S. Hrg. 109-241 NOMINATION OF VICE ADMIRAL JOHN SCOTT REDD TO BE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ JULY 21, 2005 __________ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence Available via the World Wide Web: http//www.access.gpo.gov/congress/ senate ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 24-984 WASHINGTON : 2006 _____________________________________________________________________________ For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512ÿ091800 Fax: (202) 512ÿ092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402ÿ090001 SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] PAT ROBERTS, Kansas, Chairman JOHN D. ROCKELLLER IV, West Virginia, Vice Chairman ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah CARL LEVIN, Michigan MIKE DeWINE, Ohio DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri RON WYDEN, Oregon TRENT LOTT, Mississippi EVAN BAYH, Indiana OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia BILL FRIST, Tennessee, Ex Officio HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio ---------- Bill Duhnke, Staff Director Andrew W. Johnson, Minority Staff Director Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk C O N T E N T S ---------- July 21, 2005 Page Hearing held in Washington, DC: July 21, 2005................................................ 1 Statement of: Roberts, Hon. Pat, a U.S. from the State of Kansas........... 1 Rockefeller, Hon. John D. IV, a U.S. Senator from the State of West Virginia........................................... 3 Robb, Hon. Charles, former Co-Chairman, Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction................................ 4 Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, a U.S. Senator from the State of Georgia.................................................... 6 Redd, VADM John Scott, U.S. Navy retired, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center-Designate................. 10 Prepared statement....................................... 7 Supplemental Materials: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees........................ 25 Additional Pre-Hearing Questions............................. 174 Glynn, Marilyn L., General Counsel Office of Government Ethics Letter to Hon. Pat Roberts.......................... 196 NOMINATION OF VICE ADMIRAL JOHN SCOTT REDD, U.S. NAVY, RETIRED, TO BE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER ---------- THURSDAY, JULY 21, 2005 United States Senate, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Pat Roberts (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. Committee Members Present: Senators Roberts, Hatch, Snowe, Chambliss, Levin, Wyden and Mikulski. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PAT ROBERTS Chairman Roberts. The Committee will come to order. Many are called, but few are chosen. [Laughter.] Chairman Roberts. Let me say, Admiral, that you shouldn't think that the lack of attendance is any indication of a lack of support for you; it just simply means that you are so highly qualified that nobody has any questions. Admiral Redd. Let's see what Senator Robb has to say about that, sir. Chairman Roberts. We'll leave that to our former colleague. The Committee meets today to receive testimony on the President's nomination for the newly created position of Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. Our witness today is the President's nominee, Vice Admiral John Redd. Admiral Redd, the Committee welcomes you and we thank you for your past service to our country. I understand that members of your family are with you today. I just met them and they are quite a family. Would you care to introduce them at this time? Admiral Redd. I would be honored to, sir. This is my wife, Donna, who is my best friend and the love of my life for 35 years. I will tell you, Mr. Chairman, that I married up in quality and down in age. [Laughter.] Admiral Redd. My daughter Ann, her husband, David, son Scott, Junior, and his bride Jennifer, and my son Adam are here today. So that's it. We do have four grandchildren, ages 1 to 6, but discretion won out over valor and we left them at home, sir. Chairman Roberts. They are certainly welcome if they choose to come. How old are they? Admiral Redd. One through six. Chairman Roberts. Well, their conduct could be replicated in many instances by Members of this August body. So we'll go from there. The Committee also welcomes our former colleague from Virginia, Senator Robb, who will introduce the nominee. And we are awaiting the appearance of Senator Chambliss from Georgia, who I understand will be here momentarily. Last fall, in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Congress created the National Counterterrorism Center and the position of Director. The Center will serve as the Government's primary organization for analysis of terrorism and counterterrorism intelligence; will conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities; will assign roles and responsibilities for counterterrorism activities; and ensure that agencies have access to and receive the intelligence support needed to successfully fulfill their missions. That's a tall order. The Center's Director will serve as the principal adviser to the Director of National Intelligence, or DNI, on intelligence operations that relate to counterterrorism. You will provide strategic operational plans for civilian and military counterterrorism efforts; advise the DNI on the extent to which the counterterrorism program recommendations and budget proposals across the Government conform to the President's counterterrorism priorities; and disseminate terrorism information to the most senior officials in the Executive Branch and the Congress. But the point is that Admiral Redd, in my personal opinion, is very well-qualified for this position. He comes to us with 38 years of Government experience and a very impressive resume. He most recently served as the Executive Director of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction--often referred to as the WMD Commission. I might add that the Administration and the President felt so strongly about that that they immediately adopted 70 of the 74 recommendations, and 3 are under study. Prior to his service on the Commission, Admiral Redd served as the Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. During his military career, he held a number of relevant positions, including the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs and as Commander of the Navy's Persian Gulf-based Fifth Fleet. If confirmed, he will report to the DNI on intelligence matters and to the President on the Nation's counterterrorism strategy. He faces a tough job, a tough challenge, leveraging our national assets against international terrorist groups. This will involve intelligence agencies and agencies whose primary focus is not intelligence, but whose missions and capabilities are critical to the fight. I met with the Admiral earlier this week. I was impressed by his knowledge of the organization he has been nominated to lead. He was candid in his answers. He was quick to agree to keep this Committee well informed. We had a very frank discussion about his authorities, the dual reporting chain he will be required to work within, issues of information access and competitive analysis, and even the constraints of leading a workforce assigned and, if you will pardon the expression, at the mercy of their home agencies. In his responses to this Committee, Admiral Redd made a distinction between competitive analysis and competitive warning. I think the Members of this Committee agree wholeheartedly with that distinction. On the competitive intelligence analysis side, it is not a race to see who can put out the best headline or who can grab a policymaker's attention; rather, it is a debate that should produce, in my opinion, the most accurate and well-supported analysis. Competitive analysis, however, is impossible without the level playing field created by what we call information access. The Vice Chairman is a strong supporter of the concept, as are Members of this Committee. The concept of information access involves cleared analysts being able to pull information, however or wherever collected, by searching all intelligence databases without having to wait for any one agency to push the information to them. Admiral Redd, you have observed that, to enhance information access, both technical and policy adjustments need to be made. I agree, especially with respect to the information access policies within our intelligence agencies. We discussed this at length in my office, and I will continue to support you in any way--I speak for the Committee as a whole--to ensure that analysts have access to the information they need to provide timely and informed analysis. Admiral Redd, you are taking on a real big job, a tremendous challenge. We and the Nation expect much from the NCTC. I believe you are up to the job, and I wish you every success. Be assured, this Committee stands ready to assist you. With that said, I welcome you to the Committee and I look forward to your testimony. Ordinarily at this time I would recognize the distinguished Vice Chairman, Senator Rockefeller. Unfortunately, he is not able to be here today. I know that he shares many of the concerns I have voiced and certainly recognizes the importance of this nomination. I ask unanimous consent that the Vice Chairman's statement be made part of the record. Without objection, it is so ordered. [The prepared statement of Vice Chairman Rockefeller follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV I am pleased to welcome Admiral Redd to the Committee today. With his nomination, the Director of National Intelligence is getting close to having a complete team in place to bring to fruition the reforms enacted last December. I look forward to hearing Admiral Redd's views on that legislation, the authority it