting in too close with 
the new government. They keep making rumbles on this from 
Moscow, but I think if I were in the Soviet position, I would 
be acting very much the way they do.
    Now, they are obviously deeply perplexed. It is not easy 
for them to give assistance to Indonesia when Indonesia is 
banning the Communist Party.

                       FOREIGN INVESTMENT WELCOME

    One thing I would like to mention, Mr. Chairman, is that 
one of the things the new government is welcoming is foreign 
investment. This is another 180 degree change in policy. The 
first conversation I had with General Suharto on May 27, 1966, 
he raised the question of how they were going to develop the 
outer islands. I said I felt private investment, foreign 
investment, was the soundest way. There wasn't that kind of 
money. The government didnt have that kind of money. Well, not 
as a result of that, but I merely mention it, this was the 
first time the subject was discussed with the General. Now they 
have changed their foreign investment policy to attract foreign 
capital investment, as a result of which the Hotel Indonesia is 
jam packed with potential foreign investors out there looking 
into the possibilities.
    Meanwhile, the law has been changed to favor foreign 
investment and protect foreign investors, and they have 
discovered, they think, oil in the Java Sea, no point deeper 
than 180 feet, and if this oil finding turns out to be what 
they think it is, maybe a second Gulf of Mexico.
    Senator Lausche. Mike.
    Senator Mansfield. Nothing.
    Senator Lausche. Karl?

                 RELATIONS BETWEEN SUHARTO AND NASUTION

    Senator Mundt. Curiously enough, of all places, we have a 
lot of South Dakota businessmen out in Indonesia. How they ever 
found it I don't know, but I have been in close touch with them 
and they are pretty high on this Nasution. They seem to feel 
that if elections were held, he might wind up as the President, 
as the best counter against the Communists rather than Suharto, 
a fine fellow and honest, but who doesn't seem to have the 
outgoing personality that appeals to the masses.
    Would you comment on that?
    Ambassador Green. General Nasution has a bit of this 
charisma quality maybe, and certainly Mrs. Nasution does, too. 
They are both highly popular. But I think there is no question 
that General Suharto is very much the man the people are 
looking to these days for leadership, that General Nasution has 
been in charge of the army many years and he is senior in the 
army ranks. The relation between Suharto and Nasution is good. 
Nasution comes from Sumatro for one thing, and Suharto comes 
from Java. Since 70 percent of the people come from Java, this 
is an important factor.
    I would hope very much that Nasution and Suharto could 
continue their harmonious relationship. It is productive, 
helpful. One thing Nasution has lost a bit of standing with 
students for is because in November-December, 1965, when he was 
in charge, he stood back from facing down Sukarno. Then Sukarno 
dismissed him in the cabinet shift of February 23, 1966, and 
that was quite a blow to his prestige. He recovered a good deal 
of that prestige. He is more outspoken in his opposition to 
Sukarno than is Suharto.

                     COULD SUKARNO RETURN TO POWER

    Senator Mundt. Can you envision any contingency whereby 
Sukarno might get back into power?
    Ambassador Green. Oh, I could. It is conceivable that he 
could come back if their whole stabilization program should go 
on the rocks and they couldn't make a go of things, and if the 
new order, as they call the group around General Suharto, was 
not able to maintain the unity, which is terribly important. If 
things began to slip up, then Sukarno might look pretty good in 
retrospect. So that there is a possibility of coming back.
    I think the chances are definitely against him, but I don't 
think we should rule it out.
    Senator Lausche. Will you tell Senator Mundt what you 
stated a moment ago about there being a bit of craftiness in 
the operation of Suharto in allowing Sukarno to still remain in 
the picture.
    Ambassador Green. Yes. His reason for keeping Sukarno on is 
partly this. He doesn't want to risk civil war, although I 
don't think that that would be the result of moving sharply 
against Sukarno today. Nevertheless, that has been one reason, 
partly because Sukarno was the old commander-in-chief, the 
George Washington of Indonesia, as they always say.
    But I think it is also because he wanted to use Sukarno as 
a scapegoat, to have him there so that he could be the focus of 
resentment. After all, he is the man who is responsible for 
this mess. Leave him on and people are reminded of that fact. 
If he goes in exile, by this time people might be criticizing 
the new government for some of the problems which really are 
described as Sukarno's folly.
    Also you maintain better unity in what you call the new 
order, which is made up of rather disparate forces like the 
military and the students, the business community, if they have 
a common target and they are all against Sukarno, most of them. 
This helps to make unity.
    So I think in his rather clever Javanese way Suharto has 
handled this thing quite well. But, you know, you can't go on 
playing that game forever. There comes a time when your 
administration can suffer, you might say almost from tired--
when you have to spend so much time putting out the fire 
Sukarno lights, hand-holding, going to palace functions which 
are interminable, and also because students begin to get pretty 
angry if you haven't moved against him in a final way.
    It is also confusing to the outside world--I have been 
around the country just now talking with a lot of people--that 
Sukarno is lingering on this way. It does confuse a lot of 
people as to what the new Indonesia adds up to.
    Senator Mundt. That is all.
    Senator Lausche. Al.

                         STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS

    Senator Gore. Well, Mr. Ambassador, you speak of the 
students in the sense of organization, of unity. Is this a 
rabble or is there some organization in this?
    Ambassador Green. The students are extremely well 
organized, not throughout the country but in the West Java area 
and some of the other main population centers of Indonesia. 
They are very well organized. There are two principal 
organizations, the Kami--not our kind of Commies--these are the 
university students, and the Kappi which are the high school 
students.
    These two groups are very violently anti-Sukarno and anti-
Communist, and so forth. You will find slogans put out by the 
students that are the same throughout the country on the same 
day, which shows you how well they are organized.
    They are in close touch with General Suharto and the 
military. They have been working very closely with him. They 
haven't always agreed. Sometimes they are restrictive, but I 
would say they had acted in a very responsible way so far. They 
haven't been a rabble.
    Now, there are other students that aren't members of these 
groups, particularly in a place like Surabia, Eastern Java, 
that are under the domination of other elements that are 
against the Kami. But the Kami and Kappi, these two huge 
student organizations, nevertheless represent the increasing 
view of the student population of Indonesia and today command 
good slice of the student population's support.

                           A VOLATILE ELEMENT

    Senator Gore. The reason I asked the question, we see ``the 
students'' in many parts of the world being propagandized and 
utilized. It seems to be a very volatile element and might be a 
source of danger as well as strength.
    Ambassador Green. Suharto recognizes that very point. He 
doesn't want to have Parliament in the streets. He recognizes 
the students' feelings, on the other hand. This is one of the 
reasons why Suharto has wanted to move in a constitutional way. 
This is a very important consideration, that he wants to have 
enough forward motion against Sukarno and his ilk to chip away 
from their power and debase them eventually, but he wants to do 
it in a constitutional way, partly so that the students don't 
get the idea that this is the way to change governments.
    Senator Gore. Of course, we see another example of 
students, youth, in the Red Guard in Red China. Now, they can 
be put to evil as well as good purposes.
    About two or three years ago, Mr. Ambassador, we were told 
in executive session that we had continued small amounts of 
military aid to the military leaders largely to keep liaison 
with them, that several of this group that were liquidated had 
received their military education in the United States, and 
that this aid at the proper and crucial time might prove to 
have been very valuable to us.
    Can you shed any light on that now?

                     PARTICIPANTS TRAINING PROGRAM

    Ambassador Green. I think our Participants Training Program 
in the past has been very useful. There were about, oh, I 
guess, 8,000 or so Indonesian students in the United States, 
and this included several thousand of the military. And I do 
think this had a very important result. As I look back over our 
old aid program, it wasn't so bad after all. In fact, we did a 
pretty good job, I think. And there were some scatteration 
projects and all that kind of stuff. But one area where we did 
the best of all is in the human resources field, training of 
people.
    Senator Sparkman. One of those----
    Ambassador Green. This would be the Participants Training 
Program bringing people under either our AID program, or under 
the State Department Cultural Program, or under the Military 
Assistance Program.
    Senator Sparkman. One of those hangover programs was also 
one of communications which I believe served a good end with 
the Armed Forces.
    Ambassador Green. Yes, that is right.
    Senator Sparkman. During the revolution.

                      PHILCO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

    Senator Lausche. Speak on that because they came before us 
specially in this room----
    Senator Sparkman. To continue it.
    Senator Lausche [continuing]. Urging that we provide them 
with money to install a communications system which was 
presented to us as being essential to keeping a line in 
Indonesia. You know of what I speak?
    Ambassador Green. I know exactly what you are referring to. 
You are referring--you are talking about the Philco 
Troposcatter System. Well, this system--I am not enough of a 
specialist to judge this one. This is up to the Indonesians to 
judge on their own account.
    The trouble with Philco was it was very expensive and it 
would take a long, long time to build it. There may be cheaper 
and better ways of building a communications network for 
Indonesia. I grant that the building of a good communications 
network is essential and it is true that the link that was 
already established under Philco between Jakarta and Bandung 
was a fairly important factor in the quick reaction of these 
two surviving generals.
    Senator Lausche. That is the point.
    Senator Gore. Yes. So overall you say----
    Ambassador Green. But I think you have to be careful on 
this one because there are other kinds of communications 
networks. Some of them may be considerably cheaper and more 
within the means of the Indonesians to support.

                        CONTINUATION OF U.S. AID

    Senator Gore. To come back to the overall question of aid, 
is it your conclusion that the continuation of U.S. aid 
programs even in miniscule amounts had considerable 
significance ultimately in the showdown?
    Ambassador Green. I think that the aid program which we had 
of $800 million of U.S. assistance--maybe in the 10 or 12 year 
period up until 1965--I think it was a good aid program by and 
large. There were some things that obviously weren't as good, 
but by and large it was a good aid program. The Indonesians 
knew it and today in retrospect it looks darn good because out 
of the $800 million that we gave Indonesia at that time, only 
29 percent of it was repayable in dollars. So that we didn't 
leave them saddled with a debt the way the Soviet Union did, 
for example.
    Therefore, that is one factor.
    Our training program, as I said before, left a long term 
good result. The turnkey plus projects we had for helping to 
build a factory with another one of our loans, and then we saw 
to it that that factory was managed by our people until they 
were prepared to take it over. Then they took it over, and when 
they took it over, they were able to operate it as indeed they 
are today.
    The two big projects that we helped them with in fertilizer 
and cement are operating at almost 100 percent capacity and 
they are the only two big factories in the country of that size 
operating anywhere near 100 percent capacity because of the way 
this thing was handled.

                            MULTILATERAL AID

    Senator Case. Mr. Ambassador, I don't know whether I missed 
something coming in late or not, but have you laid out a 
specific program or is this general background on the role of 
foreign aid?
    Ambassador Green. What I was talking of was in just general 
terms, but we haven't reached a point of setting out 
specifically what we will do in this calendar year of this next 
fiscal year. We are talking about it still in the Department, 
but as you can see from my remarks, I think it is very 
important that we lend a helping hand to Indonesia, but we do 
it as far as possible in consultation with other countries, 
other creditors, and that we do our share, but we see to it 
that other countries do theirs as well.
    Senator Case. This is an ideal time, isn't it, to get 
multilateral operations going because we are doing nothing now.
    Ambassador Green. Yes, it is. To the extent that it is 
possible to do.
    Senator Case. We have to realize----
    Ambassador Green. We are already discussing these things 
with other creditors and we don't want, for example, a country 
to give Indonesia short term credit because that is just going 
to compound the problems of the debt rescheduling two or three 
years from now. We want to be sure that the terms of assistance 
other countries give to Indonesia comports with their overall 
debt problem and rescheduling problem and our own assistance, 
and we are hopeful that the Soviet bloc will give Indonesia the 
kind of debt relief that we are giving. I think they will from 
what I have heard.
    Senator Mundt. If they don't, are you going to change your 
mind about giving relief?
    Ambassador Green. Well, I think this is going to raise a 
very serious problem obviously, and I think the Indonesians 
know that.

                      INDONESIAN SELF-SUFFICIENCY

    Senator Case. How close are they to being self-sufficient 
in food?
    Ambassador Green. Well----
    Senator Case. Is this one of the----
    Ambassador Green. The growing population of Java is the 
reason why they are in a food deficit position today. The 
population increases there over 2\1/2\ percent every year. It 
is one of the most overcrowded bits of real estate in the world 
today. And they live in the illusion that people can move to 
these outlying islands. They don't figure the tremendous cost 
of resettlement which makes this prohibitive. Also people that 
go to these islands find it forbidding and they tend to come 
back.
    Senator Case. You mean cold?
    Ambassador Green. No. They find that there is no rice--
other kinds of food. They miss their old homestead, rather 
typical.
    Now, as the population of Java increases, it has moved from 
a position of at one time exporting rice to the outlying areas 
to a position where it exports nothing except officials and 
problems. And obviously there is a major problem in facing up 
to family planning, or whatever you want to call it.
    The Indonesians are too preoccupied with other questions 
right now that they really haven't done much in this field.
    Senator Case. This is a good time to get going on that, 
too.
    Ambassador Green. That is right.
    Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Lausche. Senator Cooper?

                 COMMUNISTS KILLED DURING COUNTER-COUP

    Senator Cooper. You said an estimate of 300,000 to 500,000 
were killed. Is it correct that 25 percent of the population in 
Indonesia is Communist?
    Ambassador Green. You could argue that at one point there 
were as many as 25 percent of the Indonesians who in one way or 
another supported either the Communist Party or one of its 
front groups.
    Senator Cooper. The Communist Party at one time did have 
support of many peasants, people in the countryside, also the 
army.
    Ambassador Green. The Communist Party itself had 3 million 
at one time. It now appears that some of those members weren't 
very strong members, but anyway, it had 3 million membership, 
and then outside that 3 million, there were about 22 million or 
so who supported these different front activities.
    Senator Cooper. Java was one of the chief seats of 
Communist strength.
    Ambassador Green. Yes, sir.

                         SUKARNO IS DISCREDITED

    Senator Cooper. What you said a while ago, they couldn't 
hold up the fact that Sukarno still had some strength, that 
plus the large number of Communists remaining--would you say 
there is still some danger of a return of Sukarno?
    Ambassador Green. I doubt the danger of Sukarno's return is 
very great. I would say that the odds were almost overwhelming 
against Sukarno getting back on the scene again. He is very 
widely discredited and the very fact that things were so bad in 
the past--he let things run so badly down hill and they are 
suffering so much as a result. It has tended to discredit his 
image even further.
    He has refused to denounce the Communists and this, of 
course, has affected him even more.
    Now, these 25 million people who supported the Communists 
one way or another, a lot of those were people just sort of 
being on the bandwagon for their own safety. They were 
anticipating a slide into the Communist camp and they wanted to 
protect themselves come the events.

                         PROBLEMS WITH MALAYSIA

    Senator Cooper. Has the problem with Malaysia been settled?
    Ambassador Green. I think it has been settled. There are 
somethings, loose ends that have to be tied up. They don't have 
normal diplomatic relations now with Malaysia, but the 
relationships between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur are I must say 
very, very close indeed. They are fellow Moslem countries and 
in a way they are two brothers who have discovered the folly of 
their having been at each other's throats for so long.
    Senator Cooper. You think the present government is making 
progress economically and in a fiscal way to give some strength 
to Indonesia.
    Ambassador Green. Yes.
    Senator Cooper. To correct some of the chaos that you 
described.
    Ambassador Green. Very definitely. And better than I would 
have anticipated three or four months ago.
    Senator Lausche. Do you have another question?

                     DEFINING INDONESIAN COMMUNISM

    Senator Case. Just one question. You used--you use it all 
the time--what do you mean by Communist? I am not being funny. 
I really mean when you say this you have a specific thing in 
your mind. Are you talking about the influence of China, the 
influence of Russia?
    Ambassador Green. Well, each time I use it it might be in a 
little different context, but when I was talking about PKI, the 
efforts to seize power, I was referring to the organization, 
the leaders. The leaders in Indonesia, but operating I think 
with the aid and comfort and fiscal support in some ways from 
Communist China.
    Senator Case. Pretty much Chinese? Is Russia in there at 
all?
    Ambassador Green. No, I do think Russia has been 
disillusioned, became increasingly disillusioned with the PKI, 
the Communist Party of Indonesia, because it came very 
definitely under Peking's influence and Russia therefore moved 
from a position of supporting the PKI to a position of 
supporting the Indonesian government. This happened in about 
1963, 1964, 1965, in that period.
    Senator Case. Was Russia involved in the coup?
    Ambassador Green. No, in no way.
    Senator Case. Thank you.

                   WAS THE U.S. INVOLVED IN THE COUP?

    Senator Fulbright. Were we involved in the coup?
    Ambassador Green. No, sir.
    Senator Fulbright. Were we involved in the previous attempt 
at a coup about four years ago?
    Ambassador Green. No. I don't think so.
    Senator Fulbright. CIA played no part in it?
    Ambassador Green. You mean 1958?
    Senator Fulbright. Yes.
    Ambassador Green. Well, I think there was definitely some 
sympathy for the break-away group.
    Senator Fulbright. We had no part in that?
    Ambassador Green. I was not involved in the events and I am 
afraid I cannot answer.
    Senator Fulbright. You don't know about it. You haven't 
heard about it?
    Ambassador Green. I don't know for sure what happened.
    Senator Fulbright. They don't tell you about any of the 
past history in these places when you are assigned to a 
country?
    Ambassador Green. Well, I can glean a number of things, 
Senator.
    Senator Fulbright. You don't know whether CIA was involved 
or not. And we were not involved in this coup.
    Ambassador Green. No, sir. Definitely not.
    Senator Fulbright. We have been told that this would not 
have taken place had we not been doing what we were doing in 
Vietnam. Is that correct?
    Ambassador Green. Oh, I wouldn't say it is correct to say 
it wouldn't have taken place. I think that as I was saying 
perhaps before you came in----
    Senator Fulbright. I'm sorry I was late. I had another 
engagement and I couldn't be in on time.

                      A FORWARD FLOW OF A RED TIDE

    Ambassador Green. I think when these two surviving generals 
faced this tremendous Communist menace, several days after the 
abortive coup, that they had a tremendous problem because not 
only did you have this important Communist Party and all these 
sympathizers we were just talking about here, too but the 
Communists had infiltrated into the armed forces. As a matter 
of fact, one of the first things that the military had to do 
was to relieve several battalions in central Java and put them 
into obscure locations where they couldn't be in harm's way. 
And, of course, the air force commander was involved in the 
coup. And so was all of that, and Sukarno's feelings being what 
they were suspected of being, sympathetic to the Communists, 
the new emerging government, Suharto and Nasution, were faced, 
as I say, with a tremendous problem. Had there been at that 
point a forward flow of a Red tide which might have been the 
result of our not being firm in Vietnam, then I think events 
could have developed in a somewhat different way.
    I think for one thing the generals might not have been so 
determined and I think the Communists might have been more 
emboldened to resist.
    Senator Fulbright. What do you mean by the forward flow of 
the Red tide? That is very colorful language. What is the Red 
tide?
    Senator Case. You have to write books if you are going to 
use language like that.

                      CHINA AND RUSSIA IN VIETNAM

    Ambassador Green. I don't write books, but what I meant was 
that if there hadn't been any interposition of American 
strength between the Communist pressures from the north and 
Indonesia itself, if the Indonesian leadership had felt that 
there was no protection and in fact China was the wave of the 
future and that there was a threat from the north----
    Senator Fulbright. Is it China you believe that is 
occupying Vietnam?
    Ambassador Green. I don't think it is occupying Vietnam, 
but I think it is supporting North Vietnam.
    Senator Fulbright. Yes, it is. And so is Russia. Russia is 
supporting them more than China now, isn't it?
    Ambassador Green. I don't know.
    Senator Fulbright. Wouldn't you say the Russian support 
today is greater, more valuable to Vietnam than the Chinese?
    Ambassador Green. I don't know the answer to that.
    Senator Fulbright. You said a moment ago the Russians had 
shifted from supporting the Chinese in Indonesia to supporting 
the government, is that right? Didn't you say a moment ago that 
the Russians had shifted their position from support of the PKI 
to the support of the government?
    Ambassador Green. That is right.
    Senator Fulbright. Or did I misunderstand?
    Ambassador Green. That is correct.

                       CHINESE OBJECTIVES IN ASIA

    Senator Fulbright. Don't you consider the Russians part of 
the Red tide, or is it only the Chinese?
    Ambassador Green. Not the way I was using the words Red 
tide then--figuratively.
    Senator Fulbright. Are only the Chinese Communists bad and 
not the Russians?
    Ambassador Green. I look upon the Russian and the Chinese 
objectives in this part of the world as quite different. I look 
upon the Chinese purposes as more expansionist than Russia in 
this part of the world.
    Senator Fulbright. Why do you?
    Ambassador Green. Because I don't see any evidence that the 
Russians are on the move to take over any of this part of the 
world.
    Senator Fulbright. Well, what is the evidence that the 
Chinese are moving to take it over?
    Ambassador Green. I think that they are supporting directly 
or indirectly, for example, the troubles in the Northeast 
Thailand front and their broadcasts and statements are all of 
an incendiary nature to support the so-called wars of 
liberation in this part of the world.
    Senator Fulbright. Do you think that broadcasting 
statements are in themselves aggression?
    Ambassador Green. Well, if they say it and if they appear 
to mean it, why wouldn't it be so, particularly since they are 
giving aid and comfort to the so-called Thai liberation 
movement?
    Senator Fulbright. The Thai liberation. You shifted to the 
Thais. How many Chinese do they have in Thailand in this 
attack?
    Ambassador Green. I don't know of any Chinese that they 
have.
    Senator Fulbright. No.
    Ambassador Green. But this is the question of giving 
support by radio broadcasts, propaganda, and I don't know what 
kind of agents they have operating down there. It is because 
this Thai--this group that they have in Hunan Province, the 
Thai liberation group there, that has been under the Chinese 
Communist wing for some time now and have intentions for taking 
over Thailand.

                        NO USE OF CHINESE TROOPS

    Senator Fulbright. Do you know of any Chinese troops that 
are outside of their border in this area?
    Ambassador Green. No.
    Senator Fulbright. Outside of their border in any area?
    Ambassador Green. Well, they have been in the case of India 
but they came down----
    Senator Fulbright. Presently?
    Ambassador Green. At present, I don't know of any Chinese.
    Senator Fulbright. Well, I don't know what you mean by the 
Red tide is slowing over their area.
    Ambassador Green. Well, I didn't say that the Red tide was 
just China. I said that the Red tide was Hanoi, Peking. I 
didn't--I said I didn't think it was Russia.

                   IS VIETNAM A THREAT TO INDONESIA?

    Senator Fulbright. Well, then, leaving out China and 
Russia, do you think that Vietnam as such, either North or 
South, is a threat to Indonesian security?
    Ambassador Green. Indirectly. I think if North Vietnam were 
to take over by force South Vietnam, have success in that 
endeavor, that it would have an impact upon----
    Senator Fulbright. What would----
    Ambassador Green.--Indonesians.
    Senator Fulbright. Do you think there would be a threat to 
Indonesia?
    Ambassador Green. Well, it is hard to say. It is a 
speculative situation.
    Senator Fulbright. Well, if you can't say----
    Ambassador Green. I can't say in exactly what way.
    Senator Fulbright. I can't either, but you leave the 
impression that there is a great threat. I am just trying to 
develop why you think so. Do they have any navy or air force? 
Could they attack Indonesia?
    Ambassador Green. I think if they succeed in their 
aggressive efforts and take over South Vietnam, if this is the 
condition which you propose to me, if they get away with it, I 
think that other countries in the area will feel that much less 
secure, that is all. They will not act with the same degree of 
determination that in the case of Indonesia your Communists, 
pro-Communist groups there, would be the more emboldened and it 
will have a certain sapping affect.

                     BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AID

    Senator Fulbright. On the aid, you are advocating a 
bilateral program with Indonesia? Direct aid from the United 
States?
    Ambassador Green. I said I believed that to the maximum 
extent possible we should approach this problem on a 
multilateral basis. I didn't think we would be able to achieve 
that maybe this year or even the next, but we should make every 
effort to do so. I therefore thought this year we would have to 
approach it on a bilateral basis, but to pursue a policy of 
maximum coordination of our information; disclosure of what we 
intend to do and other countries are intending to do, and to 
try to bring multilateral organizations like the Asian 
Development Bank, the IMF, into the act as far as possible.
    Senator Fulbright. How much are you advocating? Do you know 
what they are asking for?
    Ambassador Green. They haven't asked us for a specific 
figure, but I said that their requirements might run in the 
range, let us say, of $225 million in net new foreign aid this 
calendar year and that I thought we should do our fair share, 
and I didn't attempt to say what that would be. And we should 
approach the problem in such a way to try to maximize foreign 
contributions.
    Senator Fulbright. How much military aid? Is that economic 
or both?
    Ambassador Green. I was talking there about economic aid. I 
am not recommending any military hardware; that is to say, any 
lethal weapons, but I do think a modest support of their civic 
action program would be desirable.
    Senator Fulbright. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Lausche. Any other questions?

                REIMBURSEMENT OF AMERICANS FOR PROPERTY

    Senator Aiken. I would like to ask one question.
    To what extent has Indonesia reimbursed Americans for 
expropriated property?
    Ambassador Green. Well, there has been no reimbursement of 
expropriated property simply because they haven't claimed to 
have expropriated any property. There were certain American 
companies that were forced out and in the case of the rubber 
companies actually they bought those assets of Goodyear and 
U.S. Rubber. They forced Goodyear out of the Bogor tire 
factory, but now Goodyear is talking about resuming management 
of the factory.
    They have established a board, interagency board, to 
discuss claims of any American investor who claims that his 
property has been forced out of his hands either with a view to 
compensation or with a view to restoration.
    Senator Aiken. Is the oil finding a ready market? Does what 
oil they produce find a ready market now?
    Ambassador Green. Yes, it does.
    Senator Aiken. Produced by American companies for the 
Indonesian government?
    Ambassador Green. That is right.
    Senator Aiken. What do the oil people mean when they say 
they felt they could handle that business better than the 
government could?
    Ambassador Green. Well, the American oil companies--there 
are two big ones, Caltex and Stanback--they have been studying 
operations now although they were almost forced out of business 
the year before last, and they are operating as a private 
company. They give the Indonesians 60 percent of the profits.
    Senator Aiken. And they are quite optimistic about not 
extending any serious loss, aren't they, in the long run?
    Ambassador Green. That is right. I think they were very 
worried at one time, one of our principal problems.

                            USE OF U.S. AID

    Senator Aiken. I was just wondering if we give the 
government their material aid, cash aid, whether that would be 
used to pay off, to pay for some of the expropriated property.
    Ambassador Green. No. I think that----
    Senator Aiken. You think it wouldn't. Not even the rubber 
people.
    Ambassador Green. No.

                       SUKARNO'S PLAN FOR AN AXIS

    Senator Lausche. To get the record complete, you began to 
state earlier the statements made by Sukarno about this axis of 
Indonesia, Hanoi and Cambodia, Peking and a fifth.
    Ambassador Green. Pyongyang, North Korea.
    Senator Lausche. What did Sukarno say on that subject? Did 
you say that he had made a statement?
    Ambassador Green. Oh, yes. He made it on August 17th. He 
merely announced where the country was going and that now they 
are establishing this axis. He mentioned those five capitals as 
being partners working together. He said it in the presence of 
hundreds of thousands of people, tens of thousands, in the 
physical presence, and over the radio and television to the 
whole country.
    Senator Lausche. That was a statement made----
    Ambassador Green. By him.
    Senator Lausche. Over the radio to all of the people of his 
country.
    Ambassador Green. Yes.
    Senator Lausche. That this axis was established.
    Ambassador Green. That is right.
    Senator Lausche. Identify the countries again in the axis.
    Ambassador Green. Communist China, North Korea, North 
Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia.
    Senator Lausche. Five countries.
    Ambassador Green. But he did it without ever asking 
Cambodia.
    Senator Lausche. Anything further?
    Senator Cooper. No. I think it was very fine to hear from 
you, so clear, so helpful.
    Senator Lausche. Thanks. Thanks very much for a very 
thorough report, and I am grateful to you.

                        U.S. POSITION IN VIETNAM

    I would like to put this question. In your opinion, would 
our position in Southeast Asia, if we pulled out of south 
Vietnam, be as formidable as it is now in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Taiwan and Japan?
    Ambassador Green. I think that it would be. Our strong 
stand in South Vietnam has provided a kind of shield behind 
which these countries have felt capable, emboldened to move 
ahead with trying to put their houses in order the way in fact 
this happened in Indonesia. Had there not been this 
interposition of American strength--people may not like this 
term--the Red tide, but I still do, I do not think that it is 
likely that the Indonesian leaders, the new military leaders, 
would have acted in as determined a way as they did.
    Now, I think it is very important that we not say this 
publicly because Indonesia wants to take credit for its own 
actions. We don't want to look as though we are always taking 
credit. That is why we haven't said it, but that is the way I 
feel.
    Senator Lausche. Yes, and I think you have exactly stated 
the position that we are in. But to me it seems that to claim 
that our presence did not give courage and strength to those 
people is absurd and cannot be maintained.
    Thanks very much.
    [Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]


              BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS

                              ----------                              


                        Friday, February 3, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
                        Subcommittee on Disarmament
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Gore (presiding), Fulbright (chairman of 
the full committee), Sparkman, Mansfield, Symington, Dodd, 
Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Aiken, and Cooper.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl and Mr. Bader, of the 
committee staff.
    Senator Gore. The committee will come to order.
    This afternoon the Subcommittee on Disarmament begins a 
series of hearings on the current disarmament and armament 
problems. It would appear that we have come to a critical 
moment in this general area. The country has before it 
enormously important decisions affecting not only our national 
security and allocation of our resources, but the whole 
organization of our economic and national life. I refer 
specifically to the immediate anti-ballistic missile question, 
but there are also important issues developing in the 
nonproliferation area as well as the sale of conventional arms.
    Chairman Fulbright shares the belief of the subcommittee 
that the subjects I have mentioned are of great importance and 
that it might be useful for the subcommittee to hold hearings.
    Because these issues are extremely complex, I believe it 
would be useful to explore the question of what we know--that 
is, what our government knows and what we do not know about 
what others are doing as a necessary background of knowledge to 
an examination of the policy implications of the decisions now 
under consideration. In order to ensure that we have a sound 
and accurate base of information on which to base our 
discussions and possible judgments, I have invited Mr. Helms of 
the Central Intelligence Agency to give to the subcommittee a 
thorough briefing.
    Mr. Helms, we are pleased to have you here this afternoon. 
Please be assured that we appreciate the sensitivity of the 
information you bring. Please proceed in your own way.

 STATEMENT OF RICHARD HELMS, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, 
ACCOMPANIED BY CARL E. DUCKETT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND 
      TECHNOLOGY, AND JOHN S. WARNER, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

    Mr. Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to 
introduce Mr. Carl Duckett, who is the Deputy Director for 
Science and Technology in the Central Intelligence Agency, who 
has come with me in the event you desire to ask me any highly 
technical questions about missiles and weapons and so forth.
    Senator Gore. Maybe for the sake of the record, he should 
give his full name and title.
    Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir. Mr. Carl Ernest Duckett, and I am 
the Deputy Director for Science and Technology of the CIA.
    Senator Clark. D-u-c-k-e-t-t?
    Mr. Duckett. That is correct, sir.
    Mr. Helms. Mr. Chairman, I understand you wish me to 
discuss today the military threat posed by the Soviet Union and 
Communist China, touching on the related economic and political 
considerations. I would also like to cover in very brief form 
some of the problems of nuclear proliferation in other 
countries.
    I want to give the general thrust of the present situation 
and also to cover what we believe to be the future trends.
    Now, we all recognize that we could spend an entire day on 
a detailed discussion of the strengths and the hardware of the 
Russian and Chinese military establishments. So I will attempt 
to cover this in the briefest compass I can and I hope will 
give it enough information so that it will enable you to ask 
the kinds of questions that will be of interest to you.

                     SOVIET STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCES

    First, I would like to cover the Soviet strategic attack 
forces.
ICBM's
    I. The new Soviet ICBM's--which we call the third 
generation--are coming into operational status now at a rapid 
rate.
    A. At this time last year, the count had been stable at 
about 225 for a good year and a half.
          1. The Soviets at that point had completed their 
        deployment of the first and second generation missiles.
          2. In 1964, however, they began their new program, 
        comprising two new missile systems.
    B. One of these, we call the SS-9. It is a large and 
accurate missile which can carry a [deleted] megaton warhead 
5,000 miles, or a [deleted] megaton warhead about 7,000 miles.
    C. The other, the SS-11, is less accurate and smaller. We 
estimate the maximum yield of its warhead at [deleted] 
megatons.
    II. The silos for these new ICBM's become operational, at 
present rate of construction, two years or little more after 
they are started. As a result, the estimated number of 
operational launchers has already moved up from that plateau of 
225, which I just mentioned, to about 385.
    A. Our current National Intelligence Estimate, issued about 
60 days ago, concludes that by the middle of this year the 
Soviet Union will have about 425 to 485 ICBM's ready to launch. 
By mid-1968, the figure should be 670 to 765.
          1. These short-term estimates, of course, can be 
        based on the number of silos already under 
        construction, making allowance for acceleration or 
        delay in the pace of completion.
    B. At longer range, we estimate that the Soviet ICBM force 
will have somewhere between 800 and 1,100 operational launchers 
four years from now, in mid-1971 to be specific.

                CHANGING CHARACTER OF SOVIET ICBM FORCE

    III. The numbers, however, do not tell the whole story. The 
present deployment is also changing the character of the Soviet 
ICBM force.
    A. First, it is going to be harder to knock out. All of the 
new launchers are in hardened silos with each silo at least 
three miles from its nearest neighbor.
          1. Two-thirds of the first and second generation 
        ICBM's were exposed on launching pads. [deleted]
          The new mix means that by the middle of next year, 
        about 80 percent of the operational launchers will be 
        hardened, and there will be [deleted]
    B. Secondly, the main emphasis of the new deployment is on 
the SS-11 system. By mid-1968, there may be as many as 400 of 
these, making up more than half of the Soviet force.
          1. The SS-9 system has the accuracy and the big 
        warhead needed to attack hardened military targets.
          2. The contrast, the SS-11, with less accuracy and a 
        much smaller warhead yield, is more suitable for large, 
        soft targets. In other words, it has been referred to 
        as a city buster.
          The Soviets, by putting their missile force in silos 
        and concentrating on the SS-11, are working for what we 
        call ``assured destruction''--that is, the capability 
        to destroy a significant portion of the population and 
        resources of the United States even if U.S. missiles 
        should strike first.
    IV. This improvement of strategic attack capabilities is 
bound to give the Soviet leaders greatly increased confidence 
that they have achieved a sufficient ``assured destruction'' 
capability to serve as a deterrent.
    A. We do not believe, however, that between now and the 
mid-1970s the Soviets themselves expect to be strong enough to 
consider the deliberate initiation of a war against the United 
States.

                      SOVIET CAPABILITY FOR ATTACK

    V. Let me review briefly the status of the remainder of the 
Soviet capability for strategic attack.
    First, Medium Range and Intermediate Range Ballistic 
Missiles:
    A. There have been no major changes during the past year in 
the Soviet Intermediate-range and Medium-range ballistic 
missile force.
          1. There are about 100 intermediate and 600 medium-
        range operational launchers.
          2. About 90 percent of the sites are in the Western 
        USSR, constituting a massive threat to Europe.
          3. We do not expect much change over the next 10 
        years in the size of the MRBM/IRBM force, but, again, 
        the character will probably change.
          4. As the existing systems become obsolete, launchers 
        on soft pads will be phased out. Present research and 
        development also suggests that the Soviets are working 
        for mobile systems, and solid fuel. They have paraded 
        prototypes of mobile missiles, including one which they 
        called a mobile ICBM, and they have tested a solid-
        fueled missile to about 3,000 miles, which is right on 
        the borderline between Intermediate and 
        Intercontinental range.
    Now, for the Soviet Submarine Force:
    B. It has a growing missile capability.
          1. A nuclear-powered submarine now under construction 
        is the first unit of a new class which will apparently 
        carry eight or more tubes for submerged launch of a new 
        missile with a range of 1,000 to 2,000 miles, and this 
        is a brand new submarine.
          Senator Gore. Is this single head or multiple head?
          Mr. Helms. Single head. We know of no multiple 
        warheads in the Soviet Union inventory.
          2. A few operational submarines have been converted 
        to fire a 700-mile ballistic missile while submerged.
          3. The rest of the missile units have to launch from 
        the surface.
          4. There are 36 submarines, with about 100 launchers 
        altogether for ballistic missiles, in the Soviet 
        submarine inventory. Most or these missiles have a 
        range of 350 miles.
          5. Another 47 submarines carry a total of about 250 
        cruise missiles, with the primary mission of attacking 
        naval task forces. This missile has a range of about 
        450 miles.
          6. About 45 of the 360 Soviet submarines are nuclear-
        powered. The power plants are noisier than ours, and 
        Soviet skippers slow down to less than 10 knots they 
        want to try to avoid detection.

                         SOVIET BOMBER PROGRAM

    Long Range Aviation:
    C. As for strategic air threat, Soviet Long Range Aviation 
now consists of 950 to 1,000 bomber and tanker aircraft. The 
number is declining slowly, and there has been no evidence of 
any new Soviet heavy bomber program.
          1. The Soviets have about 200 heavy bombers, some of 
        which are used as tankers. We estimate that they could 
        mount a strike of about 100 aircraft on two-way 
        missions against the United States.
          2. The rest of Long Range Aviation consists of 
        medium-range aircraft, featuring the super-sonic-dash 
        BLINDER medium bomber. We expect the mediums would be 
        used primarily to attack U.S. and allied targets on the 
        Eurasian landmass.
          3. The Air Force, however, has two major 
        reservations--that is our Air Force. One is that we 
        believe that long range aviation is likely to have a 
        new heavy bomber in the next few years. The other is 
        the Air Force calculation that in all-out war, 300 
        medium bombers could be used to supplement the 100 
        heavies in an attack on targets in the United States.
          I cite this because this is an Air Force disagreement 
        in the intelligence estimates, and I wanted you to be 
        aware of it.
          4. The Soviets have developed air-to-surface missiles 
        to extend the operational usefulness of manned 
        aircraft. They appear to be having trouble, however, 
        with the missiles designed for the BLINDER. The 
        principal operational missile at present delivers a 
        nuclear warhead about 350 miles, with a terminal speed 
        approaching twice the speed of sound.

                        SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE

    Now, may I turn to Soviet strategic defense.
    I. The status of Soviet strategic defense is the subject of 
a sharp difference of opinion in the intelligence community 
over Soviet anti-missile capability. So that we can have a 
clear understanding of the controversy, let me point out that 
it involves two separate missile systems.
    The first system is referred to as the Moscow System.
    A. Around Moscow, the Soviets are indeed deploying an array 
of missiles and radars conclusively demonstrated to be an ABM 
system.
    B. Part of the system should be operational this year and 
the entire complex by about 1970.
    C. When it is finished, Moscow will be protected by about 
100 solid-fuel missiles that can reach out several hundred 
miles and explode a nuclear warhead above the atmosphere.
          1. We think the system would have a good capability 
        against a limited number of existing missiles, but it 
        doesn't have what it takes to cope with a major attack, 
        or with the penetration aids that incoming missiles 
        will have in the future.
          2. The intelligence community is agreed on this 
        evaluation of the Moscow System.

                          EARLY WARNING RADARS

    D. The system starts with early warning radars in 
northwestern Russia that cover the avenues of approach for 
missiles coming from the continental United States. They can 
probably detect a missile as much as 1,600 miles away.
          1. These radars are now being calibrated, and should 
        be operational this year or early in 1968.
    E. Nearer Moscow, there is a big radar which acquires the 
incoming missile from the early warning facilities, tracks it, 
and probably assigns targets if there are a number of them 
coming in.
    F. Finally, at a dozen sites forming a ring about 50 miles 
from the center of Moscow, are the engagement radars, which aim 
the missiles on their nearby launchers and track them to the 
target.
    G. We have recently calculated that this system--including 
all of the radars but not the developing and testing--will have 
cost the Soviets the equivalent of about three billion U.S. 
dollars, from the start of construction through 1970.
    H. This system I have just described is unique to Moscow. 
You only have to think for a minute about what Moscow has meant 
in Russian history to realize that the Soviets will defend 
Moscow with any system that might help, regardless of cost, 
effectiveness, or feasibility.
    I. We have seen no indication that this system will be used 
anywhere else in the Soviet Union.

                           THE TALLINN SYSTEM

    Now, let us leave Moscow and look at the other defensive 
missile deployment.
    This one is being deployed extensively. We call it the 
Tallinn System after the city in Estonia where the first such 
complex was built.
    The Tallinn System is the object of controversy that I have 
just mentioned because so far there just isn't enough hard 
evidence to be positive of its purpose.
    A. CIA believes that this system is more likely to be a 
defense against high-flying, high-speed aircraft and other 
aerodynamic vehicles. This is the conclusion of the current 
estimate.
    B. The other view is that the weapon is basically an anti-
ballistic missile, with a secondary mission against aerodynamic 
vehicles. This is the view of DIA, the Army, and the Air Force.
    Senator Gore. Would you read that sentence again?
    Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
    The other view is that the weapon is basically an anti-
ballistic missile with a secondary mission against aerodynamic 
vehicles.
    This is the view of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Army 
Intelligence, and, Air Force Intelligence.
    C. Both views rely on inferences drawn from deployment 
patterns, the nature of associated radars, Soviet requirements, 
and, other similar factors.
          1. Neither side can line up enough evidence to 
        disprove the other view.
    II. So far we have evidence of 26 complexes for the Tallinn 
System. Some of them form a forward defense against the 
northwestern Soviet Union, while others are situated for local 
defense of specific targets.
    We think that more than 20 of these complexes can be 
operational this year. At the present pace of deployment, the 
Soviet Union would have about 75 of them by 1972--I say could 
have.
    A. Most of the complexes have three sites, with six 
launchers at each site. The 26 complexes now under construction 
will apparently have a total of about 550 launchers.
    B. On the basis of the evidence at hand we believe the 
Tallinn System missile will probably reach to a ceiling of 
about 100,000 feet, with a slant range of as much as 100 
nautical miles.
    It could engage manned aircraft flying at three-and-a-half 
times the speed of sound.
    Further, some of the Tallinn System locations do not have 
the early warning and long range radar coverage that an 
effective antiballistic missile system would have to have.

              REST OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PICTURE

    III. The rest of the Soviet strategic defense picture is 
relatively static.
    A. New jet fighter aircraft which are now becoming 
operational will give the Soviet Union improved all-weather 
capability, and greater interceptor range.
    B. There are about 1,000 sites in the Soviet Union for the 
SA-2 surface-to-air missile system. Performance in North 
Vietnam has not been particularly impressive--more than 1,500 
missiles have been fired to bring down a maximum of 44 manned, 
American aircraft. The SA-2 has an inherent blind spot against 
aircraft operating below 1,000 feet.
    C. The SA-3 system is supposed to be more effective at low 
altitudes, but the Soviets have deployed it to only about 110 
sites in the Soviet Union. This suggests that it has not come 
up to expectations.
    General Purpose Forces:
    About two thirds of Soviet military manpower--some 2 
million men--are in what we call general purpose forces: the 
ground forces, tactical air, and tactical navy.
    A. The number of divisions has remained fairly constant. 
There are 109 divisions almost completely equipped and ready 
for early commitment to battle.
          1. Their manning ranges from about 60 percent of 
        wartime levels in the Soviet interior, to 90 percent in 
        Eastern Europe
          2. Another 32 cadre divisions have only about 20 
        percent of full strength.
    B. The Soviets are gradually but steadily improving the 
ground forces weapons.
    C. They are also making a start in developing strike forces 
which they could use for action at distant points--a Soviet 
shortcoming until now.
          1. Airlift is being improved, a marine corps has been 
        created, and there has been an increase in airborne and 
        amphibious maneuvers.
    D. The Soviets continue to help the modernization and 
improvement of the East European satellite forces. The East 
Europeans can now contribute about one million men in 42 
divisions for Warsaw Pact needs.

                         SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING

    I. [deleted]
    A. The Soviets have run their underground test program at a 
leisurely pace--slightly over one shot a month over the past 
two years. [deleted]
    C. In early 1965, the Soviets conducted the first test in a 
program to investigate peaceful uses of nuclear explosions.
          1. This test, the most spectacular of the series, was 
        a [deleted] explosion which dammed the Shagan River 
        near the Semipalatinsk test site.
    D. [Deleted.]
    E. There were underground shots at Ufa, just west of the 
Urals, in 1965, and at Azgir, north of the Caspian, in 1966, 
which probably tested a technique for stimulating the flow from 
oil and gas deposits.
    II. [Deleted.]
    Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, is it orderly to ask a 
question?
    Senator Gore. Yes, sir.
    Senator Dodd. Should we wait until the end?
    Senator Gore. I believe it might be better to wait until 
the end.
    Senator Dodd. I did not want to make notes because then I 
will forget.
    Senator Gore. I think it might be well to make notes with 
the understanding of the staff that the notes will be destroyed 
after the briefing.
    Proceed.

                     PROBLEMS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY

    Mr. Helms. The Soviet Economy.
    I. The Soviet economy continues to have problems, notably 
with the allocation of critical resources. Over the next few 
years we do not expect that the growth of the Soviet GNP will 
match the performance of the 1950's.
    A. The Soviet GNP and total Soviet industrial production 
are each a little less than half of ours,
    B. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union virtually matches our 
defense effort, mainly because the Soviet consumer is way down 
in the pecking order when it comes to allocating output.
    C. Military and space spending remained fairly constant 
between 1962 and 1965, but we estimate that outlays in 1966 
were up about 7 percent.
          1. The state budget for 1967 includes an admitted 
        increase of 1.1 billion rubles for defense, and hidden 
        allocations elsewhere in the budget may make the actual 
        increase considerably larger.
    D. For our purposes today, let me just say that we conclude 
that the Soviet economy will come up with whatever expenditures 
are considered desirable for defense, no matter what the 
condition of the rest of the economy.

                             SOVIET POLICY

    I. In the Kremlin today, the General Secretary of the 
Party, Leonid Brezhnev, seems to have the most important voice 
in making key assignments, and he is getting more and more of 
the spotlight.
    A. The Soviet leadership, however, was brought into power 
in reaction to Khrushchev's erratic personal leadership, and it 
is still functioning by and large as a collective government.
    B. That means that it is a relatively cautious government, 
not given to radical departures from established policies and 
procedures.
    C. The present leadership stands better with the military, 
as far as we can judge, and this is largely because it has 
dropped Khrushchev's attempts to cut back on military spending.
    II. Domestic pre-occupation centers on the economy. It has 
been so hard to reach decisions on resource allocations that 
the Soviets are in the second year of their present Five-Year 
Plan, and the plan itself has not received final approval yet.

                       SOVIET DISPUTE WITH CHINA

    III. In foreign affairs, the overriding concern right now 
is the dispute with Communist China.
    A. Tension between Moscow and Peking has intensified 
markedly in recent months, as you all have seen in the 
newspapers. The Soviets feel they have gotten the upper hand in 
the world Communist movement, and they are beginning to behave 
somewhat more boldly.
          1. For instance, they are again trying to convoke an 
        international meeting to condemn the Chinese.
          2. The Soviets have exploited Peking's rejection of 
        appeals for united Communist action in support of North 
        Vietnam.
          3. Peking's retort has been that Moscow is secretly 
        conspiring with the United States against the Asian 
        Communists.
          4. Moscow, to avoid giving any substance to the 
        Chinese charges, has been taking the line publicly that 
        there can be little advance in U.S.-Soviet relations 
        until the Vietnam conflict is settled.
    B. The Kremlin has made it clear in private, however, that 
the Soviet Union wants to keep lines of communication with 
Washington open, despite the strains and constraints imposed by 
the Vietnamese fighting and sensitivity to charges of Soviet-
U.S. collusion.
          1. If it were not for Vietnam, the Soviet leaders 
        would probably prefer to resume the dialogue with 
        Washington on matters which are of greater concern to 
        Soviet national interests, such as European security, 
        arms control, and East-West trade.
          2. The agreements recently reached on civil air 
        routes and the peaceful use of outer space showed that 
        limited cooperation is still possible.
    Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks on the Soviet 
weapons systems, on their economy and political approach, and I 
would now go over to China.

                  CHINESE COMMUNISTS' NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    I would first like to talk about Chinese Communist advanced 
weapons.
    I. The Chinese Communists are making a concerted effort--on 
their own and with overriding priorities--to develop modern 
weapons for strategic attack. They are devoting increasing 
resources to missiles and nuclear weapons.
    A. [Deleted.]
    B. We estimate that they could begin to deploy a medium-
range ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead this year, and 
their first crude ICBM's in the early 1970s.
    II. [Deleted.]
    C. The tests indicate that the Chinese can manufacture 
nuclear bombs which can be carried by their medium bombers--
about a dozen old TU-4 BULLS similar to our B-29, and two TU-16 
BADGER jet bombers.
          1. [Deleted.]
          2. Their likely immediate goals, however, are 
        probably warheads for short- and medium-range missiles, 
        and possibly a weapon for the IL-28 BEAGLE light jet 
        bomber. The Chinese have about 250 of these aircraft, 
        which have a better chance of reaching a defended 
        target than the BULLS.
    D. In the present state of Chinese technology, any weapons 
they might make now would be crude and inefficient by our 
standards. By Far Eastern standards, however, they are a 
significant addition to Chinese military prestige.

                      CHINESE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

    III. The Chinese probably started their missile development 
by test-firing Soviet MRBM's given them before the Sino-Soviet 
split in 1960.
    A. They may have begun testing their own native versions as 
early as 1963.
    B. Now they are apparently working on several surface-to-
surface missile programs.
          1. The pace of activity at Shuang-cheng-tzu has 
        increased sharply since the fall of 1965. They 
        apparently are conducting more MRBM firings, and they 
        recently built a new launch complex, possibly for 
        training troops in the launching procedures.
    C. During the past year they have also built a very large 
launch complex, which we call Complex B. The reports we have on 
the size of the facilities indicate that this complex is for a 
large missile, probably an ICBM. This missile could also be 
used as a space booster.
          1. Complex B probably will be ready for firings by 
        the latter part of 1967, but we have no evidence that 
        the Chinese have any ICBM components so far. Therefore, 
        we cannot say whether an ICBM vehicle will be ready for 
        test flights that soon.
          2. If the Chinese inaugurate a reasonably successful 
        flight test program, within the next year or so, they 
        probably could have a few ICBMs deployed by the early 
        1970s.
          3. These probably would be inferior in reliability 
        and accuracy by U.S. standards, and also by Soviet 
        standards, but they could--in Chinese eyes--constitute 
        a limited inter-continental deterrent.
    D. The Chinese Communists have built one copy of the Soviet 
G-class submarine. In the Soviet fleet, this class is armed 
with three ballistic missiles 350-mile range. We have to assume 
that the Chinese are working on a missile to fit the submarine.

                      CHINESE CONVENTIONAL FORCES

    I would like now to turn to Chinese conventional military 
forces.
    I. Despite Chinese progress in advanced weapons, the 
military power of Communist China for some years to come will 
derive primarily from the numerical strength of its enormous 
ground forces--about 2,300,000 men--and great reserves of 
manpower.
    II. There are more than 100 infantry divisions and about a 
dozen armor and artillery divisions in the Chinese Communist 
Army, concentrated in the heavily populated regions of eastern 
China.
    A. The Chinese Army has the capability to overrun any of 
its mainland neighbors in short order, provided it does not run 
into significant opposition from a major power.
          1. It has demonstrated its ability to move and fight 
        with primitive transportation and rudimentary logistic 
        support.
          2. If it should come to all-out war, however, the 
        Chinese will be badly hampered by shortages of armor, 
        heavy ordnance, mechanized transport, and fuel.
    III. The Chinese Air Force and Navy are oriented primarily 
toward defensive missions.
    A. The bomber force at present consists of 250 jet light 
bombers, which I mentioned a few moments ago as BEAGLES. We 
believe the Chinese will start producing BADGER jet mediums 
about 1968.
    B. The bulk of the jet fighters consist of about 1,900 MIG-
15s and MIG-17s, obtained 10 or more years ago.
          1. Over the past two years, the Chinese have begun 
        assembling supersonic MIG-19s in an aircraft plant at 
        Shen-yang, known better as Mukden, in Manchuria which 
        was provided by the Soviets before 1960. The Chinese 
        inventory of MIG-19s has risen from 150 to about 350, 
        and they have been able to supply another 50 to 
        Pakistan in 1966.
          2. The Chinese have about 35 of the Mach-two, delta-
        wing MIG-21s, supplied by the Soviet Union in the early 
        1960s.
    IV. Peking's Navy is the weakest element of the Chinese 
armed forces.
    A. It has the world's fourth largest undersea fleet, with 
34 submarines, most of them medium-range torpedo attack boats. 
They have no experience in extended operations, however, and 
most of their training appears to take place within 20 miles of 
the coast.
    B. The Chinese are building submarines, destroyer escorts, 
and guided-missile patrol boats. They have four obsolete 
destroyers, six new DEs, and 11 patrol boats.

                    POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA

    I would like now to turn to Chinese political developments.
    I. Communist China is being racked by the greatest 
political convulsions since Mao Tse-tung took control in 1949.
    A. Mao, at 73, is aging, sick, and more and more 
inflexible.
          1. He is clearly concerned that his Communist Party 
        is losing the revolutionary zeal of its early days, and 
        cannot be relied on to keep China on the right track 
        after he is gone.
          2. The teenaged millions of the Red Guard are 
        supposed to rekindle that zeal with their youthful and 
        unbridled enthusiasm.
          3. When Mao reappeared last summer after a protracted 
        absence from public view, he passed over the men who 
        had been the heads of the party hierarchy and named 
        Defense Minister Lin Piao as Number Two Man--in effect, 
        Mao's designated successor.
    B. To Mao Tse-tung, the cultural revolution is probably 
primarily a drive to reshape the Communist Party, or replace it 
with a more reliable, more fanatical, and younger version.
    C. But for the men who aspire to succeed Mao, it has become 
a naked struggle for power and for survival.
    II. It is difficult to determine from day to day where the 
cultural revolution stands, who is on which side, or who is 
going to come out on top. The struggle seems to have entered a 
critical phase in January.
    A. The most dramatic development has been Mao's call for 
the Red Army to back up the Red Guards and eliminate resistance 
to the cultural revolution.
          1. We had been speculating when the resistance first 
        developed that the army would have been called in even 
        earlier if there had been no doubts about its 
        reliability.
          2. Now there is evidence that the armed forces are 
        considerably less than monolithic in their loyalty to 
        Mao and Lin.
    III. When and how will the turmoil in Peking finally be 
resolved?
    A. We have no idea. The opposing forces, judging by the 
protracted struggle, must be quite evenly matched. If the clash 
between workers and Red Guards spread--particularly if the 
army's loyalties are divided--then we may soon see something 
for which there is no other term but Civil War.
          1. Some days, it looks as though the opposing 
        elements are digging in for a long winter of political 
        trench warfare.
          2. The next day, a war of movement and a showdown 
        appears imminent.
          3. I would say it is still too early to speculate 
        usefully on the outcome.
    B. There are two points, however, which we can make.
          1. First, as long as China's leaders are pre-occupied 
        with this internal wrangling, they will find it 
        difficult to reach agreement on any new policy lines. 
        So, we do not expect any radical departures from 
        existing policies.
          2. Second, whoever wins, we can see no reason for 
        suspecting that there will be any dilution of Peking's 
        implacable hostility to the United States.

                            CHINA'S ECONOMY

    I would like to now turn to the Chinese economy.
    A. China has regained only part of the ground lost when the 
Great Leap Forward collapsed in 1960 and Soviet aid was 
withdrawn.
          1. Prospects to regain the momentum of the 1950's 
        appear remote, even without the disruption of the 
        ``cultural revolution.''
          2. The longer the political upheaval lasts, the 
        greater the likelihood of severe damage to the economy.
          3. There have already been extensive strikes, 
        shutdowns, and disruption of transportation.
    B. It has taken an overriding priority on defense to permit 
the progress China has made in advanced weapons.
          1. One of the ministries hard hit by the waves of 
        political purges and poster denunciations has been a 
        ministry directly related to the missile effort.
    C. Stagnation in agriculture remains the chief obstacle to 
a resumption of adequate economic growth.
          1. Peking claims a record harvest in 1966, but actual 
        grain production was somewhat lower in 1966 than in 
        1955.
          2. It was not much above the level of 10 years ago, 
        when there were almost 150 million fewer people to 
        feed.
          3. There were localized ration cuts, and it was only 
        thanks to grain imports that the average ration could 
        be kept above the lean levels of the poor year of 1960.
          4. China imported more than 5 million tons of grain 
        from the Free World in 1966, and will probably have to 
        import substantially more this year.
    I now would like to turn, Mr. Chairman, to the subject of 
nuclear proliferation.
    [Deleted.]

                INDIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    II. The Indian attitude toward development of nuclear 
weapons has been complicated by Peking's nuclear capability.
    A. Prime Minister Gandhi has maintained the government's 
``no bomb'' nuclear policy despite criticisms in Parliament.
          1. Both the Prime Minister and the new Chairman of 
        the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Sarabhai, have 
        stated that India's present economic and industrial 
        position does not permit launching a nuclear weapons 
        project, particularly from the viewpoint of developing 
        delivery systems.
    B. [Deleted.]
          1. An agreement with Canada, however, stipulates that 
        plutonium produced in the one reactor now operational 
        will be used only for peaceful purposes.
          2. Two other reactors which will be operational in 
        1969 and 1970 are covered by safeguards.
    Other Countries:

                           ISOTOPE SEPARATION

    III. I would like to end the discussion of proliferation 
with a brief mention of isotope separation.
    A. [Deleted.]
    B. U.S. experience has shown that for the production of 
moderate quantities of uranium-235, the centrifuge process is 
economically attractive in comparison with the gaseous 
diffusion process.
    C. [Deleted.]
    D. We believe however, that none of the countries working 
on the process has yet developed a centrifuge to the point 
where an economical plant of production size could be built.

