Congressional Record: October 4, 2007 (House)
Page H11261-H11267
MEJA EXPANSION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2007
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 702 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill,
H.R. 2740.
{time} 1105
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of
the bill (H.R. 2740) to require accountability for contractors and
contract personnel under Federal contracts, and for other purposes,
with Mr. Arcuri (Acting Chairman) in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose on
Wednesday, October 3, 2007, the amendments made in order pursuant to
House Resolution 702 had been disposed of.
The question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute, as amended.
The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended,
was agreed to.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Ross) having assumed the chair, Mr. Arcuri, Acting Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2740) to
require accountability for contractors and contract personnel under
Federal contracts, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution
702, reported the bill back to the House with an amendment adopted by
the Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment
reported from the Committee of the Whole? If not, the question is on
the amendment.
The amendment was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
[[Page H11262]]
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Forbes
Mr. FORBES. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
Mr. FORBES. I am, Mr. Speaker, in its current form.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. Forbes moves to recommit the bill H.R. 2740 to the
Committee on the Judiciary with instructions to report the
same back to the House forthwith with the following
amendment:
At the end of the text of the bill, insert the following:
SEC. 6. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect
intelligence activities that are otherwise permissible prior
to the enactment of this Act.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. FORBES. Mr. Speaker, the motion to recommit I have offered is
straightforward. It preserves the ability of our intelligence community
to protect America's national security.
We all agree that it is important to hold contractors liable for
criminal acts that they commit while working overseas. No one is above
the law. But, unfortunately, H.R. 2740 in its present form will have
significant dangerous consequences to the intelligence community and
the vital role it plays in protecting America. The motion to recommit
clarifies the application of H.R. 2740 to ensure that critical
intelligence activities will be able to continue.
The majority in its haste to score political points has ignored the
intelligence community's concerns about the implications of the bill.
Let me take a moment to outline some of the specific concerns that the
majority has ignored.
First, H.R. 2740 covers all agents of any Department or agency of the
United States, including clandestine assets. If a clandestine asset was
implicated in a crime, investigating and arresting that asset under
traditional criminal procedures could expose other assets and
compromise critical intelligence activities.
Second, H.R. 2740 extends United States criminal jurisdiction without
regard to the nationality of the offender. Host country nationals
serving or assisting sensitive assets could become criminally liable
for a felony violation of U.S. law and undermine critical intelligence
activities.
Third, H.R. 2740 applies the entire criminal code to the new category
of potential offenders and could implicate the authorized business of
the intelligence community employees and contractors.
The bill also does not limit criminal liability to activities that
occur in the course of employment, whether committed on duty or off
duty, and increases the risk of exposing intelligence activities.
We agree with our colleagues on the other side of the aisle that we
must hold everyone accountable under the law. Our criminal code is
aimed at ensuring peace and order in our country and should not be
applied internationally to every aspect of our Nation's foreign
activities.
Our country relies on our intelligence community to preserve our
national security and protect our citizens. We must legislate
responsibly when it comes to applying our criminal code to overseas
activities. Preserving our critical intelligence operations is
paramount. Politics has no role in this decision.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the motion.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise to accept the motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from
Michigan is recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to thank the distinguished
gentleman from Virginia, the ranking member, Randy Forbes, because we
are willing on this side to accept the motion to recommit, with the
understanding that we will work to clarify its scope, as has been
indicated in the discussion, and that we do understand that this would
not in any way weaken the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act or
invalidate current law which is now in place.
Mr. Speaker, with that agreement on the part of the ranking member,
this side accepts the motion to recommit.
Mr. HALL of New York. Mr. Speaker, today, the House took an important
step to restore accountability to our involvement in Iraq by passing
H.R. 2740, the MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007. This bill
serves an important purpose by bringing previously unaccountable
private security contractors under the rule of U.S. law.
By some estimates there are nearly 50,000 private security personnel
working in Iraq. These contractors operate largely outside U.S. and
Iraqi law, and episodes of significant contractor misconduct raise
animosity toward Americans in the field and lose us hearts and minds in
Iraq.
The activities of one of the most prominent contractors, Blackwater,
highlight why they are a counterproductive influence in Iraq and their
activities must be curtailed. Two weeks ago, Blackwater personnel
guarding a State Department group were involved in a shootout that
resulted in the deaths of as many as 17 Iraqis. Yesterday, the
Government Reform Committee disclosed that Blackwater has been involved
in 195 escalation of force incidents since 2005 and in 80 percent of
those Blackwater fired the first shots.
These incidents combined with a host of other abuses clearly indicate
that we need to stop putting contractors in Iraq and bring those there
under control. That's why I was proud to cosponsor and vote for the
MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act to bring these contractors under
U.S. jurisdiction if they commit criminal acts. Only by holding these
contractors accountable can we actually begin to restore our standing
in the world and win hearts and minds in Iraq.
During consideration of this bill, the House of Representatives
considered a motion to recommit forthwith that stated, ``Nothing in
this Act shall be construed to affect intelligence activities that are
otherwise permissible prior to the enactment of this Act.''