gave to the DNI, and the responsibilities it assigned to the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. The creation of the National Counterterrorism Center was one of the central pillars of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The center was a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and first established by the President through Executive order. Congress considered it important enough to establish it into law and wanted to ensure that the Director had sufficient standing to execute the broad range of responsibilities assigned to the center. That is why we established the Director as a Senate confirmable position. The National Counterterrorism Center, in addition to being the single point for integrating and analyzing terrorism related intelligence, has the responsibility for ``strategic operational planning'' for all aspects of counterterrorism activities. This includes diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement programs. While the NCTC Director does not have operational control of the agencies performing these functions, he will be responsible for assigning duties to those agencies. Admiral Redd certainly seems to have the experience necessary to take on this job. His background includes a stint as the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. More recently, he served as the Executive Director of the WMD Commission and before that, he was Deputy Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. But the job he is taking on now will be more daunting than anything he has faced before. Simply coordinating the intelligence agencies remains a major challenge. We have made significant progress, but as Members of this Committee know, access to information is still not as seamless as it needs to be. But even that will be only one of the challenges facing the new Director. He also will have to sort out the unusual chain of command established by the Intelligence Reform Act. The Director will report to the DNI on intelligence programs and directly to the President on strategic planning issues. Likewise, he will face enormous challenges in executing that inter-agency strategic operation planning role. I am confident that with the help of Director Negroponte and the strong backing of the President, Admiral Redd, if confirmed, will be able to deal with these structural issues. He will then be faced with his real job, stopping the terrorists. The terrorist threat has changed significantly since 9/11. The al Qai'da that existed then has been transformed. It still exists as an organization, but its real power now comes from the movement it has spawned. While we have done a good job of fighting the organization, we have made little headway against the movement. As the person responsible for planning and coordinating the broad counterterrorism efforts, the new Director will need to deal with the broader challenges, as well as day to day efforts to disrupt terrorist attacks. Another major challenge will come from Iraq. The ongoing insurgency there has become an incubator for a new generation of terrorists trained in urban terrorist tactics and with a deep hatred of the United States. We need to start now developing a plan to track and disrupt this group when the insurgency there begins to wind down. Our Nation must succeed at these tasks; our security and safety depends on it. I am pleased that someone of Admiral Redd's caliber has agreed to lead this effort. I look forward to his testimony and hope the Committee can move quickly to consider the nomination. Chairman Roberts. I would now recognize our former colleague, the distinguished gentleman from Virginia, Senator Robb. STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES ROBB, FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA, AND FORMER CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to be here. I had anticipated that Senator Chambliss would have made the formal introduction. Senator Hatch, Senator Wyden, I am very pleased to be back with friends and former colleagues to introduce the man that the President has nominated, and whom I hope it will be your pleasure to confirm, as the next Director of NCTC. There are many truly outstanding elements of his resume. I am not going to cover any of them. I'm going to talk only about the man that I have gotten to know. Let me just say that a lot of people have resumes that are a little bit boring. There are some elements in here that are truly elements of distinction in his background and past. But I'd like to talk to you about the man who had headed up for the past year the Commission to which you just made reference and, Mr. Chairman, to thank you and the Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for your input in working with us during the course of the last year and a half in making that a reality. As we have said, both in our report and publicly, we built on the fine work that your Committee had done and the 9/11 Commission and others had done, but yours was the most relevant and current and on point, and we very much appreciated that. Let me say first of all that Larry Silberman, the co- chairman with whom you have worked as well, would definitely have liked to have been here, liked to have had this opportunity as well. He's an old Washington hand, however, and he's very familiar with the climate in the summer months, so every year he spends July in Maine. This is not an exception. So I know that I can speak for him. We talked a little bit about this. We have been able to speak for each other in a number of instances. Several members of the professional staff--and they were outstanding--are in the room today, all supportive of the nomination of Admiral J. Scott Redd to be the next Director of NCTC. We made a very specific search to find someone that would be the right person, if you will, to head up the Commission. We consulted far and wide, and no one that we talked to had anything but unstinting praise for Scott Redd. We asked him to take the assignment, and the first objection we received was from his then-boss. He was the deputy to Paul Bremer in Iraq, and he said I can't give him up. We appealed to him based on the Executive order, which was very helpful, as well as the needs of the Nation in this particular instance, and he came and joined us. To the extent that the findings and recommendations of our report--and, Mr. Chairman, I might say that although when Fran Townsend released her review and the formal recommendations that the President was working on about 3 weeks ago now, there are now 71, I have been informed, and there are at least 2 more recommendations that are still under study. So in terms of a batting average I won't make nay other comparisons, but even Ted Williams would have thought batting way over 950 would have been something truly extraordinary. To the extent that those recommendations and findings were so readily accepted and there was so much buy-in by the community, no one was more responsible than Scott Redd. We had many people who made major contributions to that particular effort, but Scott's ability to lead a group of very highly- motivated professionals, coming from different perspectives in the national security and intelligence field and to bring all of that synergism together was really quite extraordinary, and it's one of the reasons that I think you would search in vain to find any member of the Commission or any member of the professional staff who wouldn't join me in an enthusiastic endorsement of Scott Redd to be the Director of this Center. A couple of just personal items. He is scrupulously honest and ethical. He has a good sense of humor, but he remains very much focused and mission-oriented. He has a very deft touch in working with highly-skilled colleagues and subordinates, and he knows when to lead and he knows when to listen, and not all leaders can combine both of those qualities. Perhaps most important for the person who is to lead the NCTC, he is unflappable. He is universally respected by everyone in the national security and IC community that I'm aware of, and I believe that that judgment, as I say, is shared across the board. As you can tell, I think--and I will not do any more filibustering until Senator Chambliss arrives--I have a very, very high regard for this man, and I think the President has made a superb choice. Although we are never in a position to guarantee that terrorists won't succeed in some small way, I think most of us who know Scott Redd know that he will be doing everything possible within our power to defend the country's interest, if it is the pleasure of this Committee to favorably report out and vote positively on the Senate floor for the nomination of Admiral J. Scott Redd to be the next Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. With that, Mr. Chairman, I would be delighted to answer any questions, that you or other Members of the Committee may have. If not, I know the routine and I will abandon the distinguished nominee at this point and leave him to the mercy of your incisive questions as to how he will carry out this responsibility. Chairman Roberts. There will be no need for mercy. We have Senator Chambliss, who has now arrived on the scene. Better timing could not have been arranged. Senator Chambliss, I recognize you, sir, for the purpose of an introduction. Let me say that Senator Robb has waxed poetic in regard to the Admiral and all of his qualifications and why he is an excellent nominee. We now recognize you, sir, as a Member of this Committee. STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA Senator Chambliss. So you are telling me to keep it short, Mr. Chairman. I understand that. Chairman Roberts. Now that was a sort of long way around it, but that's what we're trying to say, yes. Senator Chambliss. Actually, Senator Robb and I had this plan where I would make this grand entrance here. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, I was sitting on the floor waiting to vote so I would be here on time for this hearing, but I did not know the vote had been cancelled. So I apologize to the Chairman. Well, I'm sure that Senator Robb has waxed very eloquently relative to Admiral Redd, but let me just say, Mr. Chairman, I have had the privilege of knowing Admiral Redd for several years. He's obviously a resident of my State. He's not only been a good friend, he's been a great citizen of this country, in particular, a great citizen of our State. He has every particular asset needed to take on this new and very challenging position. For someone to step into a new position such as this, with the type of background that he has, I think is very admirable for this Admiral. Scott could very easily just retire back home to Georgia and enjoy life, enjoy his family. But, as he told me the other day, there are just certain times when your country calls that you just feel the need to respond in a positive way. He's had other opportunities to serve that have not presented the need nor the challenge that this does, and I could not be prouder of him to have him nominated for this position. He's just a great man and he's been a great leader for our country. He's going to provide exactly the type of leadership, Mr. Chairman, that the Director is going to need for this position. So I can't say enough good things about him. I'm very pleased to be here, along with Senator Robb, to commend him highly to the Committee. Chairman Roberts. Senator Chambliss, thank you very much. Admiral, now that you have achieved near-sainthood, we would now like to practice the Robb theory of leadership and do some listening. You are recognized, sir. [The prepared statement of Admiral Redd follows:] Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral John Scott Redd, U.S. Navy Retired, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center-Designate Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am honored to come before you today as the President's nominee to be the first Senate-confirmed Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. This new agency is a central element of Congress' plan to strengthen U.S. intelligence capabilities and to mobilize all Government agencies in the war on terrorism. I am fully cognizant of the immensity and the importance of the duties I have been called upon to assume. If confirmed, my pledge to you is that I will carry out the mission of the NCTC with determination, with integrity, and to the very best of my ability. In appearing before you today, I am mindful of a silent constituency: The victims of 9/11, the soldiers and civilians killed in Iraq, the sailors killed on the USS Cole, the airmen who died at Khobar Towers, those who died at the hand of terrorists at our embassies in Africa, the dead in Lebanon, Madrid, and most recently, in London. There are many others, and it is the grim nature of war that these numbers will surely grow. Nonetheless, it will be the mission of the NCTC to do everything in its power to stop each and every attack. Our national objective is difficult but straightforward. It is to destroy terrorist networks far and wide and to render terrorism ineffectual and self-defeating as a tactic, even for fanatics. I come before you today after a career of nearly 40 years in service to the Nation. You will be the judge of my qualifications, but I believe my years of service have prepared me for this responsibility in several important ways. First, I have been deeply involved in national security matters all of my adult life. I have been privileged to hold positions of responsibility for the most sensitive activities of the U.S. Government. I have participated extensively in the deliberations of the National Security Council in both Democratic and Republican administrations. Before my retirement after 36 years of active-duty military service, I served as Director of Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, leading the development of the National Military Strategy. Second, Terrorism is not an abstract concept to me. I have lived and operated under the threat of terrorists. Nine years ago, I heard and felt the blast from Khobar Towers while standing 30 miles away in Bahrain. Elements of my command were among the first to respond. Last year I served briefly in Baghdad as Ambassador Bremer's Deputy in the Coalition Provisional Authority with up-close responsibility for civilian operations under siege by terrorists. Third, the National Counterterrorism Center is itself a product of a changing world landscape, and my experience has prepared me to lead in an environment of strategic transition. I have been involved in the adaptation and reform of Government institutions in diverse settings and circumstances. I had extensive joint military experience before the Goldwater-Nichols Act made joint duty what it should be. In response to evolving threats to our vital national interests, I had the privilege to propose, promote, commission and command the FIFTH Fleet in the Middle East--the Navy's only new fleet since the World War II era. In the private sector, I was the Chief Executive Officer of a high-tech education company, where I experienced firsthand the challenges and rewards of reforming another culture, public education. Most recently, I served as Executive Director of the Presidential WMD Commission whose report is now the President's blueprint for reform of the Intelligence Community. Overall, I believe my most important experience is that of leadership, developed at the helm of over a dozen operating organizations as a Commander, a Chief Executive officer or a Chief Operating Officer. Foremost among those experiences has been my service in the United States Military. I have commanded eight military organizations, all of which were in the business of conducting operations at the tip of the spear. Those were my most personally rewarding tours of duty and the most formative of my professional character. As if no time had passed, my heart remains with those who serve on the front lines today. If confirmed, I will draw upon all of the leadership skills, experience and judgment that I have garnered over the years. That summarizes my view of my qualifications. I will now move briefly to a few thoughts on the way ahead. First, people are key to our success. As is the case with any Government leader, my job performance will depend upon the performance of a thousand others. In my short time at the NCTC as well as over the last year with the WMD Commission, I have been impressed by the dedication, professionalism, and patriotism of the members of the Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I will build on the existing foundation and cultivate a culture within the NCTC and the larger counterterrorism community where every individual is encouraged to give his or her utmost and is honored to serve as a member of the team. I will place exceptional value on collaboration and teamwork. We are at war. The buddy system will be in force. As in all positions of this nature, there will be more to do than is humanly possible. An important part of my leadership will be setting priorities. While there are many challenges ahead, bridging what has traditionally been referred to as foreign and domestic intelligence will be one of my top priorities. That means forging and strengthening strong alliances with the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Both of these sister agencies are charting new territory in the area of counterterrorism. Both are struggling with unprecedented demands for intelligence, application of new policy and legal provisions in respect to U.S. persons, and construction of a modern information sharing architecture. Under direction from Ambassador Negroponte, I will lead a coherent, Government-wide approach to these challenges. I will invoke his full authorities, and those that repose in me as Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, to manage intelligence for counterterrorism across the Government as a single enterprise. I look forward to working with an invigorated foreign intelligence community. In particular, the CIA's Counterterrorism Center has for a number of years been a center of excellence. With little public recognition of their successes, the staff of CTC works tirelessly every day to save lives. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of CIA to ensure that NCTC works hand-in-glove with CTC for the good of the Nation. At the top level, the NCTC has two broad functions: Intelligence and Strategic Operational Planning. The first, and more established function resides within the world of intelligence--understanding the terrorist enemy, his objectives, his support networks, and his actions. The second and more uncharted function relates to our Government-wide operations against that enemy. Specifically, it involves strategic operational planning to bring all the instruments of national power to bear against the enemy. With respect to intelligence, a central role of the NCTC is to integrate, exploit, and disseminate all proper sources of information on international terrorism. Our goal will be to expose the networks of international terrorism, and to identify and hunt down its perpetrators. We will cast the net far and wide. Those who knowingly put money in the hands of terrorists, or who provide refuge or other support, are no less our enemies than those who strap-on the bombs. In this foundational mission, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center is a key member of the U.S. Intelligence Community and a direct subordinate of the Director of National Intelligence. I have known John Negroponte for 20 years and appear before you with his full support. In addition to tactical and operational intelligence, we must also take the long view. If confirmed, I will place greater emphasis on long term, in-depth analysis. The counterterrorism strategy of the