                    CHINA'S SUPPORT OF NORTH VIETNAM

    Mr. Chairman, I have, or I am prepared, to discuss two 
other matters, if you choose, these having to do with the 
Chinese contribution to North Vietnam and the possibility of 
Chinese intervention in North Vietnam, It is not strictly the 
topic that we have agreed that I would discuss, but if you had 
any interest in this, I would be glad to cover it.
    Senator Gore. What is the pleasure of the committee?
    I would like to hear it. Yes, we would.
    Mr. Helms. We estimate that there are 26,000 to 48,000 
Chinese Communist military personnel in North Vietnam.
    Senator Gore. What is the figure?
    Mr. Helms. 26,000 to 48,000. There is a wide spread there 
because we have no way of actually counting the number of 
individual Chinese. We simply know the units that are there and 
what the units are for, and these units are of a kind that do 
not have a very specific table of organization and personnel. 
They can be larger or smaller, depending on how you want to use 
them. And we have been trying to narrow this figure, but the 
only thing we can say now is that the range is between 26,000 
and 48,000.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question in 
context?
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Senator Symington. Are they, Mr. Helms, logistic or combat 
troops or both?
    Mr. Helms. No, sir. This is what I wanted to cover, Senator 
Symington.
    Senator Symington. I am sorry.
    Mr. Helms. Thank you.
    Senator Symington. Thank you.
    Mr. Helms. As far as we can determine, there are no ground 
combat formations.
    B. Evidence shows that there are two antiaircraft artillery 
divisions and possibly elements of two more, manning the 85-
millimeter and 100-millimeter guns defending some of the key 
targets.

                           LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

    C. The rest of the Chinese personnel are mainly railway, 
engineer, and logistic units, building airfields, bridges, and 
the like, laying track, and keeping the supplies moving. In 
other words, there are no combat personnel, I repeat.
    Senator Gore. You would not regard the manning of anti-
aircraft guns as combat?
    Mr. Helms. Well, not in the sense that it is used in the 
military technology.
    Senator Gore. I understand.
    Mr. Helms. In other words, these are not fellows manning 
guns shooting at other soldiers.They are fellows manning anti-
aircraft guns.
    Senator Gore. Shooting Americans down.
    Mr. Helms. That is the idea, but they are not combat forces 
in the way the military uses the terms.

                EFFECTIVENESS OF SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES

    Senator Aiken. Our witness stated yesterday, that what he 
could learn from the time he was there, Russian SAM's are 
comparatively ineffective, and most of our planes are brought 
down by conventional weapons.
    Mr. Helms. That is correct.
    Senator Aiken. If that is correct, I have to reverse my 
opinion.
    Mr. Helms. The reason for this, Senator Aiken, if I may 
take just a moment, is that by having a mix of surface-to-air 
missiles and antiaircraft guns, the surface-to-air missiles are 
quite effective at certain altitudes. Therefore, our planes, to 
avoid them, go in on the deck, and in that way they just run 
into the antiaircraft fire. And there is enough of it so there 
is just no way of missing it, and this is why so many have been 
brought down by AA rather than surface-to-air missiles.
    Senator Aiken. But you do not think I am too far wrong in 
not crediting the Russians for their firing.
    Mr. Helms. I do not.
    Senator Gore. It is for the purpose of avoiding the SAM 
fire that they come in on the deck, so to speak.
    Mr. Helms. That is right. So, I think the question comes 
down as to who is manning the antiaircraft guns, and they are 
being manned by a variety of personnel.

             POSSIBILITY OF CHINESE INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM

    Now, may I discuss just a moment our beliefs about the 
possibility of Chinese intervention in Vietnam.
    VI. We believe that there are three situations in which 
Peking would feel obliged to intervene in force in the 
Vietnamese fighting.
    A. One of these would arise from U.S. air strikes against 
targets in China. In May 1965, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi 
asked the British Charge in Peking to pass along a warning to 
this effect.
    B. The second circumstance which would trigger Chinese 
intervention would be a major U.S. invasion of North Vietnam. 
Chinese leaders passed this word to a visiting delegation from 
Ghana, shortly before Chen Yi talked with the British.
    C. In addition, if the collapse of the Hanoi Government 
should seem imminent, China might probably move into North 
Vietnam to ``restore order.''
    VII. It is always dangerous to assume that the Chinese are 
going to be guided by rational decisions, but we believe that 
Peking is bound to feel that the domestic political turmoil and 
the intensification of the dispute with Moscow leaves China 
less ready than it might otherwise be to engage in direct 
hostilities with the United States.
    A. Another factor which would contribute to increased 
Chinese caution would be a growing belief in Peking that the 
United States is determined to persevere, over the short run at 
least, in the Vietnamese war.

                THRESHOLD OF SENSITIVITY HAS BEEN RAISED

    B. We think, therefore, that the threshold of sensitivity--
the level at which Peking would feel forced to fight--has 
probably been raised a degree or two.
          1. For example, a shallow incursion by U.S. troops 
        into the Demilitarized Zone between North and South 
        Vietnam might be less likely today to trigger a Chinese 
        reaction than it would have in 1965.
    C. Chinese statements concerning the ``inevitability'' of 
war with the U.S. now appear only infrequently.
          1. Peking has made no mention of ``volunteers'' for 
        Vietnam since the fall of 1965, except for brief 
        flurries last summer and again in December, after 
        bombings in the area of Hanoi and Haiphong.
          2. Peking has always said that the Vietnamese must 
        bear the primary responsibility for fighting; in recent 
        months this theme has been given additional emphasis.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Gore. Thank you very much, Mr. Helms.

             SOVIET ADVANTAGES IN ANTI-MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

    Beginning where you began, with a few questions, will you 
or your assistant give us an estimate of the lead or advantage 
which the Soviets may have over the United States in the 
development and deployment of anti-missile missiles at this 
time? I would want to know the extent of the tests of anti-
ballistic missiles which they conducted before entering the 
test treaty, concluding the test treaty, and also if you think 
their underground tests, particularly the last ones, had some 
bearing upon anti-ballistic missiles.
    Now, this is a big question. Divide it into about three 
parts.
    Mr. Helms. I understand and I would like very much to have 
Mr. Duckett answer it.
    But, before I do, sir, may I explain one thing. We in the 
Agency are not competent to talk about the United States 
forces. In the first place, we have never kept track in the 
Agency of what the United States has in its arsenal. We have 
not made what are referred to as net estimates--in other words, 
a comparison of where the Soviets stand and where the United 
States stands in various weaponry, for the very simple reason 
that our charter is to take care of countries outside of the 
United States and not to involve ourselves in these comparisons 
in the United States.
    That is for the Department of Defense or the State 
Department or for somebody else to do, so I would like us, if 
we may, to confine our remarks to the Soviet systems rather 
than the U.S. systems.
    Senator Gore. I agree.
    Mr. Duckett. Sir, if I could discuss the Soviet anti-
ballistic missile capability in two contexts.
    First, the development or the technical capability of the 
system; and secondly, its development status, because both are 
pertinent and are different.
    From a developmental standpoint, the test program has been 
a long one, starting certainly by 1960.

                        VULNERABILITY TO ATTACK

    The components which we can now identify in that system we 
described as around Moscow, are components which we feel limit 
the system in two key ways: One, it appears there will be a 
rather limited number of interceptor missiles involved, at 
least in this initial deployment, and that means by definition, 
therefore, only a limited number of targets can be attacked.
    So this would make it vulnerable, if you will, to what you 
would call a saturation attack.
    Secondly, we believe that the kinds of radars we see are 
the types which cannot contain much of the sophistication which 
the United States has felt would be desirable to handle a 
complex type of attack, and by complex here I mean an attack 
including decoys, penetration aids, and other devices to make 
the radar have a difficult time separating out the actual bomb.
    We do not believe the system has any appreciable capability 
to handle that type of attack.
    Senator Gore. You mean when you refer to separation out of 
the actual bomb, the incoming missile being fired at Russia?
    Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir, that is correct.
    In other words, if there are in that attack, not only 
bombs, but also various penetration devices to attempt to hide, 
if you would, or to prevent the radar determining which is the 
real bomb, we think this system would have difficulty handling 
that type of attack.
    So, those are the limitations. The limitation with regard 
to number of interceptors, and its apparent lack of ability to 
handle what we would call a sophisticated attack.

                    DEPLOYMENT OF THE MOSCOW SYSTEM

    Now, as to deployment status, it is difficult to pick 
particular dates here and the reason is that the deployment of 
the Moscow System has not gone at a steady pace. As best we can 
determine, and for reasons we cannot determine, possibly 
technical, the deployment has not started and proceeded at a 
steady rate from the beginning. Rather, there have been periods 
when there was relative inactivity around these installations 
suggesting that there was some modification or change taking 
place.
    You see, therefore, sir, until we know that one of these 
sites is totally operational, we cannot say that there will not 
be other delays or changes in the pace of construction.
    We do recognize, however, that at least the first of these 
Moscow installations will probably be ready, if there is no 
further disruption, by sometime during the latter part of the 
year.

                     HOW AN ABM DEFENSE WOULD WORK

    Senator Gore. Now, just here. Senator Aiken and I have some 
small advantage over other members of the committee in that we 
have heard the technicians in the Atomic Energy Commission 
describe the manner of operation of an anti-ballistic missile 
missile defense.
    Would you, for the benefit of the committee, describe 
theoretically how this system will operate? First, I think you 
would perhaps agree that this system was tested by the Soviets 
in perhaps 1961.
    Mr. Duckett. Yes.
    Senator Pell. Also, how classified is this?
    Mr. Helms. As far as the classification is concerned, 
Senator Pell, what we are talking about now has about the 
highest classification we have.
    Senator Pell. Thank you. I was wondering if some of these 
theories have been in the press.
    Mr. Helms. But when we are talking about this anti-
ballistic missile system, it involves all the collection 
devices at the disposition of the United States Government and 
some of these we are trying very hard, at least as to their 
quality, to keep as secret as we possibly can, so nothing can 
be more highly classified than what we are talking about now.
    Senator Pell. Thank you.
    Mr. Duckett. Sir, I think if I may, I could best treat the 
question of how the systems work by giving a very brief 
description and then being most happy to amplify on any part of 
that that I could.
    May I again remind the chairman that I am referring to the 
Moscow System only in this conversation.
    That system we are certain employs a very large, long-range 
type of missile. Although we cannot give precise numbers as to 
range and altitude, we do believe its range and altitude both 
are measured in hundreds of miles, and that would say that one 
of the characteristics of this system would be that it would 
intercept the incoming missiles well outside of the atmosphere.

                      THE MEANING OF INTERCEPTION

    Senator Gore. When you use the word ``intercept'' many 
people have an idea that they are going to have a head-on 
collision. You don't mean that at all?
    Mr. Duckett. No, sir. Obviously, the question of the 
relative closeness that is required for killing the incoming 
missile is a function of the type of kill mechanism which this 
missile will employ, and my honest answer is we do not know the 
precise kill mechanism and thus cannot describe precisely how 
close an intercept would be required for a kill.

                            KILL MECHANISMS

    Senator Gore. Well, what are the possible kill mechanisms?
    Mr. Duckett. The possible kill mechanisms which we have 
studied are what I would call normal nuclear effects, meaning 
gamma rays and other forms of radiation. X-rays have caused 
more concern, I believe, because X-ray effects are far more 
pronounced outside of the atmosphere.
    Senator Gore. In terms of distance, say their radar detects 
an incoming missile, and they wish to fire an interceptor 
missile, and it explodes in the projected trajectory of the 
incoming missile. By use of gamma and ordinary nucleonic rays, 
what would be the range of destruction?
    Mr. Duckett. Sir, I will say in all honesty I don't believe 
that we in the United States know from our own measurement 
programs a very precise answer to that question.
    I think there is a considerable uncertainty based on the 
advice we could get from the experts, but certainly if one is 
talking about the gamma radiations, the kind of numbers that we 
are advised by our experts are, in fact, measured in ones, or 
at most, tens of kilometers for any of these effects. In other 
words, a fairly close intercept is required for these types of 
mechanisms.

                      DEFENSE AGAINST THE POLARIS

    Senator Aiken. I was going to ask whether you would 
estimate that the defense against the ICBM was more effective 
than the defense against the Polaris.
    Mr. Duckett. I see.
    Senator Aiken. I think that is important. I have had a 
feeling that the Polaris can hit them if they get too bold.
    Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir, I believe I can answer, Senator, in 
this way: The radar systems which I have referred to, that are 
part of this Moscow System, and also the radars which are 
situated to the north of Moscow, are not situated in such a way 
that they could cover more than a small part of what we would 
call the Polaris threat zone. That is, there are no radars 
which we have identified which are pointed, for example, 
towards the Mediterranean or towards Spain, and thus if Polaris 
were fired from that area today, we do not have identified, at 
least, any Soviet radar which would be likely to detect them.
    Thus, I would have to say that our best evidence today is 
that the Moscow system is deployed primarily, if not entirely, 
towards the ICBM threat.
    Senator Aiken. And the Polaris is possibly our major 
deterrent to avoid a war?
    Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir. We do not see what we would identify 
as a capability against Polaris.
    Senator Aiken. Yes.

                      DEFENSIVE AREA AROUND MOSCOW

    Senator Gore. Well, proceeding with the possible mechanism, 
do I deduce from what you say that if the defending missiles' 
detonation depends upon gamma, and for want of a better word 
orthodox nucleonic rays, you would have a defense area ranging 
from a four to a hundred square mile area?
    Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire, sir, if you are 
referring to the entire area around Moscow defended--I am not 
sure that I understand.
    Senator Gore. Now, here is the detonation----
    Mr. Duckett. Around any detonation.
    Senator Gore [continuing]. Of the anti-missile missile in 
the calculated trajectory of an incoming missile.
    Mr. Duckett. I understand.
    Senator Gore. How large an area is created by a ball of 
fire, a ball of rays? Would this be, you say, a mile if you go 
a mile in all directions----
    Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. Or if it is 10 miles in all directions?
    Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, again here I would re-emphasize 
that I don't believe that we have agreed figures even in the 
United States on these kinds of questions. But I know of no one 
who believes that what I think we are both agreeing we could 
refer to as conventional radiation, would be likely to afford a 
kill of an incoming weapon for any distance greater than, say, 
one mile. And that would be a one-mile sphere, actually, one 
mile in any direction.
    Senator Gore. A sphere two miles in diameter?
    Mr. Duckett. Two miles in diameter, correct, sir.
    Senator Gore. All right.

                      EFFECT OF X-RAYS ON WEAPONS

    Now, if they depend upon X-rays, what would be the area?
    Mr. Duckett. All right, sir.
    I think, again, Mr. Chairman, this is an even more 
controversial figure, and may I say that certainly I am well 
aware we feel that it is an important thing to be aware of, 
that there are figures by various U.S. scientists that extend 
out to hundreds, to literally thousands of miles with various 
theories of how X-rays might affect a weapon.
    So, we simply do not have from the advice we have been able 
to acquire any number which I can quote to you as a figure 
representing X-ray effects.
    I would add, therefore, that we do not believe today that 
we have any mechanism available to use that allows us to state 
with any certainty what kill distance the Soviets might achieve 
with X-rays.
    I believe it is accepted, however, by most U.S. scientists 
that this would be, in fact, a distance measured in tens and 
possibly even out to a hundred miles or more, and it is 
certainly a far greater distance than the conventional kill 
technique.
    Senator Sparkman. You mean in diameter or radius?
    Mr. Duckett. Senator Sparkman, I am referring here to the 
actual distance from the burst to the actual warhead.
    Senator Sparkman. Oh, yes.
    Mr. Duckett. And that distance, as I am saying, and in some 
people's minds, is tens of miles and in others it is in 
hundreds of miles, and we don't know the answer.
    Senator Gore. So, within the order of estimates, you would 
have a ball of X-rays with estimates of its extent ranging from 
a ball of X-rays with a radius of 20 miles up to a radius of 
two to three hundred miles?
    Mr. Duckett. Yes.
    Senator Gore. Of course, if this were perfected, why then, 
the defense is calculated to come within the proximity of an 
incoming missile much more readily.
    Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir.

                          SOVIET MISSILE TESTS

    Senator Gore. Now, I don't want to ask too many questions 
myself, but I think a very crucial question here is whether or 
not the Soviets tested X-rays or gamma rays in their tests in 
1961. They did, as I understand it, fire a missile through the 
ball of rays with radar observation.
    Can you give us a description of that?
    Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, there were tests conducted in 
the fall of 1961 and again in the fall of 1962 which did 
involve nuclear explosions in the area where the developmental 
work on the antiballistic missile program has been conducted. 
Those tests involved a series of bursts. However, our best 
information is that all of the nuclear bursts were, in fact, on 
the missile that was fired into the area rather than bursts 
that were on the interceptor missile coming out of the 
antiballistic missile combination. So, I would like to express 
first that we have no knowledge of any tests where, in fact, an 
interceptor missile carrying a nuclear warhead has been 
conducted by the Soviets.
    However, in these tests, it is true that in addition to the 
missile which was on the actual warhead, which did burst, it 
was followed in some cases by one additional missile and in 
other cases by two additional missiles, which were simply 
following along the same trajectory so as to pass through, if 
you will, the area where the detonation had occurred.
    [Deleted.] We believe that the most likely reason for these 
tests was to determine the effect of this nuclear explosion on 
the radar equipment on the ground.
    I base that on----

                      TESTING THE BLACKOUT EFFECT

    Senator Gore. In other words, the test may have been 
testing the blackout effect?
    Mr. Duckett. Precisely.
    Senator Gore. Interference with communications?
    Mr. Duckett. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I refer specifically to the 
testing to determine if, in fact, the radar on the ground could 
see through the nuclear cloud and pick up an incoming missile 
through that cloud.
    I stress here, however, that whereas we state we believe 
this is the most likely purpose of these tests, we certainly 
much accept that depending on how extensively they monitored 
and measured these tests, it is certainly possible effects data 
could have been acquired even though this would not have been 
the primary purpose.
    [Deleted.]

                  U.S. NEWS ARTICLE ON SOVIET TESTING

    Mr. Helms. Mr. Chairman, may I point out for just a moment, 
that in the February 6 issue of U.S. News and World Report, 
there is an article on this subject which starts on page 36 and 
runs across the top of the page and which is rather a scary 
article. We have examined this very carefully and can find no 
evidence that anyone has in support of this article which says 
the Soviet know about the X-ray effects, and they were testing 
it and so forth. We have analyzed it very carefully and we 
believe what Mr. Duckett has just told you and not what appears 
in this article and other publications.
    Senator Gore. I certainly don't want to over-step my time. 
I suggest that we first conclude our questions with respect to 
the Soviets and take them up topic by topic as Mr. Helms 
presented them.
    Senator Sparkman?
    Senator Sparkman. No questions right now.
    Senator Gore. Senator Symington?
    Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                  NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

    Mr. Helms, I want to ask one question. I was rather shocked 
to see the size and caliber of the United Arab Republic Air 
Force, the number of first-class MIGs they had, et cetera.
    I was also surprised to see their relatively heavy 
development in submarines, especially because of their getting 
closer to the Communists and, therefore, the availability to 
their submarine developments, two Russian submarines, et 
cetera.
    With that premise, it looks to me as if there could be some 
trouble there. [Deleted.]
    As far as the aircraft are concerned, they figure they can 
stand off what the Egyptians have now and also on the ground.

              KEEPING INDIA FROM BUILDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    Senator Symington. There is only one other question that 
interests me. And I am very interested in these hearings that 
Senator Gore is conducting because if you do not put the cork 
in this proliferation, I think we are going to blow ourselves 
up in due course.
    When we continue to feed those cows in India, do we have 
any specifications about what they should or should not do in 
nuclear fashion? Do we discuss it with them? Do you know of any 
discussion in your agency or in the State Department about it, 
letting us know what they are doing if we continue to feed them 
and their cattle. I say that in a somewhat snide manner, but I 
see 2 million more tons going out today and so forth.
    Mr. Helms. Well, sir, this is probably not my proper field, 
but I do sit in meetings in the executive branch. And you do 
know that the Administration is very conscious of this problem 
[Deleted.] and doing everything they can to keep track of any 
activity in this field, and I think we are pretty well 
informed, Senator Symington.
    Senator Symington. When do you think they will have some 
nuclear weapons that they could deliver on their friends, the 
Pakistanis, or the Chinese?
    Mr. Helms. I do not think they have started to build them.
    Senator Symington. Yes.

                            U.S. ABM SYSTEM

    One more question, which if you do not want to answer, I 
would be regretful, but understanding, perhaps--there is quite 
a discussion going on now in a good many different places among 
a good many different experts about whether we should build an 
antiballistic ballistic missile or whether we should proceed on 
it. Based on your knowledge of what you have been testifying 
about, would you think we should go ahead now or do you think 
we should wait until these discussions are over, which is the 
position of Dr. Foster, or do you think we should not go ahead 
or do you think it is beyond your province? There are four of 
them.
    Mr. Helms. Senator, I believe that is beyond my province. I 
beg your indulgence.
    Senator Gore. Senator Clark.

                    COLLAPSE OF THE HANOI GOVERNMENT

    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I have to go. I wonder if I 
may ask this rather quick and rather innocuous question.
    I was interested in your giving the three conditions under 
which China might enter the Vietnam war.
    Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
    Senator Sparkman. I think it was Harrison Salisbury 
yesterday, was it not, who gave three conditions. I noticed a 
little variation, but not very much. You said, or I believe he 
said, an attack on the Chinese territory, invasion of the 
north, or an effort on the part of Hanoi to stop the war. Were 
those not the three that he gave, as I recall?
    Senator Gore. Mr. Helms gave as the third one the imminent 
collapse of the Hanoi regime. Maybe, they were about the same 
thing.
    Senator Sparkman. I said there was very little difference. 
I just wondered whether you meant the same thing. I think he 
related it to an effort on the part of Hanoi to stop the war.
    Mr. Helms. Senator Sparkman, to me it is not the same 
thing.
    Senator Sparkman. Not the same thing.
    Mr. Helms. When we talk about the collapse of the Hanoi 
government, we mean it's going out of business, the collapse of 
order and government and all the rest of it in Hanoi. In other 
words, that they have had it, to use the vernacular. I do not 
think the Chinese would come in because Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh 
decided he wanted to alter the course of the war, change its 
character or stop it.
    Senator Sparkman. He said an effort to make Hanoi continue 
the war.

                      COLLAPSE OF MAO'S GOVERNMENT

    Talking about the collapse of the Hanoi government, is 
there any likelihood that Mao's government might collapse?
    Mr. Helms. We do not know, sir. There is always that 
possibility.
    Senator Sparkman. Thank you.
    Senator Gore. Senator Clark.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, Senator Clark said he 
would yield to one more question.

                 EFFECTIVENESS OF BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM

    When I was out there a year ago, Mr. Helms, I talked to 
everybody in the windows, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, above all 
Hong Kong, Mr. Wells, et cetera. I could find nobody in the 
State Department or military or the Agency that felt any amount 
of bombing including civilian bombing of Hanoi would bring in 
the Red Chinese into North Vietnam and, therefore, I have been 
especially intrigued with all this--well, I will not use the 
word, because we are on the record, but about the dangers of 
the bombing.
    On the other hand, I found about half of the people who 
felt they would come in if we went into North Vietnam, and all 
the people felt they would come in if we went into North 
Vietnam with ground troops, around Haiphong or Hanoi, because 
that would show we were trying to take over a government, 
instead of taking over land.
    Is there any change in that position now as far as your 
Agency is concerned?
    Mr. Helms. No, sir. The way you gave this, I am not sure 
which was Agency position, and which was State, and which was 
Defense and so on.
    Senator Symington. I want to be sure. I do not want in any 
way to have a trap question. I found nobody, either in State or 
the military, who felt any amount of bombing or any amount of 
air attack would bring in the Chinese.
    Mr. Helms. That is our belief, unless it collapsed the 
Hanoi government.
    Senator Symington. Your last answer is the reason I asked 
the question.
    Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. Thank you.
    Senator Gore. Senator Clark.

                   U.S. WEAPONS COULD DESTROY MOSCOW

    Senator Clark. Mr. Helms, I have drawn a tentative 
conclusion from what you and Mr. Duckett have testified to, and 
I wonder if I am right, that despite the Moscow system the 
various United States weapons systems could today destroy 
Moscow.
    Mr. Helms. That is correct.
    Senator Clark. That is right.

                      CHINA'S MILITARY CAPABILITY

    Now, you spoke of the Chinese conventional threat, and if 
they had a capability outside their borders to attack 
successfully their neighbors unless a military power, such as 
the United States, intervened. In your judgment, does the 
present political turmoil in China affect their external 
military capability, or is it likely to, if that turmoil 
continues?
    Mr. Helms. Senator Clark, until now we have not seen any 
evidence that it has affected their military capability. I 
think it has--it could. I do not think there is any doubt about 
it. I think the extent to which the army gets involved in 
domestic matters with the Red Guard and other things could very 
well affect their capacity to move in an assertive and an 
aggressive way. We rather have the impression that the Chinese 
are inward these days. That does not mean they are not manning 
their radars, flying their aircraft, marching their troops, and 
all the rest of it. They are. That goes on as it always has. 
But it could be affected over the long term by this increasing 
amount of disorder.
    Senator Clark. But do you think at the present time, and I 
am thinking more of logistics than I am of their firepower, do 
you think they have a logistical capability of moving 
successfully pretty far outside their own borders in the 
absence of resistance from a major military power?
    I was thinking about the Indians.
    Mr. Helms. I would not like to leave that impression, 
because the Chinese army has a very limited truck park, and 
when they extend their logistic lines as far as Tibet and over 
into the area where they would have to go down into India, they 
are stretched pretty thin, indeed. I think there is a very real 
question as to how far they could go in India and maintain 
their forces.
    Senator Clark. How about northeast Thailand?
    Mr. Helms. That is a different problem. They could walk 
down there rather than in India.

               CURTAILING INFILTRATION FROM NORTH VIETNAM

    Senator Clark. Our friend, Mr. Joseph Alsop, from day to 
day expresses his views about the situation in the Vietnamese 
war. What can you tell us as to the accuracy of his recent 
views that the rate of infiltration from North to South Vietnam 
has been very seriously curtailed as a result of various steps 
which we have taken? And what can you also tell us as to the 
accuracy of his view that, I think it is his view, by 
implication at least, that we have so successfully curtailed 
that rate of infiltration that our enemies in Vietnam are going 
to have to rely from here on in primarily on Viet Cong 
guerrillas who, in turn, are becoming younger and younger and 
less and less effective, and they are running out of troops?
    Mr. Helms. Senator Clark. I want to answer your question as 
forthrightly as a man can answer it. So, let me step back just 
a minute and say that we in the administration have permitted a 
situation to develop in which the same sets of figures are used 
by different people in different ways by adding them up and 
subtracting from them and so forth to the point where there is 
such a confusion about infiltration rates that an honest man 
has a very hard time laying his hand on anything that makes 
very much sense.
    So, rather than answering Mr. Alsop's contention, I would 
like to answer your question this way: We believe that the 
North Vietnamese have the capability of infiltrating into the 
South the number of troops that they need, require, or think 
they need to maintain their forces there.
    Senator Clark. Just a couple of more questions.

                      ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

    I am just as concerned as Senator Symington about the 
danger in the arms race in the Middle East. I, too, have just 
come back from there, although I did not go into the matter in 
nearly as great a depth as Senator Symington.
    I got the general impression based on conversations I had 
with politicians, and with one conversation I had with the 
Israeli chief of military intelligence, that the UAR does not 
presently want to go to war with Israel because they are afraid 
they would get licked. The Israelis know this. And that the 
balance of power for the foreseeable future, as between the 
Arab states, which more or less ring Israel, and the Israelis, 
is such, that there is no present danger of an Arab attack on 
Israel. How would you explain that?
    Mr. Helms. I think that is correct. I would subscribe to 
that. I do not think there is any doubt that the Israeli army 
is far more competent than the Egyptian or any combination of 
Arab armies. Their air force is much better and much better 
manned.
    I recognize that one should be very careful in using 
characterizations, but the Egyptians have not shown any great 
capability to man very well the sophisticated equipment which 
the Soviets have given them. The Israelis are far better at 
this and, therefore, I do not believe that any single Arab 
state or probably any combination of them intends to attack 
Israel these days.

                    RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST

    Senator Clark. I also got the view over there that the 
Russians, as a political matter, were looking with rather 
covetous eyes on the other end of the Red Sea, the Aden area 
and the Somalia area. And that their support of the UAR in 
Yemen and their view that the British pretty soon are going to 
get out of Aden, and the thought that de Gaulle was shortly 
going to conduct a plebiscite to see whether he should give up 
French Somaliland, posed a pretty considerable threat that the 
vacuum thus created might be filled, not directly by the 
Russians, but by Russian--if at least not satellites, at least 
allies who would be Russian oriented.
    Would you comment on that?
    Mr. Helms. We agree with your assessment.

                      SUBCOMMITTEE'S JURISDICTION

    Senator Gore. With due apologies to my colleagues, could we 
not stay a little more along the line of the jurisdiction of 
this subcommittee.
    Senator Clark. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, if you will 
excuse me saying so, and I hope you would agree with me, that 
the conventional arms race in the Middle East is a problem for 
the Disarmament Subcommittee of a high order of priority. These 
questions of mine were intended to develop what could be done 
to terminate an arms race in the interests of arms control and 
disarmament.
    Senator Gore. All right, proceed.
    Senator Symington. Maybe it is my fault, because I was 
trying in the conventional--this growing conventional danger of 
the UAR with the reaction on the part of the Israelis 
[Deleted.]
    Senator Gore. Well, I certainly do not mean to imply that 
the arms race in the Middle East is not of great importance. I 
guess I had just overly anticipated that we would stay on the 
ballistic and antiballistic development today. But if members 
desire to go elsewhere, proceed.
    Senator Clark. No, I only had one more question.
    Senator Symington. It is probably my fault.
    [Deleted.]
    Senator Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Gore. Senator Cooper? Senator Pell?

                         JET AIRCRAFT TO JORDAN

    Senator Pell. One question, along the line of Senator 
Symington and Senator Clark, is we were informed by the 
committee, and I am sure everybody else knows, that we were 
giving a rather large supply of brand new jet airplanes, I 
think, to Jordan. Would that not very much upset the present 
balance from an intelligence viewpoint? Is Jordan at the low 
end of the balance of terror, or whatever it is called, in that 
part of the world?
    Mr. Helms. The jet aircraft that we give to Jordan is not 
going to upset the balance of power in the Middle East in a way 
that would be dangerous in our opinion. In the first place, the 
Jordanians have been one of the Arab countries that has taken a 
rather moderate road, as you know, and has stood for peace and 
quiet in the area. These jet planes, obviously the Israelis 
object to it, and come in and make comments about it, and put 
all the pressure on our government they can about it, but they 
are not fearful of them.
    Senator Pell. Thank you. No further questions.

                     MOSCOW MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

    Senator Gore. Well, I have a few more questions on the 
question of ballistic defense before going to the Chinese 
situation.
    Now, you have indicated your judgment that, even with the 
operational deployment of the Moscow System, that with a 
multiple attack of sophisticated weapons without question the 
screen could be successfully penetrated. Do you mean 
sufficiently to destroy Moscow?
    Mr. Helms. We believe so, sir. Yes.
    Senator Gore. You believe so.
    Now, if the Soviets successfully deployed one system around 
Moscow, to what extent would this imply that the deployment of 
additional systems or a multiplication of that system, or an 
integration of that system with others, could possibly 
neutralize or minimize the effect of an offense against them?
    Mr. Helms. Well, sir, as I mentioned, we do not see any 
evidence whatsoever that this Moscow System exists anywhere 
else in the Soviet Union, or that they intend to install it 
anywhere else in the Soviet Union. Therefore, we are of the 
opinion that in the year 1967, if the United States were to 
attack the Soviet Union, we would obliterate the Soviet Union.
    Senator Gore. Well, that is not the purport of my question.

                           THE TALLINN SYSTEM

    My question was, is the nature of this system such that if 
it, in fact, should be multiplied----
    Mr. Helms. I see.
    Senator Gore [continuing]. What would be the defense 
potential?
    Mr. Helms. Well, it would be better than the Tallinn System 
that they are presently installing. It would do a better job 
than the Tallinn System which they are installing, but we 
believe it would have the same defects that the Moscow System 
presently has and that, therefore, we would be able to 
penetrate it.
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Now, coming to the Tallinn system, I have heard scientists 
express the view that it is primarily for ballistic defense. 
Others, as you say, including your judgment, say that it is 
primarily for high defense against high, fast-flying planes.
    Now, assuming that it had both capabilities, which I think 
from all I have heard is likely to be the case, to what extent 
it has capability is a matter of disagreement. But assuming 
that it has dual capability, to what extent would it serve as 
an initiation or a beginning of deployment of more so-called 
Moscow Systems? Are they radically different, or are their 
radars and other components, computable and supplementary?
    Mr. Helms. They are sufficiently different that we do not 
believe that they would be interchangeable and that you could 
mix one with the other.
    Senator Gore. Then, to bring this to a conclusion, you do 
not now foresee a sufficient deployment of either the Moscow 
System or the Tallinn system, or a multiplication or merging of 
these two which would compromise seriously our strategy of 
deterrence, our ability to destroy?
    Mr. Helms. No, sir.
    Senator Gore. Before going to the Chinese situation, are 
there other questions with respect to the Russian?
    Senator Symington?
    Senator Symington. No, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Gore. Senator Cooper?

                    IF RUSSIA MADE THE FIRST STRIKE

    Senator Cooper. Would it be the same answer if Russia made 
the first strike?
    Mr. Helms. I beg your pardon, sir?
    Senator Cooper. Suppose Russia made the first strike, would 
your answer be the same?
    Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, it is my understanding of American 
capability that we could still do the job even if they made the 
first strike. That is the basis on which our forces are 
deployed at the present time.
    Senator Cooper. With the added factor of the installation 
of this system?
    Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. Now, going----
    Senator Symington. Just one point. I think the questions 
that you have raised are terribly pertinent because our problem 
is to gauge, as the ABM decision comes up for decision by 
people--Senator Gore, as you know, serves on the Joint Atomic 
Energy Commission--the nature and the degree of the anti-
ballistic development in the Soviet Union, correct?
    Senator Gore. Yes.

                       FRIGHT-MONGERING ABOUT ABM

    Senator Symington. With that premise, what you say to us 
today, as I understand it, is that they have a very high degree 
of development, very possibly around Moscow, but it is not 
carried out in the rest of the country.
    Mr. Helms. Correct.
    Senator Symington. Is that correct?
    Mr. Helms. Correct.
    Senator Symington. And that does not bear out a lot of the 
fright-mongering that has been going on.
    I am not saying we shouldn't have an ABM system, but I am 
saying you cleared that completely to me this afternoon, that 
their very highly developed unit is only around one city, is 
that correct?
    Mr. Helms. That is correct.
    Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Pell. May I ask a question?
    Senator Gore. Yes.

                 RUSSIAN DEPLOYMENT AIMED AGAINST U.S.

    Senator Pell. Are there any signs of any development vis-a-
vis China or is the whole defense to ICBM's launched from the 
Continental United States?
    Mr. Helms. So far the deployment looks to us as though it 
was designed: (a) against the United States, in other words, 
the normal missile path over which we would fire our missiles; 
and (b) to defend certain particular industrial complexes 
inside the Soviet Union.
    We see no deployment thus far that we believe is directed 
specifically at China.
    Senator Pell. Thank you.

                             GANTRY DEVICES

    Senator Gore. Now, coming to the Chinese situation, you 
gave some adjectives, which I don't recall, in describing the 
size of the complex for missile firing and weaponry 
development. Would you break this down into gantry size? What 
size thrust, what size launching pad, what size gantry do you 
find?
    Mr. Helms. May I ask Mr. Duckett to answer that? I have 
forgotten the numbers.
    Senator Pell. The what?
    Senator Gore. Gantry.
    I believe ours at Cape Kennedy run to--what height?
    Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, the gantry device involved for 
the Saturn V, which, of course, is the very monstrous space 
launcher, is something over 500 feet in height. However, the 
more conventional missile associated or weapon associated 
gantries would be customarily in the two to three hundred foot 
height for our, say, Titan-Atlas type systems.
    Senator Gore. In other words, if we were going to test an 
ICBM of five to seven thousand miles, we would use a gantry of 
in the order of 200, 250 feet?
    Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir. I would add, Mr. Chairman, however, 
that that in itself wouldn't, we would feel, be a guide of good 
criterion because the Minuteman is launched with little, if 
any, sort of a gantry at all. But I believe if I have captured 
the sense of the Chairman's question, that I could best answer 
the Chinese one this way. [Deleted.]
    Senator Gore. In other words, to elaborate this point----
    Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. Do you think insofar as the gantry device is 
concerned, or the launching pad complex, that they are now 
constructing or have constructed such facilities to test an 
ICBM?
    Mr. Duckett. We do believe, sir, that is the most likely 
function for this new launch facility, [deleted.]
    [Discussion off the record.]

                         PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

    Senator Pell. Wouldn't it be sound psychological warfare 
for the Chinese to build at very little expense a bamboo 
illusionary gantry to make us think they have this capability 
when they really didn't?
    Senator Gore. Again, off the record.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Gore. Back on the record.
    Will you proceed?
    You said that there were two measurements that you were 
undertaking to determine. One was the size and height. What is 
the other one?
    Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, if I may go off the record again 
for just a moment.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Gore. Back on the record.

                       NUCLEAR THREAT FROM CHINA

    In the committee hearings earlier this week, I felt it 
necessary on two occasions to express some reservation to the 
statements of two eminent elder statesmen of the country, whose 
statements seem to me to downgrade the nuclear threat from Red 
China.
    From what you gentlemen have said to us, they are nearing 
the test stage of an intercontinental ballistic missile. They 
have had several tests of nuclear devices. Have those devices 
been equal to the device with which we destroyed Hiroshima?
    Mr. Helms. You answer that.
    Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, certainly the devices, and 
particularly the last one, are well beyond the capability of 
our Hiroshima bomb.
    Senator Gore. That ran to the order of [deleted] as 
powerful?
    Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir. My understanding of the Hiroshima 
bomb was on the order of 20 kilotons and in the case of the 
most recent Chinese tests we believe that its yield was on the 
order of [deleted].
    Therefore, more than a factor of [deleted] in terms of 
yield.
    Senator Gore. Then, if China had one intercontinental 
ballistic missile, with a warhead equal to [deleted] the weapon 
that obliterated Hiroshima, and it should be trained on Tokyo 
or New Delhi or even toward a Soviet city, it would surely be 
something that could not be ignored.
    Mr. Helms. It could not be ignored in any sense.
    Senator Gore. Or for that matter on Saigon.
    Mr. Helms. Or on Saigon.

                       CHINA'S NUCLEAR STOCKPILE

    Senator Gore. Now, what is your projection of the nuclear 
stockpile which China has now or will have two, five, seven 
years from now, in that order?
    Mr. Helms. Would you answer that, Carl, if you can.
    Mr. Duckett. I would like to answer part of the question 
and then I will have to get the specific projections.
    I would answer that part of the question dealing with 
today's stockpile, and, that is, that we believe that it is 
most likely that [deleted].
    Senator Gore. How large a gaseous diffusion plant do they 
have?
    Mr. Duckett. This part, sir, I am willing to check some 
documents or offer to give you the numbers because I would hate 
to have those wrong. I don't trust my head to give you that, so 
I would prefer either to give you this later or attempt to dig 
it out of my material.
    I don't have that clearly in hand.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave. May I ask 
one question?
    Senator Gore. Yes, indeed.

                   CHINA AS A SERIOUS NUCLEAR MENACE

    Senator Symington. Mr. Helms, in a very broad way, when do 
you think the Chinese will be a serious nuclear menace to the 
security of the United States? What time period, very broad 
guesstimate.
    Mr. Helms. Well, sir, as best we can estimate it, and I 
want to say I am terribly anxious not to mislead you, and I am 
making these estimates with the information we have available. 
But it is not adequate, in my opinion. We are talking about the 
middle 1970's, but I don't know whether that is a good estimate 
or not.
    Senator Symington. That is what I wanted to know.
    Senator Gore. Excuse me, I was talking to somebody else.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Gore. Well, back on the record.

               DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

    The Chinese are giving top priority, are they not, to the 
development of a nuclear capability?
    Mr. Helms. This they are certainly doing.
    Senator Gore. [Deleted.]
    Senator Gore. Do they have reactors to make plutonium?
    Mr. Helms. Yes.
    Senator Gore. When would they have----
    Mr. Helms. [Deleted.]
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Now, just in a general way, when would you estimate that 
the Chinese would have a stockpile of weapons in the order of a 
number, say, from one to 500?
    Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, we have to date been unable to 
actually estimate that they will stockpile numbers in the 
hundreds. I say that not to infer that we do not think they 
will at some date stockpile numbers such as that. Rather, to 
illustrate that we believe that into the, well, into the 
1970's, they will be forced to use those facilities which we 
now know about. We do not see those facilities producing 
numbers in the hundreds of stockpiled weapons as far ahead as 
we can project from those with reasonable confidence.
    So, I would simply say that our estimating to date is on 
much lesser numbers. And we will certainly provide to you, 
preferring to do it in a more precise way, those numbers in 
this nearer term period up into the early and mid `70's. But 
this does not include the hundreds of weapons in any case, sir.

                        THE DANGERS OF GUESSING

    Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman, if you will forgive me, I would 
just like to congratulate the witnesses on the conservation of 
their statements and their bearing upon on what is really 
known. We have seen in the past the temptation to make real 
guesses into guesstimates, and I congratulate you on not 
guessing. This is one of the greatest dangers on which 
decisions are somewhat untenable.
    Mr. Helms. Thank you, sir.

             THE U.S. IS LIGHT YEARS AHEAD OF EVERYONE ELSE

    Senator Cooper. What are the factors which inhibit an early 
developmental capability to strike the United States?
    Mr. Helms. Sir, they just have got to develop the 
industrial equipment and the knowhow and all the rest of the 
things to do these things, and they are in a pretty primitive 
state. I think it is important that we realize that the Soviets 
and the United States are light years ahead of anybody else in 
the world in these fields, particularly when it comes to the 
industrialization that is necessary to do this. The Chinese are 
just going to have a very difficult time catching up.
    But we believe that they have the capacity, the manpower 
and so forth to do it, and they will get there eventually.
    Senator Gore. Of course, this is a factor, it seems to me, 
which may be a very troublesome and perhaps a limiting one upon 
the Soviets in reaching the feeling of freedom to conclude an 
agreement with us with respect to ABM vis-a-vis the United 
States and Russia. That is why I was particularly interested in 
developing this at this point, not so much as to when it would 
be a threat to the United States, but as to its immediate 
effect upon this drive by our government to conclude an 
agreement with the Soviets.
    Mr. Helms. Of course, this is quite possible, Mr. Chairman. 
I mean what is going on in the Soviet mind on this problem is 
very hard to get at, but I think you put your finger on 
something that may turn out to be the case. They may say this 
isn't directed at you, but we still have a problem, and that is 
on our landmass, and we don't have the Pacific Ocean protecting 
us.
    Senator Gore. Yes. In other words, if they have a hundred 
weapons aimed at the cities of Russia, and if they set up a 
deterrence of their own vis-a-vis China and Russia, then all 
this will be in addition to their huge land army.
    Obviously, we haven't gone into the proliferation 
negotiations at all.

                           AN ABM MORATORIUM

    Now, if the United States and the Soviet Union do agree to 
a moratorium on ABM, what assurances could we have, what 
verification, what type of verification could we have that they 
were complying with this?
    Mr. Helms. Well, Senator Gore, I think that this 
verification problem, as you know, has been about as 
controversial in the disarmament field. I confidently feel that 
we could in the intelligence community tell whether or not the 
Soviets were complying about an anti-ballistic missile system. 
This is the kind of system, in order to operate, that has to 
have some exposure, and I think we could keep track of that 
pretty well. This is not to say, if I may say so, that I would 
necessarily like to go into a meeting of the executive branch 
of the Government and put my hand in the fire for this because 
there are certain problems which could develop in our lives 
that might make this difficult for us. But in the state of the 
art in 1967 we could verify it.
    Senator Gore. You think you could verify it?
    Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, I believe so.
    Senator Gore. Particularly the installation of a system of 
the sophistication of the Moscow System?
    Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, because these radars are big, and they 
are exposed.
    Senator Gore. They have to be exposed to operate.
    Mr. Helms. That is right, and they have to be big.
    Senator Gore. Well, it is 25 until 5 and I suppose--Senator 
Cooper, do you have a question before we conclude?
    Senator Cooper. No, thank you.
    Senator Gore. We want to thank you. It is entirely possible 
that other members of the subcommittee would have some 
questions, and, in fact, we will want to talk with you about 
the non-proliferation situation a little further.
    We will have to call you when we can arrange a date.
    Mr. Helms. Thank you, sir. I would be glad to appear at any 
time.
    Senator Gore. Thank you. You have been very helpful.
    Thank you very much.
    [Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, 
subject to call of the chair.]


STATUS OF DEVELOPMENT OF BALLISTIC AND ANTI-BALLISTIC SYSTEMS IN U.S., 
                AND BRIEFING ON NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

                              ----------                              


                        Monday, February 6, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
                        Subcommittee on Disarmament
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                     Washington, DC
    The, subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., 
in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Gore (presiding), Lausche, Clark, Pell, 
McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, Case, and Cooper.
    Also present: Lt. Col. E. L. Harper, USAF; Lt. Col. A. B. 
Outlaw, USAF; Col. Wm. B. Arnold, USAF; Maj. Christopher, ACDA, 
Congressional Liaison; Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency; Herbert Scoville, Jr., 
Assistant Director, Science & Technology Bureau; and Charles N. 
Van Doren, Deputy General Counsel.
    Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Bader, of the committee staff.
    [This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for 
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions 
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the 
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the 
published hearings.]

   STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN S. FOSTER Jr., DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE 
RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


       CONTROVERSY OVER VALUE OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE [P. 4]

    The first controversy arose around the question, ``Could a 
bullet hit a bullet?'' This phase passed, first when 
calculations showed the feasibility of such an intercept, and 
later and most definitely when successful intercepts of actual 
ICBM targets fired from Vandenberg AFB were accomplished by the 
old NlKE ZEUS system in 1962-63. We had 10 out of 14 successful 
intercepts with the average miss distance less than 470 feet--a 
distance at which destruction is assured from a nuclear burst.
    After this ``simple'' problem was solved, it was realized 
that the offense would replace the easy-to-intercept single 
warhead with clouds of objects, or take other deceptive 
measures. Examples of these objects were decoys designed to 
look like warheads to the radar, and chaff designed to conceal 
the warhead in a cloud of light objects. Against those more 
sophisticated targets there was a necessity for the defense to 
discriminate among them so as to know which objects to take 
under fire. Hence, many objects might have to be tracked and 
observed simultaneously. Also, it might be necessary for the 
defense to wait for atmospheric reentry of the targets and rely 
on slow-down and burn-up of the lighter objects before this 
discrimination could be accomplished.
    If you turn to the page and then turn the whole assembly 
sidesways, you will see a figure which depicts the kind of 
things that go on under the worst conditions during an attack.
    Up in the right-hand corner, you see a cloud. This is 
intended to represent the situation when there are large 
numbers of objects coming in a very large distribution of 
chaff. The radar, and looking at it at a distance of several 
hundred miles, sees it merely as a cloud, and can acquire and 
track that cloud as it comes into the vicinity of the target.
    When the cloud has reached a distance of about a hundred 
miles, it then is possible for the radar to distinguish 
different objects within the cloud, and to make a designation 
on several of them.
    Subsequently, however, if you get to the lower left-hand, 
you will see that the cloud itself stops, and at ranges of 25 
to 50 miles one would expect to see individual objects 
penetrating through the atmosphere toward the target. As you 
see in this case, some of them are indicated as radiating.--
radar jamming--and others are merely decoys looking like 
reentry vehicles. Still others must be considered to be reentry 
vehicles including thermonuclear war heads.

                DEFECTS OF NIKE-ZEUS SYSTEM WERE REMOVED

    Turn now back to the middle of page 2. The old NIKE ZEUS 
system, when confronted with these more sophisticated targets, 
had two fatal defects. One was that it used what are now 
considered to be old-fashioned mechanical radars, which had to 
be mechanically slewed or pointed at each target in turn. This 
required a matter of seconds.
    One practically had to have a radar for each target. The 
ZEUS missile could not be delayed in firing until atmospheric 
reentry of the targets took place, because it was too slow. 
Hence, discrimination could not be aided by atmospheric 
filtering.
    Because of these defects, the NIKE X concept was born. 
First, the mechanical radars of NIKE ZEUS were replaced by 
phased array radars, which by varying the electrical phase of 
the power over the face of a fixed antenna array could change 
the direction of the radar beam in a matter of microseconds 
(Figure 2). This imparted a capability of tracking many objects 
simultaneously, and thus removed one of the ZEUS defects. 
Second, a very high-performance short-range interceptor 
missile, the SPRINT was introduced, capable of flying to 80,000 
feet in 10 seconds. It was smaller, cheaper, and had much 
higher acceleration than ZEUS, and thus could afford to wait 
until reentry of the targets before being committed to fire. 
Atmospheric filtering was now feasible, and the remaining 
targets could be attacked with the high firepower SPRINT'.
    The old ZEUS interceptor was retained in the system for 
long range attacks on simple targets. We now had two 
interceptors--the ZEUS weighing 24,000 pounds, three-stage, 
carrying a nuclear [deleted] warhead, and designed to intercept 
out to about 75 miles; and the SPRINT, 7,400 pounds, two-stage, 
carrying a [deleted] warhead, and designed to intercept out to 
about 20 miles.
    The NIKE X development, initiated in 1963, was thus much 
more effective than the old ZEUS system. It must be noted, 
however, that it was essentially a ``terminal defense'' system. 
The SPRINT effective radius was about 20 miles, which meant 
that it could only defend cities or selected sites. Hence, 
since it is obviously impractical to deploy terminal defenses 
at every small city or village in the United States, it was 
subject to a by-pass attack. That is to say, an enemy could 
always target the undefended cities and obtain high casualties. 
This option was available even to unsophisticated opponents. 
The sophisticated opponent, by concentrating his firepower, 
could overwhelm the defense at any selected defended site.

                    DEVELOPMENT OF ``AREA DEFENSE''

    The next important development in defense effectiveness 
came with the introduction of ``area defense'' in the period 
1964-65. I would like to define the term ``area defense.'' The 
concept is presented pictorially in Figure 3.
    The detection sensor is the Perimeter Acquisition Radar 
(PAR) which detects ballistic missiles at long ranges of 
approximately 1,600 n.m. This is about the range at which an 
incoming missile appears above the horizon. The PAR radar 
tracks the incoming missile and predicts its future path. To 
intercept the incoming missile, we employ the SPARTAN missile 
which is a long range interceptor developed from the old NIKE-
ZEUS. Once the PAR radar has predicted the future path of the 
target, a SPARTAN missile is fired so as to intercept it.
    Senator Clark. Well, it is a missile, isn't it? It is also 
a target.
    Dr. Foster. That is correct.
    Senator Gore. It is your target.
    Dr. Foster. That is correct.
    Senator Clark. It is their missile.
    Dr. Foster. Well, their missile is a complete system on the 
pad. Shortly after boost the re-entry vehicle and multiple 
object if there are to be multiple objects are severed off.
    Senator Clark. It is semantics, but I want to clear what 
you are talking about. What you mean is that the object which 
is intended to explode on American target is what you are 
talking about when you say you are going to intercept it at 
1,660 miles.
    Dr. Forster. Yes, that is correct. Acquire at 1,600 miles 
and subsequently intercept it at some shorter distances.
    Senator Clark. Yes.
    Dr. Foster. This interceptor has a range of over 400 miles, 
and intercepts the incoming missile well above the atmosphere. 
Because of its long range, the SPARTAN can intercept incoming 
missiles directed at targets several hundred miles from the 
SPARTAN battery location. Thus, because each SPARTAN battery 
can defend a fairly large area, it requires only about 14 
batteries to provide coverage of the entire continental United 
States. The SPARTAN missile is guided by a missile site radar 
(MSR) which is associated with each battery. The PAR radars 
would be defended with short range high performance SPRINT 
missiles to prevent their being targeted first to blind the 
defense.

                 CHANGE IN CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS

    The advance which made area defense feasible was a change 
in the concept of the nuclear warhead. The SPARTAN warhead is a 
high-yield nuclear warhead with a high-energy X-ray output 
(``the hot bomb''). Such a warhead, and particularly a large-
yield warhead, substantially increases the kill radius of the 
interceptor at altitudes of, say, 300,000 feet.
    Senator Clark. When you say kill radius, you are talking 
about killing the missile and not killing a lot of people?
    Dr. Foster. That is correct. It is the radius at which we 
can be confident of killing----
    Senator Clark. Destroying?
    Dr. Foster [continuing]. An incoming warhead.
    Senator Gore. Well,----
    Dr. Foster. Destroying it.
    Senator Gore. Since Senator Clark has made this 
interruption, I Wonder if you could indicate here just what 
would be the kill radius from X-rays?
    Dr. Foster. The kill radius from X-rays takes place above a 
hundred thousand feet as the major mechanism for kill of enemy 
warheads, and above these altitudes the kill radius is assumed 
to be about 10 miles against hardened Soviet warheads.
    Senator Gore. When you say, let's understand what you mean. 
If we are speaking of the same term when we are saying radius, 
are you speaking of five miles each way from the detonation?
    Dr. Foster. I mean 10 miles each way.
    Senator Gore. Then you are speaking 20 miles radius?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, sir, I am speaking of a sphere 20 miles in 
diameter. If there are any objects within that sphere with our 
explosion at the center, then we would believe that they are 
destroyed.
    Now, in actual fact today the community would agree that we 
would destroy the existing--the system we are talking about, 
could, if it were deployed destroy the existing Soviet warheads 
at much greater distances.
    Senator Gore. When you reduce your diameter of the sphere 
to 20 miles you think that would be the minimum of any 
foreseeable sophistication of incoming weapons?
    Dr. Foster. Well, Mr. Chairman, I believe that it is 
possible in time to configure re-entry vehicle and the 
thermonuclear warheads within them so that they could sustain 
even greater x-ray intensities than those I have indicated. The 
number of 10 miles I associate with the kind of hardening that 
can be achieved by the Soviets during the few years after our 
initial deployment of such a system.
    Senator Gore. What do you mean a few years, just an order?
    Dr. Foster. Five years.
    Senator Gore. And say it would take us three years to 
deploy.
    Dr. Foster. We could have a system, say, by 1973 and I 
would claim that the effectiveness of the U.S. ballistic 
missile defense would be about 10 miles against Soviet radar--
excuse me, Soviet reentry vehicles in the field through until 
1978.

                 LENGTH OF TIME TO IMPROVE U.S. OFFENSE

    Senator Gore. A very pertinent question here is the time 
element with respect to our own improvement of reentry of our 
own missiles. The Soviets are now deploying a system, the 
Tallinn System, over some 26 other areas. How long will--if we 
proceed upon the tactical philosophy of improving our offense 
as the best defense, in what period of time will we be able to 
accomplish this hardening and improvement which you think it 
would take the Soviets five years to accomplish?
    Dr. Foster. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have, as you know, been 
working aggressively on this general area ever since 1961, and 
currently have in our missiles the products of the program. We 
are, however, continuing to increase the hardness of the 
reentry vehicle so although the systems deployed by 1969 will 
be harder than those currently deployed and those by 1971 will 
be still harder. I believe I may have given the committee some 
misunderstanding with respect to your earlier question.
    It is not so much-- the kill radius that we talked about 
for the U.S. high-yield warhead associated with SPARTAN is not 
so much to make sure that we can kill the object we are aiming 
at. We can surely do that because, as I indicated, we had been 
able in 1962 and '63 to bring a missile to within a few hundred 
feet of an incoming ICBM.
    It is important, however, because it forces the enemy, if 
he wishes to attack with many objects coming in simultaneously 
from one missile, to put each of these objects a large distance 
from its neighbors, and so in trying to kill them all at once 
we can only be sure of killing things out to a radius of 10 
miles.
    Senator Clark. From where?
    Dr. Foster. From the point of detonation. All of the other 
objects, if they are to still survive, must be outside of that.
    That then forces the enemy to either use lighter warheads, 
lighter objects that he can throw to larger distances, or more 
propellant to throw them to larger distances, or more 
propellant to throw them to larger distances.
    Well, to continue----

            DEVELOPMENT OF PERIMETER ACQUISITION RADAR (PAR)

    Senator Aiken. May I ask you one question there? Is it 
possible to change direction of a missile at specified 
distances from the target?
    Dr. Foster During flight, Senator?
    Senator Aiken. Yes.
    Dr. Foster. Yes, it is.
    Senator Aiken. And have you developed a PAR so that it will 
adapt itself to change in the direction of the missile?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, we have, Senator.
    Senator Aiken. Our defenses, will they change with the 
direction?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, that is a particular feature of the PAR 
radar.
    Senator Aiken. That is a particular feature of PAR?
    Dr. Foster. That it can track essentially instantaneously 
over a large volume of the sky.