I am an ardent supporter of our efforts to combat terrorism, prevent
terrorist attacks, and bring terrorists to justice. I want our
intelligence community to have all of the tools it needs to accomplish
these tasks, and believe it can be successful in doing so within the
rule of law. Some of my proudest votes on this floor have been to give
our government new tools to fight terrorism and keep Americans safe.
However, for the following reasons I could not in good conscience vote
for this motion to recommit forthwith.
It is often said that, ``the devil is in the details.'' In this case,
I fear the level is in the lack of details. The drafting of this
legislative language is extremely vague, and I have serious
reservations about the scope of its impact. It seems that this language
could be interpreted to provide legal cover to abuses committed by
contractors, like those at Abu Ghraib, that undermine our national
security and are contrary to the founding principles of our nation. On
a day when the New York Times has reported at length on the concerted
efforts of the Administration to twist the law to make practices like
freezing and water-boarding legal, I could not support language that
could be manipulated to provide cover for such illegal and
counterproductive acts.
I am doubly skeptical of this language because if it was not meant to
provide cover for questionable acts, it would not be necessary. The
MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act does not make any previously legal
acts illegal, it simply extends the jurisdiction of U.S. law.
Previously uncovered contractors would not be impeded in their work if
they were acting and continue to act in accordance with the law.
For these reasons, I voted to support the MEJA Expansion and
Enforcement Act and voted against the motion to recommit forthwith.
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, my colleague from Virginia
has offered a motion to recommit H.R. 2740 the MEJA Expansion and
Enforcement Act, to the Judiciary Committee and to amend the
legislation with regard to intelligence activities. I will support this
motion, but with two important qualifications.
The motion to recommit would amend H.R. 2740 with a rule of
construction, stating, ``nothing in this Act shall be construed to
affect intelligence activities that are otherwise permissible prior to
the enactment of this Act.'' This amendment does not at all modify the
force of my legislation, does not limit the scope of the MEJA
jurisdiction, and does not grant immunity to anyone, including
contractor employees of the intelligence community. Put simply, I am
voting in support of this motion because it in no way alters the
underlying bill before us.
With that said, let me attach two qualifications to my support.
First, the amendment is
[[Page H11263]]
unnecessary in the context of both current law and this legislation.
Second, the amendment raises serious questions about the activities its
proponents may be seeking to protect.
My legislation would indeed place contractor employees of non-defense
related agencies under the extraterritorial jurisdiction of United
States federal law, granting the Department of Justice authority to
prosecute felony offenses committed by non-defense contractors. Defense
contractors are already covered by MEJA, a point that seems lost on the
authors of this motion. Given that the majority of the intelligence
community falls under the Department of Defense, it stands to reason
that many--if not most--contractors engaged in intelligence-related
activities are already under the jurisdiction of federal law. Not only
that, employees of the Defense Department intelligence agencies,
including agents of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, and intelligence services of the different branches of
the Armed Forces, among others, are covered by MEJA, and this coverage
has not endangered our national security in the least. So concerns
about my legislation, which deals with non-defense contractors, seem
ill-founded in the context of current law.
To my knowledge, there have never been significant concerns raised
about the coverage of these Defense Department intelligence agents and
contractors, for one major reason: prosecutorial discretion. The
Department of Justice always has the discretion to refrain from
prosecuting a case if it will endanger our national security interests.
My legislation does not compel prosecution and it does not interfere
with the prosecutor's discretion. If a prosecutor ever has concerns
that prosecution of a contractor under MEJA would endanger state
secrets, expose clandestine networks, or otherwise undermine our
security interests, the prosecutor has the discretion not to prosecute
the case. It's as simple as that.
Let me also point out that this bill only affects contractors who
commit felony crimes. So long as private contractors, including those
who are engaged in intelligence-related activities, are conducting
themselves within the bounds of the law, this legislation is irrelevant
to them. However, if there are private, for-profit contractors tasked
with duties that require them to commit felony offenses, Congress needs
to know about it. Such a revelation would point to a need for a serious
debate about whether we are using contractors appropriately.
My second qualification is that this amendment raises serious
questions about the activities it may be intended to protect. The
question here is, given that my bill only targets activities that are
unlawful, why do my colleagues feel the need to clarify that it does
not affect activities that are permissible? What activities are
contractors carrying out that are permissible but not lawful?
I have great apprehension about what might be meant in this context,
but first let me state clearly: the law is the highest authority in the
land, other than the constitution. The law trumps executive orders,
memorandums, and policies in all cases. I am voting for this motion
with the understanding that there is no activity a contractor might be
performing that could ever be permissible but not lawful. The
activities that we assign to private contractors must be in accordance
with the law on the books. Therefore, I interpret this motion simply to
mean that nothing in my bill will have any effect on contractors
working on lawful, permissible, appropriate intelligence activities.
I raise this concern because, as my colleagues well know, Congress--
including members on both sides of the aisle--and this Administration
have been at significant odds about the activities appropriate for our
military and intelligence community to perform in certain contexts
relating to the war in Iraq and the broader war against terrorism,
especially with regard to the treatment of suspects in interrogations
and detentions. There is rampant evidence that this Administration
believes certain activities to be ``permissible'' which are clearly
illegal under several statutes in United States Code.