United States should be grounded on a thorough understanding of our adversaries. We need to understand the political, cultural, and social forces that turn teenagers into indiscriminate assassins. This context is highly differentiated in different regions and countries. An understanding of events in the Middle East cannot be automatically transposed to Africa or Southeast Asia. Without relenting in the real- time hunt for individual terrorists, the United States needs a longterm strategy that addresses the roots of terrorism and that is based upon a genuine understanding of its causes and antecedents. The intelligence-gathering and dissemination role of the NCTC is replete with opportunities, and with pitfalls. Many of the opportunities are technology-driven. Information technology has great potential to enhance almost every aspect of intelligence operations, from collection and data integration to analysis and dissemination of finished intelligence. To realize this potential will require sustained excellence and innovation, along with rapid migration from the research laboratory to the battlefield. The NCTC will be the hub of an intelligence network that goes far beyond the traditional U.S. intelligence community. The network will extend to all agencies of the Federal Government, to State and local governments and law enforcement agencies, to the private sector, and to liaison elements of foreign countries. The challenges of information sharing on this scale are well-known. However, as evidenced in the studies of the WMD Commission, building the requisite technology infrastructure will be less formidable than the task of rationalizing the disparate rules and policies that overlay the information sharing environment. Many of these rules and policies are vestiges of the cold war while others represent bureaucratic inertia. If confirmed, I will work relentlessly to overcome these and other obstacles. The goal is simple: to make sure the right people have the right information at the right time. The application of information dominance in the war on terrorism must be bounded to protect the values we are fighting for. The rights of privacy and free expression are at the core of American civil liberties. These fundamental protections would be placed in jeopardy by unrestrained collection and exploitation of personal data. Congress has attended to this concern in new legislation by creation of a Civil Liberties Board to oversee all U.S. intelligence activities. It will be my responsibility to work closely and cooperatively with this Board, as well as the DNI's Civil Liberties Protection Officer, in the counterterrorism arena. More to the point, it will be my responsibility, irrespective of external civil liberties oversight, to be vigilant in protection of American civil liberties in every aspect of the work of the National Counterterrorism Center. There is no victory in the apprehension of terrorists if it is done at the expense of principles embodied in our Constitution and Bill of Rights. The second major mission of the NCTC is Strategic Operational Planning. This is a new mission defined and assigned by the President and the Congress in direct response to the terrorist threat. Indeed, the legislation that established the National Counterterrorism Center is a landmark in the history of the U.S. Government. Congress has vested an unprecedented concentration of responsibilities in a new institution with a vital, highly focused, and unrelenting mission. Reporting to the President, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center is called upon by law to plan the employment of ``all instruments of national power.'' He or she is charged to orchestrate, by ``strategic operational planning,'' what amounts to a perpetual assault by the United States of America on terrorism and terrorists wherever and whenever they threaten our national interests. Inherent in this job is the monumental task of planning, coordinating and leveraging the counterterrorism work of all agencies of the Federal Government to achieve synergy and maximum effect. This responsibility could not be more daunting nor more necessary. If confirmed, I will concentrate the Center's full energy and capabilities to ensure that this new mission is swiftly developed, functional and effective. Further, let me add a word about our shared responsibilities. I have spent most of my adult life in the U.S. Navy, where the Captain of the Ship serves as the prototype of responsibility and accountability. I expect to be held accountable. But responsibility and accountability have a third, inseparable companion. That companion is authority. Meaningful accountability requires authorities commensurate with assigned responsibilities. I will put the new authorities of the Director of the National counterterrorism Center to the test. If need be, where I lack authority within my area of responsibility, I will seek it from the DNI or from the President. It may be that, if new statutory authorities are unclear, or if they engender conflicting interpretations, I will return to this body to request additional powers required for the NCTC to fulfill its mission. That said, my initial inclination is that the authorities are sufficient. In the same vein, as a definitional matter, I may be called a ``political appointee,'' but there is nothing political about this job. Every citizen of the United States, irrespective of political affiliation, indeed every person anywhere in the world who holds to basic humanitarian principles, has a stake in the success of the National Counterterrorism Center. Although it would be foolish not to expect detractors and critics, I firmly believe that the overwhelming majority of Americans hope for success of the NCTC. I intend to draw upon these shared values and good will, especially in my dealings with the Congress of the United States. Whatever differences may exist in approach or emphasis, I believe we are in lockstep on the desired result. I intend to preserve this relationship through candor, honesty and integrity in working with the United States Senate and House of Representatives. To succeed, we must recognize the nature of the conflict we are engaged in. I believe it is correctly characterized as a war, but there are differences from historical wars. As with most wars, there will be many battles. But in the war on terrorism, our victories in battle will in most cases be invisible or opaque to the vast majority of the public, while our defeats will be painfully obvious. We will do everything in our power to win every battle, but we must also recognize that losing a battle, should that occur, cannot be allowed to weaken our resolve to win the war. I began my remarks by acknowledging the silent witnesses who have been victims of terror. I will finish by noting another constituency. I am a father of three and grandfather of four. It is likely that the war we are fighting against terrorism will continue well into their lifetime. Without question, the conduct and outcome of this war on terrorism will shape the character and quality of their lives and, indeed, our entire civilization. I have no need for other motivation. By accepting this call to duty, I will be defending everything that I hold dear. With due humility in respect to the magnitude of the challenge, I am ready to launch, and, by God's grace, determined to prevail. Thank you. STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JOHN SCOTT REDD, U.S. NAVY, RETIRED, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNTER- TERRORISM CENTER-DESIGNATE Admiral Redd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator chambliss. You're on your own. Admiral Redd. Thank you, sir. I don't suppose there's a provision where the defense can rest at this point. [Laughter.] Chairman Roberts. Judging from your qualifications, sir, that might be a good thing to do, but we encourage your statement. Admiral Redd. Thank you, sir. I would like to thank Senator Saxby Chambliss for his very kind introduction on behalf of my adopted State of George, which we have truly come to enjoy and love. I would note for the record I am a native of Iowa, which is not far from the State of Kansas, of course, so there are some midwestern genes as well in my background. I am also very grateful to Senator Chuck Robb. I've gotten to know both of these gentlemen in the last few years as true patriots and true friends, and in spite of the typical Marine Corps-Navy jokes, which I will not repeat, given the Chairman's background, we've had a wonderful relationship. With your permission, sir, I would like to ask that my longer opening statement be entered in the record and in the interest of time I will summarize my remarks to the Committee, if that's acceptable. Chairman Roberts. Without objection. Please proceed. Admiral Redd. Mr. Chairman, Senator Hatch, Senator Wyden, Senator Chambliss, I am honored to come before you today as President Bush's nominee as the first Senate-confirmed Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. I am truly grateful to President Bush for the confidence he has shown in me, in nominating me, and I am fully cognizant of the immensity and the importance of the duties which I have been asked to assume. If confirmed, my pledge to you is that I will carry out the mission of the National Counterterrorism Center with determination, with integrity, and to the very best of my abilities. As I sit before you this afternoon, sir, I am mindful of a very silent, but very strong constituency--the victims of 9/11, the Marines who died in Lebanon, sailors killed on the USS COLE, the airmen who died in Khobar Towers, the soldiers, civilians and other servicemen who have died in Iraq and Afghanistan, diplomats who died at the hand of terrorists in our embassies in East Africa, the dead in Madrid and, most recently, in London, and I hope that today there were no fatalities there, but clearly a very good reminder today