                            POSEIDON MISSILE

    Senator Gore. Doctor Foster, as I recall it, the C.I.A. was 
unable to verify that the Soviets had accomplished a multiple 
warhead missile such as our Poseidon. How far are we along in 
the development of a multiple warhead missile?
    Dr. Foster. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you know, we have 
already deployed in the Polaris system the A-3 missile--excuse 
me, the A-3 contains three separate warheads.
    Senator Gore. Yes. But the Poseidon has----
    Dr. Foster. The Poseidon could have as many as 14 separate 
warheads.
    Senator Gore. That is what I thought. When will this be----
    Dr. Foster. That is to be deployed beginning 1970.
    Senator Gore. And our nuclear submarines will be redesigned 
to carry the Poseidon instead of the Polaris?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, sir, that is correct.
    Senator Clark. Is this a big job of redesigning?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, it is a fairly thorough redesign.
    Senator Aiken. You want to change the design of the 
submarine?
    Dr. Foster. No, it is not so much----
    Senator Aiken. Torpedo tubes or what?
    Dr. Foster. It is not so much the redesign of the 
submarine. The boats are essentially the same.
    One uses new equipment in the control of the missile.
    Senator Aiken. I see.
    Dr. Foster. And, of course, a brand new missile that is to 
go basically in the same tubes.
    Senator Gore. There are, of course, some differences in 
assessment of our intelligence units. I wonder in this instance 
if the Armed Services intelligence would agree with the C.I.A. 
that there is no hard evidence that the Soviets have developed 
a multiple head.
    Dr. Foster. I believe the intelligence community is in 
agreement that there is no hard evidence that the Soviets have 
developed a multiple warhead capability.
    Senator Gore. Has their science academy announced such? 
Have the Soviets made claims of such?
    Dr. Foster. Not to my knowledge, Mr. Chairman.
    I would like to draw your attention to a terribly important 
difference between multiple warheads and the so-called MIRV. 
Multiple warheads as it is used in the A-3 missile simply means 
three, in this case, three warheads on a single missile. And a 
plan----
    Senator Gore. Will you say that again?
    Dr. Foster. The current missile aboard Polaris submarines--
--
    Senator Gore. You are speaking of our missiles now?
    Dr. Foster. That is correct; yes--has three warheads on the 
top of the missile.
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Dr. Foster. The design is such that after the missile is 
fired and the reentry vehicle section is separated from the 
rest of the booster system the separate warheads and their 
reentry vehicles are directed to separate trajectories in 
space, such that they would fall on the ground at different 
times but make approximately an equilateral triangle with their 
aim point, with their impact points around the central aiming 
point. This separation----
    Senator Gore. In other words, they would arrive on the same 
target but with different trajectories and, therefore, 
different times?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, that is correct. They burst with a 
separation distance of about two kilometers on a side.
    Now, that separation, that deployment arrangement, is 
designed in at the factory, so to speak.
    Now, there is a quite different system to be aboard the 
Poseidon and the Minuteman III. This system involves an 
entirely separate propulsion system after the burnout of the 
last stage. This propulsion system has guidance and a program 
to take each of its payloads to a different target that is put 
on the guidance by the commander of the vehicle.
    Senator Gore. This is the MIRV?
    Dr. Foster. This is the MIRV.
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Dr. Foster. This propulsion system, then, under the 
direction of guidance, orients the whole vehicle on a 
trajectory which will load to impact on a specified point. At 
that stage, it eases off one of the payloads, which will then 
subsequently go to that impact point. The propulsion system, 
then, again under the direction of the guidance, reorients the 
remainder of the payload on to a new target. When it is on the 
course toward the new target, it eases off a second payload, 
and so on, until it is discharged, in the case of Poseidon, as 
much as 14 different reentry vehicles.
    Senator Gore. One of the 14 is discharged?
    Dr. Foster. That is correct. But not at high velocity.
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Senator Cooper. May I ask a question?
    The A-3 then is directed toward one target?
    Dr. Foster. That is correct.
    Senator Cooper. The other systems you talk about, the 
Poseidon and the Minuteman----
    Dr. Foster. Yes.
    Senator Cooper [continuing]. The payloads, as you call it, 
could be separated and they could be directed to----
    Dr. Foster Different cities.
    Senator Cooper [continuing]. As many targets as it is 
desired.
    Dr. Foster. That is correct.

                          MISSILE ACQUISITION

    And continuing, Mr. Chairman, this high yield warhead in 
the SPARTAN has a substantially increased kill radius for the 
interceptor at altitudes about 300,000 feet. The lethal range 
increases from a few hundred feet to several miles.
    Consequently, the offense is unable to rely on relatively 
small clouds of confusing objects a few miles in radius.
    To carry this warhead, a larger interceptor----
    Senator Gore. What do you mean clouds? You don't mean 
natural clouds?
    Dr. Foster. No. sir.
    Senator Gore. The cloud created by the----
    Dr. Foster. A dispersal of the large mass of tinfoil. Call 
it chaff.
    Senator Gore. In other words, artificial clouds?
    Dr. Foster. Yes. Artificial.
    I believe you can see it on Figure 1.
    Senator Gore. I saw that. But I wanted to be sure--you are 
not speaking of any sort of possible natural phenomenon?
    Dr. Foster. No, sir, I am not.
    Senator Gore. No matter how intense it might be?
    Dr. Foster. That is correct.
    Senator Gore. Okay.

                       SPARTAN REPLACED THE ZEUS

    Dr. Foster. To carry this warhead, a larger interceptor 
than the old ZEUS missile was required. The SPARTAN missile 
weighs about 35,000 pounds, is three-stage, carries a [deleted] 
warhead, and is designed to intercept at about 300 miles or 
more.
    With the introduction of SPARTAN, the ZEUS interceptor was 
no longer required--in effect, the SPARTAN replaced the ZEUS.
    Figure 4 shows the ``footprint'' on a map of the U.S. 
defended by a SPARTAN battery. A footprint is the area defended 
by SPARTAN from a specific direction of attack. The SPARTAN 
might intercept directly overhead an ICBM aimed at a point 
several hundred miles away.
    Comparatively few SPARTAN batteries can defend the whole 
United States from simple attacks. Figure 5 shows an example of 
14 SPARTAN batteries, with four PAR radars located across the 
northern U.S. border, defending against an ICBM threat from the 
Chinese Peoples Republic.
    Senator Clark. That is what CPR means?
    Dr. Foster. Yes.
    You will note I said simple attacks. It is still possible 
for a sophisticated opponent, by warheading hardening and by 
separating his incoming clouds of objects into widely separated 
clumps, to confuse the defense and make the firepower demands 
on SPARTAN too high. In this case, terminal defense SPRINT's 
must be relied upon if we are to furnish a defense.
    Senator Gore. I am violating may own suggestion, but maybe 
we had better reconsider. I find this so difficult that it may 
be helpful to others as well as me to ask a few questions as we 
go along.
    Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

                    DEFENSE AGAINST A SIMPLE ATTACK

    Senator Gore. Now, do I correctly understand that this 
defense against a so-called simple attack described here on 
Figure 5 that that would be roughly what is referred to in the 
press, otherwise as the thin defense?
    Dr. Foster. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Gore. That is the system, the cost of which would 
be anticipated, say from four to six billion dollars?
    Dr. Foster. For the defense of the United States only would 
be in the vicinity of three to four billion.
    Senator Cooper. How much?
    Dr. Foster. Three to four billion.
    Senator Gore. That is the defense against the relatively 
unsophisticated weapons which the Chinese are now developing?
    Dr. Foster. Yes.
    Senator Gore. Thank you.
    Senator Clark. Would you yield, Albert?
    Senator Gore. No, anybody. Let's just ask some questions as 
we go along.

                        COST OF CITIES' DEFENSE

    Senator Clark. The thing that bothers me is he says on page 
6, which he hasn't got to yet, that the cost of the 25-city 
defense would be $10 billion of the 50 cities defense $20 
billion. So, I wondered how that correlated with the very much 
lower figure which you just mentioned.
    Of course, he has not gotten to it.
    Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, if I may I would like to read 
that point and then answer the question.

                        DEFINITION OF A BATTERY

    Senator Cooper. May I ask a question here? Will you define 
battery?
    Dr. Foster. A battery, Senator, is a site. A location where 
one has a radar and a number of defensive missiles.
    Senator Cooper. I notice in your first drawing on page 4, 
what you call the SPARTAN footprint.
    Dr. Foster. Yes, sir, that indicates----
    Senator Cooper. Would it need more than one battery to 
protect that footprint area?
    Dr. Foster. No, sir. Rreferring again to Figure 4, you see 
an area outlined there in the central portion, in the northeast 
portion, of the United States. In the upper region of that 
area, you will notice a dark triangle. That is intended to 
indicate the point at which the radar and the SPARTAN missiles 
are located.
    Senator Cooper. Yes.
    Dr. Foster. From that point then the missile can defend the 
area indicated by the surrounding line.
    Senator Clark. What do those little plus signs mean?
    Dr. Foster. I believe, Senator, those are the intersection 
of the lines of longitude and latitude.
    Senator Cooper. Would a battery have several missiles?
    Dr. Foster. Oh, yes. It could have, for example, 20 or 30 
missiles.
    Senator Cooper. To protect an area such as designated on 
the map, do you have any idea how many missiles would be 
required?
    Dr. Foster. We would plan on 20 to 30.
    Senator Cooper. Twenty to thirty?
    Senator Clark. Looking at Figure 5 which you mentioned, 
would you define what the phrase at the top of the figure means 
``Minimum Energy (23) Attack from E. China.'' What does that 
mean?
    Dr. Foster. It refers to an attack coming from the eastern 
portion of China, attempting to get maximum range from the 
missile, which, in turn, would amount to a reentry vehicle 
coming into the United States at an angle of 23 degrees from 
the horizon.
    Senator Clark. What does minimum energy mean?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, I am afraid I forgot to take that----
    Senator Clark. I thought it meant 23 missiles.
    Dr. Foster. I forgot to take that technical designation off 
the graph.
    Senator Gore. I hope that my colleagues will now see why 
twice last week I felt the necessity of raising a reservation 
at the hearing with Ambassador Kennan and Ambassador Reischauer 
who tended to downgrade the importance of the Chinese 
development.
    When the Secretary of Defense tells us that he anticipates, 
and the C.I.A., and the Atomic Energy Commission tell us that 
they expect the Chinese to test an intercontinental ballistic 
missile of from five to seven thousand mile range this coming 
summer, and that we see from satellite pictures that their 
laboratories for nuclear development are as large as ours, in 
some cases larger, than it is anticipated that the Chinese will 
have the capability of making just such an unsophisticated 
nuclear ballistic missile attack on the United States as this 
defense in Figure 5 is calculated to provide a defense against.
    It that true?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The defense position as 
indicated by Figure 5 as designed to provide defense of the 
United States against Chinese attack amounting to tens of 
missiles successfully reaching the area of the United States.
    Senator Gore. Well, for the benefit of my colleagues, the 
Atomic Energy experts estimated that within five years the 
Chinese would likely have both missile and warheads in the 
order of hundreds.
    I don't know that--now, the C.I.A., may I say, the other 
Friday did not agree with that estimate. They did not exactly 
put an estimate upon time, and since you----
    Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, I will check for the record. I 
believe we cannot give you hard evidence to support several, to 
report a statement, saying that, to the effect that the Chinese 
could have several hundred warhead in five years.
    Senator Gore. I didn't say several!
    Dr. Foster. A hundred.
    Senator Gore. They were asked the question, not by me but I 
think by Senator Pastore, whether in five years their stockpile 
would be termed in dozens and hundreds or in thousands. There 
were three experts there and, as I recall it, they conferred 
among themselves and thought it more nearly would be measured 
by hundreds rather than dozens or thousands. That is a very 
inexact estimate, but if this is designed to protect, say, 
against tens----
    Dr. Foster. Successfully reaching the United States.
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Dr. Foster. That means one would have to multiply by two or 
three to take care of reliability, lack of reliability.
    Senator Gore. I am not trying to specify the danger, but I 
am trying to indicate to my colleagues this certainly is not 
something that can be taken lightly.

                   TESTIMONY OF INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS

    Senator Clark. Albert could you clarify for the record who 
these experts were; were these Atomic Energy employees?
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Senator Clark. And not CIA and not Pentagon?
    Senator Gore. One of them is the head of the Los Alamos 
Laboratory, and the other was Dr. Brandbury. I can get that for 
you, if you would like.
    I think we should have them here, too.
    Senator Clark. I think so, too. Because I take it from what 
you say, and I didn't know it, that the Atomic Energy 
Commission has its own bunch of intelligence experts who may 
not agree with either DOD intelligence or CIA intelligence. Is 
that correct?
    Senator Gore. Well, I think--well, the Atomic Energy 
Commission has a great deal of intelligence work which they 
have done with respect to detonations by any country. They play 
a very little role in the intelligence effort with respect to 
proliferation.
    Senator Clark. Which would overlap the covering of the same 
subject by DOD intelligence and CIA intelligence.
    Senator Gore. I think that is a reasonable statement.
    Do you agree with that, Doctor?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
    [Deleted.]
    Senator Clark. But sometimes don't agree. At least, I 
gather from what you said----
    Dr. Foster. That is correct, yes.
    Senator Gore. But, by and large, [deleted].
    Dr. Foster. Yes, when Mr. Helms or Mr. McNamara gives a 
statement on what the community's position is, it has always 
included a full treatment of the opinions and thoughts and 
ideas of the technical members of the Atomic Energy 
Commission's laboratories.
    Senator Clark. Were those the only three who do this 
detailed technical intelligence work for our Government--DOD, 
CIA and the Atomic Energy Commission? For example, nobody over 
at ACDA does any of this?
    Dr. Foster. No, sir, I believe the answer to your question 
is correct.
    Senator Gore. What about NASA?
    Dr. Foster. They do not generally get into this work.
    Senator Gore. You have then these three agencies.
    Dr. Foster. Yes, that is correct.
    Senator Gore. If it is agreeable with the subcommittee, 
since we have had the CIA and the DOD, it might be well to have 
the AEC.
    Senator Clark. I would think so.
    Senator Gore. Would you agree, Senator Cooper?
    Senator Cooper. Yes.

                         MINIMUM ENERGY ATTACK

    Senator Clark. Before you leave this, Dr. Foster, I wonder 
if you could define a little more in layman's terms than you 
have so far what this phrase on figure 5, ``Minimum Energy (23) 
Attack from East China.'' means. I have particular reference to 
what you mean by minimum energy, and again because I did not 
get it the last time, what 23 stands for.
    Dr. Foster. Yes, Senator. Imagine stepping back 5,000 or 
10,000 miles from the earth and see what is happening from a 
point on earth. One can launch a missile and have it cover a 
trajectory of a few thousand miles and land at another point. 
One has the option of deciding just how the missile reentry 
vehicle reenters the atmosphere. One can, so to speak, loft the 
missile. One can point it up to a very high angle, and have it 
go rather far from the earth, and then come in to the target 
very steeply.
    Senator Clark. Like a lob in tennis as opposed to a drive.
    Dr. Foster. Exactly. However, if you wanted to get maximum 
range, you would not lob it quite so highly. So this refers to 
angles that are of a trajectory that are set to give you the 
maximum range, and hence--or to reach those targets, use 
minimum energy. That is what the minimum energy refers to. 23 
degrees refers to the angle between the line left by the 
reentry vehicle and the horizon, horizontal.
    Senator Clark. And your opinion is, I think I have got it 
right, you opinion is that such an attack is a definite 
possibility from the Chinese People's Republic with a total of 
missiles in the general vicinity more or less of a hundred 
within how long a time?
    Dr. Foster. I do not recall the intelligence estimates on 
this for a hundred missiles.
    Senator Clark. Just give us a wide range.
    Dr. Foster. For example, I will correct this for the record 
if I may. I recall that one could have--the estimate is that 
one could have about ten missiles by 1972 to '73, and 30, a 
significant number of missile, by 1974 to '75.
    Senator Clark. That is good enough for me.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, I believe Mr. McNamara's posture 
statement treats that subject very, very carefully. Let me try 
to help here.
    From the point of view of providing assured destruction of 
the Soviet Union, that is to say from the point of view of 
having enough military capability in the United States so that 
our strategic forces could absorb an all-out attack by the 
Soviet Union and to, in turn, deliver destruction that we would 
consider totally unacceptable to them on to the Soviet Union, 
it is Mr. McNamara's position, and I agree, that the deployment 
of ballistic missile defenses by the United States is not 
required.
    Senator Gore. That is vis-a-vis the United States and the 
Soviet Union.
    Dr. Foster. Or for that matter China.
    Senator Gore. Well, China's power of defenses as of now is 
nowhere in the order of the Soviets.
    Dr. Foster. So, from that point of view of maintaining 
assured destruction capability of the United States, there is 
no need to deploy new or for the foreseeable future ballistic 
missile defenses.

   DEFENSE SECRETARY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD ANTIBALLISTIC DEFENSE [P. 10]

    Senator Gore. What you are really saying here, it seems to 
me, is that the Soviet deployment of the Moscow and Tallinn 
systems do not compromise our power of retaliation. Therefore, 
it does not compromise the strategy of deterrence.
    Dr. Foster. The Soviet deployment of ballistic missile 
defensive systems does affect the ability of equipment to 
penetrate and so as we see them deploy----
    Senator Gore. You said that.
    Dr. Foster [continuing]. Initiate whatever changes are 
necessary to make the penetration.
    Senator Gore. I understand. But you say that we are capable 
of making such improvement in our missiles that regardless of 
the defenses now envisioned within their capability----
    Dr. Foster. Yes, that is correct.
    Senator Gore [continuing]. That we will continue to have an 
assured capacity of sufficient destruction in the Soviet Union 
that we would have a retaliatory threat, even after the Soviets 
made a first attack, of sufficient magnitude that it would not 
seriously compromise our strategy of deterrence.
    Dr. Foster. Yes. That is correct.
    Senator Gore. Now, what I am trying to understand is the 
position of the Department of Defense. As you know, of course, 
Mr. Vance will be here and you referred to him before. What I 
am trying to get at is what is the position of the Department 
of Defense, or what is your own view of the necessity of 
building at some appropriate time a defense against a Chinese 
threat such as is contemplated within that possibility of your 
figure 5? Do I make myself clear?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                     ADEQUACY OF U.S. SILOS [P. 11]

    Dr. Foster. Well, Senator, the ballistic missile defense 
system--excuse me, components that we have developed over the 
last several years can be used to protect the United States 
population, as I have indicated, against Soviet attacks, if 
they are light, and they can be used to protect us against 
Chinese attack.
    They, however, can also be deployed to protect our 
MINUTEMAN-silos.
    The reason we might want to do that is simply because in 
the last two years the Soviets have concentrated on increasing 
the number of their hardened and dispersed ICBMs. As a 
consequence, they can soon--could soon have the capability to 
destroy a large number of U.S. MINUTEMEN if they chose to put 
accurate guidance in their current designs. They do not at the 
moment have accurate guidance. So the Soviets cannot, in my 
opinion, have any substantial effect on MINUTEMAN deployment.
    If however, in the future they were to get an accurate 
delivery capability, then they could indeed begin to take out 
substantial numbers of our MINUTEMAN force.
    Our response to this degradation could take a number of 
forms. One that is being seriously considered is the deployment 
of a ballistic missile defense system of those silos.
    Senator Gore. Another are submarines.
    Dr. Foster. Yes. We could put in additional or improved 
submarines.
    Senator Gore. Another possibly would be a moveable 
launching pad?
    Dr. Foster. On land.
    Senator Gore. On land?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Gore. Are there others?
    Dr. Foster. Yes. We could deploy a larger missile in or 
near the current fixed MINUTEMAN sites and provide defense 
again for that.
    Senator Gore. I do not understand.
    Dr. Foster. One of the concerns about the current MINUTEMAN 
in the event of a substantial increase in Soviet capabilities 
is its limited payload, and so one might think of an improved 
capability involving a 5,000 to 10,000 pound payload missile 
installed essentially in the current MINUTEMAN network. Such a 
missile would have a substantially higher value than the 
current MINUTEMAN, and hence would--the defense of such missile 
would be far more attractive
    Senator Gore. I understand. You said larger missiles with 
better defenses.
    Dr. Foster. Yes.
    Senator Gore. Okay. So you have these four ways in which 
you might react if the Soviets developed or perfected a 
guidance system which would give them the capability of taking 
out MINUTEMAN silos.
    Dr. Foster. Yes.
    Senator Gore. Any further questions, Senator Cooper?
    Senator Cooper. No.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Dr. Foster. Penetration aids program.
    You will note that I have described a flexible set of 
building blocks consisting of PAR and MSR radars and two types 
of interceptor missiles, SPARTAN and SPRINT. We also have a 
very large, sophisticated radar called TACMAR, designed 
specifically against sophisticated attacks. They can be put 
together in various ways to provide varying levels of defense 
against different threats.
    For example, if we wished to defend the United States 
against a large Soviet attack, we would provide an overlay of 
an area defense such as I have described. As I mentioned 
earlier, however, it would be necessary to depend primarily on 
terminal SPRINT defenses, including TACMARS, at selected 
cities. A 25-city defense (including the area component) would 
cost about $10 billion. A 50-city defense would cost almost $20 
billion.

       TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE [P. 12]

    As a matter of technical judgment, I believe that these 
larger deployments carry with them technical risks. The 
likelihood of large and sophisticated attacks with the 
deployment of significant U.S. defenses increases the technical 
uncertainty of the defensive system. In the absence of 
atmospheric nuclear tests, we simply cannot calculate all the 
effects of many simultaneous nuclear explosions. We would have 
to expect that in an all-out exchange, dozen of their warheads 
would likely explode in our cities.
    By the way--this is likely whether or not we have 
atmospheric tests.
    Mr. Chairman, I believe that sums up the technical 
assessment of BMD. It has changed greatly in recent years and 
no doubt will continue to change. That is why, even in the 
absence of a deployment decision, a high-priority R&D program 
is so necessary.

              BIOLOGICAL DAMAGE RESULTING FROM DETONATIONS

    Senator Gore. I would say to the subcommittee that Dr. 
Foster has requested, if possible, he would like to be excused 
pretty soon. How urgent is this, Doctor?
    Dr. Foster. It is not very urgent, Mr. Chairman. I am at 
your convenience.
    Senator Gore. Thank you, Doctor.
    I would like explore one question with you and then yield 
to my colleagues. At our last tests in the atmosphere over 
Johnson Island, communication was knocked out for a period of 
hours. I realize that this communication may not have been at 
frequencies which our signal system in the missiles may operate 
at, but it does raise a very serious problem, a very serious 
danger, it seems to me, that the detonation of a nuclear 
explosion designed specifically to conglomerate communication 
might compromise our own radar signal systems. Do I 
sufficiently describe the problem to elicit an answer?
    Dr. Foster. You certainly do, Mr. Chairman.
    We were aware in the 1958 period and subsequently that 
detonations at high altitudes could give rise to 
electromagnetic signals of rather high intensity and hence we 
planned those experiments in 1962.
    As a result of the measurements that were taken, all of the 
subsequent studies of our assured destruction forces, as well 
as our ballistic missile defense examinations, have included a 
thorough consideration of these effects. Specifically, for 
example, we have chosen the frequencies of the ballistic 
missile defense systems in the NIKE-ZEUS program so as to 
minimize these effects. Our communications program involving 
satellites is designed in large measure to avoid disruption of 
the service because of this effect. In our offensive forces, 
the MINUTEMAN and POSEIDON are being configured so that 
warheads in those missiles can be burst at very high altitude 
so as to maximize the difficulties that are inherent in any 
Soviet systems.
    Senator Gore. Let us see if I understand what you said in 
your last statement. Our own offensive missiles are being 
configured and designed so as to explode at varying altitudes, 
thus complicating, if not compromising or minimizing, the 
effect of the Soviet antiballistic missile defense system.
    Dr. Foster. No, Mr. Chairman. I am afraid I was not 
sufficiently clear on that point.
    Senator Gore. Is that true? Are we seeking to?
    Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, to maximize the disturbance on 
communications, one must burst the warhead not near the ground 
but near the top of the atmosphere. To do so, however, requires 
that you have the necessary command mechanisms in the missile 
system, and what I indicated was that in our advanced POLARIS 
and MINUTEMAN systems we are going to have a procedure and a 
configuration such that if desired we can burst the warheads at 
the optimum altitude to cause the greatest electromagnetic 
disturbance to communications in the Soviet Union.
    Senator Gore. Well then, the answer is yes.
    Dr. Foster. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. Now, turning it again to our defense problem, 
will you describe the possibility of the Soviets and possibly 
later the Chinese utilizing electronics in the same way to 
disturb our own detection defense, if we relied upon such a 
system?
    Dr. Foster. All right. This is in the event we deployed a 
ballistic missile defense.
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Dr. Foster. What measures are we taking, have we taken, or 
would we take, to minimize the possibility of disruption.
    Senator Gore. With what possible success or failure.
    Dr. Foster. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have recently, on 
considering the NIKE X system, changed the frequency of the PAR 
radar, the perimeter acquisition radar, which I described 
earlier, so as to minimize the difficulty from this particular 
tactic.
    At the very outset the frequencies of MSR and TACMAR radars 
were sufficiently high so that the disturbances that could be 
caused by such tactics were very temporary.
    Senator Gore. Well, very temporary--if it is a matter of 
seconds it might be fatal.
    Dr. Foster. Well, Mr. Chairman, the whole engagement takes 
place over 5 to 10 minutes on any one threat, and the blackout 
to our high frequency radars occurs over a few tens of seconds 
to a minute. It is that kind of a time scale.
    Senator Gore. I know on one of your tables here we are able 
to--the missile, a possible hostile missile, would appear over 
the horizon at, say, 300 seconds from the time of our earliest 
possible interception. If you have say in the case of a 
multiple warhead, and there is this cloud of tinfoil or chaff 
as you refer to it, and then there is a period of detecting 
which is the decoy and which is the real McCoy, you have a 
matter of seconds, very few seconds involved. That is why I 
asked you the possible duration of this electronic blackout.
    Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
    I do not want to try to predict the final tactical solution 
that we will have for this threat you describe. One of the 
solutions is as follows:
    If we see coming over the horizon at a range of 1,500 miles 
a steady stream of chaff and even possibly can see objects 
within the chaff, one tactic we have is as follows: We wait for 
two or three minutes until the chaff has come perhaps halfway, 
and if we are attempting to--and then we might attempt to 
attack the whole length of the chaff simultaneously. So, we 
would first send a missile that would go out to, perhaps, 500 
miles range, and then subsequently others at shorter ranges all 
timed to burst at once. So, it would be in a sense like Bunker 
Hill, and the whole threat, volume would be taken out at one 
time. We would then wait for----
    Senator Gore. Is this going to be a human decision sitting 
at a key or is this going to be an electronic decision 
predetermined?
    Dr. Foster. I think a bit of each, Mr. Chairman. You are 
however, describing an extremely advanced threat.
    Senator Gore. I understand----
    Senator Aiken. They depend on computers, Mr. Chairman. It 
probably will get there three months late like social security 
checks.
    Senator Gore. I hope not.
    Dr. Foster. Any objects which remain, the hard objects 
would subsequently then come and reach the atmosphere and would 
have to penetrate. Those that appeared as real objects would 
then be attacked by SPRINT. The SPRINT has a nuclear warhead.
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Dr. Foster. The warhead, however, has a very low yield and 
is mainly fusion and so there is little blackout and, as a 
consequence, there is esentially no blackout associated with 
this aspect of the engagement.
    Senator Gore. Well, I am overstepping my allotment of time. 
I wanted to ask one perhaps less technical question, but one 
which has disturbed me a great deal in thinking about this, and 
yet I have not heard anyone discuss it for a long while.
    Another result of I believe our last atmospheric test in 
the Pacific was that it blinded rabbits hundreds of miles away. 
We are speaking here of a possible defense system of SPRINT 
missiles which have a maximum range of 20 miles and if we are 
defending our cities with SPRINT missiles, and a multiple 
attack comes in, and we have this series of nuclear explosions 
overhead, just coming to the biological question, what is the 
danger of blindness or other effects of blast and radiation?
    Dr. Foster Mr. Chairman, I think we have to be concerned 
with two kinds of effects. The first, as you indicate, is 
blindness. There, I believe, the problem was not SPRINT but the 
SPARTAN explosions.
    If the SPARTAN missile were to be commanded to detonate its 
warhead at altitudes above 350,000 feet, we have no serious 
problems. If, however, for some reason, and this is not in the 
general plan, it is forced to detonate it, at, say 100,000 
feet, then we could have some serious cases of blindness, 
although, of course, that difficulty would be minor compared 
with the consequences of having had the enemy warhead penetrate 
to the ground. So in the current use----
    Senator Gore. It would be a hard choice between being 
killed or blinded.
    Dr. Foster. I do not believe so, Mr. Chairman. The 
individual----
    Senator Gore. I would choose to be blind for a while.
    Dr. Foster. Yes. The individual would have to be looking up 
at that time in about the right direction to cause serious 
trouble.
    Senator Gore. How did it happen that these rabbits were 
looking up? Did they not--with the detonation instinctively 
flicker in that direction?
    Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, the damage is caused 
substantially before the eye can close, and we arranged to have 
the rabbits despite their desires, looking up in that 
direction.
    Senator Gore. That is a technical question.
    Dr. Foster. In summary, Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that 
in the normal deployment and tactics of the NIKE X system that 
there would be any serious damage either to our population or 
to the Canadians north of us in the event we had SPARTAN 
detonations, detonations of the SPARTAN warhead.
    The other question, of course, is the fallout, and in this 
case also the bursts are at heights well above the ground, so 
that there is no problem with fallout at least in the nearterm. 
It would nevertheless raise the activity in the atmosphere. It 
would be subsequent activity, and radiation damage.
    Senator Gore. Senator Clark.
    Senator Clark. Dr. Foster, how far away are we from 
deployment of both SPARTAN and SPRINT if we were to make a 
decision right now to go ahead and deploy them?
    Dr. Foster. I believe, Senator, that with an orderly 
deployment, that is to say doing it right, and that being the 
guiding rule in the deployment, we would not have an initial 
operating capability of the first battery until 1971.
    Senator Clark. And in order to create the situation 
revealed by your figure 5, how long would that take?
    Dr. Foster. That could be completed by mid-1973.
    Senator Clark. And could you state precisely what the cost 
of deployment of the SPRINT and SPARTAN would be on that time 
schedule to the extent indicated by our figure 5?
    Dr. Foster. Yes. That would be $3 billion to $4 billion, 
and then if one wanted to, in addition, deploy, extend the 
equipment to give the necessary coverage of the MINUTEMAN 
system, that would take, extend it, another six months and 
would increase the costs another billion dollars.

                        FALLOUT SHELTER PROGRAM

    Senator Clark. This is exclusive of any fallout shelter 
program, is it not?
    Dr. Foster. Yes that is correct.
    Senator Clark. Would you recommend such a fallout shelter 
program if we decided to deploy?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, I believe I would, and that amounts to 
about $800 million above the current plan.
    Senator Clark. For the entire country.
    Dr. Foster. Yes that is correct.
    Senator Clark I take it from the answer to the questions 
addressed to you by Senator Gore that you are not particularly 
disturbed about the radioactive fallout aspect of a deployment 
and actual use of SPARTAN and SPRINT. Is that correct?
    Dr. Foster. That is correct, Senator. However, I would be 
very disturbed with the fallout associated with the all-out 
thermonuclear exchange.
    Senator Clark. Of course, I assume that would be 
devastating.
    Dr. Foster. Yes. To be more specific, I do not believe that 
blindness or fallout are aspects of our current concept of NIKE 
X which should be considered in any way as a serious 
limitation.

                         DEPLOYMENT OF NIKE X'S

    Senator Clark. Have we deployed any NIKE X's yet?
    Dr. Foster. No, sir. We have not. We are in the process of 
deploying prototype models to Kwajalein so that we can check 
out a system. That will not be completed until 1967.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    ESTIMATED U.S. DEATHS IN EVENTS OF ALL-OUT ENEMY ATTACK [P. 14]

    Senator Clark. If you would turn to page 6 of your 
statement and the last sentence on page 6 which I quote: ``We 
would have to expect that in an all-out exchange dozens of 
their warheads would likely explode in our cities.'' With what 
estimate of human casualties?
    Dr. Foster. Tens of millions.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Dr. Foster. Let me try to start anew. In the event of no 
defense and an all-out attack by the Soviet Union on the United 
States, 150 million could be killed.
    If we deployed a very large ballistic missile defense 
system----
    Senator Clark. Including SPARTAN and SPRINT.
    Dr. Foster. Including SPARTAN and SPRINT and all the radar 
and so forth--let us say it involved $20 billion so that we 
would have 7,000 or 8,000 SPRINTS and 1,000 or more SPARTANS, 
and if the Soviets took no measures to penetrate that defense 
of ours, then we could cut our losses to a few tens of 
millions.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                  TESTING OF INCOMING MISSILES [P. 23]

    Senator Gore. I have one question about research and 
development that I can just hardly resist asking here. I 
realize that even though we decide against the deployment of--I 
say we, the government, decides against the deployment of an 
ABM system, it is absolutely necessary to continue research and 
development both with respect to ascertaining as much as 
possible of what improvements in ballistic defense the Soviets 
may be able to make, and what hardening and improvement of our 
own offensive capability is necessary, and also this latter 
about which I wish to ask a question.
    What would be within our technical capability by way of 
deployment of ballistic defense in the event that we later 
decided upon such an installation? Now, with that background to 
my question, how do you test, how do you measure, say, over 
Kwajahein and over Johnson Island you have the firing 
theoretically of incoming missiles, and from another island or 
from another location you fire an interceptor missile. I 
realize or I think I realize that by telemetry of the various 
kinds you can measure the proximity of the exchange. But how 
would you measure the possibility of X-ray or gamma ray 
penetration of the incoming missile when you neither generate 
the X-ray or gamma ray by your interceptor missile nor have the 
effect of such on the theoretically attacking missile?
    Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, that is an extremely critical 
question. As you indicate, we do plan to direct against 
Kwajalein Minuteman and Poseidon missiles configured so as to 
represent the most effective means of penetrating ballistic 
missile defenses. We will be able to see on the radar, with 
several radars, just how that attack looks.
    We can, at the same time, direct one or more SPARTANS and 
SPRINTS into the general area and simulate an attack, the 
intercept of an attack, at several altitudes.
    That, as you indicate, however, is not enough because we do 
not know the effectiveness of these defensive warheads without 
actual nuclear explosions.
    It is for that reason that a fair fraction of our current 
underground test program involves the detonation of specially-
tailored nuclear warheads so as to provide the X-rays and the 
gamma rays and the neutrons of the various types for radiation 
of our hardened reentry vehicles, and for that matter our own 
SPARTA and SPRINT warheads, so as to make sure that they do not 
destroy one another.
    In the last three years we have had a whole series of very 
complicated experiments which prove, first, that our offensive 
warheads will work and, second, that they are as hard as we say 
or if we find them to be vulnerable we fix them, and then 
measure to see that they are, indeed, repaired.
    So, this underground program is a very vital part of 
maintaining the effectiveness of our offensive force to provide 
a sure destruction.
    Senator Gore. Can you measure underground the potentiality 
for generating X-rays and gamma rays and also measure the 
deposition of those X-ray on various types of missiles?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We can and we do.

                       SOVIET ATMOSPHERIC TESTING

    Senator Gore. Now, one question leads to so many. The 
Soviets in 1961 did conduct, and with multiple radar 
observation, the actual atmospheric detonation of a nuclear 
weapon and the penetration of that sphere of influence, for 
want of a better word, by another missile with radar 
observation in it in 1961.
    Now, to what extent do those atmospheric tests on ballistic 
defense which they conducted give them an advantage over what 
we can do with underground tests?
    Dr. Foster. One cannot know what the Soviets learned in 
detail from their atmospheric experiments. We can only form a 
judgment. In my judgment what they learned in those tests is 
very small compared with what we have subsequently learned in 
our underground program.
    We, ourselves, had a number of experiments in the 
atmospheric series, as you know, and we learned some things 
which have turned out to be of great importance in the design 
not only of our offensive but our defensive systems. I suspect 
it is the same way with the Soviets.
    Senator Gore. Senator Clark?
    Senator Clark. May I ask one question that will take only 
thirty seconds?
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Senator Clark. Would I be justified in assuming that a 
comprehensive test ban between ourselves and the Soviet Union, 
adequately policed and enforced, could bring further research 
and development into antiballistic missile system pretty much 
to a halt on both sides?
    Dr. Foster. I cannot speak for the Soviet Union. However, I 
do not think it would bring ballistic missile defense research 
and development to a complete halt in this country.
    Senator Clark. Would it cripple it?
    Dr. Foster. It would have a very serious effect on it, yes.
    Senator Clark. Presumably, it would have the same effect on 
the Soviets.
    Dr. Foster. Yes; and, of course, it would seriously affect 
our confidence in its effectiveness particularly against 
sophisticated attack.
    Senator Clark. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Gore. Well, rather arbitrarily we must say thank 
you.
    Dr. Foster. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I do not want to leave 
that last question without----
    Senator Gore. Let the record show that you were excused, 
but were unready to go.
    Dr. Foster. No, Mr. Chairman, I am worried because the 
question of complete cessation involves to my mind, not so much 
its effect on a ballistic missile defense program, but its 
effect on the maintenance of our assured destruction 
capability.
    Senator Clark. Yes. But at that point, we turn to reliance 
on international cooperation, adequately policed, as opposed to 
conflict, as evidenced by further research in lethal weapons of 
destruction.
    Dr. Foster. Yes, I understand. If one can be sure that we 
are no longer relying on an assured destruction capability, 
then my concern would disappear.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Of course, you would have a very 
interesting section to your question, adequately policed.
    Senator Clark. That is what we are going to ask Mr. William 
Foster about.
    Senator Gore. The committee thanks you very much. You have 
been very forthright, and I think very able. There are many, 
many unresolved questions. I dare say before we finally 
conclude, we will request you to come back for a return 
engagement.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



          UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                      Subcommittee on Disarmament

                            STAFF MEMORANDUM

    Suggested Questions for William C. Foster, Director of the 
Arms Control & Disarmament Agency
Non-Proliferation Treaty
    1. How will a non-proliferation treaty help to keep those 
nations you believe closest to the threshold of nuclear weapons 
from deciding to build a bomb? In other words, why do we want a 
non-proliferation treaty?
    2. In 1965 the Indian delegate to the ENDC said that it is 
an ``unrealistic and irrational proposition that a non-
proliferation treaty should impose obligations only on non-
nuclear countries while the nuclear powers continue to hold on 
to privileged status or club membership by retaining and even 
increasing their deadly stockpiles . . .'' How would you answer 
this charge that a non-proliferation agreement without other 
disarmament measures is an unrealistic and irrational 
proposition? Do you think India will sign a nonproliferation 
treaty?
    3. What is the Germans' problem with a non-proliferation 
treaty? How could we meet their objections?
    4. What are the prospects for denuclearized zones--such as 
in Africa or the Caribbean? There are reports that the United 
States is insisting on the right to transit nuclear weapons 
through the Panama Canal in any such zone. Is this true?
Comprehensive Test Ban
    1. Would you agree that the most meaningful way to stop the 
spread of nuclear weapons is a comprehensive test ban?
    2. Has the United States or the Soviet Union technically 
violated the partial test ban by spreading debris from an 
underground test beyond territorial boundaries? If so, why 
haven't such charges been brought by one side or the other?
Conventional Arms Sales
    1. A recent study of conventional arms sales done by the 
staff of the Committee said that ACDA did not have a 
significant role in the arms sales process. Do you agree?
    2. Do you agree with another conclusion of the study that 
policy coordination in the arms sales field is weak?
    3. The Senior Interdepartmental Group, as I understand it, 
is the forum established by the Secretary of State for the 
coordination of major foreign policy decisions. Last week this 
group discussed a major arms sale to Morocco. Did a 
representative from ACDA attend that meeting?
    4. How many professionals in the Arms Control & Disarmament 
Agency work full time on conventional arms control?
Anti-Ballistic Missiles
    1. What effect would an ABM arms race have on arms control 
measures now under consideration, such as a non-proliferation 
treaty or an underground test ban?


                  MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA

                              ----------                              


                        Monday, February 6, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
          Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:05 p.m., in 
room S-116 the Capitol, Senator Wayne Morse (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Morse (presiding), Sparkman, Gore, 
McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Cooper.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Holt of the committee 
staff.
    Senator Morse. Gentlemen, this is a long standing tradition 
in this committee. We meet informally. We take a record, but it 
is an executive record, and it is available to you and to us 
only from the point of reference. No announcements are made as 
far as this committee is concerned. I have found--I don't know 
what Frank would say--that I would rather have one of these 
meetings than three or four formal meetings. This is where you 
learn what is really going on in the executive branch. As far 
as I am concerned, we will do more of it this year, Frank, when 
we get together with the AID people.
    I met a scientist down at the White House this afternoon. 
They are going to send up his name and a memorandum to me, 
Pat--a man who will be in charge of the agricultural program in 
AID in Latin America. He has had a long and distinguished 
service in the Department of Agriculture. I think his last name 
is Wilcox.
    Senator Carlson. We had Wilcox over here in the 
Congressional Library for years, and he moved down to the 
Department.
    Senator Morse. No, not that Wilcox. This man used to be a 
professor in Minnesota. It is this kind of a meeting that helps 
us. That is why we thought that you ought to chat with us first 
about whatever you care to in regard to the great Panama 
experience you had, and then the command that you have no. What 
you think of this military aid program in Latin America. What 
you think the problems are. We have one or two questions to ask 
you later, but I would rather have you visit with us first.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROBERT PORTER, SOUTHERN MILITARY COMMAND, 
 ACCOMPANIED BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT S. SMITH, PLANS AND 
 POLICY OFFICE, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, AND ROBERT R. CORRIGAN, 
 POLITICAL ADVISOR TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

    General Porter. First, I think I should tell you a little 
bit about my background. I have heard of Senator Morse, and I 
have known Senator Carlson over the years.
    I went to West Point in 1926 from Nebraska, and I have been 
on military duty since that time. I have lived in every part of 
the world except Southeast Asia. That is the part I don't know 
anything about. Most of my time was either in Europe or in the 
Middle East, until I was sent down to Panama two years ago. I 
have just finished two years in Panama. I have traveled a great 
deal, studying the problem, getting acquainted with our people, 
the ambassador as well as the local people. I guess we have 
clocked altogether over 250,000 miles of travel in the last two 
years.
    The thing that has startled me about Panama and about the 
whole area was, frankly, how little I knew about it from having 
worked here. I thought I knew the problem from the military 
point of view because I had working plans and policy in the 
Pentagon, and I worked in the National Security Council 
Planning Board for two years when President Eisenhower was the 
President, and have seen things. I thought I knew what was 
going on. I didn't realize that these countries are so 
different. It is just astounding.

                         SITUATION IN VENEZUELA

    The situation is--dynamic isn't a very good word, but the 
situation is changing so rapidly in these countries that the 
situation today, I know, for example, in Venezuela, will be 
different in three or four months.
    Just as an example, the Minister of Defense was up here as 
a guest of Secretary McNamara the first of November, Minister 
Gomez from Venezuela. He told McNamara, ``We have no problem as 
far as internal security is concerned. Well, within ten days 
all hell had broken loose again.
    Of course, this time it culminated with them going into the 
university, and they found in the university that this was 
really the headquarters for the guerrillas. The arsenal was 
there. I had heard a joke on this Venezuelan situation from an 
educator friend. I have two brothers who are professors, and I 
met this man through my brother. He said he was in Venezuela, 
and he saw a sign indicating an art class. He was lost, and he 
had little time anyway. He went up to the top floor to see 
where this art class was, and found that they were painting 
``Yankee Go Home'' signs, and they were actually getting credit 
in the university.
    Senator Morse. It is a public scandal.
    General Porter. And they were teaching commercial art 
there.
    Well, this was last year that this happened. But it just 
shows the situation. Well, of course, Gomez had said that he 
had no problem.
    I think a lot of this problem is what the head committee 
that is working for the guerrillas, if they decided they are 
going to stay in the background, or whether they are going to 
go into an act of insurgency.

                          CUBANS IN VENEZEULA

    Senator Morse. Pat points out to me that ten days or two 
weeks ago, a group of Cubans was alleged to have landed in 
Venezuela, and they haven't been apprehended yet. Apparently, 
it is pretty reliable that they landed, isn't it?
    Mr. Holt. So I am told, but the general would know a little 
better than I do, I am sure.
    Senator Morse. Why wouldn't the military establishment of 
Venezuela, I suppose this is possible--you would think they 
would get some trace of them, wouldn't you?
    General Porter. No, I am not certain. With the size and the 
long coastline of Venezuela--people can come ashore in Oregon, 
and you wouldn't know about it. Actually with our Coast Guard, 
we are as well organized if not better than the Venezuelans. I 
made landings on beaches where we had gotten supplies in time 
of war. If you come in at night, you can just disappear, 
particularly if you have got friends there that have things 
organized.
    Senator Morse. Yes, they could have advance agents there.
    General Porter. And right now, from what I can understand 
about the situation in Venezuela, the Cubans are supporting 
Douglas Dravo and his faction of the FALN,\1\ and if the thing 
has all been taped, and where I read, things that have been 
said at the Havana conference, there is extensive coordination 
beginning to come from Cuba.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This could well have been worked out, and they would know 
where they were coming.
    Senator Morse. General, this is Senator Gore of Tennessee, 
General Porter. The general has just started to chat with us. 
We started with Panama, but we got off and were talking about 
the Venezuelan situation. He thinks it will have its effect.

                   ATTITUDE OF THE PANAMANIAN PEOPLE

    What do you think about the general attitude on the part of 
the Panamanian people as different from their government toward 
the United States? Do you think the conditions have improved 
over what they were a couple of years ago?
    General Porter. Well, of course, I am still learning in 
Panama. I do feel that the Panamanian people as a people, the 
little man, has a tie with the Panama Canal, and he has a lot 
of good image of us and of Americans because of his tie with 
the Panama Canal.
    For example, the President started out as a truck driver, 
President Robles. He was a truck driver. That was his first 
job. The first money he got was as a truck driver. Well, he is 
really one of the best friends we have got down there. He is 
having a hell of a time now because he is trying to hold the 
coalition government together, and most of the people in the 
coalition think they would make a better President than he is.
    Senator Gore. You know we are afflicted with a little of 
that now and then here.
    General Porter. But his instincts are good. He is a 
religious man, and he thinks the students ought to be 
responsible. He backed Zaguardia law and order.
    Senator Morse. Senator Hickenlooper, this is General 
Porter.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Hello, General. Nice to see you 
indeed.
    General Porter. We were just talking a little bit about 
Panama. It is a tricky situation, because the press is hostile 
to us.
    Senator Morse. Senator Cooper, this is General Porter.

                     THE RIOT IN PANAMA WAS PLANNED

    Senator Hickenlooper. General, I was in Panama. I left 
about 7 o'clock on the morning that bloody riot broke out down 
there.
    General Porter. This was in January '64?
    Senator Hickenlooper. Yes. I came on to Washington.
    General Porter. It looked spontaneous. It was planned by 
someone, and this is part of the problem, particularly with the 
university down there, and the group in the university planning 
these things to take advantage of what well could be a 
legitimate grievance.

                     MILITARY AID TO LATIN AMERICA

    Senator Morse. Am I correctly advised, General, that it 
falls under your jurisdiction to make recommendations to the 
administration regarding the whole question of the military aid 
program to Latin America? Does that fall under your bailiwick?
    General Porter. Yes. I am sort of the field man, I guess 
you would say, for the Department of Defense in the Latin 
American area. I am the senior military man in the area, and we 
get the country programs together as they come out of each of 
the countries, put them into a package and send them to Defense 
with our recommendations.
    Now, of course, there are guidelines which are provided not 
only by the Congress, but by the administration as to how we 
are going to proceed, but I tried to make a program out of 
these.
    Senator Morse. That is why we would like to have your frank 
appraisal of the situation. Within the committee, I think this 
is a fair statement to say, there is a division of point of 
view in regard to military aid to Latin America, in these 
general respects. Not that there is any difference of opinion 
that aid isn't needed.
    There is a difference of opinion as to the type of aid, and 
as to the amount of aid, and as to whether or not the 
governments themselves are doing all they can for themselves. 
For example, we have been cutting aid on this committee less 
than the House. It works out as a compromise in conference with 
the House each year. We got it down to $85 million, didn't we, 
Carl?
    Mr. Marcy. That was the cash amount.
    Senator Morse. One of the questions they suggested I ask 
you, that you are free to discuss, is where are the cuts to be 
made to come within the $85 million statutory ceiling on sales 
and grants. Are all sales handled from Washington, or does the 
General have a voice in them?
    General Porter. Well, you have asked me about four 
questions.
    Senator Morse. I know. I just wanted to throw it out on top 
of the table. You kick it around in your own way.

           MILITARY ASSISTANCE VARIES FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY

    General Porter. Okay. Let me begin by saying that as far as 
the Military Assistance Program is concerned, it took me about 
a year to make up my mind on the Military Assistance Program as 
to just what it was doing and what it could contribute in Latin 
America, because there the situation varies so from country to 
country.
    I can see a country like Colombia, where there is an active 
insurgency which has been going on actually as a result of the 
Bogatacia in 1948. It has been going on and originally you 
couldn't tell whether these were bandits or people that were 
just outside the pale, because of the acts that they had 
committed in the early fifties, or just what it was.
    But in the two years I have been down there, it is very 
obvious that much of this so-called banditry throughout the 
countryside in Colombia, and most of these countries, has been 
stopped. And what we are dealing with are actually groups that 
are trying to pull the government down and get the support of 
the people to begin bringing communism into these countries.
    Now, also, as I have gone around and looked at the 
countries and gotten acquainted with the military, these people 
are quite different from the men that I knew when I was a young 
lieutenant at Reilly, and the Chileans would come up and go to 
school with us and so on. The playboy is gone from the younger 
military people, and the impression, as I have gotten 
acquainted with senior commanders, they are really in the 
twentieth century. They are working very hard and are very much 
interested in the nation-building problems that they have got 
in their countries.

                     DISCIPLINED MILITARY OFFICERS

    Now I had always thought of the Latin American military, 
based on what I had read and what I had been taught when I was 
in school, that they were a bunch of parasites and were really 
beyond the pale. This isn't the case at all, and particularly 
the younger officers, the officers that have been through our 
school here during the last twenty years. They think pretty 
much the way an American military man does.
    They are a disciplined group, and their interest is in 
supporting their country. They have many of the same instincts 
I have when somebody says something about the United States 
which I don't like. Why my blood pressure goes up. They have 
that same instinct.
    In these countries where their literacy rate is low, they 
are hard at work teaching the youngsters that come in. And most 
countries have the draft, teaching them to read and write, and 
they are working now, most of the countries are beginning to 
have a program where they are teaching the man a trade, so when 
he finishes, he has a trade and can go back to being a plumber, 
electrician, carpenter.
    Otherwise when they get out of the service and they haven't 
anything to do, they have been taught to fire a rifle. Of 
course, they probably knew how to do that, or at least throw a 
machete or a knife, as a youngster, because the law of survival 
is pretty much the rule down there.
    But they are teaching these people a useful trade, so that 
they aren't suckers for somebody that has some money who is 
going to recruit a private gang or get themselves involved, and 
it turns out he is in a guerrilla action too. So, I think this 
is a constructive thing that I didn't know existed when I went 
down to Panama two years ago.
    Senator Morse. May I interrupt you. This is Senator 
McCarthy, General Porter, and Mr. Corrigan and Colonel Smith.

                        MOTIVATION AND EQUIPMENT

    General Porter. One of the problems that we face in all of 
these countries is to give these men, if they have gone into 
the military service, they must have the same motivation I had 
when I went to West Point in 1926. I wanted to be a soldier, 
and I have really never quite gotten over it. I can't explain 
quite why. Some people become ministers, and I sometimes wonder 
why they do that.
    They have a motivation in this regard, but unless they have 
the equipment with which to train, and they have had the basic 
education and technical knowledge that can teach men to stand 
and be shot at in time of struggle and strife, you haven't got 
much to deal with.
    One of the problems that I have seen down there is that 
unless these youngsters are motivated to train their men, they 
are going to become a bunch of bums eventually. From what I 
have seen and heard----
    Senator Morse. Senator Sparkman, this is General Porter.
    Senator Sparkman. Yes, sir, General. Glad to see you again. 
I am not going to be able to stay long. I wanted to come in for 
such time as I could.
    General Porter. The motivation of these people has to be 
kept in mind, particularly if you are trying to deal with them 
as the senior commander. And all of these people are now having 
problems with equipment which they bought from us, either at 
the end of World War II, or which was given to them at that 
time, or it came in under the Military Assistance Program after 
we had such a program, because it is getting to be about twenty 
years old.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Are you talking about the people in 
Panama?
    General Porter. I am talking generally.
    Senator Morse. About Latin America.
    General Porter. Now I trained at the beginning of World War 
II with a broom in a Jeep. That was an anti-tank gun. It worked 
all right out on maneuvers, but when you tried to fire, 
assuming you were firing with it, you are in trouble. I am just 
using that as an illustration.
    It is a question of getting these people on motivation more 
than anything else. All these countries have problems now of 
trying to hold a high quality man in the military. The next few 
years are going to be very critical.
    Senator Morse. Come up here, Senator. Senator Aiken, this 
is General Porter. Behind you is Colonel Smith. You know the 
secretary across from you.
    Senator Aiken. I have seen him around.

             QUESTIONS THE EQUIPMENT SENT TO LATIN AMERICA

    Senator Morse. One of the things that we kick around up 
here, and I have discussed frequently, is the type of equipment 
that we are supplying. Questions are raised why tanks, why late 
model military aircraft, why so much heavy equipment? Why 
submarines and destroyers?
    Why not the type of equipment that they need for 
maintaining internal disorder rather than the type of equipment 
that it is alleged we supply them which is used between 
nations? Everybody knows they are not going to war against each 
other down there, for many reasons, and that the type of our 
equipment is subject to question.
    The argument is made, take the Argentine Military 
Establishment there, is all out of proportion as to the number 
of officers to the rank and file. That is typical of some other 
military establishments, it is alleged.
    Now it is questions such as that that you could help 
clarify very much, because we don't claim to have the expertise 
that qualifies us to say. But, nevertheless, it gets into your 
debates on this whole matter of military aid. You get the 
argument that if we don't supply the equipment, they will go to 
Russia, France or Czechoslovakia. Some take the position, well, 
let them go. Let us supply them with the things that will help 
develop them economically rather than militarily.

                           SITUATION IN PERU

    The charge is made that some of the countries like Peru, 
the Indians fill the rank and file, and the sons of the 
families of the wealthy fill the officership. You know the 
argument. But I have the job as chairman here of throwing them 
out on the table and you commenting on them.
    General Porter. Let me take this last one first. Actually 
the Minister of Defense, General Arbelu, is a full-blooded 
Indian. Now there was a time in Peru when what you say was 
true, but there is great change taking place in all of these 
countries, and right now in Peru the Indian is beginning to be 
brought into the fringes of the money economy.
    For example, up at Cusco, where I was in August, the Army 
is running an experimental farm where they have 60 families 
teaching them agriculture, and they have some men who were 
doing their service up there, and they are training them in the 
trades courses. It is potato country, but also they are 
teaching them to handle livestock, chickens.
    In two years, they have taken these Indian families--cocoa 
was one of their sources of getting through the day, and of 
course it has a numbing effect. It is a form of drug. Cocoa, 
liquor and beans were pretty much all they had to eat. Now 
these people are beginning to wear the clothes that they wear 
down in the low countries. In other words, they are beginning 
to get away from the Indian clothes and are beginning to wear 
western clothes.
    They are going into a protein diet. And this hacienda, 
which is a big one, and it never paid its way in the last 25 
years, is in the black, through methods that are being taught 
these people.
    It is interesting that as they come in, all of them, whole 
families are learning to read and write. So that these are 
things that are taking place.
    Now the officer corps in all of these countries is no 
longer from the oligarchy. It is coming in from the middle 
class, and this Indian I am telling you about, who is the 
number one military man in Peru today, he worked his way up 
through the ranks. But what you say was true 15 years ago.

                          SITUATION IN BRAZIL

    We are in a state of change down there, great change. This 
is one of the encouraging things to me, that the officers are 
beginning to come up from the ranks, or they are coming up from 
the middle class, or the lower middle class, and they have the 
interests of their people very much at heart.
    For example, in Brazil, I was in Northeastern Brazil last 
spring. We were up in the area where the sugar plantations are, 
and these big land holdings, and the most critical people of 
the slowness of Castelo Branco with his land reform program 
were the military officers. We were going out to see a road 
project. We had an engineer building a farm-to-market road, so 
they get their produce out of the interior.

                      ``YOUR FORCES ARE TOO BIG''

    When you look at all of the projects, everybody has his pet 
project that he wants to get pushed to the front. There is 
about 25 or 30 years' progress, and they are trying to get it 
all done in one or two years. It is a question of how much you 
can force things like this, and come out without anything 
besides chaos and strife.
    Now on the side of the military establishments, I have 
worked with foreign military forces before I went down there. I 
was out in the Middle East and worked with Turkey, Iran and 
Pakistan for two years in this organization, and I know pretty 
much the problem in that area, and you hear these criticisms 
there too. The threat, as we see it, to these countries, and 
the reason they need forces, and what they say the threat is, 
and why they have forces, is quite different.
    I haven't been able to rationalize with them to the extent 
that I can come right out and say, ``Your forces are too big.'' 
I have brought out this subject several times. But I am really 
not in a position, in spite of the fact I can see the threat to 
them pretty well, to say move over, and I will tell you how to 
run your Army, or I will tell you how to run your Air Force or 
your Navy, because my usefulness is done if I did that.
    When you look at the problems in Argentina and the 
communications problem they have in areas between Corrientes 
and Mendoza, and when you go down to the south country, it is a 
hell of a big country. Communications are not too good. And by 
our standards of what would be required if we had mobile 
reserves and transports to get them around, and what they need 
are quite different.
    Then in Brazil, I brought up this matter of size of forces, 
and they said, ``Well, these men that we are getting into the 
Army, we are teaching them to read and write. If they weren't 
in the Army, where would they be? They would be unemployed, and 
they wouldn't be learning a trade. They wouldn't be learning to 
read and write.''