Just today, for example, the New York Times reported that the
Department of Justice has issued secret memorandums that, in direct
contrast to the policies they have publicly avowed, amounted to ``an
expansive endorsement of the harshest interrogation techniques ever
used by the Central Intelligence Agency'' and ``for the first time
provided explicit authorization to barrage terror suspects with a
combination of painful physical and psychological tactics, including
head-slapping, simulated drowning and frigid temperatures.'' I submit
the full article for inclusion in the Record.
The harshest forms of physical and psychological tactics outlined in
this article are inappropriate and illegal for our military personnel
and intelligence agents, to say nothing of private contractors, and it
is abominable that this Administration continues to work to circumvent
our time-honored values and laws to authorize behavior that is un-
American to its core.
There are clear laws on the books prohibiting torture, including the
War Crimes Act (18 U.S. Code 2441) and the federal anti-torture statute
(18 U.S. Code 2340). Moreover, torture is prohibited by the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (articles 77-134). And the United States is a
ratified signatory to international treaties, including the Geneva
Conventions (Common Article 3) and the Convention Against Torture,
which specifically outlaw torture. Most importantly, the United States
Constitution (amendments 5, 8, and 14) explicitly prohibits cruel,
unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment.
The kinds of activities that, to the great shame of our nation, have
been carried out at Abu Ghraib prison and Guantanamo Bay detention
facilities are not, in any circumstances, permissible. Let us be clear
that, in the passage of this motion, we are in no way authorizing or
legitimating these behaviors. Let us also be clear that, in this
passage of this legislation, we are providing federal prosecutors the
tools to arrest and prosecute any contractor working for this
government who commits such abominable acts to the full extent of the
law.
[From the New York Times, Oct. 4, 2007]
Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe Interrogations
(By Scott Shane, David Johnston and James Risen)
Washington, Oct. 3.--When the Justice Department publicly
declared torture ``abhorrent'' in a legal opinion in December
2004, the Bush administration appeared to have abandoned its
assertion of nearly unlimited presidential authority to order
brutal interrogations.
But soon after Alberto R. Gonzales's arrival as attorney
general in February 2005, the Justice Department issued
another opinion, this one in secret. It was a very different
document, according to officials briefed on it, an expansive
endorsement of the harshest interrogation techniques ever
used by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The new opinion, the officials said, for the first time
provided explicit authorization to barrage terror suspects
with a combination of painful physical and psychological
tactics, including head-slapping, simulated drowning and
frigid temperatures.
Mr. Gonzales approved the legal memorandum on ``combined
effects'' over the objections of James B. Comey, the deputy
attorney general, who was leaving his job after bruising
clashes with the White House. Disagreeing with what he viewed
as the opinion's overreaching legal reasoning, Mr. Comey told
colleagues at the department that they would all be
``ashamed'' when the world eventually learned of it.
Later that year, as Congress moved toward outlawing
``cruel, inhuman and degrading'' treatment, the Justice
Department issued another secret opinion, one most lawmakers
did not know existed, current and former officials said. The
Justice Department document declared that none of the C.I.A.
interrogation methods violated that standard.
The classified opinions, never previously disclosed, are a
hidden legacy of President Bush's second term and Mr.
Gonzales's tenure at the Justice Department, where he moved
quickly to align it with the White House after a 2004
rebellion by staff lawyers that had thrown policies on
surveillance and detention into turmoil.
Congress and the Supreme Court have intervened repeatedly
in the last two years to impose limits on interrogations, and
the administration has responded as a policy matter by
dropping the most extreme techniques. But the 2005 Justice
Department opinions remain in effect, and their legal
conclusions have been confirmed by several more recent
memorandums, officials said. They show how the White House
has succeeded in preserving the broadest possible legal
latitude for harsh tactics.
A White House spokesman, Tony Fratto, said Wednesday that
he would not comment on any legal opinion related to
interrogations. Mr. Fratto added, ``We have gone to great
lengths, including statutory efforts and the recent executive
order, to make it clear that the intelligence community and
our practices fall within U.S. law'' and international
agreements.
More than two dozen current and former officials involved
in counterterrorism were interviewed over the past three
months about the opinions and the deliberations on
interrogation policy. Most officials would speak only on the
condition of anonymity because of the secrecy of the
documents and the C.I.A. detention operations they govern.
When he stepped down as attorney general in September after
widespread criticism of the firing of federal prosecutors and
withering attacks on his credibility, Mr. Gonzales talked
proudly in a farewell speech of how his department was ``a
place of inspiration'' that had balanced the necessary
flexibility to conduct the war on terrorism with the need to
uphold the law.
Associates at the Justice Department said Mr. Gonzales
seldom resisted pressure from Vice President Dick Cheney and
David S. Addington, Mr. Cheney's counsel, to endorse policies
that they saw as effective in safeguarding Americans, even
though the practices brought the condemnation of other
governments, human rights groups and Democrats in Congress.
Critics say Mr. Gonzales turned his agency into an arm of the
Bush
[[Page H11264]]
White House, undermining the department's independence.
The interrogation opinions were signed by Steven G.
Bradbury, who since 2005 has headed the elite Office of Legal
Counsel at the Justice Department. He has become a frequent
public defender of the National Security Agency's domestic
surveillance program and detention policies at Congressional
hearings and press briefings, a role that some legal scholars
say is at odds with the office's tradition of avoiding
political advocacy.
