Congressional Record: October 8, 2004 (House)
Page H8863-H8873                        



 
                9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION ACT

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, 
H.R. 10.

                              {time}  0915


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of 
the bill (H.R. 10) to provide for reform of the intelligence community, 
terrorism prevention and prosecution, border security, and 
international cooperation and coordination, and for other purposes, 
with Mr. Kolbe (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose on the 
legislative day of Thursday, October 7, 2004, amendment No. 3 printed 
in House Report 108-571 by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Souder) had 
been disposed of.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed in House 
Report 108-751.


                  Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Kirk

  Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Kirk:
       Page 60, after line 9, insert the following new section:

     SEC. 1018. REPORT ON INTEGRATION OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY 
                   INTO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report on the 
     practicality of integrating the Drug Enforcement 
     Administration into the intelligence community.
       (b) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) and a Member opposed each will 
control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk).
  Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment corrects a critical problem with our 
intelligence community and adds a needed bipartisan recommendation to 
the reforms we have in the underlying legislation. We have known for 
quite some time that the sale of elicit narcotics and terrorism go hand 
in hand. This link is now firm and is clear with regard to the 
terrorist activities and terrorist groups in Colombia. It is also clear 
in Peru, but this phenomenon has spread far beyond Latin America and is 
evident in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
  Earlier this year, I traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan, the key 
frontier border area of such concern to the United States, and there I 
learned a new fact, that Osama bin Laden's connection to his family 
fortune has been reduced. His connection to donations to the United 
States and Europe has been reduced, but he has a new source of income. 
Osama bin Laden is now becoming one of the world's largest dealers in 
heroin. Through just one of his supply organizations, bin Laden's 
lieutenants are earning at least $28 million from the sale of narcotics 
through Pakistan.
  Let us remind ourselves of the conclusion of the 9/11 Commission, 
that the attacks against the World Trade Centers, Shanksville, and the 
Pentagon cost al Qaeda only $500,000. With an annual income of $28 
million coming from the sale of illegal narcotics, we know that one of 
the key terrorist financing mechanisms is the sale of illegal 
narcotics.
  In the 9/11 Commission report, they briefly mentioned this but did 
not focus on it. When you are on the front lines in Kandahar or 
Peshawar in Pakistan, you see that this link is clear.
  Our Drug Enforcement Agency has some of the best financial maps of 
terrorist organizations in the world, and the Drug Enforcement Agency 
used to be a formal member of the intelligence community. In my 
judgment and the judgment of my bipartisan partner, the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Larsen), on this amendment, we believe that the Drug 
Enforcement Agency should become part of the intelligence community 
again, that this link between terrorism and illegal narcotics is very 
clear.
  Roughly half of the 28 terrorist organizations identified by the 
State Department in October, 2001, have links to drug activities. 
Organizations like the Kurdistan Worker's Party, the National 
Liberation Army, ELN, al Qaeda, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia, Shining Path, and the United Self-Defense Forces/Group of 
Colombia. All of these in a worldwide phenomenon, depending on violence 
and terror, funded by the sale of illegal narcotics.
  This bipartisan amendment would help study the integration of the 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency into the intelligence community. It is 
supported by Karen Tandy, the administrator of the DEA. It is supported 
by a number

[[Page H8864]]

of minority members. It is supported by the attorney general. I urge 
adoption of this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to claim the time in 
opposition to the amendment, although I rise in support of the 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Kirk amendment to H.R. 
10. This amendment requires the President to submit to Congress a 
report detailing the best way to incorporate the Drug Enforcement 
Administration into the intelligence community.
  The El Paso Intelligence Center, or EPIC, is an asset of the Drug 
Enforcement Agency. It is located in El Paso, Texas. It is the Nation's 
singular, multi-agency, tactical intelligence center for drug, alien, 
and weapons trafficking intelligence. Supporting Federal, State, and 
local law enforcement officers, EPIC also provides information 
regarding homeland security, homeland defense and counterterrorism to 
its member agencies. During my 26\1/2\ year tenure with the United 
States Border Patrol, I was able to utilize the services of EPIC, 
leading to a personal appreciation of the important role that the El 
Paso Intelligence Center plays in homeland security defense.
  Currently, EPIC accomplishes its mission by processing requests for 
information received from Federal, State and local law enforcement 
personnel on persons, modes of transportation, organizations or 
addresses that are suspected of being engaged or associated with some 
type of criminal activity. Officers have 24 hours a day, 7 days a week 
access to the information in its database. It gives them the ability to 
query and provide simultaneous access to a number of other Federal 
databases. The El Paso Intelligence Center provides analysis of drug 
movement events, trends and patterns. They also do research on criminal 
investigations and communication intercept exploitation in support of 
its many different customers.
  It is well known that there is a link in my opinion between illegal 
narcotics and the funding that it creates for terrorism. The El Paso 
Intelligence Center understands this link and is known around the world 
for its ability to connect the dots between actions and players.
  The DEA plays an important role in this Nation's war on terrorism and 
war on drugs, and should be more fully integrated with our intelligence 
community. For those reasons, I urge my colleagues to support the Kirk 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time and thank the gentleman for his amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I support this amendment and appreciate the efforts of 
the gentleman from Illinois on this issue. The intelligence community 
looks forward to an opportunity to review this issue further.
  The DEA has substantial capabilities around the world that should be 
fully utilized in an appropriate fashion. The report that is provided 
for in this amendment will assist Congress in its consideration of the 
role of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the intelligence 
community along with the other important responsibilities that the DEA 
undertakes on a daily basis. I look forward to seeing the report and 
look forward to the passage of this amendment.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Larsen).
  Mr. LARSEN of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this 
amendment along with my colleague, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. 
Kirk).
  We need to consider making the DEA part of our intelligence network. 
Before our own eyes, Afghanistan is re-emerging as the international 
leader in the heroin trade. As this problem grows, the less control our 
Nation will have over the funding sources of international terrorism. A 
direct relationship exists between terrorism and the drug trade. 
Therefore, a direct relationship is needed between the DEA and our 
intelligence agencies. The DEA not only combats the drug trade around 
the world but can gather valuable information that can transcend drug 
trafficking and reach into the shadowy corners of international 
terrorism.
  According to the State Department, 12 of the 28 terrorist 
organizations listed in the Department of State October, 2001, Report 
on Foreign Terrorist Organizations have links to foreign drug 
trafficking. One fitting example of this relationship happened in 2003 
when a seizure of hashish from a trafficking group included suspected 
al Qaeda members and involved drugs worth nearly $30 million at 
wholesale.
  The drug trade not only has a role in funding terrorists but also 
plays a significant destabilizing role in Afghanistan. Just yesterday, 
drug smugglers were implicated in a terrorist attack on Hamid Karzai's 
vice presidential candidate. Free elections in Afghanistan are a threat 
to the drug trade, just as free elections in Afghanistan are a threat 
to global terrorism.
  According to our Office of National Drug Control Policy, the 
challenging security situation in Afghanistan has complicated the task 
of fighting the war against drugs and vice versa. As the terrorists 
lose ground, the opium poppy growers win, and much of the money from 
Afghanistan's opium sales goes right back to the terrorists.
  Drug traffickers and terror networks work out of the same rule book. 
They both strive to undermine democratic institutions and engage in 
widespread violence and corruption. Both groups also depend on money 
laundering, forgery and arms deals to implement their deadly goals.
  We cannot separate international terrorism from the drug trade. They 
are intertwined. This amendment will examine the ways DEA can maintain 
its current role while sharing information to help further protect our 
Nation. I believe this amendment is in the spirit of the 9/11 
Commission recommendations and will help create and consolidate the 
whole intelligence picture that a president needs to defend our Nation. 
I urge its support.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  In closing, I thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the 
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Larsen) for supporting this amendment. 
The gentleman from Texas is exactly right. El Paso Intelligence Center 
already does this. It is a critical asset but should be a formal part 
of the intelligence community, as are combatant commands that do a 
number of key tasks with regard to drug profits and terrorism.
  We know that half of the Afghan economy is now related to the sale of 
illicit narcotics. We know that the Taliban and al Qaeda depend on 
terrorist profits. We started winning the battle against narcoterrorism 
in Colombia because we took a unified campaign on this approach against 
terrorism and the sale of illegal narcotics.
  The DEA is the expert on these financial organizations. If the 9/11 
Commission said anything, it said we should attack the financial 
support for terrorism and that financial support is increasingly 
reliant on the sale of illegal narcotics, especially for Osama bin 
Laden becoming one of the number one heroin dealers in Central Asia. 
For these reasons, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois 
(Mr. Kirk) will be postponed.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment 
No. 5 printed in House Report 108-751.

[[Page H8865]]

                Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Sessions

  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Sessions:
       At the end of title II of the bill (page 235, after line 
     21), insert the following new subtitle:

 Subtitle J--Prevention of Terrorist Access to Destructive Weapons Act 
                                of 2004

     SECTION 2211. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Prevention of Terrorist 
     Access to Destructive Weapons Act of 2004''.

     SEC. 2212. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) The criminal use of man-portable air defense systems 
     (MANPADS) presents a serious threat to civil aviation 
     worldwide, especially in the hands of terrorists or foreign 
     states that harbor them.
       (2) Atomic weapons or weapons designed to release radiation 
     (``dirty bombs'') could be used by terrorists to inflict 
     enormous loss of life and damage to property and the 
     environment.
       (3) Variola virus is the causative agent of smallpox, an 
     extremely serious, contagious, and sometimes fatal disease. 
     Variola virus is classified as a Category A agent by the 
     Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, meaning that it 
     is believed to pose the greatest potential threat for adverse 
     public health impact and has a moderate to high potential for 
     large-scale dissemination. The last case of smallpox in the 
     United States was in 1949. The last naturally occurring case 
     in the world was in Somalia in 1977. Although smallpox has 
     been officially eradicated after a successful worldwide 
     vaccination program, there remain two official repositories 
     of the variola virus for research purposes. Because it is so 
     dangerous, the variola virus may appeal to terrorists.
       (4) The use, or even the threatened use, of MANPADS, atomic 
     or radiological weapons, or the variola virus, against the 
     United States, its allies, or its people, poses a grave risk 
     to the security, foreign policy, economy, and environment of 
     the United States. Accordingly, the United States has a 
     compelling national security interest in preventing unlawful 
     activities that lead to the proliferation or spread of such 
     items, including their unauthorized production, construction, 
     acquisition, transfer, possession, import, or export. All of 
     these activities markedly increase the chances that such 
     items will be obtained by terrorist organizations or rogue 
     states, which could use them to attack the United States, its 
     allies, or United States nationals or corporations.
       (5) There is no legitimate reason for a private individual 
     or company, absent explicit government authorization, to 
     produce, construct, otherwise acquire, transfer, receive, 
     possess, import, export, or use MANPADS, atomic or 
     radiological weapons, or the variola virus.
       (b) Purpose.--The purpose of this subtitle is to combat the 
     potential use of weapons that have the ability to cause 
     widespread harm to United States persons and the United 
     States economy (and that have no legitimate private use) and 
     to threaten or harm the national security or foreign 
     relations of the United States.

     SEC. 2213. MISSILE SYSTEMS DESIGNED TO DESTROY AIRCRAFT.

       Chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding after section 2332f the following:

     ``Sec. 2332g. Missile systems designed to destroy aircraft

       ``(a) Unlawful Conduct.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (3), it 
     shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly produce, 
     construct, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or 
     indirectly, receive, possess, import, export, or use, or 
     possess and threaten to use--
       ``(A) an explosive or incendiary rocket or missile that is 
     guided by any system designed to enable the rocket or missile 
     to--
       ``(i) seek or proceed toward energy radiated or reflected 
     from an aircraft or toward an image locating an aircraft; or
       ``(ii) otherwise direct or guide the rocket or missile to 
     an aircraft;
       ``(B) any device designed or intended to launch or guide a 
     rocket or missile described in subparagraph (A); or
       ``(C) any part or combination of parts designed or 
     redesigned for use in assembling or fabricating a rocket, 
     missile, or device described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
       ``(2) Nonweapon.--Paragraph (1)(A) does not apply to any 
     device that is neither designed nor redesigned for use as a 
     weapon.
       ``(3) Excluded conduct.--This subsection does not apply 
     with respect to--
       ``(A) conduct by or under the authority of the United 
     States or any department or agency thereof or of a State or 
     any department or agency thereof; or
       ``(B) conduct pursuant to the terms of a contract with the 
     United States or any department or agency thereof or with a 
     State or any department or agency thereof.
       ``(b) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by subsection (a) 
     is within the jurisdiction of the United States if--
       ``(1) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or 
     foreign commerce;
       ``(2) the offense occurs outside of the United States and 
     is committed by a national of the United States;
       ``(3) the offense is committed against a national of the 
     United States while the national is outside the United 
     States;
       ``(4) the offense is committed against any property that is 
     owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any 
     department or agency of the United States, whether the 
     property is within or outside the United States; or
       ``(5) an offender aids or abets any person over whom 
     jurisdiction exists under this subsection in committing an 
     offense under this section or conspires with any person over 
     whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection to commit an 
     offense under this section.
       ``(c) Criminal Penalties.--
       ``(1) In general.--Any person who violates, or attempts or 
     conspires to violate, subsection (a) shall be fined not more 
     than $2,000,000 and shall be sentenced to a term of 
     imprisonment not less than 30 years or to imprisonment for 
     life.
       ``(2) Life imprisonment.--Any person who, in the course of 
     a violation of subsection (a), uses, attempts or conspires to 
     use, or possesses and threatens to use, any item or items 
     described in subsection (a), shall be fined not more than 
     $2,000,000 and imprisoned for life.
       ``(3) Death penalty.--If the death of another results from 
     a person's violation of subsection (a), the person shall be 
     fined not more than $2,000,000 and punished by death or 
     imprisoned for life.
       ``(d) Definition.--As used in this section, the term 
     `aircraft' has the definition set forth in section 
     40102(a)(6) of title 49, United States Code.''.

     SEC. 2214. ATOMIC WEAPONS.

       (a) Prohibitions.--Section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
     1954 (42 U.S.C. 2122) is amended by--
       (1) inserting at the beginning ``a.'' before ``It'';
       (2) inserting ``knowingly'' after ``for any person to'';
       (3) striking ``or'' before ``export'';
       (4) striking ``transfer or receive in interstate or foreign 
     commerce,'' before ``manufacture'';
       (5) inserting ``receive,'' after ``acquire,'';
       (6) inserting ``, or use, or possess and threaten to use,'' 
     before ``any atomic weapon'';
       (7) inserting at the end the following:
       ``b. Conduct prohibited by subsection a. is within the 
     jurisdiction of the United States if--
       ``(1) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or 
     foreign commerce; the offense occurs outside of the United 
     States and is committed by a national of the United States;
       ``(2) the offense is committed against a national of the 
     United States while the national is outside the United 
     States;
       ``(3) the offense is committed against any property that is 
     owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any 
     department or agency of the United States, whether the 
     property is within or outside the United States; or
       ``(4) an offender aids or abets any person over whom 
     jurisdiction exists under this subsection in committing an 
     offense under this section or conspires with any person over 
     whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection to commit an 
     offense under this section.''.
       (b) Violations.--Section 222 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
     1954 (42 U.S.C. 2272) is amended by--
       (1) inserting at the beginning ``a.'' before ``Whoever'';
       (2) striking ``, 92,''; and
       (3) inserting at the end the following:
       ``b. Any person who violates, or attempts or conspires to 
     violate, section 92 shall be fined not more than $2,000,000 
     and sentenced to a term of imprisonment not less than 30 
     years or to imprisonment for life. Any person who, in the 
     course of a violation of section 92, uses, attempts or 
     conspires to use, or possesses and threatens to use, any 
     atomic weapon shall be fined not more than $2,000,000 and 
     imprisoned for life. If the death of another results from a 
     person's violation of section 92, the person shall be fined 
     not more than $2,000,000 and punished by death or imprisoned 
     for life.''.

     SEC. 2215. RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICES.

       Chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding after section 2332g the following:

     ``Sec. 2332h. Radiological dispersal devices

       ``(a) Unlawful Conduct.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), it 
     shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly produce, 
     construct, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or 
     indirectly, receive, possess, import, export, or use, or 
     possess and threaten to use--
       ``(A) any weapon that is designed or intended to release 
     radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human 
     life; or
       ``(B) or any device or other object that is capable of and 
     designed or intended to endanger human life through the 
     release of radiation or radioactivity.
       ``(2) Exception.--This subsection does not apply with 
     respect to--
       ``(A) conduct by or under the authority of the United 
     States or any department or agency thereof; or
       ``(B) conduct pursuant to the terms of a contract with the 
     United States or any department or agency thereof.
       ``(b) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by subsection (a) 
     is within the jurisdiction of the United States if--

[[Page H8866]]

       ``(1) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or 
     foreign commerce;
       ``(2) the offense occurs outside of the United States and 
     is committed by a national of the United States;
       ``(3) the offense is committed against a national of the 
     United States while the national is outside the United 
     States;
       ``(4) the offense is committed against any property that is 
     owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any 
     department or agency of the United States, whether the 
     property is within or outside the United States; or
       ``(5) an offender aids or abets any person over whom 
     jurisdiction exists under this subsection in committing an 
     offense under this section or conspires with any person over 
     whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection to commit an 
     offense under this section.
       ``(c) Criminal Penalties.--
       ``(1) In general.--Any person who violates, or attempts or 
     conspires to violate, subsection (a) shall be fined not more 
     than $2,000,000 and shall sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
     not less than 30 years or to imprisonment for life.
       ``(2) Life imprisonment.--Any person who, in the course of 
     a violation of subsection (a), uses, attempts or conspires to 
     use, or possesses and threatens to use, any item or items 
     described in subsection (a), shall be fined not more than 
     $2,000,000 and imprisoned for life.
       ``(3) Death penalty.--If the death of another results from 
     a person's violation of subsection (a), the person shall be 
     fined not more than $2,000,000 and punished by death or 
     imprisoned for life.''.

     SEC. 2216. VARIOLA VIRUS.

       Chapter 10 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     inserting after section 175b the following:

     ``Sec. 175c. Variola virus

       ``(a) Unlawful Conduct.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), it 
     shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly produce, 
     engineer, synthesize, acquire, transfer directly or 
     indirectly, receive, possess, import, export, or use, or 
     possess and threaten to use, variola virus.
       ``(2) Exception.--This subsection does not apply to conduct 
     by, or under the authority of, the Secretary of Health and 
     Human Services.
       ``(b) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by subsection (a) 
     is within the jurisdiction of the United States if--
       ``(1) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or 
     foreign commerce;
       ``(2) the offense occurs outside of the United States and 
     is committed by a national of the United States;
       ``(3) the offense is committed against a national of the 
     United States while the national is outside the United 
     States;
       ``(4) the offense is committed against any property that is 
     owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any 
     department or agency of the United States, whether the 
     property is within or outside the United States; or
       ``(5) an offender aids or abets any person over whom 
     jurisdiction exists under this subsection in committing an 
     offense under this section or conspires with any person over 
     whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection to commit an 
     offense under this section.
       ``(c) Criminal Penalties.--
       ``(1) In general.--Any person who violates, or attempts or 
     conspires to violate, subsection (a) shall be fined not more 
     than $2,000,000 and shall be sentenced to a term of 
     imprisonment not less than 30 years or to imprisonment for 
     life.
       ``(2) Life imprisonment.--Any person who, in the course of 
     a violation of subsection (a), uses, attempts or conspires to 
     use, or possesses and threatens to use, any item or items 
     described in subsection (a), shall be fined not more than 
     $2,000,000 and imprisoned for life.
       ``(3) Death penalty.--If the death of another results from 
     a person's violation of subsection (a), the person shall be 
     fined not more than $2,000,000 and punished by death or 
     imprisoned for life.
       ``(d) Definition.--As used in this section, the term 
     `variola virus' means a virus that can cause human smallpox 
     or any derivative of the variola major virus that contains 
     more than 85 percent of the gene sequence of the variola 
     major virus or the variola minor virus.''.

     SEC. 2217. INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS.

       Section 2516(1) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (a), by inserting ``2122 and'' after 
     ``sections'';
       (2) in paragraph (c), by inserting ``section 175c (relating 
     to variola virus),'' after ``section 175 (relating to 
     biological weapons),''; and
       (3) in paragraph (q), by inserting ``2332g, 2332h,'' after 
     ``2332f,''.

     SEC. 2218. AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 2332B(G)(5)(B) OF TITLE 18, 
                   UNITED STATES CODE.

       Section 2332b(g)(5)(B) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in clause (i)--
       (A) by inserting before ``2339 (relating to harboring 
     terrorists)'' the following: ``2332g (relating to missile 
     systems designed to destroy aircraft), 2332h (relating to 
     radiological dispersal devices),''; and
       (B) by inserting ``175c (relating to variola virus),'' 
     after ``175 or 175b (relating to biological weapons),''; and
       (2) in clause (ii)--
       (A) by striking ``section'' and inserting ``sections 92 
     (relating to prohibitions governing atomic weapons) or''; and
       (B) by inserting ``2122 or'' before ``2284''.

     SEC. 2219. AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 1956(C)(7)(D) OF TITLE 18, 
                   UNITED STATES CODE.

       Section 1956(c)(7)(D), title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by inserting after ``section 152 (relating to 
     concealment of assets; false oaths and claims; bribery),'' 
     the following: ``section 175c (relating to the variola 
     virus),'';
       (2) by inserting after ``section 2332(b) (relating to 
     international terrorist acts transcending national 
     boundaries),'' the following: ``section 2332g (relating to 
     missile systems designed to destroy aircraft), section 2332h 
     (relating to radiological dispersal devices),''; and
       (3) striking ``or'' after ``any felony violation of the 
     Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938,'' and after ``any 
     felony violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act'', 
     striking ``;'' and inserting ``, or section 92 of the Atomic 
     Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2122) (relating to prohibitions 
     governing atomic weapons)''.

     SEC. 2220. EXPORT LICENSING PROCESS.

       Section 38(g)(1)(A) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
     U.S.C. 2778) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``or'' before ``(xi)''; and
       (2) by inserting after clause (xi) the following: ``or 
     (xii) section 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Prevention of Terrorist 
     Access to Destructive Weapons Act of 2004, relating to 
     missile systems designed to destroy aircraft (18 U.S.C. 
     2332g), prohibitions governing atomic weapons (42 U.S.C. 
     2122), radiological dispersal devices (18 U.S.C. 2332h), and 
     variola virus (18 U.S.C. 175b);''.

     SEC. 2221. CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Chapter 113B.--The table of sections for chapter 113B 
     of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting the 
     following after the item for section 2332f:

``2332g. Missile systems designed to destroy aircraft.
``2332h. Radiological dispersal devices.''.

       (b) Chapter 10.--The table of sections for chapter 10 of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting the 
     following item after the item for section 175b:

``175c. Variola virus.''.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions) and the gentleman from Virginia 
(Mr. Scott) each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions).
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Today, I rise to offer my legislation, Prevention of Terrorist Access 
to Destructive Weapons Act, an amendment to H.R. 10. This amendment 
will aid the hard-working Federal investigators and agents on the front 
line in the war on terror by establishing a zero tolerance policy 
towards the illegal importation, possession or transfer of shoulder-
fired missiles, atomic weapons, dirty bombs, and the smallpox virus.

                              {time}  0930

  Mr. SESSIONS. Today, maximum penalties of only 10 years in prison 
apply to the unlawful possession of shoulder-fired missiles. The same 
weak penalty also currently applies to the unlawful possession of an 
atomic weapon. Today, there is no law criminalizing the possession of 
dirty bombs with criminal intent, and the unregistered possession of 
the smallpox virus carries a maximum penalties of only 5 years in 
prison.
  Given the terrorist threats that we currently face in the United 
States, weak punishments for the possession or use of these weapons is 
simply unacceptable in light of the fact that we know that 26 terror 
groups already have shoulder-fired missiles in their possession.
  My amendment imposes stringent, mandatory minimum criminal penalties 
for these heinous crimes similar to the laws that we already use to 
prosecute drug kingpins. Specifically, for each of the weapons covered 
by the bill, unlawful possession would result in mandatory imprisonment 
for up to 30 years to life. Using, attempting, or conspiring to use, or 
possessing and threatening to use these weapons would result in 
mandatory life in prison. And if one death were to result from the 
unlawful possession of one of these weapons, this amendment would allow 
the death penalty to be applied to anyone who targets America in a 
terrorist attack.
  Although tougher penalties may not deter homicidal terrorists 
determined to attack the United States, they will help to deter those 
middlemen who are

[[Page H8867]]

essential to the transfer of such weapons. Many of these middlemen aid 
terrorists purely for financial gain, and significantly tougher 
mandatory penalties would dramatically alter their cost-benefit 
calculations.
  When the middleman is caught importing or hiding these weapons, the 
existence of tough penalties will also assist prosecutors and 
investigators in obtaining cooperation and moving swiftly to identify 
terrorists. Long mandatory sentences, including life without parole, 
provide a fast and powerful incentive to cooperate, as has already been 
proven in cracking the code of silence for organized crime. In the case 
of these dangerous weapons, the speed with which persons choose to 
cooperate could also save thousands of lives.
  These increased penalties are completely justified in light of the 
catastrophic destruction that could be caused by the use of any of 
these weapons, and supporting my amendment will send a strong message 
of America's resolve to win the war on terrorism.
  Mr. Chairman, I encourage my colleagues to join me in supporting and 
giving Federal investigators and prosecutors the tools they have asked 
for to aid them in their fight against terrorism by supporting this 
commonsense, effective amendment.

               [From the Associated Press, Aug. 5, 2004]

                Two Arrested in Missile Sting Operation

       Washington.--Two leaders of a mosque in Albany, New York, 
     were arrested on charges stemming from an alleged plot to 
     help a man they thought was a terrorist who wanted to 
     purchase a shoulder-fired missile, federal authorities said 
     Thursday.
       The men have ties to a group called Ansar al-Islam, which 
     has been linked to the al Qaeda terror network, according to 
     two federal law enforcement authorities speaking on condition 
     of anonymity.
       The two arrests came as FBI, Immigration and Customs 
     Enforcement and other agents executed search warrants at the 
     Masjid As-Salam mosque and two Albany-area homes, officials 
     said. The men were identified as Yassin Aref, 34, the imam of 
     the mosque, and 49-year-old Mohammed Hoosain, one of the 
     mosque's founders.
       According to law enforcement officials, the two are being 
     charged with providing material support to terrorism by 
     participating in a conspiracy to help an individual they 
     believed was a terrorist purchase a shoulder-fired missile.
       The individual was an undercover government agent and no 
     missile ever changed hands. Aref and Hoosain were allegedly 
     involved in money-laundering aspects of the plot, the 
     officials said.
       The investigation has been going on for a year and is not 
     related to the Bush administration's decision earlier this 
     week to raise the terror alert level for certain financial 
     sector buildings in New York and Washington, the officials 
     said.
       In Albany, some mosque members gathered early Thursday 
     outside the institution for morning prayers.
       More details about the case were expected to be released 
     later Thursday by the Justice Department.
                                  ____


               [From the Los Angeles Times, Mar. 4, 2004]

           2 Convicted of Seeking Missiles for Al Qaeda Ally

                            (By Tony Perry)

       San Diego.--A Pakistani national and a naturalized American 
     pleaded guilty Wednesday to a conspiracy to help the Al Qaeda 
     terrorist group by selling five tons of hashish and a half-
     ton of heroin in exchange for money and four Stinger 
     missiles.
       Muhamed Abid Afridi, 30, and a naturalized citizen from 
     Inida, Ilyas Ali, 56, admitted in U.S. District Court here 
     that they planned to sell the missiles to the Taliban, an 
     ally of Al Qaeda.
       Afridi, Ali and a second Pakinstani were arrested in Hong 
     Kong in September 2002 after meeting with undercover FBI 
     agents posing as arms dealers with Stingers to sell. They 
     allegedly offered to sell the agents heroin and hashish in 
     return for missiles and money.
       ``They both had the will and the means to carry out the 
     transaction they were negotiating,'' said Assistant U.S. 
     Atty. Michael Skerlos.
       Stingers are shoulder-launched missiles distributed widely 
     by the CIA to Afghan rebels fighting the Soviet army in the 
     1980s. Easy to use and deadly accurate at hitting low-flying 
     aircraft, Stingers were credited with helping the Afghans 
     demoralize and rout the much stronger Soviets.
       ``Because of the actions taken in this investigation, 
     America is safer and our citizens are more secure,'' Atty. 
     General John Ashcroft said in a statement.
       Initial meetings between Ali and the FBI agents occurred in 
     San Diego, according to court documents. Afridi and Ali are 
     scheduled to be sentenced June 29 by Judge M. James Lorenz; a 
     plea bargain recommends that each be sentenced to up to 10 
     years in prison.
       The case against the second Pakistani, Syed Mustajab Shah, 
     has a court date April 5.
       Ali was a grocer in Minneapolis before his arrest.
                                  ____


             [From Jane's Intelligence Review, Sept. 2001]

                      The Proliferation of MANPADS

                         (By Thomas B. Hunter)

       Man-portable surface-to-air missiles, also known as 
     MANPADs, represent a significant potential threat to military 
     and civilian aircraft.
       Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
     proliferation of SA-series MANPADs has increased, and the 
     diffusion of these weapons now exceeds the infamous spread of 
     US-made Stinger missiles from Afghanistan during the 1990s. 
     Today, MANPADs of various types are in the hands of as many 
     as 27 guerrilla and terrorist groups around the world.
       Tracking the proliferation of MANPADs is a difficult 
     endeavour. Often, the only verification of use by non-state 
     actors has been post-event in nature--recovery of a used 
     launcher or fragments from expended missiles. The black 
     market is the primary source for these weapons. Unlike state-
     to-state transfers, usually documented and visible, the 
     illicit black market MANPAD trade defies accurate tracking.
       The inability of governments to correctly identify seized 
     weapons also contributes to inaccurate reports. In many 
     cases, soldiers and government officials have identified 
     rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and other handheld rocket 
     launchers as MANPADs. Moreover, the word `Stinger' has become 
     an all-encompassing term for any MANPAD among many civilian, 
     military, and non-state groups, further complicating efforts 
     to verify proliferation activity.
       In many cases of surface-to-air attacks on aircraft, 
     misreporting is quite common. Airbursts occurring near low-
     flying aircraft have frequently been reported as attacks by 
     MANPADs, when in fact they are usually RPGs. Attacks on 
     aircraft at very low altitudes, those occurring under 1,000 
     feet, are almost exclusively RPGs. Guerrilla and terrorist 
     forces have successfully adapted the RPG to the anti-aircraft 
     role. This skill was demonstrated perhaps most clearly when 
     two US MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by Somali 
     gunmen in October 1993.
       One popular misconception is that these missiles become 
     unusable after several years due to battery or other systems 
     failures, and are therefore useless after a period of time. 
     While it is true that all MANPAD batteries have a finite 
     shelf life, these can be replaced with commercially purchased 
     batteries available on the open market and technically 
     proficient terrorist groups might also be able to construct 
     hybrid batteries to replace used ones.
       Other concerns include deterioration of missile propellants 
     and seeker coolant, and general storage issues. While these 
     concerns merit attention, the commonly held assumption that 
     these weapons have short shelf lives is erroneous. Most 
     missiles are hermetically sealed in launchers designed for 
     rough handling by soldiers in the field. Temperature extremes 
     are also factored into the design of these weapons, reducing 
     the threat of environmental degradation.
       Clearly, the shelf life of MANPADs is, in large part, 
     dependent on the conditions in which the weapon is stored. 
     However, under ideal (factory specified) conditions, some 
     versions of these weapons can remain operational for 22 years 
     or more. So while it can be assumed that some weapons have 
     not been stored in ideal conditions, many weapons previously 
     believed to be inoperative, such as the Afghan Stingers, may 
     indeed be operational.
       Furthermore, MANPADs remain a popular commodity on the 
     global black arms market. With the exception of the Soviet-
     Afghan war, these weapons are more widespread today than at 
     any time since their introduction in the late 1960s. 
     Guerrilla and terrorist organisations can obtain them with 
     relative ease, with the primary limitation being money. As 
     some of these groups increase their profits through drug 
     trafficking and other activities, the likelihood of further 
     illicit purchases will also increase.
       MANPADs have proliferated to non-state groups throughout 
     sub-Saharan Africa. These weapons can be found in the hands 
     of insurgent groups in Angola, the Democratic Republic of 
     Congo, Ethiopia. Rwanda and Somalia.
       Of these states, Angola has seen the greatest activity. The 
     CIA covertly provided FIM-92A Stinger missiles to UNITA 
     rebels in the late 1980s as part of its effort to assist in 
     the overthrow of Angola's pro-communist government. As in 
     Afghanistan, efforts to recover the missiles following the 
     end of hostilities proved futile. Today UNITA retains an 
     unknown number of advanced weapons, which may be augmented 
     with SA-7 (NATO reporting name `Grail,' Russian name Strela-
     2) and FIM-43 Redeye missiles captured from government 
     forces.
       UNITA has also shown willingness to use them, sometimes 
     against civilian aircraft. UNITA fired missiles at three 
     World Food Programme (WFP) aircraft in June 2001, for 
     example. One plane was struck but managed to land safely at a 
     nearby airport. This attack was of particular concern in that 
     the missile struck the aircraft at an altitude of 15,000 
     feet--3,500 feet beyond the weapon's published maximum range. 
     While this is not the first report of Stinger missiles 
     reaching