                   AN ALTERNATIVE TO MILITARY SERVICE

    Senator McCarthy. General, could I raise a question at that 
point. This is one of the questions that bothers me. You make 
the Army really the best profession in the country. You said 
earlier that if you didn't give them advanced equipment that 
the best men would be lost.
    Where would they go, to other professions? If so, would 
that be bad? Do you have to put them in the Army in order to 
teach them to read and write? I think this was one of the basic 
questions that concerns those of us who are really looking at 
this thing. You say they wouldn't learn to read and write if we 
didn't put them in the Army.
    General Porter. You have three questions here. Let's take 
one at a time.
    Senator McCarthy. I know it. They are all questions you 
made. I just wanted to back you up on it to see if there isn't 
an alternative.
    General Porter. And your questions are darn good questions, 
and I am not sure whether I can answer to your satisfaction. 
All these countries have something like a draft law, and they 
will get the men. Now the men that normally they are drafting 
into the Army, if they are already students, they have 
exemptions the way we have in our country, and they are not 
going to be drawn into the Army.
    Senator McCarthy. Of course, we are doing the same thing in 
our draft now.
    General Porter. That is right.
    Senator McCarthy. Teaching them to read and write.
    General Porter. And I worked that a hell of a lot of my 
time.
    Senator McCarthy. That is right.
    General Porter. But a lot of these people are outside of 
the money economy. A lot of them have never worn shoes. Their 
basic habits of sanitation and so on are very primitive.
    Now if these people aren't drawn into the Army and pulled 
out of their farm community, they would probably never get out 
of it, because the school situation in a country like Brazil is 
really quite discouraging. You have been down there. You have 
seen it. Wouldn't you agree with that, Bob?
    Now what we are doing with a lot of these boys that are 
coming out, we are bringing them into the twentieth century. In 
the coastal country I would agree with what you say. When you 
get into Sao Paulo, the Rio complex, and up to Belo Horizonte, 
I think that in that area, yes, they would have an opportunity. 
But you get into the northeast, up into the back country of 
Recife, they are just going to exist there all their lives. 
This is one way of helping prime this pump. Teach them a trade 
and bring them along.

                  TEACHING SOLDIERS TO READ AND WRITE

    Senator Hickenlooper. General, is it fair to say that when 
they go into the Army, they are under a discipline to read and 
write?
    General Porter. That is right.
    Senator Hickenlooper. And if they are not in the Army, 
their own discipline is not sufficient to give them any 
stimulus to learn to read and write?
    General Porter. That is absolutely right. Not only that, 
but when they began to get hope, and a lot of these people, you 
look at them, they are not well when they are small, and they 
grow up and have been undernourished all their life. I was 
talking to people down in the Amazon about this. I was asking a 
doctor in Peru about the health of the people in the Amazon 
Basin. She said a lot of these people endemically, by the time 
they are old enough to live and do a man's work, haven't the 
strength to do it because of the ailments that they have got.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Do you know Dr. Popano who ran that 
agricultural farm? He died here a short time ago.
    General Porter. I have read about him.
    Mr. Corrigan. Yes.I knew him very well.
    Senator Hickenlooper. When I was down there I stayed all 
night at the farm, just about that very thing you are talking 
about. He ran that school, getting these youngsters in from all 
over Central America theoretically. He had some from Colombia. 
He said a startling thing. He got them in there; they would 
come in as freshmen. It would take them about four to six weeks 
to get the worms out of them. That is number one.
    Then he said within three months they would gain 40 to 60 
pounds just by getting a reasonable diet. Then he said they 
were ready to learn. He said before that they were indolent. 
They didn't have the stimulus.
    General Porter. To go back to Senator McCarthy's question, 
I feel that probably, and this is just off the top of my head, 
15 or 20 percent of the people that go into the Army might go 
ahead and get a third grade education or a fourth grade 
education anyway. The group that is being called into the Army. 
But the rest of them would not, and they would have less than a 
50/50 chance of meeting a decent wage during their lifetime 
unless they could learn to read and write.

                           LENGTH OF SERVICE

    Senator Cooper. What is the length of service in these 
countries? What does it average, and what do these men do when 
they get out of the Army? Does what they learn there carry on 
in civilian life?
    General Porter. It varies. The minimum tour is a year. In 
some countries it is two years.
    For example, in some of the countries, if a man shows an 
interest in getting a trade, they will extend his service until 
he can become a plumber or a bricklayer or a carpenter. The 
Army has vocational schools where they are training them to do 
this. They are getting ready to do this in Guatemala, for 
example. They are doing this in Peru. They are doing this in 
Colombia. But it varies, Senator, from country to country.
    Now these people will normally go back to their village 
initially. How long they will stay there depends on whether 
they can make a contribution when they get back. But if they 
have a trade and can do such things as bricklaying, they are 
short of people that can do this all over the country or if 
they can fix a radio set or do primitive electrical wiring.
    So the chances are better that they are going to stay and 
work in the countryside and make a decent living there, or 
begin to, if they have the trade. Otherwise, their having seen 
the city, they are going to drift back.

                        MILITARY SALES PROGRAMS

    Senator Morse. I think it would be helpful to the 
committee, if you gentlemen of the committee agree with me, if 
the general would explain to us how the sales programs are 
handled.
    You have got an $85 million ceiling, so-called. How are the 
sales programs handled? Are they handled in Washington? Does 
the General Staff handle them? Who makes the selection? To what 
extent do we turn down their requests for purchase? I think we 
are pretty ignorant about that up here, at least I am. I wish 
you would explain that to us.
    General Porter. Well, the sales program is handled pretty 
much out of Washington. We are just in the throes of changing 
now actually, and I think Mr. McMillan is coming over here to 
testify tomorrow. At least, I was told that. He is to come over 
here tomorrow.
    Senator Morse. Before Armed Services.
    General Porter. I think that is right. The sales program 
has been handled directly from Washington. It has been that way 
for a long time, principally because from the very beginning, 
when the Latin American countries wanted to buy something in 
the United States, the military attache went over to State, 
talked to them in State. Then referred them to people in 
defense, and passed on the shopping list of the things that 
they said they needed. Then they would indicate encouragement 
or discouragement. I will be very honest and say that in the 
two years I have been down country, I have felt that the Latin 
Americans felt very discouraged about trying to buy from us, 
feeling that we did everything we could to slow down selling 
them anything, even spare parts for equipment they had.
    It has come about in part because of the procedures we 
have. They have to get an export license, and they come up. 
They go over to the Pentagon and get a quotation if they want 
to buy from the military. Then they send that down country. At 
that time. we are notified in Panama, my headquarters, that 
they are going to buy or want to buy. Normally then we make a 
comment as to whether we think that is needed or not. There are 
cases where I have found out about it afterwards.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Don't they submit it to you first?
    General Porter. No.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They don't say, ``We have the 
recommendation''?
    General Porter. No, because it comes in through their 
attache, you see. Now this is in a state of flux, and they are 
beginning to draw our people in country into it, but this has 
been handled this way in the last 40 years, and we are just in 
the state of trying to change it.

                          $85 MILLION CEILING

    This $85 million ceiling that the Senate put on this year 
is forcing us to do that. You see the policy that Mr. McNamara 
has announced is that if they will buy, we will take it out of 
the grant program. So this is an oversimplification of the 
ground rules. It would take 15 minutes with a prepared paper to 
give you an accurate statement. But this is pretty much the 
intent.
    That anybody who has the money and will buy, they would 
take priority. Well, this is throwing my programs for these 
countries, making them damned complicated, because I am not 
certain as to just how much of this money is going to be 
available to buy spare parts and to buy weapons and the things 
that I need in these 20 programs.
    I will say this: That every request to buy that has come in 
here in my 20 years down country has really been looked at 
carefully by both the people in State and Defense, to see 
whether it was in our interests to sell.

                          A LOT OF LOST MOTION

    Senator Hickenlooper. It seems to me there is a lot of lost 
motion in that--probably there is a good reason for it, I don't 
know. It would seem to me that the best way to do it is if 
Country X wants certain equipment, they should submit it to the 
local people, and there should be a recommendation that this is 
either excessive or it has utility, or if available and if 
compatible with other programs, it should be granted. Then come 
up here and get the job done, instead of rushing up here and 
back three or four times, and so on.
    General Porter. I think that the procedure you are 
suggesting is one that is under consideration now, but we 
haven't had this fully established.
    Senator Hickenlooper. We haven't abolished the Commission 
for the widows of the War of 1845, I guess. It takes a long 
time to get these things done.
    General Porter. You run into additional things. There are a 
number of purchasing missions, for example, here in Washington 
from these countries. I feel that people down country would 
prefer to come in, the military people would be very happy and 
prefer to come in this way, but this is the way they have been 
doing it for 25 years.

                        GRANTS CAN BE A WINDFALL

    It would be useful to us, because we could get a better fix 
on what the requirements were, and our people in country would 
know about them too. But in some of these countries where they 
have limited means and they get a windfall of $100,000, the 
equivalent of that in foreign exchange, they are going to get 
it spent and committed before the end of the fiscal year, just 
the way some of our people do here, particularly when you have 
crying needs. They are going to get the first thing that they 
can.
    Senator Morse. They come up here from State and the 
Pentagon Building through their officials. The State and the 
Pentagon Building get in touch with you then to get your 
recommendation before you go ahead and make any arrangements 
with them?
    General Porter. That is right. Normally I know about it. 
There have been cases where I haven't, but I think this is the 
exception.
    Senator Morse. I think it is so important if you are going 
to do it, as Senator Hickenlooper says, it is the cart before 
the horse. If you are going to do it that way, they certainly 
ought to get back to you for your recommendation.
    General Porter. Actually, what I have found out in my two 
years down there is that the Latin American is not a program or 
a plan, whatever he is, whether wearing a civilian or military 
suit. They sort of live from hand to mouth. One of the things I 
have been trying to do is get these people working, and I know 
they are working through the Alliance for Progress to do the 
same thing, to try to get them to chalk out where they are 
going to be in five years, and how they will get there in the 
most economical way. We are just beginning to make some 
progress.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They can always do it manana.

                    A NEW BREED OF MILITARY OFFICERS

    General Porter. But we are getting a new breed down there 
now. Truly there are a lot of people that are beginning to see 
that unless they program ahead, they are going to be blown by 
the wind, and they are never going to get to their destination.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think they have a lot of capable 
people in each of these countries, but the question of the 
percentage of the influence and control that those capable 
people have realized, what you are saying, how much authority 
they have from time to time.
    General Porter. Well, it has been encouraging in the two 
years I have been down there to see that the military are doing 
better now than they were two years ago, and not so much 
through anything I have been able to do except to just beating 
away on them. And this matter that unless you know where you 
are going, how you are ever going to get there. You just start 
out in a certain direction, and you wander and are blown around 
by the winds.

                         SITUATION IN ARGENTINA

    For example, in Argentina, we had just gotten the Argentine 
military to develop for themselves a five-year program to try 
to improve their forces. In doing that, it was interesting to 
see from the beginning what they needed.
    They were beginning to cut back in the size of forces and 
equipment. For example, this A4B deal. They were going to 
retire, as I recall, two planes for each A4B that they were to 
get, and they were to get 50.
    Actually, we began to show them that they could do better 
than that, because the maintenance problems in trying to train 
the pilots, they do the same training program and keep their 
pilots proficient with less planes than what they planned to 
buy. But they had never faced up to these things until we began 
talking to them and getting this sort of thing worked out.
    Going back to my life as a young lieutenant in the early 
days here, we were pretty provincial in those days too. When 
you face up to the fact that most of these countries are about 
50 years behind us in planning and programming techniques, and 
in their sense of responsibility and in their schooling, it is 
pretty hard to bring them up to 1967 when they are in 1920 or 
1927 in a lot of their thinking and in a lot of their 
activities.

                     FORMULA FOR CUTTING OFF FUNDS

    Senator Morse. When Congress put a ceiling on, speaking 
hypothetically now, like the $85 million ceiling, and State and 
the Pentagon have to cut under that ceiling, is there any 
particular formula that is followed as to whether the cut will 
be taken off of grants or taken off of sales?
    General Porter. Well, let me explain how our programs are 
put together.
    Senator Morse. That is what we need.
    General Porter. We have a table that shows the money amount 
under the $55 million ceiling that was on before the $85 
million was put on. We had a table which showed the amount. 
They put in what was called defense articles for each country 
under that $55 million ceiling. Added to that was a certain 
amount for training. And then the overhead and administrative 
costs and the program were involved.
    At that time under the $55 million ceiling on defense 
articles, there was no ceiling on sales, you see, the amount of 
credits that could be developed. I want you to listen to this, 
Bob, because he helps put the programs together in country. I 
am explaining how we put the program together.
    Now under that table 36, as they call it, that is showing 
what money could be available, based on programs and 
discussions that come out of the countries. Then we go ahead 
and put a program together.
    Now with the $85 million ceiling that had been put on, this 
actually was about a 60 percent cut in each of these programs, 
if you took it right across the board, because of the sales 
that would have to be accommodated under this $85 million 
ceiling. So, we went back to work and began to see what we 
would do, what programs we would defer, based on the 
programming ahead.

                           TRAINING PROGRAMS

    Mr. McNamara requires us to have a 5-year program for each 
of these countries. The only thing we could do would be to take 
certain types of equipment that weren't as much needed for 
modernization, and looking at the threat that was in the 
country and the state of training of people, and people that 
had gone into the program, get them trained. Start training, 
for example, on communications equipment or something like 
that, so it wouldn't create complete chaos in these countries 
due to this change in policy, which came from the $85 million 
ceiling.
    For example, it takes about 50 weeks' training to get a 
radio operator trained to run a military radio these days. We 
have to put him in training far enough ahead so that when the 
equipment gets there, we can marry him up with this piece of 
equipment.
    Now in doing that, we fixed up some articles or lists from 
each of the countries to get a deferred list of items that 
would not be funded in each of these countries until we could 
see how the sales program worked out. It is pretty difficult 18 
months ahead of time to see what foreign exchange they are 
going to have available in country, and what the credit is 
going to be from country to country.
    This list is being held together intact over in the 
Department of Defense now, but it is not being funded under the 
'67 program until we see what money is available for grant aid. 
But the Pentagon agreed, I pushed them, to go ahead with the 
grant program higher than the sales figure in that the material 
that was in the grant program was so important, particularly 
during this year, to the continuity of operations in country. 
For example, where there are spare parts; some replacement 
vehicles; communications vehicles; certain aircraft that are 
needed; batteries, a lot of things. Batteries, for example, for 
a submarine which needs to be fixed. If we just stop this in 
mid-stream, it would do nothing but create chaos in all twenty 
countries.
    My interest is in trying to get in any change of policy to 
get an orderly change so that we don't completely wreck their 
military establishments in one or two years. Now this list that 
we have now, that we have what, $11 million?
    Colonel Smith. $11.1 million. Yes, sir.
    General Porter. In checking today and talking to the people 
in the Pentagon on what the military purchasing commissions 
here are talking to them about, it looks as if we are going to 
have to go back into our grant aid programs again to try to see 
what more we can get out of them. In other words, the grant 
program is going to take another beating. I don't know whether 
I have answered your question.

                            THE LOAN PROGRAM

    Senator Morse. It helps very much. Before I call on Pat for 
a supplement, there is another facet of this that I would like 
to have you explain to us. You have got the grants, and you 
have got the purchases, grants and sales.
    Now, we have the loan program. That is causing some 
confusion up here. Last year at the last session a bill was 
offered for the calendar, and went over, and it will be up 
shortly. As I recall, Pat--Carl, this is that loan bill that 
came out of Armed Services--it was three destroyers for Brazil, 
two for Argentina, one for Colombia, and a submarine for Chile 
and a submarine for--it was Colombia, I guess.
    Mr. Holt. Three destroyers for Argentina, two for Brazil, 
one submarine for Chile, one destroyer for Colombia, two 
destroyer escorts for----
    Senator Morse. No airplanes?
    Mr. Holt. This is just naval.
    Colonel Smith. This is what?
    Mr. Holt. This is the '66 bill that didn't pass.
    Senator Morse. It didn't pass. It was held up. We took the 
position it ought to get into Foreign Relations for review too. 
They got it on the calendar the last week as I recall, and it 
raised some questions. Now I understand that there is a 
proposal, based upon the 1965 Loan Act, for a destroyer to be 
loaned to the Argentine.
    Mr. Holt. If I understand it correctly, there was 
legislation passed in '64 or '65.
    Senator Morse. Sixty-five.
    Colonel Smith. That is correct.
    Mr. Holt. Authorizing the loan of destroyers for Argentina.
    Colonel Smith. Three for Brazil, two for Argentina. Chile 
was cut out and so was Peru.
    Mr. Holt. Right. But this has never been fully implemented, 
and it is not proposed to do so.
    Colonel Smith. It has never been fully implemented, and it 
is being considered for implementation. As a matter of fact, 
they have gone for the one destroyer for Brazil as of today. 
The situation is about halfway through the rebuild for Brazil.
    General Porter. These destroyers, the U.S. offered the 
Brazilians and Argentina destroyers which were of early World 
War II vintage, and the cost to them of repairing these 
destroyers was how much, Bob, a couple of million dollars?
    Colonel Smith. About $5 million.
    General Porter. I know, but between the A, B and C type, 
there is about $1 or $2 million more to repair a C type than a 
B type.--
    Colonel Smith. That is right.
    General Porter. To get it so it would be of any use to 
them. Of course they were trying to get C and O to give them, 
make D type available. And he said no they are out in Vietnam. 
So there has been a lot of study of this type C destroyer on 
the part of both Brazil and Argentina, to try to find the 
destroyers that are in the best condition.
    They have been studying these ships for six to eight 
months, trying to find a ship that they thought would be worth 
rehabilitating, you see, because we have taken out of mothballs 
naturally the best and put them back in the fleet to use them 
out in Vietnam.
    Colonel Smith. Senator, it doesn't cost the taxpayer now on 
these loans. The country receiving the loan, for example, 
Brazil, pays this rehabilitation activation cost. In fact, on 
the $85 million ceiling-- a few words about title X. The value 
of the hull itself is charged against this ceiling. There is no 
U.S. money spent on these destroyers when they are loaned, and 
we have a recapture clause at any time.

                  WHAT TYPE OF EQUIPMENT IS NECESSARY

    Senator Morse. What can we say about the nature of this 
equipment in answer to the charge that this is the type of 
equipment that we shouldn't be making available? That we should 
make a different type of military equipment available to them?
    Who am I to say? I don't know what type of equipment they 
ought to have. The argument is that this kind of equipment 
isn't necessary to maintain internal order. It isn't necessary 
to protect them from a Communist coup. They need helicopters 
and light equipment for that, and personnel for that, rather 
than this heavy equipment constantly building up the military 
establishment.
    It goes back to the first point, however, that the General 
made very early here in the day. If we are going to get the 
class of personnel that you want, referring to what you say, 
you have got to have training in all the various aspects of 
military operation.
    General Porter. Let's just talk a minute about the Navy 
problem in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. They 
are the countries that are the leaders down there as far as the 
Navy is concerned.
    These countries live by the sea. When we started in with 
this, under the Rio Treaty--and are talking about Western 
Hemisphere defense--this was going to be a partnership, and all 
of our bilateral with them back in the early fifties was to be 
a joint effort.

                      SWITCHING INTERNAL SECURITY

    Now we started during the Kennedy administration, right 
after Cuba, we began switching over to internal security. But 
we never really went down to renegotiate these bilaterals.
    In some of these countries, they still are thinking in 
those terms. But actually you look at the situation in Brazil, 
or Argentina, with their long coastline and the responsibility 
that the Argentina navy has for the south country in Argentina. 
I don't say that the destroyer is what is actually needed. I am 
not sure what they need because they are doing all sorts of 
things. They are the administrators for that southern area of 
Argentina.
    But they need destroyers to deal with the policing of their 
maritime provinces in the south. The seas are bad. Their Navy 
is something like ours. They have Air, they have Marines, they 
have pretty much a complete force, but they are trying to 
police these maritime areas principally with their forces.

                        THE PANAMA CANAL PROBLEM

    From where I sit in Panama looking at the Panama Canal 
problem, we have taken the Panama Canal as a commerce route 
that will always be open. If anything did happen there, and I 
should probably cross myself and knock on wood because 
hopefully we will never get into this situation, then all of 
our shipping between the east and west coasts is going to have 
to make that long route down there. The smaller craft are going 
to go through the Magellan Straits and a the big craft are 
going to go around the Cape. Then because of the weather, 
Navies of Argentina and Chile are going to have to lead a lot 
of these merchant ships by the hand, because there is no coast 
guard as such.
    The Navy handles the coast guard operations for the whole 
country, and then destroyers are about the smallest craft that 
can live in some of the high seas you get down in the south 
country there around the Cape of both sides.

                   NAVAL ROLE IN CHILE AND ARGENTINA

    Yet, for example, in Chile, down in the straits of 
Magellan, I was down in December and studied that thing because 
of its strategic position. You have 49 knot winds. That is the 
ordinary, day in and day out blow that they have down where the 
Straits of Magellan exit into the Pacific Ocean. There are 
terrible storms there all the time.
    I really feel, and I didn't feel strongly on this until I 
went down there on this and studied these problems, that there 
is a deep water role for the Navy of Argentina and Chile.
    That doesn't mean they need aircraft carriers or cruisers, 
but they need destroyers. They need craft that will stand up in 
bad weather because merchant ships get into distress and they 
have to police the southern waters.
    Brazil with its big coastline and its problems is really a 
maritime power because of overseas trade. The same way with 
Peru. Between 95 and 100 percent of their trade goes by ship, 
and the other less than 5 percent by air.
    That is the only way they can get the stuff out. These 
countries have a tradition, a naval tradition. As a soldier it 
is sort of hard for me to explain what a Navy tradition is, but 
they have very capable people, and Peru is probably the best. 
Chile comes next. But these destroyers are really needed by 
these countries, not for the guns on them, but for the role it 
permits them to provide as far as their country is concerned.

                              BAD STRATEGY

    Senator Morse. What are we going to say to the argument--
and I am just putting this out in our own executive session 
before it goes to the floor--that if we expand the loan 
program, which is what this '66 bill allegedly attempts to do, 
and therefore was a runaround the $85 million--and there was a 
demand to block it until we looked at it longer--what are we 
going to say to the argument that if you are going to put a 
ceiling on for grants and sales, then subsequently come around 
with a loan program that loans a great deal of equipment, 
whatever its value is, that amounts in fact, to increasing the 
ceiling. Therefore, the legislation ought to put one ceiling 
and say to the Pentagon Building that this covers loans, and it 
covers grants and it covers sales.
    I think it was bad strategy, just giving you my opinion. 
Carl, you listen to this. You were in on this discussion we had 
at the end of a year when they brought up at the last minute 
this loan bill, and it stirred up such a hornet's nest around 
here.
    General Porter. This is on the Navy ships?
    Senator Morse. Yes, on the Navy ships. What are we going to 
say to meet the argument that the Pentagon Building should come 
in with one package, and that legislation in a given session 
shouldn't wait until after the foreign aid bill is passed. Then 
they lose out, say, in the foreign aid bill by getting a lower 
ceiling than they wanted, and then subsequently give us an end 
run play with a proposal for a lot of loans of equipment, which 
in effect breaks the ceiling? How are we going to meet this 
next year?
    Mr. Marcy. Let me add one thing, Senator. The other fact 
that is added there is sales. You see, in effect, when you make 
a sale of military equipment, you are using part of the 
economic strength of that country to buy the military equipment 
which in turn means perhaps you have to increase the economic 
aid. So sales, grants and loans are all combined.
    Colonel Smith. I don't believe Senator Morse's point here 
is that your present, the last Fulbright amendment, included 
grants, sales and these ship loans.
    Senator McCarthy. It didn't include the ships.
    Colonel Smith. They all counted under your $85 million 
ceiling.
    You must be referring to a bill with which we are not 
familiar.
    Senator Morse. This is a question of fact that I didn't 
cover. I am glad I raised it. The $85 million also included the 
loans.
    Colonel Smith. It included ship loans unless there is 
wording in this new bill that exempts it from the ceiling.

               VALUE OF SHIPS COUNTED AGAINST THE CEILING

    Senator McCarthy. I thought the ships were granted by a 
separate act that had no relationship to the ceiling.
    Colonel Smith. They are granted, Senator, by Title 10 code 
as a separate act. However, by the Fulbright amendment, their 
value counts against the ceiling.
    Senator Corrigan. And their rehabilitation.
    Colonel Smith. The rehabilitation would count if the U.S. 
does it. If they do it, it does not count.
    Senator Morse. The Colonel says they must do it.
    General Porter. We are telling them they must do it, but 
this is still being worked out because they are so short of 
money.
    Colonel Smith. If they borrow money to do it, it counts 
under the ceiling or even if we guarantee the loan.
    Senator McCarthy. You mean if the Defense Department does.
    Colonel Smith. That is correct, sir.

                          EXPORT-IMPORT LOANS

    Senator McCarthy. Are the Export-Import loans guaranteed by 
the Defense Department or are they separate?
    Colonel Smith. No, sir. Export-Import guarantees certain 
reverse loans.
    Senator McCarthy. They don't count, the Export-Import 
loans, for the shipment of military equipment would not be 
included.
    Colonel Smith. If it is military equipment sponsored by 
DOD, it counts against the ceiling.
    Senator McCarthy. I see, but if it were an entirely private 
sale?
    Colonel Smith. Private sales do not count.
    Senator McCarthy. Approve it, you would still have to 
approve the private sale.
    Colonel Smith. If they were to get an Export-Import loan 
without Defense Department guarantee, which is almost 
impossible, it would not count. But that has never happened. 
Export-Import will not touch this normally.
    Senator McCarthy. Didn't they buy some arms from this 
fellow over in Alexandria because it was cheaper to buy from 
him than from the Defense Department, last year, Venezuela did?
    Colonel Smith. Venezuela? If they did, and they didn't get 
a loan through the DOD----
    Senator McCarthy. That would be outside the scope.
    Colonel Smith. It would be outside the scope.

                SALE OF AIRPLANES TO CHILE AND ARGENTINA

    Senator McCarthy. Let me ask about a specific sale or 
transfer. The 50 airplanes, what are they getting, 25?
    Colonel Smith. Twenty-five.
    Senator McCarthy. They asked for 50, and they will probably 
get the other 25. You don't think so?
    Colonel Smith. I don't think so.
    General Porter. We don't see where they are going to come 
from.
    Senator McCarthy. We originally approved 50 though. So the 
reason we are not selling them 50 is that we don't have them?
    General Porter. That is right.
    Senator McCarthy. At the time, the Chileans argued that 
anything you could do to cut it down was good from their point 
of view. They said, ``If they get 50, we have got to have 30 
just for political purposes.'' Now why couldn't we have said 25 
in the first place instead of 50, so the Chileans could then 
say, ``They got 25, we have to buy 15.'' We went for 50, and 
now we say they really don't need 50, 25 will do. This is the 
kind of game they play, and I don't understand.
    General Porter. This interplay between Argentina and Chile, 
from where I sat, didn't look the same way to me.
    Senator McCarthy. That is what the Ambassador told me.
    General Porter. He was trying to make a case and make a 
name for himself by using Argentina as a lever to get us to go 
ahead and sell F-5's.
    Senator McCarthy. His first position was don't sell to 
Argentina; we won't buy any.
    General Porter. He was speaking for himself.
    Senator McCarthy. I thought he was speaking for the 
Christian Democrats. He is the number two man.

                      AIRCRAFT FOR PILOT TRAINING

    General Porter. I know, but actually the military had to 
have replacement aircraft to keep their pilots in training. 
They were so short of aircraft that they had to find aircraft 
from some place. General Rosavitz, when I first went down to 
Chile, was talking about trying to find an aircraft that he 
could use for pilot training, and we offered him an F-86. Well, 
the F-86 has some wing problems. By the time they got through 
with the wing modification, they would have a lot of money tied 
up in those aircraft, more than he felt they were worth.
    Now this was the reason that the Argentine went to the A4B, 
instead of the F-86.
    Rosavitz, though, was prepared to take an aircraft that 
would keep the pilot training going. But Tomich up here got 
into the act. The first thing you know, this had political 
overtones, and we had a so-called arms race, competition 
between Argentina and Chile. This would never have happened had 
this been handled only on the military circuit, and had we been 
able to say, ``Look, come 1970 there will be a new aircraft 
that you can go ahead with, put your money in for 10 or 15 
years available, so you can keep your pilots going.''
    A lot of these pilots go into civil air work down there, 
and they have used the military as a recruiting ground for 
their civil air fleet which makes sense. We are doing it here 
if we can. We are having trouble keeping military pilots in the 
Air Force now, flying DC-6's and 7's.

                      ARMS RACE WAS JUST A DEVICE

    I will be very honest with you, and please don't ever use 
this. But this whole business of an arms race between Chile and 
Argentina was a device used on the part of the Chileans, hoping 
that they could shake us loose from F-5 earlier. It was picked 
up by the newspapers because the newspapers down there are 
pretty much hostile to Frei, and the first thing you know, it 
is taken from one country to another and the thing just 
snowballs.
    Senator McCarthy. Who wanted to shake loose the F-5's, the 
government or the military?
    General Porter. These Air Forces in South America would 
like very much to have the F-5 because they see it as an 
airplane that is easy to maintain over the long term, in the 
next 15 year. They feel that within 15 years a propeller-driven 
airplane in the commercial world is going to be pretty much a 
thing of the past. They are looking to their pilot training, as 
General Rosavitz said to me, trying to keep the seed alive.
    Also we are working to try to get some sort of a counter-
insurgency aircraft going, which would be a propeller-driven 
job. But that hasn't been coming along too well, and we 
couldn't offer them and suggest that they put their money into 
an F-5 or something like that because we didn't have anything 
we could promise them.

                       HOW THE FIGURE WAS REACHED

    Senator McCarthy. What about the question of the number, 50 
as against 30 in Chile, which was the Chilean number they 
insisted they would need to offset 50 advanced jet aircraft in 
Argentina? Why not 25 and 15? I mean what are they worth, $2 
million a piece roughly?
    General Porter. Here is the way the 50 figure was arrived 
at.
    There were certain squadrons of aircraft in Argentina that 
needed to be replaced. In doing that, they had a certain number 
of aircraft, and I can't recall the exact figure, I think 
something like 80, that they were going to replace, either 100 
or 80, that they were going to replace with these 50 aircraft.
    They figured with the pilots, if they stood down from these 
80 aircraft, they could keep their training going with the 50 
aircraft.
    Senator McCarthy. I want it clear I don't think there is 
danger of military action between Chile and Argentina.
    General Porter. No, and the military down there knows this 
is not going to be.

                       A QUESTION OF APPEARANCES

    Senator McCarthy. It becomes a question of appearances and 
of politics and of the economic consequences of this sort of 
thing. You talk about training in these F-5's and whatever 
other jets they have got. The word I get is that the experience 
of these pilots in these hot fighter planes doesn't qualify 
them for commercial use. Our airlines are short of pilots, but 
they are saying they are not getting the kind of men out of 
these hot jets that they used to get out of the military. They 
don't make good pilots on a commercial jet.
    General Porter. I think that is a matter of opinion. As a 
soldier I am not qualified to answer that sort of question.
    Senator McCarthy. I don't know whether that is true or not, 
but that is what I am told. Then they say we go to South 
America and they want to train them on hot jets so they can 
transfer them to commercial flying. It would be better to 
transfer them to jet transports or something like that.
    General Porter. This speed of aircraft, this A4B is below 
Mach 1, so it really isn't a supersonic plane. The F-5 is just 
over. So we are not talking about these really advanced jets, 
and so on. This 30 versus 50, this is the first time I have 
heard that, Mr. Senator.
    Senator McCarthy. That was the Tomich ratio as I heard it 
the first time. That if it was cut down they wouldn't need as 
many.
    General Porter. I really think this ploy on the part of the 
Chileans shows how desperately they want us to sell them 
aircraft. They would have bought the A4B. They would have 
bought anything that would fly if it would get them a 
reasonable aircraft, but we didn't have it, you see, and with 
procedures and our policy, the F-5 was not in sight for at 
least five years.

                             BRITISH PLANE

    Senator McCarthy. How good a plane is this British one they 
are buying now?
    General Porter. Well, our people say it is a pretty good 
plane. It won't do the things actually that the F-5 will do for 
them.
    Senator McCarthy. It is supersonic?
    General Porter. No, it isn't. It is subsonic. In a dive it 
will break the sound barrier.
    Senator McCarthy. You can do that with most any airplane, 
can't you? You mean it can go supersonic and come out of it?
    General Porter. That is right. It has to go into a dive to 
do it, but it isn't truly a supersonic plane. We haven't got 
any down there. Now going to newspapers, the Peruvians have 
been looking at some that the British have, this Electric.
    Senator McCarthy. The lightening? That is what they sold 
Saudi Arabia.
    Colonel Smith. The aircraft is good, Senator. The question 
is how long they will continue support of the aircraft.
    General Porter. This is a problem. Now on this particular 
thing of support, the thing that the Latin American military is 
concerned about, they feel if they can't come to us and buy and 
they go to Europe and buy, they are going to pay more to begin 
with. Then there isn't the assurance that there will be the 
spare parts, and they know that they are going to have to tool 
up again to get the spare parts, which means another contract. 
The maintenance of it will be much higher than it would be if 
they can get into our market.

               MC NAMARA'S HARD-NOSED POSITION ON GRANTS

    Senator Morse. You have been very generous with your time. 
I only have three quick questions to ask now.
    It has been reported to us, though not reliably, that the 
Secretary of Defense has recommended against the continuation 
of the grant program for the military equipment to Latin 
America. I would like to know whether or not that is true. 
Second, has the State Department agreed with him?
    General Porter. I am not certain that you should ask me 
that question.
    Senator Morse. All right. That is all I need to know.
    General Porter. Because I am a subordinate over there. I 
could tell you what my view was as to the importance of the 
military program down there, but I am not in the policy-making 
business. I make recommendations.
    Mr. Corrigan. Could I say--I am with the State Department, 
and I am Political Advisor to General Porter. I think I can 
merely tell you that I have been in the State Department for 
the last few days talking with some people about a lower level 
over there in the Latin American section, and they tell me that 
this is true.
    That apparently Mr. NcNamara is taking a hard-nosed 
viewpoint that grant military assistance should stop rather 
precipitously within a year or two. ARA, the Latin American 
section, Mr. Lincoln Gordon, is taking very strong exception to 
this. He thinks that such abrupt stoppage of the grant military 
assistance program would be mischievous and counterproductive 
at a time when we don't know exactly where we are going in our 
relationship with Latin America. He thinks eventually that 
perhaps there should be a diminution of it, but it should be 
more orderly and not a meat-ax approach.
    I understand that last Friday there was a meeting on this, 
a so-called interdepartmental regional group meeting, IRV, and 
there Mr. Lincoln Gordon did take a strong position that he 
disagreed with the McNamara position, which was expounded at 
that meeting by a representative of Mr. McNamara's office.
    I understand Mr. McNamara's representative, on the other 
hand, did hold to his guns, and that this matter is being 
referred up to what we call the senior interdepartmental group, 
which is chaired by the Secretary of Defense. If they don't 
come to an agreement there, the matter would be referred to the 
President.

                          GRANTS VERSUS CREDIT

    Senator Morse. This is a hot one up here you know, this 
grant versus credit.
    General Porter. You know from where I sit I think the grant 
program is terribly important to us down there, because the 
only way we really are going to influence and control the 
introduction of weapons into South America in my judgment, 
considering the nationalistic attitude of the people and their 
Spanish temperament, is through collaboration, where we are 
working together and we can give them advice, and say ``Look, 
we will help you get this equipment if you need it and if you 
can justify it.''
    Now the way we are going to go, the way things are 
developing now, we are not going to be able to do this. 
Venezuela is a good case in point.
    In Venezuela now where there are advisers, when they ask us 
our views, we can tell them, but we are not privy to what is 
going on in Venezuela. But if you look at the grant aid program 
and look at how much budget in most of these countries is 
available for modernization, replacement of old rifles with the 
M-1 and things like that, you will find that the 5 percent or 
so of their budget that our military assistance grant program 
provides is over 50 percent of what they have for modernization 
of their equipment. When you look at the trends, what this does 
in the way of giving new radios to them, new equipment of that 
nature, and the vehicles that will carry the radios so you can 
use them out in the field, helicopters and things like that, 
this is the difference between having a force which will be 
able to do the job and not having it. They are pretty well 
mixed up. Their budget is pretty well tied up to about 85 or 90 
percent in all of these countries on fixed charges of cost of 
personnel, maintaining their plant, or civic action activities, 
if they are committed to road building, these educational 
programs, and it is hard to smoke these things out.

                  NON-MILITARY COSTS FOR CONSTRUCTION

    For example, in Brazil, it shows if you just look at their 
budget, about 60 percent of the Brazilian budget goes into the 
military. But if you actually could break out the non-military 
cost of the Brazilian forces, you would find that less than six 
percent of the money, looking at their overall budget, actually 
goes for internal security, pure internal security or national 
defense projects. About ten percent of that is going into 
roadbuilding, railroad building, and other civil action 
projects that they are in.
    Senator Morse. Airfields.
    Mr. Corrigan. And running the service up and down the 
Amazon. The Navy does that, you see, and going into the back 
country, the airfields and the air service, running the medical 
service into those back areas. One of the most difficult things 
that I have gotten into is trying to figure out just exactly 
what goes into their defense appropriation and how much is 
used.
    It varies from country to country. In Argentina quite a lot 
of the budget goes into civil action type stuff there, but the 
Argentine has never admitted it was civic action, but it is up 
in the northwest.

                        MILITARY ADVISORY GROUPS

    Senator Morse. Senator McCarthy, we have one other 
question, as you know, that we discussed here that I thought 
the General could help us with. That deals with the military 
advisory groups in these various countries.
    I wanted to discuss with him if he would from the 
standpoint of Nicaragua. First, what do you think is the 
situation down there, and how large is our military advisory 
group? To what degree, if any, do the critics which are 
attributed to the military getting involved in military coups, 
working with an American military advisory group. And I think 
we ought to have ammunition to answer those criticisms.
    Senator McCarthy. Are there any other countries that have 
military advisory groups in major countries in Latin America, 
or is it only United States groups there?
    General Porter. In Paraguay, there is one from Argentina 
and there is one from Brazil. But they are working on specific 
things.
    Senator McCarthy. These are Latin American countries?
    General Porter. That is right.

                           EUROPEAN ADVISORS

    Senator McCarthy. Any of the European countries?
    General Porter. No. Up until World War II, yes. Germany and 
France had all of them. We started in 1940 or '41.
    Senator McCarthy. What is the tradition of the Brazilian 
Army? Was that German-trained or not? Do you know?
    General Porter. Bob, can you answer that?
    Mr. Corrigan. Prior to World War II, it was. Since World 
War II, it has not been.
    Senator McCarthy. What about Argentina? That was German, 
wasn't it?
    General Porter. Bolivia was German; Chile was German.
    Senator McCarthy. I know Chile was German. I thought 
Argentina was not German. I wondered whether you noted any 
difference in the way in which their army responded in 
political crisis on the basis of whether they were German, 
French or British trained.
    General Porter. I think actually in Argentina the French 
were there, because they are still sending French----
    Senator McCarthy. I think so. Generally, where the French 
are, the army is a little more political.
    General Porter. Peru is French also.
    Senator McCarthy. Chile was German.
    General Porter. Chile is German.
    Senator McCarthy. They are loyal to any administration, 
aren't they?
    General Porter. Yes. Bolivia was German also. But the 
reasons that the Chileans are loyal to their administration is 
for other reasons.
    Senator McCarthy. You don't think it has anything to do 
with being trained by Germans?
    General Porter. No.
    Mr. Corrigan. So was Brazil. They weren't too loyal when 
they kicked out Goulart.
    Senator McCarthy. I was thinking of that. You think most of 
the army there is becoming Americanized?
    General Porter. Oh yes. The German Ambassador in Panama, 
who had been in Bolivia, told me he was sorry the Germans 
didn't leave Bolivia sooner, because there were still some bad 
effects in the Bolivian Army.
    Senator McCarthy. German tradition?
    General Porter. From the days of German tradition. He was 
getting after me because we hadn't been able to change all of 
these things. I don't think that is a very good analogy.
    Senator McCarthy. It isn't analogy, but a question. 
Sometimes the things run deep. But the point is now, so far as 
the military advisory groups, they are either from other Latin 
American countries or they are all from the United States.

                         SITUATION IN NICARAGUA

    Senator Morse. That last ticker was that the election had 
gone better than three to one for Somoza.
    Senator McCarthy. Where did they get that one third?
    General Porter. I think Nicaragua. This is probably as 
difficult an area for me to understand as there is. I frankly, 
from what I have seen of the situation there, feel that we are 
dealing with probably the most backward country. I put this and 
Bolivia as the two most backward countries in the area.
    I think that things are much more limited there than they 
are in the other Central American areas, even Honduras 
included. I say this because the rule of the machete is still 
pretty much the rule in Nicaragua. For example, I think I told 
you this, Colonel Francisco was coming back from inspecting a 
unit on the coast here about four months ago, and about 40 
miles from Managua, he ran into a road jam. He got out of the 
car and went walking to find out why these cars were stopped. 
There were over 50 cars that were halted.
    He got up at the head of the column and discovered that 
there were two families that were shooting it out across the 
road. This had been going on for about six hours. This was a 
private feud, the Hatfields and McCoys or something like that. 
By dark there were well over 100 cars that were waiting there 
until dark came and the people went home and they went to 
Managua.
    I don't know just how you deal in our terms, in our 
political life, with this sort of going on in the countryside, 
you see. From what I have seen of Nicaragua, it is pretty much 
a peculiar place from the word go. I just don't know how to 
rationalize what goes on there.
    I will say this. That La Guardia is pretty well-trained by 
our standards. But when you take a Nicaraguan who is used to 
this sort of life I was just telling you about, and you give 
him a life, and he is provoked, up to a point he is pretty 
well-disciplined. He is not going to take the brickbats on his 
helmet. He is going to use his bare bayonet much more quickly.

                       ASSESSMENT OF GEN. SOMOZA

    I really feel from what I have seen that Somoza will 
probably give them a good administration. This is just my own 
judgment. I don't know Somoza well. The president that had died 
of a heart attack was a very, very fine man. He was loved by 
the people. Aguerro, I don't know him. I don't know whether you 
know him or not. He ran last time and withdrew. Do you know 
Aguerro at all?
    Mr. Corrigan. No. But only this morning, General, I was 
reading at the State Department an analytical telegram from our 
Embassy in Managua, where, reporting the results of numerous 
conversations Embassy people had had with people of different 
political beliefs and opinions, and even among the conservative 
people of substance like in the professions and whatnot, a 
number of people, these conservatives, of course, are very 
unhappy about Somoza.
    They feel that Somoza has exaggerated and insisted on 
keeping power too long, and they are sorry that Samoza decided 
to run. They would rather see the thing evolve in a way from 
where maybe the Samozas would let people like Schick, who are 
good people not associated with the family, but nevertheless 
did move ahead and insist on running for the presidency. These 
people said therefore they were not too sanguine about the way 
things may develop in Nicaragua, particularly because they felt 
that this fellow Taucheau is a bit of the Aryan side, that he 
may be more suppressive than his brother Luis. But they all 
went on to say, these opponents of Somoza, talking of the 
political party who is the opposition party, they all went on 
to say Aguerro would be terrible.
    The point I wish to make is that apparently these people of 
substance feel that this wasn't the time. They didn't have the 
fellow of sufficient stature and ability to move in and change 
the situation.
    Senator Morse. This hotel episode would show that.
    Mr. Corrigan. It was scandalous and outrageous.
    Mr. Holt. You know the old saying. You can't beat somebody 
with nobody. This is a lot of what is involved in Nicaragua. 
This Aguerro is nobody----
    Mr. Corrigan. This situation that is evolving has to 
evolve, and I think this situation in the past two days will 
temper this, rather than the reverse. I am inclined to hope 
that he will become a little more politic, a little more bland 
and a little more clever in building up his relationships than 
being oppressive. This is the question. We have to see how he 
evolves with power once he has power.

                          EXERCISING INFLUENCE

    General Porter. In our military advisory group, we have 
between 25 and 30 people in our mission there, Army, Navy and 
Air Force total, and they are dealing with advising the 
military academy.
    They are working, trying to teach them how to use 
communications. Teaching them to maintain their equipment. They 
are working on training to try to teach them how to train 
soldiers so they will stand when people are shooting at them 
without running. And it is a minimum number there. I really 
feel it is a benefit to us because these people are talking to 
the military people, and are feeling their pulse, and it gives 
us a way of restraining them.
    Senator Morse. Exercising influence.
    General Porter. That is right.
    Senator Morse. General, you have been very, very generous. 
You have too, Mr. Corrigan, and I appreciate it very much.
    [Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]


   Strategic Implications of Antiballistic Missile Defense Deployment

                              ----------                              




  Limitations on Use of Chemical and Bacteriological Agents in Warfare

                              ----------                              




            Sales of Military Equipment by the United States

                              ----------                              


                       Tuesday, February 7, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
                        Subcommittee on Disarmament
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:10 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Gore, Sparkman, Symington, Clark, Pell, 
McCarthy, and Aiken.
    Also present: Senator McGee.
    Captain Hibler; Mr. Knaur; Jack Stempler, Special Assistant 
to Secretary of Defense; Mel Christopher, Congressional Liaison 
to ACDA.
    [This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for 
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions 
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the 
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the 
published hearings.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


STATEMENT OF CYRUS R. VANCE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


DR. FOSTER'S CONCLUSION ABOUT NIKE-X BEING READY FOR PRODUCTION [P. 35]

    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Secretary, before you go further, I 
wonder if I may break in. What was Dr. Foster's conclusion 
about Nike-X being ready for production?
    Mr. Vance. He indicated that we had components which would 
permit us to commence the production and deployment of a Nike-X 
system at this time, but he also came to the very strong 
conclusion that from a technical standpoint he did not believe 
that the deployment of a Nike-X system to protect against 
Soviet attacks upon our population was a wise and sound course. 
He thought it presented grave technical difficulties.
    Senator Sparkman. Thank you.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION [P. 35]

    Senator Gore. So as of now your decision is to defer any 
deployment but to continue with research and development.
    Mr. Vance. That is correct, and we have also asked this 
year, Mr. Chairman, that the Congress appropriate $377 million 
for FY 1968 which, together with the $168 million already 
appropriated in FY 1967, could be used for production should 
the talks with the Soviets fail. If they failed, the issue 
could then be reconsidered and a new decision would be possible 
at that time should the President choose to make it.
    Senator Gore. What is the status of those discussions?
    Mr. Vance. Communications have started between our two 
countries. No substance has as yet been discussed between the 
two countries. They have indicated an interest in such 
discussions.
    Senator Gore. No actual conference has occurred on it.
    Mr. Vance. There has been one or, I believe, two 
preliminary discussions.
    Senator Gore. I see. Of reasonably high officials?
    Mr. Vance. Of high officials, in which there was an 
indication that they were interested in further exploring this 
problem with us.
    Senator Gore. Fine.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


        ESTIMATED COST OF TOTAL DAMAGE-LIMITING PACKAGE [P. 38]

    Mr. Vance. To test the contribution that each of these 
Nike-X deployments might make to our damage limiting 
objectives, we have projected both the U.S. and Soviet 
strategic nuclear forces (assuming no reaction by the Soviets 
to the U.S. ABM deployment) to fiscal year 1976, by which time 
posture B, the heavier defense, could be fully in place. These 
forces are shown on the tables.
    With respect to another table in my classified statement, 
there is one very significant number--that is the total number 
of ballistic missile warheads, which is the third item on this 
table. That shows that in 1976 the total number of ballistic 
missile warheads which the U.S. would have is 7,328. In 
contrast, it is estimated that at that time the Soviets, 
assuming no reaction on their part to an ABM deployment by the 
United States, would be between 1,133 and 1,598.
    Senator Aiken. What size warhead?
    Mr. Vance. They would vary.
    Senator Aiken. What is an average, would it be mostly 
small?
    Mr. Vance. They would be, primarily, small. I can give you 
that in terms of megaton equivalents if you would like; it 
would be 1,825 equivalent one megaton weapons.
    Senator Aiken. Medium range or ICBM?
    Mr. Vance. These are all ICBM's and submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles.
    Senator Aiken. Never mind.
    Senator Gore. Now in your estimate of 7,000 plus for the 
United States----
    Mr. Vance. Yes, sir?
    Senator Gore. [continuing] In the event of the Poseidon 
missile, are you counting that as one warhead or 14 warheads?
    Mr. Vance. 14 warheads, sir.
    Senator Gore. So you are really in many respects, so far as 
actually the ballistic missile is concerned, the number would 
be smaller.
    Mr. Vance. Quite right, sir.
    Senator Gore. Thank you.
    Senator Sparkman. Does that mean the 400 would be 5,600 out 
of that 7,328?
    Mr. Vance. There are 400 large submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles (Poseidon class)----
    Senator Sparkman. 14 times that would be--14 times 4.

                      RUSSIAN POLARIS DEVELOPMENT

    Senator Symington. Following the chairman's question, Mr. 
Secretary, have you made any provision for the logical 
development of a 14-headed tube on a Polaris submarine by the 
Russians in your figure?
    Mr. Vance. Yes, sir. We have made computations which I will 
come to later on.
    Senator Symington. My point is you have 1,133 and 1,598 
here. Does that include 16 times 14 in it?
    Mr. Vance. This assumes no reaction on the part of the 
Soviet Union to a U.S. ABM deployment, which I think, as I said 
before, is a most unrealistic assumption. I believe they will 
react, Senator Symington.
    Senator Symington. I do not mean to be short about it, but 
actually these figures do not mean a lot if they have a lot of 
Polaris submarines with 14 in each tube.
    Mr. Vance. I am going to point out later on that I do not 
think this is the posture the Soviet Union will be in if we 
deploy an ABM. I think they will be forced to react and will 
have substantially more warheads than shown on this table.
    Senator Symington. I do not mean to labor it. But certainly 
you do not mean they will develop a 14-weapon Polaris missile 
just because we do not put up an ABM, do you?
    Mr. Vance. They may develop a multi-warhead Polaris-type 
missile. Whether it would be able to have 14 warheads or not, I 
do not now know, Senator Symington; they might decide instead 
simply to proliferate land-based ICBM's which also could have 
multiple warheads.
    Senator Symington. Thank you.
    Senator Gore. As I believe the CIA told us, as of now we 
have no information that they have developed or are developing, 
attempting to develop a multiple warhead.
    Mr. Vance. That is correct. We have no information at this 
point in time which leads us to believe that they are 
developing multiple warheads. They may be, but we have no 
information at this point.
    Senator Symington. It was not too long ago that we did not 
have information that they were developing Polaris submarines.
    Senator Sparkman. May I ask this one question, sir?
    Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.

                       RUSSIAN SAM DEFENSE SITES

    Senator Sparkman. SAM sites, we have 112 and they will have 
between 1,360 and 2,006. Why that great difference?
    Mr. Vance. It is a difference of emphasis which they place, 
as opposed to us, on defense. They have always been very, very 
strong on defense, as you may know, Senator Sparkman. We feel 
that they have wasted billions of dollars on their SAM defense. 
Both the military and the civilians in the Defense Department 
agree that despite the Soviets' massive deployment of surface-
to-air missiles, our bombers could still penetrate and that at 
least 85 percent of them would get through. So that we feel 
that this vast expenditure of billions of dollars by the 
Soviets on SAMs in the past has been essentially a waste of 
money on their part.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


 ESTIMATES OF SOVIET AND UNITED STATES FIRST STRIKE FATALITIES [P. 41]

    Mr. Vance. We believe that even if we struck first they 
would still have the capability to come back and inflict that 
amount of damage upon the United States. And we have reviewed, 
not because we ever intended to do so, the question of whether 
or not the United States could ever launch a pre-emptive strike 
on the Soviet Union and receive an acceptable level of damage 
in return. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and we are all in 
agreement that we could not do so, even if we struck first.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Senator Gore. You and Secretary McNamara take the position 
that the best, most fortuitous balance of terror so far as we 
are concerned is to pay relatively small attention to defense 
and maximize our power of assured destruction.
    Mr. Vance. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Gore. Thank you.
    Senator Sparkman. I think it was Winston Churchill's 
analysis that the development of atomic and nuclear weapons 
would prevent a third world war; was it not?
    Mr. Vance. I believe he did comment to that effect.
    Senator Sparkman. Because of the horror and terror of it.
    Senator Symington. I do not think that is quite right. The 
development of nuclear weapons, according to a conversation I 
had with him in 1954, made him feel that the British were 
helpless in the future against an all-out attack. He also felt 
it gave greater advantages to Russia because of the size of 
their land mass, and the time involved if there was ever 
another war. Therefore, it was important for us--he always 
classified himself with us--to be sure that we never lowered 
our deterrence.
    I am inclined this morning to support the decision not to 
have the ABM. I did not have the privilege of hearing Mr. 
Foster yesterday. But I did hear him before the Armed Services-
Appropriations Joint Committees, and, based on his position, I 
am inclined to support it. But in supporting it, I am in no way 
reducing my conviction that the best way to prevent a future 
war is to be sure we have adequate deterrence against Russia, 
so that they know they would be destroyed if they attacked us.
    Mr. Vance. I am absolutely in agreement with that. We must 
assure our destruction capability.
    Senator Sparkman. I am given a quote by the staff, 
``Security will be the sturdy stepson of terror.''
    Mr. Vance. Will be the what, sir?
    Senator Sparkman. ``Will be the sturdy stepson of terror.'' 
I am sure that he advocated the maintenance of the deterrent 
forces. But he said the maintenance of that deterrent force 
would prevent World War III. I am sure he said that.
    Senator Symington. An equally famous quotation is his 
characterization of the ``balance of terror.'' The word 
``balance'' is the important one.
    Senator Sparkman. Yes.
    Senator Gore. I would like to put a question here that has 
been troubling me. Suppose we are convinced that despite 
whatever defense systems the Soviets install, we can still 
wreak this havoc in such horrible proportions as described 
here. Suppose that they are convinced that their system is 
impregnable. Then has not our strategy of deterrence been 
compromised?
    Mr. Vance. Mr. Chairman, during the last several years we 
have released more information of a formerly classified nature 
than ever before, because we wanted the Soviet Union to know 
our capability so that they would not misinterpret our power, 
and our capability to destroy them as a viable nation should 
they attempt to attack us.
    We have been criticized for releasing so much information, 
but I think it is vitally important that the Soviet Union 
should know what our capability is so they do not miscalculate.
    Senator Gore. I was not referring to their information 
about the number of our warheads and even the nature of the 
improvements. But suppose that they have a confidence in their 
defense which we do not share but which they hold? Is not the 
crucial question their conception of our power of retaliation 
rather than our conception of it?
    Mr. Vance. It is, sir; no question about it.
    Senator Symington. In other words, what the Chairman is 
saying, as I understand it, it is better for us not to have the 
deterrence and have them feel we do, than to have it, and have 
them feel we do not.
    Mr. Vance. I think it is better that we have it and they 
know it.
    Senator Symington. That is best.

                   OUR STRATEGY OF DETERMENT [P. 44]

    Mr. Vance. I think that this is one valuable thing that can 
come out of discussions with the Soviet Union. If we can sit 
down and go through these matters with them and sit down and 
very frankly discuss our capability to penetrate such system.
    Senator Gore. We are going to tell them that we have 14, 
multiple, 14-head warheads that can go different directions and 
different trajectories.
    Mr. Vance. Exactly what we would tell them I cannot say 
precisely at this point. But we would be making it as clear as 
clear could be that we have that capability to penetrate.
    Senator Gore. Okay.
    Senator Sparkman. If they have been reading our papers and 
listening to radio, they would know it anyway.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  COSTS OF AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE SYSTEM AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM [P. 44]

    Senator Symington. I understand. But it worries me. The 
cost of the project is so heavily emphasized in the defense of 
the civilians, it might cost--for example, a figure given us 
was $40 billion in 10 years. At the same time the civilian 
heads are so determined to pursue a war that is costing us, 
according to the staff of the Appropriations Committee, $30 
billion a year chasing these little people around the woods 
over there in Vietnam. So if it comes down to a question of 
price, I am perfectly willing to consider the civilian heads 
probably better informed and better in a position to make a 
decision. But it is hard for me to see why the ABM system is so 
heavily defended in not being put up because of the price, $40 
billion over 10 years, when we are spending somewhere between 
$2 billion and $2.5 billion a month in this little country over 
in Southeast Asia. That is the one thing that runs through my 
mind as I read these details of the heavy costs.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


           INCREASE OF SOVIET SECOND STRIKE POTENTIAL [P. 45]

    Mr. Vance. If the Soviets are determined to maintain an 
Assured Destruction capability against us and they believe that 
our deployment of an ABM defense would reduce our fatalities in 
the ``U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate'' case to the 
levels shown in the table above, they would have no alternative 
but to increase the second strike damage potential of their 
offensive forces. They could do so in several different ways, 
by deploying a new large, land-based ICBM (either mobile, or 
hardened and defended), or a new submarine-launched missile 
like our Poseidon, or by adding large numbers of hardened but 
undefended SS-9s or SS-11s. They have the technical capability 
to deploy any of these systems with MIRVs (or single warheads) 
by the mid-1970s. Shown in the table below are the relative 
costs to the Soviet Union of responding to a U.S. ABM 
deployment with a land-mobile ICBM system. I think the table is 
self-explanatory.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 Number of Fatalities in an All-Out Strategic
                                                               Exchange (in millions)  (ASSUMES SOVIET REACTION
                                                                            TO U.S. ABM DEPLOYMENT)
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
                        U.S. Programs                           Soviets Strike First,      U.S. Strikes First,
                                                                   U.S. Retaliates          Soviets Retaliate
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
                                                               U.S. Fat.    Sov. Fat.    U.S. Fat.    Sov. Fat.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approved (no response)......................................          120         120+          100           70
Posture A...................................................          120         120+           90           70
Posture B...................................................          120         120+           90           70
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If the Soviets choose to respond to our ABM deployment with 
MIRVs, penetration aids, and such a system (200 missiles 
against Posture A and 650 against Posture B) the results would 
be as shown below, and this is a very significant table. It 
shows very simply----
    Senator Gore. We are back where we started.
    Mr. Vance. [continuing] That we are back where we started.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                SOVIET INCREASE OF SECOND STRIKE [P. 46]

    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, if I may, before we go to 
the next subject; these assumptions can be very wrong. For 
example, several years ago some of us were criticized, 
including President Kennedy, about a missile gap.
    The fact is, if there was a missile gap it was created by 
Mr. Dulles and destroyed by Mr. Dulles; eliminated would be a 
better word.
    Senator Gore. You mean Allen?
    Senator Symington. Yes.
    Between December 1959, the record will show, and August 
1961, the Central Intelligence Agency, at both times under the 
direction of Mr. Dulles, in four separate reductions, reduced 
the number of ICBMs on launching pads in Russia 7.5 percent.
    Therefore, sometimes I always worry, regardless of the 
efforts made, as to the ability of any of us to know exactly 
what is going on behind the Iron Curtain, although I understand 
we have better results now because of satellite information.
    Mr. Vance. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Symington. But when you say that they would have no 
alternative but to increase the second strike, which they would 
do, for example, by developing new missiles for their Polaris-
type submarines, surely you do not mean to imply they won't do 
that anyway, do you?
    Mr. Vance. No, I do not mean to imply that. They might very 
well.
    Senator Symington. I would say that they would do it on any 
basis, wouldn't you? They would make the best weapon they could 
for their new Polaris submarines.
    Mr. Vance. I think what they will do is assure themselves 
that they maintain a sufficient capability for Assured 
Destruction, so that they feel that we will not strike them 
first. I think that they will do whatever is required to put 
themselves in that posture, in the same fashion that we have 
done in the past and will continue to do.
    Senator Symington. Thank you.