Mr. Bradbury defended the work of his office as the
government's most authoritative interpreter of the law. ``In
my experience, the White House has not told me how an opinion
should come out,'' he said in an interview. ``The White House
has accepted and respected our opinions, even when they
didn't like the advice being given.''
The debate over how terrorism suspects should be held and
questioned began shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks,
when the Bush administration adopted secret detention and
coercive interrogation, both practices the United States had
previously denounced when used by other countries. It adopted
the new measures without public debate or Congressional vote,
choosing to rely instead on the confidential legal advice of
a handful of appointees.
The policies set off bruising internal battles, pitting
administration moderates against hard-liners, military
lawyers against Pentagon chiefs and, most surprising, a
handful of conservative lawyers at the Justice Department
against the White House in the stunning mutiny of 2004. But
under Mr. Gonzales and Mr. Bradbury, the Justice
Department was wrenched back into line with the White
House.
After the Supreme Court ruled in 2006 that the Geneva
Conventions applied to prisoners who belonged to Al Qaeda,
President Bush for the first time acknowledged the C.I.A.'s
secret jails and ordered their inmates moved to Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. The C.I.A. halted its use of waterboarding, or
pouring water over a bound prisoner's cloth-covered face to
induce fear of suffocation.
But in July, after a monthlong debate inside the
administration, President Bush signed a new executive order
authorizing the use of what the administration calls
``enhanced'' interrogation techniques--the details remain
secret--and officials say the C.I.A. again is holding
prisoners in ``black sites'' overseas. The executive order
was reviewed and approved by Mr. Bradbury and the Office of
Legal Counsel.
Douglas W. Kmiec, who headed that office under President
Ronald Reagan and the first President George Bush and wrote a
book about it, said he believed the intense pressures of the
campaign against terrorism have warped the office's proper
role.
``The office was designed to insulate against any need to
be an advocate,'' said Mr. Kmiec, now a conservative scholar
at Pepperdine University law school. But at times in recent
years, Mr. Kmiec said, the office, headed by William H.
Rehnquist and Antonin Scalia before they served on the
Supreme Court, ``lost its ability to say no.'' ``The approach
changed dramatically with opinions on the war on terror,''
Mr. Kmiec said. ``The office became an advocate for the
president's policies.''
From the secret sites in Afghanistan, Thailand and Eastern
Europe where C.I.A. teams held Qaeda terrorists, questions
for the lawyers at C.I.A. headquarters arrived daily. Nervous
interrogators wanted to know: Are we breaking the laws
against torture? The Bush administration had entered
uncharted legal territory beginning in 2002, holding
prisoners outside the scrutiny of the International Red Cross
and subjecting them to harrowing pressure tactics. They
included slaps to the head; hours held naked in a frigid
cell; days and nights without sleep while battered by
thundering rock music; long periods manacled in stress
positions; or the ultimate, waterboarding.
Never in history had the United States authorized such
tactics. While President Bush and C.I.A. officials would
later insist that the harsh measures produced crucial
intelligence, many veteran interrogators, psychologists and
other experts say that less coercive methods are equally or
more effective.
With virtually no experience in interrogations, the C.I.A.
had constructed its program in a few harried months by
consulting Egyptian and Saudi intelligence officials and
copying Soviet interrogation methods long used in training
American service men to withstand capture. The agency
officers questioning prisoners constantly sought advice from
lawyers thousands of miles away.
``We were getting asked about combinations--`Can we do this
and this at the same time?' '' recalled Paul C. Kelbaugh, a
veteran intelligence lawyer who was deputy legal counsel at
the C.I.A.'s Counterterrorist Center from 2001 to 2003.
Interrogators were worried that even approved techniques
had such a painful, multiplying effect when combined that
they might cross the legal line, Mr. Kelbaugh said. He
recalled agency officers asking: ``These approved techniques,
say, withholding food, and 50-degree temperature--can they be
combined?'' Or ``Do I have to do the less extreme before the
more extreme?''
The questions came more frequently, Mr. Kelbaugh said, as
word spread about a C.I.A. inspector general inquiry
unrelated to the war on terrorism. Some veteran C.I.A.
officers came under scrutiny because they were advisers to
Peruvian officers who in early 2001 shot down a missionary
flight they had mistaken for a drug-running aircraft. The
Americans were not charged with crimes, but they endured
three years of investigation, saw their careers derailed and
ran up big legal bills.
That experience shook the Qaeda interrogation team, Mr.
Kelbaugh said. ``You think you're making a difference and
maybe saving 3,000 American lives from the next attack. And
someone tells you, `Well, that guidance was a little vague,
and the inspector general wants to talk to you,' '' he
recalled. ``We couldn't tell them, `Do the best you can,'
because the people who did the best they could in Peru were
looking at a grand jury.'' Mr. Kelbaugh said the questions
were sometimes close calls that required consultation with
the Justice Department. But in August 2002, the department
provided a sweeping legal justification for even the harshest
tactics.
That opinion, which would become infamous as ``the torture
memo'' after it was leaked, was written largely by John Yoo,
a young Berkeley law professor serving in the Office of Legal
Counsel. His broad views of presidential power were shared by
Mr. Addington, the vice president's adviser. Their close
alliance provoked John Ashcroft, then the attorney general,
to refer privately to Mr. Yoo as Dr. Yes for his seeming
eagerness to give the White House whatever legal
justifications it desired, a Justice Department official
recalled.