[[Page H8868]]

     this height, it is clear that aircraft travelling at an 
     altitude believed to be out of the range of these weapons 
     should be aware of this proven capability.
       During the Soviet-Afghan War, the CIA working in 
     conjunction with the Pakistani Army's Inter-Services 
     Intelligence (ISI), delivered over 1,000 Stingers to 
     Mujahideen rebels. While the rebels fired many of the 
     missiles against Soviet aircraft, hundreds remained after 
     the fighting ended in 1987. Poor bookkeeping at the CIA, 
     combined with the dispersal of the weapons to numerous 
     clans throughout the country, made accounting for and 
     recovering them impossible. The result was a proliferation 
     of advanced anti-aircraft weaponry throughout the region.
       It is well-known that the rebels did not retain all of the 
     Stingers left behind after the war. Many found their way onto 
     the global grey and black arms markets and ended up in 
     guerrilla arsenals from Sri Lanka to Chechnya. With a 
     reported black market price of between US$80,000 and 
     $250,000, Stingers represent a significant profit potential 
     due in no small part to widespread demand.
       Terrorist leader Osama bin Laden also reportedly possesses 
     a number of MANPADs, including SA-7s and Stingers. As Bin 
     Laden has both the financial resources and black market 
     connections to make procurement possible, these reports are 
     probably accurate. Persistent rumours also indicate that Bin 
     Laden's personal bodyguards may be equipped with Stingers, 
     ostensibly to counter an airborne attack.
       Regardless of the veracity of the latter information, it is 
     logical to assume that Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda (`The Base') 
     network is in possession of additional MANPADs. If this is 
     true, then Al-Qaeda represents the most significant threat to 
     international civil aviation. Given Bin Laden's specific 
     threats against U.S. citizens, this threat is especially 
     relevant with regard to U.S.-owned airlines.
       While the Russian military is certainly not confronted with 
     the same threat level that it experienced in Afghanistan, the 
     increased proliferation of MANPADs to Chechen rebels has 
     dramatically increased the danger to close air support (CAS) 
     aircraft operating in theatre. A number of aircraft have been 
     shot down, including Su-25 `Frogfoot' and Su-24 `Pencer' 
     fighter-bombers. MANPADs have also shot down a number of 
     military helicopters.
       The sources of Chechen MANPADs are varied. However, a large 
     number of systems have been seized by Russian authorities, 
     indicating that the rebels have established an effective 
     pipeline for delivery. For example, three SA-7 missiles were 
     found in the territory of Ingushetia near the Russian-
     Georgian border in September 2000. Just one month later, an 
     unspecified number of SA-7s were discovered in a building 
     near Severy airport. The following month a Russian military 
     operation resulted in the seizure of four SA-7 missiles with 
     their launchers from a lorry in Dagestan. A rebel spokesman 
     later announced that the weapons were part of a shipment of 
     arms destined for use in Chechnya. The shipment reportedly 
     cost the Chechens $40,000.
       Another report indicated that Bin Laden might have 
     delivered as many as 50 Stinger missiles to the Chechens. The 
     weapons were to have been transported from either Georgia or 
     Azerbaijan and delivered in December 1999. Eight Stinger 
     missiles were reportedly airdropped in the mountains of 
     Sharoyskiy District on the night of 12-13 June 2001. The 
     source of these weapons was not reported.
       The primary MANPAD threat in the Western Hemisphere is 
     their possible future use by the two main Colombian insurgent 
     groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas 
     Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia--FARC) and the National 
     Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional--ELN). 
     Complicating analysis of the Colombia MANPAD situation is a 
     plethora of false of misleading reporting.
       Colombian electronic and print press outlets have regularly 
     reported that both the FARC and ELN possess these missile 
     systems. Government officials have also fanned this fire by 
     issuing corroborating statements. These reports, both 
     military and civilian, cumulatively suggest that the FARC 
     currently possesses SA-7, SA-14 ``Gremlin'', SA-16 ``Gimlet'' 
     and Redeye missiles. The Redeye missiles were variously 
     reported to have come from Nicaraguan (former Contra) or 
     Syrian arsenals and the SA-series weapons from various 
     sources. There is no definitive evidence, however, to confirm 
     that any Colombian guerrilla group currently possesses 
     MANPADs of any type.
       This misreporting is usually a matter of an honest mistake 
     due to lack of familiarity with MANPADs, the Colombian 
     situation may mask an ulterior motive. While the threat to 
     the Colombian government from insurgent and narcotics 
     trafficking groups is quite real, it is well-known that 
     officials from that government have frequently overstated the 
     sophistication of rebel groups in an effort to garner greater 
     financial and political support from the USA. Given this 
     history, it is possible that MANPAD events have occasionally 
     been intentionally overstated.
       According to Colombia expert Steven Salisbury, FARC 
     commanders have admitted to possessing MANPADs. ``The FARC 
     commanders who told me the FARC has shoulder-fired SAMs 
     [surface-to-air missiles] were field commanders talking 
     privately to me,'' he said. ``They said, yes, they have 
     SAMs.'' This information given to Salisbury was corroborated 
     by two FARC block commanders as well as other guerrillas.
       Four additional factors must be highlighted. The first of 
     these is that FARC commanders have stated that they do indeed 
     possess MANPADs. The second is that both the FARC and ELN are 
     known to be aggressively seeking these weapons. The third 
     factor is that the guerrillas have received training on these 
     weapons. In one instance, a Colombian government source 
     stated that 25 guerrillas travelled to Nicaragua to attend an 
     anti-aircraft course taught by former Sandanista soldiers. 
     This course reportedly included MANPAD training as well as 
     gunnery techniques involving 0.50-calibre heavy machine guns 
     and the use of RPG-7s in the anti-air role. FARC members may 
     also have travelled to Syria and Libya to receive similar 
     training. Finally, both the FARC and ELN have the financial 
     resources to make such a purchase possible.
       With these factors in mind, it appears likely that the FARC 
     will procure at least one type of MANPAD--if it has not done 
     so already. Colombian guerrilla groups have had very little 
     difficulty obtaining weapons for use in their war against the 
     government. Well-established arms transit routes are in place 
     to facilitate these shipments. The arms pipelines through 
     which the FARC and ELN may obtain MANPADs run through the 
     following countries Albania, Belgium, Ecuador, Jordan, North 
     Korea, Peru, Romania, and Russia. Of specific concern is the 
     Russian relationship, as the FARC and Russian mafias have a 
     well-established arms-for-drugs pipeline in place. The 
     Russian mafias have demonstrated the ability to obtain 
     virtually any type of weapons system. If the Colombian 
     guerrillas are to obtain these weapons, and have not been 
     successful already, they will most likely come from this 
     black market channel.
       It must be noted that when the FARC obtains these weapons, 
     it will almost certainly use them only in critical 
     situations, such as the defence of important base camps or 
     headquarters facilities. They will most likely not be used 
     against drug-spraying aircraft or other non-threatening 
     targets due to the high value of MANPADs to the FARC 
     leadership.
       If the FARC does indeed maintain a small inventory of these 
     weapons, this is the most likely explanation for why they 
     have not yet been employed. If employed, targets would 
     most likely include Colombian Air Force CAS aircraft or 
     possibly high-value civilian flights such as aircraft 
     transporting senior government officials.
       Hizbullah probably took its first delivery of MANPADs in 
     1982 with the acquisition of a small number of SA-7s. 
     Reporting since that time indicates that these stocks were 
     supplemented with PIM-92A Stingers in the mid-1990s, provided 
     by Islamic Mujahideen rebels in Afghanistan. Most recently, 
     the group may have received a small number of Chinese-made 
     Qianwei (`Advanced Guard')--1 (QW-1) systems. If true, the 
     acquisition of this latter system represents a significant 
     upgrade in the surface-to-air capabilities of Hizbullah.
       The Palestinian Authority also maintains a stock of SA-7 
     missiles and launchers. Reports also indicates that the 
     Palestinians may have a small number of Stinger systems as 
     well. The source of the SA-7 weapons is unclear, but it is 
     possible some were delivered from Egypt aboard fishing boats, 
     a common local method of arms smuggling.
       For example, on 8 May 2001, Israeli security services 
     intercepted the Lebanese-flagged vessel Santorini off the 
     coast between Haifa and Tel Aviv. A search of the ship 
     revealed a large quantity of arms, including 60 mm mortars, 
     landmines, grenades, and four SA-7 missiles with launchers. 
     The shipment was reportedly sent by the Palestinian Front for 
     the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and intended for 
     use by Palestinian militants. The MANPADS were confiscated by 
     the Israelis and probably added to their own arsenal.
       Apart from the Afghan Mujahideen, the Liberation Tigers of 
     Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have enjoyed the greatest success with 
     MANPADs. LTTE guerrillas have fired an estimated 20 missiles 
     at government aircraft since 1996, shooting down three 
     helicopters and probably two fixed-wing transports. These 
     attacks killed a total of 179 personnel.
       It is estimated that the LTTE possesses SA-7, SA-1a, and 
     other MANPADs. One Chinese-built Hongying-5 (HN-5A) system 
     was also discovered during government operations; however, 
     there is no indication that the LTTE possesses additional 
     units. It is possible that this weapon was procured from 
     sources within the Burmese military.
       In December 2000 Sri Lankan news carried video of a Tamil 
     rebel holding what appeared to be a Stinger missile during an 
     October operation against the Trincomalee naval facility. 
     However, later analysis indicated this weapon was most 
     probably a double barrelled 107 mm Katyusha rocket, believed 
     to be a variant of the Chinese Type 63 107mm launcher, and 
     not a MANPAD.
       The LTTE reportedly acquired these weapons from a variety 
     of sources. Press reports indicated that the Kurdistan's 
     Worker's Party (PPK), working with the Greek 17 November 
     terrorist organisation, sold 11 Stinger missiles to the LTTE 
     in 1994. These weapons were reportedly built in Greece, which 
     is a member of European consortium manufacturing PIM-92A/C 
     Stinger systems under license from the USA. Other Stingers 
     may have been sold or donated to the Tamils by the Afghan 
     Taliban during the 1990s. LTTE

[[Page H8869]]

     weapons buyers have also been reported in Cambodia and 
     Thailand, reportedly seeking MANPADs Given the Tamils success 
     with these weapons, it is likely that procurement efforts 
     will continue.

  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 4 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, this did not go through the Committee on the Judiciary 
and it is somewhat complicated and it appears to be overlapping and 
recreates and reauthorizations present law. For example under title 
XVIII, chapter 10 already criminalizes the use of biological weapons; 
chapter 11(b) criminalizes chemical weapons; chapter 39 criminalizes 
nuclear weapons; chapter 4 criminalizes the use of explosives, and on 
and on.
  In addition, many of those, all of those offenses are predicates to 
18 U.S.C. (a) 2332(b) which provides for the death penalty if death 
results from any violation of those statutes.
  The only change appears to be a mandatory 30 years for attempts and 
conspiracies. There is no differentiation for a role in a conspiracy, 
relative knowledge of the crime, or even if death were an accident that 
had not been intended. What we have is new mandatory minimums.
  We have, in the Committee on the Judiciary, often cited many findings 
and recommendations from researchers, sentencing professionals, even 
the judicial branch, justices on the Supreme Court, including the chief 
justice, citing problems created by mandatory sentences. They have been 
found to be a waste of money compared to alternatives such as treatment 
or traditional sentencing. They disrupt the ability of the Sentencing 
Commission and the courts to apply an orderly, proportional, 
nondisparate sentencing system. They discriminate against minorities 
and they transfer an inordinate amount of discretion to prosecutors in 
an adversarial system.
  Mandatory minimum sentences increase disparities in sentencing 
because they do not allow distinctions between major players and bit 
players in a crime. In a recent letter to the subcommittee, the U.S. 
Judicial Conference, headed by the chief justice of the Supreme Court, 
noted and I quote: In addition to resulting in unwarranted sentencing 
disparities, mandatory minimums often lead to treatment of dissimilar 
offenders in a similar manner by requiring courts to impose the same 
sentence on offenders, when sound policy and common sense call for 
reasonable differences in punishment to reflect differences in the 
seriousness of the conduct or danger to society.
  In other words, mandatory minimums violate common sense. That is the 
chief justice and the U.S. Judicial Conference.
  Mr. Chairman, this bill, the underlying bill, is a reorganization 
bill. We should not include controversial criminal penalties, 
especially when the Judicial Conference headed by the chief justice 
tells us that these things violate common sense. We also need to study 
the international implications of this, because when we add in the 
death penalty, we add in complications of international cooperation. 
Most countries around the world do not have the death penalty and we 
have had problems where they would not even extradite criminals to the 
United States because we have all of these death penalties.
  We need to study this, and having a floor amendment is not the 
appropriate way to legislate. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we would 
defeat this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, the several very important articles in my added 
materials that I have submitted speak not only to the threat to the 
United States, but also the reality of the groups who were engaged in 
the transfer, the trafficking of shoulder-fired missiles, of weapons of 
mass destruction, in terms of viruses that could be placed in the 
United States of America.
  Mr. Chairman, I respect the gentleman for not liking the minimum 
mandatory sentences. I would also say that it is up to this body, Mr. 
Chairman, to make sure that we provide the tools necessary to the 
Attorney General and other U.S. attorneys who may be prosecuting these 
cases, to give to the frontline agents and investigators those 
abilities to find and stop those people who are perpetrators of crime, 
mass murder against the United States of America.
  Most of all, I would remind this body how important it is to make 
sure that we keep terrorism away from our doorsteps. I believe in 
effective law enforcement, effective use of the laws of this country, 
and making sure that we have looked at this from the perspective of the 
Attorney General of the United States and U.S. attorneys across this 
country who support this important legislation.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I would just point out that we already have in the Code 
serious penalties for all of these crimes. The appropriate way to 
legislate would be to go through the committee so that we could see 
exactly how these fit into the present sentencing scheme. I would hope 
that we defeat the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Members of this body understand that 
there is a need to make sure that we protect this country and the laws 
of this country. We have consulted with the Attorney General of the 
United States and other U.S. attorneys who are asking for this. I 
support this amendment. I believe it will help the President of the 
United States to ensure the safety of our country.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kolbe). The question is on the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Sessions) will be postponed.


                 Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Bonilla

  Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 6 offered by Mr. Bonilla:
       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following 
     (and redesignate provisions and amend the table of contents 
     accordingly):

     SECTION ___. INCREASE IN DETENTION BED SPACE.

       Subject to the availability of appropriated funds, the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security shall increase by not less 
     than 2,500, in each of fiscal years 2006 and 2007, the number 
     of beds available for immigration detention and removal 
     operations of the Department of Homeland Security above the 
     number for which funds were allotted for the preceding fiscal 
     year.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bonilla) and a Member opposed each will 
control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bonilla).
  Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  First, let me compliment the committees who put this bill together. 
They have done a great job facing very complicated circumstances. 
Specifically, they did a very good job about increasing the Border 
Patrol staff, that we need to deal with the increased flow of illegal 
immigration along the southwest border, along with other Federal agents 
that are necessary to do the job.
  Unfortunately, there was an oversight in the bill in providing bed 
space for the people that we catch. Let me point out as well that the 
overwhelming number of them now are categorized as they are by the 
Border Patrol as OTMs, ``other than Mexicans,'' people trying to enter 
our country that have figured out a different way to come in versus the 
ports of entry on either coast or using other means.
  Mr. Chairman, in many cases the OTMs, are now arrested, processed, 
interrogated and released into communities because the Department of 
Homeland Security does not have

[[Page H8870]]

enough bed space. So, believe it or not, in Texas alone, since January, 
there have been over 15,000 OTMs released in communities throughout the 
State in the neighborhood. They might have been introduced into any 
neighborhood in Texas, no matter where one lives.
  Mr. Chairman, this is an outrage. Homeland Security claims the 
problem is bed space, so in this amendment we deal with that problem, 
calling for 2,500 additional bed spaces in 2006 and another 2,500 in 
2007.
  This is an amendment that is supported by the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Cox), Chairman of Homeland Security. It is also 
supported by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Ortiz), my good friend, who 
represents an area near the Mexican border and the Gulf Coast in Texas 
and who has been working very hard on this issue.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a nonpartisan issue. We have strong support by 
other members of the committees working on this. The gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Smith), my good colleague and friend from San Antonio and 
central Texas area, has been working hard on this issue as well. This 
is also something that is supported by, again no matter what ethnic 
group or political party one belongs to, especially on the southwest 
border. There is strong support by the mayors, the county judges, the 
county commissioners that are working very hard to deal with this 
illegal immigration problem every day.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to just single out the wonderful 
Border Patrol agents that are patrolling day and night, sometimes 
working with fewer resources than they should have, and doing a great 
job of patrolling the border. Help is on the way for them in terms of 
manpower and hopefully this amendment, when adopted, will provide the 
bed space as well to house the illegal aliens that are coming across 
our border and taking advantage of what we now have along the Mexican 
border.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to claim 
the time in opposition to the amendment, although I support the 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Texas?
  There was no objection.
  The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Chairman, there is no example any better of 
the failure of the administration to make America safe than is 
illustrated by the amendment offered by my colleague from Texas today. 
What the amendment says is that we need 2,500 more bed spaces so that 
we can end this deplorable, unacceptable practice of catching illegal 
immigrants who come across our borders every day from countries other 
than Mexico and seeing them immediately released into our country, 
knowing that 80 to 90 percent of them will never show up again for a 
deportation hearing.
  Mr. Chairman, it is a practice that must end, but our administration 
has allowed this to go on for year after year after year. And it is 
very unfortunate, even though I appreciate greatly the intent expressed 
by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bonilla), my colleague, it is very 
unfortunate that all the amendment does is direct the Department of 
Homeland Security to somewhere in their budget find the money for an 
additional 2,500 beds so we can end this practice that represents a 
serious threat to the security of our country.
  The truth of the matter is the gentleman from Texas is on the 
Committee on Appropriations, and when we look at what the Committee on 
Appropriations did to try to help solve this problem, all they did was 
what the President asked for. He asked for 117 additional bed spaces, 
when the President knows that even today we have only appropriated 
money to hold 1,944 detainees who cross the border illegally every day 
and we are holding 22,500. We are stretched to the limit now.
  As the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bonilla) points out, we need at 
least 2,500 more and probably 5,000 more beds, which is provided for in 
his amendment but not funded.
  Nowhere is the gap between the rhetoric of the administration on 
protecting America and the reality of the failure to protect America 
any clearer than it is right here.
  The Democrats on the House Committee on Homeland Security did a 6-
month investigation of the problems of our border. We produced a report 
entitled Transforming the Southern Border. It pointed out a lot of 
interesting facts, one of which is the one we are discussing. As our 
staff traveled along the Rio Grande south of El Paso, we took this 
picture. What it shows is a cargo van backed up to a school bus just 
across the border inside the United States, along with an 18-wheeler, 
another cargo van, and another school bus.
  As the staff flew over, nobody was to be seen who would be a part of 
our Border Patrol. So they called into the Border Patrol to tell them 
about this suspicious-looking activity. When they flew back over, the 
bus and the van and all the vehicles were gone. We do not know if they 
were exchanging illegal immigrants, illegal goods, narcotics, or 
nuclear weapons.
  As the 9/11 Commission said, our borders are porous and we must 
remedy this problem. But to do so it is going to take more than 
rhetoric.
  Mr. Chairman, when we look at what we are spending on homeland 
security today, we are spending $20 billion more than we did in the 
year of 9/11. That is a lot of money, but maybe not in an $850 billion 
discretionary budget. But last year alone, while we had increased 
homeland security spending, $20 billion, the richest 1 percent of 
Americans, those making over a million dollars, got four times the tax 
relief, almost $90 billion.
  The reality is that we have made the wrong choice. We have failed to 
make America safe. And when illegal immigrants can come across our 
borders in the numbers that they are coming, last year alone 25,000 
illegal immigrants were actually caught coming across our border from 
places other than Mexico. Every year there is close to a million that 
get across that are caught. No telling how many are not caught. But of 
those 25,000, because we did not have the detention space, the jail 
space to hold them, 80 to 90 percent of them never showed up because 
the 25,000 were given a free pass into America, released on personal 
bond.
  Mr. Chairman, it does not surprise anybody that 80 to 90 percent of 
those 25,000 never show up. They are in our country today. This failure 
to protect America is inexcusable. I think we have got to stop it.
  Mr. Chairman, I think I will vote for the amendment offered by my 
colleague, but I want to point out that we failed to fund the very 
issue he raises.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, I would yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner) 
for a quick question.
  Mr. Chairman, did the gentleman acknowledge in the end that he would 
vote for the amendment? I wanted to understand that clearly.
  Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield, yes, 
I will vote for the amendment because I believe it is based on a 
sincere intent to solve a serious problem. But I was simply pointing 
out that it provides no funding. The gentleman's Committee on 
Appropriations only provided funding for 117 beds in next year's budget 
and there is no money to do what is provided for in this amendment. To 
simply direct the department to take it out of their hide is simply 
unrealistic.
  Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I thank the gentleman 
from Texas for his answer.
  I wanted to reiterate that in spite of the rhetoric that was just 
heard from the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner), my colleague, he is 
supporting the amendment. I am delighted to hear that.
  The gentleman makes a lot of good points about problems that the 
Department of Homeland Security has faced over the last couple of 
years. I agree with the gentleman. That is why I am here trying to do 
something about it.
  But, again, in spite of the rant that we just heard about how bad the 
problem is, and I can assure the gentleman that I have probably 
delivered the same remarks in my district, and here in Washington as 
well, about the problems that the Department of Homeland Security is 
facing, but ultimately we are all here to try to do something about it.

[[Page H8871]]

  So I would hope that the gentleman would not only vote for the 
amendment, as he has indicated he will, but also tell his friends that 
we need this help for our good agents that are patrolling the border 
and for all of us who are trying to do something about it.
  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I am proud to rise in support of this 
amendment. Congressman Bonilla's amendment seeks to increase alien 
detention bed space by 2,500 beds per year for fiscal years 2006 and 
2007. It is a very simple provision, but it will have a material impact 
on improving the security of our homeland and discouraging illegal 
immigration.
  In order to have a successful border security strategy, it must be 
balanced. That is why this amendment is so important. There are other 
provisions in H.R. 10 that will increase staffing levels for the Border 
Patrol and ICE investigators. These, too, are important initiatives and 
will result in many more illegal aliens and immigration violators being 
apprehended. But in order to make the best use of these new assets, we 
must have adequate facilities to detain those additional immigration 
violators who are caught, especially those considered high-risk or in 
mandatory detention categories.
  The Department of Homeland Security's Detention and Removal Office, 
or DRO, is currently authorized to fund approximately 19,000 detention 
beds. However, they consistently hold over 22,000 illegal aliens each 
day in facilities around the Nation. In the first year, this amendment 
would increase available bed space to meet the minimum demand and then 
would go above that in FY 2007 to provide additional detention 
resources to meet the expected demand that these other new border 
control initiatives will create.
  It is a well-known fact that the majority of aliens not detained and 
released, pending an immigration hearing, never return for their 
scheduled hearing but seek instead to melt into U.S. communities. There 
are approximately 300,000 non-citizens in the United States who have 
received deportation orders, but who have not left the country. There 
is no doubt that more of these individuals would have left the country 
if they had been detained in the beginning.
  Approximately 50 percent of DRO detainees are Mexicans, but there is 
a growing number of individuals from different countries, called 
``other than Mexicans'' or OTMs. Less is known about their motivation 
for coming to the U.S., and I have serious concerns about individuals 
illegally entering America who originally are from countries of 
interest with respect to terrorism. We must have the resources to 
detain these individuals to guarantee that we have an opportunity to 
verify their identity and motives, and that they are deported if 
necessary.
  In order to monitor more of the individuals that are released, DRO 
utilizes alternative methods of detention. This includes release on 
recognizance, release on bond, electronic monitoring devices (EMD), and 
the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP). While these 
alternative methods are appropriate and responsible initiatives, it is 
essential that we have sufficient detention bed space for high-risk 
individuals, those with criminal records, and repeat immigration 
violators.
  As Chairman of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, I would 
like to thank Mr. Bonilla for offering this critical amendment and 
request the support of my colleagues in ensuring passage. Thank you, 
Mr. Speaker, and I yield back the remainder of my time.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, thousands of illegal aliens pour 
over our southern border each day. A significant number of these aliens 
are not Mexican, and cannot simply be sent back over the border.
  Border Patrol agents must process aliens from countries other than 
Mexico and are forced to release them into our communities pending a 
hearing. This is because there is not enough bed space in our detention 
facilities.
  When illegal aliens are released pending a hearing, it is estimated 
that 85 percent will never be heard from again.
  This process has become known as the ``catch and release'' program, 
and it threatens our national security.
  The Department of Homeland Security recently reported that from 
October through June over 44,000 non-Mexican aliens were apprehended on 
the southern border from countries such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, 
Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.
  The hard work of our Border Patrol agents is wasted when we do not 
have enough detention space.
  The Bonilla amendment would help correct this problem by authorizing 
an increase of 2,500 detention bed spaces for each of the next two 
years.
  The lack of detention space has reached a crisis.
  Every day we are releasing aliens from dozens of countries into our 
communities. We don't know if these individuals are criminals or 
terrorists.
  The Bonilla amendment curtails the catch and release program on our 
southern border. It lets the U.S. detain illegal immigrants who enter 
our country rather than release them in our communities.
  Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment by my 
friend from Texas, and the co-chair of the House Border Caucus, Mr. 
Bonilla.
  Let me begin by thanking the gentleman for his hard work to find a 
way to stop the current ``catch and release'' policy propounded by this 
government . . . by releasing many of the illegal immigrants we are 
catching into the U.S. population. This is frightening for all of us.
  Now, the basis for this ``catch and release'' policy is a lack of 
beds for the Department of Homeland Security to hold these illegal 
immigrants from countries other than Mexico (OTMs). The gentleman's 
amendment today specifically addresses this shortcoming and I join him 
in advocating it to the House.
  We are apprehending an alarming number of OTMs with not enough space 
to detain them--forcing us to release them into our community--we need 
additional beds. The gentleman's amendment is certainly a good 
beginning and I am grateful for his efforts to end this policy.
  Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bonilla).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mrs. Capito

  Mrs. CAPITO. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 7 offered by Mrs. Capito:
       At the end of title II add the following:
Subtitle J--Railroad Carriers and Mass Transportation Protection Act of 
                                 20004

     SEC. 2111. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Railroad Carriers and 
     Mass Transportation Protection Act of 2004''.

     SEC. 2112. ATTACKS AGAINST RAILROAD CARRIERS AND MASS 
                   TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 97 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by striking sections 1992 through 1993 and 
     inserting the following:

     ``Sec. 1992. Terrorist attacks and other violence against 
       railroad carriers and against mass transportation systems 
       on land, on water, or through the air

       ``(a) General Prohibitions.--Whoever, in a circumstance 
     described in subsection (c), knowingly--
       ``(1) wrecks, derails, sets fire to, or disables railroad 
     on-track equipment or a mass transportation vehicle;
       ``(2) with intent to endanger the safety of any person, or 
     with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life, and 
     without the authorization of the railroad carrier or mass 
     transportation provider--
       ``(A) places any biological agent or toxin, destructive 
     substance, or destructive device in, upon, or near railroad 
     on-track equipment or a mass transportation vehicle; or
       ``(B) releases a hazardous material or a biological agent 
     or toxin on or near any property described in subparagraph 
     (A) or (B) of paragraph (3);
       ``(3) sets fire to, undermines, makes unworkable, unusable, 
     or hazardous to work on or use, or places any biological 
     agent or toxin, destructive substance, or destructive device 
     in, upon, or near any--
       ``(A) tunnel, bridge, viaduct, trestle, track, 
     electromagnetic guideway, signal, station, depot, warehouse, 
     terminal, or any other way, structure, property, or 
     appurtenance used in the operation of, or in support of the 
     operation of, a railroad carrier, without the authorization 
     of the railroad carrier, and with intent to, or knowing or 
     having reason to know such activity would likely, derail, 
     disable, or wreck railroad on-track equipment;
       ``(B) garage, terminal, structure, track, electromagnetic 
     guideway, supply, or facility used in the operation of, or in 
     support of the operation of, a mass transportation vehicle, 
     without the authorization of the mass transportation 
     provider, and with intent to, or knowing or having reason to 
     know such activity would likely, derail, disable, or wreck a 
     mass transportation vehicle used, operated, or employed by a 
     mass transportation provider; or
       ``(4) removes an appurtenance from, damages, or otherwise 
     impairs the operation of a railroad signal system or mass 
     transportation signal or dispatching system, including a 
     train control system, centralized dispatching system, or 
     highway-railroad grade crossing warning signal, without 
     authorization from the railroad carrier or mass 
     transportation provider;
       ``(5) with intent to endanger the safety of any person, or 
     with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life, 
     interferes with, disables, or incapacitates any dispatcher, 
     driver, captain, locomotive engineer, railroad conductor, or 
     other person while the person is employed in dispatching, 
     operating, or maintaining railroad on-track equipment or a 
     mass transportation vehicle;

[[Page H8872]]

       ``(6) commits an act, including the use of a dangerous 
     weapon, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily 
     injury to any person who is on property described in 
     subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (3), except that this 
     subparagraph shall not apply to rail police officers in 
     acting the course of their law enforcement duties under 
     section 28101 of title 49, United States Code;
       ``(7) conveys false information, knowing the information to 
     be false, concerning an attempt or alleged attempt that was 
     made, is being made, or is to be made, to engage in a 
     violation of this subsection; or
       ``(8) attempts, threatens, or conspires to engage in any 
     violation of any of paragraphs (1) through (7);

     shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
     20 years, or both.
       ``(b) Aggravated Offense.--Whoever commits an offense under 
     subsection (a) of this section in a circumstance in which--
       ``(1) the railroad on-track equipment or mass 
     transportation vehicle was carrying a passenger or employee 
     at the time of the offense;
       ``(2) the railroad on-track equipment or mass 
     transportation vehicle was carrying high-level radioactive 
     waste or spent nuclear fuel at the time of the offense;
       ``(3) the railroad on-track equipment or mass 
     transportation vehicle was carrying a hazardous material at 
     the time of the offense that--
       ``(A) was required to be placarded under subpart F of part 
     172 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations; and
       ``(B) is identified as class number 3, 4, 5, 6.1, or 8 and 
     packing group I or packing group II, or class number 1, 2, or 
     7 under the hazardous materials table of section 172.101 of 
     title 49, Code of Federal Regulations; or
       ``(4) the offense results in the death of any person;

     shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of 
     years or life, or both. In the case of a violation described 
     in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the term of imprisonment 
     shall be not less than 30 years; and, in the case of a 
     violation described in paragraph (4) of this subsection, the 
     offender shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for 
     life and be subject to the death penalty.
       ``(c) Circumstances Required for Offense.--A circumstance 
     referred to in subsection (a) is any of the following:
       ``(1) Any of the conduct required for the offense is, or, 
     in the case of an attempt, threat, or conspiracy to engage in 
     conduct, the conduct required for the completed offense would 
     be, engaged in, on, against, or affecting a mass 
     transportation provider or railroad carrier engaged in or 
     affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
       ``(2) Any person travels or communicates across a State 
     line in order to commit the offense, or transports materials 
     across a State line in aid of the commission of the offense.
       ``(d) Definitions.--In this section--
       ``(1) the term `biological agent' has the meaning given to 
     that term in section 178(1);
       ``(2) the term `dangerous weapon' means a weapon, device, 
     instrument, material, or substance, animate or inanimate, 
     that is used for, or is readily capable of, causing death or 
     serious bodily injury, including a pocket knife with a blade 
     of less than 2\1/2\ inches in length and a box cutter;
       ``(3) the term `destructive device' has the meaning given 
     to that term in section 921(a)(4);
       ``(4) the term `destructive substance' means an explosive 
     substance, flammable material, infernal machine, or other 
     chemical, mechanical, or radioactive device or material, or 
     matter of a combustible, contaminative, corrosive, or 
     explosive nature, except that the term `radioactive device' 
     does not include any radioactive device or material used 
     solely for medical, industrial, research, or other peaceful 
     purposes;
       ``(5) the term `hazardous material' has the meaning given 
     to that term in chapter 51 of title 49;
       ``(6) the term `high-level radioactive waste' has the 
     meaning given to that term in section 2(12) of the Nuclear 
     Waste Policy Act of 1982 (42 U.S.C. 10101(12));
       ``(7) the term `mass transportation' has the meaning given 
     to that term in section 5302(a)(7) of title 49, except that 
     the term includes school bus, charter, and sightseeing 
     transportation;
       ``(8) the term `on-track equipment' means a carriage or 
     other contrivance that runs on rails or electromagnetic 
     guideways;
       ``(9) the term `railroad on-track equipment' means a train, 
     locomotive, tender, motor unit, freight or passenger car, or 
     other on-track equipment used, operated, or employed by a 
     railroad carrier;
       ``(10) the term `railroad' has the meaning given to that 
     term in chapter 201 of title 49;
       ``(11) the term `railroad carrier' has the meaning given to 
     that term in chapter 201 of title 49;
       ``(12) the term `serious bodily injury' has the meaning 
     given to that term in section 1365;
       ``(13) the term `spent nuclear fuel' has the meaning given 
     to that term in section 2(23) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
     of 1982 (42 U.S.C. 10101(23));
       ``(14) the term `State' has the meaning given to that term 
     in section 2266;
       ``(15) the term `toxin' has the meaning given to that term 
     in section 178(2); and
       ``(16) the term `vehicle' means any carriage or other 
     contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of 
     transportation on land, on water, or through the air.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 97 of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) by striking ``RAILROADS'' in the chapter heading and 
     inserting ``RAILROAD CARRIERS AND MASS TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 
     ON LAND, ON WATER, OR THROUGH THE AIR'';
       (B) by striking the items relating to sections 1992 and 
     1993; and
       (C) by inserting after the item relating to section 1991 
     the following:

``1992. Terrorist attacks and other violence against railroad carriers 
              and against mass transportation systems on land, on 
              water, or through the air.''.

       (2) The table of chapters at the beginning of part I of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking the item 
     relating to chapter 97 and inserting the following:

``97. Railroad carriers and mass transportation systems on land, on 
    water, or through the air...............................1991''.....

       (3) Title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) in section 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i), by striking ``1992 
     (relating to wrecking trains), 1993 (relating to terrorist 
     attacks and other acts of violence against mass 
     transportation systems),'' and inserting ``1992 (relating to 
     terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against railroad 
     carriers and against mass transportation systems on land, on 
     water, or through the air),'';
       (B) in section 2339A, by striking ``1993,''; and
       (C) in section 2516(1)(c) by striking ``1992 (relating to 
     wrecking trains),'' and inserting ``1992 (relating to 
     terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against railroad 
     carriers and against mass transportation systems on land, on 
     water, or through the air),''.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the 
gentlewoman from West Virginia (Mrs. Capito) and the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Scott) each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from West Virginia (Mrs. 
Capito).
  Mrs. CAPITO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by thanking the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Chairman Sensenbrenner) the Committee on Rules, the 
Departments of Justice and Transportation, the Subcommittee on 
Railroads of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and 
the many others who are supporting me in this initiative.
  Mr. Chairman, in the wake of the September 11th attacks, as well as 
the recent bombing of four commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, the need 
for stronger criminal laws to deal with terrorists and other violence 
has never been stronger. Intelligence reports last spring indicate that 
some terrorists might try to bomb U.S. rail lines or buses in major 
U.S. cities. We have also heard reports of so-called ``dirty bombs'' 
that can be easily transported over our extensive mass transportation 
system.
  Mr. Chairman, I do not have to remind anyone in this body of the 
potential loss of life and disruption to our economy and way of life 
from this modern new threat.
  In order to help meet this threat head on, I have introduced an 
amendment that revises, enhances, and consolidates two Federal criminal 
law statutes into one comprehensive statute in order to deter and more 
effectively punish terrorist acts against railroad carriers and other 
mass transportation providers.
  Specifically, under current Federal criminal law, terrorist acts 
against railroad carriers are prosecuted under the so-called ``Wrecking 
Trains'' statute which was enacted in 1940. This statute is in many 
ways outdated, full of gaps and inconsistencies, and quite literally 
inadequately addresses modern threats like radioactive materials or 
biological agents.
  Additionally, the September 11 attacks on our homeland gave rise to 
the creation of another Federal criminal statute which covers terrorist 
acts against mass transportation systems. By combining these two 
statutes to cover all forms of transportation and railway carriers, we 
can introduce more consistency, predictability, and effectiveness into 
Federal prosecutorial powers.
  First, it would reduce our criminal law's vulnerability to bogus 
legal claims and also prevent prosecutors from having to prosecute for 
lesser offenses because of discrepancies or gaps in the current law. 
Richard Reid, known as the Shoe Bomber, was actually able to have a 
charge against him

[[Page H8873]]

dismissed because the new mass transportation statute did not 
explicitly define an airplane as a vehicle for purposes of prosecuting 
under the statute. My amendment will prevent oversights like this from 
happening.
  Secondly, my amendment will bring more consistent and uniform 
protections to all modes of railroad carriers and mass transportation 
providers.
  Third, my amendment will expand the jurisdictional reach of criminal 
law to cover more offenses, such as the release of biological agents or 
radioactive material, and cover more property if the prohibited conduct 
affects interstate commerce or travel, or communicating, or 
transporting prohibited materials across State lines.
  Fourth, my amendment will make capital punishment an option under 
aggravating circumstances that involve terrorist acts that result in 
the death of a person. If our jurisdictional system is unable to have 
this tool at their disposal in order to meet the new threats that 
terrorism has brought upon us, then we will lose a critical opportunity 
to deter and prevent more terrorism from happening.
  And fifth, my amendment protects all law enforcement, railroad 
carriers, and mass transportation providers from criminal liability if 
they are performing their duties in the course of lawful and authorized 
activities. In other words, my amendment protects conduct that should 
be protected, but does not protect conduct that should not be protected 
such as terrorist or imposters posing as rail or mass transportation 
employees.
  Mr. Chairman, overall, Congress has taken dramatic steps in the last 
3 years to improve our security here and abroad, but there is more work 
to be accomplished. I strongly urge passage of this amendment to H.R. 
10.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a 10-page amendment with mandatory minimum 
sentences, mandatory sentences of life imprisonment, and a death 
penalty provision. It has not been considered by any subcommittee or 
the full Committee on the Judiciary, and I am not sure it has even been 
considered by the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. We 
have information that the Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure has not considered it and, in fact, may not support it.
  It appears to make, but it is not clear whether conspiracies, 
attempts and threats are subject to the same penalties as the 
underlying offense. Not only have these provisions not been considered 
by the appropriate committees of jurisdiction, but because of the 
mandatory minimum sentences, neither sentencing experts nor judges on 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission who have the responsibility to assure a 
rational and proportional sentencing system, nor any Federal judge who 
would review all the facts and circumstances of the case, will get to 
assess whether or not these sentences make any sense.
  Mr. Chairman, I remind my colleagues that the Judicial Conference has 
written a letter saying that these mandatory minimums violate common 
sense, and yet here we are asked to decide in a 5-minute debate whether 
or not they are appropriate in this case.
  Mr. Chairman, the author of the amendment indicates that we are 
trying to conform one code section to another. I would ask that we do 
that when we consider the code sections. We are going to consider the 
PATRIOT Act. That is one of the code sections involved. And the time to 
consider the PATRIOT Act and amending the PATRIOT Act is when we have 
the PATRIOT Act before us; not when we are doing a reorganization bill 
without any serious committee of jurisdiction considering the 
underlying amendment.
  I say again, Mr. Chairman, when we have death penalty, that makes 
life complicated from an international point of view. We may have 
terrorists who are caught in another country. We cannot get them 
extradited because of all of these death penalties and we need to 
consider that.
  We have heard that the Shoe Bomber was complicated as to which code 
section he was under. We have an easy case for attempted murder, plain 
and simple. It gives life imprisonment. Certainly the death penalty, if 
he had completed the act, would not have made any sense. The death 
penalty for a suicide bomber is obviously not going to be much of a 
deterrent.
  Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we would consider all the 
implications and not adopt this amendment at this time.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mrs. CAPITO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the comments of the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Scott). I would like to say that in working through this 
amendment, we did work with the Committee on the Judiciary and the 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. We are also trying to 
reform an act here, the 1940 Wrecking Trains statute, that is sorely 
outdated and full of gaps. When it was conceived, there was no 
conception of a terrorist bombing on mass transportation. I think we 
know, obviously from the events in Spain, that that is a very real 
possibility in terms of acts of terrorism.
  Mr. Chairman, the purpose of my amendment is to not only pull that 
1940s Wrecking Train statute into the modern era, but also to combine 
it with other mass transportation sections so that not only the 
deterrent but the prosecutorial powers are available to our prosecutors 
to be able to use the most stringent and severe punishments that could 
possibly be available to try to use as a deterrent to terrorism.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
  Mr. Chairman, in 2001, we considered this provision when we put it in 
the PATRIOT Act. It was inconsistent with an older version. We need to 
consider whether we want to conform the law to the newer version or to 
the older version. That is why we have committees, so we can assess 
what the appropriate punishment is.
  Mr. Chairman, 5-minute debates on the floor without committee 
consideration does not give us that opportunity. I would hope that we 
would delay consideration of this by defeating the amendment and 
consider the issue when we do the PATRIOT Act.
  Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gentlewoman from West Virginia whether 
or not conspiracies, attempts, and threats are subject to the same 
penalties as the underlying offense.