                    DEFENSE AGAINST CHINESE CAPACITY

    Senator Gore. In my view, Mr. Secretary, if we could 
succeed in dissuading the Soviets from deploying their system, 
this would be a very great accomplishment. I have wondered if 
they were in a position to do so or would be willing to do so 
in view of the Chinese--the very rapid strides they are making. 
You are coming to that later?
    Mr. Vance. I am coming to that, but I would be glad to 
comment on that now.
    I think that in any discussions we have with the Soviet 
Union, both of us would reserve our rights to do what each of 
us might have to do with respect to China.
    Senator Gore. Could I ask a technical question right here?
    Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. Now, the deployments that are being made in 
the Soviet Union now, we have been told, are aimed at or 
instrumented--I have difficulty in talking in this field--
designed, I guess is a better word, to protect them against 
missiles that would be coming in on trajectories which the 
United States would be calculated to use in case of an attack.
    Mr. Vance. That is correct. That is the way their present 
system appears to be designed.
    Senator Gore. Now, my question is to what extent is it 
feasible and, if feasible, at what cost, for the same systems 
to be designed or redesigned to provide protection against 
missiles coming from the land mass of China?
    Mr. Vance. I do not have an exact cost figure, but the 
Soviets would have to change the placement of their radars, 
they would probably also have to change the placement of some 
of their missile sites, and the small missile site radars that 
go with them.
    I do not have an exact cost figure, but I think it would be 
quite low because, as I will indicate later on, for us to build 
a system which would be quite effective against the Red Chinese 
would cost, we estimate, only about $3.5 billion.
    Senator Gore. That is a light defense?
    Mr. Vance. That is a light defense; that is right.
    Senator Gore. But this does not, as I have understood this 
estimate, contemplate a submarine capacity on the part of the 
Chinese.
    Mr. Vance. We would take care of any submarine capacity of 
the Chinese through our regular antisubmarine warfare 
components.
    We know that they have at this point only one missile 
submarine. There are no indications that they yet have any 
missiles for that one submarine. They may be working on 
missiles for it. But we feel confident that we could take care 
of that one submarine with our current ASW forces, and we are 
also confident that if they move to a bigger submarine program 
that we would be able to take necessary steps to contain that 
particular threat.
    But, as I say, we have made no final decision with respect 
to whether or not we should deploy an ABM system against the 
potential Red Chinese threat because the lead time is such that 
we do not have to make the decision now.

                    SOVIET MISSILE AND RADAR SYSTEMS

    Senator Gore. One other question that is so elementary but, 
nevertheless, those of us who are elementary in our level of 
knowledge can only ask elementary questions. Are the silos, the 
hardened silos, in which the Soviets are placing their 
interceptor missiles, perpendicular or are they slanted toward 
the trajectories of the missile lanes it is anticipated the 
United States will use? Do the missiles take off 
perpendicularly? This will give some measure of how difficult 
it would be, some measure of the difficulty, if they wanted to 
redesign, replace their radars and use the same missiles that 
are now being installed as a defense against ours for defense 
against the Chinese.
    Mr. Vance. I think the determining factor is the way their 
radars are placed.
    Senator Symington. You have to go out of the ground 
vertically.
    Senator Gore. I thought so. This is what I would want to 
know. This would have a bearing, this could have a bearing, if 
they could use the same silos or same missiles by changing the 
direction of their radars and the telemetry.
    Mr. Vance. I think the critical thing is the placement of 
their radars, and they would have to change the placement of 
some of their radar facilities to reorient their system against 
the Chinese and away from the United States.
    Senator Gore. How difficult would this replacement be? I 
know this must be a big installation.
    Mr. Vance. It is a big installation, sir, and it is quite a 
costly installation. They have two of these so-called Hen House 
radars up in the northwest section of the Soviet Union, giving 
coverage to the threat corridor of ICBMs coming in from the 
United States, and they have one under the process of 
construction called the Dog House down southwest of Moscow.
    One would expect that they would have to put either Hen 
House or Dog House types over to the east to take care of the 
threat corridor for missiles coming in from China.
    Some of the radars, such as those emplaced around Moscow, 
essentially protect the city from any direction and 
consequently would not have to be changed to defend against the 
CPR. But the large Hen House radar, for example, essentially 
covers a sector. If the Soviets were defending against China we 
would expect such a radar to be oriented in that particular 
direction.
    Senator Gore. Now, this committee would be concerned in the 
case of, including myself, of the question of the verification.
    Mr. Vance. Yes.
    Senator Gore. Supposing the Soviets said the silos they 
were constructing, supposing they said, ``The defenses we are 
deploying are safeguards against the Chinese whose hostility is 
increasing toward us.''
    Now, could we be reasonably certain that this would be true 
or untrue?
    Mr. Vance. As you know, we have a considerable and growing 
unilateral capability through our satellites to determine both 
the deployment of missiles and the deployment of radar systems.
    As to whether or not it would be necessary to have some 
form of on-site inspection in addition to our unilateral 
capability is not yet clear, and this is probably one of the 
issues we will have to discuss with the Soviet Union in any 
talks we have with respect of a moratorium on or a cessation of 
ABM deployment.
    Senator Gore. One other question and then I will let you 
proceed with your statement.

                  PROTECTION AGAINST THE EAST OR WEST

    What is the relative time element in deployment of the 
construction of the missile and the silo, the launching 
mechanism, on the one hand, and the radar installations which 
you say would be necessary to change as to location if this 
cellar be, silo be, in which a missile is on station, is to be 
used as protection against the East or against the West?
    Mr. Vance. Are you asking me how long it would take the 
Soviets or how long it would take us?
    Senator Gore. Well, I am trying to get some idea, just for 
my own satisfaction, if we reach such an agreement as is being 
sought, which I hope we can conclude, how much reliance could 
we safely place upon the Soviet word that they were deploying 
as a defense against China if, in fact, the silo and missile 
could be used for either, and it would require a shifting of 
the radar from here to there. What I am trying to get at is 
what time element would be involved in re-installation of the 
radar or the necessary facilities to use this silo and this 
missile as an antiballistic defense against us?
    Mr. Vance. I will give you my best estimate, and I would 
like to correct it for the record. I believe it will be two to 
three years.
    Senator Gore. Two to three years?
    Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. If the deployment of the entire, the overall, 
system runs from five to seven.
    Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. That is what I wanted to get.
    Mr. Vance. I would like to get that for the record.
    New radars and interceptor missiles, if already in 
production, could probably be installed in 2-3 years.
    Senator Gore. So this will be an extremely important part 
of the negotiations.
    Mr. Vance. I would think it would be an extremely important 
part.
    Senator Gore. Thank you.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   RED CHINESE NUCLEAR THREAT [P. 49]

    Mr. Vance. With regard to the Red Chinese nuclear threat, 
an austere ABM defense consisting, for example, of four PAR and 
15 Missile Site Radars, together with some 400 Spartan and 200 
Sprint missiles (the latter to protect the principal radars), 
might offer a high degree of protection to the nation against a 
missile attack, at least through the 1970's. The total 
investment cost of such a program might amount to about $3.5 
billion, including the cost of the nuclear warheads.
    The effectiveness of this deployment in reducing U.S. 
fatalities from a Red Chinese attack in the 1970's is shown in 
the table below:

                             U.S. FATALITIES
                              (In Millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Chinese Strike First
                                                 (Operational Inventory)
                                               -------------------------
                                                 25 Missile   75 Missile
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without ABM...................................           .5           10
With ABM......................................           0+            1
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                             

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
            SENSE OF URGENCY REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS [P. 50]

    Mr. Vance. It is very hard to give any precise figure on 
this, Senator Symington. I wish I could. I think it all depends 
on how the discussions seem to proceed.
    If we are making progress then we would be willing to wait 
longer than otherwise. But if it becomes obvious that nothing 
is going to come out of these discussions, then I think that we 
would have to reconsider our position more promptly. It is just 
very hard to put any precise time on this.
    Senator Symington. Within a year?
    Mr. Vance. I think that there would be a good chance that 
within a year we could know one way or the other on this.
    Senator Gore. Well, that is giving us an order of time.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  PRACTICABILITY OF ABM SYSTEM AGAINST ENEMY SUBMARINE ATTACK [P. 52]

    Mr. Vance. Antisubmarine tactics are to get the submarine 
before it can fire, in other words, to track it and be on top 
of it so that when it gets ready to fire, why, you can kill it.
    Senator Gore. Do we know where the Soviet submarines are 
all the time?
    Mr. Vance. We do, with a few exceptions, We have really 
extremely good information with respect to Soviet submarines.
    Recently one submarine did get in close to the U.S. coast 
without our knowing it was there. We had one similar case in 
the Pacific where we lost one of their submarines for a while 
and then picked it up. But, by and large, we have really 
excellent information with respect to where Soviet submarines 
are. This is done by a number of different procedures.
    We have our so-called SOSUS stations, which are long-range 
listening stations which can detect things hundreds of miles 
away under the water. [Deleted.]
    Senator Symington. Will the Senator yield? But it is much 
more difficult to track a nuclear submarine than a non-nuclear 
submarine, is it not?
    Mr. Vance. The answer to that is no, quite frankly, 
Senator, because the Soviet nuclear submarines are really quite 
noisy. The most difficult ones to track right now are the 
Soviet submarines which are diesel and battery powered. When 
they go down to three knots on battery, then it is virtually 
impossible to hear them.
    Senator Symington. When I was out at Guam two months ago, I 
went out on a Polaris and they tell me they are dead for sixty 
days. They receive but they do not broadcast, and that they 
were practically impossible to detect.
    Does that mean our nuclear submarines are much easier to--
--
    Mr. Vance. Our submarines are much quieter than the Soviet 
submarines.
    Senator Symington. But then following their development of 
the art, they will be more quiet.
    Mr. Vance. There is no question but we must plan on them 
becoming more quiet. But at the same time we are trying to 
increase our capability to detect either kind of submarine. We 
are devoting a lot of effort to this.

  U.S. ACTION IN EVENT OF ENEMY SUBMARINES POSITIONING OFF OUR COASTS

    Senator Gore. What would we do if we discovered that a 
significant number of Soviet or Chinese submarines were taking 
suspicious positions off our coasts? We would become quite 
alarmed and might just provoke an exchange.
    Mr. Vance. If we saw such a situation developing, we would 
deploy the necessary forces to contain such a threat.
    Senator Symington. But if the Senator will yield, if they 
want to hit you they do not have to have submarines. They could 
put twenty different ships in our harbors with false bottoms, 
and drop them and disappear, and nobody would know, and they 
would all go off at the same time, and they would destroy 
twenty ports the same as if they had dropped a delayed fuse in 
the water. It is interesting from the stand-point of attack, 
but it does not have to be done that way, if we want to get 
technical.
    Sentor Gore. This is a frightening world.
    Mr. Vance. It is a frightening world, Senator; I agree.
    Senator Sparkman. It becomes more so as we move along.
    Mr. Vance. It does indeed.
    Senator Sparkman. Let me ask one question, talking about 
the ABM: Where would it fit in with the defense of Western 
Europe or would it fit in? Could it be made to fit in?
    Mr. Vance. It would have, in my view, a limited capability.
    On the other hand, I doubt that it would prove an effective 
defense just as it would not prove an effective defense here. 
They could saturate it and, therefore, I think it would be an 
unwise move on the part of our European allies to expend the 
funds trying to protect their population, just as I feel it 
would be an unwise move on our part. It just simply would not 
do it.
    Senator Sparkman. Then we are to regard this as a defense 
of our continental nation?
    Mr. Vance. Yes.
    The deployments I have been discussing this morning are 
protections for the continental United States, designed to 
protect the continental United States.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


       CHINA AS A NUCLEAR POWER BY 1980-85 IS QUESTIONED [P. 53]

    Senator Symington. To me it is a pretty tricky sentence.
    Senator Gore knows more about this than I do. But, as I 
remember it, the Russians were four years behind us, roughly, 
on the explosion of the hydrogen weapon, and had a more 
sophisticated hydrogen weapon than we did and I do not think 
you can talk in any sense of the term today, the theory of it 
anyway, about 1980-85 before China is a full nuclear power.
    Mr. Vance. I would be the first to say that predictions 
more than five years in the future are extremely risky, 
Senator.
    Senator Symington. I thank you for that. That was my only 
point, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Vance. I was trying to present it as we best saw it at 
this time on the basis of the intelligence estimates which have 
been made in the government.

         FUTURE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY COULD ALTER BALANCE OF POWER

    Senator Gore. Now, I have heard CIA, the Atomic Energy, and 
your own experts on this subject. My impression of the 
consensus is that by the--and indeed, Secretary McNamara said 
by the mid-1970's say 1975, that the Chinese will have a 
significant nuclear and intercontinental ballistic capability. 
It is estimated that they will test their first ICBM this 
summer in a range from 5,000 to 7,000 miles.
    Should that test be successful, then one would assume it is 
a question of building more of what they are testing. They have 
tested nuclear weapon to the extent of 10 or 20 times in power 
of the one with which we destroyed Hiroshima.
    So if they, say, if by 1975 they have 100 capable of 
attacking the United States, this is, it seems to me, a 
significant alteration of the balance of power in the world. We 
then face a threat which we have not previously faced, and they 
have a deterrence not only against us but against the Soviets, 
and they have a power of intimidation over their neighbors that 
they had not previously had.
    Would this not be a significant alteration of the balance 
of power and have a significant effect upon the whole strategy 
of deterrence?
    Mr. Vance. It might well have a significant effect on the 
balance of deterrence, and that is why I have carefully 
differentiated between a system designed against the Soviet 
threat and one designed against the Chinese threat.
    I have merely said that as of this time, the lead times are 
such that we do not feel that we have to make a decision this 
year with respect to the deployment of a system oriented 
against the Chinese threat.
    Senator Gore. But you are holding all options with respect 
to the Chinese.
    Mr. Vance. We are indeed, sir.
    Senator Gore. And you would expect in the negotiations the 
Soviets to do the same thing.
    Mr. Vance. I would, sir.
    Senator Gore. Is this not possibly one of the most 
complicated factors which makes it really impossible for 
Russia, and more impossible, I guess, than the United States, 
to negotiate and reach an agreement vis-a-vis the United States 
and the U.S.S.R.? Here is this third complicating factor which 
both powers must take into account and, perhaps Russia with her 
proximity and her existing hostility, I do not know that the 
hostility is any greater than against us, but it is certainly 
an immediate thing with their border troubles and their history 
of hostilities between the Chinese and the Russian people?
    Mr. Vance. It is clearly a complicating factor and one 
which would be a very delicate one in connection with the 
discussions which we expect to have with the Soviet Union.
    Senator Gore. Senator McGee, would you like to have a 
question before we go to another phase of his testimony?
    Senator McGee. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say, inasmuch 
as the chairman put the elementary questions because of his 
elementary school understanding of this, I am at pre-school, 
and maybe getting into the kindergarden today. I appreciate 
your courtesy in letting me attend.
    Senator Gore. Senator Aiken?

                      FRANCE'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

    Senator Aiken. I have not heard France mentioned at all.
    Mr. Vance. In what respect, sir?
    Senator Aiken. In regard to achieving capability, ICBM or 
anything else. Do you write them off?
    Mr. Vance. I think that in time they will achieve a limited 
capability. I do not think that this limited capability will 
really be a credible deterrent to the Soviet Union, and I 
really do not think that the French nuclear force can be 
anything but, quite frankly, a destabilizing influence in the 
whole world.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


STATEMENT OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CYRUS R. VANCE BEFORE 
                THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT 
OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE FEBRUARY 7, 1967 [P. 
55]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reaffirmed their 
recommendation that a decision be made now to deploy, with an 
initial operational capability in FY 1972 a NIKE-X system which 
would provide for area defense of the continental U.S. and 
local defense of 25 cities against a ``low'' Soviet threat.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             POSTURE A                       POSTURE B
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   Invest. Cost                    Invest. Cost
                                                      Number        ($ Billion)       Number        ($ Billion)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radars:.........................................
    MAR.........................................               0               0               8            $2.8
    TACMAR......................................               7            $1.9               3             0.6
    PAR.........................................               6             0.8               6             0.8
    MSR.........................................              26             3.8              95             8.4
        Invest. Cost............................  ..............            $6.5  ..............           $12.6
Missiles:.......................................
    SPARTAN.....................................            1200            $1.7            1200            $1.7
    SPRINT......................................            1100             0.7            7300             3.1
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Invest. Cost................................  ..............            $2.4  ..............            $4.8
DoD Invest. Cost................................  ..............            $8.9  ..............           $17.4
AEC Invest. Cost................................  ..............             1.0  ..............             2.0
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
        Total Invest. Cost (ex-R&D).............  ..............            $9.9  ..............           $19.4
Annual Operating Cost...........................  ..............           $0.38  ..............           $0.72
No. of Cities w/Term. Def:......................              25  ..............              50  ..............
IOC with Decision 1/67:.........................           FY 72  ..............           FY 72  ..............
Deployment Completed:...........................           FY 75  ..............           FY 76  ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is worth noting, in connection with the costs shown in 
the foregoing table, that had we produced and deployed the 
NIKE-ZEUS system proposed by the Army in 1959 at an estimated 
cost of $13 to $14 billion, most of it would have had to be 
torn out and replaced, almost before it became operational, by 
the new missiles and radars of the NlKE-X system. By the same 
token other technological developments in offensive forces over 
the next seven years may make obsolete or drastically degrade 
the NIKE-X system as presently envisioned.We can predict with 
certainty that there will be substantial additional costs for 
updating any system we might consider installing at this time 
against the Soviet missile threat.
    The deployment of a NIKE-X system would also require some 
improvement in our defense against manned bomber attack in 
order to preclude the Soviets from undercutting the NIKE-X 
defense; and we would want to expand and accelerate the fallout 
shelter program. The investment cost (including R&D) of the 
former is estimated at about $1.5 to $2.4 billion and would 
provide for a small force of F-111 or F-12 type interceptors 
(e.g., 48 F-11s or 32 F-12s) and about 42 airborne warning and 
control aircraft (AWACS). The expanded fallout shelter program 
would cost about $800 million more than the one we are now 
pursuing. We would also need some of our anti-submarine warfare 
forces for use against Soviet missile submarines, but we are 
not yet clear whether these ASW forces would actually have to 
be increased over the currently planned levels. In any event, 
the ``current'' estimates of the investment cost of the total 
Damage Limiting package would amount to at least $12.2 billion 
for Posture A and at least $21.7 billion for Posture B.
    To test the contribution that each of these NIKE-X 
deployments might make to our Damage Limiting objectives, we 
have projected both the U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear 
forces (assuming no reaction by the Soviets to the U.S. ABM 
deployment) to FY 1976, by which time Posture B, the heavier 
defense, could be fully in place.

                                              PROJECTED U.S. ANO SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, MID-1976
                                             (Assuming no reaction by the Soviets to U.S. ABM deployment) *
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                 U.S.                                USSR
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICBMs (Hard Launchers)..........................................................
    Large (TITAN II/SS-9 Class).................................................                                   0                             276-249
    Small (MINUTEMAN/SS-11 Class................................................                                1000                             500-950
    Mobile......................................................................                                   0                                50-0
SLBMs...........................................................................
    Large (POSEIDON Class)......................................................                                 400                                   0
    Small (POLARIS/SSN-5 Class).................................................                                 128                             307-399
Total No. of 8M Warheads........................................................                                7328                           1133-1598
Bombers (for Intercontinental Attacks)..........................................
    Heavy.......................................................................                                 255                              70-110
    Medium......................................................................                                 210                             300-500
ABM (Anti-ballistic Missile Defense)............................................
    Area interceptors...........................................................  ..................................                            800-3250
    Terminal Interceptors.......................................................  ..................................                            300-1500
Air Defense.....................................................................
    Fighters....................................................................                                 697                           1700-2400
    SAM Sites...................................................................                                 112                           1360-2006
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*The Soviet forces are based on extrapolation of the latest intelligence estimates.



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
    If the Soviets are determined to maintain an Assured 
Destruction capability against us and they believe that our 
deployment of an ABM defense would reduce our fatalities in the 
``U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate'' case to the levels 
shown in the table above, they would have no alternative but to 
increase the second strike damage potential of their offensive 
forces. They could do so in several different ways, one of 
which is reflected in the table below: by deploying a new 
large, land-based ICBM (either mobile, or hardened and 
defended), or a new submarine-launched missile like our 
Poseidon, or by adding large numbers of hardened but undefended 
SS-9s or SS-11s. They have the technical capability to deploy 
any of these systems with MIRVs (or single warheads) by the 
mid-1970s. Shown in the table below are the relative costs to 
the Soviet Union of responding to a U.S. ABM deployment with a 
hand-mobile ICBM systeem:

LEVEL OF U.S. FATALITIES WHICH SOVIETS BELIEVE WILL PROVIDE DETERRENCE a
                               (Millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Cost to the Soviet of Offsetting U.S. Cost to Deploy an ABM
------------------------------------------------------------------------
        40   $1 Soviet cost to $4 U.S. cost
        60   $1 Soviet cost to $2 U.S. cost
        90   $1 Soviet cost to $1 U.S. cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ U.S. fatalities if U.S. strikes first and Soviets retaliate.

    If the Soviets choose to respond in that way to our ABM 
deployment with MIRVs, penetration aids, and such a system (200 
missiles against Posture A and 650 against Posture B), the 
results would be as shown below:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      Number of Fatalities in an All-Out Strategic
                                                       Exchange (in millions) 1976 (Assumes Soviet
                                                            Reaction to U.S. ABM Deployment)
                                                  ---------------------------------------------------
                  U.S. Programs                      Soviets Strike First,      U.S. Strikes First,
                                                        U.S. Retaliates          Soviets Retaliate
                                                  ---------------------------------------------------
                                                    U.S. Fat.    Sov. Fat.    U.S. Fat.    Sov. Fat.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approved (no response)...........................          120         120+          100           70
Posture A........................................          120         120+           90           70
Posture B........................................          120         120+           90           70
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In short, the Soviets have it within their technical and 
economic capacity to offset any further Damage Limiting 
measures we might undertake, provided they are determined to 
maintain their deterrent against us. It is the virtual 
certainty that the Soviets will act to maintain thelr deterrent 
which casts such grave doubts on the advisability of our 
deploying the NIKE-X system for the protection of our cities 
against the kind of heavy, sophisticated missile attack they 
could launch in the 1970s. In all probability, all we would 
accomplish would be to increase greatly both their defense 
expenditures and ours without any gain in real security to 
either side.
    2. Defense Against the red Chinese Nuclear Threat
    With regard to red Chinese nuclear threat, an austere ABM 
defense consisting, for example, of 4 PAR and 15 Missile Site 
Radars, together with some 400 Spartan and 200 Sprint missiles 
(the latter to protect the principal radars), might offer a 
high degree of protection to the nation against a missile 
attack, at least through the 1970s. The total investment cost 
of such a program might amount to $3.5 billion, including the 
cost of the nuclear warheads.
    The effectiveness of this deployment in reducing U.S. 
fatalities from a Red Chinese attack in the 1970s is shown in 
the table below:

                             U.S. FATALITIES
                              (In Millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               Chinese Strike First
                                             (Operational Inventory)
                                        --------------------------------
                                           25 Missiles      75 Missiles
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without ABM............................               5               10
With ABM...............................              0+                1
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This austere defense could probably preclude damage in the 
1970s almost entirely. As the Chinese force grows to the level 
it might achieve by 1980-85, additions and improvements might 
be required, but relatively modest additional outlays could 
probably limit the Chinese damage potential to low levels well 
beyond 1985.
    It is not clear that we need an ABM defense against China. 
In any event, the lead time for deployment of a significant 
Chinese offensive force is longer than that required for U.S. 
ABM deployment; therefore, the decision for the latter need not 
be made now.
    3. Defense of Our-Land-based ICBM Forces Against a 
``Higher-Than-Expected Soviet Threat''
    As I indicated earlier, our Assured Destruction capability 
is of such crucial importance to our security that we must be 
prepared to cope with Soviet strategic threats which are 
greater than those projected in the latest intelligence 
estimates.
    The most severe threat we must consider in planning our 
Assured Destruction forces is an extensive, effective Soviet 
ABM deployment combined with a deployment; of a substantial 
ICBM force with a hard-target kill capability, in the form of 
highly accurate ICBMs. To date, Soviet missile accuracy has 
been substantially inferior to our own, and we expect it to 
remain so. However, if the Soviets develop accurate Multiple 
Independently-Aimed Reentry vehicles (MIRVs), they might, by 
equipping their SS-9 boosters with 6 MIRVs (each with a CEP of 
0.3 n. mi. and a yield of 3 MT), be able to destroy large 
numbers of our Minuteman missiles. An extensive, effective 
Soviet ABM system much better than the one we consider 
probable) might then be able to intercept and destroy a large 
part of our residual missile warheads, including those carried 
by submarine-launched missiles. (The Soviet offensive and 
defensive threats assumed here are both substantially higher 
than expected.
    Under the assumption that the Soviets have started the 
development of highly accurate reentry vehicles (including 
MIRVs) a reasonable upper limit on the build-up in their threat 
would be the following:

                                       GREATER-THAN-EXPECTED SOVIET THREAT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Soviet Threat to Minuteman \a\                 FY 70      FY 71      FY 72      FY 73      FY 74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SS-9.....................................................        180        180        180        150        100
SS-9 MIRV................................................          0         50        100        150        200
    (Six 3-megaton.
    RVs/Missile).
SS-11 (improved accuracy)................................        160        260        360        460        660
Total No. of BM Warheads.................................        340        740       1140       1510      1960
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\The older Soviet ICBMs, the current SS-ll and the submarine-launched ballistic missiles are excluded because
  they do not have sufficient accuracy to post a threat to our hardened and dispersed Minuteman force.

    The effect of such a deployment could be to reduce the 
number of U.S. Minuteman surviving attack to the levels shown 
below:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             FY 70      FY 71      FY 72      FY 73      FY 74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minuteman Surviving \b\..................................        800        590        390        245        160
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\b\ In addition, the Polaris and Poseidon force would survive.

    To hedge againt the possibility of such a threat to our 
landbase missile forces, we have authorized the development and 
production of the Poseidon. Should still additional offensive 
power be required, and such a requirement is not now clear, we 
are considering the development and deployment of a new 
Advanced ICBM (a large payload missile with an as yet 
undetermined basing system designed to reduce vulnerability to 
such a Soviet threat.
    The deployment of the NIKE-X as a defense for our Minuteman 
force, however, would offer a partial substitute for the 
possible further expansion of our offensive forces. The 
contribution one illustrative NIKE-X deployment might make to 
the survival of our Minuteman force against the greater-than-
expected Soviet threat, compared with the ``No Defense'' case 
is shown below:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    FY 70        FY 71        FY 72        FY 73        FY 74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No Defense Case
    MM Surviving...............................          800          590          390          245          160
NIKE-X Defense
    ABM interceptors...........................            0           55          395          475          475
    MM Surviving a.............................          800          590          515          465         390
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a The number of Minuteman ``surviving with NIKE-X Defense'' assumes the Soviets attack the defended Minuteman
  silos first. They might attack our radars first if they felt they had enough information on our defenses and
  were willing to gamble that we would delay launching our Minuteman for at least 15 minutes while their attack
  proceeded. In that case, the number of surviving Minuteman might be 100 fewer.

    But I want to emphasize that we have absolutely no direct 
evidence that the Soviet Union is developing MIRVs with such 
low CEPs, or, in fact, that they are developing MIRVs at all. 
Indeed, the tests we have seen to date indicate a far lower 
order of accuracy for Soviet ICBMs. Nevertheless, the 
intelligence lead time would be relatively short--about two 
years between the first indication of such a development effort 
and the start of deployment of the systems. Therefore, in 
examining the worst case, we have assumed that they could have 
such an operational capability as early as FY 1971. But even 
against this higher than expected combined Soviet, MIRVed 
missile/ABM threat, and even without a NIKE-X defense of 
Minuteman, our proposed strategic missile and bomber forces 
could still inflict 40 percent or more fatalities on the Soviet 
population throughout the 1969-1976 period.
    More extreme threats are highly unlikely. In any event, the 
changes we are now proposing in our strategic offensive forces 
would make it dangerous and expensive for the Soviets, to move 
in the direction of more extreme threats to our Assured 
Destruction capability. If we assume, as I believe we should, 
that the Soviet Union would want to reduce the vulnerability of 
their own offensive forces against the possibility of a first 
strike by our very accurate forces in the FY 1972-73 period, 
they must further disperse and harden their strategic missiles, 
which is exactly what they appear to be doing now. To do so is 
expensive and for the same budget outlay results in reduced 
missile payloads. Not to so would leave the Soviet force highly 
vulnerable to a first strike.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                     ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES [P. 63]

    Mr. Vance. Let me give both 1967 and 1968.
    Senator Symington. Fine.
    Mr. Vance. I will give them to you in terms of new 
obligational authority. For research, development test and 
evaluation concerned with chemical and biological warfare, 
there is $103 million in the 1968 budget; there is also $248 
million for procurement and $12 million for operations and 
maintenance, for a total FY 1968 program of $363 million.
    Now, let me give you some breakdowns.
    Senator Symington. I do not care about that unless you 
wanted to do it. I was just thinking, I think I am right in 
saying, that on chemical and biological warfare, just a quick 
mathematical interpretation in my head, that you are spending 
between one-fifth and one-tenth of one percent of your total in 
that field.
    Mr. Vance. I think that is correct. I can give you the 
figures for 1967 on that.
    Senator Gore. I would like to have it, if you don't mind.
    Senator Symington. I just want to develop the thought. Let 
me finish. I think it was about 1955 that I got a briefing on 
this subject. It was not covered in the committee, and we were 
spending about $50 million. I think the figures will show in 
1955, or a little less, maybe $48 million in this field. I am 
glad to hear we have doubled that, although we have more than 
doubled our military expenditures. I am very glad this subject 
has come up here this morning because I think it is one thing 
that, we have gotten so interested in nuclear problems that 
then the problems of a general limited war we may well have 
sloughed this off a bit, and yet it seems to me that it is 
terribly important, especially in the fields of killing animals 
and killing people.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            FISCAL YEAR 1967 AND 1968 BUDGET FIGURES [P. 64]

    Senator Symington. Would you give us those figures.
    Mr. Vance. Yes. With respect to 1967 the total funds are as 
follows: For research development, test and evaluation, $109 
million; for procurement, $169 million; and for operation and 
maintenance, $12 million--for a total of $290 million.
    I would like to point out one other thing if I might, and 
that is the distribution of these procurement funds in the FY 
1968 budget. I think it might be interesting to you. They have 
gone up quite substantially this year, and the reason is that 
they break down as follows: For smoke, flame and incendiary, 
$160 million; for riot control agents, $7 million; for 
defoliants, $46 million; for defense materiel, $15 million; and 
for other chemical and biological, $20 million.
    But the big increase is the result of the smoke, flame and 
incendiary category which is caused by our operations in 
Southeast Asia.
    Senator Gore. I would like to ask a question about a 
somewhat related matter here, and that is the possible use of 
radioactive agents, radioactive metal pellets.
    As you know, a city can be depopulated as well with 
radioactivity as it can with blast.
    Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. What is the status of that art? What are you 
spending on that or is this in the Atomic Energy field?
    Mr. Vance. There has been some work done in the past on 
very clean bombs which would have little blast effect but a 
very heavy short-term radiation effect.
    As to the amount of money which is being expended on such 
weapons at this time, I simply do not know, sir. I think that 
the best thing for me to do would be to supply that figure for 
the record.
    Senator Gore. Very well, I wish you would. It may be just a 
wild dream or nightmare, but is it not technically possible to 
shower a city with radioactive agents, and that any person who 
stayed in the city over a period of twenty-four hours would 
have a lethal dose. Therefore, if the people were adequately 
warned and notified, once such city is showered with such 
agents, the whole place could be depopulated; however, it might 
be important industrially.
    Mr. Vance. I am not an expert in this field. I know that 
there are people who have done a good deal of work and who hold 
a theory somewhat similar to that which you have expressed.
    I hesitate to speak on how effective this could be because 
I simply do not know what the state of the art is with respect 
to such weapons at this point.
    Senator Gore. Of course, we know that the armed services 
bought some watches, wristwatches, that they had to discard in 
large numbers because there was a little too much radioactivity 
on the dial, but if you are not prepared on this, why, it is a 
part of the whole armament and the threat today.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I would like to continue 
on that if I may.
    Senator Gore. I did not mean to break in.
    Senator Symington. The thought I wanted to express, at 
first I was excited about those figures, but then when you read 
them I got less excited because of the tremendous additional 
effort that is being devoted to chasing these little people 
around the woods. You will pardon the expression, but I am 
getting a little apprehensive about the price.
    I believe about twelve years ago when we had a briefing on 
this, a special briefing for me and my legislative assistant at 
that time, we were very interested in certain diseases, 
anthrax, I remember, for cattle; tularemia, whatever the name 
of that rabbit disease was.
    Mr. Vance. Tularemia.
    Senator Symington. Is that right?
    Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. And you had great hopes for that type 
and character. But from what I have read we are only spending 
around $20 million a year as against a possible hedge in a 
multi-billion nuclear picture in this chemical and biological 
warfare. Am I correct, based on figures you read?
    Mr. Vance. Yes, sir; on that type of thing. However, we 
have substantial stocks in many of these items. If you would 
care to I can go through the various types of stocks we have.
    Senator Symington. I do not want to take too much time on 
it but, Mr. Chairman, may I respectfully suggest that some time 
in the future, that some time we might have a hearing on 
chemical and biological warfare.
    Senator Gore. Maybe we had better set a time for that.
    Mr. Vance. Fine.
    Senator Symington. On anything that could be lethal 
delivered by a missile or any other way, suitcase, that would 
not be nuclear.
    Senator Gore. Is that agreeable with you, Senator Aiken?
    Senator Aiken. Yes.
    I was wondering about the neutron bomb, wondering what Dr. 
Teller's progress is, what progress he is making with that.
    Mr. Vance. That is what I was talking about before.
    Senator Aiken. That is what you were talking about.
    Mr. Vance. Yes.
    Senator Aiken. Is he making any progress with it?
    Mr. Vance. I do not know where he stands on the neutron 
bomb.
    Senator Aiken. I know his eyes used to shine when he 
mentioned that.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


STATEMENT OF JOHN T. McNAUGHTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS [P. 66]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    3. Military sales to developing countries have amounted to 
about 10 percent of the total. I should underline the fact that 
the Department of Defense does not respond independently to 
requests from countries of the Middle East, Latin America, 
Africa or other underdeveloped areas for the purchase of arms. 
These requests are subject to the most intensive review and 
debate within the U.S. Government; usually, serious efforts are 
made to reduce the requests in either quantitative or 
qualitative terms; non-U.S. alternative sources of supply are 
often sought for foreign policy reasons, Mr. Chairman; that is 
when the U.S. does not want to be involved in the case.
    Senator McCarthy. Is that when you have the Germans ship 
the tanks for you to Israel?
    Mr. McNaughton. Senator McCarthy, we did not do that. I beg 
your pardon. I thought you were talking about Iran--the Iran 
case.
    Senator McCarthy. No.
    Mr. McNaughton. The German case to Israel about two years 
ago, this was involved in that case, yes. This attempt, this 
desire not to have the United States as a source of supply, and 
later on, Mr. Chairman, I am sure you will want to have 
questions about this delicate situation in the Middle East, and 
the extent to which the United States is involved.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               TANK AND AIRCRAFT SALES TO ISRAEL [P. 67]

    1. The first is our recent tank or aircraft sales to Israel 
(1964 and 1966) were concluded primarily to prevent the 
development of an arms imbalance in the area which would have 
had a seriously destabilizing effect. The imbalance was being 
created by a heavy infusion of modern Soviet equipment 
(principally tanks and MIG 21's) to the U.A.R., Syria and Iraq. 
Our negotiations with Israel were protracted, and a serious 
American effort was made to have them meet their requirements 
from European markets. In the end, however, and especially with 
respect to aircraft, available European equipment proved either 
too sophisticated or too expensive; we at length acceded to 
Israel's request [Deleted.] assurances from the Israelis.
    [Deleted.]

                    SALE OF SMALL AIRCRAFT TO JORDAN

    Our recent, 1966, sale of a small number of aircraft to 
Jordan was the result of a similarly protracted and reluctant 
process. The United States Command had levied on Jordan a 
requirement to acquire three squadrons of supersonic aircraft 
as Jordan's contribution to the all-Arab military posture. The 
U.A.C. would provide a limited sum of money (contributions from 
member states); Jordan could buy western aircraft if it chose, 
but the U.A.C. showed a clear preference for MIG 21s, which 
were available at a cut-rate price. The pressures in the Arab 
world were such that Jordan was compelled to comply. The 
pressures were such that Jordan asked the U.S. to sell suitable 
aircraft on generous credit terms. Over a period of 18 months, 
we repeatedly insisted that Jordan explore all possibilities in 
the U.K., France, Sweden and other markets; but European prices 
and the credit terms proved far too severe--far beyond 
purchasing power of the limited funds available from the U.A.C. 
In the end, when it appeared that Jordan would be forced to 
accept MIG 21s, and thus to open its country to a large Soviet 
training mission and also to U.A.R. military influence--a move 
which we regarded as inimical to the integrity of Jordan and a 
grave danger to stability in the Middle East--we agreed to sell 
Jordan a small number of F-104's from our MAP inventory. In 
concluding the arrangement, we successfully reduced the 
Jordanian request from 60 to 36, and consummated ultimately an 
initial sale of only 12 of the 36.

                         MILITARY SALES TO IRAN

    [Deleted.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


         AMOUNT OF ARMAMENT GERMANS HAVE SOLD OR RESOLD [P. 69]

    Senator Gore. The Germans say they cannot afford to buy 
more arms from the United States, as I understand it, unless 
they are able to sell their own surplus of old used equipment.
    The question I wanted to ask you is how much armament have 
the Germans sold or resold?
    Mr. McNaughton. I do not have the exact figures on that, 
Mr. Chairman. Let me see, I have--they both grant and sell, Mr. 
Chairman. Germany both grants and sells. They also have a grant 
program, and I have the figures for Turkey, for example, and I 
do not have any further figures on what they have done by way 
of transfer of equipment. I can get this for you.
    Senator Gore. Fine. Will you supply that to us.
    Mr. McNaughton. I will submit it for the record.
    The information requested is classified and was furnished 
separately to the committee:

                                   MILITARY EQUIPMENT OF U.S. ORIGIN SUPPLIED TO A THIRD COUNTRY BY THE FRG, 1954-1966
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                             Estimated
  3rd Country Receiving              Item Description                 Quantity         How Originally Acquired    How Provided by FRG?    Transfer Value
                                                                                              from US?                                      ($Millions)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAD.....................  Submachine gun, cal.45, Thompson...  500.................  Nash List \1\...........  Sales...................  ..............
                           81mm Mortar........................  30..................  Nash List...............  Sales...................             0.8
                           Transceivers PRC 6.................  48..................  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
                           VRC 7..............................  24..................  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
GREECE...................  F-84F Aircraft.....................  69..................  Nash List...............  Grant...................  ..............
                           Machine gun, .50 cal, Browning.....  Unk.................  Nash List...............  Grant...................  ..............
                           Communications Equipment...........  Unk.................  Nash List...............  Grant...................             9.5
                           F-84 Spare Parts...................  Unk.................  Nash List...............  Grant...................  ..............
                           Prime Mover, M-4, 18-ton...........  91..................  Nash List...............  Grant...................  ..............
INDIA....................  Trainer a/c, T-6G (Harvard)........  34..................  Nash List/Sales.........  Sales...................             1.5
IRAN.....................  F-86 Sabre VI Aircraft \2\.........  90..................  ........................  Sales...................  ..............
                           Machine guns, cal.30...............  858.................  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
                           Submachine gun, .45 cal............  4,092...............  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
                           Rifle, Recoilless, 75mm............  339.................  Nash List...............  Sales...................            14.5
                           Rocket Launcher, 3.5"..............  658.................  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
                           Ammunition.........................  Misc................  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
                           Machine gun, cal.50, Browning......  200.................  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
ISRAEL...................  Anti-aircraft guns, 40mm...........  54..................  Nash List/Sales.........  Grant...................  ..............
                           Tanks, M-48........................  60..................  Sales...................  Grant...................            20.0
                           Helicopter, H-34...................  30..................  Sales...................  Grant...................  ..............
JORDAN...................  Ammunition.........................  Misc................  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
                           Rifles, M1.........................  30,100..............  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
                           BAR's..............................  1,412...............  Nash List...............  Sales...................             1.1
                           Mortars, 81mm......................  250.................  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
SUDAN....................  Rifles and Carbines................  32,600..............  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
                           Rocket Launcher M1A3...............  1,200...............  Nash List...............  Sales...................             2.0
                           Mortars, 81mm......................  380.................  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
                           Ammunition.........................  Misc................  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
TURKEY...................  Aircraft, Fighter, F-84F...........  116.................  Nash List...............  42 Grant & 74 Sales.....  ..............
                           Rocket Launcher, 3.5"..............  5,000...............  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
                           Mortar, 4.2".......................  100.................  Nash List...............  Grant...................  ..............
                           Howitzer, 105mm, SP................  50..................  Nash List...............  Grant...................  ..............
                           Tank, medium, M48..................  108.................  Sales...................  Sales...................            25.0
                           Tractors, Bulldozers, etc..........  115.................  Sales...................  Grant...................  ..............
                           Commo Equipment....................  Unk.................  Nash List...............  Grant...................  ..............
                           Machine gun, .30 cal, Browning.....  2,250...............  Sales/Nash List.........  Grant...................  ..............
                           Ammunition.........................  Unk.................  Sales...................  Grant...................  ..............
VENEZUELA................  F-86K \3\..........................  74..................  Sales...................  Sales...................             2.2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Nash List comprises all the military equipment and services which the U.S. has supplied the FRG under grant aid. This equipment was provided as
  a part of 1954 US/FRG agreements to organize and equip German forces. Eight years later, in 1962, U.S. reversionary rights to this equipment were sold
  to the FRG for $75 million. Conditions of this sale require the FRG to coordinate and obtain U.S. agreement in the transfer (sales or grant) of any
  equipment to non-NATO third countries. For NATO countries, sales or grant must be coordinated for selected major items and, by subsequent agreement,
  FRG aid for Greece and Turkey is coordinated to assure integration of U.S. and FRG support.
\2\ These planes were manufactured in Canada under U.S. license. Prior to provision to Iran, the FRG obtained assurance from GOI that the aircraft were
  solely for Iranian use. In late 1966, it was reported that some of the planes were in Pakistan. Both the FRG and Canada protested. Iran stated that
  the aircraft were in Pakistan only for repair.
\3\ Produced under U.S. license in Italy for U.S. MAP use subsequently paid for by the FRG.



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
              DISTINCTION BETWEEN OUR COMPETITORS [P. 72]

    Mr. McNaughton. Senator Symington, you had asked why we 
draw a distinction between our competitors.
    When it comes to balance of payments, of course, the 
difference may not be so great, but if you are talking in terms 
of whether, for example, a determined Chile, which wants jet 
aircraft, is going to get aircraft from one country or another, 
there is no, so far as I know, there is no real push for 
Soviets sales, for example, in Latin America, although the 
committee has learned there is some intelligence that there are 
some overtures in this regard recently. But we do not mind much 
having the British fill that need for an inexpensive aircraft 
in Latin America, which is under the level that we are trying 
to keep Latin America to with the Hawker Hunter in Chile.
    We are trying to keep Latin America below the supersonic 
aircraft at an economic level, and we have so far succeeded, 
and the Hawker Hunter, in effect, was sold to Chile. We could 
have had that business easily. It would have been easy to have 
the business in Chile by selling more expensive F-5s which were 
exactly what Chile wanted.
    Saudi Arabia is a case in which the balance of 
considerations, everything taken into account, we, in effect, 
allowed part of that deal with Saudi Arabia to go to the United 
Kingdom.
    Senator McCarthy. Wasn't it on condition that they buy $300 
million of F-111 from us?
    Mr. McNaughton. It was more than that. I mean----
    Senator McCarthy. I mean the British bought from us and you 
let the British sell in Saudi Arabia.
    Mr. McNaughton. $400 million worth of business in Saudi 
Arabia.
    Senator McCarthy. $300 million.
    Mr. McNaughton. No, it was more than that, $2 billion.
    Senator McCarthy. Saudi Arabia?
    Mr. McNaughton. No, the whole deal was, the British deal--
--
    Senator McCarthy. I mean you let the British sell to Saudi 
Arabia.
    Mr. McNaughton. About $400 million worth.
    Senator McCarthy. Yes, sir.
    Mr. McNaughton. Phased over a ten-year period it comes to 
over $400 million.
    Senator McCarthy. How much would they pay for the F-111?
    Mr. McNaughton. They actually have not paid, but the deal, 
as I recall it, runs in the neighborhood of $2 billion, 
including the phantom and C-130 aircraft.
    Mr. Vance. Approximately $2 billion, the F-111 and the 
followon spares.
    Senator Gore. $2 billion.
    Mr. McNaughton. It is broken down into several pieces. 
There is a total deal of which the F-111s are a piece.
    Senator McCarthy. How much?
    Mr. McNaughton. Which adds up to $2.5 billion.
    Senator McCarthy. How much are they?
    Mr. McNaughton. The F-111 part of this I have listed as 
about $725 million.
    Senator McCarthy. That is quite different.
    Mr. McNaughton. Of the $2.5 billion package, there is a $2 
billion package with the British, and this $2 billion package 
they wanted some business running the other way. We ultimately 
agreed that provided they could meet competitive terms on 
price, delivery, quality, that we would buy from them or find 
things to buy from them, $325 million, and the $400 million, 
Senator McCarthy, that was part of that package.
    Senator McCarthy. And the Hawker Hunter is part of it, too.
    Mr. McNaughton. No, it is not.
    Senator McCarthy. Well, you said you could have gotten the 
business if you wanted to.
    Mr. McNaughton. All we had to do was sell F-5s.
    Senator McCarthy. Why did you not?
    Mr. McNaughton. We do not want Latin America to have that 
airplane.
    Senator McCarthy. Well, you said the F-5 was no worse than 
the Hawker Hunter.
    Mr. McNaughton. No, it is a supersonic plane.
    Senator McCarthy. I thought you said it was the same.
    Mr. McNaughton. It is hotter.
    Senator McCarthy. I thought you said it was roughly the 
same kind. We have some subsonic planes.
    Mr. McNaughton. The subsonic planes are wearing out, 
Senator McCarthy.
    Senator McCarthy. I think the point is that you do let some 
of our allies sell, don't you, when you really could get the 
business away from them if you wanted it.
    Mr. McNaughton. That is correct.
    Senator McCarthy. Saudi Arabia is a clear case.
    Mr. McNaughton. That is a case for one reason. Chile is a 
case for another reason.

                MILITARY DETERMINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

    Senator McCarthy. What I am concerned about is the 
manipulations concerned in the Defense Department. We sit 
around here trying to be foreign policy experts, and all of 
this kind of stuff is going on
    [Deleted.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               POWER IMBALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST [P. 73]

    Senator Symington. Right. There was a question of balance.
    I want to make this point to you. I have just come back 
from the Middle East. The situation in Jordan is extremely 
serious. I personally hope we do everything and anything we can 
to help this fellow in his problem in Jordan, but in my opinion 
there is a tremendous imbalance out there as a result of what 
has been going on, and I think it is operated on too classified 
a basis from the Congress. I am not talking about from the 
people.
    For example, there is no question about it, you check it 
when Mr. Battle comes back, because he briefed me at length on 
it, and he is a very brilliant fellow and is coming back here 
as assistant secretary. Now, today the quality of the U.A.R. 
air force is fantastic as against the number and quality of the 
Israeli air force.
    They bought their airplanes from France because we were too 
high toned to sell them, for various reasons that I have never 
been able to figure out, and get the business over here. So 
they buy the Mystere from France, and the new plane, whatever 
it is, the Mirage, and the Russians, who are, our embassy tells 
us in the highest classification, moving very rapidly into the 
U.A.R., they now ship there just as an illustration. The U.A.R. 
today has over four times more MIG's than the Chinese and the 
North Vietnamese combined, and sixty of those MIG's are 
considered the most modern that they have. This is the 
information I got only last month.
    Now, it is all very well to say that the Israelis can 
handle the U.A.R. because of pilot security, et cetera, but any 
day that the Soviets really get annoyed or there were any other 
mercenaries who really knew how to fly came in to run those 
U.A.R. airplanes, in my opinion, Israel is dead.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Whereupon, at 12:45 o'clock p.m., the subcommittee was 
adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                       MONDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1967

                                   U.S. Senate,    
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                     Washington, DC
    The committee met in public executive session at 10:00 
a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, 
Lausche, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, 
and Case.
    William M. Roth, nominee to be Special Representative for 
Trade Negotiations, and William B. McComber, nominee to be 
Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, were 
heard in public session and then ordered reported. William S. 
Gaud, to be U.S. Alternate Governor of the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and Maurine B. Neuberger, to be a member of 
the General Advisory Committee of the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, were also approved.
    S. 623, the International Bridge Act of 1967, was discussed 
and carried over.
    The following treaties were ordered reported: Customs 
Conventions: Ex. J, 89/2, on Containers; Ex. K, 89/2, on the 
Temporary Importation of Professional Equipment; Ex. L, 89/2, 
on the A.T.A. Carnet for the Temporary Admission of Goods; Ex. 
M, 89/2, regarding E.C.S. Carnets for Commercial Samples; Ex. 
N, 89/2, on the International Transport of Goods under cover of 
T.I.R. Carnets.
    Fisheries Conventions: Ex. H, 89/2, Exploration of the Sea 
Convention; Ex. T, 89/2, notes Amending the Convention on Great 
Lakes Fisheries; Ex. U, 89/2, International Convention for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas.
    Maritime Conventions: Ex. Q, 89/2, Inter-American 
Convention on Facilitation of International Waterborne 
Transportation (Convention of Mar del Plata); and Ex. R, 89/2, 
Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Tariff.
    Discussion followed on whether or not to hold public 
hearings on the Foreign Aid Bill.
    [The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                       Tuesday, February 28, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
                    Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                     Washington, DC
    The committee met in executive session at 10:15 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, 
Lausche, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, 
Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
    Ex. D, 88/2, the Consular Convention with the Soviet Union 
was discussed and ordered reported, with minority views, by a 
vote of 15-4.
    S. 990, to establish a United States Committee on Human 
Rights for International Human Rights Year-1968, was considered 
carried over.
    Discussion on educational trip to Vietnam by some members 
of the committee.
    [The committee adjourned at 11:15 a.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                       Tuesday, February 28, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
                        Subcommittee on Disarmament
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                     Washington, DC
    The committee met in executive session at 2:25 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Gore (chairman of the subcommittee), 
Fulbright, Mansfield, Lausche, Symington, Pell, Case, and 
Cooper.
    General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
accompanied by Captain Louis L. Meier (USN), appeared to 
testify on the development of the Nike-X Antiballistic missile 
system.
    [The committee adjourned at 4:00 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        Wednesday, March 1, 1967

                           U.S. Senate,    
                        Subcommittee on Disarmament
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                     Washington, DC
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol. Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Gore, Fulbright, Lausche, Clark, Pell, 
Hickenlooper, Aiken, Case, and Cooper.
    The subcommittee heard testimony from Gerald F. Tape, 
Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission; Dr. Norris E. Bradbury, 
Director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory; and Dr. 
Michael M. May, Director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, 
Livermore.
    [The subcommittee adjourned at 12:10 p.m.]


              SALES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT BY UNITED STATES

                              ----------                              


                        Thursday, March 2, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
                        Subcommittee on Disarmament
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                     Washington, DC
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in 
Room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Gore (presiding), Fulbright, Morse, 
Lausche, Symington, Clark, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, and Carlson.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Bader, of the 
committee staff.
    [This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for 
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions 
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the 
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the 
published hearings.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


STATEMENT OF JOHN T. MCNAUGHTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
               FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

          DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S MILITARY SALES PROGRAM [P. 134]

    Mr. McNaughton. I want to double check this figure because 
our total sales program runs about one and a half billion per 
year, and how it could be a billion dollars in profits out of 
one and a half billion dollars of business is a little 
difficult for me to understand. I will double check that 
number.
    But, on the question of Senator Morse's proposal, you 
cannot discuss the question of, for example, sales to Jordan, 
sales to Israel, sales to Pakistan or India in open session 
without risking very serious problems with the countries 
involved. This is why we have requested a closed hearing on the 
subject. The State Department would feel even stronger than we 
do about this.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Senator Fulbright. I just did not want you to leave the 
record, in answer to Senator Lausche, as if CENTO amounted to 
something. The way he asked it, and you said yes, there is 
CENTO, it sounded as if it was of some significance, and it 
really is not.
    Senator Lausche. Well, the fact is it was at one time, and 
I was going to follow up with the question whether or not the 
significance did exist when Russia was trying to move in on the 
Congress or sometimes by press reports of speeches by my 
deputy, Mr. Kuss. Generally, by the critics of the sales 
program.
    Mr. McNaughton. The image that is given, for example, all 
the way through the committee staff report, is one of the 
United States energetically seeking business.
    Senator Fulbright. The same way right here.
    Mr. McNaughton. This is untrue, and I think it should be 
fully understood that this is untrue.
    The efforts that we put into this program by a factor of 
five to one are efforts to avoid selling.
    Senator Fulbright. I can guarantee that is not true here.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


         ARMS SALES TO HELP BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS SYSTEM [P. 137]

    Mr. McNaughton. I can guarantee that it is true in fact. It 
is my program, and this is where most of our efforts go--such 
as the Iranian program, trying to find--ways to keep a country 
from spending its resources on things it should not spend them 
on. This is not always the case, but in no case do we practice 
the hard sell, and I think that should be fully understood.
    Almost 90 percent of our sales are to the industrialized 
nations anyway where the problem on the first sale it does not 
arise, but we do not press sales.