Mr. Yoo's memorandum said no interrogation practices were
illegal unless they produced pain equivalent to organ failure
or ``even death.'' A second memo produced at the same time
spelled out the approved practices and how often or how long
they could be used. Despite that guidance, in March 2003,
when the C.I.A. caught Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the chief
planner of the Sept. 11 attacks, interrogators were again
haunted by uncertainty. Former intelligence officials, for
the first time, disclosed that a variety of tough
interrogation tactics were used about 100 times over two
weeks on Mr. Mohammed. Agency officials then ordered a halt,
fearing the combined assault might have amounted to illegal
torture. A C.I.A. spokesman, George Little, declined to
discuss the handling of Mr. Mohammed. Mr. Little said the
program ``has been conducted lawfully, with great care and
close review'' and ``has helped our country disrupt terrorist
plots and save innocent lives.''
``The agency has always sought a clear legal framework,
conducting the program in strict accord with U.S. law, and
protecting the officers who go face-to-face with ruthless
terrorists,'' Mr. Little added.
Some intelligence officers say that many of Mr. Mohammed's
statements proved exaggerated or false. One problem, a former
senior agency official said, was that the C.I.A.'s initial
interrogators were not experts on Mr. Mohammed's background
or Al Qaeda, and it took about a month to get such an expert
to the secret prison. The former official said many C.I.A.
professionals now believe patient, repeated questioning by
well-informed experts is more effective than harsh physical
pressure.
Other intelligence officers, including Mr. Kelbaugh, insist
that the harsh treatment produced invaluable insights into Al
Qaeda's structure and plans. ``We leaned in pretty hard on
K.S.M.,'' Mr. Kelbaugh said, referring to Mr. Mohammed. ``We
were getting good information, and then they were told:
``Slow it down. It may not be correct. Wait for some legal
clarification.''
The doubts at the C.I.A. proved prophetic. In late 2003,
after Mr. Yoo left the Justice Department, the new head of
the Office of Legal Counsel, Jack Goldsmith, began reviewing
his work, which he found deeply flawed. Mr. Goldsmith
infuriated White House officials, first by rejecting part of
the National Security Agency's surveillance program,
prompting the threat of mass resignations by top Justice
Department officials, including Mr. Ashcroft and Mr. Comey,
and a showdown at the attorney general's hospital bedside.
Then, in June 2004, Mr. Goldsmith formally withdrew the
August 2002 Yoo memorandum on interrogation, which he found
overreaching and poorly reasoned. Mr. Goldsmith left the
Justice Department soon afterward. He first spoke at length
about his dissenting views to The New York Times last month,
and testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on
Tuesday.
Six months later, the Justice Department quietly posted on
its Web site a new legal opinion that appeared to end any
flirtation with torture, starting with its clarionlike
opening: ``Torture is abhorrent both to American law and
values and to international norms.''
A single footnote--added to reassure the C.I.A.--suggested
that the Justice Department was not declaring the agency's
previous actions illegal. But the opinion was unmistakably a
retreat. Some White House officials had opposed publicizing
the document, but acquiesced to Justice Department officials
who argued that doing so would help clear the way for Mr.
Gonzales's confirmation as attorney general.
If President Bush wanted to make sure the Justice
Department did not rebel again, Mr. Gonzales was the ideal
choice. As White House counsel, he had been a fierce
protector of the president's prerogatives. Deeply loyal to
Mr. Bush for championing his career from their days in Texas,
Mr. Gonzales would sometimes tell colleagues that he had just
one regret about becoming attorney general: He did not see
nearly as much of the president as he had in his previous
post.
[[Page H11265]]
Among his first tasks at the Justice Department was to find
a trusted chief for the Office of Legal Counsel. First he
informed Daniel Levin, the acting head who had backed Mr.
Goldsmith's dissents and signed the new opinion renouncing
torture, that he would not get the job. He encouraged Mr.
Levin to take a position at the National Security Council, in
effect sidelining him.
Mr. Bradbury soon emerged as the presumed favorite. But
White House officials, still smarting from Mr. Goldsmith's
rebuffs, chose to delay his nomination. Harriet E. Miers, the
new White House counsel, ``decided to watch Bradbury for a
month or two. He was sort of on trial,'' one Justice
Department official recalled.
Mr. Bradbury's biography had a Horatio Alger element that
appealed to a succession of bosses, including Justice
Clarence Thomas of the Supreme Court and Mr. Gonzales, the
son of poor immigrants. Mr. Bradbury's father had died when
he was an infant, and his mother took in laundry to support
her children. The first in his family to go to college, he
attended Stanford and the University of Michigan Law School.
He joined the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis, where he came
under the tutelage of Kenneth W. Starr, the Whitewater
independent prosecutor.
Mr. Bradbury belonged to the same circle as his
predecessors: young, conservative lawyers with sterling
credentials, often with clerkships for prominent conservative
judges and ties to the Federalist Society, a powerhouse of
the legal right. Mr. Yoo, in fact, had proposed his old
friend Mr. Goldsmith for the Office of Legal Counsel job; Mr.