                              {time}  1000

  Mrs. CAPITO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. I yield to the gentlewoman from West Virginia.
  Mrs. CAPITO. I think there is a lot of prosecutorial discretion in 
the bill, and I think that would probably be left up to the prosecutor.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Reclaiming my time, I would say again, you 
have mandatory minimums in the bill which would not give anybody any 
flexibility, and if a conspiracy attempt and threat are subject to the 
same mandatory minimums as actually completing the crime, that would be 
something that we would want to consider. It is just not clear.
  If the gentlewoman wants time to respond, I will give her time.
  Mrs. CAPITO. In terms of the death penalty, I think that is 
definitely at the discretion of the prosecutor, and there are two sets 
of offenses there. One is a 20-year and one is a 30-year minimum, and I 
think that is also at the discretion of the prosecutors. That is my 
understanding.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Reclaiming my time, I would hope we would 
defeat the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kolbe). All time has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from West 
Virginia (Mrs. Capito).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mrs. 
Capito) having assumed the chair, Mr. Kolbe, Chairman pro tempore of 
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported 
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 10) 
to provide for reform of the intelligence community, terrorism 
prevention and prosecution, border security, and international 
cooperation and coordination, and for other purposes, had come to no 
resolution thereon.

                          ____________________


Congressional Record: October 8, 2004 (House)
Page H8874-H8894                      



 
                9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION ACT

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, 
H.R. 10.

                              {time}  1002


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of 
the bill (H.R. 10) to provide for reform of the intelligence community, 
terrorism prevention and prosecution, border security, and 
international cooperation and coordination, and for other purposes, 
with Mr. Kolbe (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the committee of the whole rose 
earlier today, amendment No. 7 printed in House Report 108-751 by the 
gentlewoman from West Virginia (Mrs. Capito) had been disposed of.
  Pursuant to the order of the House of today, it shall be in order at 
any time for the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence or a designee to offer amendments en bloc consisting of 
any of the amendment numbers 9, 16, 18, 20, and 22 printed in House 
report 108-751.
  The amendments en bloc shall be considered read, shall be debatable 
for 10 minutes, equally divided and controlled by the chairman and the 
ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence or their designees, shall not be subject to amendment, and 
shall not be subject to a demand for a division of the question.
  The original proponent of the amendment included in the amendments en 
bloc may insert a statement in the Congressional Record immediately 
before disposition of the amendments en bloc.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 printed in House 
Report 108-751.


                 Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Carter

  Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 8 offered by Mr. Carter:
       At the end of title II insert the following:

        Subtitle J--Terrorist Penalties Enhancement Act of 2004

     SEC. 2221. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Terrorist Penalties 
     Enhancement Act of 2004''.

     SEC. 2222. PENALTIES FOR TERRORIST OFFENSES RESULTING IN 
                   DEATH; DENIAL OF FEDERAL BENEFITS TO 
                   TERRORISTS.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 113B of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 2339E. Terrorist offenses resulting in death

       ``(a) Whoever, in the course of committing a terrorist 
     offense, engages in conduct that results in the death of a 
     person, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term 
     of years or for life.
       ``(b) As used in this section, the term `terrorist offense' 
     means--
       ``(1) a Federal felony offense that is--
       ``(A) a Federal crime of terrorism as defined in section 
     2332b(g) except to the extent such crime is an offense under 
     section 1363; or
       ``(B) an offense under this chapter, section 175, 175b, 
     229, or 831, or section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; 
     or
       ``(2) a Federal offense that is an attempt or conspiracy to 
     commit an offense described in paragraph (1).

     ``Sec. 2339F. Denial of Federal benefits to terrorists

       ``(a) An individual or corporation who is convicted of a 
     terrorist offense (as defined in section 2339E) shall, as 
     provided by the court on motion of the Government, be 
     ineligible for any or all Federal benefits for any term of 
     years or for life.
       ``(b) As used in this section, the term `Federal benefit' 
     has the meaning given that term in section 421(d) of the 
     Controlled Substances Act, and also includes any assistance 
     or benefit described in section 115(a) of the Personal 
     Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
     1996, with the same limitations and to the same extent as 
     provided in section 115 of that Act with respect to denials 
     of benefits and assistance to which that section applies.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment to Table of Sections.--The table 
     of sections at the beginning of the chapter 113B of title 18, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new items:

``2339E. Terrorist offenses resulting in death.
``2339F. Denial of federal benefits to terrorists.''.

       (c) Aggravating Factor in Death Penalty Cases.--Section 
     3592(c)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     inserting ``section 2339E (terrorist offenses resulting in 
     death),'' after ``destruction),''.

     SEC. 2223. DEATH PENALTY IN CERTAIN AIR PIRACY CASES 
                   OCCURRING BEFORE ENACTMENT OF THE FEDERAL DEATH 
                   PENALTY ACT OF 1994.

       Section 60003 of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
     Enforcement Act of 1994, (Public Law 103-322), is amended, as 
     of the time of its enactment, by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(c) Death Penalty Procedures for Certain Previous 
     Aircraft Piracy Violations.--An individual convicted of 
     violating section 46502 of title 49, United States Code, or 
     its predecessor, may be sentenced to death in accordance with 
     the procedures established in chapter 228 of title 18, United 
     States Code, if for any offense committed before the 
     enactment of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
     Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-322), but after the enactment of 
     the Antihijacking Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-366), it is 
     determined by the finder of fact, before consideration of the 
     factors set forth in sections 3591(a)(2) and 3592(a) and (c) 
     of title 18, United States Code, that one or more of the 
     factors set forth in former section 46503(c)(2) of title 49, 
     United States Code, or its predecessor, has been proven by 
     the Government to exist, beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
     none of the factors set forth in former section 46503(c)(1) 
     of title 49, United States Code, or its predecessor, has been 
     proven by the defendant to exist, by a preponderance of the 
     information. The meaning of the term `especially heinous, 
     cruel, or depraved', as used in the factor set forth in 
     former section 46503(c)(2)(B)(iv) of title 49, United States 
     Code, or its predecessor, shall be narrowed by adding the 
     limiting language `in that it involved torture or serious 
     physical abuse to the victim', and shall be construed as when 
     that term is used in section 3592(c)(6) of title 18, United 
     States Code.''
       Conform the table of sections accordingly.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Carter) and a Member opposed each will 
control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Carter).
  Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, today I offer an amendment, the Terrorist Penalties 
Enhancements Act, which will provide new and expanded penalties to 
those who commit fatal acts of terrorism.
  Since September 11, Federal and State officials continue to work hard 
to prevent further terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. However, despite 
some changes to the law to increase penalties after deadly terrorist 
attacks, a jury is still denied the ability to consider a death 
sentence or life imprisonment for a terrorist in many cases, even when 
the attacks result in death and the court believes it is necessary to 
prevent further harm to our citizens.
  For example, in the case in which a terrorist causes massive loss of 
life by sabotaging a nuclear power plant or a national defense 
installation, there would be no possibility of imposing the death 
penalty under the statutes defining these offenses because they contain

[[Page H8875]]

no death penalty authorizations. In contrast, dozens of other Federal 
violent crime provisions authorize up to life imprisonment or the death 
penalty in cases where victims are killed. Because the potential 
tragedy here is so great, we must hope that changing this law to allow 
a sentence of death or life imprisonment will serve as a deterrent to 
would-be terrorists. It is one more tool in our arsenal.
  Mr. Chairman, hearings have been held on this straightforward 
legislation, and it has been agreed to by the House Committee on the 
Judiciary. It will make terrorists who kill eligible for the Federal 
death penalty. This legislation will also deny these same terrorists 
any Federal benefits they otherwise may have been eligible to receive. 
These Federal benefits denied include Social Security, welfare, 
unemployment and food stamps.
  As a former State District Judge for over 20 years, I have presided 
over five capital murders trials, three of which resulted in the death 
penalty. I understand the gravity of seeking and imposing the death 
penalty. However, from my experience, I believe the death penalty is a 
tool that can deter acts of terrorism and can serve as a tool for 
prosecutors when negotiating sentences.
  I am pleased that President George Bush expressed his support for 
this legislation. In a speech to the FBI Academy, President Bush said, 
``For the sake of American people, Congress should change the law and 
give law enforcement officials the same tools they have to fight terror 
that they have to fight other crime.''
  In Hershey, Pennsylvania, President Bush reemphasized the inequity in 
current law. President Bush said, ``We ought to be sending a strong 
signal: If you sabotage a defense installation or a nuclear facility in 
a way that takes an innocent life, you ought to get the death penalty, 
the Federal death penalty.''
  This legislation today puts all would-be terrorists on notice that 
they will receive ultimate justice should they decide to plan and 
execute a future attack.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, this bill creates 23 new death penalties, making all 
Federal crimes of terrorism punishable by death. We would remind people 
that a 23-year study of over 4,500 death penalty cases found reversible 
error in 68 percent of the cases. We suspect that approximately 100 
people in the last 10 years have been wrongfully executed. This burden 
falls disproportionately on minorities.
  So when you talk about a strong signal, the signal, I guess, is you 
put people to death because, well, they might have been guilty. We know 
in the end the death penalty will not deter suicide bombers from 
completing their crimes. Furthermore, we have the problem of 
international law, the fact that most countries in the world, 
particularly our allies, do not have the death penalty and will not 
extradite criminals to the United States if they will be subject to the 
death penalty.
  One of the problems with the Federal crimes of terrorism is that it 
is somewhat vague. It could include some kind of a political protest. 
The death could occur by accident. It was not even intended. Somebody 
got trampled in the protest, for example, and here you are talking 
about the death penalty. But because it includes not only completing 
the crime and killing somebody, it includes support for someone. You 
might want to rename this the ``Put Mama to Death Bill.'' If a mother 
harbors her son, lets him stay at home, she would then become and 
everybody in the family becomes subject to the death penalty.
  Mr. Chairman, this has nothing to do with reorganization of the 
intelligence community. I would hope that we would reserve judgment on 
this and consider this bill and others when we consider the Patriot 
Act.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Green).
  Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, it is simple. We must do 
everything we can to stop terrorists, and that starts with ensuring 
that all terrorist acts are punished swiftly and severely. This 
amendment sends a clear message that we take terrorism seriously; that 
we understand that terrorist acts are not really crimes, they are 
combat; that on 9/11 we were not merely assaulted, we were invaded; and 
when there is combat, when terrorists invade our soil in deadly 
fashion, we will punish those responsible with the heaviest possible 
penalties. To do less would be a disservice to those who have lost 
their lives and would send a signal of softness to those who still seek 
our destruction.
  I was proud to work with the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Carter) on 
this subject. I commend him for carrying it forward. It is important 
work. It is good work that he is doing. I urge my colleagues to support 
this amendment.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I would point out that we will be considering the 
Patriot Act. I would hope that we would consider this legislation as 
part of that.
  Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back 
the balance of my time.
  Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Carter).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Carter) will be postponed.


               Amendment En Bloc Offered By Mr. Hoekstra

  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to the unanimous consent 
agreement, I offer the amendments en bloc.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendments en 
bloc.
  The text of the amendments en bloc is as follows:

       Amendments en bloc offered by Mr. Hoekstra consisting of 
     amendments numbered 9, 16, 18, 20 and 22:

                 Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Castle

       At the end of the bill, insert the following new section:

     SEC. 5__. REMOVAL OF CIVIL LIABILITY BARRIERS THAT DISCOURAGE 
                   THE DONATION OF FIRE EQUIPMENT TO VOLUNTEER 
                   FIRE COMPANIES.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Good 
     Samaritan Volunteer Firefighter Assistance Act of 2004''.
       (b) Liability Protection.--A person who donates fire 
     control or fire rescue equipment to a volunteer fire company 
     shall not be liable for civil damages under any State or 
     Federal law for personal injuries, property damage or loss, 
     or death proximately caused by the equipment after the 
     donation.
       (c) Exceptions.--Subsection (b) does not apply to a person 
     if--
       (1) the person's act or omission proximately causing the 
     injury, damage, loss, or death constitutes gross negligence 
     or intentional misconduct; or
       (2) the person is the manufacturer of the fire control or 
     fire rescue equipment.
       (d) Preemption.--This section preempts the laws of any 
     State to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with this 
     section, except that notwithstanding subsection (c) this 
     section shall not preempt any State law that provides 
     additional protection from liability for a person who donates 
     fire control or fire rescue equipment to a volunteer fire 
     company.
       (e) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Person.--The term ``person'' includes any governmental 
     or other entity.
       (2) Fire control or rescue equipment.--The term ``fire 
     control or fire rescue equipment'' includes any fire vehicle, 
     fire fighting tool, communications equipment, protective 
     gear, fire hose, or breathing apparatus.
       (3) State.--The term ``State'' includes the several States, 
     the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
     the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, American 
     Samoa, Guam, the Virgin Islands, any other territory or 
     possession of the United States, and any political 
     subdivision of any such State, territory, or possession.
       (4) Volunteer fire company.--The term ``volunteer fire 
     company'' means an association of individuals who provide 
     fire protection and other emergency services, where at least 
     30 percent of the individuals receive little or no 
     compensation compared with an entry level full-time paid 
     individual in that

[[Page H8876]]

     association or in the nearest such association with an entry 
     level full-time paid individual.
       (f) Effective Date.--This section applies only to liability 
     for injury, damage, loss, or death caused by equipment that, 
     for purposes of subsection (b), is donated on or after the 
     date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.
       (g) Attorney General Review.--
       (1) In general.--The Attorney General of the United States 
     shall conduct a State-by-State review of the donation of 
     firefighter equipment to volunteer firefighter companies 
     during the 5-year period ending on the date of the enactment 
     of this Act.
       (2) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Attorney General of the United 
     States shall publish and submit to the Congress a report on 
     the results of the review conducted under paragraph (1). The 
     report shall include, for each State, the most effective way 
     to fund firefighter companies, whether first responder 
     funding is sufficient to respond to the Nation's needs, and 
     the best method to ensure that the equipment donated to 
     volunteer firefighter companies is in usable condition.
                                  ____


            Amendment No. 16 Offered by Mr. Barton of Texas

       After section 5010 insert the following new section:

     SEC. 5011. DIGITAL TELEVISION CONVERSION DEADLINE.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
       (1) Congress granted television broadcasters additional 6 
     MHz blocks of spectrum to transmit digital broadcasts 
     simultaneously with the analog broadcasts they transmit on 
     their original 6 megahertz blocks of spectrum.
       (2) Section 309(j)(14) of the Communications Act of 1934 
     requires each television broadcaster to cease analog 
     transmissions and return 6 megahertz of spectrum by December 
     31, 2006, or once just over 85 percent of the television 
     households in that broadcaster's market can view digital 
     broadcast television channels using a digital television, a 
     digital-to-analog-converter box, cable service, or satellite 
     service, whichever is later.
       (3) Twenty-four megahertz of spectrum currently occupied by 
     the television broadcasters has been earmarked for use by 
     first responders once the television broadcasters return the 
     spectrum broadcasters currently use to provide analog 
     transmissions.
       (4) This spectrum would be ideal to provide first 
     responders with interoperable communications channels.
       (5) Large parts of the vacated spectrum could be auctioned 
     for advanced commercial services, such as wireless broadband.
       (6) The ``85-percent penetration test'' could delay the 
     termination of analog television broadcasts and the return of 
     spectrum well beyond 2007, hindering the use of that spectrum 
     for these important public-safety and advanced commercial 
     uses.
       (7) Proposals to require broadcasters to return, on a date 
     certain, just the spectrum earmarked for future public-safety 
     use would not adequately resolve the identified need for 
     improved public-safety communications interoperability. 
     Broadcasters estimate that the public-safety only approach 
     would dislocate as many as 75 stations, including some in 
     major markets, airing major network programming, sometimes 
     even in digital form. Unless broadcasters are required to 
     return concurrently all the spectrum currently used for 
     analog transmissions, it will be exceedingly difficult to 
     relocate these 75 stations, which also serve a critical 
     public safety function by broadcasting weather, traffic, 
     disaster, and other safety alerts.
       (8) Proposals to require broadcasters to return, on a date 
     certain, just the spectrum earmarked for future public-safety 
     use also would neither address the digital television 
     transition in a comprehensive fashion nor free valuable 
     spectrum for advanced commercial services.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--Now, therefore, it is the sense of 
     Congress that section 309(j)(14) of the Communications Act of 
     1934 should be amended to eliminate the 85-percent 
     penetration test and to require broadcasters to cease analog 
     transmissions at the close of December 31, 2006, so that the 
     spectrum can be returned and repurposed for important public-
     safety and advanced commercial uses.
                                  ____


                Amendment No. 18 Offered by Mr. Fossella

       Page 606, after line 17, insert the following (and 
     redesignate the subsequent subsections accordingly):
       (d) Multi-Year Interoperability Grants.--
       (1) Multi-year commitments.--In awarding grants to any 
     State, region, local government, or Indian tribe for the 
     purposes of enhancing interoperable communications 
     capabilities for emergency response providers, the Secretary 
     may commit to obligate Federal assistance beyond the current 
     fiscal year, subject to the limitations and restrictions in 
     this subsection.
       (2) Restrictions.--
       (A) Time limit.--No multi-year interoperability commitment 
     may exceed 3 years in duration.
       (B) Amount of committed funds.--The total amount of 
     assistance the Secretary has committed to obligate for any 
     future fiscal year under paragraph (1) may not exceed 
     $150,000,000.
       (3) Letters of intent.--
       (A) Issuance.--Pursuant to paragraph (1), the Secretary may 
     issue a letter of intent to an applicant committing to 
     obligate from future budget authority an amount, not more 
     than the Federal Government's share of the project's cost, 
     for an interoperability communications project (including 
     interest costs and costs of formulating the project).
       (B) Schedule.--A letter of intent under this paragraph 
     shall establish a schedule under which the Secretary will 
     reimburse the applicant for the Federal Government's share of 
     the project's costs, as amounts become available, if the 
     applicant, after the Secretary issues the letter, carries out 
     the project before receiving amounts under a grant issued by 
     the Secretary.
       (C) Notice to secretary.--An applicant that is issued a 
     letter of intent under this subsection shall notify the 
     Secretary of the applicant's intent to carry out a project 
     pursuant to the letter before the project begins.
       (D) Notice to congress.--The Secretary shall transmit a 
     written notification to the Congress no later than 3 days 
     before the issuance of a letter of intent under this section.
       (E) Limitations.--A letter of intent issued under this 
     section is not an obligation of the Government under section 
     1501 of title 31, United States Code, and is not deemed to be 
     an administrative commitment for financing. An obligation or 
     administrative commitment may be made only as amounts are 
     provided in authorization and appropriations laws.
       (F) Statutory construction.--Nothing in this subsection 
     shall be construed--
       (i) to prohibit the obligation of amounts pursuant to a 
     letter of intent under this subsection in the same fiscal 
     year as the letter of intent is issued; or
       (ii) to apply to, or replace, Federal assistance intended 
     for interoperable communications that is not provided 
     pursuant to a commitment under this subsection.
       (e) Interoperable Communications Plans.--Any applicant 
     requesting funding assistance from the Secretary for 
     interoperable communications for emergency response providers 
     shall submit an Interoperable Communications Plan to the 
     Secretary for approval. Such a plan shall--
       (1) describe the current state of communications 
     interoperability in the applicable jurisdictions among 
     Federal, State, and local emergency response providers and 
     other relevant private resources;
       (2) describe the available and planned use of public safety 
     frequency spectrum and resources for interoperable 
     communications within such jurisdictions;
       (3) describe how the planned use of spectrum and resources 
     for interoperable communications is compatible with 
     surrounding capabilities and interoperable communications 
     plans of Federal, State, and local governmental entities, 
     military installations, foreign governments, critical 
     infrastructure, and other relevant entities;
       (4) include a 5-year plan for the dedication of Federal, 
     State, and local government and private resources to achieve 
     a consistent, secure, and effective interoperable 
     communications system, including planning, system design and 
     engineering, testing and technology development, procurement 
     and installation, training, and operations and maintenance; 
     and
       (5) describe how such 5-year plan meets or exceeds any 
     applicable standards and grant requirements established by 
     the Secretary.
                                  ____


                  Amendment No. 20 Offered by Mr. Mica

       Page 198, after line 22, insert the following (and 
     redesignate subsequent subparagraphs of the quoted matter 
     accordingly):
       ``(D) Prescreening international passengers.--Not later 
     than 60 days after date of enactment of this subparagraph, 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the designee of the 
     Secretary, shall issue a notice of proposed rulemaking that 
     will allow the Department of Homeland Security to compare 
     passenger name records for any international flight to or 
     from the United States against the consolidated and 
     integrated terrorist watchlist maintained by the Federal 
     Government before departure of the flight.
       Page 199, strike lines 17 through 22 and insert the 
     following:
       ``(F) Appeal procedures.--
       ``(i) In general.--The Assistant Secretary shall establish 
     a timely and fair process for individuals identified as a 
     threat under one or more of subparagraphs (C), (D), and (E) 
     to appeal to the Transportation Security Administration the 
     determination and correct any erroneous information.
       ``(ii) Records.--The process shall include the 
     establishment of a method by which the Assistant Secretary 
     will be able to maintain a record of air passengers who have 
     been misidentified and have corrected erroneous information. 
     To prevent repeated delays of misidentified passengers, the 
     Transportation Security Administration record shall contain 
     information determined by the Assistant Secretary to 
     authenticate the identity of such a passenger.
       Page 203, lines 5 and 6, strike ``explosive detection 
     systems'' and insert ``explosive detection devices''.
       Page 203, line 9, insert ``backscatter x-ray scanners,'' 
     after ``shoe scanners,''.
       Page 213, after line 9, insert the following (and conform 
     the table of contents of the bill accordingly):

[[Page H8877]]

     SEC. 2188. IN-LINE CHECKED BAGGAGE SCREENING.

       The Secretary of Homeland Security shall take such action 
     as may be necessary to expedite the installation and use of 
     advanced in-line baggage-screening equipment at commercial 
     airports.
       Page 213, line 10, redesignate section 2188 of the bill as 
     section 2189 and conform the table of contents of the bill 
     accordingly.
                                  ____


                Amendment No. 22 Offered by Mr. Shadegg

       In title V, at the end of chapter 3 of subtitle H (page 
     609, after line 21) add the following:

     SEC. __. PILOT STUDY TO MOVE WARNING SYSTEMS INTO THE MODERN 
                   DIGITAL AGE.

       (a) Pilot Study.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, from 
     funds available for improving the national system to notify 
     the general public in the event of a terrorist attack, and in 
     consultation with the Attorney General and the heads of other 
     appropriate Federal agencies, the National Association of 
     State Chief Information Officers, and other stakeholders with 
     respect to public warning systems, shall conduct a pilot 
     study under which the Secretary may issue public warnings 
     regarding threats to homeland security using a warning system 
     that is similar to the AMBER Alert communications network.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 9 months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the 
     Congress a report regarding the findings, conclusions, and 
     recommendations of the pilot study.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House earlier 
today, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and the gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Harman) or her designee each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra).
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
  This en bloc amendment has been agreed to in a bipartisan fashion 
which supports the amendments that have been offered by the gentleman 
from Delaware (Mr. Castle), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Barton), the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Fossella), the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Mica) and the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Shadegg).
  I encourage my colleagues to support this en bloc amendment and move 
the process forward.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to claim 
the time in opposition to the amendments.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Virginia?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  There is one bill, the firefighters bill, that is in here, we 
considered that, and we had a debate on it. I just want to incorporate 
by reference the problems with that legislation. It is not necessary 
because firefighters can receive gifts, and if they want to immunize 
the donor, they can do that under present law.
  Furthermore, the answer to giving firefighters more equipment is in 
funding first responders equipment, rather than tort reform. So I would 
hope that we would consider that as we consider the en bloc amendments.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Delaware (Mr. Castle), a former member of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence.
  (Mr. CASTLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence for yielding me time.
  This is sort of like a deja vu discussion, that the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Scott) and I have had this discussion before. I feel this 
legislation is necessary. There are some States that have waived the 
liability provisions to allow corporations to make donations of 
equipment to fire companies without liability, which is very, very 
important. A lot of these companies have very good and new equipment, 
hardly used because their fire needs are not as great as regular fire 
companies. They are willing to make this donation, but they are 
reluctant to do so because of the liability issues.

                              {time}  1015

  A few States have waived those provisions but others have not. We 
simply would allow this throughout this country. I cannot imagine 
anything that is more dutiful or more beneficial to fighting fires in 
this country than this.
  So he opposed this before, and I said at the time, I hope he is the 
only one who is opposing this, and, he almost was. There were three 
people who opposed it. It carried by 397 to 3. Obviously, it has to do 
with what we are dealing with in this country in terms of terrorism, in 
terms of the problems of dealing with security in the United States of 
America, intelligence and all those other areas. Quite frankly, it is 
something that a lot of people want to get done, but we have got to 
find the vehicle for it, and this is a proper vehicle.
  It was unopposed and that is the reason it was put in the en bloc 
amendment, agreed to by Members on both sides of the aisle. My sense is 
this is something that each and every one of us should be supporting so 
that both our rural and our urban fire departments can take advantage 
of this particular type of law and have emergency vehicles and other 
equipment donated to them without that concern of liability.
  I would hope that his concerns about that, which he has expressed, 
would not lead to opposition to the en bloc amendment and, hopefully, 
ultimately, the passage of this, and we will all be protected.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CASTLE. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, as the gentleman from Delaware 
has indicated, we have had this debate before, and I would just point 
out that my concerns with parts of the amendment are outweighed by the 
support of the other provisions in the other bills in the bloc. So I 
will not be opposing the bloc.
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of my amendment to H.R. 10 
which is identical to legislation I introduced, H.R. 1787, the ``Good 
Samaritan Volunteer Firefighter Assistance Act.'' On September 14 this 
legislation overwhelming passed the U.S. House of Representatives 397 
to 3.
  My amendment removes a barrier which currently prevents some 
organizations from donating surplus fire fighting equipment to fire 
departments in need. Under current law, the threat of civil liability 
has caused some organizations to destroy fire equipment, rather than 
donating it to volunteer, rural and other financially-strapped 
departments.
  We know that every day, across the United States, firefighters 
respond to calls for help. We are grateful that these brave men and 
women work to save our lives and protect our homes and businesses. We 
may presume that our firefighters work in departments with the latest 
and best firefighting and protective equipment. When in reality there 
are an estimated 30,000 firefighters who risk their lives daily due to 
a lack of basic Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).
  In both rural and urban fire departments, limited budgets make it 
difficult to purchase more than fuel and minimum maintenance. At the 
same time, certain industries are constantly improving and updating the 
fire protection equipment to take advantage of new, state-of-the-art 
innovation. Sometimes, the surplus equipment has never been used to put 
out a single fire. Sadly, the threat of civil liability causes many 
organizations to destroy, rather than donate, millions of dollars of 
quality fire equipment.
  Not only do volunteer fire departments provide an indispensable 
service, some estimates indicate that the nearly 800,000 volunteer 
firefighters nationwide save state and local governments $36.8 billion 
a year. Of the 26,000 fire departments in the United States, more than 
19,000 are all volunteers and another 3,800 are mostly volunteer.
  Ten states: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana, 
Missouri, New York, South Carolina and Texas have passed similar 
legislation. In the seven years of the Texas program more than $12 
million worth of firefighter equipment has been donated and given to 
needy departments--this includes nearly 70 emergency vehicles, more 
than 1,500 piece of communications equipment. In total more than 33,000 
items have been donated.
  Congress can respond to the needs of fire companies by removing civil 
liability barriers. Equipping our nation's first responders is 
essential as we fight the war on terror and I am

[[Page H8878]]

hopeful the esteemed Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and my 
colleagues will again join me in supporting this measure.
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this amendment 
sponsored by the Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. 
This Sense of Congress sets out the right approach for this nation to 
move toward the digital television transition and return much-needed 
spectrum for public-safety and advanced commercial purposes, such as 
wireless broadband. The Congress, the Federal Communications 
Commission, as well as the telecommunications industry have spent 
valuable time and money for the advancement of the transition. A hard 
date will bring certainty to all those involved in this transition.
  The Senate, in its just passed National Intelligence Reform bill, 
included a 2008 hard deadline for broadcasters to vacate only portions 
of the 700 MHz spectrum reserved for public safety. I do not believe 
this is the correct approach, nor do I believe that it adequately 
solves the public safety issue.
  I commend the Chairman for his amendment and I look forward to our 
continued work as we move from an analog to a digital world.
  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Amendment offered by 
my colleague and good friend, Mr. Shadegg of Arizona.
  Mr. Shadegg is a distinguished Member of the Select Committee on 
Homeland Security and ably serves as Chairman of its Subcommittee on 
Emergency Preparedness & Response.
  Under Chairman Shadegg's leadership, the EP&R Subcommittee recently 
held a very informative and eye-opening hearing on the state of our 
Nation's warning and alert system.
  The Amendment that he is offering today is the product of that 
excellent hearing.
  I commend Chairman Shadegg for his foresight in recognizing the 
importance of emergency warnings and alerts, and for his leadership in 
offering this important Amendment.
  It is simply imperative that our Nation maintain and operate an 
effective emergency communication system. It is our responsibility to 
ensure that our citizens receive sufficient and timely warnings to 
enable them to take action necessary for their safety--whether the 
cause is a terrorist attack or a force of nature.
  This Amendment authorizes a pilot study examining whether a system 
like the AMBER Alert network should, and can, be used for emergency 
warnings and alerts. The AMBER Alert network, which provides actionable 
intelligence on a geographic basis to help identify and track missing 
children, is a proven success. This Amendment is certainly worthy of 
our support.
  Let me again commend Chairman Shadegg. And I urge my colleagues to 
vote ``yes'' on the Shadegg Amendment.
  Mr. GARY G. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of 
the Mica amendment, which will go a long way in making certain our 
skies are safe and free of terrorism.
  I would like to focus my comments on important provisions in this 
amendment that will help ensure the civil liberties of all of America's 
citizens are protected during this war on terrorism. I thank Aviation 
Subcommittee Chairman Mica for including this language in his 
amendment, which I had submitted to the Rules Committee as a separate 
amendment.
  There is no question that we should be vigilant in our fight against 
terrorism or that increased security measures will serve to 
inconvenience some of our citizens. However, forcing certain law-
abiding citizens to be repeatedly detained and questioned each time 
they travel should not be tolerated.
  This amendment will establish a process for the Transportation 
Security Administration to ensure those passengers who are erroneously 
flagged under its new pre-screening system are not unnecessarily 
delayed on future flights.
  To illustrate the importance of addressing this issue, I would like 
to highlight an example of a family in my district who has been 
repeatedly delayed when traveling.
  The most recent case occurred this summer, when returning from an 
oversees trip. The family was met by officials as they deplaned and 
escorted to a holding room at JFK Airport. During their detainment, 
officials thoroughly inspected the family's luggage and would not even 
allow them to go to the restroom without escort. The family was 
extensively questioned about their background and employment.
  It took over three hours for the officials to clear and release the 
family. Unfortunately, the long delay caused them to miss their 
connecting flight to California.
  According to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, this family was 
delayed due to the nature of our law enforcement databases, which can 
give rise to ``near matches'' and ``tentative hits,'' resulting in 
misidentification scenarios.
  This was not the first time this family was delayed because of the 
similarity of their name to names that appear on watch lists. 
Unfortunately, according to the Department of Homeland Security, it 
will not be the last--the family should expect similar detainment in 
the future because of this shortcoming in our law enforcement 
databases.
  Some of you might say that this is the price American citizens of 
Middle-Eastern descent must pay to ensure safety in our skies.
  But we must ask ourselves--how do we protect those unfortunate 
Americans, who share names that are similar to dangerous people on 
terrorist watch lists, from being effectively denied the ability to 
fly?
  There is no question that we must encourage our security officials to 
be vigilant. But, it is reasonable to expect that the Transportation 
Security Administration be able to maintain their watch lists to ensure 
that the system does not continue to erroneously flag the same law-
abiding citizens every time they try to travel on a plane.
  I believe this can be done in a way that maintains aviation security, 
improves the effectiveness of watch lists, and demonstrates to our 
fellow Americans of Middle-Eastern descent that America affords the 
same freedoms and opportunities to all of its law-abiding citizens, 
even during this war on terrorism.
  Specifically, this amendment will: establish a timely and fair 
process for individuals identified as a threat to appeal the 
determination and correct any erroneous information; include a method 
by which TSA will be able to maintain a record of air passengers who 
have been misidentified; and prevent repeated delays of misidentified 
passengers by ensuring the record contain information determined by TSA 
to authenticate the identity of such a passenger.
  As we work toward policies that secure our homeland, we must not 
forget that there are U.S. citizens who are of Middle Eastern descent. 
They have greatly contributed to American society and are deserving of 
equal treatment under the Constitution of the United States.
  These various cultures and races became citizens of the United States 
just as our ancestors did, and they are our neighbors, co-workers, 
friends, and family members. Most of all, they are our fellow 
Americans.
  It is unfortunate that these Americans have been forced to bear the 
brunt of our increased security.
  In the past, when American law enforcement confronted challenges to 
our safety and security from espionage, drug trafficking and organized 
crime, we were able to meet those challenges in ways that preserved our 
fundamental freedoms and civil liberties.
  We must meet the challenge of terrorism with this same careful regard 
for the Constitutional rights of Americans and respect for all human 
beings.
  Last week, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee 
unanimously approved these provisions and I ask my colleagues to 
support this amendment today.
  Mr. UPTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Barton Amendment.
  Part of the spectrum which the broadcasters are to return at the end 
of the DTV transition has been earmarked for public safety 
interoperable radio communications. The tragic events of 9/11 
underscore the need for this, and that is why we must move with 
deliberate speed to complete the transition.
  But moving with deliberate speed does not mean moving recklessly, and 
it does not mean grasping at well-intentioned half-measures that would 
either cause scores of television stations to literally go dark or 
would actually set us back in our efforts to get spectrum into the 
hands of public safety because they are riddled with ill-defined 
exceptions.
  Moreover, we need to consider consumers' analog television sets which 
could go dark once broadcasters cease analog broadcasts--if we do not 
take care to do this right. Helping public safety and minimizing 
consumer disruptions need not be mutually goals.
  I support the Barton amendment because it says that we should impose 
a hard-date for the end of the entire transition as part of a 
comprehensive digital television transition bill to be enacted next 
Congress. I look forward to working in the Energy and Commerce 
Committee next Congress on this and other proposals to minimize 
consumer disruptions, focusing on how to get low-cost digital-to-analog 
converter boxes into the hands of consumers, not to mention other 
policy matters that are relevant to the transition. The Barton 
Amendment signs us up to move--not with reckless abandon--but with 
deliberate speed to ensure that we really get spectrum into the hands 
of public safety in an expeditious fashion.
  I urge all of my colleagues to support the Barton Amendment.
  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Fossella-
Stupak amendment. From the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 to 
the attacks on September 11, 2001, the inability of our first 
responders to communicate adequately and effectively has posed a 
serious obstacle to our Nation's ability to respond to acts of 
terrorism and other emergencies.
  Regrettably, there is no silver bullet or panacea that will enable us 
to attain interoperable

[[Page H8879]]

communications overnight. And, contrary to the good intentions of some 
of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, merely throwing more 
money at the problem or creating new grant programs is not the answer. 
We already have enough programs.
  Indeed, since 2002, the Federal government has awarded more than $1.2 
billion in grant assistance specifically for the purpose of enhancing 
interoperable communications. And, unfortunately, our progress has been 
disappointing. The primary reason for this--according to the Government 
Accountability Office--is that Federal interoperable communications 
grant programs ``present challenges to short- and long-term planning.''
  That is why I rise in support of the Fossella-Stupak Amendment. It 
does not create a new interoperable communications grant program. 
Rather, it gives the Department of Homeland Security much needed 
flexibility to support State and local short- and long-term planning 
for interoperable communications.