              EXAMPLE OF A CERTAIN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY

    Let me read you what happened just two, three days ago when 
the Air Minister Gomez from Brazil was here. Brazil is a 
perfect case of what Senator Fulbright refers to where I think 
almost a half billion dollars of economic grants or loans may 
go in a very short period of time.
    Senator Fulbright. Yes.
    Mr. McNaughton. The Air Minister was here, and he told me 
that Brazil is the largest country in South America. It has the 
largest Air Force, but it has old and outclassed fighters and 
aircraft. He wants to upgrade his Air Force, to keep it 
current. To improve the morale of his pilots, he wants just 12 
F-5's, the supersonic light Northrop airplane, to be delivered 
within one year. He wants them by the middle of next year, and 
he told us, he said, ``I don't want your grant, I don't want 
your credit. All I want is an agreement that Northrop can sell 
them to us,'' and the implication is, ``If you don't sell them 
to us we are going to get them somewhere else.''
    What I told him was, here is an extract from the memorandum 
of conservation:
    ``When Mr. McNaughton joined the group the Minister 
recounted his reasons for early acquisition of the F-5. Mr. 
McNaughton stressed the following points: (a) We place emphasis 
on economic and social development and were against the 
diversion of resources from this important sector at this time.
    ``(b) That the acquisition of the F-5 by Brazil would 
inevitably lead to a chain reaction demand for it by other 
Latin American countries who are not able to afford such 
expenditures at this time.''
    This morning I find the pressure is still on. He is still 
in town. The question is what do you do about it. Now, this 
gets into the whole policy question of our relations with 
Brazil, the State Department, AID----
    Senator Fulbright. It does.
    Mr. McNaughton.--DOD, who are all dealing in this problem 
trying to slow down, to prevent, these proud people from buying 
something they do not need, they have no business having, and 
this is where I spend my time to avoid selling them and, 
hopefully, to avoid having them drooling their money off 
somewhere else buying Mirages or Lightnings from the British--
Mirages from the French or Lightnings from the British. This is 
where the effort goes, and I would like to point out----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Is your point that if we do not sell, 
leaving aside entirely the aid we put into Brazil, they will 
find the money some place and buy from the British and the 
French. It looks like we are giving to them on the one hand, 
and taking away with the other.
    Mr. McNaughton. Senator Hickenlooper, this is a part----
    Senator Hickenlooper. That money might as well come back 
home as to go to Britain or France.
    Mr. McNaughton. This is entirely correct.
    What is going on there obviously is an internal political 
fight within the country.
    We had the same thing happen in Chile where they ended up 
buying the Hawker Hunters from the British. You have an 
internal fight going on there where for political reasons the 
government decides they have to allocate something for this 
purpose, and then the question comes up of one of restraint, 
trying to hold this thing down, and Chile wanted F-5's. We 
refused to sell them F-5's. We tried to sell them something 
that they considered too antiquated, which would have been a 
non-upgranting of their present force, and they eventually went 
to Hawker Hunter.
    Venezuela ended up buying aircraft from Germany. We did not 
veto this. It is an F-86, not a great step forward.
    Senator Lausche. Can you veto sales by Germany?
    Mr. McNaughton. Well, we have a veto over resales by 
Germany to non-NATO Countries.
    Senator Lausche. That is our equipment that sold to 
Germany?
    Mr. McNaughton. That is right. But one point I think you 
should understand, that these efforts, imperfect as they may 
be, Senator Fulbright, are paying off in Latin America, for 
example. In Brazil----
    Senator Gore. In dictatorships?
    Mr. McNaughton.--they are paying off in terms of military, 
the size of the military establishment.
    By using restraint, for example by agreeing to allow them 
to have 25 A-4B's in Argentina they are replacing two squadrons 
of Meteors of 50 aircraft.
    In Brazil, for example, we gave them 54 T-33's to replace 
50 plus 33 aircraft. They have smaller Air Forces.
    There is a human, psychological, political, internal 
problem that these governments have a deal with, just as you 
have a deal with who sits where around the table or who is 
where in the Pentagon. These problems are important to these 
people and, therefore, we move slowly to contract their 
expenditures on sophisticated types of equipment which, in our 
view, are unnecessary to the Latin Americans.
    The figures I wanted to give you, in Brazil, for example, 
in 1961, they had 165 combat aircraft. The 1967 figure shows 
122-165 down to 122.
    Argentina has reduced combat aircraft from 275 to 125 
combat aircraft.
    Bolivia, from 15 down to 8 in that period.
    Chile, from 57 to 48.
    Now, what we have is a case in which the old Mustang, the 
P-51, which used to be the airplane--well, when we finally sold 
these to Latin America, they kept them for a long time. And 
then they moved to the F-80, the F-86. They are now looking for 
the F-5, how long can we postpone the F-5? They do not need it 
at all.
    Senator Gore. Why does Chile need an F-5?
    Mr. McNaughton. Chile does not need an F-5.
    Senator Gore. Why does Argentina need one?
    Mr. McNaughton. Argentina does not need one. No one in 
Latin America needs one.
    Senator Gore. Why should we either give or sell them one?
    Mr. McNaughton. Because you have got the French, the 
British--Senator Hickenlooper's point, at some point when the 
F-5 is--their old equipment, in effect, has worn out, it 
becomes more expensive even to maintain the old equipment than 
to buy new, there will be a break point, and this could come in 
1969.
    Mr. McNaughton. Because you have got the French, the 
British--Senator Hickenlooper's point, at some when the F-5 
is--their old equipment, in effect, has worn out, it becomes 
more expensive even to maintain the old equipment then to buy 
new, there will be a break point, and this could come in 1969.
    Senator Lausche. If I may interrupt, the principle which 
Senator Gore is now enunciating, that is, why should we sell it 
to them, in trade with Red Russia, the proponents of trade 
argue that unless we engage in trade with them, other nations 
will, and that is about the same principle that you are up 
against.
    Mr. McNaughton. But not in Latin America. The Soviet 
problem is not a problem in Latin America.
    Senator Lausche. But if we do not help them along in this 
internal contest, they will go to France or they will go to the 
United Kingdom to acquire their planes.
    Mr. McNaughton. That is correct.
    Now, Frei in Chile obviously had a very serious problem, 
and he ended up having to decide that something of this nature 
had to be done, some sophisticated aircraft had to be 
purchased. His Air Force had to be upgraded to some extent in 
order to maintain the political fact of balance the way he 
would like it.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            PUBLIC HEARING ON MILITARY EXPORT SALES [P. 140]

    On the question of public hearings you, of course, should 
address this question to the Secretaries involved, but my own 
view is that it would be very difficult to answer the specific 
questions that come up as to why sales in this case, why not in 
that case. What were the other agreements that the country made 
that made this a more sensible deal than appears by just a 
transfer of arms, this sort of thing. This can hardly be done 
in public session without gravely injuring our relations with 
the countries involved.
    [Deleted.]
    Senator Gore. Aren't we?
    Mr. McNaugthon. We are in fact, but there is an explanation 
for it that cannot be given in public.
    What we are trying to do is to keep this Jordan separated 
from the Nasser group which is being, in effect, subsidized by 
the Soviets. We are trying to keep Jordan, which is trying to 
behave vis-a-vis Israel; we are trying to keep them from 
falling into the grasp of a Nasserite group and, therefore, we 
have to provide some arms to Jordan under various 
circumstances. Israel then finds herself surrounded by the 
Nasserite group, and, likewise, needs arms.
    Senator Gore. Meanwhile, Jordan will not cooperate in 
solving the Palestine refugee problem to which we have provided 
subsidy all these years. Jordan, has no prospect of ever 
becoming a viable economic state. It will be a permanent 
American subsidized entity.
    What is its justification?
    Mr. McNaughton. Do I gather that----
    Senator Lausche. May I interrupt here? I was in Israel in 
November of 1955. Please take this off the record.
    [Discussion off the record.]

                        MILITARY SALES BY RUSSIA

    Senator Lausche. Do you have full information to what 
extent Russia is selling military equipment to the different 
nations of the world?
    Mr. McNaughton. We have. I do not have it with me, Senator 
Lausche.
    Senator Lausche. But you have it?
    Mr. McNaughton. We have, I think, fairly reliable 
information on this.
    Senator Lausche. Is Russia restraining itself from selling 
to countries that want to buy from her?
    Mr. McNaughton. It is hard, just as it is difficult for the 
Senators to see from the data, that the United States is 
restraining itself, I cannot say that we can see from the 
evidence we have that Russia is restraining herself for 
political reasons.
    All we can see are the items that show up, and it runs into 
$2 billion just around the Mediterranean, the southern edges of 
the Mediterranean.
    Senator Lausche. It has been selling to Pakistan, has it 
not of late?
    Mr. McNaughton. I do not have information on that in my 
mind.
    Senator Lausche. Maybe I am confused.
    Mr. McNaughton. Let me check on that for you, Senator 
Lausche, on Pakistan.
    Senator Lausche. Ayub was talking about going to Russia, 
was he not?
    Mr. McNaughton. He was talking about going to China.
    Senator Lausche. China?
    Mr. McNaughton. We do have information of his getting 
equipment from China.
    Senator Lausche. You do not have to check it. My thought is 
that while we are reviewing the military equipment we are 
selling, we should also obtain detailed information about what 
Russia is doing.
    Mr. McNaughton. Senator Lausche, we could do that.
    Senator Lausche. I am talking about our committee.
    Mr. McNaughton. Not only Russia and China, but we would be 
glad to make available to you what we have on this.
    Senator Lausche. The issue is we do not sell whether 
someone else will.
    Mr. McNaughton. In some cases.
    Senator Lausche. In some cases others have sold.
    Mr. McNaughton. That is right.
    Senator Lausche. And they are prepared to sell?
    Mr. McNaughton. And in some cases we do not care, and in 
some cases we do.
    Now, the Pakistan case is a case of getting equipment from 
China, not from the Soviet Union.
    Senator Lausche. I see.
    Mr. McNaughton. One hundred and seventy medium tanks and 60 
MIG-19's from China to Pakistan.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


      EFFORTS AT BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS [P. 146]

    Mr. McNaughton. The second point I want to make, though, is 
one I think you might discuss with witnesses from State. Not 
this question about ACDA or State participation, but the 
question of whether any efforts have been made to get bilateral 
deals with the Soviets to cut out arms races.
    Senator Clark. I think you know that my interest in affairs 
of this kind. We have tried on one or two occasions to make 
some progress in having them stop these sales, and we stop the 
sales.
    They just get incredibly linked together, and they say, 
``Well, if you will take everything out of Turkey'', or 
something of that nature, and where our national interest 
cannot permit this to happen, so they become very, very 
difficult.
    Senator Clark. You agree this is a State Department and not 
a Defense Department responsibility to negotiate with the 
Russians?
    Mr. McNaughton. That is correct. But I made a statement in 
response to your statement that nothing has been done, and I 
want you to know that we have made efforts along this line, and 
the Committee might be interested in talking to State about it.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   COPRODUCTION ARRANGEMENTS [P. 146]

    Mr. McNaughton. I would like to confirm that this is the 
specific legislation which applies to Senator McCarthy's 
question, but I suspect that is the root of the authority from 
Congress.
    Senator McCarthy. It is probably right. [Deleted.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


      DEFENSE DEPARTMENT POLICY ON ARMS SALES AND GRANTS [P. 147]

    Mr. McNaughton. I am prepared to answer the question, 
Senator McCarthy. In cases in which we have given grant 
assistance, for example, Nationalist China, if we had given 
grant assistance, the country comes along, the time arrives, 
when we can shift the sales along the line that Senator 
Symington was talking about, then we maintain the same 
relationship that we had with that country but instead of 
granting equipment we sell equipment.
    This will begin to happen in Greece, perhaps soon. Maybe in 
3 or 4 years from now in Turkey; maybe some time in the future 
in Korea. It is already happening in the Republic of China; in 
Iran we see it happening.
    These are cases where this shift is taking place, and the 
last time I testified, Senator McCarthy, you will recall I 
pointed out that the total involved of the two is remaining 
about the same.
    Senator McCarthy. Well, he says this has to be maintained 
through the sales media.
    Now, couldn't we maintain these if we simply granted the 
arms to them?
    Mr. McNaughton. Certainly.
    Senator McCarthy. Why does he say you have to do it through 
the sales media?
    Mr. McNaughton. Because we assume that the grants will be 
reduced as the countries become more able to pay for what they 
use.
    Senator McCarthy. We might be better off giving granting 
them. This makes a formal commitment. Where would Nationalist 
China go, for example, if we did not maintain this 
relationship? Through the sales media? It is just a kind of a 
wild statement, it seems to me, that does not stand up under 
any kind of testing.
    Mr. McNaughton. I can tell you where China would go, 
Senator McCarthy. They would dig down into their socks and take 
it out of their development program.
    Senator McCarthy. I am talking about Nationalist China.
    Mr. McNaughton. I am talking about that.
    Senator Gore (presiding). What would be wrong with that?
    Mr. McNaughton. Because we are interested in the economic 
development of Nationalist China. This is an argument against 
buying more.
    Senator McCarthy. If they are going to buy it from somebody 
else or not from us----
    Mr. McNaughton. Or anybody.
    Senator McCarthy. Anybody.
    Mr. McNaughton. This is one reason why in Nationalist China 
we do not insist that the whole program be sales, Mr. Chairman.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


             PUBLIC HEARINGS ON ARMS SALES PROGRAM [P. 148]

    Senator Gore. The Secretary expressed the view from his 
standpoint it would be inadvisable for the Executive Department 
to testify publically on many matters. I take it that if the 
full committee, insisted upon a public hearing, this would be a 
matter which would address itself to your superiors and, 
perhaps, even to the President.
    Mr. McNaughton. I would think so, Mr. Chairman. I hope you 
would consider very seriously the impact on our relations with 
every country mentioned today if the whole--the deals that had 
to be arranged in each of these cases, which almost necessarily 
would have to be surfaced to give the full picture in each 
case, were brought out in public session or if a person had to 
take the Fifth, so to speak, with respect to half of each of 
these pictures, because the inferences could be drawn from that 
as well, I just hope you consider this, Mr. Chairman, before 
you make this recommendation.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                ARMS SUPPLIES TO RIVAL NATIONS [P. 149]

    Senator McCarthy. What really saved us in India and 
Pakistan is that the British were supplying most of the Indian 
equipment and we were supplying arms to Pakistan. We did not 
have to prove our superiority or they prove theirs over ours. 
But if you had had Russian equipment in India and American 
equipment in Pakistan, we would have said we have got to test 
our equipment, we have got to prove our weapons are better than 
theirs.
    I think the British claimed their Centurion tank did prove 
to be better than our tanks in the India-Pakistan War.
    Our explanation, I understand, was that the British tank 
crews were better trained. But if it had been Russian equipment 
against American equipment, you would have had a hard time 
settling it.
    So now you get this thing up. I think you are better off if 
Morocco and Algeria both were supplied by the French, or by the 
Russians, or maybe both supplied by the United States, so we do 
not have to prove anything if there is a border incident 
between Algeria and Morocco. But we are giving airplanes and 
tanks and American equipment right there today, so when the 
test comes who is going to prove out to be, to have, the better 
equipment or the better ally.
    The test is going to be between the Centurions and the 
Pattons.
    The Defense Department seems to feel this is all good. With 
this policy we have political control, they say. And without 
it, we would lose everything.
    Mr. McNaughton. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make clear 
for the record that I disagree with Senator McCarthy's 
interpretation of the defense Department's position----
    Senator McCarthy. I just read it.
    Mr. McNaughton. I am shocked at the suggestion that we 
would encourage a war to test equipment.
    Senator McCarthy. I did not say a war.
    Mr. McNaughton. Or a continuation of a war.
    Senator McCarthy. I did not say a war.
    Mr. McNaughton. In order to prove our equipment is better 
than someone else's.
    Senator McCarthy. I did not say that. I said there is a 
temptation to do it. It would be much harder to draw off.
    Mr. McNaughton. I am shocked at the suggestion that we 
would be tempted to encourage a war or continue a war.
    Senator McCarthy. I did not say we would. I said we would 
be tempted to prolong it in order to prove the superiority of 
weapons and even to test them.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Gore. I suggested a few days ago that in my view 
you would not succeed in persuading the Russians to limit the 
deployment of defensive systems so long as we were rattling our 
offensive missiles and bragging about having superiority.
    It seems to me if we are going to succeed in preventing 
this intensification of the arms race we must negotiate some 
modification of our own offensive stockpile; that offensive and 
defensive measure must be taken together.
    To what extent this can be accomplished, I do not know. But 
I personally welcome this response from the Soviets that I just 
read off the record. I want to say that.
    [Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., subcommittee adjourned.]


        POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS

                              ----------                              


                         Friday, March 3, 1967

                               U.S. SENATE,
                        Subcommittee on Disarmament
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Gore, Fulbright, Mansfield, Lausche, 
Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, 
and Cooper.
    Also present: Senator McGee.
    Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee staff.
    [This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for 
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions 
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the 
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the 
published hearings.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY 
ADRIAN S. FISHER, ACTING DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 
AGENCY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    SERIOUS THOUGHT NOT GIVEN TO A NONPROLIFERATION TREATY [P. 152]

    Now that we are getting to a point where there might be a 
treaty, they are having to face the fact that they may be 
expected to close off the nuclear option by formal treaty 
indefinitely into the future and, therefore, some of the 
misgivings which we might have known about earlier are now 
coming to the surface, because this is a major step for certain 
countries in certain situations, and in this regard I would 
refer to India, for example.
    Here is a country looking across the mountains on Mainland 
China, which is building nuclear weapons, and so the Indian 
Government recognizes that this step would be for it a very 
major and important decision.
    We think it will make the decision in favor of the 
nonproliferation. I do not think we ought to underestimate the 
importance of it to them.
    So it is not, I think, surprising that, when you get up to 
the hurdle, there is some hesitancy about taking the hurdle. We 
saw that in a minor way in the Latin American discussions of 
the Latin American nuclear-free zone. When they finally got up 
to the point of say, ``Let us put it on paper and signing it,'' 
then there were two or three countries that just were not sure 
they wanted to close off this option indefinitely into the 
future. They all did, but it was an illustration here in this 
hemisphere of a phenomenon that is going to be observable in 
other parts of the world.

          POSSIBLE PEACEFUL APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES

    A second point has been the reluctance of some governments 
to forgo the possible peaceful application of nuclear 
explosives. Let us put aside for the moment whether in some 
cases this might be a pretext rather than a reason, and accept 
the fact that there is a valid concern about being denied the 
possibilities of the use of peaceful explosions for peaceful 
purposes, for civilian purposes, indefinitely into the future.
    Senator Aiken. May I ask you: Is that covered in the Inter-
American Agreement?
    Secretary Rusk. It was quite frankly not covered fully to 
our own satisfaction because in the Inter-American Treaty they 
did have some language which seemed to say if peaceful 
explosions can be developed in a way that does not produce 
weapons through some technical advances in the future, we do 
not wish to close off that option.
    In the present state of the art, we do not see that 
distinction coming along. But I would like to emphasize that, 
as we see this problem, peaceful explosions are, in fact, 
weapons, and explosions that can dig a harbor can destroy a 
city. So we do not see how you can stop proliferation by 
leaving open the possibility of developing explosive 
capabilities for engineering and civil purposes.
    The state of the art theoretically, I suppose, could change 
some time where there might be certain types of explosions that 
would not have anything to do with weapons, but we do not see 
it at the present time. So we feel that we cannot except 
peaceful explosions from such a treaty.
    However, this is a valid interest on the part of a good 
many countries. We ourselves, as you know, are contemplating 
the possibility of using such explosion for an Isthmian Canal.
    It might well be that a country like Mauritania might wish 
to have a harbor dug. It is short of a good harbor. It may be 
that a good many things in many parts of the world might happen 
in this connection.
    We have discussed with the Soviet Union and with a good 
many other governments, the possibility of trying to make some 
international arrangement under which existing nuclear powers 
could furnish the services of a nuclear peaceful explosion in 
situations where it would be feasible from an engineering point 
of view-but to do that either through IAEA in Vienna, or 
perhaps, through the Security Council of the United Nations, or 
through some other international arrangement, which would make 
it possible for us to say to the non-nuclear countries around 
the world, ``If the time comes when you need an explosion for 
peaceful purposes, we would ensure that you have this service 
available to you.'' That is what we would like to do.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


          TECHNOLOGICAL SPINOFF FROM THE WEAPONS FIELD [P.154]

    Senator Rusk. Those of you on the Joint Committee, I think, 
would probably agree with that. The gadgetry of weapons 
introduces very little into industry as such, and has any 
peaceful or industrial or commercial application. So that we 
think that that is a concern that can be met on the merits, and 
the German attitude seems to be reasonably relaxed on that at 
the present time and in the light of technical explanations, 
which have been provided.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


          PROBLEM OF SAFEGUARDS PROVISIONS IN TREATY [P. 154]

    Secretary Rusk. There is a major complication at the moment 
in Euratom because Euratom has set up its own safeguards. Those 
safeguards are, from a technical point of view, comparable to 
the IAEA safeguards and, from the point of view of inspection 
alone, would be satisfactory.
    But the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, for example, and 
possibly some others, take the view that inspection of allies 
by allies is not adequate and, therefore, there ought to be 
more general international safeguards in order that all could 
have equal assurances about the non-use of these materials for 
weapons purposes.
    The Euratom countries are divided on this at the present 
time. It is now being studied in Euratom, and they will be 
having discussion of this at a ministerial level, I understand, 
later this month.
    There are two or three possibilities in which this matter 
might be solved. One would be for the IAEA to put in effect a 
Good Housekeeping stamp of approval on the Euratom safeguards.
    Another might be for the IAEA to safeguard the safeguard 
system, to test it periodically to be sure that the Euratom 
safeguards are working adequately.
    A third might be for the members of Euratom to approach 
this from a national point of view, rather than from a group 
point of view, and each one of them, the non-nuclears--this 
would exclude France--the non-nuclears to say, ``Well, we are 
in Euratom, but where there is a Euratom facility in my country 
we will accept the IAEA safeguards for that facility,'' even 
though there may not be unanimity in Euratom itself.
    Now, we do not exclude the possibility that France will 
vote with the others and accept IAEA safeguards in Euratom, but 
if France does not there still is that possibility.
    I would like to raise with the committee for thought, and I 
will be doing it also with the joint committee, one point that 
could make some difference in the attitude of other governments 
in this matter because there is a sense of discrimination if 
the IAEA safeguards are to be applied solely to the non-nuclear 
countries.
    Now, if we, for example, were in a position to say that we 
ourselves will accept IAEA safeguards on the peaceful uses 
installations in our country, this could relieve the political 
situation considerably with respect to this sense of 
discrimination, and it might encourage some of the others to 
move more forthrightly in this field.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Our only trouble there would be 
inspection, would it not? Do we consider our safeguards more 
stringent than those of IAEA, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency?
    Secretary Rusk. Nevertheless, if IAEA had access to all of 
our peaceful uses installations----
    Senator Hickenlooper. I say that is the trouble, which is 
inspection. There is the access.
    Secretary Rusk. My understanding of the IAEA safeguards is 
that they are so constructed as not to get into such things as 
industrial secrets. Our Atomic Energy Commission has no 
difficulty with this so far as our peaceful installations are 
concerned. Now, weapons installations would be another matter.
    But we will go into that in some detail because it has some 
technical aspects. But my understanding is that the character 
of the safeguards is such that you apply them at a critical 
point to determine what is being done, and you do not have to 
get into the question of how it is being done from a 
technical----
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think there are some technical 
difficulties if we do get into industrial operations that 
violate the rules.
    Secretary Rusk. I will get Dr. Seaborg and others to 
consult.
    Senator Gore. In any event, the existence of the IAEA is, 
despite its limitations, a definite plus. We have something 
agreed upon with which to start.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Now, it is most unlikely that the Soviet Union would accept 
IAEA safeguards instead of its own country, or that France 
would accept it. Britain has a special problem and, perhaps, 
this could be left off the tape for just a moment.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Secretary Rusk. The Soviet Union would be prepared to see a 
treaty go forward without a safeguards article.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I make a respectful 
suggestion that the Secretary complete his statement before we 
question him, if possible, so that we will be sure we can all 
be here.
    Senator Gore. The Chair thinks it is a very pertinent 
suggestion and agrees with it. Is there objection on the part 
of the committee?
    Proceed, Mr. Secretary.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, my remarks are quite informal at this 
point, Mr. Chairman. I will bring them to a conclusion on this 
matter of the nonproliferation treaty.
    I was just saying that the Soviet Union would probably 
accept a treaty without a safeguards provision.
    We feel that a safeguards provision is very important, and 
we understand that the committees here in the Senate feel that 
it is very important, so we have a good deal of work to do 
still on that point.

          EFFECT OF TREATY ON POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF EUROPE

    On another subject, which is potentially a source of very 
great difficulty, is the effect of a nonproliferation treaty on 
the political unification of Europe. Now, this involves a 
matter which we have been talking with the Soviets about for 
literally four or five years.
    It has to do with political arrangements in Western Europe 
that may or may not have anything to do with the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. I think our friends in Western Europe would 
be unwilling to sign a proliferation treaty which barred the 
possibility of a political unification of, say, the six states 
now in the present EEC.
    We ourselves do not wish to bar European unity through such 
a treaty.
    Senator Lausche. Who does?
    Secretary Rusk. But the attitude of the Soviet Union is 
likely to be very severe on this point.
    Looking at it from their point of view, they would say, 
``Look, how do you expect us to accept the notion of a 
politically-unified Europe in which there would be Germans and 
the Unified Europe would be a nuclear power by succession,'' 
say, from France or France and Britain if Britain is a part of 
it by that time?
    This is a very serious question, and one that we are likely 
to have to face fairly soon now because we are getting to the 
point of making clear what our respective interpretations are 
on the language which your subcommittee has already had, if, 
indeed, that language survives the present discussion, that is, 
the present international discussion.
    There are theoretically two or three ways of dealing with 
this. One would be to say if you do not have a common 
interpretation on so fundamental a point, then you go back to 
the drawing board because you have not had a sufficient meeting 
of the minds to claim that you have a treaty.
    A second would be for us and other signatories to make 
clear our own interpretation of that point publicly, as we 
would in any event have to do in presenting such a treaty, say, 
to the Senate, and then hope that the Russians would at least 
be silent. We do not know whether they would be silent or 
whether that would be a satisfactory solution, but it is this 
point which we have had in mind when we have said to you and to 
our allies that we do not have an agreement with the Soviet 
Union yet on the text of a nonproliferation treaty, because the 
words which you have in front of you, perhaps, conceal the 
possibility of a basic misunderstanding of what the words mean.
    Now, it is true that political unity of Europe is some 
distance off, at best. It is possible that it may never come 
into existence for other reasons entirely. It seems at this 
stage to be a rather hypothetical obstacle, but we may be faced 
with the problem: Do you have a treaty if the words can be 
agreed at a time when beneath the surface there is a major 
difference of interpretation by at least a number of the 
principal signatories?
    I do not want to minimize the difficulty of that problem, 
and I do not want to pretend that we can see any answer at the 
present time until we explore further what the Soviet attitude 
on that point is likely to be. If they are willing to gamble, 
this is a hypothetical question long in the future, and sign 
the treaty with the full knowledge of the interpretation which 
the rest of us put on it, this point, then there may be no 
great difficulty.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


             ASSURANCES AGAINST NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL [P. 155]

    Secretary Rusk. A further point that has come into the 
discussion is the question of assurances, assurances to non-
nuclear countries who may think they will be subject to nuclear 
blackmail. This is not so much a problem with those who are 
allied, say, with the United States, countries like Japan or 
our NATO allies. It is more of a problem with countries who do 
not have such an alliance, such as India living next door to a 
nuclear China.
    This is very troublesome because for us to give anyone, for 
example, the kind of assurances which might give them complete 
comfort would involve a very far reaching extension of American 
commitments. It could only be done by a treaty, and it would 
have to be done almost on the NATO formula, that an attack on 
one is an attack on all.
    If a country like India is to feel that it is the 
beneficiary of ironclad guarantees--and I am not at all sure 
that we ourselves want to entertain the idea--that if there is 
to be a nuclear exchange anywhere, from anywhere in the world, 
that we insist on being a part of it.
    So, this is a major problem, and it may be the key question 
upon which the Indian decision would be made as to whether or 
not to sign.
    I do not want to suggest to this committee that we ought to 
go racing down the track of providing these assurances to 
individual countries in connection with a nonproliferation 
treaty, but it is something which is very much worth 
considering, very much worth consideration.

                     REVIEW AND AMENDMENT OF TREATY

    On the question of review and amendment, the duration of a 
treaty is a matter that has been discussed. I believe you, Mr. 
Chairman, have suggested a possible ten-year duration clause. 
There have been suggestions from other quarters that there 
might be a five-year duration clause.
    One of the advantages of a shorter term--that is, some term 
such as five or ten years--would be that it would tend to 
eliminate certain of these hypothetical problems such as what 
do you do about explosions for peaceful purposes; what do you 
do about the European unity clause, and things of that sort.
    But, on the other hand, if there is a termination date 
there is considerable prospect that a number of countries would 
race during that period--perhaps I could amend this language on 
the tape--race during that period to become eight months 
pregnant, and that you then might find that at the end of that 
period you would have an epidemic of nuclear powers, new 
nuclear powers, arriving on the scene. So, it is a troublesome 
question.
    It seems to me that there will be some advantages in our 
having an open-ended treaty subject to periodic review. In the 
present text we are talking about a review every five years. 
But it may be difficult to achieve a permanent treaty, and at 
some stage we may have to come back and discuss with you 
whether it is better to have a treaty for a period of years 
than no treaty at all, given the attitudes of a considerable 
variety of governments on this subject.
    At the present time, the momentum is toward a permanent 
treaty, but there are one or two problems that do point back to 
the possibility of, to the possible desirability of, a shorter 
term treaty.
    We will ourselves favor an open-ended treaty as far as time 
is concerned.
    Mr. Chairman, those are the key issues that are under 
discussion at the present time.

                       PROCEDURES OF DISCUSSIONS

    Procedurally, we are now discussing these matters closely 
with our allies. We should hope during the course of the next 
two to three weeks to bring those allied discussions to a 
conclusion soon, test the allied interpretation of this 
language with the Soviet Union, and then table, if possible, a 
treaty in Geneva for the consideration of the Geneva 
Conference, and then submission to other governments.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


        ABM MATTER TIED IN WITH NONPROLIFERATION TREATY [P. 157]

    Senator Rusk. You know that the President yesterday 
announced that he had received from Mr. Kosygin a letter which 
said that the Soviet Union is prepared to discuss both 
offensive and defensive nuclear weapons, and was prepared to 
enter into negotiations with us to see whether steps of 
disarmament could be taken in both fields.
    There was no detail in the letter. It is our impression 
that the Soviet Union is working on these matters within its 
own structure. It, too, may have some interdepartmental 
negotiations underway on this, and that they are in the process 
of preparing a position on which they would enter into any 
detailed discussions with us.
    But we do have some impressions, not spelled out in Mr. 
Kosygin's letter which was very short, and said, ``We are ready 
to have discussions,'' not spelled out in his letter but 
nevertheless a present picture.
    You remember they rejected the notion of a freeze on 
offensive and defensive weapons which we proposed in Geneva 
last year.
    I suppose the reason they rejected the freeze was because 
they considered the existing situation unfavorable to them. 
They, at the present time, seem to make it clear that they are 
not interested in talking about freezes, but in mutual 
limitations to an agreed level on both sides.
    It is my impression--although we have no specific proof of 
this--that they would expect numerical equivalence between the 
Soviet Union and the United States in such negotiations. That 
is a pretty difficult and complicated thing for us to accept or 
to bring about or to inspect because if you get into the 
questions of that sort, you get into questions of what kinds of 
warheads, what kinds of megatonnage, what kinds of deliveries, 
what types of missiles, a great deal of fine print which is 
almost impossible to monitor in any event inside of a society 
which does not accept inspection.
    So that I do not want to leave any false optimism before 
the committee on this matter.
    We are encouraged to know that they are prepared seriously 
to discuss the matter, and we will be discussing it with them. 
But we do not have any reason at this point to suppose they 
will think about it in terms of a freeze, nor do we have any 
clear indication as to what they would do about the ABM's which 
they have already deployed in the Soviet Union, in the Moscow 
area.
    So all that I can report on this point is that they have 
agreed to talk in a more systematic and official way than had 
been communicated to us earlier.
    They have asked us to make any further proposals that we 
might have on this matter, and those are being now prepared in 
the executive branch.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF OUR STOCKPILE [P. 158]

    Senator Gore. It seems to me that with the superiority 
which we have publicly asserted, which may be more apparent 
than real, it would be unrealistic to expect the Soviets to 
agree to stop their defensive buildup. The first question I 
would like to ask you relates to the public disclosure of our 
stockpile.
    We have been informed in the committee that megaton-wise 
the stockpile vis-a-vis the US and the USSR is roughly equal. 
In the number of warheads and missiles we have about a three or 
three and a half to one superiority. Secretary McNamara has 
publicly announced our stockpile of missiles.
    I can understand he thought he would impress the Soviets 
that no matter how much they deployed a defensive system our 
missile offensive stockpile was so great that their defense 
would be overwhelmed.
    But, on the other hand, it seems to me that this gives a 
weapon to the Soviet military to insist upon a defense because 
we are waving our bombs and bragging about our superiority.
    I wonder if you would give us your views with respect to 
that.
    Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, that in the course of NATO 
discussions it was felt necessary to go into these matters in 
considerable detail with our allies, and under those 
circumstances the matter of--these things do tend to become 
public in general orders of magnitude.
    We have no doubt that the Soviet Union has known for a long 
time the general order of magnitude of our stockpiles and our 
weapons situation, and the fact that they have added certain 
new information-gathering techniques, with which members of the 
committee are familiar--some which we also have--we do not 
think that this is a matter of disclosing information to the 
Soviet Union, but rather telling our own people and other 
peoples in the alliances the approximate situation. I doubt 
that that would influence very seriously the actual negotiating 
position because they know that.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


DECISION TO DEPLOY ARMS DEFERRED UNTIL FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS 
                                [P. 160]

    Senator Gore. I seem to detect from your statements this 
morning that the essence of the Administration decision now is 
to perhaps defer a decision to proceed with deployment. I have 
understood Secretary McNamara to be in opposition to deployment 
even though the Soviets did not agree. Has the administration 
reached a decision in that regard?
    Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, that, as you know, there are 
substantial funds in the present budget for continuing with an 
active research and development program for ABM's, but no final 
decision has been taken with respect to deployment until we can 
test a little more fully the possibilities of some agreement 
with the Soviet Union.
    I would not want to leave the impression that a final 
decision has been made that come what may we should not deploy 
anything. It may well be that in any event certain light 
deployments may be felt required, for example, to protect the 
strategic strike force and to maintain its deterrent 
capability. But those are matters on which the executive and 
the appropriate committee of Congress will be in full touch 
with each other.
    I think what has been done thus far is to defer a final 
decision on that point until we can find out where we are in 
our discussions in this matter with the Soviet Union.
    Senator Gore. Senator Fulbright.
    Senator Fulbright. Mr. Secretary, I think it has been a 
very interesting statement. I will ask a few questions 
pertinent to this matter.
    I understood from our briefings with the CIA and the 
military that there is some difference of opinion about the 
character and effectiveness of the ABM system around Moscow. 
The CIA gave me the impression they did not think anything very 
serious--that it was not very advanced, and that they doubted 
its effectiveness. Do you have any view about this?
    Secretary Rusk. My own impression, and I do not have the 
exact technical reports in front of me, is that as far as the 
Moscow system is concerned, it is a first generation system 
which is likely to become operational within the next year or 
two and that there is no doubt among the different members of 
the intelligence community that this is an ABM system.
    There are some other installations in other parts of the 
Soviet Union about which there is some discussion as to whether 
those are, in fact, serious ABM systems, or whether they are an 
antiaircraft or other type system.
    Senator Fulbright. That is right. I understood that, too. 
But even as to the Moscow one, I gathered from Mr. Helms he was 
not too upset. He left the impression with me it was a 
difference in view as to its importance between him and the 
military, and it could be, it is kind of a utilitarian concept 
around Moscow, it could be very effective or effective against 
planes but also has some capability against missiles, but they 
were not too excited about it in contrast to the military.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


      DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ABROAD
                                [P. 161]

    Senator Fulbright. In addition to that, you might give us 
information--if you do not have it immediately, perhaps, you 
could supply it for the record--on the CIA, and AID, State 
Department, Agriculture, Labor employees abroad. In other 
words, I think it is significant if there is going to be any 
agreement either on ABM or nonproliferation or almost any field 
that the Russians feel there is some degree of equivalence. We 
must realize that they are not going to sign an agreement if 
they think we have an insurmountable advantage. Do you agree 
with that on principle?
    Secretary Rusk. I think that is probably correct, Mr. 
Chairman. I think that there is another possibility. Let me 
contrast two situations.
    Senator Fulbright. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. The one would be a formal agreement signed 
by the two sides on this question. That is going to be 
extremely difficult and complicated, in my judgment, because 
that sort of an agreement has to be written against the 
prospect of violation, and the fine print becomes extremely 
complicated, and we run into the difficulty of inspection 
straight away.
    It is not inconceivable that there is an alternative, and 
that is we both proceed by mutual example, with neither side 
giving up its freedom of action, but each side acting in 
relation to what the other side is doing.
    Now, we did that during a period of about two years on the 
Defense budgets until the situation in the Far East brought 
that process----
    Senator Fulbright. And you were making some progress.
    Secretary Rusk. We were making some progress on that.
    Senator Fulbright. I am inclined to think for the 
preliminary stages this is the area where you are most likely 
to make progress.
    Secretary Rusk. In view of the capabilities of both sides 
to keep a general eye on the situation, something like a mutual 
example may be a way to get started. But I do not want to 
prejudge the results. If we can work out something with the 
Soviet Union, maybe it should be more precise.
    Senator Fulbright. I understand.
    I wonder if you would undertake to do what the military has 
already done, to give the committee an estimate of the number 
of persons included in these activities abroad in all of these 
fields. Is there any reason why you cannot say how many CIA 
agents we have abroad?
    Secretary Rusk. There is some problem on that.
    Senator Fulbright. Even in view of the revelations that 
have been made recently?
    Secretary Rusk Yes. [deleted]
    Senator Fulbright. Well, I will abide by your judgment.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY [P. 163]

    Secretary Rusk. Well I think you are right, Mr. Chairman. 
On the nonproliferation matter, for example, the IAEA ought to 
play a major role in regard to safeguards, perhaps in regard to 
the provision of explosions for peaceful purposes.
    Whether the Eastern Europeans would cooperate on a basis 
that would be generally acceptable--in other words, what would 
they do about a veto. We do not know what that would do. We are 
prepared to go a long way in this ourselves.
    Senator Fulbright. For example, when you were speaking of 
the blackmail problem, of what a terrible problem it was, and I 
agree with you, I would certainly hesitate about the United 
States unilaterally making any assurances on protection, 
because this, in a sense, puts you up as a kind of antagonist 
to the Soviet Union. It seems to me in this case that some 
utilization of the U.N., an agency in which both the U.S.S.R. 
and the United States are influential members, will be 
required. I do not see how you are going to get around those 
very dilemmas you already mentioned if you do not utilize some 
form of international machinery.
    I was told in Sweden that there was very strong feeling 
about this proliferation treaty.
    There would be some public feeling against an agreement in 
which the nuclear countries maintain their status quo. They 
want an agreement, but they want us and the Soviet Union to at 
least make some undertaking for the gradual transfer of 
responsibility to an international organization.
    Secretary Rusk. That is, to me, a reasonable attitude on 
the part of a good many non-nuclear countries. It is a very 
hard objective to achieve.
    Senator Fulbright. Very.
    Secretary Rusk. And, therefore, the question is do you wait 
until the nuclear powers find some way to begin some nuclear 
disarmament before you try for a nonproliferation treaty. What 
we have tried to do with that, Mr. Chairman, we are trying to 
take that problem somewhat into account in a preambular 
declaration in which we all repeat the commitments we have made 
to make the effort, in the United Nations resolutions and 
elsewhere, and we will be sure that you have, if you do not 
already have, the text on it. We are trying to work something 
out on that. This is a reasonable concern of the non-nuclear 
countries.
    Senator Fulbright. It seemed so to me and being reasonable 
they are in a position to thwart us if we do not make a gesture 
by simply not signing. There is no way for us to make a country 
like Sweden sign if we do not do something in this case.
    Secretary Rusk. You remember in the case of Sweden, Mr. 
Chairman, when they signed the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty they 
reserved the right to have nuclear weapons in the future. In 
other words, they said, ``We won't test, but we want the 
right''----
    Senator Gore. Who said that?
    Secretary Rusk. Sweden.
    Senator Fulbright. They are capable of making it, too. They 
are very ingenious people.
    Secretary Rusk. I am not sure whether it is a completely 
real argument on their part. It is a good idea, but I am not 
sure it is a real argument or a little defensive apparatus as 
they come up to the hurdle of making a final commitment that 
they won't go nuclear. I am just not sure in their particular 
case.
    Senator Fulbright. I imagine others though--you already 
mentioned the Indians--have the same, but I expect they are not 
unique among the non-nuclear powers, are they, in this 
attitude?
    Secretary Rusk. I think that is correct.
    Senator Fulbright. I was told that several others had 
exactly the same view.
    I do not wish to occupy the time, although there are many 
other aspects of it that I am sure can be discussed.
    In conclusion, I do want to urge you to use all the 
ingenuity you can, to determine whether some kind of 
international organization could participate; perhaps a new 
committee, within the U.N. in which the U.S.S.R. and ourselves 
can have confidence. I can understand the difficulty of 
involving too many countries and the difficulties that have 
resulted from such large membership. But surely some devices 
within that organization can be developed in which there is not 
that problem, to which some of these functions can be given.
    I really do not see any alternative to it. I cannot imagine 
that the rest of the world will sit by idly, and even if the 
Russians are not disposed to agree with us entirely at the 
moment, they appear to be coming along.
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that the 
subcommittee has been told, and I may have to take this off the 
record when the time comes, the Soviets have agreed to hold 
technical talks with us on PLOWSHARE type activities.
    Senator Gore. At Geneva?
    Secretary Rusk. Bilaterally, and we would hope that, 
perhaps, this might be an additional way in which we could get 
into the question of how they and we, and maybe Britain, could 
provide PLOWSHARE type services to--
    Senator Fulbright. Jointly.
    Secretary Rusk. Through non-nuclear countries, jointly, 
through some joint arrangement.
    Senator Fulbright. I would urge you to go as fast as you 
can in this direction, with the least important and least 
difficult step to begin with, if there is one. I had the same 
thought about the importance of the Antarctic Treaty, not that 
it in itself solved a lot, but a start in the right direction 
was made, and I hope we will do something in this case.
    Senator Gore. Senator Hickenlooper.

                 HAVE SOVIETS EVER MADE ANY CONCESSIONS

    Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, do you know of any 
time in recent history that the Soviets have agreed to anything 
that in any way stood in the way of their advancing to at least 
full equality or superiority over the United States? In other 
words, have they made any real concessions of any kind? I am 
not talking superficially.
    Secretary Rusk. No, I understand, Senator. It was the 
judgment of our experts at the time that the conclusion of the 
atmospheric test ban treaty would, in fact, work to our 
advantage relatively. Now, that is an arguable and debatable 
point.
    Senator Hickenlooper. It is so far as I am concerned.
    Secretary Rusk. But this was the view that we had in front 
of us at the time.
    I think, broadly speaking, the answer to your question is, 
No.
    Senator Symington. What was the question?
    Senator Hickenlooper. It was a rather long-winded and 
complicated question, and I do not know that I can repeat it, 
but I will try to.
    Senator Symington. I would appreciate that. I could not 
hear you.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I asked the Secretary if he knew of 
any occasion in recent history, since the Soviet Union has come 
to major world power, when they have made any concessions of 
any kind other than superficial ones for incidental 
accommodations, where they in any way impaired their ability to 
at least come equal, or superior, to the United States in 
various major fields.
    I understood his answer to be in the main, no, with the 
exception of the Test Ban Treaty, and I have argued that point 
with him. I do not quite agree with the fact that it was of any 
advantage to us.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   REASONABLE PARITY ASSUMED [P. 165]

    Secretary Rusk. We would have great difficulty in accepting 
arrangements which we felt were putting us at a disadvantage. 
What we are trying to work on in these matters--and differences 
of views can differ on it--is to try to get some sort of 
ceiling and downward turn in the arms race in a way that does 
not change the relative position of either side.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


        EFFECT OF BOMBING PAUSES ON NEGOTIATION EFFORTS [P. 166]

    Secretary Rusk. We sent the North Vietnamese a message 
which was returned to our embassy on the first day as though it 
were unopened. On the first day Peking said that even if we 
stopped bombing there would be no negotiations. I happened to 
be in Vienna with Mr. Gromyko at the tenth anniversary of the 
Austrian State Treaty on the third day of that suspension and 
he told me that the pause was an insult, that it was an 
ultimatum.
    So that was our experience at that particular time. We did 
send the other side a message, which was returned to us, trying 
to elicit some response from them.
    Senator Lausche. Well, then the pause was intended 
definitely to lead toward an understanding that we would go to 
the negotiating table.
    Secretary Rusk. That was the hope at the time.
    Senator Lausche. And there were communications between the 
two countries in which North Vietnam completely rejected the 
efforts which we made.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir, they returned the communication.
    Senator Lausche. Now, they returned it without opening it.
    Secretary Rusk. I have no doubt they took off a copy before 
they sent it back, but they gave it back to us in the same form 
in which we had given it to them, sealed in the envelope.
    Senator Lausche. Am I correct that in the beginning of 1966 
there were 37 days of cessation?
    Secretary Rusk. Running from Christmas, 1965, through----
    Senator Pell. Will the Senator yield for a moment on this?
    Senator Lausche. Yes.
    Senator Pell. There is one further point, and, as you know, 
I have been very reticent of any discussion of this subject. 
But it has since come out in the press; and that is in 
connection with the '65 short cessation. I think the record 
should show, because as I say it has been in the press, that 
there was a communication, it may have been meaningless--the 
Secretary and I have discussed this privately--it may not have 
been meaningless, but there was a communication from the North 
Vietnamese Government at the end of that cessation of bombing 
period, would that not be correct?
    Secretary Rusk. In the five day?
    Senator Pell. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. No.
    Senator Pell. In Paris.
    Secretary Rusk. Are you not perhaps thinking of the 37 day?
    Senator Pell. No, I am thinking of the five-day period in 
Paris when it was in the press afterward. I have never said 
anything about it, but I read it in the press later.
    Secretary Rusk. I know of the discussion of this subject in 
connection with the 37-day suspension, but I do not recall that 
this happened in the five and a half day. I will look this up.
    Senator Pell. We had phone conversations, one phone 
conversation or two, and the question was the communication at 
the end of the period which came a few hours before the end of 
the cessation of its bombing, which was resumed by the time we 
got it. It had already resumed, but we were concerned about 
this matter. I have never discussed this matter.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, let me check back on this. I think 
we are talking about two different pauses.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


             HO CHI MINH COMMUNICATION TO THE POPE [P. 167]

    Senator Lausche. Was there anything essentially significant 
that happened with respect to this last stoppage, and that is 
by way of a statement made by the ambassador of North Vietnam 
to France, and a communication sent by Ho Chi Minh to the Pope.
    Secretary Rusk. That came at the end of this period of six 
days. You recall, Senator, that the two countries who are the 
co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference were then in conference in 
London; Mr. Kosygin was there with Prime Minister Wilson, and 
they took certain initiatives, communicating with the parties 
to see if they could move the situation off center, but without 
success. The Hanoi response was as contained in President Ho 
Chi Minh's message to the Pope on February 13, and I will be 
glad to put the text of that in the record if the Senator 
wishes.

               DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN ABM SYSTEM [P. 169]

    Senator Williams. If we decide to deploy them, how long 
would it take us to get them actually installed?
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Fisher tells me--I am not familiar with 
this point myself--that to deploy these missiles in suitable 
arrays, with all the facilities that would go with them, would 
require four to five years.
    Senator Williams. What I was trying to determine is, how 
far ahead in deployment are the Russians at this point, two or 
three years?
    Mr. Fisher. My understanding, Senator Williams, is they 
have about a year to go before the initial operational 
capability of a limited system around Moscow. There is 
considerable argument what the other systems are. They have 
about a year to go around Moscow. We have four to five to go 
before our system would reach an operational capacity. That 
would put them three or four ahead of us with the qualification 
on it that the system around Moscow is not considered effective 
against the totality of U.S. missiles. It does not provide 
adequate radar coverage to protect against POLARIS missiles, 
and that automatically starts an argument in the intelligence 
community of what have they done it for if it is not any good, 
but there is an understanding that it would not be effective 
against POLARIS missiles because the radar coverage now 
existing just does not cover certain segments from which 
POLARIS missiles will come.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


          REPORTS OF U.S. ``CRISIS'' FOR WEST GERMANY [P. 175]

    Secretary Rusk. Senator Symington, I think the committee 
should know from the beginning of the Geneva Conference we have 
had the most intimate consultation among the four NATO members 
who are part of that conference, plus the German liaison 
representative who is present in Geneva, that this matter has 
been discussed frequently in NATO itself, and that at the 
present time we are consulting with our allies before there is 
an agreement with the Soviet Union.
    Now some of our allies doubt what I just said. Some of them 
seem to think there is an agreement under the rug we are not 
disclosing. Now, for reasons that I explained to the committee 
earlier this morning, this just is not true. There is a major 
question of interpretation still outstanding between us and the 
Soviet Union, so this is not a case of our having an agreement 
with the Soviet Union under the rug on which we are consulting 
with our allies in the spirit that nothing can be changed. We 
are, in fact, now in process of consulting our allies prior 
to--we hope to be--a final stage with the Soviet Union, and 
before a treaty text is actually presented in Geneva.
    Senator Symington. Well, this article worried me.
    Secretary Rusk. There have been, Senator--and I may have to 
deal with the record a little bit on this--there have been 
certain kinds of resistances in Germany to the whole idea of a 
nonproliferation treaty. First, they say that they have already 
renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons, therefore they do 
not need a treaty. Secondly, some of them say that ``In any 
event, we are prepared to take these obligations to our allies, 
but we do not want to undertake obligations of the Soviet Union 
and thereby give the Soviet Union a right to interfere with our 
affairs here.''
    Some of them have said that this would sentence them to 
permanent inferiority to France inside the alliance in Europe. 
Some of them have hoped that maybe this issue could be used as 
a card to play in bargaining with the Soviet Union with respect 
to a settlement of the German question. There have been a 
combination of ideas on this subject.
    Now, Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Brandt have 
brushed aside most of these problems in their own views about a 
nonproliferation treaty, but they do have some internal 
political problems with respect to it.
    We will do our best to satisfy them on the fair question 
such as effect on industry and peaceful uses and questions of 
that sort, but there is built into a nonproliferation treaty--
there is inherent in such a treaty--a discrimination between 
nuclear powers and nonnuclear powers.
    The whole purpose is not to let further countries become 
nuclear powers. So there is not much we can do about that, but 
I think it is quite clear, Senator, that within NATO itself, 
and within European NATO, leave out the United States, if the 
Federal Republic of Germany should become a nuclear power, NATO 
would disintegrate because the other European allies in NATO 
would not be prepared to see this happen. I think the Germans 
understand that, and my guess is that at the end of the day 
they will sign, perhaps grumpily, but I think they will sign.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


        MUTUAL INTERESTS EXIST WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION [P. 176]

    Now, there are some people who forget about that when they 
raise questions about why we are trying to probe for points, 
even small points, of possible agreement with the Soviet Union.
    Now, in the case of trade, for example, Senator, basically 
what we are doing, if the Congress will give us permission, is 
to agree with our friends in Europe.
    You will notice that for 15 years we were in a minority of 
one in COCOM.
    Senator Symington. Yes, sir.
    Secretary Rusk. And our friends in Europe kept pushing down 
the COCOM list and trading and so forth, and we were resistant 
to it and finally we said, ``We will agree with you then.''

                            EAST-WEST TRADE

    Well, that immediately created a what does this mean, you 
say. In the case of trade, Eastern Europe has 24 percent of its 
foreign trade with Western Europe, 1.6 percent of its trade 
with us. When we say to our Congress, ``Will you give us 
permission to enter into agreements where we can change our 
arrangements somewhat,'' then some of our friends in Europe 
say, ``Well, you are going way out of our way to make overtures 
to Moscow,'' when in fact all we are doing is agreeing with our 
friends in Europe.
    Senator Symington. Several years ago the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce both testified in open 
hearings the United States was the last developed country in 
the world not doing its best to sell everything it could behind 
the Iron Curtain, except in most cases sophisticated war 
materials.
    Secretary Rusk. That is right.
    Senator Symington. And yet when we try to improve our 
position through trade, as I understand your point, we are 
criticized by a die-hard group over here as being in effect 
overly friendly with Moscow.
    Secretary Rusk. I have added another point, Senator. I have 
said to some of our friends in Europe of course what you would 
really hope is that we continue our policy of no trade while 
you continue to develop the Eastern European market without our 
competition, and they have and sometimes they will say, ``Yes, 
I expect that is right.''
    Senator Symington. I will correct my use of the word there, 
but we understand each other.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               ROLE OF ACDA IN ARMS NEGOTIATIONS [P. 177]

    Secretary Rusk. The Committee of Principals is made up of 
those whose advice the President inevitably will want to have 
and have to have before the President makes decisions on these 
very important questions. That includes Defense for obvious 
reasons; CIA is heavily involved because some of these issues 
turn crucially on our ability to be assured that arrangements 
we may propose can be monitored and inspected and verified.
    So that I do not believe that the composition of the 
Committee of Principals creates any distortion. The Committee 
of Principals are those whose advice any president would feel 
he would have to have before he made any final decision.
    On the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, Mr. Foster is 
carrying the principal negotiations on those. He is in Geneva 
now, and I am not sure that I should put this on the record, he 
will shortly be visiting certain of the capitals in Europe to 
go into these matters further to try to bring the NATO matter 
to a conclusion.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                                [P. 178]

    Senator Clark. Now, when you say the people at the top 
level, will Ambassador Thompson stop at the Gromyko level or 
will he move right up?
    Secretary Rusk. No, he has talked--we would certainly think 
this would certainly go to Mr. Kosygin, and, as a matter of 
fact, Senator, I would probably want to take this out of the 
record----
    Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, this record will be closely 
held, and, so far as any public release is concerned, you will 
have complete discretion to change it.
    Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, sir.
    The real people on this subject, Senator Clark, are 
probably in the back room of the Kremlin, those people who 
almost never expose themselves internationally, but who really 
join the Presidium in the actual determination of policy on 
important subjects.
    Senator Clark. I imagine that would include their own 
equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, that would include them----
    Senator Clark. Their intelligence sections.
    Secretary Rusk [continuing]. And key members of the 
Presidium, who are represented publicly by Kosygin and 
Brezhnev.

                                [P. 178]

    Senator Clark. You will remember the very strong 
recommendations in that regard made by Mr. Wiesner's committee.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Clark. During the ICY.
    Secretary Rusk. And we pressed the regional representatives 
to consider coming forward with proposals affecting their 
regions; for example, Mexico and Brazil for Latin America; 
Egypt and Ethiopia for the Near East and Africa and otherwise.
    Very little has been done on that. But, more importantly, 
Senator, I myself have discussed this on more than one occasion 
with Mr. Gromyko, hoping that we and the Soviet Union quietly--
and I must take this out of the record--hoping that we and the 
Soviet Union quietly could begin to concert our policy to level 
off and turn downward this unfortunate neighborhood arms race 
in the Near East.
    Unfortunately Mr. Gromyko has said that action in the 
nuclear field is the limit of their interest. They have not 
been willing seriously to take up the race in conventional 
arms. As you know, they are supplying substantial arms to 
Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and now----
    Senator Clark. Iran.
    Secretary Rusk [continuing]. And now selling arms to Iran.
    We regret this very much because we think this is an arms 
race that ought to be unnecessary and that something ought to 
be done about it.
    If we could get some help from the Soviet Union on that, I 
think we could make some headway.

               AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS ON NUCLEAR MATTERS

    Senator Clark. This might be worthwhile taking up at Geneva 
at that level to start with. We would at least like to see the 
Russians join with us in halting that arms race in the Middle 
East.
    Secretary Rusk. There may be some point in our making some 
public proposals along these lines so that everybody 
understands what the situation is. We would be prepared to 
encourage and cooperate in any such effort, but there are 
others who will not.
    Senator Clark. I understand you want to get out of here by 
12.
    Secretary Rusk. It is up to you. It is up to you.
    Senator Clark. It occurs to me that this business of the 
political union of Europe as an objection to the 
nonproliferation treaty might be handled, might it not, by an 
escape cause and will you not have an escape clause in the 
treaty anyway so that if political union became a pragmatic 
matter of some urgency, they could, if they want to, get out 
from under?
    Secretary Rusk. A withdrawal clause.
    Senator Clark. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. They could utilize a withdrawal clause.
    We would like to be able to find an answer that is somewhat 
better than that because that makes the proliferation treaty 
itself somewhat fragile in theory anyhow.
    But, Senator, I think there is an understanding among all 
concerned that the political unification of Europe is quite a 
distance ahead, and I hope we can find some way not to let that 
presently hypothetical question bar present advance on 
nonproliferation.
    Senator Clark. Would you agree that if we can make some 
progress with respect to the ABM discussion between the USSR 
and ourselves, including the discussions for some curtailment 
of offensive weapons and missiles, this might well remove the 
major objections by the non-nuclear powers to the nuclear 
proliferation treaty because then the presence of ourselves 
would have made those concessions in terms of reducing their 
own capability, which I understand India and Sweden and some 
others have been asking for some time.
    Secretary Rusk. I would think if we and the Soviets could 
make any progress at all either in putting a ceiling on the 
nuclear race or turning it down somewhat, that this could have 
a very stimulating effect on the non-nuclear areas, no question 
about it.
    Senator Clark. This, of course, is a matter in which the 
ACDA is very much interested.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Clark. The final question--how long, in your 
judgment, can we make--this is a diplomatic and political 
matter guided, of course, by proper military advice with 
respect to deployment of ABM's. I could hope we could wait long 
enough for a negotiation with the Soviets along the lines of 
the Kosygin letter to proceed at the usual leisurely pace with 
which the Soviets always engage in such negotiations.
    Secretary Rusk. I do not want to be categoric about the 
decision that the President will have to make in consultation 
with congressional leaders. But it is my present view that we 
would be able to wait during a very, very substantial period of 
active and promising negotiations. In other words, I do not 
think we are going to hurry if there is any possibility that we 
can reach some result with the Soviet Union on this.
    Senator Clark. I am happy to hear that. The chairman will 
recall that General Wheeler testified that there was enough 
money in the budget, which is coming up, to enable them to go 
as far ahead as the Joint Chiefs thought they needed to with 
the development and even perhaps the initial deployment of an 
ABM without making a public fuss about it.
    Secretary Rusk. I think that is true for the present and 
under the budget that is now before the Congress.
    As you know, it is now publicly known there is a difference 
of view on this matter between General Wheeler and the 
Secretary of Defense, and General Wheeler has spoken about the 
ABM's on television, for example.
    This has been a friendly disagreement, but it is an 
important disagreement on that particular point. But this is a 
matter where the President and the civilian leadership will 
make the decision at the end of the day.