that this is a war which is ongoing. There are many others. And it is a grime reality of the war that we're in that these numbers will surely grow. Nonetheless, it will be the mission of the National Counterterrorism Center to do everything possible to stop each and every attack. Our national objective is difficult, but it's straightforward. It is to destroy terrorist networks far and wide and to render terrorism ineffectual and self-defeating as a tactic, even for fanatics. I come before you today, Mr. Chairman, having served my country for almost 40 years. At the end of the day, you and this Committee and the Senate will be the judge of my qualifications, but I do believe my years of service have prepared me for this responsibility. Let me just highlight two points regarding my qualifications. First, terrorism is not an abstract concept to me. I have lived and operated under the threat of terrorists. Nine years ago I was standing at my headquarters in Bahrain when Khobar Towers exploded. I not only heard, but I felt the blast 30 miles away. Elements of my command were among the first to respond to that tragedy. Last year, as was mentioned, I served briefly in Baghdad as Jerry Bremer's deputy at the Coalition Provisional Authority, with up-close responsibility for civilian operations under the threat and under the siege of terrorists. Secondly, if confirmed, I believe that the skills and experiences I will draw upon most would be those of leadership. I have been privileged to lead over a dozen operating organizations as a commander, as a chief executive officer, or chief operating officer. Foremost among those experiences has been my service in the United States military. I've commanded eight military organizations, and all of them were in the business of conducting operations at the tip of the spear. Those were my most rewarding tours of duty and it will not surprise you that my heart remains today with those who serve on the front lines. Let me focus just for a moment, if I could, on the way ahead. Congress and the President have assigned two fundamental roles to the NCTC. The first centers on intelligence, as has been noted. By law, the National Counterterrorism Center is to be the primary organization for the analysis and integration of all intelligence pertaining to counterterrorism, and making that information readily available to all who need it. In this role, if confirmed, I will report directly to Ambassador Negroponte in his role and position as Director of National Intelligence. The second role centers on planning. Congress has given to the NCTC the significant new task of strategic operational planning for all counterterrorism activities. That explicitly involves integrating all elements of national power, from diplomacy and financial to the military and offensive intelligence operations, to homeland security and law enforcement. While it does not involve execution of counterterrorism operations, this responsibility is clearly substantial, daunting and, I believe, very necessary. As you have noted, in this strategic operational planning role, if confirmed, I will report directly to the President. In both roles it is my pledge to you I will use the authorities, all the authorities, which you have given the Director of the NCTC to the utmost of my abilities. At the heart of both of those roles is the concept of integration, and I'm sure we'll talk a lot about that today. I will give particular attention to forging and strengthening strong alliances with all the members of the Government's counterterrorism team. On the domestic front, the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI are key players. Both of these sister organizations, as you know, are charting new territory in the area of counterterrorism. In the area that I know firsthand, I look forward to working with an invigorated foreign intelligence community, including the military and the CIA's highly-capable Counterterrorist Center. Bringing together all of these organizations into a cohesive, dynamic and effective community is probably the greatest value that we can bring. Effective integration also requires effective teamwork. Teamwork involves people. If confirmed, I will do everything in my power, sir, to nurture a vision and a culture where every individual is inspired to do his or her best for the effort and is honored to serve as a member of the team. In our struggle against terrorism, we will work hard to do the right thing. But there's an even higher standard. We must not only do the right thing; we must do it in the right way. The end does not justify the means. Our intelligence and operational activities against terrorists must be bounded to protect the values we are fighting for. The rights of privacy and free expression are at the core of American civil liberties. The apprehension of terrorists is a pyrrhic victory if it is done at the expense of the principles embodied in our Constitution and Bill of Rights. Finally, let me say a word about our shared responsibilities. I may be technically called a political appointee, but there's nothing political about this job. Every citizen of the United States, regardless of political affiliation, and indeed every person anywhere in the world who holds to basic humanitarian principles has a stake in the success of the National Counterterrorism Center. I intend to draw upon these shared values and good will, especially in my dealings with the Congress. Whatever differences may exist in approach or emphasis, I believe we are in lockstep on the desired result. I intend to preserve this relationship through candor, through honesty and integrity in working with you. I began my remarks, Mr. Chairman, by acknowledging the silent witness of those who have been victims of terror. I will finish by noting another constituency. As we have noted today, I am a father of three and a grandfather of four. It is very likely that the war we are fighting against terrorism will continue well into their lifetimes. Without question, the conduct and outcome of this war on terrorism will shape the character and quality of their lives and indeed for our entire civilization. I have no need for other motivation. By accepting this call to duty, I will be defending everything that I hold dear. With due humility and respect to the magnitude of the challenge, I am ready to launch. By God's grace I will do everything in my power to ensure that we prevail. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Roberts. Admiral, we thank you for a comprehensive and pertinent if not poignant statement. We will now proceed to questions. Do you agree, sir, to appear before the Committee, here or in other venues, when invited? Admiral Redd. I do, sir. Chairman Roberts. Do you agree to send intelligence community officials to appear before the Committee and designated staff when invited? Admiral Redd. I do, sir. Chairman Roberts. Do you agree to provide documents or any material requested by the Committee in order for it to carry out its oversight and its legislative responsibilities? Admiral Redd. I do, sir. Chairman Roberts. If confirmed, you are going to have considerable input into decisions at the NCTC with regard to information access. We both mentioned this in our statements. In concert with expanded information access, we need to be certain that intelligence community analysts operate on a level playing field. Without this level playing field, I believe that effective and competitive intelligence analysis is simply impossible. This Committee has heard that the NCTC is described as the Las Vegas of the intelligence community. What goes on at the NCTC stays at NCTC. In other words, the NCTC might have information access, but counterterrorism analysts in other parts of the intelligence community don't have the same level of access. What steps, sir, would you take to ensure that we are leveraging each agency's all-source analysis capability through improved information access? Admiral Redd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is clearly one of the critical areas and one of my highest priorities, gained both from personal experience in the past, and most explicitly from the WMD Commission. The simple goal in information- sharing, as you understand, sir, is to get the right information to the right people at the right time. My sense, again being in the process of reading in at the NCTC, is that we're on a journey. I would submit to you, sir, that the NCTC is probably at the forefront of information- sharing in terms of where we are. There's been some progress out there. There remain challenges, as you know--technology challenges, to a certain extent resources problems, although those tend to be derivative of the technology, and finally some practices and policy. I would submit to you that the even-existing setup today, particularly involving NCTC on line, is an incredible step forward. So the information does come in. And, as you know, there's a history here in terms of how TTIC was setup, now NCTC, as people have come in and brought their own authorities from each of the agencies--many in law, some in practice--and brought those together. So the first step has been to make sure that within NCTC there's a good and wide sharing. What we're seeing now and what you see now is, with NCTC online, every disseminated product is now available on NCTC online, and those are available throughout the community. That's a very major step forward. There are still some challenges and, as you understand, with Ambassador Negroponte standing up, some of the reasons and rationales for the way TTIC was set up originally, and now NCTC, in terms of people bringing their own authorities from their agencies, we may be over that and may be able to do that. There are still challenges in terms of getting all the access out. We have to do it, obviously, in terms of what the law says in terms of U.S. persons. That's one of the areas. I would say this