  Specifically, under the Fossella-Stupak Amendment, the Department may 
issue Letters of Intent to commit future funding for interoperable 
communications for up to three years. These commitments must be made 
pursuant to existing grant programs.
  States and local governments have been reluctant to invest in 
expensive and complicated communication systems due to uncertainty over 
the availability of Federal funds from year to year. Providing cash-
strapped States and local governments with reasonable assurance that 
multi-year Federal assistance will be available should spur 
comprehensive planning and meaningful investments in communications.
  The Fossella-Stupak Amendment also requires applicants to develop 
multi-year interoperable communication plans. Such plans are essential 
for long-term planning, such as coordinating communications strategies 
with different agencies and neighboring jurisdictions, and for 
preventing funds from being wasted on hastily planned systems.
  I understand that numerous fire service and law enforcement groups, 
State and local government organizations, and other entities 
representing the public safety community played a key role in drafting 
this Amendment. They and I support this Amendment, and so should you.
  I commend Representatives Fossella and Stupak for their leadership 
and vision in offering this important Amendment.
  As Chairman of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, I strongly 
encourage my colleagues to support this Amendment.
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I agree with Chairman Barton that the 
digital television transition has taken too long and that we need to 
quickly get our police officers, firefighters, and other first 
responders an additional 24 megahertz of spectrum to help them safely 
do their jobs. This spectrum, currently occupied by television channels 
63, 64, 68, and 69, is set to be turned over to first responders once 
the stations broadcasting on those channels transition to digital. Can 
the federal government speed this up?
  Some have proposed getting first responders this spectrum more 
quickly by requiring certain broadcasters to return their spectrum by 
the end of 2006. This suggestion, though well intentioned, is a 
simplistic approach to a complex problem. It does not ensure that the 
public safety sector will be ready to use this new spectrum. Also, this 
suggestion, by supplanting certain broadcasters directly, and shutting 
down others to prevent interference, will prevent many consumers from 
receiving important programming such as local news and weather. 
Finally, it will also disproportionately harm the Hispanic community by 
shutting down a number of Spanish-language stations.
  Likewise, the amendment before us today does not reflect the 
complexity of this issue. Although I agree with Chairman Barton that we 
need to speed up the digital transition, the amendment declares that we 
should establish a hard deadline of December 31, 2006, when all analog 
television broadcasts on all channels would cease. Such an absolute 
declaration is premature. It would not allow enough time for affordable 
equipment to come to market or to properly educate consumers about the 
transition. Moreover, it could result in many consumers losing their 
television service. That must not happen.
  Congress needs to address the digital transition issue soon in a 
comprehensive way, addressing, among others, three major issues. First, 
we need to expedite public safety's access to new spectrum and provide 
them with certainty so they know when they will be receiving new 
spectrum. Certainty will allow first responders time to plan how to use 
the spectrum. It will also allow them time to line up the funding 
necessary to make use of the spectrum once it becomes available.
  Second, we need to implement a far-reaching plan to educate consumers 
on what will happen once the digital transition is complete. It is 
important that consumers know when the transition will take place, how 
it will take place, and what it means for them with regard to their 
television viewing.
  Third, consumers should not bear unfair cost burdens, and we need to 
have a program in place to provide subsidies so that no one is left 
behind as the United States transitions to digital television.
  I am pleased that Chairman Barton recognizes the need to tackle these 
issues in a thoughtful and comprehensive way. Unfortunately, I cannot 
support the amendment before us today because it is premature and could 
lead to consumers losing their television service.
  I am confident, however, that regardless of which party controls the 
House next Congress, the Committee on Energy and Commerce will work on 
a bipartisan basis to properly address these issues in a way that will 
speed up the digital transition, provide certainty to public safety 
regarding new spectrum, and protect consumers from losing their 
television service.
  Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, the amendment I have offered makes several 
non-controversial, but important changes:
  First, it prevents a repeat of the ``Cat Stevens'' incident.
  On September 21st, Yusuf Islam, formerly known as Cat Stevens, was 
allowed to board United Flight 919 from London to Washington, DC.
  The plane was hundreds of miles over the Atlantic before it was 
discovered that Mr. Islam was on the terrorist watchlist. Fortunately, 
the plane was diverted to Maine without incident. That plane should 
never have left the ground with Mr. Islam on board.
  My amendment requires DHS to compare the names of international 
passengers to the terrorist watch-lists prior to the flight's 
departure, and it ensures that future flights will not take off with 
known terrorists on board.
  Secondly, my amendment requires TSA to establish an appeal process 
for passengers wrongly placed on terror watchlists.
  It also establishes a process for DHS to track passengers erroneously 
flagged under the Department's new pre-screening system.
  The watchlists are incredibly important tools, but they are far from 
perfect.
  Last week, I learned that several members of Congress, including the 
Chairman of the Transportation Committee, have been prevented from 
boarding airliners because they shared the first and last name of 
someone on the watchlist.
  This provision will ensure that they and others are not unnecessarily 
delayed on future flights.
  Lastly, this amendment directs the Department of Homeland Security to 
take all necessary actions to expedite the installation and use of 
advanced in-line baggage-screening equipment at commercial airports.
  I am disappointed that language to provide innovative non-Federal 
financing for these systems was not included in H.R. 10 due to 
shortsighted CBO scorekeeping.
  However, I do believe the Administration has the authority to pursue 
this approach, and hopefully, this section will encourage them to do 
so.
  We worked closely with members on both sides of the aisle to develop 
this amendment. A similar amendment passed the Transportation Committee 
unanimously last week and I urge all of my colleagues to vote in favor 
of this amendment.
  Mr. PICKERING. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to support the Amendment 
being offered by Mr. Barton, Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee. First, I would like to thank Chairman Barton for his 
leadership on this issue. I agree with Chairman Barton that H.R. 10 is 
not the vehicle by which to effectively transition this precious public 
spectrum to public safety and valuable commercial and non-licensed 
uses. In order to address all issues and concerns, we must take a 
comprehensive approach and develop a comprehensive solution so that our 
first responders receive all the tools they need and the American 
people receive the unimaginable benefits of digital technology. The 
Senate proposal is the wrong approach and I hope we will work to 
accomplish our goal in a more all-inclusive process focusing on all 
broadcast issues. We cannot effectively address the digital transition 
piece by piece. I look forward to working with Chairman Barton on this 
very important issue in order to find a date that is appropriate and 
achievable in order to effectively transition to that new and exciting 
digital age of television that will promote public safety, encourage 
innovation, create jobs, and benefit all Americans.
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, my amendment expresses the sense 
of the Congress that the way to get valuable spectrum promptly into the 
hands of public safety officials without shutting off consumers' 
televisions is to enact comprehensive, hard-deadline digital television 
legislation.
  The Senate-passed 9/11 bill, however, requires the return of only a 
portion of that spectrum, rather than all the spectrum that 
broadcasters are currently using for analog broadcasts. Broadcasters 
estimate that these provisions would shut off as many as 75 stations.

[[Page H8880]]

Many of these broadcasters carry major networks in major markets. 
Because the Senate bill does not require the other broadcasters to 
vacate their analog spectrum, there will be nowhere to relocate these 
75 stations.
  By waiting until the 109th Congress set a date-certain for all 
broadcasters to clear the spectrum they use for analog broadcasts, we 
can turn spectrum over to public safety sooner, and all broadcasters 
will be able to move to their final digital channels. The remaining 
spectrum can be auctioned for advanced commercial services, such as 
wireless broadband. Some of the billions of dollars generated can then 
be used for digital-to-analog converter boxes so that households 
relying on over-the-air analog broadcasts can continue to use their 
analog televisions.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in expressing the Sense of the 
Congress that the responsible policy should be to address this issue 
comprehensively through regular order, not in a piecemeal fashion on a 
bill to implement the 9/11 Commission recommendations. I look forward 
next year to working with Ranking Minority Member Dingell, Subcommittee 
Chairman Upton, and Subcommittee Ranking Minority Member Markey, along 
with all of the Members of the Energy and Commerce Committee, to pass 
hard-deadline legislation. I urge my colleagues to vote for this 
amendment so that public safety gets its needed spectrum without making 
televisions go dark.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, we have no additional speakers, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kolbe). The question is on the 
amendments en bloc offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
Hoekstra).
  The amendments en bloc were agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment 
No. 10 printed in House Report 108-751.


                 Amendment No. 10 Offered by Mr. Foley

  Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. Offered by Mr. Foley:
       Page 328, after line 7, insert the following (and amend the 
     table of contents accordingly)

      Subtitle F--Treatment of Aliens Who Commit Acts of Torture, 
           Extrajudicial Killings, or Other Atrocities Abroad

     SEC. 3121. INADMISSIBILITY AND DEPORTABILITY OF ALIENS WHO 
                   HAVE COMMITTED ACTS OF TORTURE OR EXTRAJUDICIAL 
                   KILLINGS ABROAD.

       (a) Inadmissibility.--Section 212(a)(3)(E) of the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(E)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in clause (ii), by striking ``has engaged in conduct 
     that is defined as genocide for purposes of the International 
     Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide is 
     inadmissible'' and inserting ``ordered, incited, assisted, or 
     otherwise participated in conduct outside the United States 
     that would, if committed in the United States or by a United 
     States national, be genocide, as defined in section 1091(a) 
     of title 18, United States Code, is inadmissible'';
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(iii) Commission of acts of torture or extrajudicial 
     killings.--Any alien who, outside the United States, has 
     committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise 
     participated in the commission of--

       ``(I) any act of torture, as defined in section 2340 of 
     title 18, United States Code; or
       ``(II) under color of law of any foreign nation, any 
     extrajudicial killing, as defined in section 3(a) of the 
     Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (28 U.S.C. 1350 note);

     is inadmissible.''; and
       (3) in the subparagraph heading, by striking ``Participants 
     in nazi persecution or genocide'' and inserting 
     ``Participants in nazi persecution, genocide, or the 
     commission of any act of torture or extrajudicial killing''.
       (b) Deportability.--Section 237(a)(4)(D) of such Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1227(a)(4)(D)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``clause (i) or (ii)'' and inserting 
     ``clause (i), (ii), or (iii)''; and
       (2) in the subparagraph heading, by striking ``Assisted in 
     nazi persecution or engaged in genocide'' and inserting 
     ``Participated in nazi persecution, genocide, or the 
     commission of any act of torture or extrajudicial killing''.
       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply to offenses committed before, on, or after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 3122. INADMISSIBILITY AND DEPORTABILITY OF FOREIGN 
                   GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO HAVE COMMITTED 
                   PARTICULARLY SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS 
                   FREEDOM.

       (a) Ground of Inadmissibility.--Section 212(a)(2)(G) of the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(G)) is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(G) Foreign government officials who have committed 
     particularly severe violations of religious freedom.--Any 
     alien who, while serving as a foreign government official, 
     was responsible for or directly carried out, at any time, 
     particularly severe violations of religious freedom, as 
     defined in section 3 of the International Religious Freedom 
     Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6402), is inadmissible.''.
       (b) Ground of Deportability.--Section 237(a)(4) of the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(4)) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(E) Participated in the commission of severe violations 
     of religious freedom.--Any alien described in section 
     212(a)(2)(G) is deportable.''.

     SEC. 3123. WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY.

       Section 212(d)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1182(d)(3)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``and 3(E)'' and 
     inserting ``and clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (3)(E)''; 
     and
       (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and 3(E)'' and 
     inserting ``and clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (3)(E)''.

     SEC. 3124. BAR TO GOOD MORAL CHARACTER FOR ALIENS WHO HAVE 
                   COMMITTED ACTS OF TORTURE, EXTRAJUDICIAL 
                   KILLINGS, OR SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS 
                   FREEDOM.

       Section 101(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1101(f)) is amended--
       (1) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (8) and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(9) one who at any time has engaged in conduct described 
     in section 212(a)(3)(E) (relating to assistance in Nazi 
     persecution, participation in genocide, or commission of acts 
     of torture or extrajudicial killings) or 212(a)(2)(G) 
     (relating to severe violations of religious freedom).''.

     SEC. 3125. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL 
                   INVESTIGATIONS.

       (a) Amendment of the Immigration and Nationality Act.--
     Section 103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
     1103) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(h)(1) The Attorney General shall establish within the 
     Criminal Division of the Department of Justice an Office of 
     Special Investigations with the authority to detect and 
     investigate, and, where appropriate, to take legal action to 
     denaturalize any alien described in section 212(a)(3)(E).
       ``(2) The Attorney General shall consult with the Secretary 
     of the Department of Homeland Security in making 
     determinations concerning the criminal prosecution or 
     extradition of aliens described in section 212(a)(3)(E).
       ``(3) In determining the appropriate legal action to take 
     against an alien described in section 212(a)(3)(E), 
     consideration shall be given to--
       ``(A) the availability of criminal prosecution under the 
     laws of the United States for any conduct that may form the 
     basis for removal and denaturalization; or
       ``(B) the availability of extradition of the alien to a 
     foreign jurisdiction that is prepared to undertake a 
     prosecution for such conduct.''.
       (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated to 
     the Department of Justice such sums as may be necessary to 
     carry out the additional duties established under section 
     103(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (as added by 
     this subtitle) in order to ensure that the Office of Special 
     Investigations fulfills its continuing obligations regarding 
     Nazi war criminals.
       (2) Availability of funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant 
     to paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until 
     expended.

     SEC. 3126. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary 
     of Homeland Security, shall submit to the Committees on the 
     Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives a 
     report on implementation of this subtitle that includes a 
     description of--
       (1) the procedures used to refer matters to the Office of 
     Special Investigations and other components within the 
     Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security 
     in a manner consistent with the amendments made by this 
     subtitle;
       (2) the revisions, if any, made to immigration forms to 
     reflect changes in the Immigration and Nationality Act made 
     by the amendments contained in this subtitle; and
       (3) the procedures developed, with adequate due process 
     protection, to obtain sufficient evidence to determine 
     whether an alien may be inadmissible under the terms of the 
     amendments made by this subtitle.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Foley) and a Member opposed each will 
control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Foley).
  Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I rise today in support of our amendment, the Foley-Ackerman 
amendment to H.R. 10, the Anti-Atrocity Alien Deportation Act that will 
help strengthen our Nation's security.
  Every year, according to Amnesty International, an estimated 800 to 
1,000 war criminals and human rights abusers seek refuge in the United 
States.

[[Page H8881]]

Due to loopholes in current law, these criminals could be living in our 
States, in our towns, and even in our neighborhoods. There is nothing 
in current U.S. law to bar such monsters from the United States or to 
legally justify their removal from our country.
  This headline, the INS says it cannot deport them. The Justice 
Department will not prosecute them. Torturers, death squad leaders, and 
human rights criminals who seek refuge in the United States have 
nothing to fear except their victims.
  Let me be perfectly clear: Torturers are terrorists. Many of us here 
today probably think of torturers as domestic terrorists, those just 
committing unspeakable crimes in their own Nations, but that cannot be 
further from the truth.
  Let us look at the facts. North Korea, Iran, Syria, Libya, Cuba, 
Sudan, the former regimes in Afghanistan, the Taliban, and Iraq, they 
are all State sponsors of terrorism, and all have some of the worst 
human rights records in history. They detain people for indefinite 
periods of time, commit brutal acts of torture and kill with little 
regard for human life. We would be naive to believe that torturers and 
terrorists are in many ways not one in the same.
  The Anti-Atrocity Alien Deportation amendment, which the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Ackerman) and I have worked on for over 4\1/2\ 
years, we are offering it today, will give the Federal Government 
another weapon in our war on terror. This amendment will, among other 
things, make aliens who commit torture or other human rights violations 
inadmissible and removable.
  This bipartisan and bicameral provision will strengthen H.R. 10 by 
adding additional layers to our immigration laws, barring these 
criminals with clear ties to terror from even entering our country.
  For decades, those who have committed some of the most horrific acts 
against humanity have sought sanctuary here with impunity. This 
amendment would strip their protection once and for all. We cannot let 
these criminals continue to be around our families any longer. They 
have committed crimes against their own people. They have committed 
crimes against the United States. They have committed crimes against 
humanity.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to control the 
time in opposition and will be in favor of the legislation.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Ackerman) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  First, I want to say it has been a privilege to work with the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Foley) on a completely nonpartisan basis 
for almost half a decade on this particular legislation.
  The Foley-Ackerman amendment closes the loophole that currently 
allows war criminals who enter the United States to remain in the 
United States. This measure enjoys bipartisan support in both the House 
and the Senate. A bill sponsored by the chairman and ranking Democrat 
on the Senate Judiciary Committee, Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy, has 
been reported out of the Judiciary Committee in that body.
  At this very moment, with our Nation engaged in a conflict in Iraq, 
which previously had a regime that committed every kind of grotesque 
criminal behavior that our Nation deplores, the U.S. Code provides no, 
again, no, assurance that Saddam Hussein's henchmen, Iraqi war 
criminals, perpetrators of torture or atrocities from there or other 
places could not somehow come into the United States and enjoy the very 
benefits that they have so cruelly deprived of others.
  It is hard to believe but it is true. Some of Saddam Hussein's most 
brutal thugs, if they were able to hide their past and slip past the 
INS, they could conceivably apply and receive either U.S. permanent 
resident status or even possibly citizenship.
  How do we know this? Because war criminals from other conflicts have 
been surreptitiously coming to the United States since World War II. We 
cannot continue to leave the United States open to monsters who have 
committed horrible atrocities against innocent civilians, and we need 
to slam that door shut and to shut it tightly. We must also capture 
those war criminals who have already entered the United States and show 
them the door.
  The Foley-Ackerman amendment provides the Justice Department's Office 
of Special Investigation, the OSI, with the statutory authority to hunt 
down these thugs and criminals and, through the courts, remove them 
from our country.
  The OSI is currently tasked with finding and expelling Nazi war 
criminals seeking to evade the consequences of their unprecedented and 
horrific crimes. Since its creation in 1979, this elite team of 
prosecutors and investigators has been methodically removing Nazi war 
criminals who were able to sneak into the United States. Based on its 
terrific past performance, its current readiness, and most critically, 
its desire to perform the mission, OSI is the right agency to ensure 
that this land remain free from the most vile criminals and violators 
of human rights.
  Mr. Chairman, the very notion that anyone who has perpetuated 
genocide or committed these horrible crimes, these acts of torture, 
would be able to get into the United States is shocking enough. The 
fact that there is currently no law on the books to find these 
criminals and to remove them from our country is even worse. War 
criminals should have no safe haven or refuge anywhere, least of all in 
this land of liberty, and that is why I am encouraging all of our 
colleagues, Mr. Chairman, to vote in support of the Foley-Ackerman 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Hostettler), the chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Immigration, Border Security and Claims.
  (Mr. HOSTETTLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Foley-
Ackerman amendment to H.R. 10, the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation 
Act. This important amendment will close a longstanding gap that has 
allowed thousands of aliens who have tortured or otherwise abused the 
human rights of untold numbers in their home country to live in the 
United States.
  They are living here in our country the lives that many of their 
victims will never enjoy. As we continue our war on terror, we must do 
everything in our power to make sure that our Federal agencies have the 
tools they need to ensure our safety.
  The Foley-Ackerman amendment will take such a step. This amendment 
will keep our country safe by barring admission into the United States 
and authorizing the deportation of any foreigner who has committed acts 
of torture or other human rights abuses abroad.
  These criminals have committed some of the most atrocious acts ever 
imagined by mankind. We can no longer be a safe haven for those who 
seek to do us harm and have proven this by doing grave harm to others 
in the countries they have fled.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to vote for this very important 
amendment.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished 
gentleman for the time.
  I rise to support this amendment because it spells out that 
immigrants who have committed torture or extrajudicial killings abroad 
are not eligible to enter the United States, and it changes the 
provisions that makes immigrants inadmissible if they have committed 
acts of genocide. The amendment also expands an existing bar against 
government officials who have committed severe violations of religious 
freedom.
  I want to thank and commend the two gentlemen, and that is why I 
believe it is very important that H.R. 10 is clearly stripped of any 
violations of the convention against torture and to make sure that as 
we are consistent in

[[Page H8882]]

denying into the United States those who would commit genocide, torture 
and other heinous acts, that we accept the responsibility of having the 
high moral ground, making sure that no legislation that we pass would 
deport any alien to a place where they might be tortured and subjected 
to such horrific acts.
  This is a very strong amendment. It puts us on the right side of the 
column, protecting those who would be subjected to the violence of 
those who would be interested in coming to this country, and I support 
the gentlemen in this amendment and would ask that we also consider the 
elimination of such language in our own H.R. 10. I support this 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Ackerman) 
has one-half minute remaining.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have no further speakers, and I yield 
our time to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Foley).
  Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my colleague the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Ackerman) and the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler), 
Richard Krieger from my district, who brought this important issue to 
our attention who has been diligently tracking and identifying these 
criminals.
  Let me read a couple of names: Marko Boskic, Bosnia, member of a 
group that killed 1,200 Bosnian Muslims in one day; Major General Jean-
Claude Duperval, Haiti, implicated in the massacre at Raboteau, Haiti, 
1994; Nikola Vukovic, beat Bosnian Muslims with rifles and metal pipes; 
Mohamed Ali Samatar from Somalia, oversaw the killing of more than 
50,000 northern Somali Issaks; Abdi Ali Nur from Somalia, assisted in 
sham trials and the execution of hundreds of civilians. That is just a 
few of them.
  I will enter this into the Record at this point so people can see.

                                   TABLE OF INDIVIDUALS ACCUSED OF ATROCITIES
                                    [Arranged by Time of Atrocity Committed]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Name                         Country                    Crime               Time of atrocities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thomas Ricardo Anderson Kohatsu....  Peru..................  Implicated in the torture    1997
                                                              of Leonor La Rosa and
                                                              Mariela Lucy Barreto. La
                                                              Rosa was paralyzed,
                                                              Barreto was killed.
Marko Boskic.......................  Bosnia................  Member of group that killed  July 15, 1995
                                                              1,200 Bosnian Muslims in
                                                              one day.
Major Gen. Jean-Claude Duperval....  Haiti.................  Implicated in massacre at    1994
                                                              Raboteau, Haiti.
Jean-Marie Vianney Mudahinyuka.....  Rwanda................  Part of an elite group that  1994
                                                              ordered the killings of
                                                              500,000 Tutsis.
Nikola Vukovic.....................  Bosnia................  Beat Bosnian Muslims with    1992-1994
                                                              rifles and metal pipes.
                                                              Carved a religious symbol
                                                              into the forehead of one
                                                              prisoner.
Emanuel ``Toto'' Constant..........  Haiti.................  Created paramilitary         1991-1994
                                                              organization that killed
                                                              over 3,000 pro-democracy
                                                              activists.
Carl Dorelien......................  Haiti.................  Oversaw the deaths of 5,000  1991-1994
                                                              people.
Zijad Muzic........................  Bosnia................  Ethnic cleansing of Croats   1991-1993
                                                              and Bosnian Muslims.
Jackson Joanis.....................  Haiti.................  Accused of torture and       Early 1990s
                                                              murder.
Thioun Prasith.....................  Cambodia..............  Implicated in the deaths of  Late 1970s-1993
                                                              thousands of people.
Mohamed Ali Samatar................  Somalia...............  Oversaw killing of more      1971-1990
                                                              than 50,000 northern
                                                              Somali Issaks.
Juan Lopez Grijalba................  Honduras..............  Military chief accused of    1980s
                                                              murder and torture of
                                                              civilians.
Jaime Ramirez Raudales.............  Honduras..............  Charged with political       1980s
                                                              murders.
Abdi Ali Nur.......................  Somalia...............  Assisted in sham trials and  Late 1980s
                                                              the executions of hundreds
                                                              of civilians.
Luis Discua........................  Honduras..............  Killed dozens of leftists    1980s
                                                              in Honduras.
Alvaro Rafael Saravia Marino.......  Honduras..............  Murdered Salvadoran          1980
                                                              archbishop.
Kelbessa Negewo....................  Ethiopia..............  Tortured, beat and raped     1978
                                                              Ethiopians.
Armando Fernando Larios............  Chile.................  Helped kill Chile's foreign  1976
                                                              minister.
Gen. Fernando Vecino Alegret,        Vietnam...............  Cuban interrogator that      1967
 a.k.a. ``Fidel''.                                            tortured American POWs
                                                              during Vietnam War.
Helmut Oberlander..................  Ukraine...............  Belonged to Nazi death       1941-1943
                                                              squad that killed
                                                              thousands of Jews.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                General

       Iran: Pro-democracy Iranian Students tortured in 1970s.
       Iraq: Dissidents against Ba'ath party regime systematically 
     tortured.
       Afghanistan: Taliban.
     Sources sorted by name of accused individuals:
       1. Kohatsu: ``U.S. Becoming haven for Torturers.'' San 
     Diego Union Tribune, April 10, 2002.
       2. Boskic: Rupert, James. ``Accused killer in Bosnian war 
     makes a life in U.S.'' New York Newsday, Sep. 13, 2004.
       3. Duperval: Daniel, Trenton and Susannah A. Nesmith. 
     ``Abusers back in the streets; Some of Haiti's most notorious 
     human rights abusers walk the streets openly now.'' The Miami 
     Herald. March 15, 2004.
       4. Mudahinyuka: Korecki, Natasha. ``More charges for Rwanda 
     suspect.'' Chicago Sun-Times. May 15, 2004.
       5.Vukovic: Dart, Bob. ``U.S. is a haven for foreign war 
     criminals.'' Austin American Statesman. April 11, 2002.
       6. Constant: ``Torture suspects find haven in U.S.'' Miami 
     Herald. Aug. 1, 2001.
       7. Dorelien: Wilber, Del Quentin. ``Rights abusers can find 
     haven.'' Baltimore Sun. Aug. 28, 2000.
       8. Muzic: Fainaru, Steve. ``Suspect in `cleansing' by Serbs 
     living in Vt.'' The Boston Globe. May 3, 1999.
       9. Joanis: Benjamin, Jody A. ``Haitian enforcer makes bid 
     to stay put.'' Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel. June. 22, 2001.
       10. Prasith: Fifield, Adam. ``Apologist in suburbia.'' The 
     Village Voice. May 5, 1998.
       11. Samatar: Ragavan, Chitra. ``A safe haven, but for 
     whom?'' U.S. News and World Report. Nov. 15, 1999.
       12. Grijalba: ``Foley introduces bill to stop influx of 
     criminals here.'' Sun-Herald.com. April 4, 2003. http://
     www.sun-herald.com.
       13. Raudales: Valbrun, Marjorie. ``U.S. to pursue torturers 
     who flee here--Move seeks to address `nexus' between human-
     rights abusers and national-security risks.'' The Wall Street 
     Journal. May 8, 2003.
       14. Abdi Ali Nur: Ragavan, Chitra. ``A safe haven, but 
     whom?'' U.S. News and World Report. Nov. 15, 1999.
       15. Discua: ``Foley introduces bill to stop influx of 
     criminals here.'' Sun-Herald.com. April 4, 2003. http://
     www.sun-herald.com
       16. Marino: Charvy, Alfonso and Elizabeth Donovan. 
     ``Torture suspects find haven.'' The Miami Herald. July 22, 
     2001.
       17. Negewo: Dart, Bob. ``U.S. is a haven for torturers, 
     report says; many settle here illegally.'' The Atlanta-
     Journal Constitution. April 11, 2002.
       18. Larios: Valbrun, Marjorie. ``U.S. to pursue torturers 
     who flee here--Move seeks to address `nexus' between human-
     rights abusers and national-security risks.'' The Wall Street 
     Journal. May 8, 2003.
       19. Alegret a.k.a. ``FIDEL'': Alfonso, Pablo and Sonji 
     Jacobs. ``Ex-POW identifies Cuban dignitary as his chief 
     tormentor.'' The Miami Herald. Sep. 9, 1999.
       20. Oberlander: Staletovitch, Jenny. ``New law would send 
     modern war criminals packing.'' The Palm Beach Post. Jan. 18, 
     2000.

  These are articles from papers about criminals living in the United 
States.
  I urge my colleagues to vote for this very important national 
security measure. I thank my legislative counsel and legal director, 
Bradley Schreiber, and my staff for working so diligently.
  As I mentioned, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Ackerman) and I have 
been doing this now for 4\1/2\ plus years. It has finally come to 
fruition. We thank our colleagues. We urge adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Foley).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment 
No. 11 printed in House Report 108-751.


               Amendment No. 11 Offered by Mr. Goodlatte

  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 11 offered by Mr. Goodlatte:
       Page 235, after line 21, insert the following:

     Subtitle J--Pretrial Detention and Postrelease Supervision of 
                               Terrorists

     SEC. 2221. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Pretrial Detention and 
     Lifetime Supervision of Terrorists Act of 2004''.

     SEC. 2222. PRESUMPTION FOR PRETRIAL DETENTION IN CASES 
                   INVOLVING TERRORISM.

       Section 3142 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (e)--
       (A) by inserting ``or'' before ``the Maritime''; and
       (B) by inserting after ``or 2332b of title 18 of the United 
     States Code'' the following: ``, or

[[Page H8883]]

     an offense listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) of title 18 of 
     the United States Code, if the Attorney General certifies 
     that the offense appears by its nature or context to be 
     intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to 
     influence the policy of a government by intimidation or 
     coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
     destruction, assassination, or kidnaping, or an offense 
     involved in or related to domestic or international terrorism 
     as defined in section 2331 of title 18 of the United States 
     Code''; and
       (2) in subsections (f)(1)(A) and (g)(1), by inserting after 
     ``violence'' the following: ``, or an offense listed in 
     section 2332b(g)(5)(B) of title 18 of the United States Code, 
     if the Attorney General certifies that the offense appears by 
     its nature or context to be intended to intimidate or coerce 
     a civilian population, to influence the policy of a 
     government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the 
     conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, 
     or kidnaping, or an offense involved in or related to 
     domestic or international terrorism as defined in section 
     2331 of title 18 of the United States Code''.

     SEC. 2223. POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION OF TERRORISTS.

       Section 3583(j) of title 18, United States Code, is amended 
     in subsection (j), by striking ``, the commission'' and all 
     that follows through ``person,''.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) and a Member opposed each will 
control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte).

                              {time}  1030

  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment would simply create a rebuttable 
presumption that no amount of bail or other conditions would assure the 
appearance in court of a defendant when he is charged with a terrorist 
offense and there is probable cause that the defendant committed 
certain terrorist acts. This bill simply creates a rebuttable 
presumption which can be overcome by evidence that the defendant would 
appear in court.
  This presumption that a defendant would not show up in court already 
applies to those who are charged with major drug crimes and certain 
violent crimes. If it is good enough for drug dealers and violent 
criminals, it should be good enough for terrorists. It is simply too 
risky to trust terrorists who have been charged with terrorist offenses 
to return to court to be tried. We should not allow these criminals to 
roam free in our streets while they await trial.
  In addition, this bill would help prevent further terrorist attacks 
by giving judges the discretion to impose a term of supervised relief 
up to life for terrorists who have been convicted of terrorist 
offenses. Currently, the law provides that only those who committed 
terrorist offenses which either resulted in or created a foreseeable 
risk of death could be supervised for a term of years up to life after 
being released. This bill would make clear that post-trial supervision 
is available for all victim terrorists, not just those whose terrorist 
acts happen to result in death.
  This amendment only authorizes a court to impose the supervised 
relief of a terrorist. It does not mandate any particular term of 
supervised relief for any particular criminal, nor does it mandate that 
any supervised release be imposed at all. It leaves that decision up to 
the courts based on the facts and circumstances of each individual 
case.
  In addition, current law already gives courts the authority to modify 
or end the period of supervised release if the court determines that 
the criminal's conduct and circumstances so warrant. This safeguard is 
not changed by this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment makes simple changes to current Federal 
criminal law to ensure that those who have committed terrorist acts 
will not attempt to harm our citizens again. I urge my colleagues to 
support this important amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in 
opposition for the minority, and I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment adds to the list of crimes for which the 
presumption of detention occurs. It is an extraneous PATRIOT Act II 
provision not sought by the 9/11 Commission. This puts the defendant in 
a position where he has to prove the unprovable.
  The Department of Justice has a bad record of detaining people who 
should not be detained. Brendon Mayfield, a lawyer in Seattle, was 
detained as a material witness in the Madrid train bombing. The 
Department of Justice was subsequently forced to admit that they had 
the wrong person, in that Mr. Mayfield had nothing to do with the 
crime, notwithstanding the fact that he had been held on one of these 
presumptions of detention.
  I would hope we would consider this when we consider PATRIOT Act II.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds to say to the 
gentleman from Virginia that this is freestanding legislation which I 
have introduced. It has nothing to do with the so-called PATRIOT Act II 
the gentleman refers to. It is a good measure.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin 
(Mr. Green).
  Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding me this time, and I rise in strong support of this amendment. 
This amendment would enhance public safety by denying pretrial release 
to individuals accused of committing a terrorism offense. It would also 
provide that any individual convicted of a terrorism offense could be 
sentenced to supervised release for any term of years up to life.
  Defendants in Federal cases who are accused of certain crimes are 
presumptively denied pretrial release. For these crimes there is a 
rebuttable presumption that no condition or combination of conditions 
will reasonably assure the appearance of that person as required for 
the safety of the community.
  The list of crimes currently includes drug offenses, carrying maximum 
prison sentences of 10 years or more, but does not include most 
terrorism offenses. Thus, persons accused of many drug offenses are 
presumptively to be detained before trial, but no comparable 
presumption exists for people accused of most terrorist crimes. This 
makes no sense.
  The continuing danger posed to national security by those who 
materially support terrorism, who are the vital links in the chain of 
any terrorist act, may be no less than that posed by the direct 
perpetrators, the triggermen, of terrorist violence. And the court 
should be afforded the same degree of discretion in prescribing post-
release supervision in all these cases as well.
  The standard for every one of these amendments is whether or not this 
language enhances the safety and security of this country. Clearly, 
this amendment is a step in the right direction. It gives our courts 
some of the same tools they have in drug cases. I urge my colleagues to 
support this amendment.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as she may 
consume to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking 
member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise to discuss three subjects, the first 
of which is this amendment. Although I listened carefully to the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte). I think many of the points he 
makes are valid, and I agree with him that we should not be coddling 
terrorists, but I think this amendment is ill timed and needs further 
consideration by this House.
  The gentleman has said that he is not participating in an effort to 
expand the PATRIOT Act, but these ideas have been circulated in a 
package called PATRIOT Act II. My view of the PATRIOT Act, which I 
supported, is that next year is the right time to consider how to 
expand or contract it.
  I am a cosponsor of the SAFE Act, which would delete some provisions 
of the PATRIOT Act that are egregious, but I have an open mind in 
looking at some features of the PATRIOT Act which might be fine-tuned 
to work more effectively. So for that reason, I oppose this amendment.
  I also will oppose the Hostettler amendment, which will be offered in 
a few minutes. I think it replaces the worst features of H.R. 10 with 
some other bad features. Certainly, the outsourcing of terrorists, as 
some of us have called it, which some Members of the majority including 
the gentleman

[[Page H8884]]

from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), agree would violate U.S. law and the 
International Convention on Torture, is a terrible idea.
  But there are other features of the Hostettler amendment that make 
asylum much harder to get, and in ways that have nothing whatsoever to 
do with finding and prosecuting terrorists, punish innocent immigrants. 
That is not the purpose of the debate today.
  Finally, I want to comment on the en bloc amendment which was just 
offered and agreed to. I think it is a very good amendment, and the 
features of it I want to talk about are the Barton amendment, and the 
Fossella amendment, both of which have to do with interoperable 
communications.
  We have done almost nothing since 
9/11 effectively to deal with the failure to have communications 
equipment and adequate bandwidth with which to communicate, which was a 
major problem in New York and a major problem at the Pentagon. This 
administration is not even funding initiatives in this fiscal year for 
interoperable communications, claiming there is enough money in the 
pipeline.
  The right answer is to free up some dedicated bandwidth for emergency 
communications. There is a pending bill called the HERO Act, introduced 
by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) and me, which has been 
sadly withering on the vine for a year and a half, opposed by the 
broadcasters. These two amendments will help with multiyear funding, 
which we need for ports as well as interoperable communications, and 
will help convey the sense of the Congress that makes it clear we have 
to free up this bandwidth so that our first responders have the tools 
that they need.
  So as we proceed this morning, Mr. Chairman, I hope we are all paying 
close attention to amendments. Some are good, some are less good. I 
would like to say to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte), 
however, that I think he is an extremely careful legislator and a very 
good lawyer, and I hope that next year we can work together to craft 
PATRIOT Act amendments both to eliminate provisions that do not work 
and to enhance provisions that do work that will keep America safe, 
find the bad guys, and protect our civil liberties and our 
constitution.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time, 
and I say to the gentlewoman that I appreciate her comments, but I 
would also point out that we are engaged in the midst of a war against 
terror right now and a lot is going to happen in the next year, 
including the apprehension of people who, under appropriate 
circumstances meet this standard, and we should have the opportunity 
for the court, and this is a decision by the judge, not something that 
is a mandatory decision, but the judge should have the discretion to 
allow that the individual be held pending trial without bond.
  Secondly, there will be people who have been convicted of terrorist 
acts potentially released during that period of time, and if the court 
finds it appropriate to authorize lifetime supervision, we ought to get 
that supervision started now to keep track of people who have engaged 
in terrorist acts and give the court the authority to undertake that 
now, without waiting an additional year and expose our country to 
greater risks that will occur during that time.
  So I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kolbe). The question is on the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro temore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia 
(Mr. Goodlatte) will be postponed.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 12 printed in House 
Report 108-751.


           Amendment No. 12 Offered by Mr. Green of Wisconsin

  Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 12 offered by Mr. Green of Wisconsin:
       Page 252, line 18, strike ``DEPORTATION'' and insert 
     ``REMOVAL'' (and amend the table of contents accordingly).
       Page 258, after line 5, insert the following (and amend the 
     table of contents accordingly):

     SEC. 3034. INADMISSIBILITY DUE TO TERRORIST AND TERRORIST-
                   RELATED ACTIVITIES.

       (a) In General.--Section 212(a)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration 
     and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)) is amended to 
     read as follows:
       ``(i) In general.--Any alien who--

       ``(I) has engaged in a terrorist activity;
       ``(II) a consular officer, the Attorney General, or the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security knows, or has reasonable 
     ground to believe, is engaged in or is likely to engage after 
     entry in any terrorist activity (as defined in clause (iv));
       ``(III) has, under circumstances indicating an intention to 
     cause death or serious bodily harm, incited terrorist 
     activity;
       ``(IV) is a representative (as defined in clause (v)) of--

       ``(aa) a terrorist organization; or
       ``(bb) a political, social, or other group that endorses or 
     espouses terrorist activity;

       ``(V) is a member of a terrorist organization described in 
     subclause (I) or (II) of clause (vi);
       ``(VI) is a member of a terrorist organization described in 
     clause (vi)(III), unless the alien can demonstrate by clear 
     and convincing evidence that the alien did not know, and 
     should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a 
     terrorist organization;
       ``(VII) endorses or espouses terrorist activity or 
     persuades others to endorse or espouse terrorist activity or 
     support a terrorist organization;
       ``(VIII) has received military-type training (as defined in 
     section 2339D(c)(1) of title 18, United States Code) from or 
     on behalf of any organization that, at the time the training 
     was received, was a terrorist organization under section 
     212(a)(3)(B)(vi); or
       ``(IX) is the spouse or child of an alien who is 
     inadmissible under this subparagraph, if the activity causing 
     the alien to be found inadmissible occurred within the last 5 
     years,

     is inadmissible. An alien who is an officer, official, 
     representative, or spokesman of the Palestine Liberation 
     Organization is considered, for purposes of this Act, to be 
     engaged in a terrorist activity.''.
       (b) Engage in Terrorist Activity Defined.--Section 
     212(a)(3)(B)(iv) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(iv) Engage in terrorist activity defined.--As used in 
     this subparagraph, the term `engage in terrorist activity' 
     means, in an individual capacity or as a member of an 
     organization--

       ``(I) to commit or to incite to commit, under circumstances 
     indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily 
     injury, a terrorist activity;
       ``(II) to prepare or plan a terrorist activity;
       ``(III) to gather information on potential targets for 
     terrorist activity;
       ``(IV) to solicit funds or other things of value for--

       ``(aa) a terrorist activity;
       ``(bb) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) 
     or (vi)(II); or
       ``(cc) a terrorist organization described in clause 
     (vi)(III), unless the solicitor can demonstrate by clear and 
     convincing evidence that he did not know, and should not 
     reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist 
     organization;

       ``(V) to solicit any individual--

       ``(aa) to engage in conduct otherwise described in this 
     clause;
       ``(bb) for membership in a terrorist organization described 
     in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or
       ``(cc) for membership in a terrorist organization described 
     in clause (vi)(III), unless the solicitor can demonstrate by 
     clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and 
     should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a 
     terrorist organization; or

       ``(VI) to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably 
     should know, affords material support, including a safe 
     house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of 
     funds or other material financial benefit, false 
     documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, 
     biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or 
     training--

       ``(aa) for the commission of a terrorist activity;
       ``(bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably 
     should know, has committed or plans to commit a terrorist 
     activity;
       ``(cc) to a terrorist organization described in subclause 
     (I) or (II) of clause (vi); or
       ``(dd) to a terrorist organization described in clause 
     (vi)(III), unless the actor can demonstrate by clear and 
     convincing evidence that the actor did not know, and should 
     not reasonably have known, that the organization was a 
     terrorist organization.''.
       (c) Terrorist Organization Defined.--Section 
     212(a)(3)(B)(vi) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(vi) Terrorist organization defined.--As used in this 
     section, the term `terrorist organization' means an 
     organization--

       ``(I) designated under section 219;

[[Page H8885]]

       ``(II) otherwise designated, upon publication in the 
     Federal Register, by the Secretary of State in consultation 
     with or upon the request of the Attorney General or the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, as a terrorist organization, 
     after finding that the organization engages in the activities 
     described in subclauses (I) through (VI) of clause (iv); or
       ``(III) that is a group of two or more individuals, whether 
     organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup which 
     engages in, the activities described in subclauses (I) 
     through (VI) of clause (iv).''.