Goldsmith had hired Mr. Bradbury as his top deputy.
``We all grew up together,'' said Viet D. Dinh, an
assistant attorney general from 2001 to 2003 and very much a
member of the club. ``You start with a small universe of
Supreme Court clerks, and you narrow it down from there.''
But what might have been subtle differences in quieter
times now cleaved them into warring camps.
Justice Department colleagues say Mr. Gonzales was soon
meeting frequently with Mr. Bradbury on national security
issues, a White House priority. Admirers describe Mr.
Bradbury as low-key but highly skilled, a conciliator who
brought from 10 years of corporate practice a more pragmatic
approach to the job than Mr. Yoo and Mr. Goldsmith, both from
the academic world.
``As a practicing lawyer, you know how to address real
problems,'' said Noel J. Francisco, who worked at the Justice
Department from 2003 to 2005. ``At O.L.C., you're not writing
law review articles and you're not theorizing. You're giving
a client practical advice on a real problem.''
As he had at the White House, Mr. Gonzales usually said
little in meetings with other officials, often deferring to
the hard-driving Mr. Addington. Mr. Bradbury also often
appeared in accord with the vice president's lawyer.
Mr. Bradbury appeared to be ``fundamentally sympathetic to
what the White House and the C.I.A. wanted to do,'' recalled
Philip Zelikow, a former top State Department official. At
interagency meetings on detention and interrogation, Mr.
Addington was at times ``vituperative,'' said Mr. Zelikow,
but Mr. Bradbury, while taking similar positions, was
``professional and collegial.''
While waiting to learn whether he would be nominated to
head the Office of Legal Counsel, Mr. Bradbury was in an
awkward position, knowing that a decision contrary to White
House wishes could kill his chances.
Charles J. Cooper, who headed the Office of Legal Counsel
under President Reagan, said he was ``very troubled'' at the
notion of a probationary period.
``If the purpose of the delay was a tryout, I think they
should have avoided it,'' Mr. Cooper said. ``You're implying
that the acting official is molding his or her legal analysis
to win the job.''
Mr. Bradbury said he made no such concessions. ``No one
ever suggested to me that my nomination depended on how I
ruled on any opinion,'' he said. ``Every opinion I've signed
at the Office of Legal Counsel represents my best judgment of
what the law requires.''
Scott Horton, an attorney affiliated with Human Rights
First who has closely followed the interrogation debate, said
any official offering legal advice on the campaign against
terror was on treacherous ground.
``For government lawyers, the national security issues they
were deciding were like working with nuclear waste--extremely
hazardous to their health,'' Mr. Horton said. ``If you give
the administration what it wants, you'll lose credibility in
the academic community,'' he said. ``But if you hold back,
you'll be vilified by conservatives and the administration.''
In any case, the White House grew comfortable with Mr.
Bradbury's approach. He helped block the appointment of a
liberal Ivy League law professor to a career post in the
Office of Legal Counsel. And he signed the opinion approving
combined interrogation techniques.
Mr. Comey strongly objected and told associates that he
advised Mr. Gonzales not to endorse the opinion. But the
attorney general made clear that the White House was adamant
about it, and that he would do nothing to resist.
Under Mr. Ashcroft, Mr. Comey's opposition might have
killed the opinion. An imposing former prosecutor and self-
described conservative who stands 6-foot-8, he was the rare
administration official who was willing to confront Mr.
Addington. At one testy 2004 White House meeting, when Mr.
Comey stated that ``no lawyer'' would endorse Mr. Yoo's
justification for the N.S.A. program, Mr. Addington demurred,
saying he was a lawyer and found it convincing. Mr. Comey
shot back: ``No good lawyer,'' according to someone present.
But under Mr. Gonzales, and after the departure of Mr.
Goldsmith and other allies, the deputy attorney general found
himself isolated. His troublemaking on N.S.A. and on
interrogation, and in appointing his friend Patrick J.
Fitzgerald as special prosecutor in the C.I.A. leak case,
which would lead to the perjury conviction of I. Lewis Libby,
Mr. Cheney's chief of staff, had irreparably offended the
White House.
``On national security matters generally, there was a sense
that Comey was a wimp and that Comey was disloyal,'' said one
Justice Department official who heard the White House talk,
expressed with particular force by Mr. Addington.
Mr. Comey provided some hints of his thinking about
interrogation and related issues in a speech that spring.
Speaking at the N.S.A.'s Fort Meade campus on Law Day--a
noteworthy setting for the man who had helped lead the
dissent a year earlier that forced some changes in the N.S.A.
program--Mr. Comey spoke of the ``agonizing collisions'' of
the law and the desire to protect Americans.
``We are likely to hear the words: `If we don't do this,
people will die,' '' Mr. Comey said. But he argued that
government lawyers must uphold the principles of their great
institutions.
``It takes far more than a sharp legal mind to say `no'
when it matters most,'' he said. ``It takes moral character.
It takes an understanding that in the long run, intelligence
under law is the only sustainable intelligence in this
country.''
Mr. Gonzales's aides were happy to see Mr. Comey depart in
the summer of 2005. That June, President Bush nominated Mr.
Bradbury to head the Office of Legal Counsel, which some
colleagues viewed as a sign that he had passed a loyalty
test. Soon Mr. Bradbury applied his practical approach to a
new challenge to the C.I.A.'s methods.