to you, that certainly within NCTC today I don't think there's a piece--you don't know what you don't know, but I don't think there's a piece of counterterrorism intelligence which is not in the NCTC. Even at this point, however, it's not as widely shared as it should be, and we're making some improvements on that. But the next step clearly is to get that out within the larger CT analysis community. The other step is sort of the next ring out, those people who are part of the counterterrorism team, but they're not necessarily part of the intelligence community. That's the next major challenge in terms of breaking down these policies. I would just say we're on a journey, sir. We've come a long ways. We've got a ways to go. Chairman Roberts. Should not the NCTC have a cadre of permanent personnel? You talked about other members of the intelligence community bringing their expertise and having access. Shouldn't we have a cadre of permanent personnel and, if so--and I know this is very early to be asking you this-- could you give us an estimate of how many permanent personnel there should be? Admiral Redd. I think I can give you a principled argument. I can't give you the details, obviously, because I haven't done the management sort of analysis. But intuitively, I sense that I think it's a good idea to have a cadre of permanent people. I guess in my own background I draw on a couple of examples from the defense side, either the Office of the Secretary of Defense or, particularly, the Joint Staff. It's a tradeoff, the balance of having people there who have longevity, who provide continuity and who are truly beholding, if you will, to the NCTC on the one hand, and on the other hand to have that sort of joint experience. You do want to have both, I believe. I think you want to have a lot of people rotating through because not only do they bring in a lot of experience, they take a lot of that back, and that helps in sort of a Goldwater-Nichols idea, if you want, in the intelligence community. I don't know what those numbers are, whether it's 50/50, 70/30, 60/40. I'd really need to look at that. It will not happen overnight. As you know, we have to make sure that as we go that direction, and we go away from the assignee model which you have right now, that our initial take on the authorities, the way we deal with the various authorities from the contributing organizations, we haven't lost yet. My sense is that we won't, and that we can do that, but I can't give you a number today, sir. Chairman Roberts. Senator Wyden. Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Admiral. I enjoyed my visit with you. As I indicated to you, my interest here is trying to find a way to balance both ends of the teeter-totter, to fight terrorism ferociously while at the same time being sensitive to personal liberties. Obviously, to be successful in counterterrorism you've got to be able to share data effectively. And yet the standards for collecting data, as I indicated to you, are pretty meager. And also it doesn't seem that there are adequate provisions for oversight and protection of some of this data. The Supreme Court, in a 1989 case, held that the Government can withhold data bases from public disclosure even when all the information they contain is publicly available. The Court said, ``Plainly there is a vast difference between the public records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse filed, counter archives and local police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a single clearing house of information.'' You are going to be the single clearinghouse of information. You are going to be exactly what the Supreme Court spoke to. And the Congress--and I strongly support the proposition--believed that that was important, to make sure that you'd have improved access to information regarding terrorist suspects and people who would put our citizens at risk. What I'm concerned about is the other side of the ledger, which is how you're going to protect the privacy of law-abiding people. I'd like to hear you address that. I haven't heard you address it thus far in the hearing. You have a certainly laudable paragraph about it in your written testimony. But how do you seek specifically to improve information access without sweeping up all this personal information on innocent people? Admiral Redd. Well, we had a good discussion the other day, sir. I think it's important just to note, as we did in the discussion the other day, that NCTC itself, as you know, is not in the collection business. All the information comes in to us from the various agencies. We went back. I've talked to the staff about this briefly. I will certainly tell you I'm not an expert on the subject and I'm not sure that NCTC is going to be the first line of defense in this. But, just to deal with the specific issue which you raised, first of all, the collection of the information that comes in to us, there are some pretty significant standards, particularly in the areas we talked about, in terms of protecting U.S. persons. Clearly we have to balance the goal. You're looking to us. You created us and you brought this information together with the purpose of connecting the dots. But I would say to you there's a difference--I think there's a difference, at least in our discussion, between searching information in the context of a counterterrorism nexus. In other words, there's something that indicates there's--I won't use the legal term ``probable cause,'' but there's something related to terrorism, and doing a search on that subject is very different than going out and data-mining and, as some people have said, maybe instead of connecting the dots that's trying to find the dots. But within NCTC and within those searches, we are bound by the very same rules and regulations and law in terms of what we can do in terms of protecting U.S. persons. Senator Wyden. But there aren't really any rules with respect to searches, in public data bases. There are some rules with respect to the private sector. So why don't you tell me what the protections are, as you see them, as it relates to public data bases for the rights of our citizens. Admiral Redd. I think, as I said, sir, two things. First of all, there must be a nexus between the search--not data- mining--but to do the search there must be a nexus to terrorism. And we are out to connect the dots. And I think that very proper for us to do. We are not allowed to go on fishing expeditions. I can't go in and say, ``Put Ron Wyden's name in and go find out all sorts of things.'' That's against the rules and it's against the law, as I understand it. I will tell you this as a practical matter. In fact, Chairman Roberts in a recent hearing made the comment, quoting General Hayden, that in practice I find that the people at NCTC are so concerned about this and so aware of it that they probably lean so far back in some ways we may even have to push them. It was General Hayden's comment that we're not even coming up to that line. Senator, let me just say this is a complicated subject. I don't pretend to be an expert on it at this point in time. Technology brings challenges. As we go through, as you understand, it brings lots of challenges. Technology also brings opportunities. Technology can help us keep that data, as you know, safer--biometrics, for example, to make sure that the people who are searching that data base are cleared, things like that. I wish had a more complete---- Senator Wyden. Admiral, I will just tell you I think we disagree on this point. I want to hold the record open because I believe there are almost no rules as to how the Government can use information collected by Government agencies or acquired from commercial data bases. And that's what I hope that you will be interested in working on. Let me just hold the record open, because I would like to have you tell me what you believe to be the rules with respect to how the Government can use the information collected by Government agencies, because I believe they are meager or non-existent. The other area that I wanted to touch on we also talked about briefly, and that is, I think it is so important that in your position, policymakers get the unvarnished truth of what's really going on out there and what the country can't afford to have is somebody in a critical position like yours saying, once again, something is a slam dunk when it isn't. Tell me what in your past--and, as we talked about, some of this can be sensitive--would convince the Committee that you will be out there telling policymakers what they don't want to hear? Admiral Redd. I thought about that after you asked me the question, sir, and I guess I'm going to take you back 43 years to start with, as a plebe at the Naval Academy when I was first introduced to the honor concept. My classmates elected me to be one of six representatives on the honor committee, and we dealt even then, with all the tough cases, and some people were thrown out for honor offenses. My whole life in the Navy has to do with speaking truth to power, whether it's as an ensign on a ship, whether it's Fifth Fleet commander talking to my boss, or whether it was in the National Security Council, talking to the very senior people there. The bottom line is, lives are at stake and when lives are at stake, you just can't mess around. Some of the more interesting examples I won't be able to share with you in public. If you would like a specific example, I can give you one. As the Fifth Fleet commander, when we set that up, the Chief of Naval Operations used to bring all the component commanders in. All the rest of them were four-stars. I was a three-star. As it turned out, the Fifth Fleet in the Middle East was probably the hottest spot. So I ended up having a lot more carrier time than the other CINCs did, and that wasn't always the most popular thing. It was the right thing to do, and I made a proposal for increasing that. Senator Wyden. That answer will work for me. I look forward to supporting your confirmation and working with you in the days ahead. And let us particularly dig in on this question of how we can win the war on terrorism, fight it ferociously, pulling out all the stops, and do a better job of safeguarding the privacy rights of our citizens, because I think the only area, based on our conversation, we disagree on is---- Admiral Redd. We are in absolute agreement on the goal, sir. Senator Wyden. I think there's virtually no ``there'' there with respect to rules on how the Government can use information collected by Government agencies, and we've got to do a better job. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Roberts. Senator Levin, who must return to the floor to help manage the Defense Authorization Act. Senator Levin. Thank you and Senator Chambliss for allowing me to go out of order. I appreciate it a great deal. Senator Wyden's question about speaking truth to power, telling policymakers, whether they are in the executive or legislative branch, to me is perhaps the single most important question that we can ask you. And the answer that you give, as far as I'm concerned, is the most single important answer that I can even think of, which is that you have a record of saying to people in power, who have a rank above you, what they didn't necessarily want to hear, and that you are committed to do exactly that, and to come up with objective, independent assessments at NCTC and to tell the policymakers, whatever branch of government they might be in, precisely what it is that you determine to be the facts. And that assurance, to me, is what is critical and I very much welcome what you say. Admiral Redd. I give that to you, sir. I have done that and I will continue to do it. Senator Levin. Thank you. You were Executive Director of the Silberman-Robb Commission and you looked at the intelligence prior to our going to Iraq. Before that Commission met, the 9/11 Commission also took a look at some of the issues that were overlapping. One of them was the question of whether there was a collaborative or operational relationship between Iraq and al- Qa'ida. The 9/11 Commission found no evidence of that. Did the Silberman-Robb Commission discover anything that would contradict the 9/11 Commission's finding? Admiral Redd. We did not explicitly look at that issue, sir. We were not charged to go back and either rewrite the NIE. We obviously talked to the people involved. Some witnesses thought there might have been one, but frankly it was not our job, nor our charter, to go back and to redo the intelligence analysts. We were looking more for what processes went wrong, and we took that as a given because that's where the Intelligence Committee came out. Senator Levin. What was the NIE finding on that issue? Admiral Redd. Actually, I said NIE, but I think it was the intelligence. I don't know whether it was an NIE or just an intelligence, my recollection is that while there were clearly terrorist connections--and there was clearly support for terrorists--that the official community position was they could not find a direct nexus between al-Qa'ida and 9/11 and Iraq. Senator Levin. Did you look at the question of how it is or how it was, then, that there was an inconsistency between what the Administration's statements were relative to that and what that underlying intelligence community position was? Did you look at that issue? Admiral Redd. We had a brief discussion in closed session with the Commission, but basically our charter and our job was basically to find out what went wrong and when it went wrong, and what were the processes. The intelligence itself was public record, so how that intelligence was dealt with by policymakers here or in the executive branch was, we thought, rightly beyond our charter, because it was not a question of what the intelligence community said. It was out in the open for everybody to make their own judgment. Senator Levin. Do you personally have an opinion that explains that inconsistency? Admiral Redd. I'm sorry, inconsistency---- Senator Levin. Inconsistency between Administration statements on the relationship between al-Qa'ida and Iraq and the intelligence community's assessment? Admiral Redd. My recollection--as I told you in private--I probably sat in 200---- Senator Levin. I mean about the relationship. Admiral Redd. I understand, sir. But I sat in probably 200 National Security Council meetings in the last Administration, the Clinton Administration, as well as this one, and I think the intelligence community, certainly on WMD, and I think with the terror thing, was pretty much convinced, on WMD, clearly convinced. I can't say that I have a personal opinion. I will tell you there were some indications--we weren't asked to look into it, but there were some indications that there might have been more of a connection there than the intelligence community came up with, sir. But I'll be honest with you. We didn't delve in deeply. Senator Levin. Thank you. And again my thanks to Senator Chambliss and our Chairman. Chairman Roberts. Senator Chambliss? Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, again I just thank you for your commitment to public service. Thank you for what you've done for our country and thank you for what you're willing to do in this particular position for our country. I think you are right. I've got two grandchildren also, and our children and grandchildren are certainly going to be the beneficiaries of the great work that I know you're going to do. It's going to be in their lifetime, probably, that this war on terrorism is going to be concluded, rather than in ours. But the framework and the foundation for that battle is going to be part of your day-to-day operation from now on. You have been a commander, both at the very highest level, commanding the naval forces in Central Command. You were commander of the Fifth Fleet. You also commanded a multinational NATO force, destroyer squadron, guided missile destroyer, as well as a carrier battle group. In each of those leadership positions, you have been a consumer of intelligence. And now you're going to be on the other end of it. I think that that experience that you have is extremely valuable because you understand how critically important it is that intelligence get to the leadership that is on the battlefield in real time. I think that's going to be your biggest challenge. One thing that I would just say to you is that this Committee has been very much involved in the process of drafting the legislation, reform legislation of the intelligence community. We're here to provide you with the type of resources you need, to try to provide you with the type of assistance you need in any way relative to ensuring that whatever needs you have to carry out that mission of disseminating that information to the right people in real time is there. The only thing I will say is, I hope you will make a point of staying in touch with us. We don't want you up here testifying all the time; but we want you coming up talking to us and telling us how things are working and what your needs are. So all I want to say to you is, I appreciate again your willingness to continue to serve our country. We look forward to continuing to work with you on an even more regular basis. Admiral Redd. Thank you, Senator. A couple of very good point. And yes, being a consumer makes you more critical about the process. At the WMD Commission we talked about what is, I guess, most commonly attributed to Colin Powell--tell me what you know, tell me what you don't know, and tell me what you think. And we sort of added a fourth thing to that--tell me why you think it. That's probably one of the things that the NCTC can best do, is get to the bottom of--you know, so many times presuppositions differ and from different presuppositions you get into a different answer. And if you don't go back to that and say why do you think what you think, that's certainly a value-added, which I think NCTC can do. The battlefield analogy with the military is a very real one and it represents a very real challenge, as you know. We have seen in both of the Gulf wars the tremendous ability to get intelligence out to the battlefield commander, as needed, on time and timed to influence a battle. The new challenge is getting it out to a different battlefield, and that's the State and local officials here, on the border, and FBI, and making sure that we take this very--in some cases--very highly- classified information, get it down to a classification level where it's actionable, and getting that actionable intelligence out to the man or woman on the street, whether it's law enforcement or homeland security. You have my commitment, sir. I will stay in touch. It's very clear that Congress has had a major hand in intelligence reform in general and in the establishment of the NCTC, so I will stay closely in touch, sir. I won't wait to be called. Senator Chambliss. Thank you. Chairman Roberts. Welcome back, Senator Mikulski. Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm glad once again to rejoin the Committee after my very short hospital stay. Admiral Redd, first of all, welcome to the Committee and welcome to the job. I certainly believe you will be confirmed. I could only reiterate what others have said about a very distinguished career. And also you're at the point in your life where you could be on boards of directors and home for dinner every night. Admiral Redd. I've been reminded of that, yes, ma'am. Senator Mikulski. I'm sure. And, to your family, we also want to express our gratitude. We're glad that someone of your leadership seasoning and experience is taking this job. I believe that you are qualified for the job. My questions are really how do you see the job. Senators Wyden and Levin raised the issues of truth to power. That's one of the questions I ask. But mine are a bit different. Going back to operating off of some of the information in the Robb-Silberman report, first of all let me say this. Every time there's been a problem now, it's let's have another center--a center today, a center tomorrow, a center here, a center there. And we seem to be losing our center of gravity sometimes because of it. Then, what emerges is the ambiguities in the respective roles and authorities that have come forth. Senators Collins and Levin wrote a letter to Homeland Security, TTIC and so on asking for clarification between all of the elements. My question to you is, how do you see really establishing this? One other dimension, I am the Ranking Member on the Commerce, Justice Appropriations, so that's for the FBI. We're very close with the FBI. We don't want a domestic surveillance agency, but the FBI is out of the loop in some ways, even with what we talk about here, and the Judiciary Committee. So, could you give me a picture of how you see launching this ship, number one; and then, number two, what you would see, elaborating on what you define as the strategic operations planning aspects of what's included in the statute? Mine's more nuts and bolts, because I tell you, as the Ranking Member for FBI, being on here with the Intel Committee, and then I'm on Defense Appropriations, it's a little---- Admiral Redd. I obviously like the concept of launching the ship, Senator. It's a metaphor I'm familiar with. Senator Mikulski. I thought you'd like it. Admiral Redd. I obviously would note that a lot of my early training came from the State of Maryland, down the road in Annapolis. I think, as I said in my opening statement, there are two fundamental missions. One of them we're pretty well down the road on. That's on the intelligence side. There's a lot to be done yet on the intelligence and integration side. We're not there yet, but we're clearly in the right place, moving in the right direction. I have to say, Mr. Chairman, if I say ``we,'' I apologize. I understand and I've been assiduous about not taking any actions or doing anything which would assume or presume confirmation, but sometimes when you get in a leadership mode you start---- Senator Mikulski. Don't worry about it. Admiral Redd. Thank you. Having said that, the strategic operational planning is a landmark piece of legislation and it's a landmark concept. I have watched in the military, obviously, before I was born, the Department of the Navy and the Department of War, and never the twain shall meet. So after Grenada and some other things, we got Goldwater-Nichols and we finally got the militaries talking to each other. I've seen that progress now, and my experience in Baghdad, where we had all elements of the government coming together, sometimes a bit of a lashup, but making it work together. In the past, we've had a very robust, sometimes painful but nonetheless reasonably effective way of doing overall policy-- the National Security Council deputies committee, principals committee, National Security Council itself with the President presiding and deciding those high policy-level things. So the strategic operational planning function of the NCTC really is the next level down. We're putting somebody in and saying this center now has a mission of doing that on a day-to- day basis, taking all the elements of national power--it obviously involves the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State and a number of other agencies--and bringing them together and saying this is our cut at how strategic operational planning ought to be done. So I think a couple of things. It's a very comfortable model to me in the sense that I've done it. That's the way you do planning. You start with a strategy and you say, okay, what are the goals, what are the missions, what are the tasks, who is best suited to take these tasks on, assign them out. Then the agencies come back and they bring it together and you say, okay, let's make sure we're coordinating. And here's the key part. Then we look at some metrics. How are we doing? Because, as you well know from your Armed Services and other associations, the first casualty of war is usually the plan. But the process of going through and getting to that plan is what's critical. So we're starting it. There's work going on. We're just in the process of standing that up. The first thing is to get people, to get the right number of the right people. We've just got a new deputy director who has reported aboard with extensive planning experience. He happens to be an active-duty two-star general who set up the global war on terrorism, Jeff Schlosser, and I'm looking forward to working with him. But fundamentally, this is going to be an interesting evolution, but it's a critical one because it really is, on a day-to-day basis, bringing the elements together. Senator Mikulski. First of all, we will look forward to seeing how this is going to work. But do you believe that the way we are underway in clarifying the roles, these ambiguous roles between NCTC and counterterrorism at CIA, and where is the FBI in all this---- Admiral Redd. Yes, ma'am. As I said earlier, it's no secret there have been some disagreements, but the bottom line is, everybody's heading in the same direction. I think the Congress has made it clear, the President has made it clear, that the National Counterterrorism Center is to be the primary organization for analysis and integration of all intelligence information. I'm now back on the intelligence side, obviously. The FBI and the NCTC are collocated out there. And we're making a lot of progress. We still have a few things to work out, but I think that under John Negroponte's leadership we're making a lot of progress as well. Senator Mikulski. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I think that covers this line of questions. I think the next line will be when Admiral Redd's on the job and we have a chance to visit to see how this is going and how we can make it happen. Chairman Roberts. We would look forward to that, Senator. I thank you for your questions. I just have basically one more and then an observation. You've been described--and these are my words; I'm paraphrasing--as sort of a oil can man--hear a squeak, hear a problem, hear a gearbox or see a gearbox that's not working, whether it be on the policy side or whether it be in the military or any of your past assignments. And that's what you need to head up the NCTC. And you've also been described as a person who is able to bring people together and have what we in the Senate sometimes call meaningful dialogue, despite strong differences of opinion. We talked about the fact that in the intelligence community there was a lot of discussion when we went through the intelligence reform bill about who is the majority user of intelligence and where should that authority lie. As I indicated to you, it would be late in the evening and we could hear the bulldozers scraping up turf against the Committee doors so they could have ample input, as they have had in the past. Having said that, the Department of Defense obviously takes up a great deal of the intelligence budget and the majority user is the warfighter. There's nothing more important than real-time intelligence to the warfighter. You've indicated that and you've indicated quite poignantly those who are missing, because in part we didn't have the proper intelligence. And there are other reasons as well. But as I have pointed out to people that were involved in debate, while the majority user--and no Member of Congress wants to deny the warfighter any real-time intelligence, that would be ridiculous--we want the very best and we want it real- time, and I think we're making unbelievable progress. If you look back where we were 5 years ago, 3 years ago, 2 years ago, what we're obtaining today from detainee interrogation and other means of collection, then getting that into the hands of the warfighter, saving Iraqi lives, saving Afghan lives, saving American lives, subverting plots against the homeland and other areas of the world, I think we're doing much better. But the primary users are the President of the United States and the National Security Council and the Congress. So my question to you is, will you alert the Committee if you encounter pushback from any of the agencies or elements of agencies which do not fall under the National Intelligence Program? We're here to help. Admiral Redd. The short answer, Senator, is yes. If I could qualify that a little, if I encounter pushback, which I am not able to resolve or we're not able to resolve to our satisfaction. There will be pushback, as you understand. Your metaphors are very rich, and I can see the bulldozer scraping that turf up into a pretty high berm, probably, outside of the Committee. All that said, there will be pushback, but I think I'm old- fashioned enough and maybe naive enough to believe that even inside the Beltway that substance will triumph over style and that function will triumph over form. So I think from a leadership standpoint the key thing is reminding everybody of the vision of why we're here and overcoming that parochialism by lifting everybody up to the plane above that. I know certainly the Cabinet officers all feel that way and most of the people I deal with on the senior levels feel that way. So that's part of the leadership challenge, whether you have the absolute authority to command or demand something. Obviously that's one thing, especially in Washington or inside here, but the reality is that reminding people of why we are here and what the mission is I find is often very good at clearing the air. I will come back to you, sir, if I'm not able to accomplish my mission and I need help. Chairman Roberts. Well, we'll ride shotgun with you any time. Admiral Redd. Thank you, sir. Chairman Roberts. Thank you for your presentation. That concludes the Committee hearing. 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