       (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act 
     and shall apply to--
       (1) removal proceedings instituted before, on, or after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act; and
       (2) acts and conditions constituting a ground for 
     inadmissibility occurring or existing before, on, or after 
     such date.

     SEC. 3035. DEPORTABILITY OF TERRORISTS.

       (a) In General.--Section 237(a)(4)(B) (8 U.S.C. 
     1227(a)(4)(B)) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(B) Terrorist activities.--Any alien who would be 
     considered inadmissible pursuant to subparagraph (B) or (F) 
     of section 212(a)(3) is deportable.''.
       (b) Deportation of Aliens Who Have Received Military-Type 
     Training From Terrorist Organizations.--Section 237(a)(4) of 
     the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(4)) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(E) Recipient of military-type training.--Any alien who 
     has received military-type training (as defined in section 
     2339D(c)(1) of title 18, United States Code) from or on 
     behalf of any organization that, at the time the training was 
     received, was a terrorist organization, as defined in section 
     212(a)(3)(B)(vi), is deportable.''.
       (c) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act 
     and shall apply to acts and conditions constituting a ground 
     for removal occurring or existing before, on, or after such 
     date.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the 
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Green) and a Member opposed each will 
control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Green).
  (Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, my time is limited, so I will focus on just two aspects 
of this amendment that come largely from my own legislation, H.R. 4942.
  First, this amendment recognizes that our enemy is not merely the 
terrorist who pulls the trigger or places the bomb or drives that rig 
truck, it is also those who through their material support make the 
violent act possible. They provide the training, they provide the 
shelter, the ID documents, the resources, the intelligence, the many 
dirty acts that help the chain of destruction. If we can break these 
links in the terrorist chain, then the chain will fall apart.
  The second thing these provisions do is common sense. It makes 
material support of terrorism, especially those who participate in 
military-style training, grounds for being inadmissible into this 
country and grounds for deportation.
  We are a welcoming country. I am the proud son of immigrants. But we 
cannot allow our welcoming arms to be a tool for terrorists who seek 
our downfall.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise to seek the time in 
opposition, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, no one is opposed to identifying and denying admission 
to terrorists, and no one is opposed to deporting terrorists who are 
found in the United States. However, we should not exclude or deport 
someone as a terrorist who is an innocent person. This amendment would 
make that possibility more likely by expanding the already overly broad 
provisions for excluding and deporting individuals on terrorism 
grounds.
  The terrorist removal provisions presently in the Immigration 
Nationality Act specify that terrorist organizations must be designated 
by the Secretary of the Department of State. This amendment would 
eliminate that requirement. This would greatly increase the possibility 
that people will be excluded or deported on the basis of involvement 
with an organization that has incorrectly been called a terrorist 
organization.

                              {time}  1045

  Moreover, I would be surprised if someone removed on that basis would 
ever be allowed to return to the United States.
  Under current law, involvement with a terrorist organization is not a 
ground for removal unless that person knew or should have known that it 
was a terrorist organization. We have seen this occur time and time 
again, particularly after passage of the PATRIOT Act and, as well, as 
it is related to many in the Muslim community. I believe that more 
consideration needs to be given to these very important issues.
  I ask my colleagues to vote against this amendment.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Mr. Chairman, no one is opposed to denying admission 
to terrorists, and no one is opposed to deporting terrorists who are 
found in the United States. However, we should not exclude or deport 
someone as a terrorist who is an innocent person. This amendment would 
make that possibility more likely by expanding the already overbroad 
provisions for excluding and deporting individuals on terrorism 
grounds.
  The terrorist removal provisions presently in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act specify that terrorist organizations must be designated 
by the Secretary of the Department of State. This amendment would 
eliminate that requirement. This would greatly increase the possibility 
that people will be excluded or deported on the basis of involvement 
with an organization that has incorrectly been called a ``terrorist 
organization.'' Moreover, I would be surprised if someone removed on 
that basis would ever be allowed to return to the United States.
  Under current law, involvement with a terrorist organization is not a 
ground for removal unless the person knew or should have known that it 
was a terrorist organization. The amendment would require the alien to 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and 
should not reasonably have known that it was a terrorist organization. 
This would create a higher standard that would be much more difficult 
to prove. In fact, I am not sure that it is possible to establish the 
negative proposition that you did not know something.
  Finally, the changes that this amendment would make would apply 
retroactively, which would increase the likelihood of ensnaring 
innocent people. I urge you to vote against this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), the distinguished 
chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary who has produced so many of 
the important provisions of this legislation.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, I am puzzled why anybody would oppose this amendment. 
The amendment simply states that if you cannot be admitted to the 
United States because you are affiliated with a terrorist organization, 
then you can be deported if you get in through one way or another. We 
have a big problem with illegal aliens crossing both the northern and 
the southern border. If you do not go through the passport check and 
enter the United States illegally and you could not enter the United 
States legally because you were a part of a terrorist organization, 
then if this amendment goes down, you cannot kick them out. So it seems 
to me that if you cannot get in and it is illegal for you to get in and 
you do get in, anyhow, illegally, or by fooling an immigration 
inspector, then the government ought to have the power to be able to 
deport these people.
  The amendment is as simple as that, meaning if they do get in when 
they should not, they should be able to be removed and sent out of the 
country and make America safer.
  I urge support of the amendment.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Let me just say that the important part of this is that the amendment 
would require the alien to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence 
that he did not know and should not reasonably have known that it was a 
terrorist organization. This is a higher standard and would be much 
more difficult to prove. And might I say we are adding this to a bill 
that frankly the White House has indicated that it strongly opposes any 
overbroad expansion of expedited removal. This is clearly in that 
ballpark.

[[Page H8886]]

  The administration has concerns with the overbroad alien 
identification standards proposed by the bill and unrelated to security 
concerns. All of these amendments that we will be talking about, we 
have a clear statement by the White House that they oppose. But also my 
understanding is that the chairman of the full Committee on the 
Judiciary has indicated that he would not stand for the expansion of 
section 411 of the PATRIOT Act. In fact, the chairman said that it will 
be done ``over my dead body.'' This is what we are doing here right 
now. Even if we do so, we need to do so with far more detailed review 
and judicial committee hearings and the understanding of the imbalance 
between civil liberties and respect for the judicial system and the 
right of someone to go into the courts and prove otherwise than what we 
are doing here under H.R. 10 which is supposed to be, as the 9/11 
Commission has said, the overhaul of the U.S. intelligence agencies.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler), chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims.
  (Mr. HOSTETTLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this 
amendment and commend my colleague from Wisconsin for his work on this 
issue. Currently, terrorists and their supporters can be kept out of 
the United States, but as soon as they set foot in the U.S. on tourist 
visas, for example, we cannot deport them for many of the very same 
offenses. This hinders our ability to protect Americans from those 
alien terrorists who have infiltrated the United States. This amendment 
makes aliens deportable for terrorist-related offenses to the same 
extent that they would not be admitted in the first place to the United 
States.
  Another deficiency in current law is based on a flawed understanding 
of how terrorist organizations operate. The Immigration and Nationality 
Act now reads that if an alien provides funding or other material 
support to a terrorist organization, the alien can escape deportation 
if he can show that he did not know that the funds or support would 
further the organization's terrorist activity. That is, his donation 
did not immediately go to buying explosives. This notion is based on a 
fundamental misunderstanding of how terrorist organizations operate.
  As Kenneth McKune, former associate coordinator for counterterrorism 
at the State Department explained, ``Given the purposes, organizational 
structure and clandestine nature of foreign terrorist organizations, it 
is highly likely that any material support to these organizations will 
ultimately inure to the benefit of their criminal, terrorist functions, 
regardless of whether such support was ostensibly intended to support 
nonviolent, nonterrorist activities.''
  Money given to terrorist organizations is fungible. Senator Dianne 
Feinstein has rightly stated that, ``I simply do not accept that so-
called humanitarian works by terrorist groups can be kept separate from 
their other operations.''
  I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
  Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I think what is interesting to listen to today are the 
arguments on the other side. Where they cannot win on the merits, they 
choose to throw up a smoke screen of process, no matter how far off 
point it may be. This amendment stands for a very simple proposition, 
those who materially support terrorists, who make the terrorist act 
possible by providing training, intelligence, logistics, 
transportation, those who materially support terrorism should not be 
here. They should not be allowed in this country; and if they are in 
this country, they should be deported. We must have this tool. If we 
are truly going to make this country safe, if we are truly going to 
disrupt terrorism before the trigger is pulled or the bomb is set, 
before lives are lost, we must have these tools.
  Those who support terrorism intellectually through their training 
support and harboring terrorists, those who operate and move in the 
shadows of the terrorist operation, they do not belong here. They are 
every bit as dangerous as the one who would pull the trigger. I urge my 
colleagues to support this amendment. I think it is a vitally important 
tool in our overall effort in homeland security.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kolbe). The gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. 
Jackson-Lee) is recognized to close for 2 minutes.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  We do not want terrorists in this country and we certainly want to be 
able to identify the terrorists as everyone might expect we would want 
to do. This amendment is particularly overbroad, has an ability to wrap 
up innocent individuals, and it goes against what the administration 
has said. The administration strongly opposes the overbroad expansion 
of expedited removal authority.
  Might I remind my colleagues of the unfortunate circumstances, though 
they are someone different, of Cat Stevens, Yusuf Islam, who came here 
with all innocent purposes. In fact, his last years of work have been 
in charitable work. Look what we tried to do with him. So many of our 
constituents in the United States have Muslim names and are affiliated 
with organizations who have good intentions but may be misconceived and 
therefore they are wrapped up in this expedited removal.
  This is something that needs to be done in a separate, bipartisan 
manner, which is to have hearings, to get testimony, to understand the 
depth of the need and how to craft something that works. Our own 
chairman has indicated that we cannot by extension extend the PATRIOT 
Act without considerable thought and I believe it is important when we 
are defending our Nation to have considerable thought.
  I would ask my colleagues to deny this amendment, to reject it, and I 
ask us to focus on restoring the sense of integrity to our intelligence 
system as the 9/11 Commission report argues for and the Maloney-Shays 
bill argues for.
  I ask for a ``no'' vote on this particular amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Green).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin 
(Mr. Green) will be postponed.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 13 printed in House 
Report 108-751.


               Amendment No. 13 Offered by Mr. Hostettler

  Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 13 offered by Mr. Hostettler:
       Page 243, beginning on line 12, strike ``and the officer 
     determines that the alien has been physically present in the 
     United States for less than 1 year''.
       Page 244, beginning on line 7, strike ``if the officer 
     determines that the alien has been physically present in the 
     United States for less than 1 year''.
       Page 245, line 5, strike ``the central motive'' and insert 
     ``a central reason''.
       Page 254, strike line 6 and all that follows through line 
     24 on page 255 and insert the following:

     SEC. 3032. DETENTION OF ALIENS BARRED FROM RESTRICTION ON 
                   REMOVAL PENDING REMOVAL.

       (a) In General.--Section 241 of Immigration and Nationality 
     Act (8 U.S.C. 1231) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(j) Detention of Aliens Barred From Restriction on 
     Removal Pending Removal.--
       ``(1) In general.--In order to protect the United States 
     from those aliens who would threaten the national security or 
     endanger the lives and safety of the American people, the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security may, in the Secretary's 
     unreviewable discretion, determine that any alien who has 
     been ordered removed from the United States and who is

[[Page H8887]]

     described in subsection (b)(3)(B) is a specially dangerous 
     alien and should be detained until removed. This 
     determination shall be reviewed every six months until the 
     alien is removed. In making this determination, the Secretary 
     shall consider the length of sentence and severity of the 
     offense, the loss and injury to the victim, and the future 
     risk the alien poses to the community.
       ``(2) Aliens granted protection restricting removal.--Any 
     alien described in paragraph (1) who has been ordered 
     removed, and who has been granted any other protection under 
     the immigration law, as defined in section 101(a)(17), 
     restricting the alien's removal, shall be detained. The 
     Secretary of State shall seek diplomatic assurances that such 
     alien shall be protected if removed from the United 
     States.''.
       (b) Severability.--If any amendment, or part of any 
     amendment, made by subsection (a), or the application of any 
     amendment or part of any amendment to any person or 
     circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional--
       (1) the Secretary of Homeland Security shall continue to 
     seek the removal of any alien described in section 241(j)(1) 
     of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by this 
     Act, consistent with any protection described in section 
     241(j)(2) of such Act; and
       (2) the Secretary of State shall continue to seek 
     diplomatic assurances that any alien described in section 
     241(j)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended 
     by this Act, would be protected upon removal.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler) and the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Berman) each will control 5 minutes.
  Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend the 
debate on this amendment to 20 minutes, equally divided.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Indiana?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler) 
and the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) each will control 10 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler).
  Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. It is supported by 
leadership, including Chairman Henry Hyde, and will protect the 
American people from dangerous aliens while continuing our Nation's 
proud history of providing refuge to the innocent oppressed. This 
amendment will protect the American people in the same way as section 
3032, which it replaces, would have. Section 3032 would have barred 
aliens who posed a threat to the American public from seeking our 
country's protection.
  The courts have created a need to defend the American public against 
such aliens. You see, the decisions of a few judges have turned what 
was a clear congressional mandate authorizing the detention of 
dangerous aliens who are facing removal into a confused and unworkable 
mess. Congress has authorized the Attorney General to detain all aliens 
who pose a risk to the community, including aliens granted protection 
under the Convention Against Torture, until they can be removed from 
the United States. The Supreme Court has read this provision, however, 
to find that any alien who has been ordered deported but who cannot be 
removed must be released, no matter how grave a danger the alien poses, 
unless some ``special circumstance'' makes the alien especially 
dangerous.
  Congress' clear standard has eroded to the point that the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals ordered Department of Homeland Security 
authorities to release a dangerously insane alien who had accumulated 
convictions for assault, harassment and rape. Why? Because the Supreme 
Court had released a killer in the same circumstances, and the alien in 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' case had not actually killed 
anyone. Under such logic, DHS cannot protect the public against an 
alien who has been granted torture convention protection and who 
therefore cannot be removed from the United States unless the alien has 
done something more serious than killing another person.
  This amendment will address the goals of section 3032 by giving the 
Secretary of Homeland Security the tools to keep dangerous aliens 
granted protection under the torture convention out of our communities, 
off of our streets, and away from our children. It will authorize the 
Secretary, in his unreviewable discretion, to detain aliens granted 
such protection who pose a risk to the American people. In addition, 
this amendment will continue our Nation's tradition of providing aliens 
the opportunity to request asylum and torture convention relief while 
at the same time ensuring that our country's generosity is not abused.
  It would also amend section 3007 to reinforce the current burdens 
governing asylum, with one exception. Aliens who claim that they need 
asylum because they have been accused in connection with terrorist, 
militant or guerilla activity must show that race, religion, membership 
in a particular social group, nationality or political opinion is a 
central reason for any claimed persecution. This amendment will protect 
innocent aliens who come to our shores fleeing thugs and dictators, 
while undoing an inappropriate burden imposed on our government by, 
once again, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
  Contrary to law and logic, the Ninth Circuit has required the 
government to prove that aliens claiming persecution because they have 
been tied to terrorism are not eligible for asylum, instead of 
requiring the aliens seeking protection to show that they are. My 
subcommittee has discovered that Hesham Hedayet, who killed two 
innocent bystanders at LAX on July 4, 2002, had tried to exploit this 
loophole.
  I must underscore again, however, the most important effect of this 
amendment which is to give the Secretary of Homeland Security the 
discretion to detain aliens who would pose a risk to the American 
people if released.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, we are about to embark on the debate on three 
amendments dealing with three provisions of this bill that are very 
important and I think the House should try to understand the context, 
so I would like to use this initial time just to sort of set the table.
  The majority in putting forth this bill on the floor used 
intelligence reform and the compelling and legitimate concern about 
terrorism to insert three obnoxious, overbroad and overreaching 
provisions that flagrantly violate our convention against torture, 
which the United States has signed and ratified, and threaten to send 
people who are likely to be tortured back to their countries that will 
torture them; to engage in a process that allows a massive deportation 
of people, having nothing to do with terrorism, who are in this country 
for less than 5 years, through expedited removal, in a fashion that 
will not allow them a hearing, this is section 3006, that will not 
allow them a hearing, that will not allow them to contact their 
families, that will require them to establish they are either here 
legally or have been here for more than 5 years by the documents on 
their person, and, if not, to be detained and immediately removed from 
this country, in total and in flagrant violation of existing processes, 
taking a legitimate idea of expedited removal at our points of entry 
and in establishing it to the country in its entirety throughout its 
interior and to anyone who is here less than 5 years.

                              {time}  1100

  Then, finally, in section 307 to massively alter the procedures and 
tests for getting asylum in such a way as to fundamentally depart from 
this country's tradition as a haven for refugees and people fleeing 
because of a well-founded fear of persecution, based on their politics, 
their gender, their religion, their ethnicity. These are horrible 
provisions. They have nothing to do with terrorism.
  Now we have an amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana after 
the White House counsel wrote the toughest letter we have seen saying 
the notion that America is going to send somebody back to a country 
where they are likely to be tortured is unconscionable, we do not 
support it, we do not ask for this provision. He offers an amendment, 
which is a smokescreen, a total smokescreen, that tries to pretend that 
we are getting out of this problem by making amendments to three 
sections, notwithstanding the fact that if his amendment were to pass 
and the Smith amendments that follow his amendment to strike sections 
306 and 307 were to lose, every one of these problems would still 
exist.

[[Page H8888]]

  Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Missouri (Mr. Blunt), majority whip.
  Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Indiana for 
yielding me this time.
  Because of the strange conflict in current law, terrorists and 
criminals who are not citizens of our country but for some reason get 
here are, in fact, being released into our society. There are three 
amendments, as the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) pointed out. 
I think it is better to debate them one at a time. That is why we do 
that. We are going to vote on them one at a time.
  This amendment is an important amendment because it deals with that 
specific problem. I cannot believe anyone in this House would want 
violent criminals from other countries who somehow get here to be able 
to be released in our country. This amendment allows that those 
criminals would be detained.
  There is a great example of a Jordanian who was convicted in Jordan 
of conspiracy to bomb a Jordanian school for American children. He is 
convicted of a conspiracy where his goal, his target, was to kill 
American children. He somehow got to this country.
  Under the current interpretation of the courts, we cannot send him 
back to Jordan because he might be tortured, but we also cannot detain 
him. So in that interpretation this person is likely to be set free in 
some community in the United States, a person who is conspiring to kill 
American children in Jordan. So we would put him in a community of the 
United States that is full of American children, nobody but American 
children, to kill in that community? That cannot be allowed.
  What the gentleman from Indiana's (Mr. Hostettler) amendment does is 
address the concern that we all would have about sending anybody into a 
place where they would be punished in a way that we would think was not 
appropriate.
  I have got to tell my colleagues the appropriateness to this body and 
anywhere else and even as we would talk personally of a punishment for 
some whose target was to kill American children, it is hard to imagine 
how that punishment could be too difficult, but that is not what we are 
about in this society. So this amendment would allow that person to be 
detained.
  If one catches a rattlesnake on one's farm, they do not look at it 
and say, this is definitely a rattlesnake, let us go up and release it 
in the front yard. What this amendment does is say, if they catch that 
rattlesnake and they say we are going to be able detain this 
rattlesnake, even though he did not commit his crime in the United 
States. We are not going to let this criminal who was, in this case, 
targeting American children, in other cases might be a murderer, in 
other cases might be a rapist, in other cases might be a pedophile, we 
are not going to let this person go and release him in our community 
simply because we have no place to send him back to and he did not 
commit the crimes that there was an agreement that he committed in the 
United States.
  This is a good amendment. It improves this bill. But the underlying 
bill was designed to deal with the concern that we could not find an 
adequate way to deal with until the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. 
Hostettler) worked hard to come up with this amendment.
  I urge support for this amendment. We are debating these and voting 
on them one at a time. I urge that this amendment be adopted.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield for the purpose of making a 
unanimous consent request to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers)
  (Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I reluctantly rise to tell the gentleman 
from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler) of the Committee on the Judiciary that 
this breaks our deadlock, but it simply does not go far enough; and I 
am hoping that he will carefully consider the arguments being made by 
his colleagues, particularly on the Committee on the Judiciary, to see 
why it is that we think that even the Hostettler amendment can be 
approved.
  I rise in strong opposition to this amendment. the Hostettler 
Amendment allows for some of the broadest and most damaging immigration 
changes we will have passed in several decades, and will decimate legal 
protections in our laws of expedited removal, asylum, and extraordinary 
rendition and torture.
  Expedited removal (Section 3006)--The Hostettler Amendment would 
amend the immigration laws to permit summary deportations for persons 
who cannot prove that have physically been in the U.S. for more than 5 
years. While the amendment deletes the provision that would have 
applied this summary deportation provision to asylee applicants, it 
still suffers from several glaring loopholes that would result in 
deserving immigrants facing the legal nightmare of summary deportation. 
Groups who would lose legal protections under the Hostettler Amendment 
include:
  Trafficking victims, and victims of rape, incest, kidnaping, and 
domestic violence. Currently, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
allows these victims to remain in the U.S. so they are not subject to 
further violence and abuse. Under the Hostettler amendment, trafficking 
victims and other victims of rape, incest and kidnaping would be 
subject to mandatory deportation.
  Batterred women and children. The Violence Against Women Act provides 
that battered immigrant women and children are permitted to remain 
here, so they are not forced to face further battering and violence. 
Under the Hostettler amendment, these immigrants could be plucked off 
the street and subject to mandatory deportation.
  Cubans who arrive in the U.S. by sea or by land. Currently, the 
Attorney General has only discretionary power to exempt Cubans who 
arrive in the U.S. via land or sea from expedited removal. Under the 
Hostettler amendment, this discretionary power would again be obviated 
by the mandatory requirement of expedited removal. This would mean that 
Cubans who arrive at our shores would face automatic summary 
deportation
  Asylum (Section 3007)--Under the Hostettler amendment, the rights of 
all asylum candidates would be impaired, decimating our historic 
commitment to refugees and persecuted immigrants. Among other things, 
the Hostettler Amendment would:
  Require an asylum applicant to prove that a central reason for his or 
her being persecuted was race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion; a far more difficult 
evidentiary burden than current law.
  Permit adjudicators to deny asylum because the applicant is unable to 
provide specific corroborating specific, and deny judicial review of 
such denials.
  Introduce brand new credibility grounds for denying asylum, such as 
``demeanor,'' any inconsistency in statements (even if attributable to 
fear of retribution), and other subjective grounds that introduce new 
cultural barriers to asylum, particularly for traumatized victims of 
torture and violence.
  Exclude country conditions from human rights organizations, 
journalists, and other relevant, reliable and more recent information 
than may be obtained from State Department reports.
  Extraordinary Rendition/Torture (Section 3032)--The Hostettler 
Amendment would also allow immigrants to be returned to countries where 
they could be tortured in violation of the Convention Against Torture. 
This is because the amended provision would allow our government to 
send an individual to a country with a history of human rights 
violations even if a U.S. immigration judge has determined he or she 
would face torture, as long as the Secretary of State had merely asked 
the country if they would agree not to torture the immigrant. In 
essence, we would be substituting the judgment of a foreign diplomat 
from Syria, China or the Sudan, for that of a judge in the U.S., with 
the immigrant facing excruciating torture if the judge was right.
  Another problem with the Hostettler Amendment is that it would create 
unreviewable authority on the part of the DHS to detain non-citizens 
who are found to be at risk of torture or persecution in their home 
countries.
  The Hostettler amendment is opposed by a wide range of human rights, 
civil liberties and immigration groups, including the ACLU, the 
American Immigration Lawyers Association, Amnesty International, the 
Center for Victims of Torture, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, Human 
Rights Watch, the US Committee for Refugees, the National Council of La 
Raza and the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops. I urge No vote.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds.
  In response to the last speaker, he demonstrated why it is a 
smokescreen. The issue of criminal aliens is a serious issue which we 
should have to deal with; so they insert that into the Hostettler 
amendment. But what they do is leave a gaping loophole whereby a 
country that utilizes torture gives assurances to the United States and 
therefore gets back the person whom they are going to torture.

[[Page H8889]]

  Mr. Chairman, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  I rise in strong opposition to the Hostettler amendment. The 
Hostettler amendment amends the ill-considered and counterproductive 
torture provisions in H.R. 10 in a way that still allows foreigners to 
be subjected to torture.
  How does it do this? The Hostettler amendment gives the Secretary of 
Homeland Security the power to detain certain foreigners that, ``in the 
Secretary's unreviewable discretion,'' the Secretary has determined to 
be a specially dangerous alien that should be detained until removed. 
Such persons would be held behind bars indefinitely with no recourse to 
a court or another independent fact finder empowered to review the 
basis for the Secretary's decision. Any foreign person that the 
Secretary of Homeland Security decides is ``especially dangerous'' can 
just be locked up forever with no trial or just deported.
  And the Hostettler amendment stipulates that the ``Secretary of State 
shall seek diplomatic assurances that such alien shall be protected if 
removed from the United States.'' That means that the State Department 
is supposed to seek diplomatic assurances from a country that it will 
not torture somebody after a U.S. judge already has found that this 
country likely would, in fact, torture that person. Are we really going 
to trust the assurances of the countries that our own State Department 
says torture detainees?
  Mr. Chairman, we should really call this the ``In Syria we trust'' 
amendment or perhaps the ``In Sudan we trust'' amendment. The 
assurances that these countries have provided that they would not 
torture have proved completely unreliable in practice.
  In 2002, Maher Arar, a Syrian-born citizen, was intercepted at New 
York's JFK Airport and deported to Syria, where he was detained and 
reportedly tortured. The Washington Post has reported that while Syria 
provided ``diplomatic assurances'' that Arar would not be mistreated, 
these assurances proved worthless. Maher Arar was tortured anyway.
  America should not be outsourcing torture to countries like Syria and 
the Sudan. America should be relying not on diplomatic assurances from 
countries that we already know practice torture, particularly when a 
U.S. judge has already found that it is more likely than not that the 
deported person would be tortured if they were sent there.
  We as America cannot preach temperance from a bar stool. If we want 
to protect our own Marines and soldiers from torture, we must have the 
same standard for protecting prisoners that we have under our control 
from torture. We cannot build a new generation of nuclear bunker 
busters and then tell the Muslim nations they should not want nuclear 
weapons, and we cannot tell the Muslim world not to torture American 
prisoners at the same time we are sending Muslim detainees to countries 
that we know are going to torture those prisoners.
  We cannot exist in a world where the United States is not the moral 
leader. This amendment must be defeated.
  Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), distinguished chairman of the Committee 
on the Judiciary.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Hostettler 
amendment, which I believe deals with the issue of compliance with the 
torture amendment in a humane manner that will safeguard the safety of 
the American people.
  Let me say why this is necessary. Under current law, as interpreted 
by the courts, a criminal who has committed a crime or conspired to 
commit a crime in another country, or someone who is on a terrorist 
watch list can come to the United States. When they get here, they 
claim asylum. It takes a while to adjudicate asylum applications.
  They also can say if he is immediately deported, then he would be 
tortured if he went back home. So the way it stands now under the 
current law, that person would be out in society free to commit crimes, 
free to commit terrorist acts until the time comes for the asylum 
hearing. And then if the person were found not to be eligible for 
asylum, they still could not be deported if they thought that they 
would be tortured when they come back home.
  So if we cannot send them home under the torture convention, and that 
is the case in many Middle Eastern countries, and we cannot detain 
them, then they are out on the street posing a danger to society.
  What the Hostettler amendment does in this circumstance is say that 
they can be detained. And there are procedural safeguards in the 
Hostettler amendment that set up standards for detention and require a 
review every 6 months. If my colleagues vote against this amendment, 
they are going to have these people out on the street.
  They should not be out on the street. They should be detained or 
deported. If we cannot deport them, then let us give the Department of 
Homeland Security the authority to detain them. Pass the amendment.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee), ranking member of the Immigration, Border 
Security, and Claims Subcommittee.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding me this time and for his leadership. I thank the chairman of 
the subcommittee and the chairman of the full committee for their 
comments.
  I agree with the chairman of the full committee. Keep them, detain 
them here. The problem with this amendment is that it is subjected to 
persons who are not terrorists. It is subjected to persons who can 
cause harm but are not terrorists. This is the problem.
  The White House has already said that the President of the United 
States opposes provisions dealing with sending people to places where 
torture occurs. The President made it clear that the United States 
stands against and will not tolerate torture and that the United States 
remains committed to comply with its obligations under the convention 
against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment.
  The amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana amendment does 
not solve the problem. It requires, or asks, the Secretary of State to 
simply ask a country not to torture the individual. Do my colleagues 
believe that Sudan would comply with that? That is not the case. This 
amendment is subjected to mistake.
  Let me just read Cat Stevens: ``I am a victim.'' Although the 
circumstances are different, he was yanked off a Washington-bound plane 
and sent home. The singer, formerly known as Cat Stevens, says he 
became the victim of an ``unjust and arbitrary system.'' This is what 
we are passing now.
  ``I was devastated,'' he wrote. ``The unbelievable thing is that only 
2 months earlier, I had been having meetings in Washington with top 
officials from the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community 
Initiatives to talk about my charity work.''
  The real key in this amendment is that we should deal with this 
question in another separate opportunity to really address this in a 
fair manner. This amendment will be a wide, wide, wide net, and what 
will happen with this net? Innocent persons will be forced to places 
where they will be tortured.
  The President is standing up against it. We stand up against it. I 
will simply argue that this is not the appropriate vehicle to use. This 
goes against the convention against torture, and I ask my colleagues to 
consider a high moral ground in this and to vote against the amendment. 
We must also support the two Smith of New Jersey amendments to 
eliminate the very bad H.R. 10 provisions subjecting deported persons 
to possible torture against the convention against torture.
  This amendment would make minor changes to the expedited removal 
provisions in section 3006, but we need more than minor changes. We 
need to eliminate expedited removal proceedings entirely. Expedited 
removal proceedings are conducted by immigration officers who are not 
even attorneys. There is no hearing before an immigration judge, no 
right to counsel, and no appeal. Nevertheless, despite this complete 
absence of due process, someone removed from the United States in 
expedited removal proceedings is barred for 5 years from returning.
  The amendment also would modify section 3032 to specify that people 
who have received

[[Page H8890]]

CAT relief or withholding of removal may be detained indefinitely if 
they are dangerous. The authority to detain dangerous aliens 
indefinitely already exists.
  In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the United States Supreme 
Court held that the detention provisions in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, read in light of the Constitution's demands, limit an 
alien's post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary 
to bring about that alien's removal from the United States. The Supreme 
Court found further that once removal is no longer reasonably 
foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute--
except where special circumstances justify continued detention, such as 
when it is necessary to protect the public.
  In response to that Supreme Court decision, the former Immigration 
and Naturalization Service promulgated regulations for determining the 
circumstances under which an alien may be held in custody beyond the 
statutory removal period. 8 C.F.R. Sec. 241.4. These regulations 
authorize the Government to continue to detain aliens who present 
foreign policy concerns or national security and terrorism concerns, as 
well as individuals who are especially dangerous due to a mental 
condition or personality disorder, even though their removal is not 
likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.
  If we are going to establish a statutory criterion for deciding when 
indefinite detention is warranted, we need to have a hearing first. An 
unwise or inadequate criterion will result in people being detained 
indefinitely who should be released from custody. We need to proceed 
with caution on this matter.
  I urge you to vote against this amendment.

                              {time}  1115

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kolbe). There is 1 minute remaining on 
each side. The gentleman from California (Mr. Berman), as a member of 
the Committee on the Judiciary and in opposition, has the right to 
close.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler).
  Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to at this time state that 
the administration, as a result of the amendment to section 3032, has 
said that they favor the change in my amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of the time to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart).
  Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I think it is 
important that we realize that this amendment, while not perfect, it is 
extremely important that it pass. I am very supportive of the Smith 
amendments that will be debated shortly. But what this amendment does 
is it keeps us, the United States of America, in compliance with the 
convention against torture, allowing us, obviously, not to, in order to 
be in compliance with the convention against torture, not to deport 
people to places where they will be tortured. But it also gives 
discretion to the Secretary of Homeland Security to detain, to keep 
under detention, terrorists, murderers, rapists, child molesters, and a 
limited list of other serious criminals.
  To comply with the convention against torture, it is important that 
we pass this amendment.
  I thank the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler) for his hard 
work.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the remaining time.
  I am going to vote against the Hostettler amendment because, number 
one, it is a smokescreen by pretending to fix 3006 and 3007, the 
amendments that will follow this amendment when we come back to the 
Committee of the Whole; and, secondly, because it has a glaring 
loophole involving assurances from the torturing country that they will 
not torture. That means it is still in violation of the Convention 
Against Torture. Members will decide how they are going to vote on that 
particular amendment.
  The point I want to make most of all is do not fall for the trap 
which is being set by this amendment that the Smith amendments to 3006 
and 3037, that have nothing to do with terrorism and that allow for 
mass deportations with no due process and which fundamentally change 
our asylum laws, do not fall for the trap that by pasting the 
Hostettler amendment you have cured the defects in those provisions. Be 
sure to vote for the Smith amendments and against those provisions when 
they come up.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler).
  The amendment was agreed to.


        Sequential Votes Postponed in the Committee of the Whole

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, 
proceedings will now resume on those amendments on which further 
proceedings were postponed in the following order: Amendment No. 4 
offered by Mr. Kirk of Illinois, Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. 
Sessions of Texas, Amendment No. 8 offered by Mr. Carter of Texas, 
Amendment No. 11 offered by Mr. Goodlatte of Virginia, Amendment No. 12 
offered by Mr. Green of Wisconsin.
  The Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the time for any electronic vote 
after the first vote in this series.


                  Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Kirk

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The pending business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on Amendment No. 4 offered by the gentleman from Illinois 
(Mr. Kirk) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the 
ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 414, 
noes 0, not voting 18, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 512]

                               AYES--414

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Baldwin
     Ballenger
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Beauprez
     Becerra
     Bell
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blumenauer
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown, Corrine
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burns
     Burr
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carson (IN)
     Carson (OK)
     Carter
     Case
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Chocola
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Cole
     Collins
     Cooper
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dooley (CA)
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Emanuel
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Everett
     Farr
     Fattah
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harman
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herseth
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley (OR)
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Israel
     Issa
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kleczka
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Lynch
     Maloney
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Mica
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Nethercutt
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Owens
     Oxley

[[Page H8891]]


     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Renzi
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Rodriguez
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schrock
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Toomey
     Turner (OH)
     Turner (TX)
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Vitter
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--18

     Boehlert
     Clay
     Conyers
     Culberson
     Filner
     Gephardt
     Hinojosa
     Lipinski
     Majette
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     Meek (FL)
     Norwood
     Ortiz
     Paul
     Slaughter
     Tauzin
     Towns


                Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Aderholt) (during the vote). Members 
are advised that there are 2 minutes remaining in this vote.

                              {time}  1142

  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Ms. McCARTHY of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 512, I was 
unavoidable detained at a doctor's appointment. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``aye.''
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 512, I was in my 
Congressional District on official business. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``aye.''