The administration had always asserted that the C.I.A.'s
pressure tactics did not amount to torture, which is banned
by federal law and international treaty. But officials had
privately decided the agency did not have to comply with
another provision in the Convention Against Torture--the
prohibition on ``cruel, inhuman, or degrading'' treatment.
Now that loophole was about to be closed. First Senator
Richard J. Durbin, Democrat of Illinois, and then Senator
John McCain, the Arizona Republican who had been tortured as
a prisoner in North Vietnam, proposed legislation to ban such
treatment. At the administration's request, Mr. Bradbury
assessed whether the proposed legislation would outlaw any
C.I.A. methods, a legal question that had never before been
answered by the Justice Department.
At least a few administration officials argued that no
reasonable interpretation of ``cruel, inhuman or degrading''
would permit the most extreme C.I.A. methods, like
waterboarding. Mr. Bradbury was placed in a tough spot, said
Mr. Zelikow, the State Department counselor, who was working
at the time to rein in interrogation policy. ``If Justice
says some practices are in violation of the C.I.D.
standard,'' Mr. Zelikow said, referring to cruel, inhuman or
degrading, ``then they are now saying that officials broke
current law.''
In the end, Mr. Bradbury's opinion delivered what the White
House wanted: a statement that the standard imposed by Mr.
McCain's Detainee Treatment Act would not force any change in
the C.I.A.'s practices, according to officials familiar with
the memo. Relying on a Supreme Court finding that only
conduct that ``shocks the conscience'' was unconstitutional,
the opinion found that in some circumstances not even
waterboarding was necessarily cruel, inhuman or degrading,
if, for example, a suspect was believed to possess crucial
intelligence about a planned terrorist attack, the officials
familiar with the legal finding said.
In a frequent practice, Mr. Bush attached a statement to
the new law when he signed it, declaring his authority to set
aside the restrictions if they interfered with his
constitutional powers. At the same time, though, the
administration responded to pressure from Mr. McCain and
other lawmakers by reviewing interrogation policy and giving
up several C.I.A. techniques.
Since late 2005, Mr. Bradbury has become a linchpin of the
administration's defense of counterterrorism programs,
helping to negotiate the Military Commissions Act last year
and frequently testifying about the N.S.A. surveillance
program. Once, he answered questions about administration
detention policies for an ``Ask the White House'' feature on
a Web site.
Mr. Kmiec, the former Office of Legal Counsel head now at
Pepperdine, called Mr. Bradbury's public activities a
departure for an office that traditionally has shunned any
advocacy role.
A senior administration official called Mr. Bradbury's
active role in shaping legislation and speaking to Congress
and the press ``entirely appropriate'' and consistent with
past practice. The official, who spoke on the condition of
anonymity, said Mr. Bradbury ``has played a critical role in
achieving greater transparency'' on the legal basis for
detention and surveillance programs.
[[Page H11266]]
Though President Bush repeatedly nominated Mr. Bradbury as
the Office of Legal Counsel's assistant attorney general,
Democratic senators have blocked the nomination. Senator
Durbin said the Justice Department would not turn over copies
of his opinions or other evidence of Mr. Bradbury's role in
interrogation policy.
``There are fundamental questions about whether Mr.
Bradbury approved interrogation methods that are clearly
unacceptable,'' Mr. Durbin said.
John D. Hutson, who served as the Navy's top lawyer from
1997 to 2000, said he believed that the existence of legal
opinions justifying abusive treatment is pernicious,
potentially blurring the rules for Americans handling
prisoners.
``I know from the military that if you tell someone they
can do a little of this for the country's good, some people
will do a lot of it for the country's better,'' Mr. Hutson
said. Like other military lawyers, he also fears that
official American acceptance of such treatment could endanger
Americans in the future.
``The problem is, once you've got a legal opinion that says
such a technique is O.K., what happens when one of our people
is captured and they do it to him? How do we protest then?''
he asked.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is
ordered on the motion to recommit.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. FORBES. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule
XX, this 15-minute vote on the motion to recommit will be followed by
5-minutes votes on passage of H.R. 2740, if ordered; ordering the
previous question on H. Res. 704; adoption of H. Res. 704, if ordered;
ordering the previous question on H. Res. 703; and adoption of H. Res.