     ATTITUDE OF NON-NUCLEAR POWERS TOWARD NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

    Senator Clark. What is your view as to the diplomatic 
desirability if India gets too difficult, giving a bilateral 
guarantee to India because of the possible Chinese threat which 
would seem to be a good deal greater than that against any 
other country?
    I can see this might cause a lot of diplomatic flap, but I 
am concerned that India may balk on this nonproliferation 
treaty.
    Could you comment on that?
    Senator Gore. He commented on that while you were out.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think this is one----
    Senator Clark. Do not repeat what you said.
    Secretary Rusk. It is a very, very serious question for us, 
quite apart from this question for India. I do not think, 
first, that India would be interested in a unilateral guarantee 
by the United States alone in this matter. They would, I think, 
say that it would have to be at least by the United States and 
the Soviet Union acting together.
    Senator Clark. This should not be too difficult for the 
Soviet Union point of view.
    Secretary Rusk. That could create some problems. Apparently 
they have discussed that with the Soviet Union apparently 
without much encouragement. But for us, Senator, there is also 
a very, very major problem as to whether we ourselves want to 
extend our own commitments that far. Do we pledge the lives of 
a hundred million Americans in the first two hours to this end?
    Senator Clark. I certainly think not.
    Secretary Rusk. It is a very grave decision for us to take.
    Senator Clark. Just let me interrupt, and I would think 
that the Indian guarantee, if it came forward at all, would be 
merely against China and not with respect to the Soviet Union, 
which hopefully would join with us.
    I do not think you have to worry about France and Britain 
attacking India, but if the Soviet Union and ourselves were 
prepared to guarantee against China, in my opinion, maybe I am 
wrong, this does not confront you with the difficulty you spoke 
of because, as I understand it, China has no effective air 
force and our manned bombers could destroy the Chinese nuclear 
capability overnight.
    Maybe it raises the question of first strike.
    Secretary Rusk. I would hope, Senator, that some way could 
be found for the United Nations to strengthen what has been 
said on this subject in such a way that countries like India 
would feel sufficient reassurance to be willing and able to go 
ahead with a nonproliferation policy.
    Senator Gore. Senator Pell.
    Senator Pell. Thank you.
    Mr. Secretary, first I regret not having been here when Mr. 
Macomber's name was up for confirmation, and I am delighted to 
see such an old friend and competent officer as he is 
accompanying you for the first time. The record will show what 
is said even though he is out of the room.
    Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, Senator. I am 
delighted to have Mr. Macomber with me.

                       ABM NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW

    Senator Pell. Secondly, in connection with the ABM's, I am 
delighted to hear that Ambassador Thompson will be occupying a 
leading role as a negotiator.
    Do we intend to move right into those discussions, or will 
there be a time lag?
    Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, that we would like to begin 
them soon rather than late. We have the impression that the 
Soviets are still in the position of preparing their own 
position. I do not think I said this a little earlier, but this 
latest communication we had from them was an invitation for us 
to present some additional views on the subject. We do not yet 
have from them any that gives us a real feel of what their 
approach to it is going to be, except that offensive and 
defensive weapons will have to be discussed together; and, 
secondly, this should be in the framework of disarmament rather 
than in terms of freezes.
    Senator Pell. Right.
    Secretary Rusk. So that is about the only major clue we 
have at the present time.
    Senator Pell. Thank you.

                          1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL

    Another question I had here was in connection with the 
disarmament subject, and this is, do we ever intend to ratify 
the 1925 Geneva Protocol on which I believe the U.N. Assembly 
passed a resolution calling on all nations to refrain from the 
use of gaseous warfare and bacteriological materials in 
warfare? What is our position on that?
    Secretary Rusk. May I ask Mr. Fisher to comment on that?
    Mr. Fisher. Yes, the U.N. resolution, I believe the term 
was, invites people to ratify the 1925 protocol. We voted for 
it, in the explanation of the vote considered by various 
countries through their own constitutional structures. That 
convention is not now before the Senate. It was recalled, I 
believe, shortly after World War II, in sort of a review by the 
Foreign Relations Committee of things that had been up here for 
a long while.
    The real consideration, Senator Pell, is whether or not it 
is best to invest the substantial effort that would be required 
to get that through on the basis of the 1925 convention or 
whether we should consider the problem of bringing it up to 
date, try to negotiate an up-to-date treaty which takes into 
account many developments since 1925, which, for example, deals 
with all forms of biological warfare which are not by its terms 
covered in the 1925 convention.
    Senator Pell. But to interrupt for the moment, the only 
thing on the table in a multilateral matter would be the 1925 
convention, would it not?
    Mr. Fisher. That is correct, and our feeling would be, 
however, we have discussed this frankly with 5,000 scientists 
who visited the President's science adviser and myself two 
weeks ago, that perhaps it might be better to consider 
undertaking a major study in this context looking at all the 
control problems of BW and CW in a 1967 context rather than the 
context of ratifying the 1925 convention.
    Senator Pell. I would hope the reason that is inhibiting 
you is not the fact we are occasionally using tear gas in 
Vietnam.
    Mr. Fisher. No. We would be perfectly clear in our own view 
that incapacitants, nonlethal incapacitants, are not covered by 
the 1925 convention, and any ratification, if they would have 
taken place, would have made that perfectly clear.
    Senator Pell. Thank you.
    In connection with the words in Senator Lausche's 
colloquy----
    Senator Clark. Would the Senator yield for one moment?
    I would like to supplement in the strongest possible way 
the view Senator Pell has expressed about the high degree of 
desirability of moving into the problem of arms control, in 
radiological, chemical, and biological warfare. I think we have 
neglected it.
    Mr. Fisher. If I can comment, we have had to put the cart--
the horse research before the cart, because in many people's 
minds there has been the view that this was an insoluble 
problem because of the difficulties of control that the 
theretofore 1925 convention was a mere paper promise and 
therefore forget about it.
    [Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                         MONDAY, MARCH 6, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 2:40 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore, 
Church, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper 
and Case.
    Michael Wood, former Director of Development, National 
Student Association, and Phillip Sherburne, former President, 
National Student Association, testified on the National Student 
Association and the C.I.A.
    [The committee adjourned at 5:45 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                         MONDAY, MARCH 13, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse, 
Gore, Lausche, Church, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, 
Carlson and Case.
    Arthur Goldberg, Ambassador to the United Nations, 
accompanied by Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser, Department of 
State, testified further on Ex. D, 90/1, the Treaty on Outer 
Space.
    The proposed Latin American Resolution and the question of 
staff members going on trips while the Senate is in session was 
also discussed.
    [The committee adjourned at 12:10 p.m.]


                           Arms Sales to Iran

                              ----------                              


                        Tuesday, March 14, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
       Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
            Affairs, of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Symington, Fulbright, Gore, Clark, 
McCarthy and Hickenlooper.
    Also present: Peter Knauer, Assistant for Congressional and 
Special Projects, Office of the Director of Military 
Assistance, Department of Defense; and Lt. Col. Albertus B. 
Outlaw, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 
(Legislative Affairs).
    Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee 
staff.
    [This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for 
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions 
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the 
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the 
published hearings.]

 STATEMENT OF MR. HENRY J. KUSS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
 DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS NEGOTIATIONS; ACCOMPANIED 
BY MR. W.B. LIGON, DIRECTOR, NEAR EAST NEGOTIATING DIRECTORATE 
AND ECONOMIC PLANNING-COORDINATION OASD (ISI) FOR ILN

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            EXECUTIVE BRANCH DECISION IN IRANIAN CASE [P. 4]

    Mr. Kuss. First of all, this machinery included intensive 
and detailed discussions with the country itself. For several 
years, we have agreed with the Government of Iran that military 
supplies will not be sold or bought by them, by any country, 
without clear analysis of their need and the economic 
capability to support the impact of such purchases.
    Secondly, a U.S. military team bringing in our unified 
command and joint staff machinery, worked with the Imperial 
Iranian forces in analyzing the threat and recommending the 
types of equipment which would be desirable.
    Simultaneously, our State Department and AID machinery, at 
the embassy level, worked with the Central Bank, not just with 
their defense ministry, but with the Central Bank of Iran, to 
determine financial resources which would be available to meet 
total Iranian development and consumption requirements as well 
as the effects of contemplated military procurement on such 
resources.
    Both these military and economic analyses were reviewed by 
the Shah, and his prime minister and other governmental 
agencies of Iran, and discussed with our ambassador.
    All of this information was then made available in 
Washington to the State Department, AID, and Defense machinery 
for further consideration.
    There were many adjustments made in the application of this 
machinery. Needless to say, they didn't all adopt my 
recommendations. There were many changes.
    On the basis of these views, a decision was made at the 
highest level in the United States Government concerning the 
program which we would be willing to undertake.
    From the time that the Shah gave indication of his first 
need for additional equipment, to the time that my office was 
informed of the program to be specifically negotiated, over 
nine months elapsed with consultative machinery operating in 
Iran and the United States.
    In the final analysis, the most surprising thing to me is 
that the Shah waited nine months since he was financially 
independent; certainly he is politically independent and had 
achieved the approval of the Majlis in November 1965 for the 
purchase of $200 million outright from any source.
    This waiting period only proves to me to some extent that 
he really preferred the United States to continue as principal 
military supplier even though he had to wait through all of the 
time for the machinery to be processed, and even though he did 
not get all that he was capable of purchasing in the process, 
in the first analysis.
    I should like to conclude my opening remarks with a 
highlight summary of the situation taken from reports by people 
in our AID, Defense and political machinery, who are a lot 
closer to the situation than I personally can confess to be.
    These statements from our AID, political, Defense people on 
the scene are as follows:
    1. While Iran's economic situation is basically sound, the 
United States would greatly prefer that it limit the 
expenditure of further resources on military equipment. This is 
an important element of what was the basis for our final 
decision.
    The impression is that we wished to limit the amount of 
military supply that we provide.
    However, there is no prospect of convincing the Shah that 
Iran need not develop what he considers an adequate defense 
establishment to protect his fully exposed vital oil 
installations in the south. Moreover, it is in the United 
States interest to maintain a close military relationship with 
Iran in order to protect our interests and to enable us to 
maintain a dialogue with the Shah on the broader issues of 
Iranian economic development and their relationship to military 
expenditures.
    The United States has made significant progress in the last 
two years in stimulating the Government of Iran to examine this 
relationship.

                        ECONOMIC GROWTH IN IRAN

    For its own part, the Government of Iran has made great 
strides in promoting economic growth in Iran, whose GNP 
increased nearly 10 percent last year. Iran is credit-worthy 
and, given its inability to rapidly absorb large amounts of 
foreign financing for its development program, there is room 
for additional military credits on reasonable terms.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Given its inability?
    Mr. Kuss. Yes. In other words, it can't grow up overnight. 
All revenues are coming in faster than it can really spend them 
on development projects.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Therefore, they have some extra money 
left over to buy arms?
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. That is the point I am making here.
    The United States government has constantly tried to apply 
brakes to Iranian military spending. Last year, although the 
Shah planned $200 million in just one year from us in 
purchases, in accordance with the requirements as confirmed by 
the special U.S. military survey team, the U.S. government 
limited the Shah to $50 million a year, with the possibility of 
similar tranches over the next three-year period.
    Limitations upon limitations have been placed on what he 
can do with military programs.
    2. Recent months have seen the steady--and I am quoting 
now--continuation of a clearly visible trend toward a more 
independent Iranian posture on the world scene. Developments 
affecting Pakistan, one of Iran's closest allies, have 
reinforced the Shah in his conviction that Iran must be 
prepared to stand on its own feet. In setting his twin goals of 
economic development and national defense, the Shah has linked 
military security to economic and social progress, and believes 
that he cannot have the latter without the former. Partly also 
because of a deep-seated Iranian Nasserist antagonism and 
partly because of the USSR's new policy of friendliness toward 
Iran, Iran has shifted the focus of its major concern from the 
threat of communism in the USSR in the north to Nasser and Arab 
nationalism in the south. The Shah is acutely aware of the 
vulnerability of his oil lifeline in the south to surprise 
attack and the susceptibility to subversion of the Arab 
minority, in Khuzestan.
    The Shah feels compelled to maintain an adequate defense 
establishment in face of a large-scale Soviet arms supply to 
UAR, Iraq and Syria. He believes strongly that it is in the 
interest of the United States, as well as Iran, that Iran be in 
a position to deter or cope with regional threats rather than 
calling on us a la Vietnam.
    Egypt has several times Iran's arsenal.
    The reason for the Shah's insistence on aircraft of the 
type of F-4, and he did insist, was that even neighboring Iraq 
already has delivered 18 of the all-weather Mach 2.3 MIG-21's, 
whereas Iran has nothing better than day-flying Mach 1.3 F-5's.

                      SHAH'S MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

    He has expressed his desire to meet his military 
requirements from the United States, but he has made it 
abundantly clear also that if the United States is unwilling or 
unable to meet his major military requirements, he is 
determined to go elsewhere to acquire what he needs.
    3. The Shah's arms purchases from the Soviets are in 
relatively non-sensitive areas such as trucks, armored 
personnel carriers and ack-ack guns; his payments are primarily 
in natural gas which for 60 years have been flared off. The 
Shah's purchasing from the Soviets seems to him, and I am 
reporting, seems to him, to be not without some value. He is 
convinced that it will undercut Soviet propaganda about the 
United States being solely arms merchants to Iran, and about 
Iran's being an American puppet.
    He also believes it will cause difficulties in the Soviet 
relationship with Nasser and other radical Arabs.
    Gentlemen, I deliberately didn't try to answer all the 
questions in my opening statement but that poses a lot of 
questions, I am sure.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               END-USE AGREEMENT WITH WEST GERMANY [P. 7]

    Mr. Bader. While you are getting that--let me ask you a 
question. As I understand it, we include in our military sales 
or grant agreement with West Germany a so-called end-use 
agreement. Is that correct? That is, we have total veto, as Mr. 
McNaughton said, over the final disposition of American 
military equipment.
    Mr. Kuss. That is right.
    Mr. Bader. Is that correct?
    Mr. Kuss. I negotiated them; yes, that is correct.
    Mr. Bader. Fine.
    So in the case of the these F-86, if they are not in Iran--
if they actually belong to Pakistan--then the West German 
government and perhaps the Iranian government, if they were the 
middleman in this case, have turned aside what was American 
desire and policy with regard to Pakistan. Would that be 
correct?
    Mr. Kuss. I believe that would be correct.
    May I continue my answer?
    Mr. Bader. Certainly.
    Mr. Kuss. To supplement what you said, let me put it in the 
record that the United States was supplying military equipment 
through grant and sales to Iran at the time that this 
circumstance arose.
    The United States approval of the German sale to Iran was 
influenced by the fact that there appeared to be legitimate 
requirements and the experience of the purchase would not 
unduly upset the Iranian defense budget.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Senator McCarthy. I just want to know, what is the game? 
Why do the Canadians do it for Germany under our license? The 
Canadians don't have a serious balance of payments problem with 
Germany. We do.
    What are the politics of it?
    Mr. Kuss. The Canadians have--I am not sure the balance of 
payments is the consideration at all.
    Senator McCarthy. Why? That is the question.
    Mr. Kuss. The Canadians have as serious a balance of 
payments problem as ourselves, if one is to talk balance of 
payments, and the Canadians having financed a production line 
for F-86's for themselves were in a position to provide F-86's 
for Germany during the build-up period.
    Senator McCarthy. Is that because we couldn't do it?
    Mr. Kuss. We could have done it.
    Senator McCarthy. Why didn't we? I want to know why the 
Canadians with our license produced and sold it to Germany. Who 
arranged this? Did this involve cooperation on the part of the 
Defense Department and our manufacturers of F-86's? What I want 
to get at is the process by which these complicated decisions 
are made, like the one involving the sale of Lightning fighters 
to Saudi Arabia, for example. We sell F-111's to England and 
they in turn sell Lightning fighters to Saudi Arabia. Northrop 
Aviation, however, says really what the Saudis should have are 
F-5's, but, in the end, the Saudis are told: ``You really can't 
go out and do the kind of thing you are urging them to do, 
compete in the open market really for arms sales because 
somebody just said you have got to take Lightning fighters and 
we are in turn going to supply F-111's to England.''
    Mr. Kuss. My answer to the first question, to start with, 
first of all, the North American Aircraft Corporation has the 
right to license foreign manufacturers to produce F-86 aircraft 
in this case.
    Senator Symington. F-86 is a North American; not Northrop?
    Mr. Kuss. North American, right.
    I understood the question to be F-86--has the right to--
this was some years ago, of course, with the F-86--they have 
the right to license other countries to produce the F-86 
aircraft with the approval of the United States Government. 
They obtained that right through their contractual arrangements 
with the Defense Department.
    They then obtained the approval of the Office of Munitions 
Control, who would also check it out with Defense, to license 
Canada to produce, not only for themselves, but for other 
countries as they were able to work out mutually-agreeable 
sales arrangements.

             TOTAL U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN [P. 8]

    The United States Government, in reviewing that license, 
approved it but insisted that the license itself contain a 
clause that if the Canadians were to sell those airplanes to 
any other country that they must get the approval of the United 
States Government, specifically for that other country, number 
one.
    And, further, in that particular agreement, that if the 
other country were to ever sell it to any other country, they 
must also get the approval in succession of the United States 
government.
    Senator Symington. If you will yield to me a minute, 
Senator--as I understand it, then, some 90 F-86's were sold by 
Canada to West Germany, correct?
    Mr. Kuss. That is correct.
    Senator Symington. And those were sold by West Germany--
    Mr. Kuss. Maybe more, sir.
    Senator Symington. All right, we are talking about these 
90.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            MOVEMENT OF F-86'S FROM IRAN TO PAKISTAN [P. 8]

    Senator Symington. I understand about the initiation; I am 
just talking about these planes.
    They moved from West Germany into Iran, then from Iran to 
Pakistan. Did we know that they had moved from Iran to Pakistan 
when they did, or did we find out later?
    Mr. Kuss. When we knew, and we consulted with the 
Government of Canada, both the----
    Senator Symington. Let me ask the question again to be sure 
you understand my point.
    Did we know at the time the planes moved from Iran to 
Pakistan that they were going from Iran to Pakistan, after they 
were sold to Iran by West Germany? Did we know it at the time?
    Mr. Kuss. No.
    As a deliberate plan of our own. No, we did not know.
    Senator Symington. We did not know.
    Senator McCarthy. I think he is saying that we didn't know 
it was going to be through these three stages when we first 
licensed them in Canada.
    Senator Symington. Just bear with me.
    Mr. Kuss. We expressed no objection to a sale to Iran, not 
Pakistan.
    Senator Symington. We licensed the sale to Iran.
    Senator McCarthy. You approved that one, not the next one?
    Senator Symington. When did we discover Iran had moved them 
into Pakistan by sale, barter or gift?
    Mr. Kuss. I don't have a date here. I will be glad to 
supply it for you.
    Senator Symington. Roughly how many weeks or months was 
it--was it some months after they went into Pakistan that we 
found out that they had gone to Pakistan?
    Mr. Kuss. It was some months, and after consultation with 
Germany and Canada, both countries protested. Iran stated that 
the aircraft were in Pakistan only for repair. Action was taken 
to try to influence the return of the aircraft to Iran. The 
Federal Republic of Germany held up further sales which they 
had pending at that time to Iran as a result.
    At the moment on this transaction we have two points of 
information which I believe that you have seen, sir. The 
Washington Daily News had indicated that the aircraft had been 
returned as a result of strong U.S. pressures. This return of 
the aircraft is generally confirmed by DIA but we are still 
waiting for specific confirmation.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    BRITISH SALE OF AIRCRAFT [P. 10]

    Mr. Kuss. The Lightning is a British air defense aircraft 
and solely usable for that purpose and no other purpose.
    Senator Symington. Right. And that plane went from 
Britain----
    Mr. Kuss. To Saudi Arabia.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


         SALE OF F-86 AIRCRAFT BY WEST GERMANY TO IRAN [P. 11]

    Mr. Bader. Is this also the case, as I have heard reported, 
of some 200 to 400 M-47 tanks that have gone through Merex to 
Pakistan via Iran.
    Mr. Kuss. There have been no M-47 tanks that have gone from 
Iran to Pakistan, to my knowledge.
    Mr. Bader. Fine.
    The West German Government has----
    Mr. Kuss. As a matter of fact we have had that under 
discussion with the West German Government, and we both have 
held up any sale to Iran for the very purpose that we thought 
they might----
    Mr. Bader. They might go there.
    Mr. Kuss. That they might go there.
    Mr. Bader. Thank you.

                            F-4 SALE TO IRAN

    I would like to go to the F-4 sale, Mr. Chairman, with your 
permission.
    Senator Symington. Very well.
    Mr. Bader. Mr. Kuss, as I understand it, there are two 
basic agreements between the United States Government and the 
Iran Government with regard to military assistance, that is 
agreements to talk about what you call in the Defense 
Department hardware. First is the September 1962 memorandum of 
understanding, and the second is the July 1964 memorandum of 
understanding, is that correct?
    Mr. Kuss. That is correct.
    Mr. Bader. Now, in the memorandum of understanding of 1962, 
we--in the major grant items there were 52 F-5's, is that 
correct?
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, that is correct.
    Mr. Bader. That is roughly correct.
    Now, would you explain to the subcommittee the terms of 
this July 1964 memorandum of understanding? As I understand 
it--and I must say I am quite confused about it--it has been 
amended in August of 1966, is that correct, to allow for the F-
4 sale? Am I correct in the information that the July 1964 
memorandum of understanding, as amended in August of 1966, 
permits the sale to Iran of roughly $400 million of military 
equipment, including the supplemental $200 million that covers 
the F-4 sale?
    Mr. Kuss. That is right.
    Mr. Bader. That is right.
    Mr. Kuss. May I say, there is one basic sales agreement and 
that is the 1964 agreement. In that agreement we acquired 
promises from the government of Iran that they would not 
proceed at any independent pace on the purchase of this 
military equipment, but that it would be subject to an annual 
review of the economic availabilities of foreign exchange to 
their development program as well as for other purposes. And we 
did not wish to destroy that arrangement that we had achieved 
from them in 1964. Thus, when we came to the conclusion that it 
would be necessary to add $200 million of credit to the 1964 
agreement, we thought it best to add it to an agreement under 
which we had far more links, controls, reviews, analyses, if 
you will, agreed to by the Government of Iran than if we were 
to establish an entirely new agreement.
    Mr. Bader. When did the Shah of Iran first approach the 
United States about his requirement for an aircraft with the 
capability beyond that of the F-5?
    Mr. Kuss. From my personal knowledge, he was talking about 
aircraft well beyond the F-5 before the 1964 agreement was 
established.
    Mr. Bader. With direct reference to the F-4's, was this in 
the beginning of 1966?
    Mr. Kuss. F-4s, and other aircraft, well beyond the F-5.
    Senator Symington. Let me ask what counsel is interested 
in, and what we are interested in: Was there mention in any of 
these agreements of the F-4, the ones that they eventually got?
    Mr. Kuss. No, sir.
    Senator Symington. When was the decision made to ship F-
4's? When was the decision made and why was it made?
    Mr. Kuss. May I review that----
    Senator Symington. Yes.
    Mr. Kuss--For the record?
    As we have pointed out on numerous occasions, there is a 
tremendous amount of machinery in existence.
    Senator Symington. We understand that.
    Mr. Kuss. In the executive branch. One part of this 
machinery was the military machinery, the joint staff 
machinery, that we sent to Iran to review with the Iranian 
armed forces what they stated as their requirements.
    Mr. Bader. This is the so-called Peterson mission.
    Mr. Kuss. This is the so-called Peterson report.
    Mr. Bader. When was that issued?
    Mr. Kuss. The Peterson report was issued in approximately 
early '65.
    Mr. Bader. The Peterson report was the basis of the 
military justification for F-4's.
    Mr. Kuss. Excuse me, early '66.
    Mr. Bader. That was the basis for the military 
justification.
    Mr. Kuss. March 1966.
    Mr. Bader. March 1966.
    Mr. Kuss. March 1966, and in the Peterson report they 
recommended that it would be necessary for F-4D aircraft, D 
aircraft, be provided to combat the Mig 21's that were 
available in the southern regions that the Shah was--to meet 
the threat that was established.
    Mr. Bader. And this was in March of 1966.
    Mr. Kuss. This was in March of 1966, right.
    Mr. Bader. Did the Peterson report recommend two squadrons 
of F-4s which we have now sold to Iran?
    Mr. Kuss. I do not recall; I would have to check.
    Mr. Bader. According to the Peterson report, as I read it, 
they recommended six squadrons of F-5 aircraft and one squadron 
of F-4C aircraft during the fiscal year '67-'71 time frame.
    Mr. Kuss. You have got to read the Peterson report in two 
ways. First of all, we were anxious to keep things as 
restricted as possible. The Peterson report not only gave a 
report on what was within, shall we say, a constricted level, 
but it also indicated that many hundreds of millions of dollars 
more worth of equipment could have been justified if one were 
dealing with the kind of threat that the Shah was talking about 
in Iraq, Syria, and the U.A.R.
    Mr. Bader. When was the decision made to go from one 
squadron of F-4's, which the Peterson report recommended, to 
two squadrons of F-4's which was the final agreement?
    Mr. Kuss. This decision was communicated to the Shah on the 
10th of August.
    Mr. Bader. On the 10th of August.
    Mr. Kuss. The decision was made, of course, within our own 
executive branch shortly before that at the highest levels of 
government.
    Mr. Bader. Will we also deliver to Iran the original----
    Senator Symington. Excuse me just a second. You say the 
highest levels of government. By that, do you mean the 
President?
    Mr. Bader. Yes, sir. I do.
    Senator Symington. Is it true that Secretary McNamara 
opposed this sale?
    Mr. Kuss. Proposed?
    Senator Symington. Opposed it.
    Mr. Kuss. Opposed the sale?
    Senator Symington. Yes.
    Mr. Kuss. No, not to my knowledge, sir.
    Senator Symington. Not to your knowledge. Thank you.
    Mr. Bader. Will we also deliver to Iran the 13 squadrons of 
F-5's that were called for under the 1964 agreement?
    Mr. Kuss. I would have to check that.
    May I put that in the record? There is a substitution of F-
4 squadrons for F-5 squadrons, and I just want to be sure about 
the numbers, and I would like to insert them.

           F-5 AIRCRAFT PROVIDED BY THE UNITED STATES TO IRAN

    Mr. Bader. It was the decision of the highest levels, that 
is the President, that this would be F-4D's rather than F-4C's, 
as well, that would be the latest and most sophisticated----
    Mr. Kuss. F-4D's
    Mr. Bader (continuing). Models coming off the line and 
later models coming off the line.
    Senator Symington. Who is the one who knows about these 
sales?
    Mr. Kuss. It all depends on which question you ask, sir.
    Senator Symington. I see.
    Mr. Kuss. If you want to ask the question about the model 
of the F-4, I can answer that.
    Senator Symington. What was the day the decision was made 
to ship the F-4's?
    Mr. Kuss. I believe I said it was communicated on the 10th 
of August.
    Senator Symington. Fine.

             CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION ABOUT SALE TO IRAN

    Now, when was the Congress notified that F-4's were going 
to be shipped to Iran?
    Mr. Kuss. I do not believe the Congress was notified, 
Senator, until Mr. McNaughton spoke on the subject.
    Senator Symington. That was after it was in the press.
    Mr. Kuss. Correct, sir.
    Senator Symington. And we talked about governmental 
machinery.
    Is it the policy of the Defense Department to tell the 
press before it tells the Congress about these sales?
    Mr. Kuss. As a matter of fact, I do not believe we told the 
press. I believe the British leaked it because of competition. 
It was not our doing.
    Senator Symington. So the British leaked it to the American 
press.
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. Do you know who first published it in 
the United States?
    Mr. Kuss. No, I do not.
    Senator Symington. Do you not think that, if we sell the 
most sophisticated fighter to a foreign country, that 
information should be supplied to the Congress?
    Mr. Kuss. I would like to answer that question this way: 
The F-4D, as we sold it to the Iranian Government, was not the 
most sophisticated fighter that we were dealing with in terms 
of sales to other countries. For example, it is not the same 
airplane we sold to the British.
    Senator Symington. Well then, let us say the second or the 
third or the fourth most sophisticated airplane.
    Mr. Kuss. I would like to answer that question by saying 
that in addition to considering the problem, there were many 
security meetings held at which we reviewed the switches, the 
panels, black boxes of the F-4D, which related to nuclear 
capability. They were taken out. We reviewed the missile which 
was related to the F-4D and substituted SIDEWINDER missiles 
which had been released already.
    We eliminated the SHRIKE which is used on the F-4D. We 
eliminated the WALLEYE missile which is used there. We 
retrofitted some of our F-4D's with CORDS and DCM and 
eliminated that.
    So on balance we took a decision that we felt that this 
would not be a security lapse here or any sensitivity, if 
things went wrong.
    Senator Symington. Let me repeat my question, please.
    Mr. Kuss. All right.
    Senator Symington. Do you not think, if you make a sale of 
a sophisticated, modern airplane to a foreign government, the 
Congress should be informed of that?
    Mr. Kuss. I think I can best answer that question by saying 
it is not my function to determine that answer, sir.
    Senator Symington. Well, then you could say this also, 
could you not; that you did not inform the Congress?
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. And you do not know anybody who did 
inform the Congress.
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. And to the best of your knowledge it 
would have remained a secret unless a foreign country had not 
leaked it to the press.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


         FOREIGN AND MILITARY POSITION CHANGED BY SALES [P. 14]

    Senator Symington. So you knew that the sale was going to 
be made before you agreed to sell them the F-4's.
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir, and we protested against it 
considerably. We made a major point of it in our negotiation, 
and made sure that the Shah was clear that our willingness to 
sell sophisticated and sensitive equipment was conditional 
pending clarification of Iran's position with respect to the 
purchases from the Soviet bloc.
    Now, the Shah responded to us on that and noted that he 
wanted to reaffirm that if it came to Soviet equipment, he 
would limit it to nonsensitive equipment. He went on further in 
our discussions with him on the subject to note that he had 
declined to send Iranians to the U.S.S.R. for training----
    Senator Symington. I understand those points.
    Mr. Kuss. I think these are important.
    Senator Symington. We have had that information given to us 
in great detail.
    Mr. Kuss. I do not think the last group were.
    He has limited the Soviet technicians, only a few, to go to 
Iran to instruct Iranians on maintenance. The Soviets wanted 
the team to remain two years. He gave them six months. And, as 
a consequence, it was on balance when you consider the 
tremendous position we have there, the number of technicians we 
have there, the large predominance of $1.4 billion, I think, 
that it will add up to, of the military equipment that we have 
provided, that we still maintained our position in a changing 
world, a world in which he was growing more independent, and in 
a world in which he had gas to sell that he could not sell 
anywhere else.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              STEEL MILL SALE BY U.S.S.R. TO IRAN [P. 15]

    Senator Symington. If they are building a $280 million 
steel mill and a $400 million pipeline plant, and they are 
purchasing over $100 million in military equipment, would you 
not say, inasmuch as all this has happened in recent months, 
that the position of the Russians from an economic standpoint 
was rapidly moving at least into an equilibrium with our own in 
Iran?
    Mr. Kuss. No, sir, I do not believe so. I have certainly 
pointed out very clearly on the military side that it is not 
anything like an equilibrium. It is a man trying to dart in 
through the armor with a little pin.
    On the economic side, I can only say that when in 1962 we 
decided, the Congress, along with the Executive Branch, to 
eliminate development aid for Iran, it was inevitable that Iran 
was going to turn to business means in the area to find its 
way. And that in 1964, the 1964 military agreement was 
essentially an agreement to phase out military assistance as 
well, and when you move into a situation where you no longer 
are giving it away, you find that you have got to find 
different ways and means of handling your problem, and you no 
longer have the absolute control that we had when we were in 
the position of largesse to everybody giving it away.
    Senator Symington. At any time did we suggest to the 
Iranians that they purchase what they needed in the way of 
additional military equipment somewhere else?
    Mr. Kuss. Absolutely not. We, number one, opposed the 
Russian program, made a major point of this.
    Senator Symington. Yes, you answered the question, if it is 
no, and you explained to us that you did oppose the Russian 
plan.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


          EVENTUAL AIRCRAFT SALES TO IRAN AND PAKISTAN [P. 16]

    Mr. Kuss. We expressed no objection to a Canadian-German 
arrangement which would get them to Iran for the use of the 
Iranian armed forces.
    Senator Symington. Right.
    How did they get to Pakistan?
    Mr. Kuss. We found out through intelligence channels that 
some of the airplanes were in Pakistan.
    Senator Symington. You are going to let us know how many.
    Mr. Kuss. And we are going to let you know how many, and we 
also have found out that upon remonstration on our part, the 
Canadian part, the German part, the newspapers have reported 
that they have been returned. DIA has reported they have been 
generally returned, but they are not sure about the number.
    Senator Symington. Returned from where to where?
    Mr. Kuss. From Pakistan to Iran.
    Senator Symington. To Iran.
    Did we ask the Iranians for an explanation of how they got 
from Iran to Pakistan?
    Mr. Kuss. We dealt, since our arrangements were with the 
Canadians and the Germans, through the Canadians and the 
Germans.
    Senator Symington. Did we ask the Canadians and/or Germans 
how they explained how the planes got from Iran to Pakistan?
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, that is where the Germans stopped selling 
any more equipment to Iran.
    Senator Symington. What did the Germans say as to how they 
got from Iran to Pakistan?
    Mr. Kuss. The Germans indicated that the first Iranian 
explanation was that they were in Pakistan for overhaul. As you 
know, Pakistan does a great deal of overhaul for most countries 
in that area. This was not satisfactory to anyone, and that is 
why we have been pursuing this further.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                 RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARMS SALES [P. 17]

    Senator Fulbright. But who makes the decision to sell arms? 
Who determines the country's capacity to purchase without 
endangering their economy? Do you as an official of the Defense 
Department?
    Mr. Kuss. It is my responsibility since the management for 
funds must be put somewhere to see to it that that is managed 
in a viable way.
    But we have a government that has many elements to it and 
in almost every case, and particularly in the Iranian case, the 
machinery operated from the Teheran Embassy, economic aid 
people, with the Central Bank people, to the AID people in 
Washington, and it was as a result of their actions that the 
program was reduced, the Shah requested, to a much, much 
smaller program.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            RATIONALE BEHIND SALE TO IRAN QUESTIONED [P. 18]

    Mr. Kuss. Well, as you say, I probably wouldn't agree with 
you.
    Senator Fulbright. I don't think you would.
    Mr. Kuss. But only because it is the machinery, the very 
machinery that you propose to exercise which came to the 
conclusion to provide the kind of arms and to eliminate 
economic aid in 1962, to eliminate military assistance in 1964 
on a phased basis, to provide arms on a very stringent basis, 
and to not supply everything that the Shah wanted. It is this 
very machinery that you speak of that came to that conclusion.
    Senator Fulbright. I am sure Iran wants it.
    I was there with Mr. Douglas Dillon in 1959. I suggested to 
the Shah that if he spent money on the improvement of the 
ordinary citizens, he would be more secure than trying to 
protect himself with arms. But there is nothing I can do about 
it, and I don't know that it does any good to bedevil you about 
it. I realize you are an official in the Department of Defense. 
I only hope you do not go too far in loading everybody down 
with arms that can't afford it.
    Mr. Kuss. Let me repeat again, Senator, that as far as the 
underdeveloped country, arms sales are fairly meaningless to 
us. They amount to 10 percent of our total program. My office 
is occupied with doing things with people with whom we used to 
be giving billions in foreign aid in our alliances.
    When it comes to the application to these non-developed 
countries, my responsibility is to see to it that if we do 
extend credit they have got the money to repay it, that we 
manage it on an appropriate basis.
    Senator Fulbright. I am not arguing about their having the 
money for purchases. I expect you will get it.
    What they are doing is taking it out of the hides of poor 
peasants. That is what is creating a politically explosive 
situation.
    The Shah will get the money from the Majlis. You don't 
dispute that?
    Mr. Kuss. Let me make that clear. The Majlis has, as you 
pointed out, voted $200 million that he could spend in one 
year. We didn't agree with that. We didn't agree with that at 
all. We dealt with the Central Bank, Mr. Sami, whom you 
probably know is a very capable man there.
    Next we dealt with our economic mission in Teheran; next 
with the AID group. What we dealt with was a situation which 
compared what each tranche of military equipment would involve 
in the way of debt pre-payment against any balance of foreign 
exchange that was left over after all of the feasible projects 
could be administered for the economic development program. We 
dealt with that as a given factor by our AID people who did not 
take the Shah's estimates of all revenues, reduced them and who 
did not take all of the Shah's estimates on what his economic 
programs were feasible, and the programs that we are dealing 
with here, all through it have a ceiling something like this, 
and this curve here is the debt pre-payment capability which 
our economic advisers told us was possible after covering the 
other programs.
    Senator Symington. If the chairman will yield.
    Senator Fulbright. I will.
    Senator Symington. It would seem clear from your testimony 
that you felt the Shah had a right because of danger to his 
country to make arrangements to obtain these airplanes. Is that 
correct?
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. All right. Now, in the Peterson report--
--
    Senator Fulbright. Danger from whom?
    Senator Symington. I was going to get to that. In the 
Peterson report it says, and I quote: ``The combined forces of 
these latter three countries represent a overwhelming military 
capability vis-a-vis Iran. But for the foreseeable future the 
possibility of their making such a combined assault on Iranian 
forces seems quite remote. A unilateral attack of Iran by UAR 
forces is unlikely. But if it should come, it would be limited 
to naval action unless the Israeli issue were first resolved or 
unless the UAR achieved hegemony over the minor states of the 
area, a circumstance not readily foreseen.''
    Now, as I understand it, therefore, you believe that the 
threat comes from Syria, the UAR, and Iraq primarily, is that 
correct? The Pentagon feels that way?
    Mr. Kuss. That is a result of the Peterson report, yes.
    Senator Symington. All right. How many Mig 21's has Iraq 
got roughly? I think this is very important.
    Mr. Kuss. They have 18 on hand, and I believe another 18 
coming.
    Senator Symington. That is 36. How many has Syria got?
    Mr. Kuss. Actual order of battle on hand, 18 for Iraq, 
Syria 26, 102 for UAR.
    Senator Symington. Wait a minute, you are ahead of me. How 
many has Iraq got?
    Mr. Kuss. Eighteen.
    Senator Symington. And how many do you say they are going 
to have?
    Mr. Kuss. My records indicate they will have 18 more.
    Senator Symington. That is 36.
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. How many has Syria got?
    Mr. Kuss. The order of battle indicates 26 here.
    Senator Symington. Twenty-six. That is a total of 62, 
correct?
    Mr. Kuss. Right.
    Senator Symington. Now how many did you say Egypt has?
    Mr. Kuss. 102. Those are just Mig-21's.
    Senator Symington. But the SU-7 is an improved Mig-21, is 
it not?
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. That is 38 additional SU-7's in the 
UAR.
    Senator Symington. Well, I mean do you not want to include 
the best they have got? The figure I got in Cairo last month 
was 60 SU-7's. But you have got 38; you have 102 and 38.
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. I would like to check.
    Senator Symington. That is 140 and 62. That is over 200 of 
the latest model fighters that those three countries have. Why 
do you not sell more F-4's to Iran if you want to put them in a 
balance of power position against these three countries? In 
other words, what do you really do for the Shah by giving him 
one or two squadrons of F-4's if your premise is correct that 
these three countries are enemies and they have over a hundred 
of the most modern Russian fighters. I am following Senator 
Fulbright's thinking on this.

                     OUR MILITARY POSITION IN IRAN

    You have been to Iran and so have I. It is a country where 
there are very rich people and very poor people. What good does 
it do to let them take their resources, and buy these airplanes 
from us, if they get them at all, as against what they could do 
with that money for the betterment of their economy because the 
number of planes that you have agreed on does not make them 
safe against these countries. Incidentally, all these latter 
countries are really satellites of the Soviet Union, are they 
not?
    Mr. Kuss. They certainly are.
    Senator Symington. Therefore, if the Soviet Union wanted to 
move against Iran, the military imbalance is still stronger, is 
it not?
    Mr. Kuss. It certainly is. May I answer the question?
    Senator Symington. I am just asking a few as we go along.
    As I understand it, we are selling military equipment to 
them, sophisticated military equipment; and the Soviet Union is 
selling them unsophisticated military equipment, plus a 
tremendous steel mill, for which they are going to be paid in 
natural gas, and in oil. Is that correct?
    Mr. Kuss. That is correct.
    Senator Symington. Would you say that in our effort to 
preserve a military position which is at best theoretical, we 
are passing over the economic control of the country to the 
Soviet Union?
    Mr. Kuss. I do not see it that way. With a few projects, I 
do not see it at all. I would believe that the relationship of 
our western influence in both the economic area and the 
military area is probably about on the order of the $1.4 
billion military to $100 million Soviet.

                        SOVIET INFLUENCE IN IRAN

    Senator Symington. But we are putting the Soviet Union in 
about equilibrium when it comes to economic control.
    Mr. Kuss. I do not believe so.
    Senator Symington. You do not think so?
    Mr. Kuss. No, sir.
    Senator Symington. You think we still control the economy 
of Iran?
    Mr. Kuss. First of all, I do not believe that the word 
``control'' is one that the Soviets use.
    Senator Symington. What do you think the word should be?
    Mr. Kuss. I believe that the good influence, if you will, 
that we have in Iran is sufficiently great, in a preponderance, 
in a majority, to warrant the course of action that we took, 
and that was the on balance decision of both our economists, 
our political people, and our military people.
    Senator Symington. You told the subcommittee this afternoon 
that we did our best to prevent the sale of the Russian 
military equipment to Iran, but we were unsuccessful. Is that 
correct?
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. And at the same time you also told the 
committee that the Iranians are working out with the Russians a 
big steel mill, and that they are going to have, with the help 
of the British and the Russians, a $400 million gas pipeline 
with which they are going to pay for this military equipment, 
along with gas. Is that correct?
    Mr. Kuss. That is right.
    Senator Symington. So there is a major recent economic 
influx of the Soviet Union into Iran, and also a major and 
unprecedented movement of military equipment into Iran from the 
Soviet Union, correct?
    Mr. Kuss. Not in proportion to our influence.
    Senator Symington. But there is a major influx.
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir; there has been a change.
    Senator Symington. And all told, the operations of the 
Soviets, economic and military together, for say the last 18 
months, is greater than our own; so in effect we are moving 
more out of the picture with our grant-in-aid and our military 
sales, and our economic sales; and the Soviets are moving more 
into the picture.
    Mr. Kuss. We are----
    Senator Symington. Is that correct?
    Mr. Kuss. No, sir. We are hardly moving out of the picture 
militarily. We have found other monies have been given away to 
substitute for the military side of the equation.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   ARMS SALES TO WEST GERMANY [P. 21]

    Senator Fulbright. You said the decision to sell in Teheran 
was made at the highest level after considering all aspects. I 
assume you mean the relative need of their domestic economy, 
and you finally came up with a decision that they needed these 
arms, is that correct?
    Mr. Kuss. As well as the politics of whether we can stand 
the Russian situation.
    Senator Fulbright. Politics.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                                [P. 22]

    Mr. Kuss. All of these have to be considered. It has to be 
required, must be more economically purchaseable in the United 
States. Then they will endeavor to do it. Now, the problem 
today is not in meeting the basic part of that agreement. The 
problem today is essentially the basic internal German economic 
problem, a budget that cannot be changed materially because of 
a revenue system that is dependent upon revenues from the 
States, a requirement for a complete tax reform system.
    Today the German armed forces have one-half the procurement 
budget in 1967 that they had in 1963. So you can imagine just 
that kind of a change. Why? Because they have not been able to 
go along with the increases that would have been necessary to 
keep up their total establishment because of the revenue 
limitations in the total federal program.
    Now, this is something we cannot control It is something 
that they must control, and I want to make clear that our 
agreement with them is that yes, they will balance, they will 
endeavor to procure equipment, if it is required, and if it is 
economical to do so, and for five years they have done so.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed, to 
reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, MARCH 16, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 2:10 p.m., in 
Room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, 
and Case.
    Eugene Groves, President, National Student Association, 
accompanied by Richard Stearnes, International Affairs Vice 
President, testified on the association of the National Student 
Association with the C.I.A.
    [The committee adjourned at 4:05 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                         MONDAY, MARCH 20, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in 
Room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, 
Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Pell, 
McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Case and Cooper.
    S. Con. Res. 16, extending greetings to Canada on the 
occasion of its Centennial, was ordered reported favorably.
    S. 623, International Bridge Bill, was ordered reported 
favorably.
    S. 1029, to improve certain benefits for employees who 
serve in high risk situations, and for other purposes, was 
discussed and no action taken.
    Ex. E, 89/1, 90/1, Amendments to the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, was ordered reported 
favorably.
    Ex. O, 89/2, International Telecommunication Convention, 
was discussed and carried over.
    Ex. D, 90/1, Treaty on Outer Space, was discussed and it 
was decided to have some items clarified by someone from 
downtown before further consideration.
    S.J. Res. 53, recommending increased assistance to Latin 
America, was discussed and a hearing set for Thursday p.m. was 
moved up to Tuesday, March 21, p.m.
    [The committee adjourned at 12:15 p.m.]


                           BRIEFING ON AFRICA

                              ----------                              


                        Tuesday, March 28, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
                    Subcommittee on African Affairs
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3: 10 p.m. in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Eugene J. McCarthy (chairman 
of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators McCarthy and Hickenlooper.
    Also Present: Senators Symington and Carlson.
    Mr. Marcy, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Bader of the committee 
staff.
                              ----------                              

    Senator McCarthy. Do you want to just talk to us, Mr. 
Palmer? This is kind of a new committee, and we have no policy 
with reference to Africa. If you do not have one, why we are in 
good shape.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH PALMER II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR 
  AFRICAN AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY: FRED L. HADSEL, DIRECTOR, 
 OFFICE OF INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS; AND WILLIAM E. LANG, DEPUTY 
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AFRICAN AND FOREIGN MILITARY 
                            RIGHTS)

    Mr. Palmer. Maybe between the two of us we can devise one, 
Mr. Chairman.
    Senator McCarthy. We ought to hear what it is. If you would 
like to talk to us generally about two or three items that we 
have indicated in the letter, why I think that would be a good 
beginning.
    Mr. Palmer. Fine.
    You had mentioned that you would like to discuss the 
military programs in Africa. Would you like to start on that, 
Mr. Chairman?
    Senator McCarthy. I guess that is as good as any.
    Senator Hickenlooper. There are only two things I want to 
discuss in Africa: Rhodesia and South Africa.

                     NORTH AFRICAN MILITARY PROBLEM

    Senator McCarthy. Why do we not do a quick one on the North 
African military problem, and then we will go to South Africa.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, of 
course this situation in North Africa has been one of 
continuing concern for us. As you know, there have been 
tensions in the area in the past, but they have been kept under 
fairly manageable control, with the exception of one clash 
between the Algerians and the Moroccans back in 1963. On the 
whole, our military program in North Africa until just a couple 
of years ago was a fairly modest one. We have been supplying 
both Morocco and Tunisia for some time since independence with 
military assistance.
    Mr. Lang can give you the figures if you would like them.
    But what has given the problem increased importance in the 
last two or three years has been the very massive Soviet 
buildup, supply of arms to Algeria. This again, of course, 
during the Ben Bella regime. It has continued on under 
Boumedienne and has achieved very, very substantial 
proportions, about $180 million worth of military assistance to 
Algeria since 1963.
    It is not only the quantity of it, but it is the types of 
weapons that have given both the Moroccans and the Tunisians 
concern--jet bombers, fighters, surface to air missiles and 
other very advanced types of equipment--with the result that 
quite an imbalance has been created between the armed forces of 
Algeria and those of Morocco on the one side, and Tunisia on 
the other.
    Now, we have done a lot of skull practice to try to get our 
best estimates as to why this has come about and how it has 
come about.

                           ALGERIA AND EGYPT

    I think our best estimate involves a number of factors. 
First of all, under the Ben Bella regime Algeria was, of 
course, committed to export revolution. They were training 
guerrillas. We have good reason to believe they trained them 
for the Congo and for other areas, and it was a very 
revolutionary government. Boumedienne----
    Senator Hickenlooper. And an ally of Nasser.
    Mr. Palmer. I am sorry.
    Senator Hickenlooper. And an ally of Nasser.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes.
    When Boumedienne came to power he downplayed this, and the 
direction of his policy has been much more toward trying to 
develop Algeria internally. Nevertheless we think that most of 
these commitments were made during the Ben Bella period and 
have been continued during the Boumedienne period.
    As you know, Algeria emerged into independence with a Maqui 
type force, and the Algerian government was faced with the 
necessity of converting that into a more traditional and modern 
standing army.
    There was a certain amount of speculation that what may 
well have happened is Ben Bella took a look at what the Soviets 
were doing for Egypt and said, ``I don't really know what I 
need, but you tell me what I need.'' The Soviets used this at a 
time when their relationships with Algeria were extremely 
favorable to try to put in a lot of equipment hoping to 
ingratiate themselves and buttress their influence that really 
was over and above Algeria's needs.
    Then, of course----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Do you mind if I interrupt?
    Mr. Palmer. No, sir.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Is it possible that this is a squeeze 
play on the part of the Russians with Egypt on the one side and 
Algeria on the other, to squeeze out Libya and Tunisia.
    Mr. Palmer. I think this may have been one--an original 
part of the strategy.
    Senator Hickenlooper. And eventually isolate Morocco and so 
on.
    Mr. Palmer. I think this could have been an original part 
of the strategy, Senator. However, I think that Boumedienne's 
relations with the Soviets have not been nearly as close as Ben 
Bella's were, and I doubt if it is--nor Boumedienne's 
relationships with Egypt, with Nasser are as close as Ben 
Bella's were, although Boumedienne will be attending a meeting 
in the next few days in Cairo along with some of the other so-
called progressives in Africa.
    But thus far----
    Senator McCarthy. What are the cultural differences between 
Algeria and Egypt? They are considerable, are they not?
    Mr. Palmer. They are considerable, yes. There is, of 
course, very great, strong Berber influence on the Algerians.
    Senator McCarthy. Yes.
    Mr. Palmer. They do consider themselves as Arabs, but as a 
different type and a different part of the Arab world.
    I think there are other factors, too, that led to this 
massive Algerian buildup. First of all, the fact they did get a 
rather bloody nose in this 1963 conflict with Morocco and also 
the fact that the government in Algeria is a military regime, 
and the man in power has to be in a position of reasonably 
satisfying the military commanders to continue to get their 
support.
    So that I think the rationale, I think, and the explanation 
for all of these things is found in this combination of 
factors.

                        NO AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS

    Now, we do not really think that the present government of 
Algeria has any aggressive intentions with respect to either 
Morocco or Tunisia.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Why are they building up their 
military forces?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, as I say, I think this is partly an 
inheritance of the past from the Ben Bella regime, partly 
transformation of their military forces into a more traditional 
army. I think it is partly an overreaction to the beating they 
took in 1963. I think it is generally part of their suspicions 
as a revolutionary regime that somebody may try to take their 
revolution away from them. I think it is partly because they 
are a military regime in and of themselves.
    As I say, we do not really think that Boumedienne--who is 
quite different, we think, from Ben Bella--really has any 
present intention of taking a crack at either Morocco or 
Tunisia, nor do I think that the Moroccans or the Tunisians 
really think this is a serious present possibility. But what 
worries them very much is the future.
    Algeria is still not an entirely stable government by any 
means. There is internal dissidence within the country. One 
cannot be sure that there may not be further changes within the 
country.
    Furthermore, about 2,000 Algerians have gone to the Soviet 
Union for military training, and although I think there is good 
reason to believe that not too many of these have been 
indoctrinated, nevertheless it may well be and could easily be 
that a number of them have been. In the event that there was a 
change of government, and given this huge military machine that 
is being built up, this is what really concerns the Moroccans 
and the Tunisians and has caused them to look to their own 
weaknesses and to come to us in terms of assistance.
    There is, of course, always the danger in the meanwhile, 
too, that there may be a mishap. The border between Morocco and 
Algeria is, of course, a disputed border. There has been 
trouble there in the past, but since 1963--and particularly 
since Boumedienne came to power--they have usually found a 
peaceful means of reconciling their differences.
    Moreover, the OAU, the Organization of African Unity, has 
set up a commission to try to deal with this problem and to try 
to bring about a reconciliation between the two. I think this 
has had a deterrent and helpful effect in minimizing the 
possibility of mishaps.

                     CONDITION OF THE MOROCCAN KING

    Nevertheless, the problem of an arms race is very much 
there. As you are all aware, I know, when the King of Morocco 
was here very recently, he did again reiterate to us a request 
that he had made some months before, which we had tried to 
resist at that time, for further defensive weapons. At the time 
we were resisting, of course, the full extent of the Algerian 
buildup was not clear, but in view of the intervening period 
and greater clarity about the extent and the quality of this 
buildup, we felt that there were legitimate defensive 
requirements.
    Senator Hickenlooper. It seems I saw a story in the paper 
that he had a heart attack just recently.
    Mr. Palmer. I do not believe it was a heart attack. This is 
Bourguiba, I think, that you are talking about.
    Senator Hickenlooper. No, both of them.
    Mr. Palmer. Well----
    Senator Hickenlooper. The story I saw.
    Mr. Palmer. In Hassan's case, I do not think it really can 
be characterized as a heart attack. It was apparently a 
circulatory ailment, and they say it was short of a heart 
attack but enough to constitute a warning, so----
    Senator Symington. It was an attack on the blood that did 
not reach the heart.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Only the red corpuscles.
    Senator Symington. They do not believe in integration. 
[Laughter.]

                          A FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM

    Mr. Palmer. So this is essentially the program that we have 
at the present time. We have agreed to sell $14 million worth 
of arms to the Moroccans. The Tunisians have also made requests 
on us for additional assistance to build up a minimal deterrent 
force in Tunisia. Their armed forces are extremely weak at the 
present time. At their request, we have under study a program 
of about $25 million spread over five years, to build their 
armed forces up to give them a minimal, as I say, deterrent.
    We have only committed ourselves to one year's tranche of 
this, the first year for $5 million.
    Senator Symington. You say ``tranche,'' that lovely little 
word. You give them five years to draw on.
    Mr. Palmer. No, we have only said that we would supply them 
$5 million worth of equipment this year.
    Senator Symington. What is the tranche aspect of that?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, as I said, it is a five-year program, but 
the only thing we are committed to is the first year of that at 
the present time.
    Senator Symington. Can I ask a question there?
    Senator Hickenlooper. Go ahead. You are chairman.
    Senator Symington. When you have a first year commitment 
and only agree to come through with the money for the first 
year, how do you define the rest of the four years? Semi-
commitment, or is there some tricky word that describes that?
    Mr. Palmer. Tranche was perhaps not a good word for me to 
use.
    Senator Symington. I was not thinking of tranche so much, 
but I was thinking of how can you have a five-year agreement if 
you only agree to give them the money for one year?
    Mr. Palmer. No, we have not got a five-year agreement. We 
gave them a report that would provide them with a minimal 
defense capability over a period of five years.
    Senator Symington. Who made the report?
    Mr. Palmer. We did.
    Senator Symington. Who is ``we''?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, the Department of Defense--Bill, do you 
want to speak to this?
    Mr. Lang. Yes, Mr. Senator.

                        MILITARY TEAM IN TUNISIA

    A military team went to Tunisia at the request of President 
Bourguiba to see what changes or modifications of the Tunisian 
armed forces would be needed to give them the best defensive 
capability they could have taking into account their limited 
resources.
    Senator Symington. When was this?
    Mr. Lang. This was a year ago last November.
    Senator Symington. What was the name of the general who 
headed it up?
    Mr. Lang. It was not a general, but a colonel by the name 
of Clowes.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, while you were gone I took 
the liberty of asking a couple of questions, and I would like 
to pursue them a minute.
    Senator McCarthy. Go ahead.
    Senator Symington. The question was a five-year agreement 
with Tunisia, as a result of an investigation made by the 
Department of Defense presumably, Mr. Secretary, at the request 
of the State Department.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. By a Colonel Clowes, and he went over 
and told Tunisia they need $25 million to have a modern----
    Mr. Lang. If I may complete the discussion, Mr. Senator----
    Senator Symington. Let me just see if I got it straight up 
to this point: at his request we tell him he needs $25 million, 
which we are going to give them on the basis of a five-year 
agreement. But we only put up the money for the first year, $5 
million for the first year; is that right?
    Mr. Lang. I think it might be helpful, Senator, to go into 
a bit more detail as to what happened to the report.
    The study was made, as I said, at the request of President 
Bourguiba. Colonel Clowes headed a military team which stayed 
in Tunisia about three weeks, prepared a report which was 
reviewed by headquarters EUCOM, Commander, European Forces, 
also by the Joint Staff, and was endorsed by both.
    Colonel Clowes' report made a number of recommendations 
that the Tunisians should follow or carry out in reorganizing 
their forces, increasing the size of their forces to a 
relatively small extent, but also changing the size and 
composition of their units.
    The report also indicated that Tunisians would need 
additional equipment which they could absorb best over a five-
year period. This was not equipment that should be poured in at 
one point in time.

                            PLANES TO LIBYA

    Senator Symington. Are you in the State Department or 
Department of Defense?
    Mr. Lang. I am in the Defense Department.
    Senator Symington. Whom do you work for?
    Mr. Lang. John McNaughton.
    Senator Symington. You work for Mr. McNaughton.
    Mr. Lang. Yes.
    Senator Symington. You also sold some planes to Libya, have 
you not?
    Mr. Lang. Not as yet, sir.
    Senator Symington. But you plan to.
    Mr. Lang. The negotiations will be begun fairly shortly. 
Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. I thought we decided we were going to 
sell F-5s to Libya.
    Mr. Lang. The decision has been pretty much made, but the 
negotiations not.
    Senator McCarthy. Is this part of a general strategic plan 
for North Africa? I mean Tunisia and Libya?
    Mr. Lang. When you speak of a strategic plan, sir----
    Senator McCarthy. What you have recommended for Tunisia, 
did you conduct the same kind of study in Libya and make these 
recommendations?
    Mr. Lang. No. The Libyan sales agreement is not the result 
of a survey team report.
    Senator Symington. What is it the result of?
    Mr. Lang. The request of the Libyan government, sir.
    Senator Symington. You see, some of the people in the 
Department of Defense were very glad this committee was getting 
into this because they did not know what was going on 
themselves. So by golly, if people in your own building do not 
know, then I think we are entitled to find out. I say this with 
great respect, but it gets pretty complicated. At any rate, Mr. 
Chairman, would it be in order, as long as we are discussing 
the north littoral of Africa, that you give us a report on what 
you plan in Libya?
    Mr. Lang. Fine, sir. We have completed the discussion, I 
take it, on Tunisia.
    Senator Symington. No. I think they are all together. 
Exactly. What you are doing on Libya, the information that was 
volunteered to my office was that you had agreed to sell the F-
5's to Libya. So I would like to find out whether the 
information I got from Mr. McNaughton's department is correct. 
Would you check that out and let me know?
    Mr. Lang. Yes. I can recount now.
    Senator Symington. No, that is all right, but it seems to 
me you said we were planning on doing it. I understand we have 
done it, so I would like to have that point checked for the 
record and we can supply that.
    On Tunisia, as I understand, there is a team in Tunisia; in 
Morocco, I have been listening to----
    I am almost through, Mr. Chairman. I just want to try to 
understand. We are running right across here now. It looks like 
Rommel. We are moving right over here now to get this thing 
organized.