                  Amendment No. 5 Offered by Sessions

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The pending business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Sessions) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the 
ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 385, 
noes 30, not voting 17, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 513]

                               AYES--385

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Baldwin
     Ballenger
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Beauprez
     Becerra
     Bell
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown, Corrine
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burns
     Burr
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carson (OK)
     Carter
     Case
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Chocola
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Cole
     Collins
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costello
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dooley (CA)
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Emanuel
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Everett
     Fattah
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harman
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herseth
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Hooley (OR)
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Israel
     Issa
     Istook
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kleczka
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Lynch
     Maloney
     Manzullo
     Marshall
     Matheson
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Mica
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Nethercutt
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Obey
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Owens
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Renzi
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Rodriguez
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Royce
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schrock
     Scott (GA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Toomey
     Turner (OH)
     Turner (TX)
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Visclosky
     Vitter
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watson
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Wu
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                                NOES--30

     Blumenauer
     Carson (IN)
     Farr
     Grijalva
     Hastings (FL)
     Holt
     Honda
     Jackson (IL)
     Kildee
     Kucinich
     Lee
     Lewis (GA)
     Markey
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     Mollohan
     Oberstar
     Olver
     Payne
     Rangel
     Roybal-Allard
     Sabo
     Scott (VA)
     Solis
     Stark
     Velazquez
     Waters
     Watt
     Woolsey

                             NOT VOTING--17

     Boehlert
     Cox
     Culberson
     Filner
     Gephardt
     Hinojosa
     Lipinski
     Majette
     Matsui
     Meek (FL)
     Norwood
     Ortiz
     Paul
     Ruppersberger
     Slaughter
     Tauzin
     Towns


                Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised there 
are 2 minutes remaining in this vote.

                              {time}  1152

  Mr. KUCINICH and Mr. BLUMENAUER changed their vote from ``aye'' to 
``no.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 513, I was in my 
Congressional District on official business. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``aye.''


                 Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Carter

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Aderholt). The pending business is the 
demand for a recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Carter) on which further proceedings were postponed and 
on which the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

[[Page H8892]]

                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 344, 
noes 72, not voting 16, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 514]

                               AYES--344

     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Beauprez
     Bell
     Berkley
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown, Corrine
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burns
     Burr
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carson (OK)
     Carter
     Case
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Chocola
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Cole
     Collins
     Cooper
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dooley (CA)
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Emanuel
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Everett
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harman
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herseth
     Hill
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Hooley (OR)
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Israel
     Issa
     Istook
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Lynch
     Maloney
     Manzullo
     Marshall
     Matheson
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Menendez
     Mica
     Michaud
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neal (MA)
     Nethercutt
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Renzi
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Rodriguez
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sandlin
     Saxton
     Schiff
     Schrock
     Scott (GA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Turner (OH)
     Turner (TX)
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Vitter
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Wu
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                                NOES--72

     Abercrombie
     Baldwin
     Becerra
     Berman
     Blumenauer
     Capuano
     Carson (IN)
     Clay
     Conyers
     Davis (IL)
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     Ehlers
     Farr
     Fattah
     Frank (MA)
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hastings (FL)
     Hinchey
     Hoekstra
     Holt
     Honda
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren
     Markey
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     Meeks (NY)
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Mollohan
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Oberstar
     Olver
     Owens
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Rangel
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanders
     Schakowsky
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Smith (NJ)
     Solis
     Stark
     Tierney
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Woolsey

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Boehlert
     Culberson
     Filner
     Gephardt
     Hinojosa
     Lipinski
     Majette
     Matsui
     Meek (FL)
     Norwood
     Obey
     Ortiz
     Paul
     Slaughter
     Tauzin
     Towns


                Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised there 
are 2 minutes remaining in this vote.

                              {time}  1202

  Mr. RUSH, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Ms. LINDA T. SANCHEZ of 
California, Mr. WAXMAN and Mr. SHERMAN changed their vote from ``aye'' 
to ``no.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 514, I was in my 
Congressional District on official business. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``aye''.


               Amendment No. 11 Offered by Mr. Goodlatte

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Aderholt). The pending business is the 
demand for a recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) on which further proceedings were 
postponed and on which the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 333, 
noes 84, not voting 15, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 515]

                               AYES--333

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Andrews
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Beauprez
     Bell
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown, Corrine
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burns
     Burr
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carson (OK)
     Carter
     Case
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Chocola
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Cole
     Collins
     Cooper
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dooley (CA)
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Emanuel
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Everett
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herseth
     Hill
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Hooley (OR)
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Israel
     Issa
     Istook
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kleczka
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Lynch
     Manzullo
     Marshall
     Matheson
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Menendez
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Musgrave
     Myrick

[[Page H8893]]


     Napolitano
     Nethercutt
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Obey
     Osborne
     Ose
     Oxley
     Pascrell
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Renzi
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Rodriguez
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Sandlin
     Saxton
     Schiff
     Schrock
     Scott (GA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stupak
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Turner (OH)
     Turner (TX)
     Udall (CO)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Vitter
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Wu
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                                NOES--84

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Baldwin
     Becerra
     Blumenauer
     Brown (OH)
     Capps
     Carson (IN)
     Clay
     Conyers
     Davis (IL)
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Farr
     Fattah
     Frank (MA)
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hinchey
     Holt
     Honda
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson (IL)
     Jones (OH)
     Kilpatrick
     Kucinich
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren
     Maloney
     Markey
     McCarthy (MO)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     Meehan
     Meeks (NY)
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Mollohan
     Nadler
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Olver
     Otter
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Rangel
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Schakowsky
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Smith (WA)
     Solis
     Stark
     Strickland
     Tierney
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Woolsey

                             NOT VOTING--15

     Boehlert
     Culberson
     Filner
     Gephardt
     Hinojosa
     Lipinski
     Majette
     Matsui
     Meek (FL)
     Norwood
     Ortiz
     Paul
     Slaughter
     Tauzin
     Towns


                Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (during the vote). There are 2 minutes 
remaining in this vote.

                              {time}  1212

  Mr. RUSH, Mrs. MALONEY, and Mr. DICKS changed their vote from ``aye'' 
to ``no.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 515, I was in my 
congressional district on official business. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``aye''.


             Amendment 12 Offered by Mr. Green of Wisconsin

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The pending business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin 
(Mr. Green) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which 
the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 283, 
noes 132, not voting 17, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 516]

                               AYES--283

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Beauprez
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burns
     Burr
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Cardoza
     Carson (OK)
     Carter
     Case
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Chocola
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Cole
     Collins
     Cooper
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeFazio
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dingell
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herseth
     Hill
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Hooley (OR)
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Issa
     Istook
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kaptur
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     Marshall
     Matheson
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pascrell
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sandlin
     Saxton
     Schrock
     Scott (GA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Turner (OH)
     Turner (TX)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Vitter
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Wu
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--132

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Becerra
     Bell
     Berkley
     Berman
     Blumenauer
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown, Corrine
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson (IN)
     Clay
     Conyers
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Doggett
     Dooley (CA)
     Emanuel
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Frank (MA)
     Gonzalez
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hinchey
     Hoeffel
     Holt
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Maloney
     Markey
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     Meehan
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Mollohan
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Price (NC)
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Smith (WA)
     Solis
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tauscher
     Thompson (CA)
     Tierney
     Udall (CO)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Wilson (NM)
     Woolsey
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--17

     Boehlert
     Culberson
     Filner
     Gephardt
     Hinojosa
     Johnson, E. B.
     Lipinski
     Majette
     Matsui
     Meek (FL)
     Norwood
     Ortiz
     Paul
     Slaughter
     Sullivan
     Tauzin
     Towns


                Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Aderholt) (during the vote). Members 
are advised that 2 minutes remain in this vote.

                              {time}  1220

  Mr. WYNN changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. SHAYS changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.

[[Page H8894]]

  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated against:
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 516, I was in my 
congressional district on official business. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``no''.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Terry) having assumed the chair, Mr. Aderholt, Chairman pro tempore of 
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported 
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 10) 
to provide for reform of the intelligence community, terrorism 
prevention and prosecution, border security, and international 
cooperation and coordination, and for other purposes, had come to no 
resolution thereon.

                          ____________________


Congressional Record: October 8, 2004 (House)
Page H8894-H8978                       



 
                9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION ACT

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, 
H.R. 10.

                              {time}  1222


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of 
the bill (H.R. 10) to provide for reform of the intelligence community, 
terrorism prevention and prosecution, border security, and 
international cooperation and coordination, and for other purposes, 
with Mr. Aderholt (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose 
earlier today, the amendment numbered 12 printed in House Report 108-
751 by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Green) had been disposed of.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 14 printed in House 
Report 108-751.


          Amendment No. 14 Offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 14 offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey:
       Strike section 3006 (page 242, line 18 through page 244, 
     line 9) and redesignate provisions and conform the table of 
     contents accordingly.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith) and the gentleman from Wisconsin 
(Mr. Sensenbrenner) each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, section 3006 would make one of the most sweeping, 
unfair changes in immigration policy in the last decade and, if 
enacted, would pose life-threatening consequences for asylum seekers, 
trafficking victims, men, women and children. Section 3006 would 
radically alter existing law with respect to expedited removal, and it 
would mandate that any noncitizen found in the U.S. be summarily 
deported if an immigration officer determined that the person had not 
been inspected upon entry to the country and could not prove to the 
immigration officer that he or she had been living in the U.S. for more 
than 5 years.
  This mandate, Mr. Chairman, effectively transforms what was a 
discretionary program managed by Homeland Security and requires them to 
impose this procedure anywhere, including in the interior of the U.S.
  Section 3006 would be especially harmful for women and children who 
are escaping a range of gender-related persecutions such as rape, 
sexual slavery, trafficking and honor killings since persons scarred by 
such trauma often require time before they can step forward to express 
their claims.
  Mr. Chairman, section 3006 would provide for a super-expedited 
process of removing these people from the United States, with virtually 
no right of review, thus eviscerating protections that Congress has 
provided over the last several years for such victims in the Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act which I was the prime sponsor 
of and is the law of the land.
  Mr. Chairman, I want all of my colleagues to know that President 
Bush, in his SAP which came out yesterday, made it very clear that he 
is against this provision. The Bush administration wants this out. I 
call on Members on both sides of the aisle, Democrats and Republicans, 
to vote for my amendment which would strip it. Also, there are some 40 
organizations, the U.S. Catholic Conference of Bishops; National 
Association of Evangelicals; Refugees International; and Human Rights 
First--a whole array from the left, right, middle, and everywhere else, 
who say this is an unwarranted change, an unfair change in our 
immigration policy. It does not belong in here. The 9/11 Commission did 
not ask for it.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this is not an issue of humanitarian application of our 
immigration refugee laws. It is an issue of securing our borders. None 
of the people the gentleman from New Jersey described would be subject 
to this if they have come to the United States and entered legally with 
a claim of persecution under the Refugee Act or a claim of asylum 
because of what is going on in their home country.
  Simply stated, the amendment of the gentleman from New Jersey would 
strike the expedited removal provisions of this bill. The expedited 
removal provisions say that the provision of existing law shall be used 
when the INS picks up somebody who is illegally in this country and who 
has not been here for 5 years or more.
  What is going on is that there are a lot of non-Mexicans that are 
coming across the southern border. Many of these people come from the 
Middle East. Without having the expedited removal procedures that are 
contained in this law, we are stuck with these people. This is a 
tremendous security threat to the United States. And what the provision 
that the gentleman from New Jersey seeks to strike is a provision that 
says that you do not have to jump through all kinds of legal hoops to 
get these people who have illegally entered the United States out of 
our country or who have entered legally and have overstayed their 
visas. It is as simple as that. This is a question of border security. 
It is not a question of persecuting all of the list of people that the 
gentleman from New Jersey talked about.
  If you want secure borders in this country, the only vote on the 
Smith amendment is ``no.''
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my good

[[Page H8895]]

friend and colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman).
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, my friend, the chairman of the Committee on 
the Judiciary, says this is a matter of security. The Bush 
administration and George Bush say this is a massively overbroad 
expedited removal expansion. The President of the United States in 
January of this year gave a speech where he said the vast majority of 
these people ``bring to America the values of faith in God, love of 
family, hard work and self-reliance.''
  If this amendment does not pass, this bill, because a group of people 
in the majority party in a caucus led by the gentleman from Colorado 
(Mr. Tancredo) wants to glom their anti-immigration ideas onto a 
terrorism and intelligence reform bill, that these people will be 
deported, up to a million, without due process, without an 
administrative hearing, without a balancing process that deals with 
earned adjustment or with guest workers or with anything else. It is 
the forcing of an anti-immigration agenda onto an intelligence and 
homeland security reform bill.
  We are talking here about victims of trafficking, Cubans fleeing 
Castro, battered women eligible for VAWA protection. We are talking 
about people who are classic refugees who will be picked up in this 
process; they will never have a chance to assert their asylum claims, 
people who will be subject to torture. You can say you adhere to every 
convention in the world on refugees and on torture, but if you 
summarily allow low-level enforcement officers in the Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement agency or in the Border Patrol to pick people up, 
take them out of the country, not let them tell their families they are 
being deported, insisting that they prove their credentials by the 
documents they have on their body at that time, that means either legal 
citizenship or legal residents or being here more than 5 years, you are 
subject to deportation, immediately, summarily, without any chance for 
judicial review and administrative hearing, any process whatsoever.
  Please support the Smith amendment. It is very important.

                              {time}  1230

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time 
to the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart).
  Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Chairman, it is really 
unfortunate that this provision is in the base bill. It lumps the base 
bill, as written, all immigrants who may be accused of being 
undocumented who have been here for 5 years or less, with terrorists.
  The current law says, if they are a terrorist, there is no limitation 
on time. They are picked up, and if they are not arrested, they are 
thrown out without a hearing. It also says, if they are an undocumented 
immigrant, within 2 years they can be picked up and sent out without a 
hearing. That is current.
  This expands it to 5 years even though the 2 years of current law is 
not being used.
  There is a border initiative that has been announced. Many other 
initiatives can be announced under current law. But, no, we want to 
expand it to 5 years and say that folks who are working in restaurants 
or folks that are cutting the grass or folks that are doing something 
that is very honorable and has nothing to do with terrorism are now 
going to be lumped together to say, even if they have a claim to stay 
in this country, they do not even have a hearing. They cannot even have 
a hearing and they are going to be thrown out.
  And, by the way, it is not even ``may.'' It is ``shall.'' That is 
what we are talking about. And it is most unfortunate that in the 
context of a terrorism bill we have this language.
  Vote for the Smith amendment.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry. Has the time 
of the gentleman from New Jersey expired?
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Aderholt). The gentleman from New 
Jersey's (Mr. Smith) time has expired.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to 
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler), chairman of the 
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims Subcommittee.
  (Mr. HOSTETTLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of the full 
committee for yielding me this time.
  I join the gentleman from Wisconsin (Chairman Sensenbrenner) in 
opposing this amendment, which would take a vital tool out of the hands 
of our Border Patrol in keeping foreign terrorists out of the United 
States.
  As it is distressingly easy for aliens to illegally cross our 
borders, it would also be relatively easy for terrorists to enter. The 
Border Patrol recently released data that in just the period from last 
October through this June, over 44,000 non-Mexican aliens were caught 
trying to cross the northern or southern borders, including eight from 
Afghanistan, six from Algeria, 13 from Egypt, 20 from Indonesia, 10 
from Iran, 55 from Israel, 122 from Pakistan, six from Saudi Arabia, 
six from Syria, 22 from Turkey, and two from Yemen. A South African 
woman alleged to be a terrorist on the terrorist watch list recently 
indicated that she had crossed the border illegally from Mexico.
  What happens to these aliens when they are intercepted? They go 
through a ``revolving door'' when we release them because of a lack of 
detention space. Then we hold out some desperate hope that they will 
appear for their immigration court hearings months afterward. However, 
the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General found that 
the INS was not able to remove 87 percent of aliens with final orders 
of removal who were not detained. And, worse yet, 94 percent of 
nondetained aliens from state sponsors of terrorism who had final 
removal orders could not be located for their deportation. In an age of 
terrorism, this is just unacceptable.
  There is no good reason not to subject illegal aliens who have 
crossed the border illegally to immediate deportation. These aliens, if 
they have been in the U.S. less than 10 years, have no right to seek 
cancellation of removal unless they are making a claim of asylum. Once 
again, unless they are making a claim of asylum and can show a credible 
fear of persecution, there is no reason not to subject them to 
expedited removal.
  And, in fact, the amendment that just recently passed in the House, 
previously, removes the 1-year limitation in the base bill for 
convention against torture and asylum relief. So those who seek relief 
from convention against torture and for asylum will not be harmed by 
the bill.
  So the amendment must be rejected so that we can allow for the 
expedited removal of individuals who would do us harm. I urge my 
colleagues to vote against the amendment.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in favor of Mr. 
Smith's amendment. This amendment would eliminate section 3006, which 
contains the expedited removal provisions of H.R. 10. Expedited removal 
proceedings are conducted by immigration officers who are not even 
attorneys. There is no hearing before an immigration judge, no right to 
counsel, and no appeal. Nevertheless, despite this complete absence of 
due process, someone removed from the United States in expedited 
removal proceedings is barred for 5 years from returning.
  In fact, section 3006 would make expedited removal proceedings even 
harsher than they already are. When aliens are placed in expedited 
removal proceedings now, they have been in the United States for less 
than a year and can apply for asylum if they are able to establish a 
credible fear of persecution. Section 3006 would place undocumented 
aliens in expedited removal proceedings who have been in the United 
States for up to 5 years, and it would deprive them of the right to 
apply for asylum if they have been here for more than a year and have 
not filed an asylum application yet, even if they can establish a 
credible fear of persecution.
  It is true that aliens in full due process removal proceedings before 
an Immigration Judge also are barred from applying for asylum if they 
have been in the United States for a year and have not already filed an 
asylum application, but it is not an absolute bar. The alien may still 
apply for asylum if he can demonstrate the existence of changed 
circumstances which materially affect his eligibility for asylum, or he 
can show extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing 
the application within the one-year period. If people who have been in 
the United States for more than a year are going to be subjected to

[[Page H8896]]

expedited removal proceedings, the same exceptions should be available 
to them for filing an asylum application after the 1-year period.
  The fact that section 3006 would apply the 1-year time limit without 
the exception that was enacted with it is a clear indication of the 
intention of that section, which is to move people out of the country 
as quickly as possible without regard to the consequences. It is a 
certainty that this will result in sending people to countries where 
they will be persecuted.
  I urge you to vote for this amendment to remove section 3006 from 
H.R. 10.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Linder). The question is on the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin 
(Mr. Sensenbrenner) will be postponed.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 15 printed in House 
report 108-751.


          Amendment No. 15 Offered by Mr. Smith of new jersey

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 15 offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey:
       Strike section 3007 (page 244, line 10 through page 247, 
     line 18) and redesignate provisions and conform the table of 
     contents accordingly.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith) and the gentleman from Wisconsin 
(Mr. Sensenbrenner) each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, section 3007 would make sweeping changes, again, to our 
asylum law that the drafters erroneously contend would stop terrorists 
from being granted asylum. I think Members should remember that under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, terrorists are ineligible for 
asylum. Worse than being unnecessary, Mr. Chairman, this section would 
erect a number of brand-new barriers to winning asylum claims that are 
likely to prevent bona fide refugees from receiving the protection of 
asylum in the United States, and they will result in bona fide refugees 
being returned to their persecutors. This stacks the deck against 
refugees.
  Let me just point out to my colleagues that in section 3007, asylum 
officers and immigration judges would be encouraged to deny an asylum 
claim simply because the applicant was unable to recall or recount 
information later in the process that she did not mention when she 
initially encountered an immigration officer. Asylum applicants, 
particularly survivors of torture, rape, forced abortion or 
sterilization may not be comfortable telling this information to a 
uniformed male inspection officer at an airport. Asylum applicants in 
that setting may not be provided with appropriate interpreters and may 
be understandably fearful of discussing their problems about their home 
countries in detail. They are frightened people, especially trafficking 
victims.
  In section 3007 there is also, amazingly, a demeanor standard which 
flies in the face of our American standards. If somebody looks down 
during the asylum interview and does not somehow convey honesty, when 
one has been tortured, when they have been a victim of trafficking, 
when they have been hurt emotionally, psychologically, and physically, 
they could be denied asylum. Sometimes, talking to somebody who is a 
uniformed member of our service, they may be intimidated.
  Also, and this is the central problem with this language, Mr. 
Chairman, it changes what is in the Refugee convention. There are five 
reasons why people can get asylum: race, nationality, religion, the 
Members know what they are. This changes it so that the applicant must 
prove it is the central reason. Asking asylum seekers to read the minds 
of their persecutors is absurd on its face. This will mean many people 
who are true asylum seekers, that should get it, will not get it.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to quote from the 9/11 Commission staff report 
entitled 9/11 and Terrorist Travel. The staff found that a number of 
terrorists have abused the asylum system and that once terrorists have 
entered the United States, their next challenge was to find a way to 
remain here. The primary method was immigration fraud, concocting bogus 
political asylum stories when they arrive.
  This amendment strikes a good-faith effort to try to prevent these 
people from gaming the system.
  The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, which deals with the border States 
of Arizona and California, has made it difficult for immigration judges 
to deny fraudulent asylum application by terrorists and simply by scam 
artists. In their recent decisions, the 9th Circuit has failed to give 
deference to the adverse credibility determination of immigration 
judges in asylum cases, and as a result, many fraudulent applications 
have been approved.
  The role of an appeals court is not to make a judgment on the 
credibility of the witnesses. That is done by the trial court. And here 
the immigration judges have determined that some of these applicants 
have no credibility, and yet the 9th Circuit says their determination 
really does not mean anything.
  Even worse, the 9th Circuit has created a disturbing precedent that 
has made it easier for suspected terrorists to receive asylum. The 
Circuit has held that punishment inflicted on account of perceived 
membership in a terrorist group may constitute persecution on account 
of the political opinion of that terrorist group. Aliens who have been 
arrested in the United States on suspicion of being members of 
terrorist organizations have received asylum because of alleged fear of 
persecution if returned because of an affiliation with these groups. 
Talk about circular reasoning.
  A member of the Board of Immigration Appeals complains that if a 
terrorist organization arose in this country aimed at the violent 
overthrow of the Federal Government through a program of murder of 
government and law enforcement officials and federal judges, it would 
appear that government suppression of this organization would be an act 
of persecution in the 9th Circuit. Being a guerilla is not a form of 
political opinion. Being a guerrilla means being engaged in acts of 
violence and illegality.
  All the bill does is overturn the precedent of the 9th Circuit and 
provide a list of factors that an immigration judge can consider in 
assessing the credibility of the applicant, such as the demeanor, 
candor, and consistency of the witness.
  What the gentleman from New Jersey is proposing to do is to say that 
if the witness has bad demeanor, no candor, and no consistency, they 
have got to grant the petition for asylum. And that is wrong and the 
amendment should be defeated.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart).
  Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Chairman, with all due 
respect to the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, whom I have 
great respect for, that is not what the effect of the Smith amendment 
would be.
  There is a long tradition, based on international and domestic law 
and jurisprudence, that establishes the right to seek political asylum 
when there is a well-founded fear of persecution. In addition, our laws 
are clear that membership in any terrorist organization or activity in 
a terrorist organization automatically bars them even if they have a 
well-founded fear of persecution.
  So what this legislation, the base bill, does is go much farther than 
what the opponents of the Smith amendment have portrayed up to now. And 
the reality of the matter is that when the law is as clear with regard 
to terrorism, and certainly as it has been in recent years, it is 
unfortunate to diminish the rights of people who are legitimately 
fearing for their lives and seeking political asylum.

[[Page H8897]]

  That is why the Smith amendment is so necessary. So I would ask my 
colleagues to support it.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the 
distinguished gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. Abercrombie).
  (Mr. ABERCROMBIE asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, I only have 30 seconds here, and this 
is all I ask of all the Members: Let us not confuse trafficking with 
terrorism. I understand how they can be concerned about that and why 
they are trying to do their best. Nobody gainsays them that. But in the 
process, we are destroying the opportunity or standing the chance of 
destroying the opportunity to make the necessary differentiations, 
especially where trafficking is concerned.
  There are over 50,000, by the State Department's estimation, people 
who are essentially made slaves today in the United States, who are 
trafficked, and they could display exactly the same sense of demeanor 
and the other characteristics that the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. 
Smith) has been discussing, and the other persons who are opposed to 
it.
  Please give the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith) an opportunity 
with this amendment so we can make certain that we do not make that 
confusion.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, because I have so many 
requests for time and will not get to all of them, I ask unanimous 
consent to extend this debate by 5 minutes equally divided between the 
proponent and opponent.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New Jersey?
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I object, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Objection is heard.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I yield 45 seconds to the 
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Cardin), who is the vice chairman of the 
Helsinki Commission, on which I serve as well.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, first, I thank the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Smith) for bringing forth this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, let me point out that the adoption of this amendment is 
very much consistent with the 9/11 Commission's report. They talk about 
the United States winning the battle of ideas. The United States has 
stood against persecution of individuals because of race, nationality, 
or religion. If we do not adopt this amendment, the underlying bill 
will make it much more difficult for people who are legitimately being 
persecuted to be able to claim asylum in the United States.

                              {time}  1245

  That is not what this Nation is about. Our Nation is about helping 
people and individuals who are being persecuted. This amendment is very 
important. I urge my colleagues to support it.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time 
to the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman).
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Linder). The gentleman from California 
is recognized for 45 seconds.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, it is already law that terrorists cannot 
assert asylum. That is the law. A balanced and sensible proposal to fix 
our broken immigration system involves better border security, it 
involves the U.S. Visit Program, it involves sensible reforms in the 
procedures, it involves combining watch lists. It does not require the 
gaming of the asylum hearing process in a way that would cause us to 
depart from the fundamental precepts this country has always had, that 
we are a refuge for true refugees fleeing persecution in other 
countries.
  The ``fixes'' in this process, in this bill, that the gentleman from 
New Jersey (Mr. Smith) seeks to strike, games the system against people 
who are true refugees. Please pass the Smith amendment.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.
  Mr. Chairman, what this amendment does is it allows liars to get 
asylum, because under the Smith amendment, somebody that an immigration 
judge determines is lying through his teeth and has no candor cannot 
take into consideration in determining the decision the fact that the 
judge has determined that the applicant has lied.
  That is wrong. An ``aye'' vote protects liars. A ``no'' vote allows 
the judge to make a determination on candor.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of the time to the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Hostettler).
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Indiana is recognized 
for 1\1/2\ minutes.
  (Mr. HOSTETTLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I join the gentleman from Wisconsin 
(Chairman Sensenbrenner) in opposing this amendment. We must remember 
that terrorists continually try to abuse our asylum system. For 
example, in 1993, Mir Aimal Kansi murdered two CIA employees at CIA 
headquarters and Ramzi Yousef masterminded the first World Trade Center 
attack after they were free after applying for asylum. Just weeks ago, 
Shahawar Matin Siraj was arrested in New York City for plotting to bomb 
a subway station. Siraj was freed after applying for asylum.
  As the gentleman from Wisconsin (Chairman Sensenbrenner) stated, the 
Ninth Circuit has adopted a body of circuit law that is essentially 
preventing immigration judges from finding that asylum applicants are 
lying by severely limiting the factors, such as their inconsistencies 
and demeanor, that the immigration judge can consider in finding aliens 
untruthful.
  Given that government attorneys are not allowed to ask the foreign 
government about the facts regarding the asylum claimants, about the 
only evidence available to the government on which to deny an asylum 
application is the perceived truthfulness of the applicant's testimony.
  If a criminal jury can sentence a United States citizen who is a 
criminal defendant to life imprisonment or execution based on their not 
believing the American citizen's defendant's story, certainly an 
immigration judge can deny an alien asylum on the same basis.
  The bill would overturn this ridiculous precedent used by the Ninth 
Circuit. The bill provides a list of factors that an immigration judge 
can consider in determining truthfulness.
  Oppose the Smith amendment.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in favor of Mr. 
Smith's amendment. Mr. Smith's amendment would eliminate section 3007. 
Section 3007 would create a special eligibility standard for asylum 
applicants who claim persecution on account of an accusation of 
involvement with a guerilla, militant, or terrorist organization; or on 
account of an accusation of engaging in or supporting guerilla, 
militant, or terrorist activities. They must establish that race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion was or will be the central motive for their 
persecution.
  Frankly, this puzzles me. The burden of proof in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act now provides that the person must establish that he has 
been persecuted or has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
or political opinion. It seems to me that if the persecution is on 
account of one of those enumerated grounds, it necessarily would be the 
central motive for the persecution.
  Section 3007 also would require Immigration Judges to deny applicants 
asylum because they fail to provide corroborating evidence if it is 
reasonable to expect corroborating evidence. This is not necessary 
either. My immigration counsel, Nolan Rappaport, wrote decisions for 
the Board of Immigration Appeals before he left the Justice Department. 
In 1989, he wrote Matter of Dass, 20 I&N Dec. 120 (BIA 1989), in which 
the Board held that corroborating evidence should be presented in 
asylum cases if it is available. That was 15 years ago, and it is still 
the rule that immigration judges follow in asylum proceedings. The 
thing that is new is the provision in section 3007 which states that, 
``No court shall reverse a determination made by an adjudicator with 
respect to the availability of corroborating evidence . . . unless the 
court finds that a reasonable adjudicator is compelled to conclude that 
such corroborating evidence is unavailable.'' That is punitive and 
unnecessary. Immigration Judges do not need statutory guidance in 
making credibility determinations, and Federal circuit court judges 
should not be so severely restricted in their review of credibility 
determinations.

[[Page H8898]]

  I urge you to vote for Mr. Smith's amendment to eliminate section 
3007.


                         Parliamentary Inquiry

  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, what is the procedure by which one can 
point out that none of the gentlemen from Indiana received asylum?
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman has not stated a proper 
parliamentary inquiry.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Jersey 
(Mr. Smith) will be postponed.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment 
No. 17 printed in House Report 108-751.


                  Amendment No. 17 Offered by Mr. Ose

  Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 17 offered by Mr. Ose:
       At the end of title III of the bill, insert the following:

                     Subtitle F--Security Barriers

     SEC. 3121. EXPEDITED COMPLETION OF SECURITY BARRIERS.

       (a) In General.--In order to construct the physical 
     barriers and roads described in section 102 of the Omnibus 
     Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997 (Public Law 104-208, 
     div. C), the tracts of land described in subsection (b) shall 
     be exempt from the requirements of the provisions listed in 
     subsection (c).
       (b) Legal Description.--The tracts of land referred to in 
     subsection (a) are as follows:
       (1) Zone west.--A tract of land situated within Section 2, 
     3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, Township 19 South, Range 2 West 
     of the San Bernadino Meridian, within the County of San 
     Diego, State of California, more particularly described as 
     follows: Beginning at the Southwest corner of Fractional 
     Section 7, T19S, R2W; said Point-of-Beginning being on the 
     United States/Mexico International Boundary Line and also 
     being a point of mean sea level of the Pacific Ocean (at 
     Borderfield State Park); thence, N 02 deg.31'00'' W, a 
     distance of approximately 800.00 feet to a point. Thence, N 
     84 deg.44'08'' E, a distance of approximately 1,845.12 feet 
     to a point. Said point being on the Section line common to 
     Section 7 and 8, T19S, R2W. Thence, S 01 deg.05'10'' W, along 
     said Section line, a distance of approximately 270.62 feet to 
     a point. Thence, S 89 deg.49'43'' E, a distance of 
     approximately 1,356.50 feet to a point. Thence, N 
     45 deg.34'58'' E, a distance of approximately 1,901.75 feet 
     to a point. Said point being on the Section line common to 
     Sections 5 and 8, T19S, R2W. Thence, N 00 deg.00'00'' E, a 
     distance of approximately 300.00 feet to a point. Thence, S 
     89 deg.54'53'' E, a distance of approximately 1,322.05 feet 
     to a point. Thence, S 00 deg.25'27'' W, a distance of 
     approximately 300.00 feet to a point. Said point being on the 
     Section line common to Sections 5 and 8, T19S, R2W. Thence, S 
     89 deg.37'09'' E, along the Section line common to Section 4, 
     5, 8, and 9, T19S, R2W, a distance of approximately 5,361.32 
     feet to a point. Thence, N 00 deg.12'59'' E, a distance of 
     approximately 400.00 feet to a point. Thence, N 
     90 deg.00'00'' E, a distance of approximately 1,349.81 feet 
     to a point. Said point being on the Section line common to 
     Sections 3 and 4, T19S, R2W. Thence, S 00 deg.30'02'' W, a 
     distance of approximately 410.37 feet to a point. Said point 
     being the Section corner common to Sections 3, 4, 9, and 10, 
     T19S, R2W. Thence, S 89 deg.36'11'' E, along the Section line 
     common to Sections 2, 3, 10, and 11, T19S, R2W, a distance of 
     approximately 6,129.36 feet to a point. Thence, along the arc 
     of a curve to the left, having a radius of 518.88 feet, and a 
     distance of 204.96 feet to a point. Thence, S 89 deg.59'41'' 
     E, a distance of approximately 258.66 feet to a point. 
     Thence, S 00 deg.00'00'' E, a distance of approximately 
     111.74 feet to a point. Said point being within the NW \1/4\ 
     of fractional section 11, T19S, R2W, on the United States/
     Mexico International Boundary. Thence, S 84 deg.41'20'' W, 
     along said United States/Mexico International Boundary, a 
     distance of approximately 19,210.48 feet to the Point-of-
     Beginning. Said tract of land containing an area of 396.61 
     acre, more or less.
       (2) Zone east.--A tract of land situated within Section 32 
     and 33, Township 18 South, Range 1 East of the San Bernadino 
     Meridian, County of San Diego, State of California, and being 
     described as follows: Beginning at the \1/4\ Section line of 
     Section 32, T18S, R1E. Said Point-of-Beginning being on the 
     United States/Mexico International Boundary Line and having a 
     coordinate value of X = 6360877.25 Y = 1781730.88. Thence, N 
     00 deg.32'02'' W, a distance of approximately 163.56 feet to 
     a point. Thence, N 78 deg.33'17'' E, a distance of 
     approximately 1,388.23 feet to a point. Thence, N 
     84 deg.37'31'' E, a distance of approximately 1,340.20 feet 
     to a point. Thence, N 75 deg.00'00'' E, a distance of 
     approximately 1,000.00 feet to a point. Thence, S 
     88 deg.06'07'' E, a distance of approximately 1,806.81 feet 
     to a point. Thence, N 80 deg.00'00'' E, a distance of 
     approximately 1,050.00 feet to a point. Thence, N 
     87 deg.00'00'' E, a distance of approximately 1,100.00 feet 
     to a point. Thence, S 00 deg.00'00'' W, a distance of 
     approximately 300.00 feet to a point. Said point being on the 
     United States/Mexico International boundary. Thence, S 
     84 deg.44'09'' W, along said boundary, a distance of 
     approximately 7,629.63 to the Point-of-Beginning. Said tract 
     of land having an area of approximately 56.60 acres more or 
     less.
       (c) Exemption From Certain Requirements.--The provisions 
     referred to in subsection (a) areas as follows:
       (1) Noise Control Act of 1972 (42 U.S.C. 4901 et seq.), as 
     amended by Quiet Communities of 1978 (P.L. 95-609).
       (2) Clean Air Act and amendments of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 7401-
     7671q).
       (3) Clean Water Act of 1977 (33 U.S.C. 1342).
       (4) Executive Order 11988 (Floodplain Management), as 
     amended by Executive Order 12608.
       (5) Executive Order 11990 (Protection of Wetlands), as 
     amended by Executive Order 12608.
       (6) Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C. 
     1456(c)).
       (7) Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (42 
     U.S.C. 6901-6992k) as amended by Hazardous and Solid Waste 
     Amendments of 1984 (P.L. 98-616; 98 Stat. 3221).
       (8) Comprehensive, Environmental Response, Compensation, 
     Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601-9675), as amended by 
     Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know-Act of 1986 
     (42 U.S.C. 11001 et seq.).
       (9) Farmland Protection Policy Act of 1981 (7 U.S.C. 4201 
     et seq.).
       (10) Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended (16 U.S.C. 
     1531-1544).
       (11) Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (16 U.S.C. 703-712).
       (12) Bald and Golden Eagle Act of 1940, as amended (16 
     U.S.C. 688-688d).
       (13) National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (16 U.S.C. 
     470 et seq.), as amended Executive Order 13007--Sacred Sites 
     Presidential Memorandum regarding government to Government 
     Relations (April 29, 1994).
       (14) Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
     (43 CFR Part 10).
       (15) Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 (16 
     U.S.C. 470aa-470ii).
       (16) Executive Order 12898 (Federal Actions to Address 
     Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income 
     Populations) of 1994.

          Modification to Amendment No. 17 Offered by Mr. Ose

  Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my amendment be 
modified in the form at the desk.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will report the modification.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Modification to amendment No. 17 offered by Mr. Ose:
       On page 5, line 4, strike ``areas as'' and insert ``are 
     as''.
       Add at the end of subsection (c) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(17) Any other laws or requirements that delay 
     construction of the barriers and roads described in this 
     section.''.