703, if ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 342,
nays 75, not voting 15, as follows:
[Roll No. 939]
YEAS--342
Ackerman
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Allen
Altmire
Arcuri
Baca
Bachmann
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Barrow
Barton (TX)
Bean
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blumenauer
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boustany
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Broun (GA)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crenshaw
Cuellar
Culberson
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Davis, Lincoln
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Donnelly
Doolittle
Doyle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Edwards
Ehlers
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
English (PA)
Eshoo
Etheridge
Everett
Fallin
Fattah
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Giffords
Gilchrest
Gillibrand
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Granger
Graves
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Hall (TX)
Hare
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Herseth Sandlin
Higgins
Hill
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Hooley
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Inglis (SC)
Israel
Issa
Jefferson
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jordan
Kagen
Kaptur
Keller
Kennedy
Kildee
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Klein (FL)
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Lamborn
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Lynch
Mack
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Manzullo
Marchant
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (CA)
McCarthy (NY)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McIntyre
McKeon
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
McNulty
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Mitchell
Moore (KS)
Moran (KS)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murphy, Tim
Musgrave
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Neugebauer
Nunes
Oberstar
Obey
Ortiz
Paul
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (GA)
Price (NC)
Putnam
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Reyes
Reynolds
Richardson
Rodriguez
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross
Royce
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Salazar
Sali
Sarbanes
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schmidt
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Sestak
Shadegg
Shays
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuler
Shuster
Simpson
Skelton
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Souder
Space
Spratt
Stearns
Stupak
Sullivan
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Van Hollen
Walberg
Walden (OR)
Walsh (NY)
Walz (MN)
Wamp
Wasserman Schultz
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Westmoreland
Wexler
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (OH)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Wu
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NAYS--75
Abercrombie
Andrews
Baldwin
Becerra
Braley (IA)
Castor
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Crowley
Davis (IL)
Doggett
Ellison
Farr
Filner
Gonzalez
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hastings (FL)
Hinchey
Hirono
Hodes
Holt
Honda
Inslee
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kilpatrick
Kucinich
Lewis (GA)
Markey
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Olver
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Rahall
Rangel
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sires
Slaughter
Solis
Stark
Sutton
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Velazquez
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Woolsey
Wynn
Yarmuth
NOT VOTING--15
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Carson
Cubin
Davis, Jo Ann
Delahunt
Dingell
Gerlach
Jindal
Lee
Perlmutter
Pickering
Pryce (OH)
Renzi
Visclosky
{time} 1141
Mr. McGOVERN, Mr. ROTHMAN, Ms. VELAZQUEZ, Mr. HONDA, Mr. FARR, Ms.
LORETTA SANCHEZ of California, Mr. BECERRA, Mr. WAXMAN, Ms. MOORE of
Wisconsin, Mr. MOLLOHAN, Mr. GRIJALVA, Ms. LINDA T. SANCHEZ of
California, Mr. HODES, Ms. WATERS, Mr. OLVER and Mr. TIERNEY changed
their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
Messrs. LaHOOD, CAPUANO, WILSON of Ohio, HARE, BRADY of Pennsylvania,
ISRAEL, EMANUEL, FATTAH, AL GREEN of Texas, BOEHNER, MEEKS of New York,
LARSON of Connecticut, Ms. MATSUI, Mr. THOMPSON of California, Mrs.
CAPPS and Mr. NADLER changed their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
So the motion to recommit was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the instructions of the House
in the motion to recommit, I report the bill, H.R. 2740, back to the
House with an amendment.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment:
At the end of the text of the bill, insert the following:
SEC. 6. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect
intelligence activities that are otherwise permissible prior
to the enactment of this Act.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the amendment.
The amendment was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
[[Page H11267]]
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 389,
noes 30, not voting 13, as follows:
[Roll No. 940]
AYES--389
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Akin
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Bachmann
Bachus
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bartlett (MD)
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blumenauer
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Braley (IA)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carter
Castle
Castor
Chabot
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Cohen
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cuellar
Culberson
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Davis, Lincoln
Davis, Tom
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Edwards
Ehlers
Ellison
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
English (PA)
Eshoo
Etheridge
Everett
Fallin
Farr
Fattah
Feeney
Ferguson
Filner
Flake
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Frank (MA)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Giffords
Gilchrest
Gillibrand
Gingrey
Gohmert
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Granger
Graves
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hall (TX)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Herseth Sandlin
Higgins
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hobson
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Hulshof
Inglis (SC)
Inslee
Israel
Issa
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Jordan
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Keller
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Klein (FL)
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kucinich
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Lynch
Mack
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Manzullo
Marchant
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (CA)
McCarthy (NY)
McCaul (TX)
McCollum (MN)
McCotter
McDermott
McGovern
McHenry
McHugh
McIntyre
McKeon
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
McNulty
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Mica
Michaud
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murphy, Tim
Murtha
Musgrave
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Neugebauer
Nunes
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Platts
Poe
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (NC)
Putnam
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Reyes
Reynolds
Richardson
Rodriguez
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Salazar
Sali
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schmidt
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sestak
Shays
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuler
Shuster
Simpson
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Souder
Space
Spratt
Stark
Stearns
Stupak
Sullivan
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Tierney
Towns
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Walberg
Walden (OR)
Walsh (NY)
Walz (MN)
Wamp
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Wexler
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (OH)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
Young (FL)
NOES--30
Alexander
Baker
Barton (TX)
Boustany
Broun (GA)
Burgess
Buyer
Cannon
Deal (GA)
Doolittle
Franks (AZ)
Hastert
Hoekstra
Hunter
Johnson, Sam
Lamborn
Linder
McCrery
Miller (FL)
Miller, Gary
Pitts
Price (GA)
Renzi
Rogers (AL)
Rohrabacher
Sessions
Shadegg
Tancredo
Westmoreland
Young (AK)
NOT VOTING--13
Barrett (SC)
Carson
Cubin
Davis, Jo Ann
Delahunt
Dingell
Gerlach
Jindal
Lee
Perlmutter
Pickering
Pryce (OH)
Visclosky
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised there
are 2 minutes remaining on this vote.
{time} 1150
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________
