XIII. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AGAINST IRAQ'S LINKS TO TERRORISM

(U) The Committee focused its work in reviewing U.S. intelligence on Iraq's links to terrorism on the quality of intelligence analysis, the objectivity and reasonableness of the Intelligence Community's (IC) judgments, and whether any influence was brought to bear to shape that analysis to support policy objectives. The Committee also examined, however, the role of intelligence collectors in providing the fundamental information upon which the intelligence analysts based their assessments. To understand the collection posture against Iraq's links to terrorism, Committee staff interviewed the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection (ADCI/C) and various members of the National Intelligence Collection Board (NICB), analysts from the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI's) Counterterrorist Center (CTC), and analysts from the National Security Agency (NSA).

(Notwithstanding four decades of intelligence reporting, IC officials and analysts
expressed frustration over the lack of useful intelligence collected on Iraq's involvement in
terrorism, particularly on links to al-Qaida. A January 2003 IC assessment of Iraqi support for
terrorism explained, "Our knowledge of Iraq's ties to terrorism is evolving and
." Based on information provided to Committee staff, these gaps had three main
causes:

- 1. a late start collecting against the target,
- 2. the lack of a U.S. presence in Iraq, and
- 3. reliance on foreign government services, opposition groups and defectors for current intelligence.

	Human
intelligence (HUMINT) reports were derived from detainees, defector	
groups, as well as foreign government services. Analysts explained that information	
from HUMINT provided insight into historical links, but provided little informa	tion on the
current environment. Thus, the IC's collection, and subsequent analysis, provid	ed an
understanding of the historical context of the Iraqi regime's relationships and co	ntacts, but left
many intelligence gaps about the Iraqi regime's intentions. Analysts briefed staf	f on the IC's
collection efforts, the intelligence that yie	elded the bulk of
the information on Iraq's ties to terrorism.	


A. Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

IC analysts told Committee staff that there was no robust HUMINT collection

Committee staff that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers "went out and tried to pitch all or as many as we could
(The CTC collections officer noted that there was one major gap in collection, h stated:
We had one gap that we were struggling with. That was the more broader strategic plans of Saddam Hussein in terms of the use of WMD as a terrorist weapon. We were very concerned about it, but we did not have much reporting. What reporting we got wasn't very reliable information. We ended up having to do more reasoned logic in terms of working through the scenarios to make judgments about if he would turn that over to terrorist groups, when he would turn it over to terrorist groups, and then how they might use it.
CTC analysts told Committee staff that the CIA also targeted Palestinian surrogates and that the CIA already had considerable collection efforts in place to work with Palestinian groups. CTC noted that they had insights into Baghdad's efforts to reach out to additional Palestinian groups
were also key to the CIA's collection. foreign government services
The CTC analysts told Committee staff, "Iraq was a hard target we relied heavily on working with foreign government services and their accesses
In terms of obtaining information on the al-Qaida-Zarqawi network, CTC told Committee staff that there had been an ongoing collection effort since 9/11 that had been 'aggressively worked."


Iraqi Support for Terrorism described a network of more than a dozen al-Qaida or al-Qaida-associated operatives in Baghdad, and estimated that 100-200 al-Qaida fighters were present in northeastern Iraq in territory under the control of Ansar al-Islam. As a result, collection continued to focus on understanding the historical context of the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida and trying to understand the nature of contacts between the two. CTC told staff that they relied heavily on foreign government services, and increasingly on detainee debriefs to look into an al-Qaida/Iraq relationship. CTC noted that questions regarding al-Qaida's ties to the Iraqi regime were among the first presented to senior al-Qaida operational planner Khalid Shaikh Muhammad following his capture. When asked if the IC had any unilateral sources that could provide information on the Iraq/al-Qaida relationship, the CTC analysts stated that they were entirely dependent on foreign government services for that information.





C. Terrorism Collection Conclusions

(U) Conclusion 99. Despite four decades of intelligence reporting on Iraq, there was little useful intelligence collected that helped analysts determine the Iraqi regime's possible links to al-Qaida.



Conclusion 100. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not have a focused human intelligence (HUMINT) collection strategy targeting Iraq's links to terrorism until 2002. The CIA had no sources on the ground in Iraq reporting specifically on terrorism. The lack of an official U.S. presence in the country curtailed the Intelligence Community's HUMINT collection capabilities.