                         Parliamentary Inquiry

  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, on the definition of ``any other laws or 
requirements,'' does that broaden it to every law in America?
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. That is not a proper parliamentary inquiry. 
That is a matter for debate on the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the modification?
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the right to object.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized under his 
reservation.
  Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. FARR. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. OSE. Perhaps I can elucidate. The point of adding that particular 
provision is that, given the crush of time, I am a little bit concerned 
that we did not cover everything. There is no purpose here to include 
Davis-Bacon or employment or employee things. This is strictly an 
effort to remove impediments to the construction of this security 
fence.
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, it will not go to 
legislative intent. It will go to what you have stated in words here, 
and it says ``any other laws or requirements.'' Any.
  Mr. OSE. If the gentleman will yield further, as they relate to the 
fence, that is my intention.
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, that delay the 
construction

[[Page H8899]]

of barriers, there could be all kinds of other reasons that are 
unrelated to just your waiving the environmental requirements.
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. FARR. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding. Let me 
state, I know the intent of our colleague, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Ose), is to ensure that there may not be other 
environmental regulations which in any way impinge on the construction 
of this fence. I think one of the things that could take place is at 
least there would be clear legislative intent established through this 
debate process indicating that it would not move into other areas about 
which my friend has mentioned as areas of concern for him.
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I think the intent here 
is to waive a lot of laws so you can get this done in an expeditious 
manner. I think you are opening up a Pandora's Box. It is going to give 
you so many lawsuits that you are never going to get the project done.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Does the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Farr) object to the modification?
  Mr. FARR. I object.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Objection is heard.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Ose) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Ose).
  Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this amendment is to secure our southern 
border immediately south of San Diego by completing the security fence 
that this Congress authorized and that President Clinton signed back in 
September of 1996. The rationale for this is very straightforward. 
Construction of this fence reduces illegal immigration. The Border 
Patrol has told us that the construction of the fence to date has 
reduced illegal immigration in that area by 80 percent.
  The gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) just 5 minutes ago talked 
about an integrated border security system that accomplishes just that, 
and this fence is part of that. Construction of the fence serves to 
protect our country from potential terrorist activity.
  I have a letter from the Secretary of the Navy here to our good 
friend, the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter), that I will enter 
into the Record that highlights exactly that point relative to the 
naval base 4 miles north of the site in question.
  Construction of this fence is part of an integrated border security 
system identified in the 9/11 Commission report as a priority. I am not 
making this stuff up. This is part of an integrated border security 
system that this country has previously authorized that has been bogged 
down for 8 years in getting completed.
  I regret, I truly do regret, the impact this may have on 
environmental or cultural resources, but we need to make a choice. The 
votes we post will be clear: Are we for protecting this country by 
completing this fence, or are we not?
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Who seeks time in opposition?
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to this 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. Farr) is 
recognized for 5 minutes in opposition to the amendment.
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
  Mr. Chairman, there is no problem that is broken that needs to be 
fixed. There is nobody opposed to the process of getting this fence 
built. The problem with this amendment is you create a whole ability to 
have more lawsuits filed and you give a message that the environmental 
laws are not necessary.
  The process is working. In 2 weeks, the Homeland Security Office is 
meeting with the California Coastal Commission where they have laid out 
all of the road map for how to get it done. The fact of the letter that 
was just submitted for the Record, the Navy never asked that any of 
these environmental laws be waived. We built a fence around the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey by abiding by all the laws, including 
the Coastal Commission laws.
  So this is a made-up issue to try to get a recorded vote to show 
that, if you support the environment, you are for terrorism. Nothing in 
the 9/11 Commission report recommended this amendment. It is totally 
unnecessary.
  I would just tell you that the process is working and what you see in 
this amendment is trying to subvert it.
  Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, before I yield to my good friend from San Diego, I want 
to make a point that the exemptions offered in section C of my 
amendment shall also incorporate section 102(c) of title I, subtitle A 
of the 1997 Omnibus Appropriations Act, that is Public Law 104-208, in 
its entirety.
  I will say there is a meeting that is going to take place in 2 weeks. 
It will be the sixteenth meeting this year alone trying to move this 
project forward. I think the meetings now take place so they can 
schedule more meetings. We need to get this finished.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 90 seconds to my friend, the gentleman from San 
Diego, California (Mr. Hunter).
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, this is the last piece of the border fence. We have 14 
miles of the most extensive smugglers' corridor in the United States. 
That is where more smugglers move cocaine, undocumented workers and 
potentially terrorists through this corridor that lies between San 
Diego and Tijuana.
  In a bill signed by President Clinton, in fact giving the Attorney 
General the right to waive the Endangered Species Act, it was 
considered to be so important. We have built now of this 14-mile 
stretch, 11 miles. Only 3 miles remain. The Secretary of the Navy has 
sent us a letter saying that there are security reasons to have that 
last piece of the border fence constructed.
  Let me just tell you what is happening in the 6 years that these 
slow-roll negotiations have gone on and on and on, and the California 
Coastal Commission and other agencies never go along with this thing. 
While that has happened, we have had North Koreans coming in the 
smugglers' corridor, as documented by the Border Patrol. We have had 
Iraqis coming in through that corridor. We have had Iranians coming in 
through that corridor.
  If you want to come in as a terrorist into the United States, do not 
come in through LAX. Come in on the land border between Mexico and the 
U.S. If you come through the gap in the fence that we are talking 
about, you are right there at one of the most sophisticated American 
naval bases in the world.
  We need to build this fence. It is in line with national security, in 
line with President Clinton's law. Let us get it done.
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Kildee).
  Mr. KILDEE. Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge my colleagues to oppose the 
Ose amendment which will exempt the construction of the proposed 
security barrier in the San Diego area from most Federal environmental 
laws, regulations and executive orders, including four that 
specifically and directly impact Indian tribes.
  The Ose amendment would waive the requirements of the National 
Historic Preservation Act of 1966, the Native American Graves 
Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990, the 1996 Executive Order 13007 
on sacred sites and the Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979.

                              {time}  1300

  These Federal requirements were enacted by Congress and implemented 
by Democratic and Republican administrations to fulfill promises we 
made to native Americans that their places of worship, resting places 
for the deceased, and religious freedom will not be disturbed or 
intruded upon again and, instead, will be protected and preserved.
  This amendment undermines those laws by precluding tribal 
consultations on Native American burial grounds, religious shrines, and 
cultural and historical sites located in the construction area.
  I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the Ose amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record the following letter:


[[Page H8900]]


                                              National Congress of


                                             American Indians,

                                  Washington, DC, October 7, 2004.
     Hon. Chairman Sensenbrenner,
     House Judiciary Chairman.
       Honorable James Sensenbrenner: We have become aware that a 
     proposed amendment to H.R. 10, ``The 9/11 Recommendations 
     Implementation Act'', would undermine two federal statutes 
     designed to preserve and protect Native American cultural 
     heritage.
       NCAI is extremely sensitive to the issues of protecting our 
     homeland. Tribes play a vital role in protecting our borders 
     with over 200 miles of United States border located on tribal 
     lands and with 38 tribes on or near international borders. 
     Additionally, significant numbers of tribes are located near 
     critical infrastructure, including missile silos, chemical 
     depots, dams and nuclear power plants.
       Native peoples have proven their unwavering commitment to 
     protecting this country. Currently, 19,761 American Indians 
     and Alaskan Natives are serving in the military, and as noted 
     by many members of Congress, Native Americans serve in the 
     United States military at higher rates than any other ethnic 
     group.
       The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
     of 1990 (NAGPRA), P.L. 101-601, 24 U.S.C. 3002), was enacted 
     to protect fragile tribal cultures from exploitation. It was 
     designed to address the flagrant violation of the ``civil 
     rights of America's first citizens'' 136 C.R. Sec. 17174.
       Furthermore, Congress has expressly stated in statue that 
     it viewed NAGPRA as part part of its trust responsibility to 
     Indian tribes and people, specifically stating that it 
     ``reflects the unique relationship between the Federal 
     Government and Indian tribes'' 25 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3010.
       The destruction of culturally sensitive sites is 
     irreversible and unconscionable. The proposed amendment of 
     Representative Ose would undermine the very foundation of 
     NAGPRA and the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (16 
     U.S.C. 470 et seq.). At the very least we would expect that a 
     consultation process be considered in any legislation that 
     would affect cultural sites. We urge you oppose any 
     amendments that would undermine our rights to protect and 
     preserve our cultural heritage.
           Sincerely,
                                                      Tex G. Hall.

  Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 10 seconds.
  The original authorization to build this fence gave the Attorney 
General the opportunity to waive all of these things the previous 
speaker voted for. You cannot have it both ways. You are either for 
protecting this country or you are not.
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Solis).
  Ms. SOLIS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Ose amendment to 
H.R. 10, and I refuse to play environmental politics with our national 
security.
  This amendment is nothing more than an extreme and unnecessary 
attempt to circumvent the ongoing approval and construction process and 
exempt construction of the fence from 16 public health, cultural 
heritage, and environmental regulations.
  The U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the California 
Coastal Commission are currently in negotiations now over the 
completion of this security barrier. In fact, they are scheduled to 
meet again October 26 of this year.
  According to the California Coastal Commission: ``Feasible 
alternatives are available that would significantly lessen adverse 
impacts to coastal zone resources and still will enable the California 
Border Patrol to meet its border patrol needs.''
  Supporters of this amendment have shown no evidence to prove that 
each of the 16 cultural heritage, public health, and environmental 
regulations it seeks to undermine is blocking completion of the 
security barrier.
  How is the executive order on environmental justice blocking 
completion of this security barrier?
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Oregon 
(Mr. Blumenauer).
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, there are all sorts of problems along 
the United States-Mexican border, but to take a sensitive area that, as 
my friend, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Kildee), has pointed out, 
where there are serious issues relating to native Americans. We are 
working on areas here, in terms of the massive amount of fill that 
would be involved, twice the size of the Hoover Dam, is something that 
people need to take a pause, a deep breath, and take a careful look. 
There is a lot of environmental damage that can be done.
  We cannot keep people, illegal aliens, from crossing the border. It 
is porous, we know it. To move forward with this massive project now, 
suspending environmental regulations, extends a precedent that I think 
is chilling.
  Our Capitol is a monument to our inability to get things right in 
terms of things that all of us know are not going to retard terrorists 
but make our Capitol into sort of a fortress. We are spending money, 
trying to make people feel good. Suspending environmental regulations 
in a way that is not going to have any long-term impact. I urge its 
rejection.
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the remaining time.
  Look, you have been able to build almost this entire fence without 
the waiving of any environmental laws. The record that the gentleman 
showed there just a moment ago gave the Attorney General the authority 
to waive NEPA and ESEA. You are now going into a whole complicated 
series of laws, including the protection of Bald Eagles, Indian rights 
and things like that, Superfund issues.
  I have been involved with these issues for a long, long time, living 
on the coast. And I will tell the gentleman that what he is opening up 
is a can of worms for lawsuits and complaints and so on.
  This is not the wise way to go with this amendment, and I object to 
the amendment and will ask for a recorded vote on it.
  Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Two speakers go, we had someone on that side talking about 
negotiations, that there are negotiations pending. The fact of the 
matter is negotiations have been going on for 6 years, and we are no 
closer to a solution. We had a speaker just previous from Oregon stand 
up and make an argument for doing nothing. I am sorry, I do not 
understand that.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend the debate time on 
each side for 1 minute.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Linder). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from San 
Diego, California (Mr. Cunningham).
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Hunter) and I have been fighting this for the last 20 years. Many of 
the same people that tried to stop us from putting up the fence when 
there were rapes and murders, there was a single line of barbed wire 
and people were coming right and left into the United States with truck 
loads of marijuana and cocaine. I resent saying this is a made-up 
issue.
  I have operated out of that Navy base. Gordon England, Secretary of 
the Navy, states that it is imperative, that it is dangerous to leave 
that hole open. Bald Eagles in a 4-mile stretch? Give me a break.
  We are at war. I sit on the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, and I cannot go into specifics, but do my colleagues know 
where these guys are coming up? In Mexico. And do my colleagues know 
what? We are vulnerable. We have a base that has nuclear ships right 
next door that could blow up the whole waterfront.
  It is wrong to oppose this. We need to close the hole in the dike.
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 50 seconds to the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Inslee).
  (Mr. INSLEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. INSLEE. Mr. Chairman, well, I have some bad news. After this 3 
miles is done, there is about another 4,000 miles unfortunately that 
remains at risk.
  I would just ask Members to consider what we just did on this floor. 
We just extended the time a little bit to get this debate right, and I 
appreciate the gentleman's courtesy in doing that.
  Do we know why Americans have accepted the Endangered Species Act? 
Because they recognize you can take just a bit more time and do it 
right.
  On October 26, when they have this meeting to get this resolved, we 
hope that is going to happen. We have built bridges, we have built 
highways, we built the most powerful military machine in world history 
with the Endangered Species Act. This is not endangering us. We should 
not go back to the

[[Page H8901]]

days of ignoring this problem. Defeat this amendment.
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the remaining time.
  Let me say it straight. Nobody is against building this fence. It is 
just, why waive all of these rules? We have built 14 miles of this 
fence without having to waive any rules. I do not think it is 
necessary. I think it is a guise and a political maneuver.
  Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier), the chairman of the Committee 
on Rules and the champion in California on immigration issues and 
protecting our country.
  (Mr. DREIER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Chairman, we have heard the eloquence of my friends, 
the gentleman from San Diego, California (Mr. Cunningham) and the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter) and the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Ose), obviously, focusing on the national security, the 
homeland security, the drug interdiction aspect of this, which is very 
important.
  Let us talk about the environmental side of not constructing this 
fence. The Tijuana Estuary happens to be a very environmentally 
sensitive area. The fact that this fence is not being constructed is 
jeopardizing the environmental quality in the San Diego sector right 
now with the trash and the other disposal that is taking place, really 
exacerbating a serious problem.
  The pro-environment vote and pro-national security and homeland 
security vote is to vote ``yes'' for the Ose amendment.
  Mrs. DAVIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I must regretfully rise in 
opposition to the Ose amendment, which has been sprung on us this 
afternoon without any notice or prior opportunity to discuss the 
issues.
  As a member of the Armed Services Committee, I have spent hundreds of 
hours devoted to the issues surrounding Homeland Security. Situated as 
my district is in San Diego, I am concerned to secure not only our 
border but also our busy port and ship-building facilities located on 
San Diego Bay, which is crossed by a dramatic bridge, our international 
airport, and our numerous military installations which are the home 
bases for nuclear carriers and nuclear submarine. We have much to be 
proud of--and much to protect.
  It is challenging to us all to prioritize actions that we can take 
with our Homeland Security dollars to provide increased security 
against past and likely focal points for terrorists. It is important 
that we assure that scarce resources are devoted to the kinds of 
actions that will in fact keep our borders safe from known entry points 
for terrorists.
  The measure before us to expedite the long-proposed triple border 
fence overturns years of effort on the part of the local communities 
along the border, civic groups, and elected representatives to come to 
consensus with the Border Patrol about appropriate means to enhance and 
strengthen the existing fence.
  Fortunately, during the past ten years since the inauguration of 
Operation Gatekeeper, the numbers of illegal border crossers in the 
area under consideration has dropped 80 percent.
  Nonetheless, I agree that the present quality of the single fence 
needs updating at least to the highest quality of fence construction 
proposed and already implemented along adjacent border areas. Moreover, 
I have been assured by local high tech companies which provide 
sophisticated technology for other homeland security needs that much 
more could be done with electronic surveillance and detection.
  Similar views have been officially expressed by the California 
Coastal Commission, which has jurisdiction in this area, and by the 
California Coastal Conservancy which has a $6 million road and access 
improvement project in this area.
  In the past, the California Border Patrol has been unwilling to 
pursue any alternative proposals other than the one which has been so 
thoroughly rejected by state and local interest groups. Their view has 
been ``my way, and it's a highway.''
  However, since its February vote to object to the proposal, the 
California Coastal Commission has been working with the Department of 
Homeland Security's office of Homeland Security, Customs and Border 
Protection in charge of construction to resolve this issue. I 
understand the parties met in April to discuss their views and that 
both parties expected and have planned to continue this effort at a 
meeting on October 26, 2004, to continue the ongoing negotiations. 
Perhaps the author was unaware of this plan. I believe we must support 
this effort.
  It is no surprise that the Ose amendment waives all powers of the 
Clean Air Act; the Clean Water Act; the Protection of Wetlands; the 
Floodplain Management; the Coastal Zone Management Act; the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act; the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, Liability Act as amended by Emergency Planning 
and Community Right-To-Know Act; the Farmland Protection Policy Act; 
the Endangered Species Act; the Migratory Bird Treaty Act; the National 
Historic Preservation Act; the Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act; and the Archeological Resources Protection Act.
  That is because this proposal is so overwhelmingly threatening to the 
sensitive lands that would be destroyed as to offend all of these acts.
  Above all, this wholesale destruction is unnecessary. I would welcome 
continued work with the affected parties, most particularly with the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, to find a solution to their 
staffing needs that does not destroy millions of dollars of prior 
investment by California in these sensitive areas. We must use our 
scarce Homeland Security dollars in projects that are focused on major 
areas where there are large numbers of border crossers who might become 
a threat from terrorists.
  San Diego deserves to be protected, but we have many areas in need of 
new programs and technology that will address likely targets.
  I urge your defeat of this proposal at this time and your willingness 
to work together toward a reasoned proposal.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. All time having expired, the question is on 
the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Ose).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Ose) will be postponed.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 19 printed in House 
Report 108-751.


         Amendment No. 19 Offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania

  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 19 offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania:
       At the end of chapter 2 of subtitle H of title V (page 602, 
     after line 16), add the following:

     SEC. __. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COMPACTS.

       Section 611(h) of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 
     and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5196(h)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) as 
     paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), respectively;
       (2) by indenting paragraph (2) (as so redesignated); and
       (3) by striking the subsection designation and heading and 
     inserting the following:
       ``(h) Emergency Preparedness Compacts.--(1) The Director 
     shall establish a program supporting the development of 
     emergency preparedness compacts for acts of terrorism, 
     disasters, and emergencies throughout the Nation, by--
       ``(A) identifying and cataloging existing emergency 
     preparedness compacts for acts of terrorism, disasters, and 
     emergencies at the State and local levels of government;
       ``(B) disseminating to State and local governments examples 
     of best practices in the development of emergency 
     preparedness compacts and models of existing emergency 
     preparedness compacts, including agreements involving 
     interstate jurisdictions; and
       ``(C) completing an inventory of Federal response 
     capabilities for acts of terrorism, disasters, and 
     emergencies, making such inventory available to appropriate 
     Federal, State, and local government officials, and ensuring 
     that such inventory is as current and accurate as 
     practicable.''.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) and a Member opposed each will 
control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon.)
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as 
I may consume.
  I thank my good friend from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews) for cosponsoring 
this amendment. The gentleman has been a leader on homeland security 
and emergency response issues long before 9/11. In fact, we first met 
when he was the solicitor for the Camden County Firefighters 
Association and I was county commissioner across the river. We have 
worked together on first responder issues since then.

[[Page H8902]]

  This amendment is critically important, Mr. Chairman, because it 
requires the Federal Government to establish what should have been 
established years ago, and that is a process of identifying emergency 
preparedness compacts. Many of our regions like the Washington area 
region have already established multistate, multicounty jurisdictional 
plans to respond to natural and manmade disasters; but that is not the 
case around the country.
  This bill requires us to inventory those plans that are in place and 
do work to encourage and establish models that other jurisdictions can 
use. But it goes beyond that, Mr. Chairman, because this bill also 
requires an inventory of assets and resources that local emergency 
responders can call upon if and when a disaster occurs.
  I can recall, Mr. Chairman, during the tenure of my time in Congress, 
I have been on site at most disasters personally. I was walking the 
freeways of the San Francisco and Oakland area after the earthquake 10 
years ago with the chiefs of the San Francisco and Oakland Fire 
Departments, and they were looking for people who were allegedly still 
trapped in vehicles sandwiched in-between those two levels of the 
freeway that had come down on top of each other. I said to the chiefs, 
why are you not using thermal imagers, and they said to me, what are 
thermal imagers? They had no idea that the Defense Department had 
developed that technology 10 years earlier. They could have used that 
to very quickly identify people who were still alive.
  This bill requires a computerized inventory of those kinds of assets 
that are available that are not easily identified.
  I think Chief Morris in Oklahoma City, another good friend of mine, 
who responded to the terrorist attack on the Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City, when the chief arrived he needed structural engineers. 
He had children at day care that were trapped. He needed specialized 
advice on how to deal with the potential of chemical and biological 
agents. He had none of that available to him.
  Through this amendment, not only will we do the regional preplanning 
and require these compacts to be established, but we will also have an 
inventory of the available technologies that first responders can use 
that chief officers on the scenes of situations like Oklahoma City or 
the World Trade Center or any other incident in America can make 
available to them from the Federal or State governments.
  It is a good amendment. I think it makes common sense, and I hope all 
of our colleagues will support it.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. There being no Member claiming the time in 
opposition to the amendment, without objection, the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Andrews) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) for offering 
this amendment. His wealth of experience on the front lines in the 
first responder community shows, once again; and I am honored to join 
with him in this amendment.

                              {time}  1315

  I thank the gentleman for his years of dedication to first responders 
in this country, long before Members talked about them on this floor.
  The gentleman from Pennsylvania and I share a geographic area. Our 
districts are separated only by a river. If, God forbid, there were a 
terrorist attack, a mass crime, a natural disaster, his constituents 
and mine would be responsible for responding to it. We are proud of the 
fact that locally in our area there is cooperation. But the fact of the 
matter is cooperation now happens by accident, not by design; and our 
amendment is to change that. It requires that the director of FEMA do 
three things: first, that the director of FEMA catalog examples of 
cooperative agreements and compacts around the country.
  Second, it requires that the FEMA director issue guidance on best 
practices, what is working. We are going to hear from the gentlewoman 
from the District of Columbia (Ms. Norton) talk about the capital area 
plan that is working very, very well.
  Thirdly, it requires an up-to-date accessible inventory of Federal 
resources that would be available. In the golden hour that takes place 
after such an attack or disaster, we do not have weeks or months to 
study a problem. The chiefs on the ground have to decide right there 
and then what to do. By making this resource available to them, I think 
we will save lives and minimize disaster. I thank the gentleman for 
offering this amendment, and I hope Members on both sides of the aisle 
will vote a resounding ``yes.''
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance 
of my time.
  In closing, I thank the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews). This 
is a bipartisan amendment. I would just say to Members I am going to 
ask for a recorded vote here because I introduced legislation almost a 
dozen years ago to require our FEMA agency to establish a computerized 
inventory. Twelve years later, it is still not done. As a reinforcement 
of this part of the bill, I am going to ask for a show of support from 
my colleagues.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as she may consume to 
the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia (Ms. Norton), whose 
capital area response plan has set the model for how to go about this 
regional planning and serves as an example to others.
  Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time, and I thank the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews) and the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) for this amendment.
  I have an amendment pending in a package we have not gotten to. My 
pending amendment would in fact have relevant regions across the United 
States, whether within the same State or not, engage functionally in 
what I think this amendment would do. I would have a coordinator and 
the coordinator could be chosen by whoever were the various officials, 
whether across State lines or within a State.
  Yes, it is true that the national capital region is the model for how 
it should be done. Here we have three States: Maryland, Virginia and 
the District of Columbia. The portions of those States closest to where 
the security is of greatest need and where the Federal presence is, 
because the Federal presence is as much in Virginia, Maryland and the 
District of Columbia, and in some cases more so, witness the Pentagon. 
This region has a long history of cooperating.
  But after 9/11, even that long history of cooperation was not enough. 
Because of the uniqueness of the national capital region, Congress has 
said there has to be a paid coordinator for this region. Other regions, 
of course, would almost surely not have the Federal Government paying 
for the coordinator. The reason that the coordinator is paid for here 
is because virtually the entire Federal presence is located here.
  But I have worried that what a coordinator would do is not being done 
in these regions. I appreciate what these Members have done. They have 
leaped over the title and essentially said do it, or at least do some 
of it, such as information-sharing. Other areas of their amendment make 
it clear that what Congress wants is coordination across State lines if 
necessary and certainly across regional lines.
  I think minimally what this amendment wants is what the country 
needs, and I hope because this is a bipartisan amendment that it will 
pass; it will pave the way for the next step which would be of course 
coordinators for the various regions. Again, I thank the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. 
Andrews) for their amendment.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) 
for his efforts. I also thank Mr. Dozor from the gentleman's staff, and 
Mr. Knotts from mine for their great effort.
  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Weldon-Andrews 
amendment on emergency preparedness compacts.
  The terrorist attacks of September 2001 stretched the response 
capabilities of our

[[Page H8903]]

local, State, and Federal emergency agencies to the breaking point. The 
attacks caused an unprecedented number of deaths, unprecedented 
physical destruction, and, at times, utter chaos. The attacks also 
presented planning, operational, and logistical problems of new and 
different dimensions.
  Both the Bush administration and 9/11 Commission have recognized that 
no one community can cope with such an unparalleled catastrophe by 
itself. Indeed, the President's Homeland Security Directive 5 and the 
9/11 Commission's report both stressed the vital importance of ensuring 
that all levels of government across the Nation have the capability to 
work together efficiently and effectively.
  This is precisely why emergency preparedness compacts are so 
important. They enable emergency managers from different jurisdictions 
and agencies to provide personnel and equipment in the event of acts of 
terrorism, disasters, and emergencies. They ensure that no community is 
overwhelmed.
  And this is also precisely why I urge you to support the Weldon-
Andrews amendment.
  Their amendment would require the Director of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, FEMA, to establish a program supporting the 
development of emergency preparedness compacts across the Nation.
  This program will identify and catalog all existing emergency 
preparedness compacts.
  This program also will encourage jurisdictions without compacts to 
enter into them by disseminating the best examples of such compacts.
  Finally, this program will create, and update as necessary, an 
inventory of Federal response capabilities and make it available to 
State and local government officials.
  I commend Representatives Weldon and Andrews for their bipartisan 
leadership and vision in offering this important amendment.
  As chairman of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, I strongly 
encourage my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Linder). The question is on the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
(Mr. Weldon) will be postponed.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 21 printed in House 
Report 108-751.


          Amendment No. 21 Offered by Mr. Bartlett of Maryland

  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 21 offered by Mr. Bartlett of Maryland:
       Page 478, insert after line 15 the following:

     SECTION 5010. STUDY OF EXPANSION OF AREA OF JURISDICTION OF 
                   OFFICE OF NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION COORDINATION.

       (a) Study.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting 
     through the Director of the Office of National Capital Region 
     Coordination, shall conduct a study of the feasibility and 
     desirability of modifying the definition of ``National 
     Capital Region'' applicable under section 882 of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 to expand the geographic area under the 
     jurisdiction of the Office of National Capital Region 
     Coordination.
       (b) Factors.--In conducting the study under subsection (a), 
     the Secretary shall analyze whether expanding the geographic 
     area under the jurisdiction of the Office of National Region 
     Coordination will--
       (1) promote coordination among State and local governments 
     within the Region, including regional governing bodies, and 
     coordination of the efforts of first responders; and
       (2) enhance the ability of such State and local governments 
     and the Federal Government to prevent and respond to a 
     terrorist attack within the Region.
       (c) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to 
     Congress on the study conducted under subsection (a), and 
     shall include in the report such recommendations (including 
     recommendations for legislation to amend section 882 of the 
     Homeland Security Act of 2002) as the Secretary considers 
     appropriate.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the 
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett) and the gentlewoman from the 
District of Columbia (Ms. Norton) each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett).
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  This amendment, which is the text of H.R. 3583, will establish a 
study to provide an objective analysis of whether the current 
capabilities of the infrastructure in the region around our Nation's 
capital are adequate in the event of a mass casualty disaster.
  I have worked closely with the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Cardin), 
the gentlewoman from Virginia (Mrs. Jo Ann Davis), and I have worked 
closely on this legislation; and we are very pleased by the wide 
bipartisan support of our colleagues in Maryland, Washington, and 
Virginia.
  This amendment calls upon the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
create a commission to report to Congress its findings. In particular, 
I have looked forward to working with the gentlewoman from the District 
of Columbia (Ms. Norton) to address her concerns concerning the 
implementation of this amendment. I will commit to the gentlewoman to 
ensure that the GSA will have major input into the study, that it will 
not predispose an alteration of the definition of the national capital 
region, and that it will assess existing emergency response 
capabilities among the public and private sectors in the District of 
Columbia, Maryland and Virginia, what capabilities would be necessary 
in the event of a mass casualty incident and recommendations to correct 
any shortfalls.
  This commission will specifically study the major Federal interstate 
highways out of America's capital. Normal rush hour traffic around our 
Nation's capital can last as long as 4 hours. In the event of a 
terrorist attack or other emergency in Washington, D.C., millions of 
people would be unable to evacuate and get home to their families.
  In June 2003, the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments 
Board urged Congress to analyze whether the current definition of the 
national capital region meets current needs. I am pleased that they 
support this amendment.
  I would also like to recognize an important local health care 
provider, Adventist HealthCare. Adventist HealthCare has two hospitals, 
Washington Adventist Hospital in Takoma Park and Shady Grove Adventist 
in Rockville, along two of the designated evacuation routes developed 
by the D.C. Division of Transportation. Adventist HealthCare has 
independently committed to invest over $360 million to develop and 
begin implementing a comprehensive plan to ensure that they are 
prepared for the potential of a mass casualty event.
  Cooperation and coordination between relevant Federal Government 
agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security, Health and Human 
Services, and private sectors, are very important.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I oppose this amendment with regret. I believe every 
Member of the national capital region and everyone who cares about the 
security of the national capital region should oppose this amendment as 
well.
  Normally, I would have absolutely no problem with a study. This study 
and this amendment, both the original bill and the amendment are called 
study of an expansion of area of jurisdiction of Office of National 
Capital Region Coordination. That is the special coordinator I just 
spoke about in the last amendment.
  The amendment itself suggests the conclusion: expansion. This is not 
the time to even think about diluting the area defined by law as the 
national capital region. It has not happened haphazardly. I did offer 
to work with my colleagues from the greater region. I think an 
objective study that was done by the region, the agencies that have the 
expertise, and the gentleman has indicated that he knows that the GSA 
has it, yes homeland security might be useful. I am a member of both 
committees. The last thing I want to do is give the Committee on 
Homeland Security, which has existing mandates to report back to 
Congress, something else to do, something which I think is absolutely 
unnecessary.
  The expertise exists within the government, and this is something 
that

[[Page H8904]]

does not require legislation at all. The resources that protect the 
national capital region we need to expand, not think about diluting. 
When we talk about this region, understand what we are talking about. 
We are talking about the Pentagon, the CIA, NIH, Arlington Cemetery, 
Andrews, Fort Belvoir, the FBI Academy, Goddard Space Center, the FDA. 
We are not talking about the District of Columbia. It goes without 
saying that is going to be protected. The greater Federal presence is 
found in nearby Maryland, Northern Virginia, and Montgomery and Prince 
George's counties.
  What expense we have to go through just to protect this region I do 
not want to even talk about, but it includes the flyover, the guards we 
have to send out. We have to send them out if there were an agency 
somewhere out in the region.
  The GSA and the National Capital Planning Commission have 
consistently been against sprawl of government agencies. It is already 
6,000 square miles. We are talking way out into Maryland and Virginia, 
Loudoun, Prince William, Fairfax. They have opposed it because of 
security, commuting, taxpayer cost-saving reasons. They have 
consistently said we have to keep as many agencies as possible within 
this region. It is much harder to protect Federal facilities; and 
therefore they say, whether you are talking about embassies or Federal 
agencies, they ought to be within this region.
  When there is an alert, they have to send them wherever the facility 
is. For economies of scale, we want to in fact keep agencies 
concentrated. If Members want a study, I am willing to study; but they 
do not need to come before this Congress and ask for an expensive study 
to be done, distracting the Department of Homeland Security from what 
it has already on its plate.
  I am willing to work with the gentleman, but I think we do not need a 
new study at taxpayers' expense beyond what we already have the ability 
to do. The agencies that are within the national capital area, the 
coordination that we do now needs far greater focus and far greater 
resources. It is clear what the gentleman wants. I oppose this 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Cardin).
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, the national capital region was established 
in 1952 during the 82nd Congress. It includes not only the District of 
Columbia; it includes in Maryland, Prince George's and Montgomery 
counties. In Virginia, it is Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince 
William counties.

                              {time}  1330

  In the south, Mr. Chairman, the region goes about 30 miles. In the 
north, it goes about 10 miles. If it went 30 miles to the north, it 
would include Baltimore, where I happen to live.
  When we adopted the Homeland Security Act in 2002, we made reference 
to the national capital region. What we are asking, and I applaud my 
friend from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett) is to let the Department of 
Homeland Security study the security issues of this region.
  If we have a problem in the Nation's capital and people try to leave 
this region, they are going to want to be able to get to Crofton and 
Annapolis and to Frederick, and there is going to be gridlock if we do 
not have a plan that includes beyond that short distance in Maryland. 
All this does is ask for a study. It does not diminish resources at 
all. In fact, it will allow us to provide a more reasonable plan for 
the Nation's capital.
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentlewoman from Virginia (Mrs. Jo Ann Davis).
  Mrs. JO ANN DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I am glad my colleague 
from D.C. talked about protecting the FBI Academy in the national 
capital region because that, in fact, is located in what the 
gentlewoman calls ``way out there in Virginia'' which is my area.
  I rise today in strong support of the Bartlett amendment, which 
directs the Department of Homeland Security to conduct a study to see 
if there is a need to expand the national capital region.
  The terrorist attacks of 2001 demonstrated firsthand the need for the 
national capital region to be expanded. The I-95 corridor, which 
includes the Fredericksburg/Stafford area that I represent, served as 
one of the major evacuation routes for D.C. Anybody who drove down that 
95 corridor on September 11, 2001, would agree that, as one of the main 
evacuation routes, it is necessary to secure sufficient infrastructure 
along I-95 to handle any mass evacuation.
  The current definition of the national capital region should be 
expanded as a result of the new threats to homeland security. I urge 
all of my colleagues to support the Bartlett amendment. I urge my 
colleague from D.C. to look at where those areas that she says need to 
be protected, where they are located.
  Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining?
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Linder). The gentlewoman from the 
District of Columbia (Ms. Norton) has 30 seconds remaining.
  Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Moran).
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I could take much longer than 30 
seconds just to list the highest priority targets that are within the 
national capital region.
  The reality of what this is going to lead to is that you are going to 
have to substantially expand the amount of money available for homeland 
security or draw from other parts of the country to adequately protect 
the Capitol, the White House, the CIA, the Pentagon and the immediate 
suburbs of Northern Virginia, Maryland and, particularly, the District 
of Columbia; you have got to provide adequate resources. This is where 
the terrorists are going to target. This is ground zero. This is where 
the money needs to be concentrated.
  If we had enough money, we would love to go beyond that area. I do 
not think we can afford to.
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), the chairman of the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a good amendment. I 
support the amendment. This is an amendment we would like to have in 
the en bloc amendment. But having this study available for the national 
capital region is helpful. I think it is the right thing to do, but it 
is also helpful in determining and developing a case study which could 
be used in other areas.
  I support the amendment.
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, on 9/11, our world changed. What used to be adequate 
for the greater metropolitan area of Washington, which is defined by 
the national capital region, generally, what was adequate then may not 
be adequate now.
  This is a very simple amendment. It simply asks for a commission to 
study; we need to look at what the national capital area represents, 
and is the infrastructure here adequate to meet the kind of a terrorist 
attack that we might anticipate in the future? It is a very simple 
amendment, sir.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment 
No. 23 printed in House Report 108-751.


                 Amendment No. 23 Offered by Mr. Porter

  Mr. PORTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 23 offered by Mr. Porter:
       At the end of subtitle C of title V (page 493, after the 
     item after line 21) add the following:

     SEC. __. UNDER SECRETARY FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND TOURISM.