                           ROLE OF THE FRENCH

    The Algerians, when de Gaulle let them go, were French 
citizens; were they not? Is that correct?
    Mr. Lang. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. Algerians were French citizens before 
their independence.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes.
    Senator McCarthy. They were eligible for French 
citizenship.
    Senator Symington. I think they actually were.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Part of Metropolitan France.
    Mr. Palmer. The northern departments were part of 
Metropolitan France.
    Senator Symington. My last question or group of questions: 
We are discussing what has been done in Morocco; we will skip 
Algeria for the moment anyway. We are discussing what is being 
done in Tunisia. We are discussing--what is being done in 
Libya. Have we discussed with the French at the diplomatic 
level what we are doing in the north littoral of Africa?
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, we have. They are aware----
    Senator Symington. Are they aware of what we are doing in 
Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya?
    Mr. Palmer. I think they understand the reasons for it. Of 
course, their relationships with Morocco are not good at the 
present time. They have not been good with Tunisia although 
they are improving, and I think the French have been 
understanding of the reasons why we have given assistance to 
these countries.
    Senator Symington. How are they with Libya?
    Mr. Palmer. So far as Libya is concerned, I do not think 
they have professed any interest in this.
    Senator Symington. How about Algeria?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, of course we have not been giving 
assistance to Algeria.
    Senator Symington. I just wondered what their relationship 
with Algeria was.
    Mr. Palmer. Oh, I see. Their relationships are clouded by a 
number of financial problems at the present time. They have not 
had since independence much of a military relationship with 
Algeria, although they are now resuming the training of 
Algerians at St. Cyr, which is the beginning of a renewed 
French interest. They have sat back--we have thought somewhat 
too much--and watched this Soviet buildup going on. We have 
talked to them very frankly about it.
    They have professed not to be concerned about it. I have 
talked several times in the Quai about this myself. The last 
time I talked in January, I had a feeling they were becoming 
increasingly concerned about it.

                   FRENCH OPINION OF AMERICAN POLICY

    Senator Symington. One final question. I do not want to 
take too much time, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to get sort 
of the package feel of this part of the world.
    You say the French have understood what we are doing. Well, 
I understand what we are doing, I think, especially after the 
testimony. At least I understood most of what we are doing, but 
do they agree to this? Do they think we are following the sound 
course there? Do they approve of our arming Morocco, Tunisia, 
and Libya against Algeria?
    Mr. Palmer. I am not aware of any objections that they have 
interposed. Are you Bill?
    Mr. Lang. No.
    Senator Symington. Are they putting anything up themselves 
in order to help along a little bit? It is closer to them than 
it is to us.
    Mr. Palmer. If I can say, Senator, I would like to come 
back to the Tunisian one again, too, because, as I said, we 
have encouraged the Tunisians to look elsewhere for assistance 
as well. We would like to spread this. We do not want to become 
the sole suppliers, and so forth, and the Tunisians are talking 
to both the French and the Turks. We are hopeful that they may 
obtain assistance in those directions.
    We would hope very much, too, the Moroccan-French 
relationships would improve to the point that the French would 
find it possible to do more in Morocco as well.
    Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                            SOVIET INFLUENCE

    Senator McCarthy. Mr. Palmer, I do not know if you can do 
this under two or three general concepts, but do you look upon 
the arms buildup down there primarily as kind of a North 
African problem, probably psychological and traditional and at 
least contained in the North African context? Egypt, Algeria, 
Morocco--I believe this is the old game they have played for a 
long time. You are just using slightly more sophisticated 
instruments of war instead of horses and rifles.
    Mr. Palmer. I would say so, yes.
    Of course what is giving it an alarming dimension are the 
types of equipment that the Algerians are acquiring.
    Now we have got a similar sort of situation, of course, in 
the horn of Africa where again the Soviets are building up the 
Somalia forces in that area. This again gives us concern, 
although there, of course, the disparities are on Ethiopia's 
side, but of course Ethiopia is a much larger and more complex 
country.
    The question that arises is what the Soviet motivations are 
in all of this. I think they are probably the obvious ones of 
influence. I think it may also suit their purposes very well to 
create pressures on the adjoining states. This is one reason we 
have been so anxious to minimize U.S. supply of arms to the 
adjoining states so that they will not fall in the trap, and 
they recognize the trap here, too, I think.
    Senator McCarthy. What do the Algerians give in exchange 
for arms or the people in Somaliland?
    Mr. Palmer. I am sorry, sir.
    Senator McCarthy. What do they give in exchange for Soviet 
arms? Are these pretty much grants? The Algerians do not have 
much, do they?
    Mr. Palmer. I think in the case of Algeria it is half.
    Mr. Lang. It is either half and half or two-thirds, two-
thirds cash. When I say cash, credit, two-thirds credit and 
one-third grant.
    Senator McCarthy. How about Somalia? They do not have 
anything, do they?
    Mr. Lang. I think perhaps the terms are roughly the same. 
We do not have really too much information on the terms.
    Senator Hickenlooper. What kind of credit is it? This 
credit that is used is a loose term. And the cash, what kind of 
credit? Is that foreign exchange, acceptable foreign exchange, 
international foreign exchange such as dollars? What is the 
credit?
    Mr. Lang. It may be barter arrangements, sir. As I 
mentioned earlier, Senator, we really do not have that much 
hard information about the terms of the agreement between the 
Soviets and the Algerians.
    Senator McCarthy. They do not have much to give in 
exchange, do they?
    Mr. Palmer. Somalia does not.
    Senator McCarthy. Somalia does not have anything.
    Mr. Palmer. Algeria has somewhat more because there is a 
considerable amount of petroleum.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They get exchange out of oil.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes.
    Senator McCarthy. But the Russians do not need that kind of 
oil.
    Mr. Palmer. No, but it does in hard currencies.

                            WHEELUS AIR BASE

    Senator McCarthy. What about the overall strategic plans? 
You said we made a study in Tunisia and made these 
recommendations. Is this simply in terms of this North African 
complex or do our recommendations there and our concessions 
with reference to Libya involve somewhat more comprehensive 
strategic planning than just this self-contained North African 
complex?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, in the case of Tunisia, of course, we are 
interested in stability in the area. We are interested in the 
very prowestern orientation of Tunisia. Bourguiba has been 
extremely courageous in speaking out on a great many political 
issues of importance to us. He supported us on Vietnam. He has 
taken a very forward stance. This put him at odds with the rest 
of the Arab world with respect to the Arab-Israel conflict, and 
he has stood for a great deal in Africa and the Middle East.
    In the case of Libya, of course, our interests there are 
much more direct. We do have an extremely important facility 
there in Wheelus.
    Senator Symington. What is important about the Wheelus 
airbase?
    Mr. Palmer. In the Wheelus airbase?
    Senator McCarthy. Is it just a base or is it more than 
that?
    Senator Symington. I have been there, and I would like to 
hear the modern version.
    Mr. Palmer. As the Senator knows, the importance of the 
facility right now, it is supporting all of our U.S. NATO-
committed air forces in Europe, in terms of year-round gunnery 
training.
    Senator Symington. So if we decided to reduce our forces in 
Germany, for example, that would reduce the need for the Air 
Force base, would it not, at Wheelus, because that is where 
they do the staging?
    Mr. Palmer. In terms of the percentage that it would be 
used, but you would still have the requirement of forces in 
Europe that would need that type of facility.
    Senator McCarthy. Fleet support, in the Mediterranean.
    Mr. Palmer. No, these are basically in support of the U.S. 
Air Force units in Europe.
    Senator McCarthy. Is that right?
    Senator Symington. In other words, as I got the story when 
I was in Germany, Wheelus was very important because they could 
fly to Wheelus and fly around the desert when the weather would 
not let them fly in Germany.
    Mr. Palmer. Precisely.
    Senator Symington. You wonder, inasmuch as the weather in 
England is not as good as Germany, why they built about the 
greatest air force in the world in their day, but I suppose it 
is more comfortable this way.
    Senator McCarthy. When they decided peace will stay for a 
while, they decided to establish places in good climates.
    Senaor Symington. The thought occurs to me very seriously 
to see it all ties in together if you are going to maintain 
this picture over there, keeping these troops in Germany to the 
extent that we are keeping them and not following what 
President Eisenhower recommended years ago, pulling a lot of 
them out, and to the degree that you do not pull them out, 
Wheelus is important.
    When we had the staging base complex, which was long before 
the intercontinental ballistic missile, then these bases were 
terribly important. They were militarily important. Now I 
understand you say they are logistically important, but if 
there is nothing over there to support, then they become 
relatively unimportant. Is that not correct?
    Mr. Lang. If there were no forces in Europe to support.
    Senator Symington. Right. And we have spent a good many 
hundred million dollars in Spain where we are behind the 
Pyrenees. The bases there are great and the weather is just 
about as good. The bases are better as a whole; more bases 
there than one base at Wheelus and so forth.
    So this really ties into the whole operation over there.

                          THE PRIMARY THREATS

    I would like to ask this question: Based on what you are 
saying about Somaliland, and what we really are doing is, Mr. 
Chairman, we are arming all the countries that we think are for 
us in case they get attacked by Somalia or Algeria--or the UAR, 
of course--that is about the long and short of it, is it not?
    Mr. Palmer. What we are hoping there to do is to assure a 
minimal defensive posture.
    Senator Symington. Let me repeat my question.
    We are arming these countries in order to help them defend 
themselves in case they are attacked by Somalia, Algeria, or 
the UAR. Is that not correct?
    Mr. Palmer. Those are the primary threats to them, yes.
    Senator Symington. Or anybody else that wants to attack 
them.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes. That is correct.
    Senator Symington. Even France.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, sir. But when we say arming them, Senator, 
I would like to point out that we have held back and held down 
very much the quantities of arms that we have made available to 
these countries.
    Senator Symington. We are only arming------
    Mr. Palmer. To assure that they were minimal just to give 
them a deterrent capability, a defense capability so they would 
not be overrun before the matter could get to the U.N.

                    OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT

    Senator Symington. How do you know whether an F-5 airplane, 
which is a supersonic fighter and extremely able, can be used 
offensively or defensively? That is what I do not understand. 
Do you have anything in the contract that says the plane cannot 
go out of Tunisia?
    Mr. Lang. All of the military assistance agreements, sir, 
do specify that the equipment will be used only for internal 
security or self-defense.
    Senator Symington. Well, suppose they figured they were 
pretty confident that Libya was going to, that Algeria was 
going to attack them. Does the contract say they cannot attack 
Algeria unless Algeria attacks them?
    Mr. Lang. Self-defense, sir, usually means that you are 
attacked first.
    Senator Symington. Well, I know, but you are going to arm 
all these countries, and every time that happens we end up in a 
war.

                         SOVIET ARMS IN ALGERIA

    Mr. Lang. Senator, it may be helpful to give some 
dimensions to the Soviet buildup or the buildup of Soviet arms 
in Algeria.
    Senator Symington. I will tell you what I wish you would do 
for the record, Mr. Chairman, if it is in order.
    I wish you would give the details of the agreements and the 
wording of the agreements, if that is agreeable.
    Senator McCarthy. That would be fine. Also, if we could get 
a kind of total really as to what the Soviet has in this area 
in contrast with what we have got here.
    Mr. Lang. Would you care for some of that now, sir? I have 
some of the statistics.
    Mr. Palmer. I think it would help.
    Senator McCarthy. I think it would. I do not know, maybe 
you ought to swing it on around what we have got in other Arab 
countries. So far as Egypt is concerned, it plays both ways, 
does it not?
    Mr. Lang. Let me speak briefly, sir, to the buildup in 
Algeria and compare it to what the Tunisians and the Moroccans 
now have.
    Senator McCarthy. All right.
    Mr. Lang. In the case of Algeria and Morocco, the size of 
the armies are not too far apart; Morocco about 50,000 and 
Algeria 60,000. The Tunisians have 18,000.
    In terms of tanks, the Moroccans have 75. The Algerians 
have 429. The Tunisians have 17.
    In terms of artillery, the Moroccans have 191. Algeria 681. 
I do not have the statistics for Tunisia.
    Armored vehicles, Morocco 120. Algeria 535.
    Jet bombers, IL-28s. Algeria 27. I think close to 30 now, 
and we think they are going to 36. Morocco, none at all.
    Algeria, 97 Migs including the Mig-21 series.
    Senator Symington. How many?
    Mr. Lang. At least 25 or more.
    Senator McCarthy. Twenty-five of the 21s.
    Mr. Lang. That is right. There are 97 Migs in total.
    Senator Symington. Any SU-7s?
    Mr. Lang. No, sir. The Moroccans now have a grand total of 
13 aircraft, nine of which are Migs. You recall the Soviets had 
a program in Morocco in the late fifties and early sixties, so 
this is the type of imbalance that exists in Morocco.

                  AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE AGAINST ALGERIA

    Senator Symington. I would like to make this comment on the 
basis of that plus the figures you have given like $25 million. 
It is just a spit in the ocean what you are doing so far as 
giving them an adequate defense against Algeria, especially if 
the Soviets continue to build up in Algeria. Is that not a fair 
statement?
    Mr. Lang. The objective, Mr. Senator, is to give the 
Moroccans and the Tunisians a defense capability which they 
could employ taking into full account the advantages they have, 
given their defensive terrain, which would enable them to hold 
a major thrust for a period of some days until the U.N. or 
another international body could consider the problem.
    Senator Symington. Let me be straight on this, because I do 
not think there is anything more important in our foreign 
policy than what we are discussing today. It certainly has been 
an awfully ignorant subject around the Armed Services 
Committee.
    I do not know how much the Foreign Relations Committee 
knew, but we knew little or nothing about it on the Armed 
Services Committee. Are you saying that with these amounts that 
we are giving these countries that over a period of days or 
weeks, whatever is necessary, that they would defend themselves 
against the buildup in Algeria that you have just told us 
about.
    Mr. Lang. It is the judgment of the Joint Staff, sir, that 
with the type of equipment and the quantities which we have 
been speaking of, that the Moroccans and the Tunisians would be 
able to hold against an Algerian thrust for a period of days.
    Senator Symington. For how long?
    Mr. Lang. This would vary, sir, where the attack would take 
place. The minimum estimates are four to seven days.
    Senator Symington. So we are giving them four to seven days 
of hold until we can get to the United Nation. Is that it?
    Mr. Lang. Yes.
    Mr. Palmer. Until they can get to the U.N.
    Senator Symington. When you say the Joint Staff, you mean 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Mr. Palmer. The joint organization which supports the Joint 
Chiefs. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. And these are the figures they have 
approved now to make it possible for these countries to defend 
themselves against Algeria, is that correct?
    Mr. Palmer. Yes.
    Senator Symington. Thank you.
    Senator Hickenlooper. What is the comparative strength in 
hardware between Algeria and Morocco?
    Mr. Lang. If I can just----
    Senator Hickenlooper. As of now as against the time when 
the Algerians were not successful against the Moroccans.
    Mr. Lang. I do not have the statistics, Senator, with me, 
but I would say----
    Senator Hickenlooper. I mean the balance. Is the balance 
about the same now as it was then?
    Mr. Lang. No, because the Soviet buildup has taken place in 
Algeria since 1964. There have been large--huge quantities of 
arms going into Algeria from '64 through the present.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Thanks.

                         COMMITMENT TO TUNISIA

    Mr. Palmer. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I can clarify just 
one other statement that related to Senator Symington's summing 
up. We do not have a five-year commitment to Tunisia. What we 
have given the Tunisians in response to their request is a 
report that is based upon a five-year buildup of the Tunisian 
armed forces. The only thing that we have committed ourselves 
to is one year's assistance to them, and, as I say, we have 
encouraged them to look to other countries to assist in 
supplying equipment for the remainder.
    Now, that is not to say we would not do something more in 
subsequent years. But I just wanted to make that clear. We do 
not a have a five-year commitment to Tunisia at the present 
time.

                            NO DEFENSE PACT

    Senator McCarthy. Mr. Palmer, could I ask, back eight or 
ten years ago when we were bent on working out treaties like 
CENTO and SEATO, there was some talk about an African 
arrangement of some kind, as a kind of a southern tier which 
would have involved what, Ethiopia, Libya, and kind of close 
off Egypt, the Sudan. I think we were talking about that. Is 
that idea still around?
    Mr. Palmer. No. The idea is not current, Mr. Chairman, at 
the present time, and I think that the nonaligned posture of 
all of these countries----
    Senator McCarthy. No plans for the Sudan then at the 
present time.
    Mr. Palmer. No, sir.
    Senator Hickenlooper. What were you about to say about the 
nonaligned posture?
    Mr. Palmer. I think the nonaligned posture of these 
countries would not make such a defense arrangement possible, 
even if we wanted to assume additional obligations which we 
have not wanted to in that context, in that area.
    Senator McCarthy. Frank, I do not know whether we need to 
press this North Africa.
    Senator Carlson. I have been very interested in this. I 
just see a picture on this map, and I can see these countries 
where the Soviet Union has been building up. I can see also 
where we have our military posture.
    It gets back to when, I think it was Secretary Rusk was 
before our committee, he talked about the balancing of arms 
between nations. In other words, if one country got a little 
ahead, it was our policy to build up the neighbors. I do not 
know how far we can go. Maybe we should be going more 
extensively than we are, I do not know. It is a problem.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, it is a difficult problem, Senator. We do 
not want to see them lose their independence. At the same time, 
we do not want to see them dissipate resources that should be 
going into economic development, and I should add to that that 
the countries themselves do not want to. Both Bourguiba and 
Hassan have given very high priority to their economic 
development programs, but both of them do feel that this 
imbalance does threaten their security.

                       COMPARISON TO VIETNAM WAR

    Senator Symington. Let me ask this question, if I may.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes.
    Senator Symington. You have heard of the Vietnam war.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. And we put in heaven knows what, great 
tens of millions of dollars, and the people supplying the Viet 
Cong have put in not even a small fraction of what we have put 
in money and equipment. For example, they put in no air forces 
at all really to speak of, except in North Vietnam. They have 
nothing in South Vietnam.
    If these people want to be independent down here, is it 
necessary for us to supply them with these--with all this 
equipment? Is there not a little Viet Cong in their hearts, 
too, that they want to be independent and they are willing to 
fight and die for what they think is right in those countries?
    Mr. Palmer. I think there is that feeling, but I think that 
they feel that they need a minimal capability in order to do 
this. I think what we have been supplying, Senator, is a pretty 
minimal capability.
    Senator Symington. If we want to support the regimes in 
this country, for example, as I have told the full committee 
already and the Armed Services Committee, the biggest shock I 
think I have ever had in armaments is the degree of the 
armament of the United Arab Republic by the Soviets.
    I was just in Cairo a few weeks ago, and I was surprised 
the same before. They have tremendously increased their arms. I 
do not think there is any remote chance if they made an all-out 
attack there that anybody has the ability to defend themselves. 
I would stake that on everything I have learned, assuming they 
can operate the equipment.
    If we are going to arm these people, and we have got a much 
bigger gross national product that the Defense Department is 
always talking about and justifying the budget, why do we not 
really arm them?
    I am only asking. Why just give them a little minimum 
business to make them last a few days and then go down the 
mine?
    Mr. Palmer. Of course that involves a lot of recurrent 
costs, Senator, that we had thought that our best posture here 
was to give them a minimum capability. That is the best 
judgment of our people. They should place their real reliance 
on the United Nations.

                    EVALUATING THE EGYPTIAN BUILDING

    Senator McCarthy. How do you evaluate the Egyptian buildup, 
Mr. Palmer, and the Algerian one? Is this the Soviets showing 
off and saying ``These are our friends,'' and saying ``Look 
what we give to them''?
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, I think that is a large element.
    Senator McCarthy. They do not anticipate they will be used.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, I think it is a large element.
    Senator McCarthy. So we take a calculated risk that this 
power will not be brought into action, or, if it is, why we can 
hold long enough for the U.N. to take some action.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes.
    Senator McCarthy. Is the U.N. concerned about this? Is 
there any special action there?
    Mr. Palmer. Yes. I started to say that King Hassan, when he 
was last here in the United States, did have a talk with the 
Secretary General of the United Nations in which he followed up 
with a letter asking the Secretary General to intervene with 
both Morocco and Algeria to see if it would not be possible to 
reach some sort of an understanding to hold the level of 
armaments down.
    I would have to say in all confidence that I do not think 
that this was handled as skillfully as it should have been by 
the Moroccans because before the Secretary General had an 
opportunity to explore this at all with the Algerians, where 
the Moroccans published the letter, and this inevitably 
resulted in a reaction from the Algerians who have taken the 
position that there are a number of differences between the two 
of them.
    It is not only the level of armaments, but there is the 
question of the disputed border. The disputed border is in the 
hands of the O.A.U., and therefore----
    Senator Symington. O.A.U.?
    Mr. Palmer. Organization of African Unity, which is the 
continental organization of African states. And that, 
therefore, they did not think the United Nations was a proper 
place for this.
    We have been hopeful nevertheless, that at some point, if 
it is not in the U.N. forum maybe in the O.A.U. forum or some 
other forum, that some means can be found of trying to reach 
some sort of an agreement, some sort of an accommodation with 
respect to levels of forces, not only in this area but in the 
area of the Horn.
    But it will not be an easy thing to bring about or to 
encourage.
    Senator McCarthy. Well, I think maybe for today we probably 
ought to leave this stand as it is. A request has been made for 
additional information which I am sure you will supply.

                            CASH AND CREDIT

    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one thing more, 
just for a minute?
    What are the terms of the deal with Morocco and what are 
the terms of the deal from the standpoint of what Senator 
Hickenlooper was referring to? We talk about credit. Could we 
have the details of the deal language?
    Mr. Palmer. Fine, sir.
    Senator Symington. As to what we agree to take in the way 
of credit terms and how much cash is involved and whether we 
are using counterpart funds and whether the loans, if they have 
any incident to the materials, bear an interest rate and if so 
how much?
    Mr. Palmer. I can give you details on the Moroccan 
arrangement now, sir.
    Senator Symington. You go right ahead and put it in the 
record if you want, because the Chairman would like to go.
    Mr. Palmer. The Moroccan package, 1965, involved 12 F-5s, 
spare parts and AGE, totaled $11 million.
    Senator Hickenlooper. What? How much?
    Mr. Palmer. $11 million, sir.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you.
    Mr. Palmer. Of that $11 million, the United States made a 
grant for components of $5 million; $6 million is extended in 
credit. Terms, 3 percent, ten years, repayable in hard 
currency, 20 semiannual payments of the same size, sir.
    Senator Symington. And Tunisia?
    Mr. Palmer. Tunisia the negotiations have not been 
completed, sir.
    Senator Symington. And Libya?
    Mr. Palmer. Libya the negotiations have not started, sir.
    Senator Symington. Thank you.

                       SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

    Senator McCarthy. Do you want to start on South Africa with 
a statement or just a question? Do you want to give us a kind 
of review on that Rhodesian sanction problem and where it is 
leading and what we really have in mind?
    Senator Hickenlooper. South Africa, if I may interject--
first I would like to have an explanation for the fiasco of the 
Enterprise or whatever it was in Johannesburg or in Capetown.
    Mr. Palmer. Capetown.
    Senator Hickenlooper. To me that is the most unconscionable 
thing we have done in a long time. I would like to have an 
explanation that makes me feel more kindly toward our own 
people for pulling that kind of a thing down there.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, as you know, Senator, in 1965 the 
aircraft carrier Enterprise was due to put in to South Africa 
for refueling.
    Senator Hickenlooper. 1965?
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, just to give a piece of background on 
this.
    At that time, the government of the Republic of South 
Africa imposed certain racial restrictions on certain 
operational aspects of the visit.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They did that at the time the visit 
was proposed.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, in 1965.
    Senator Hickenlooper. At the time the visit was proposed.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes.
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is right.
    Mr. Palmer. Specifically they required that the flight 
crews that would be operating planes from the ship to shore and 
so forth would have to be subject to South Africa's apartheid 
regulations.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I understand that.
    Mr. Palmer. As a result of that, a decision was made at 
that time not to put Enterprise in, but to refuel at sea.
    This year or last year, when the question of the FDR 
transiting from Vietnam to the United States came up, the 
Department of Defense took the position that there was an 
operational need to go into Capetown for refueling at that 
time.
    I believe, and Mr. Lang can confirm this, that there were 
Atlantic maneuvers going on at the present time and tankers 
were not readily available to refuel at sea. Moreover, there 
would have been a cost of some $250,000, I think, to refuel at 
sea.
    Now, at that time we made inquiries of the South African 
Government as to whether or not they would impose racial 
restrictions with respect to the operational aspects of the FDR 
visit.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Operational aspects. What do you mean 
by operational?
    Mr. Palmer. Flights from the carrier to the shore.
    Senator Symington. What about those flights? What is the 
apartheid significance of those flights?
    Mr. Palmer. That they would have had to go into South 
African airports, airfields, and so forth, and that any crews 
on board, if there were Negroes on board, would have to use the 
African facilities and would not be allowed to use the white 
European facilities.

                   SOUTH AFRICA'S APARTHEID POLICIES

    Mr. Lang. If I might, in '65, the South African Government 
in effect placed a condition on us that we could not have Negro 
crew members aboard the aircraft coming from the carrier to the 
airfield facilities.
    Senator McCarthy. Oh, the problem did not arise.
    Mr. Lang. Because they did not have the apartheid 
facilities for them.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes.
    In any event, on the basis of those assurances that they 
would not attach such conditions, the FDR was authorized to go 
in. But shore leave was only authorized on the basis that it 
would be for integrated activities, and quite a range of 
integrated activities had been worked out by our embassy down 
there and with various people in the community.
    The commanding officer of the vessel, however, felt--and 
there many other arrangements that were worked out by local 
citizens and so forth that would have been segregated.
    Under the circumstances it was decided that shore leave 
would only be authorized on the basis of integrated activities.
    The commander of the ship, with the concurrence of our 
ambassador, felt that this was not really practicable and that 
he could not give--if he authorized shore leave on this basis, 
one could not be sure that certain members of the crew would 
not be subject to South Africa's apartheid laws. Consequently, 
he decided, with the ambassador's concurrence, to cancel shore 
leave.

                          A CALCULATED INSULT

    Senator Hickenlooper. Therefore, it seems all the blame for 
this--the buck is being passed to the commander of the vessel.
    I have had some information from South Africa, not only 
from Americans but others, who said that some of the newspaper 
stories said it was an absolute and astounding surprise to 
these people who went on board to welcome them to find out, 
when they went on board for the first time, the commander of 
the vessel had to tell them that all leaves would be canceled. 
That was after several days of preparation, several days of 
discussion, several days when the arrangements were made.
    I do not care whether they landed at South Africa or not, 
or went into Capetown. That is beside the point. But to go 
through all of this and then do what to me appears to be--and I 
would like to be straightened out on it--a calculated insult to 
South Africa. I think it has all the earmarks of an actually 
calculated insult.
    Mr. Palmer. No, sir. It was not a calculated insult. I can 
assure you categorically.
    Senator Hickenlooper.. It has that appearance to me.
    Mr. Palmer. Senator, the problem arose from the fact, I 
think, that the instructions were sent to the captain of the 
vessel. I do not think the captain of the vessel should be 
blamed. I certainly do not blame him--pretty much at the last 
minute.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I thought you said it was his 
decision.
    Mr. Palmer. It was his decision.
    Senator Hickenlooper. What were the instructions sent to 
him?
    Mr. Palmer. But I think what gave rise to his problem, 
Senator, was the fact that it was rather late notification to 
him that the crews should only go ashore under integrated 
circumstances, and he felt that this was too difficult. He felt 
that this was impossible really to carry out.
    Senator McCarthy. So they never told him not to put them 
ashore, but merely told him if they go ashore they would have 
to be integrated.
    Mr. Palmer. That is correct. They could only go ashore for 
integrated activities.

                REACTION TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION

    Senator McCarthy. Why was that order so late in coming?
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is the point.
    Senator McCarthy. Was it after the congressional resolution 
or whatever it was that was introduced up here? What set if 
off? Anything in particular, or was it just slow in coming 
downtown?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, Bill, do you want to say anything?
    I think it was--I am trying to reconstruct something that 
took place while I was not here. As a matter of fact, I was 
overseas.
    Senator McCarthy. There was an earlier incident similar to 
this. There was a congressional protest against landing.
    Mr. Palmer. There is no doubt about it.
    Senator McCarthy. Two or three years ago.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes.
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is what he was talking about.
    Mr. Palmer. There is no doubt about it.
    Senator Hickenlooper. The Enterprise.
    Mr. Palmer. There was a lot of concern expressed in this 
country about the possibility of men who had been fighting 
together in Vietnam being placed in a position of then having 
to subject themselves to the practices of apartheid in South 
Africa. And, as I say, the decision that they should only go 
ashore on an integrated basis was a rather last minute 
decision. It put the captain, there is no doubt about it, in a 
difficult position. He had a judgment to make. He made it with 
the concurrence of our ambassador.
    Senator Symington. Could I ask a question why this was not 
thought out before?
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is the whole burden of my 
concern about this thing.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, there were two things: there was this 
aspect of it; and there was the operational aspect of it. The 
fact that the tankers were not available; the fact that there 
was a considerable sum of money involved here in refueling at 
sea.
    Senator Hickenlooper. But if you say it cost $250,000 not 
to refuel there, have you figured out what it cost as a result 
of what we did, aside from what the cost in good will was?
    Mr. Palmer. No, sir.
    Senator Hickenlooper. You might get that up sometime.
    Where did we ultimately end up by refueling?
    Mr. Palmer. We refueled there, but the crew was kept on 
board.
    Senator Hickenlooper. So we saved the money.
    Mr. Palmer. So we saved the money. Yes, sir.
    Senator Hickenlooper. And set back relations between our 
two countries and the possibility of settling the apartheid 
business by several years, I think.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, we are now reviewing, as we have 
indicated, the whole question of port facilities in South 
Africa.

                        DIVERSION OF OTHER SHIPS

    As you know, subsequent to that, we did divert another 
vessel to Mombasa while this review is going on. We are 
undertaking this with the Department of Defense and will be 
reaching some policy decision.
    Senator Symington. Where is Mombasa?
    Mr. Palmer. In Kenya, Senator.
    Senator Symington. If you could divert one to Kenya without 
any danger of trouble, why could you not divert the Enterprise 
to Kenya?
    Mr. Palmer. The FDR?
    Senator Symington. Or the FDR.
    Mr. Lang. The port facilities were not adequate, sir, to 
handle a ship the size of the FDR.
    Senator Symington. It was the size of the ship.
    Mr. Lang. Yes, the draft of the vessel.
    Senator Symington. Could you not run a line out, keep her 
in deep enough water to refuel it? You do not have to bring a 
ship to port to refuel it.
    Mr. Lang. They do not have that type of facilities in 
Mombasa, sir.
    Senator Symington. I see.

                     PROMOTING BETTER UNDERSTANDING

    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, I still do not know. I still 
say that my whole inquiry goes not to the point that we did not 
have them land at Capetown. It is the fact that for days ahead 
of time they made arrangements, I am told by people who were on 
the ground down there. They said the South Africans had bunting 
and welcome groups.
    Mr. Palmer. That is correct; they did.
    Senator Hickenlooper. It was going to be a great thing for 
them. And the idea around in that area was that this would do 
more to get a little better understanding between South Africa 
and the U.S. They tried to treat the colored people right, and 
they would not isolate them off in compounds and all this sort 
of stuff. Yet they just had a wet sock thrown in their faces, 
not the day before or the morning before, but at the time when 
they went on board the carrier to welcome them. That is the 
first time they heard.
    Mr. Palmer. That is correct. It happened when some of the 
officials were on board.
    Senator Hickenlooper. On the deck of the ship.
    Mr. Palmer. That is correct.
    Senator Hickenlooper. To me it was the most outstandingly 
boorish thing I heard of from an international standpoint. In 
other words, if they wanted to pass up Capetown or just go in 
there to fuel and have it known in advance they were not going 
to let anybody have shore leave, that is a matter of decision.
    Mr. Palmer. I think all of us would agree, Senator, that 
the matter was not handled as well as it should be.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think it is utterly inexcusable, 
and I would like to go on a little bit also, if we are all 
through asking about it. I do not want to stop this. I want to 
go on to Rhodesia and find out some of the things we are doing 
in Rhodesia. I did not want to interfere with any other 
question.

            U.S. FAVORS MAJORITY RULE AND SELF DETERMINATION

    Senator McCarthy. That is the same question everybody is 
going to ask. I will put it in these terms. Do we have a policy 
of our own there, or are we really kind of riding out the 
British position now hoping somehow or other this will work 
out?
    Mr. Palmer. In Rhodesia?
    Senator McCarthy. Yes, in South Africa, in that area.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, I think we have very much of a policy of 
our own on this, Mr. Chairman.
    I think that we have historically stood for certain values 
and for certain principles, including majority rule and 
including self-determination, including the genuine 
independence of states, including government by consent of the 
governed.
    Senator McCarthy. How do we implement it?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, we implement it in such ways as we can. 
It is certainly not uniform. Different situations call for 
different means of trying to realize these objectives, I think.
    Senator McCarthy. We are not prepared to go beyond the 
British position, are we, on anything in this area now?
    Mr. Palmer. We are not simply prepared to go beyond an 
effort to resolve the situation in Rhodesia by peaceful means. 
This much is very clear, and we have made this very clear to 
everyone concerned, I think, Mr. Chairman.
    What we have here is a declaration of independence that has 
not been recognized by any country in the world, by those who 
represent, say they represent, 220,000 whites in opposition to 
4 million Africans. The whole thrust of the British effort in 
the negotiations that have gone on now for quite some time is 
to try to assure that there will be orderly and sustained 
progress toward majority rule.
    The British have never said that there must be, or had not 
said until after the Tiger talks, that there had to be 
immediate majority rule, that there could not be independence 
before majority rule. But what they have said is that there 
must be an understanding, there must be arrangements that would 
assure that there would be unimpeded progress toward majority 
rule.

                      ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

    Senator Hickenlooper. Is majority rule more important than 
economic and social progress in a country?
    Mr. Palmer. I think that they are all important, Senator. I 
think that when we have economic and social progress in 
Rhodesia, we have it in South Africa. But when it results, I 
think, in the denial of the ability of the vast majority of the 
inhabitants to be able to have some prospect of being able to 
conduct their own affairs, then I think it does become a very 
grave moral issue.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Are they in any degree----
    Mr. Palmer. And political issue.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Are they in any way capable of 
conducting their own affairs?
    Mr. Palmer. No, not at the present time. I want to make 
this clear again, Senator, that what we are talking about is 
not immediate majority rule, but unimpeded progress toward 
majority rule. This has been the issue that has been at stake. 
It is not immediate majority rule. Of course there would have 
to be a transition period before there was majority rule, and 
the question that has been at issue here has been the return to 
legality, the return to British rule in a very light sense, to 
something akin to the previous arrangements until such time as 
it is assured that there will be unimpeded progress toward 
majority rule.
    Senator Symington. I would like to ask one question on 
this, if I might, Mr. Palmer.

                 U.S. INTERVENTION IN RHODESIAN AFFAIRS

    Secretary Acheson had a letter that impressed me a great 
deal in the Washington Post in which he said that under the 
United Nations Charter, as I remember it--I have not read the 
letter for some weeks now--but we had no right to interfere 
with the internal affairs of Rhodesia.
    Has that letter ever been answered by the State Department?
    Mr. Palmer. Ambassador Goldberg answered that letter and I 
think answered it very effectively, Senator, in a letter that 
he wrote to the Washington Post on January 8.
    Senator McCarthy. He used the Civil War, did he not, as the 
principal defense?
    Mr. Palmer. Ambassador Goldberg?
    Senator McCarthy. Yes.
    Mr. Palmer. I do not recall.
    Senator Symington. Which civil war?
    Senator McCarthy. Our Civil War.
    Senator Symington. The one in Rhodesia or the one in the 
U.S.?
    Mr. Palmer. One of Mr. Acheson's main arguments ran, of 
course, to Article 27 of the Charter, the Domestic Jurisdiction 
clause. Ambassador Goldberg, in replying to this, pointed out 
that this is not intervention in the internal affairs of a 
state because Rhodesia is not a state. It has not been 
recognized as a state by anybody in the international 
community.
    Senator Symington. Just a rebellious colony.
    Mr. Palmer. I am sorry.
    Senator Symington. Just a rebellious colony.
    Mr. Palmer. Just a rebellious colony.
    Senator Symington. Did he quote George III, too?
    Senator McCarthy. Secession.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, but at least we were recognized by people 
as being an independent nation.
    Senator Symington. Not by a lot of people.
    Mr. Palmer. Not by a lot, but we were recognized----
    Senator Hickenlooper. What would be wrong with us 
recognizing Rhodesia?
    Mr. Palmer. But we were recognized by quite a number, 
Senator, and in this case nobody has recognized Rhodesia.

                     U.S. AS POLICEMAN OF THE WORLD

    Senator Symington. One other question I would like to ask 
here. Do you think that the mantle has fallen on the United 
States now to be the policeman of the world, of the free world?
    Mr. Palmer. To be what?
    Senator Symington. To be the policeman of the free world.
    Mr. Palmer. No, sir, I do not.
    Senator Symington. Do you know of any country that we are 
not defending or protecting that is supporting us and our 
policies in Vietnam?
    Mr. Palmer. Do I know of any country----
    Senator Symington. That we are not either defending or 
financing that is supporting us in Vietnam? I am just 
wondering. I looked the map over and we are apparently taking 
on the defense of all these countries with either money or 
troops or both. I just wondered if there was any internal paper 
that we have not seen like the F-4s to Iran, for example, that 
there has been some decision made that we are going to be the 
defenders of the free world and that we are going to finance 
them as much as possible through various international 
organizations and so forth.
    Have there been things written on that that is established, 
an American policy in this field that we do not know about?
    Mr. Palmer. Not that I am aware of, Senator.
    Senator Symington. Thank you, sir.

                          SPECIAL SUPPLY SHIPS

    Senator McCarthy. Could I ask on that point, the Senate 
Armed Services Committee turned down a proposal for these 
special supply ships last week. I think there were three of 
them that were being proposed, but the overall plan called for 
30. Do you know whether it was planned that any of the 30 
should lie adjacent to any of these areas in Africa?
    Mr. Palmer. I do not know.
    Do you know?
    Senator McCarthy. Maybe you would know.
    Mr. Lang. No.
    Senator McCarthy. You know the ships we are talking about.
    Mr. Lang. I do, sir. I know of none that were intended for 
the African area.
    Senator McCarthy. Are they all related to Europe?
    Senator Symington. 30 to Europe?
    Senator McCarthy. I understand there were about three ships 
to supply a division which would mean ten divisions somewhere 
around the world that was going to be supplied when the full 
plan--I assume when the full plan became operative, and I am 
sure we did not plan to have ten divisions in Europe.
    We do not have to press this, but when we were talking 30 
ships, was it three to supply a division or was it more than 
that?
    Mr. Lang. I do not know, sir.
    Senator McCarthy. I thought it was three was my 
recollection. Was it three or was it more than that?
    In any case, they were asking for three, and I assume they 
had to supply divisions somewhere because we do not move----
    Mr. Palmer. I would like to make it clear in this 
connection----
    Senator McCarthy. In any case there was no plan to have 
these ships lie off the coast of South Africa or Somalia.
    Mr. Palmer. No, sir. Our basic policy remains as stated by 
Secretary McNamara when he appeared before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on the 
Department of Defense Appropriations. He said that ``We have 
made it clear that our policy is to avoid active military 
involvement in Africa, and we will exert all our influence to 
achieve peaceful resolution of these problems.''
    This remains very much our policy in this part of Africa 
and all over the continent. We do not want to get militarily 
involved.

                       SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA

    Senator Carlson. Getting back to Rhodesia, press dispatches 
and reports from overseas, at least, indicate that the 
sanctions of Great Britain are not bringing any results, that 
they are going to fail. Have you any plans as to what we should 
do if they do fail because we are committed to them?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, I do not think it is demonstrable yet, 
Senator, that they will fail.
    Senator Carlson. I see.
    Mr. Palmer. The program of voluntary sanctions that 
preceded the program of mandatory sanctions has had 
considerable effect. Granted that it is difficult to get good 
large figures. Nevertheless, I think the indications are that 
exports from Rhodesia dropped from about $400 million to about 
$224 million in 1966, which is about a 40 percent drop. It is 
expected that under the mandatory sanctions program they will 
probably drop another $55 million in the first five months of 
this year.
    It is estimated that the gross domestic product of Rhodesia 
has fallen by about 15 percent in 1966, and there will probably 
be a further drop of about 10 percent this year.
    I would say the two key products really are tobacco and 
sugar. So far as tobacco is concerned, about 60 percent of last 
year's crop remains unsold. The government has had to buy this 
and has to store it, and this has created considerable 
financial strains on the government.
    As this year's crop, which is already being reduced as a 
result, comes in and does not find a market, this will increase 
the pressures.
    The hope is, of course, that this will bring the Rhodesian 
Government back to the negotiating table again and that it will 
be possible to obtain a peaceful resolution of this problem.
    Senator Carlson. Are efforts being made to do that?
    Mr. Palmer. To negotiate?
    Senator Carlson. Bring them back to the negotiating table.
    Mr. Palmer. I do not think there are any active efforts 
right at the moment, but it is certainly in everybody's mind.

               SETTLING RHODESIA MATTER THROUGH THE U.N.

    Senator McCarthy. Could I ask Mr. Palmer just on this one 
point, Senator Hickenlooper, and I will recognize you next.
    Is there any reason why Acheson's position was answered by 
Goldberg and not the Secretary of State or the State 
Department?
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, because I think that the major 
argumentation that was adducted by Mr. Acheson really ran to 
positions that were taken in the United Nations.
    Senator McCarthy. Does it mean we want to try to settle it 
through the United Nations rather than by direct intervention?
    Mr. Palmer. That is correct.
    Senator McCarthy. This does not reflect a division in the 
State Department which could not be presented in a statement by 
the Secretary?
    Mr. Palmer. No, sir. These are positions which Ambassador 
Goldberg had taken as our representative.
    Senator Hickenlooper. What was the reason given or the 
reasons taken by the United Nations in this--granting that 
Rhodesia was recognized as a dependency or a colony of 
Britain--what business have we got in there in Britain's 
internal affairs or the United Nations either?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, I think Britain does bear certain 
responsibilities to the United Nations under Article 73 of the 
Charter with respect to nonself-governing territories, and so 
that there is a U.N. interest.
    Secondly, the British themselves took the program to the--
--
    Senator Hickenlooper. In the first place, Rhodesia was 
self-governing for all intents and purposes over the years.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes. Was self-governing until such time as it 
declared itself independent and at that time, at that point, 
the United Kingdom, through orders in council and so forth, 
reasserted their authority over the country. So----

                 DID THE U.S. PRESSURE BRITISH POLICY?

    Senator Symington. Always the British all over the world 
have been willing to approve the caste system of a country in 
order to control it up until they began losing countries. They 
have no basic color problem like we have in this country. Were 
their policies in Rhodesia originally formulated or developed 
under our coaching while the pound was in very serious trouble 
as in Henry Brandon's book, ``In the Red,'' for example, 
showing how twice we fished them out?
    Did we put any pressure on Great Britain with respect to 
her policies in Rhodesia, or were they all Mr. Wilson's ideas 
as to how they should be handled?
    Mr. Palmer. They were not only Mr. Wilson's ideas but his 
predecessors, I guess, as well, Senator.
    Senator Symington. There has been no pressure on our part.
    Mr. Palmer. There has been no pressure on our part. The 
whole concept of the Central African Federation, the federation 
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, when that still was in being, was a 
British concept.
    Senator Symington. I am just being educated. I have no 
criticism, no implied criticism in any sense.
    One other question.
    Mr. Palmer. We approved that.

                        THE STABILITY OF AFRICA

    Senator Symington. Do you think, based on your saying in 
answer to Senator Hickenlooper it is not going too well, do you 
think the British are going to bring Rhodesia to their knees in 
due course?
    Mr. Palmer. I could not say that with any confidence, 
Senator. I think only time is going to prove whether this 
happens or not.
    Senator Symington. Do you think it would be a good thing 
for the stability of Africa if they do?
    Mr. Palmer. Yes. I think it would be a good thing if they 
came back to constitutional rule.
    Senator Hickenlooper. If the Rhodesians came back to 
constitutional rule.
    Senator Symington. My question was will it bring Rhodesia 
to their knees.
    Senator Hickenlooper. What do you mean by constitutional 
rule?
    Mr. Palmer. Not to their knees, Senator. If they came back 
into constitutional rule, and if they would agree to guarantees 
that would result in unimpeded progress toward majority rule.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I do not understand what you mean by 
constitutional rule. There was no constitutional rule in 
Rhodesia about one-man one-vote business down there at all, was 
there?
    Mr. Palmer. No, sir.
    Senator Hickenlooper. What constitutional rule do you want 
them to come back to?
    Mr. Palmer. When I say constitutional rule, I mean come 
back into their association with Great Britain.

                       DUAL FRANCHISE IN RHODESIA

    Senator Hickenlooper. I see. Well, the only two viable 
economies, really progressively developing viable economies in 
all of Africa, I do not care where you go, are Rhodesia and 
South Africa. It seems to me we are doing everything we can to 
alienate them, to discourage them and to discourage their 
further development, and I think both of them are trying to 
make progress with some success.
    They do not have apartheid in Rhodesia by law. They have 
franchise, as I understand it, which anybody can qualify for, 
black or white. It does not make any difference what it is.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, but it is a dual franchise, Senator, 
whereby the Africans can only qualify. In practice the great 
bulk of Africans, because of educational and income 
qualifications, can only qualify for the B roll.
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is right, but when they get the 
income and educational qualifications, they qualify just the 
same as the white man qualifies with education and income 
qualifications. Is that not true?
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, they can theoretically, but the 
qualifications----
    Senator Hickenlooper. I am not talking theoretically, but 
legally.
    Mr. Palmer. But the qualifications are put pretty high.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, $300 a year income or something 
like that, and certain minimal level of education, and it 
really applies to the white man.
    I am told that more land in South Africa is owned by blacks 
than white, or in Rhodesia, is owned by blacks than white.
    Mr. Palmer. It is about evenly divided there.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They have a land reform program going 
there, and as fast as these people will take the education and 
the training, they get land, and so on.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, Senator, a lot of these things, I think, 
get lost in what the Rhodesians say and in what they do.

                     MISINFORMATION ABOUT RHODESIA

    Senator Hickenlooper. I am not going on what the Rhodesians 
say. I am going on what citizens from Iowa who have been down 
there say. We have had several of them down there, and some 
other places, and the most recent one was a man who is not 
connected with government, and not connected with my state, but 
has spent a great deal of time in Rhodesia and Zambia. He said 
it is just unbelievable the misinformation which we get here in 
this country about that situation, and nothing about the 
slaughter in Zambia, that is the murders and the mass killings 
in Zambia and the revolts there. Also, for instance, he said in 
Rhodesia for 60 years the policemen have not carried pistols or 
guns. They have got peace there, and people are satisfied. They 
are making progress, and yet we kick them in the teeth.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave now.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I have to, too.
    Senator Symington. If the Senator would yield, I would like 
to ask a couple of questions.

                        MILITARY SALES IN AFRICA

    Mr. Chairman, if it was in order, I would like to ask 
unanimous consent that we have the amount of military sales 
and/or gifts that we have made on the continent of Africa in 
the last five years. Could we have a listing of that so we get 
a feel for it?
    Mr. Lang. Certainly, sir.
    Senator Symington. That would include such countries as 
Nigeria and Liberia; some of it I am sure is small, but I think 
it might be interesting to note how it has been handled on that 
basis.
    Mr. Lang. Fine, sir. This for the past five years?
    Senator Symington. We will make it ten years if you want. 
That will cover the whole development.
    Mr. Lang. Yes, sir.

                     UNREALISTIC PROGRAMS IN AFRICA

    Senator Hickenlooper. I feel we have been undergoing for 
some years a calculated and a definite program--I may be wrong 
about this--of what we call liberty in Africa which is just as 
unrealistic as it can be. But we have it on our hands now, and 
all these little tribes with two huts and four yak tails have 
gained independence.
    Mr. Palmer. Well Senator, there is no doubt about it, the 
continent is going through an extremely difficult period.
    Senator Hickenlooper. We have to live with it and try to 
solve it.
    Mr. Palmer. A difficult period of time.
    I would like to say, if I could, just in response to 
several things that you have said, that I think that there are 
black African states also who are making good progress towards 
economic development and social development. I think the Ivory 
Coast is certainly a good example of this. Tunisia, I think, is 
a good example.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, you cannot say Tunisia is black 
Africa. It is Arab.
    Mr. Palmer. No. But I am just saying of independent Africa. 
Kenya is making good progress.
    Senator Hickenlooper. So long as Kenyatta stays in there 
maybe we have some hope, but the old man is going to die some 
day.
    Mr. Palmer. But only a few years ago a lot of the Europeans 
in Kenya were saying, ``You know we can never stay in Kenya 
because of Kenyatta.'' Now these same people are saying, ``We 
are worried about what is going to happen if something happens 
to Kenyatta.''
    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, we were going to have a great 
time in Tanzania with Nyerere, too, but it has gone about as 
far left as it can go down the drain and it is a most 
disappointing place.
    The Congo is a chaos and still is.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, Senator, I would like to speak to the 
Congo, if I could, because I think there are some encouraging 
developments that are taking place.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, everything is always 
encouraging, I realize that, when we are projecting ourselves 
into the picture.
    Mr. Palmer. No, we have lots of discouraging ones, and I 
would be delighted to talk about those, too.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Nigeria is having its troubles.
    Mr. Palmer. Nigeria is having terrible troubles, and it is 
a very anxious situation.

                   THE BASIS OF U.S. POLICY IS COLOR

    Senator Hickenlooper. We are trying to chase the Portuguese 
out of Angola, and so far as I can find out the Angolans do not 
want them to be chased out. But we may chase them; we may 
prevail there.
    Mr. Palmer. I think it is very difficult to ascertain what 
the Africans want in Angola. It is very difficult to find out.
    Senator Hickenlooper. We are going to teach them what they 
want. I do not know.
    Of course Ethiopia is a great self-determining country. I 
think they have one man--one vote there. One man is the 
emperor.
    Senator McCarthy. I think they only have one vote.
    Senator Hickenlooper. One vote, a great ally of ours.
    Mr. Palmer. But I think the fundamental difference here is, 
Senator, none of the distinctions are drawn on color except 
when you get down into this area.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think it is drawn on color. I think 
the basis of our policy in Africa is color and probably to 
affect American elections.
    Mr. Palmer. No.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think there is an awfully lot to 
that. I think there is a lot of humanity in what we are trying 
to do, too.
    Mr. Palmer. There is.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think there is a lot of it, but I 
think there is an awfully lot to influence American elections 
based on color. Otherwise, there are a lot of things that we 
would not need to do if we wanted to really promote these 
things on the basis of long-range, sound, progressive policies.
    I am not blaming you for this, do not misunderstand that.

                   HARDENING OF ATTITUDES IN RHODESIA

    Mr. Palmer. I would like to send you, Senator, if I may, a 
copy of a recent speech that I have given on Rhodesia that 
will, I hope, explain some of our concerns about the internal 
situation in Rhodesia. I have lived there for two years, 
Senator, and I must say I saw just one tremendous gap in what 
people professed and what people did, such things as the Land 
Apportionment Act. It does divide the land almost equally 
between 220,000 whites and 4 million Africans. This is not the 
whole story either, because I saw European grazing land being 
burned off because of the fact that it was excess to the 
grazing requirements, and just across the road saw African 
cattle being slaughtered because the land could not support 
them.
    Now, believe me, I am not a revolutionary on matters of 
this kind, and I know perfectly well that there is capital and 
skills and so forth that have gone into these European 
enterprises that are extremely important to the development of 
that country in that part of the world.
    To my mind, the important thing in that part of the world 
is to try to create an atmosphere that is going to enable the 
European to stay there and to continue to play his part in the 
development of the country. I think this is vital in South 
Africa, too.
    But I am convinced, too, Senator, that unless there is more 
movement, and again let me emphasize I am not saying immediate 
independence by any means----
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is what we are moving toward. Is 
that not the whole connotation of what we are doing instead of 
working along with these people to bring them up to the point 
where there will be some responsible government there?
    Mr. Palmer. But this is the problem, Senator, in Southern 
Rhodesia, that the trend has not been in that direction. The 
trend has been entirely in the opposite direction.
    If you go back to Garfield Todd when he was prime minister 
about eight years ago, ten years ago, I guess it is now, they 
were trying to work on a policy of partnership. He was too 
liberal for the white Rhodesians, and he was replaced by Edgar 
Whitehead. Edward Whitehead again tried to do something about 
the Land Apportionment Act, and he was replaced because of this 
effort by Winston Field who was further to his right.
    Winston Field in turn was replaced by Ian Smith.
    Again the whole trend in Rhodesia has been toward the right 
and not toward cooperation amongst the races, but to a 
hardening of attitude among the races.
    Now it is quite true----

                           TROUBLE IN ZAMBIA

    Senator Hickenlooper. What is happening in Zambia?
    Mr. Palmer. In Zambia there is trouble on the Copper Belt, 
but a lot of this trouble arises from both communities. It is 
not only from the black community but it is from the white 
community. A lot of the problem in Zambia is that in the Copper 
Belt a great many of the whites come from Rhodesia and come 
from the Union of South Africa. So that----
    Senator Hickenlooper. How many whites have they got in 
Zambia?
    Mr. Palmer. They have got about 70,000 or 80,000, I think, 
at the present time. And I do not think that the fault all lies 
on one side or all lies on the other, but Kaunda has had as a 
basic tenet of his policy to try to encourage, to try to 
promote good race relations in Zambia. He has tried just as 
hard as Kenyatta has in Kenya.
    One of the great dangers----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Does he not claim he is the captive 
of the revolutionary group in----
    Mr. Palmer. No, sir. I think Kaunda is still very much of 
an independent and very much devoted, both in words and in 
actions, to good race relations in Zambia.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think so. I do not mean that.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes. But the problem is that on both sides, 
because of the Rhodesian problem, relationships amongst the two 
races in Zambia are beginning to polarize, and this is one of 
our great concerns about this. If this continues in Zambia, it 
continues in Tanzania. It goes up further into East Africa, and 
the same thing happens on the other extreme in South Africa. 
You will have a polarization along racial lines that will 
result increasingly in the thing that is to be avoided, I 
think, at all costs, and that is a racial confrontation in 
Africa. This is what the direction of our efforts and I think 
the direction of the British efforts have been intended to help 
prevent.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I have taken too much time.
    Senator McCarthy. I think probably we will have another 
session on these in-between countries we have not taken up.

                         COMMUNIST INFILTRATION

    What about Tanzania? What is the situation? Do you see the 
Communist infiltration there as significant in terms of other 
countries?
    Mr. Palmer. In Tanzania?
    Senator McCarthy. Yes.
    Mr. Palmer. It is significant.
    Senator McCarthy. Beyond that country or just within the 
country itself?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, I think the influence is strongest in 
Zanzibar, less strong, I would say, on the mainland, but I 
would like to add to that that I think that Nyerere is still 
very much of an independent African, and I do not think that he 
is under any sort of control or likely to allow himself to be 
placed under a position of control.
    He does have certain ideas, certain concepts that I would 
be critical of. He is a socialist. He wants to move Tanzania in 
a socialist direction. I do not think he wants to move it in a 
Communist direction. He has resorted to extensive 
nationalization of the banks, of export-import houses, and to 
other enterprises, particularly in the agricultural field, and 
I think there is no doubt about it. He has, however, promised 
to pay compensation for these.
    It remains to be seen what--how this is going to work out 
in practice, whether it will be--whether it will accord to our 
criteria of being full and fair and prompt.
    Senator McCarthy. He sat right in that chair shortly before 
independence, this one right there, that spot, with a few of us 
in here talking to him--in fact he was here twice, and he gave 
the most stirring private enterprise discussion you ever heard 
of in your life. He has apparently changed his mind 180 
degrees.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, there are----
    Senator McCarthy. And I just think basically he believed 
what he said when he was here, but I think that he possibly was 
taken into camp with this fellow from Zanzibar or whoever it 
was who took him over.
    Mr. Palmer. Senator, I know that this is a theory, and----
    Senator McCarthy. Well, somebody took him over from 
Zanzibar.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, I think a lot of it derives from the fact 
that resources have been slow in coming into Tanzania. I think 
he has been struck with the great disparity between the civil 
servants and people who live in the urban areas, and those who 
live in the rural areas.
    Incidentally, all of his program of nationalization has 
also been accompanied by some very stringent measures to place 
restrictions--to cut down government salaries, to place 
restrictions on ownings by civil servants, and other steps of 
this kind, and I think--I am sure he is taking an ill-advised 
step here. But I think he has done it essentially for Tanzania 
and reasons that this is the path to take and that Tanzania has 
got to look increasingly to its own resources for its 
development and less to external aid.
    Senator McCarthy. I think we had better finish up this 
hearing.

                       MILITARY TROOPS IN AFRICA

    Could you submit for the record a list of the countries in 
which we have military aid troops in Africa and the extent of 
those missions if they are not classified?
    Mr. Lang. Right, sir.
    Senator McCarthy. And also that aid program as it is now 
contemplated and recommended. I assume it is all in the budget 
somewhere. If you can take it out and send it up to us for the 
record, I would appreciate it.
    I appreciate very much your coming up. I do not know 
whether you feel better now that there is an African 
subcommittee which has been reactivated here or not.