       (a) Establishment of Under Secretary for the Private Sector 
     and Tourism.--Section 103(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 
     2002 (6 U.S.C. 113(a)) is further amended by redesignating 
     paragraphs (2) through (10) in order as paragraphs (3) 
     through (11), and by inserting after paragraph (1) the 
     following:
       ``(2) An Under Secretary for the Private Sector and 
     Tourism.''.
       (b) Functions.--Section 102(f) of such Act (6 U.S.C. 
     112(f)) is further amended--

[[Page H8905]]

       (1) by striking so much as precedes paragraph (1) and 
     inserting the following:
       ``(f) Under Secretary for the Private Sector and Tourism.--
     The Undersecretary for the Private Sector and Tourism shall 
     be responsible for--''; and
       (2) by striking ``and'' after the semicolon at the end of 
     paragraph (7), by striking the period at the end of paragraph 
     (8) and inserting a semicolon, and by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(9) employing an analytic and economic staff who shall 
     report directly to the Under Secretary on the commercial and 
     economic impact of Department polices;
       ``(10) coordinating with the Office of State and Local 
     Government on all matters of concern to the private sector, 
     including the tourism industry; and
       ``(11) coordinating with the Assistant Secretary for Trade 
     Development of the Department of Commerce on means of 
     promoting tourism and travel to the United States.''.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the 
gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Porter) and a Member opposed each will 
control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Porter).
  Mr. PORTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to H.R. 10 that will recognize the 
importance of the private sector and the tourism industry in particular 
in our Nation's homeland security.
  I, like many Members here today in this great body, have read the 9/
11 report and am anxious to act on its findings.
  I would like to quote from that report: ``The mandate of the Homeland 
Security Department does not end with the government. The Department is 
also responsible for working with the private sector to ensure 
preparedness.''
  It also says, the ``private sector preparedness is not a luxury. It 
is a cost of doing business in the post 9/11 world.''
  Mr. Chairman, we currently have a Special Assistant to the Secretary 
for the Private Sector, before the report was published, and 
unfortunately, the report says we still are not helping the private 
sector enough.
  As an example, the Las Vegas community in the great State of Nevada, 
we had applied for the Urban Area Security Initiatives Grants and 
determined that, initially, we did not qualify because we are a small 
State of approximately 2 million people. With further research, they 
realized that we have 38 million tourists that visit the great State of 
Nevada annually. That is an example where there are some challenges 
with the current law.
  We need to promote this position to give it the weight, to make sure 
private industry is helped and encouraged in its effort to enhance 
homeland security while staying in business, protecting their employees 
and their customers.
  Again, as I read the 9/11 report, it mentioned how easily the 
terrorists mingled with the 500 million people who travel across our 
borders every year and with the hundreds of millions more who travel 
internally in this country. As I said, Nevada has close to 38 million 
visitors a year.
  The report has some excellent ideas on how to improve transportation 
and border security, and I look forward to passing those suggestions. 
But the travel and tourism industry is the number one, number two and 
number three industry in every State of the union. It is the common 
element of the private sector in every community. Domestic travellers 
spend close to $500 billion annually in this country. Foreign tourism 
contributes $80 billion to our economy. Tourism generates close to $95 
billion in taxes, and tourism in our country supports 7.2 million jobs, 
generating $158 billion in payroll.
  As a matter of fact, Las Vegas is the bellwether for an ever-changing 
and improving economy, creating close to 40,000 new jobs alone in the 
last year.
  Mr. Chairman, my amendment ensures that the DHS has a senior official 
that recognizes the importance of this industry and all industry and 
provides liaison with other Federal agencies active on this very 
important issues.
  Our small businesses, their employees, their customers deserve to 
have their needs count when homeland security decisions are made.
  It is important to note that this amendment does not cost the Federal 
Government in additional dollars or disrupt the operation of any 
agencies. Mr. Chairman, I urge the House to pass my amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to 
the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Porter) offers an 
amendment that points to the very important relationships between our 
homeland security and what goes on in our private sector.
  The 9/11 Commission recognized the critical role that the private 
sector plays in protecting our citizens from harm. The commission did 
not make the recommendations contained in the gentleman's amendment, 
but rather, one of the core recommendations of the 9/11 Commission did 
deal with the subject matter of the gentleman's amendment; and that is 
the recommendation to enhance preparedness for all disasters and 
emergencies, including acts of terrorism in the private sector.
  They specifically recommended that the Department of Homeland 
Security promote the adoption of private sector preparedness standards 
that have been developed by the American National Standards Institute.
  Once again, like many of the other recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission, H.R. 10 includes no provisions to deal with the need for 
standards for private sector preparedness. In the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks, the commission found that many of the tenants of the World 
Trade Center were unprepared for the catastrophic events that occurred. 
Many businesses did not regularly practice evacuation drills. Few had 
alternative communication systems, and many firms lacked the ability to 
identify who was working on that particular day.
  The Democratic substitute offered by the gentleman from New Jersey 
(Mr. Menendez), like the Private Sector Preparedness Act which I 
introduced back in July, establishes a program to ensure the safety and 
security of citizens while they are at work. It would provide 
businesses with the guidance they need to develop evacuation plans to 
account for all of their employees and to get back in business as soon 
as possible following a disaster.
  We understand that 85 percent of all critical infrastructure in our 
country is owned and operated by the private sector. It is, therefore, 
clear that a national standard is necessary to guarantee the safety of 
the American people. Yet, despite this very apparent and critical need, 
H.R. 10 fails to adopt in this 9/11 Commission's recommendations and, 
therefore, leaves a glaring gap in our Nation's security.
  I commend the gentleman for his amendment. I think that it is one 
that the department could, under existing law in the Homeland Security 
Act, carry out, but the effect of the amendment will be to urge the 
department to recognize the critical role of the private sector in our 
preparedness for terrorist instances. And it will also, I think, point 
out to the department that we must make an even greater effort to 
ensure that, as we impose security, we do not jeopardize the movement 
of commerce, the movement of trade; we do not jeopardize tourism, which 
is so vitally important to this country, particularly to the district 
and the State represented by the gentleman who offered the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. PORTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the comments from my colleague. I will 
conclude by stating the importance of this is for the safety first of 
those visiting and traveling to our communities, providing the 
expertise from those individuals that deal with, on a daily basis, the 
handling of millions and millions of visitors to our great State and to 
our country and to the businesses that do the same.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Hastert).
  Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the 9/11 
Recommendations Implementation Act. I urge all of my colleagues on both 
sides of the aisle to support it. I want to thank those who brought 
good ideas to the process to make this country safer.
  I want to thank the 9/11 Commission for their recommendations and the 
stellar work of both the chairman and the vice chairman of that 
committee over a long period of time to take the

[[Page H8906]]

interest of this Nation at heart, to try to craft recommendations that 
make this country safer against terrorists.
  I want to thank the chairmen and ranking members of the committees of 
jurisdiction in this House of Representatives. They have done an 
incredible job. They have come together. They have worked hard and, by 
and large, on a bipartisan basis to find good answers to tough 
problems. They have worked hard to provide us with their best ideas on 
how to implement these recommendations.
  Some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle complained about 
the process, and I must admit that I am baffled by those complaints. We 
had countless hearings during the August recess in every committee of 
jurisdiction. We had 20-some hearings on this issue in the last couple 
of months. We have had an open amendment process at the committee 
level, and we carefully considered the ideas of the commission and of 
the committees' chairmen, and we came up with a response that will make 
this country safer.
  Some have complained that we are going too slow. Some have complained 
that we are going too fast. Some said our bill was too strong. Others 
said this bill is too weak. Some have complained because it is simply 
their nature to complain. Despite the complaints, I am proud of this 
work product.
  This legislation will make this country safer. It will make our 
families safer. It will ensure the safety of our children and our 
parents. It is comprehensive. It reforms the government to make it more 
effective in battling terrorists that want to do harm to this country. 
It creates a National Intelligence Director. The new position will have 
full budget authority. It creates the National Counterterrorism Center 
and a Joint Intelligence Community Council. It improves terrorism 
prevention and prosecution so that we can get the terrorists and those 
who help them before they get us.

                              {time}  1345

  It improves border security. It makes it harder for terrorists to 
travel to America.
  One provision that has drawn quite a bit of attention deals with the 
convention against torture. We do not condone torture in this country 
or any other country, but we do not want known terrorists and criminals 
living among us either.
  The courts have said criminal aliens and terrorists cannot be held 
indefinitely in the United States, but the convention against torture 
says we cannot deport some people back to their own country if they ask 
for political asylum because of torture.
  In 500 cases, the Justice Department has been forced to release alien 
terrorists and other international criminals whom they cannot detain 
and they cannot deport. I do not think that makes any sense. If you 
find a rattlesnake in your backyard, you should not be forced to 
release it in your front yard.
  We have reached a common-sense solution to this problem by giving the 
Justice Department the power to continue to hold those terrorists and 
those alien criminals.
  These are the kinds of solutions that my colleagues will find in our 
bill. They will not find it in the minority's alternative.
  Why is this type of provision so controversial? To me, it just makes 
sense.
  Yes, we disagree with the other body when it comes to making our 
intelligence budget public. We believe that telling our enemies how 
much we spend on certain intelligence programs diminishes our national 
security. Why should we give those who want to do us harm any 
information that might help them?
  Yesterday, I met with three women who lost loved ones in the 9/11 
attacks. I can only imagine the pain that they feel every day, and I 
know the passion that they bring to this debate today. We share their 
sense of loss. We share their commitment to making this country, this 
Nation, safer.
  I have a simple message for them. We will get this job done. The 
process will work. We will pass a bill today that implements the 9/11 
Commission recommendations. We will appoint conferees that will hammer 
out a good conference report that will be signed by the President of 
the United States.
  Yes, at the end of the day, we will enact a law that will make our 
country safer, this America, the United States of America, and the 
people that live in it proud.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Linder). All time for the majority side 
has expired.
  Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  The distinguished Speaker said he is baffled by some of the 
complaints that were heard by those of us who supported the Menendez 
substitute. I think our complaints are easy to understand.
  We feel very strongly that the 9/11 Commission presented us with a 
package of 41 recommendations that the Commission and their cochairs 
all said are important. H.R. 10 only fully implements 11 of those 
recommendations. The Republican bill only implements 15 of them 
partially, and the Republican bill ignores or only mentions in passing 
the other 15 recommendations.
  The substitute that we offered on this floor implements all of the 
recommendations. It does it in an effective way, and it makes the kind 
of commitment that Democrats have argued for the last 2 years must be 
made to make America safe.
  We are investing today $20 billion more on homeland security than we 
did prior to 9/11, but in the last fiscal year, when we were investing 
that additional $20 billion, we were investing four times that in tax 
cuts for American families who make over $1 million a year. That is the 
wrong choice, it is the wrong priority, and our bill moves faster, it 
moves stronger in protecting the homeland than H.R. 10 offered by the 
Republican leadership.
  For that reason, we believe that the Senate bill, which passed 
yesterday, which reflects the contents of the Menendez substitute that 
was on this floor yesterday, is the superior alternative to helping 
America stay safe; and we hope that when this bill goes to conference 
that the provisions of the Senate bill that are absent in H.R. 10 will 
be added to the final product and come back to this floor with a 
conference committee report that clearly reflects the wisdom and the 
intent of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission and the work that they did so 
well.
  Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Porter 
amendment.
  Throughout this important debate, emphasis has been placed on the 
need to ensure information is shared within the intelligence community. 
As we conclude this debate, we now have before us an amendment that 
would ensure information on the private sector is also made a part of 
the process and taken into consideration in the formulation of homeland 
security policy.
  The facts speak for themselves. The travel and tourism industry has a 
considerable impact on the U.S. economy--adding nearly 5 percent to the 
GDP, generating more than half a billion dollars in revenues, 
supporting more than 17 million jobs, and providing a $14 million trade 
surplus for our country. Mr. Chairman, an overwhelming number of the 
businesses in travel and tourism are small- to medium-sized 
enterprises. Therefore, I believe DHS should be especially cognizant of 
its policy and regulatory impact on the travel and tourism industry.
  Whether it is our aviation industry, the aircraft designers or the 
airline employees on the flight line, the hotel industry, or our 
amusement parks, we need homeland security policy that will effectively 
provide for the safety of our citizens and the economic vitality of our 
most important industries. We should not put ourselves in a position 
where in an effort to protect our infrastructure, we shut down the very 
use of transportation services we are trying to protect.
  In my district, Guam, like Nevada, tourism is a leading industry in 
the private sector. Post-September 11 policies have already shown a 
major impact on businesses in my district. What this amendment does, is 
ensure this impact is assessed and considered inside DHS when 
developing policy.
  If you believe economic security ultimately underpins our national 
security, then you should vote for the Porter amendment.
  The vitality and sustainability of the travel and tourism industry is 
a national economic necessity. Consumer confidence in travel and in the 
economy is needed. Safety and security in travel is key to this 
consumer confidence. By elevating the Special Assistant to an Under 
Secretary and by encouraging coordination with local governments and 
the Commerce Department, the Porter amendment gives DHS the authority 
it needs to craft and execute policy to achieve these goals.
  I thank the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Porter) for his leadership, I 
urge adoption of

[[Page H8907]]

his amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Porter).
  The amendment was agreed to.


          Sequential Votes Postponed In Committee Of The Whole

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, 
proceedings will now resume on those amendments on which further 
proceedings were postponed in the following order: amendment No. 14 
offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey, amendment No. 15 offered by Mr. 
Smith of New Jersey, amendment No. 17 offered by Mr. Ose of California, 
amendment No. 19 offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania.
  The Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the time for any electronic vote 
after the first vote in this series.


          Amendment No. 14 Offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The pending business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Jersey 
(Mr. Smith) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which 
the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 212, 
noes 203, not voting 17, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 517]

                               AYES--212

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Bartlett (MD)
     Becerra
     Bell
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carson (IN)
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costello
     Cox
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Tom
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dooley (CA)
     Doyle
     Emanuel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Foley
     Ford
     Fossella
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Gerlach
     Gilchrest
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green (TX)
     Greenwood
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hoeffel
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley (OR)
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     King (NY)
     Kirk
     Kleczka
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lynch
     Maloney
     Markey
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Northup
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sabo
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Shays
     Sherman
     Simmons
     Skelton
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Terry
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Turner (TX)
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walsh
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (PA)
     Wexler
     Wilson (NM)
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                               NOES--203

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Beauprez
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boyd
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burns
     Burr
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carson (OK)
     Carter
     Case
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Chocola
     Coble
     Cole
     Collins
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cunningham
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Deal (GA)
     DeFazio
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Forbes
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gibbons
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Issa
     Istook
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     King (IA)
     Kingston
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     LaHood
     Latham
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     Marshall
     Matheson
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Saxton
     Schrock
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (TX)
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Turner (OH)
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden (OR)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (SC)
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--17

     Ballenger
     Boehlert
     Engel
     Filner
     Gephardt
     Hinojosa
     Kaptur
     Lipinski
     Majette
     Matsui
     Meek (FL)
     Norwood
     Ortiz
     Paul
     Slaughter
     Tauzin
     Towns


                Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Linder) (during the vote). There are 2 
minutes remaining in this vote.

                              {time}  1416

  Messrs. GARRETT of New Jersey, WAMP, PICKERING, DeFAZIO, MARSHALL, 
and COLE changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Messrs. KIRK, VAN HOLLEN, and LUCAS of Kentucky changed their vote 
from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 517, I was in my 
Congressional District on official business. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``aye.''
  Stated against:
  Ms. NORTHUP. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 517, I inadvertently voted 
incorrectly. I had every intention of voting ``no'' on the amendment 
but mistakenly pushed the green button. I did not realize my mistake 
until the vote was closed.


          Amendment No. 15 Offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The pending business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Jersey 
(Mr. Smith) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which 
the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 197, 
noes 219, not voting 16, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 518]

                               AYES--197

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Becerra
     Bell
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown, Corrine
     Burr
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carson (IN)
     Castle
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costello
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Tom
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch

[[Page H8908]]


     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dooley (CA)
     Doyle
     Ehlers
     Emanuel
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Gerlach
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green (TX)
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth
     Hinchey
     Hoeffel
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley (OR)
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     King (NY)
     Kleczka
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Maloney
     Markey
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mollohan
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sabo
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Shays
     Sherman
     Simmons
     Skelton
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Spratt
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Terry
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Turner (TX)
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walsh
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (PA)
     Wexler
     Wilson (NM)
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                               NOES--219

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Beauprez
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boyd
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burns
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carson (OK)
     Carter
     Case
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Chocola
     Coble
     Cole
     Collins
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cunningham
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Deal (GA)
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hill
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Issa
     Istook
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     King (IA)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     LaHood
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     Marshall
     Matheson
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Saxton
     Schrock
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Turner (OH)
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden (OR)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Ballenger
     Boehlert
     Filner
     Gephardt
     Hinojosa
     Kaptur
     Lipinski
     Majette
     Matsui
     Meek (FL)
     Norwood
     Ortiz
     Paul
     Slaughter
     Tauzin
     Towns


                Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Linder) (during the vote). Members are 
advised that 2 minutes remain in this vote.

                              {time}  1423

  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 518, I was in my 
Congressional District on official business. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``aye.''


                  Amendment No. 17 Offered by Mr. Ose

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The pending business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Ose) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the 
ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 256, 
noes 160, not voting 16, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 519]

                               AYES--256

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Beauprez
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boucher
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burns
     Burr
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Cardoza
     Carson (OK)
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Chocola
     Coble
     Cole
     Collins
     Cooper
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cunningham
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gingrey
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hill
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Israel
     Issa
     Istook
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kanjorski
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Lynch
     Manzullo
     Marshall
     Matheson
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     Mica
     Michaud
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Renzi
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sandlin
     Saxton
     Schrock
     Scott (GA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Turner (OH)
     Turner (TX)
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--160

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Becerra
     Bell
     Berkley
     Berman
     Blumenauer
     Boswell
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown, Corrine
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson (IN)
     Case
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Costello
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dooley (CA)
     Doyle
     Emanuel
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Frank (MA)
     Gillmor
     Gonzalez
     Green (TX)
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth
     Hinchey
     Hoeffel
     Holt
     Honda

[[Page H8909]]


     Hooley (OR)
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Maloney
     Markey
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mollohan
     Moran (VA)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Rodriguez
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sabo
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Shays
     Sherman
     Snyder
     Solis
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tauscher
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Wilson (NM)
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Ballenger
     Boehlert
     Filner
     Gephardt
     Hinojosa
     Kaptur
     Lipinski
     Majette
     Matsui
     Meek (FL)
     Norwood
     Ortiz
     Paul
     Slaughter
     Tauzin
     Towns


                Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised that 
2 minutes remain in this vote.

                              {time}  1432

  Mr. SHAYS changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated against:
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 519, I was in my 
Congressional District on official business. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``nay.''


         Amendment No. 19 Offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The pending business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) on which further proceedings were postponed 
and on which the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 415, 
noes 0, not voting 17, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 520]

                               AYES--415

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Baldwin
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Beauprez
     Becerra
     Bell
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blumenauer
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown, Corrine
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burns
     Burr
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carson (IN)
     Carson (OK)
     Carter
     Case
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Chocola
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Cole
     Collins
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dooley (CA)
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Emanuel
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Everett
     Farr
     Fattah
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harman
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herseth
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley (OR)
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Israel
     Issa
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kleczka
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Lynch
     Maloney
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Mica
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Nethercutt
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Owens
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Renzi
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Rodriguez
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schrock
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Toomey
     Turner (OH)
     Turner (TX)
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Vitter
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--17

     Ballenger
     Boehlert
     Filner
     Gephardt
     Hinojosa
     Kaptur
     Lipinski
     Majette
     Matsui
     Meek (FL)
     Norwood
     Ortiz
     Paul
     Pombo
     Slaughter
     Tauzin
     Towns


                Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Linder) (during the vote). Members are 
advised there are 2 minutes remaining in this vote.

                              {time}  1441

  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 520, I was in my 
Congressional District on official business. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``aye.''
  Ms. McCARTHY of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, the 9/11 Commission in July 
presented its report to the Congress and to the American people. The 
five Republicans and five Democrats on the panel put aside their 
partisan differences and made 41 recommendations, which if made law, 
would make this country safer. The Senate on Wednesday embraced these 
recommendations with the 96-2 passage of the Collins/Lieberman National 
Intelligence Reform Act.
  I encourage the House to act in the same bipartisan manner as the 
Senate. H.R. 10, the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act, was 
written behind closed doors and fails to fully implement 30 of the 41 
Commission recommendations.
  The job of Congress is to work with the Executive Branch to keep 
America safe, and work with our allies to make the world safe. H.R. 10 
fails to do this, and places the House on a collision course with the 
Senate.
  Upon passage of the Senate bill, 9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas Kean 
and Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton praised the outstanding leadership of 
Senators Susan Collins and Joseph Lieberman for their progress

[[Page H8910]]

in implementing the Commission's recommendations. They, along with 
families of 9/11 victims, expressed their desire for the House to pass 
a counterpart measure.
  It is disappointing that the House failed to do its job today. I urge 
the Conferees to adopt the 9/11 Commission recommendations. We owe it 
to the American people and the families of victims of 9/11.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 10, the 9/
11 Recommendations Implementation Act. This legislation is vitally 
important to overhaul the nation's intelligence system, which has been 
in place since World War II.
  There are five majors areas of reform in this legislation that will 
dramatically alter the way our country approaches national security.
  First, this bill establishes a National Director of Intelligence who 
will have full budget authority over the nation's intelligence 
agencies. For the first time in our Nation's history, we will have one 
person whose sole job is to coordinate the activities and information 
from all of our Nation's intelligence services.
  Second, this bill restructures terrorism prevention and prosecution. 
It gives law enforcement agencies and the Department of Justice new 
tools to prevent and prosecute potential terrorists and acts of 
terrorism. Whether it is strengthening our money laundering laws to 
combat terrorists' financial networks or adding additional security 
measures to our printed currency, this legislation will make it more 
difficult for terrorists to have access to financing and make it more 
difficult for those who want to finance terrorist activities.
  Third, this legislation dramatically strengthens the security of our 
Nation's borders and restricts the ability of terrorists to travel. I 
think we can all agree the best way to keep our country safe is keep 
the terrorists out of our country. If terrorists do manage to get into 
the country, this legislation gives law enforcement officers the tools 
they need to make it easier to deport them. also, this legislation 
makes sure that our federal air marshals have anonymity on all flights, 
both domestic and foreign. We will add more federal air marshals to 
foreign flights coming into this country on both U.S. and foreign 
carriers. We will add a second layer of protection in cockpits, and 
require the use of biometrically-protected crew badges for airline 
employees.
  Fourth, this bill reaches out to other nations to join us in 
combating terrorism. We will require machine-readable passports for 
tourists entering our country and also require that all names on 
passports be translated and printed in Roman alphabet for international 
travel documents and placed into watchlist systems. Also, this bill 
makes it a federal crime to give a false claim of citizenship or 
nationality.
  Finally, this legislation restructures the government in many 
important ways. It provides the authorization for the intelligence 
community reorganization plans, it restructures the Department of 
Homeland Security for faster and smarter funding for first responders, 
and it modifies the homeland security advisory system.
  Mr. Chairman, this legislation contains many important and necessary 
changes to our Nation's laws. I would like to thank all the members who 
have worked so hard on a bi-partisan basis to produce such a 
comprehensive piece of legislation. This is a positive step in 
improving the nation's intelligence system and our national security.
  Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, Benjamin Franklin once said: The 
way to be safe is never to be secure. We must never be content in the 
ways things have always been, but consistently look for new ways to 
achieve security in our homeland. For this, I am pleased to support 
H.R. 10, the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act. I believe this 
legislation will provide for the much needed reorganization and new 
tools to help our Nation prepare and defend against further terrorist 
attacks.
  After the horrific attacks of September 11th, it was evident that our 
Government needed to be transformed to meet the new challenges of this 
dangerous world. Soon after 9/11, and under the leadership of President 
Bush, various agencies with homeland security roles throughout the 
government were brought under the control and vision of a single 
Department, with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. 
The hope was to break down the existing barriers and create more 
cooperation and communication in this critical field.
  Congress is continuing this effort to improve our homeland security 
with the passage of H.R. 10. This legislation clearly recognizes that 
the United States can no longer afford to think of defending the 
homeland as being the responsibility of just one Department--be it 
Homeland Security, Justice or Defense. Many aspects of our government 
and society, from the FBI, to DOD's Northern Command, the Intelligence 
Community, the Treasury Department, Immigration, local law enforcement, 
our corporate partners, and the academic community all have important 
roles to play. All of these players must work together, in concert, to 
achieve the real results worthy of this great nation.
  The 9/11 Commission, which is the basis of this legislation, found 
that government institutions failed to adapt to the threat of terrorism 
for more than a decade, enabling the terrorists failed to exploit deep 
institutional failings within our government. These failures, in part, 
stemmed from a strict stove-piped structure.
  Our enemy is asymmetrical and unconcerned about such things as the 
internal structural uneasiness of sharing information inside the 
Intelligence Community and between other organizations. However, our 
enemies will certainly do everything they can to benefit from this 
ingrained culture--to the detriment of our society.
  The 9/11 Commission concluded that: ``the September 11th attacks fell 
into the void between the foreign and domestic threats.''
  The Report continues: ``Information was not shared, sometimes 
inadvertently or because of legal misunderstandings. Analysis was not 
pooled. Effective operations were not launched. Often the handoffs of 
information were lost across the divide separating the foreign and 
domestic agencies of the government. . . . Action officers should have 
drawn on all available knowledge in the government. This management 
should have ensured that information was shared and duties were clearly 
assigned across agencies, and across the foreign-domestic divide.''
  Although people have levied fault on the CIA and FBI, I believe we 
must not single out individual agencies. Instead, we should use our 
energies to focus on the culture and structure of our government. As 
the 9/11 Commission report continues:

       The problem is nearly intractable because of the way the 
     government is currently structured. Lines of operational 
     authority run to the expanding executive departments, and 
     they are guarded for understandable reasons: the DCI commands 
     the CIA's personnel overseas; the secretary of defense will 
     not yield to others in conveying commands to military forces; 
     the Justice Department will not give up the responsibility of 
     deciding whether to seek arrest warrants. But the result is 
     that each agency or department needs its own intelligence 
     apparatus to support the performance of its duties. It is 
     hard to break down stovepipes when there are so many stoves 
     that are legally and political entitled to have cast-iron 
     pipes of their own.

  The problem is clear: stove-piping of resources and responsibilities, 
along with not sharing the information or analysis collected is 
hindering our Nation's ability to remain secure. Instead of stove-
piping, we must increase the flow of information inside and between 
government agencies while still protecting vital sources. If we are 
going to achieve a greater level of security in this nation, we need to 
break down the barriers to homeland security. We must not be bogged 
down in a need-to-know mentality, but most rise to a need-to-share 
focus.
  The 9/11 Commission Recommendations bears out this solution. 
Repeatedly, the Commission calls for unity and the unifying of efforts 
across the government. It calls for unifying strategic intelligence and 
operational planning against Islamist terrorists across the foreign-
domestic divide with a new National Counterterrorism Center. Unifying 
the intelligence community with a new National Intelligence Director. 
And, unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism efforts.
  The old ways of thinking about and organizing our government have 
failed us. We have been confined by a vision of the past. Of local vs. 
federal, of domestic vs. foreign intelligence, of national security vs. 
law enforcement.
  We instead need to focus on unity of purpose and on communication, 
collaboration and coordination that transcends our old structure. Only 
by working together, as a single unit, can we be secure. And I believe 
that H.R. 10 is the right step forward in doing just that.
  Ms. KILPATRICK. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 10, the 9/
11 Recommendations Implementation Act. I do so not because I disagree 
on the urgent need to reform our intelligence infrastructure. On the 
contrary, the 9/11 Commission clearly, articulately and convincingly 
makes a compelling case that the U.S. intelligence network is in great 
need of overhauling.
  My reasons for voting against the measure deal less with the concept 
of intelligence reform and more with the substance of the bill we are 
considering today. The measure before us today is improperly titled. 
The ``9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act'' should really be re-
titled as the ``Immigration Reform Act of 2004.''
  I am particularly sensitive to issues of homeland security and 
intelligence capabilities. My district encompasses the majority of the 
City of Detroit, which borders our northern neighbor--Canada. Detroit 
is the Motor City capital of the world, and as such, we are 
economically dependent on the cross-border auto trade transported 
through the Port of Detroit. Securing the critical infrastructure such 
as the

[[Page H8911]]

Ambassador Bridge, the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel, and the Port of Detroit 
is vital to the economic wellbeing of our city, region, state, and 
nation. Protecting the rights of way of these thoroughfares is critical 
to the health of the American automobile industry, the largest industry 
in the manufacturing sector. Protecting these assets against terrorist 
attack is so important that the City of Detroit is one of the few major 
cities in the United States that has created an Office of Homeland 
Security. Matters of homeland security and enhanced intelligence 
capabilities are urgent concerns to my district and they should not be 
trivialized. The Republican Leadership in this chamber had the 
opportunity to stitch together a bill that would strengthen the 
nation's intelligence apparatus, but frankly it has ``pooched'' the 
job. The Leadership has confused the 9/11 Commission's urging to 
enhance America's security apparatus with its predilection to crackdown 
on the nation's immigrants.
  The only area where the bill makes its mark on strengthening the 
intelligence community is the establishment of a National Intelligence 
Director (NID). But all progress at intelligence reform ends there--
with the creation of NID. We create a position but gives the person 
occupying it no powers and no authority to implement any significant 
changes in the intelligence bureaucracy. For example, the NID has no 
budget authority, no hiring authority, and on reprogramming authority. 
By establishing a position of power without authority to hire or fire 
or to control the budget, we are in fact creating a paper tiger, a 
position with a lot of roar and no bite. The members of the 9/11 
Commission have expressed their support for a strong NID, but the bill 
crafted by the Republican leadership fails to meet their expectations.
  This bill does very little in the way of strengthening the 
intelligence community. It goes a long way in turning the U.S. 
immigration system upside down. I support immigration reform, but we 
should not be enacting such sweeping changes under a bill whose purpose 
is to reform and reorganize the intelligence community. The Republican 
Leadership is confused. It took its eye off the goal of intelligence 
reform and moved forward with a bill that cracks down on immigrants.
  Let me highlight some of the more egregious provisions of this bill. 
The ``Lone Wolf'' provision would remove the requirement that non-
citizen targets of secret intelligence surveillance be connected to a 
foreign power. The bill would permit the deportation of individuals to 
countries lacking a functioning government--an issue that is currently 
before the U.S. Supreme Court. The bill makes asylum claims more 
restrictive. The bill restricts the use of internationally accepted 
consular identification cards. Immigrants are being used as a wedge 
issue in this presidential election year. The bill is designed to 
mobilize the base vote of neo-isolationists and not the legitimate 
security concerns confronting our country and our countrymen and women.
  By using immigration as a wedge issue, we are distracted from taking 
a thoughtful approach to improving our intelligence capability. We are 
undermining our efforts to combat terrorism. Many on my side of the 
aisle will be voting to support this bill in order to move the process 
forward in the hope that a final product will be closer to the bill 
that was approved in the other chamber. My vote today is based on the 
substance and the merit of the provisions contained in this bill before 
us today. If a conference agreement can produce a bill that truly 
strengthens our intelligence community, it will have my support. Today, 
I must cast my vote against the passage of H.R. 10.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act 
(H.R. 10) is yet another attempt to address the threat of terrorism by 
giving more money and power to the federal bureaucracy. Most of the 
reforms contained in this bill will not make America safer, though they 
definitely will make us less free. H.R. 10 also wastes American 
taxpayer money on unconstitutional and ineffective foreign aid 
programs. Congress should make America safer by expanding liberty and 
refocusing our foreign policy on defending this nation's vital 
interests, rather than expanding the welfare state and wasting American 
blood and treasure on quixotic crusades to ``democratize'' the world.
  Disturbingly, H.R. 10 creates a de facto national ID card by 
mandating new federal requirements that standardize state-issued 
drivers licenses and birth certificates and even require including 
biometric identifiers in such documents. State drivers license 
information will be stored in a national database, which will include 
information about an individual's driving record!
  Nationalizing standards for drivers licenses and birth certificates, 
and linking them together via a national database, creates a national 
ID system pure and simple. Proponents of the national ID understand 
that the public remains wary of the scheme, so they attempt to claim 
they're merely creating new standards for existing state IDs. Nonsense! 
This legislation imposes federal standards in a federal bill, and it 
creates a federalized ID regardless of whether the ID itself is still 
stamped with the name of your state. It is just a matter of time until 
those who refuse to carry the new licenses will be denied the ability 
to drive or board an airplane. Domestic travel restrictions are the 
hallmark of authoritarian states, not free republics.
  The national ID will be used to track the movements of American 
citizens, not just terrorists. Subjecting every citizen to surveillance 
actually diverts resources away from tracking and apprehending 
terrorist in favor of needless snooping on innocent Americans. This is 
what happened with ``suspicious activity reports'' required by the Bank 
Secrecy Act. Thanks to BSA mandates, federal officials are forced to 
waste countless hours snooping through the private financial 
transactions of innocent Americans merely because those transactions 
exceeded $10,000.
  Furthermore, the Federal Government has no constitutional authority 
to require law-abiding Americans to present any form of identification 
before engaging in private transactions (e.g. getting a job, opening a 
bank account, or seeking medical assistance). Nothing in our 
Constitution can reasonably be construed to allow government officials 
to demand identification from individuals who are not suspected of any 
crime.
  H.R. 10 also broadens the definition of terrorism contained in the 
PATRIOT Act. H.R. 10 characterizes terrorism as acts intended ``to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion.'' 
Under this broad definition, a scuffle at an otherwise peaceful pro-
life demonstration might allow the federal government to label the 
sponsoring organization and its members as terrorists. Before 
dismissing these concerns, my colleagues should remember the abuse of 
Internal Revenue Service power by both Democratic and Republican 
administrations to punish political opponents, or the use of the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act on anti-
abortion activists. It is entirely possible that a future 
administration will use the new surveillance powers granted in this 
bill to harm people holding unpopular political views.
  Congress could promote both liberty and security by encouraging 
private property owners to take more responsibility to protect 
themselves and their property. Congress could enhance safety by 
removing the roadblocks thrown up by the misnamed Transportation 
Security Agency that prevent the full implementation of the armed 
pilots program. I cosponsored an amendment with my colleague from 
Virginia, Mr. Goode, to do just that, and I am disappointed it was 
ruled out of order.
  I am also disappointed the Financial Services Committee rejected my 
amendment to conform the regulations governing the filing of suspicious 
activities reports with the requirements of the U.S. Constitution. This 
amendment not only would have ensured greater privacy protection, but 
it also would have enabled law enforcement to better focus on people 
who truly pose a threat to our safety.
  Immediately after the attack on September 11, 2001, I introduced 
several pieces of legislation designed to help fight terrorism and 
secure the United States, including a bill to allow airline pilots to 
carry firearms and a bill that would have expedited the hiring of 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) translators to support 
counterterrorism investigations and operations. I also introduced a 
bill to authorize the president to issue letters of marque and reprisal 
to bring to justice those who committed the attacks of September 11, 
2001, and other similar acts of war planned for the future.
  The foreign policy provisions of H.R. 10 are similarly objectionable 
and should be strongly opposed. I have spoken before about the serious 
shortcomings of the 9/11 Commission, upon whose report this legislation 
is based. I find it incredible that in the 500-plus page report there 
is not one mention of how our interventionist foreign policy creates 
enemies abroad who then seek to harm us. Until we consider the root 
causes of terrorism, beyond the jingoistic explanations offered thus 
far, we will not defeat terrorism and we will not be safer.
  Among the most ill-considered foreign policy components of H.R. 10 is 
a section providing for the United States to increase support for an 
expansion of the United Nations ``Democracy Caucus.'' Worse still, the 
bill encourages further integration of that United Nations body into 
our State department. The last thing we should do if we hope to make 
our country safer from terrorism is expand our involvement in the 
United Nations.
  This bill contains a provision to train American diplomats to be more 
sensitive and attuned to the United Nations, the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)--which will be in the U.S. to 
monitor our elections next month--and other international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). even worse, this legislation 
actually will create an ``ambassador-at-large'' position

[[Page H8912]]

solely to work with non-governmental organizations overseas. It hardly 
promotes democracy abroad to accord equal status to NGOs, which, after 
all, are un-elected foreign pressure groups that, therefore, have no 
popular legitimacy whatsoever. Once again, we are saying one thing and 
doing the opposite.
  This bill also increases our counterproductive practice of sending 
United States' taxpayer money abroad to prop up selected foreign media, 
which inexplicably are referred to as ``independent media.'' This is an 
unconstitutional misuse of tax money. Additionally does anyone believe 
that citizens of countries where the U.S. subsidizes certain media 
outlets take kindly to, or take seriously, such media? How would 
Americans feel if they knew that publications taking a certain 
editorial line were financed by foreign governments? We cannot refer to 
foreign media funded by the U.S. government as ``independent media.'' 
The U.S. government should never be in the business of funding the 
media, either at home or abroad.
  Finally, I am skeptical about the reorganization of the intelligence 
community in this legislation. In creating an entire new bureaucracy, 
the National Intelligence Director, we are adding yet another layer of 
bureaucracy to our already bloated federal government. Yet, we are 
supposed to believe that even more of the same kind of government that 
failed us on September 11, 2001 will make us safer. At best, this is 
wishful thinking. The constitutional function of our intelligence 
community is to protect the United States from foreign attack. Ever 
since its creation by the National Security Act of 1947, the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been meddling in affairs that have 
nothing to do with the security of the United States. Considering the 
CIA's overthrow of Iranian leader Mohammed Mossadeq in the 1950s, and 
the CIA's training of the Muhajadin jihadists in Afghanistan in the 
1980s, it is entirely possible the actions of the CIA abroad have 
actually made us less safe and more vulnerable to foreign attack. It 
would be best to confine our intelligence community to the defense of 
our territory from foreign attack. This may well mean turning 
intelligence functions over to the Department of Defense, where they 
belong.
  For all of these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I vigorously oppose H.R. 10. 
It represents the worst approach to combating terrorism--more federal 
bureaucracy, more foreign intervention, and less liberty for the 
American people.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to discuss H.R. 10, the 
legislation that ostensibly implements the recommendations made by the 
independent commission that investigated the federal government's 
failure to prevent the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
  Let me say at the outset that this bill is certainly not perfect. 
But, I am pleased it includes a number of critical aviation security 
improvements I have pushed for.
  It also includes the core recommendation made by the 9/11 Commission 
to create a National Intelligence Director to centralize coordination 
and oversight of the disparate branches of our intelligence community.
  Therefore, despite some flaws, I will vote for H.R. 10, with the hope 
that its shortcomings can be resolved in the conference with the 
Senate.
  I want to expand on my comments about the aviation security 
provisions in H.R. 10. I am pleased that this bill provides $60 million 
over two years for the deployment of checkpoint explosive detection 
equipment. The bill also directs the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) to give priority to developing, testing, 
improving, and deploying equipment at screening checkpoints that will 
be able to detect nonmetallic weapons and explosives on individuals and 
in their baggage.
  This bill would implement the 9/11 Commission recommendation that TSA 
not wait until the issues surrounding a successor to the CAPPS program 
are resolved before utilizing all available government terrorist watch 
lists to prescreen passengers boarding an aircraft. The air carriers 
currently manage the ``no-fly'' and ``automatic selectee'' lists that 
they receive from TSA. Because the airlines have access to these lists, 
some government agencies are unwilling to give their watch lists to TSA 
because they are reluctant to share intelligence information with 
private firms. This problem will be resolved when TSA takes over the 
passenger pre-screening function, as mandated by this bill.
  Perimeter security is still a weak link in aviation security as 
evidenced by the recent events at the Orlando airport in which workers 
were charged with sneaking drugs and guns aboard commercial aircraft. 
Importantly, the bill requires TSA to submit a study to Congress on 
airport perimeter security to determine the feasibility of access 
control technologies and procedures, as well as an assessment of the 
feasibility of physically screening all individuals prior to entry into 
secure areas of an airport.
  With regard to strategic planning, the bill requires the Department 
of Homeland Security to develop a risk-based strategic plan to protect 
transportation assets in general, and aviation assets in particular. 
The bill would also require the TSA to develop a threat matrix that 
outlines each threat to the civil aviation system, and the layers of 
security to respond to that threat. A strong strategic planning process 
may avert any future ``failures of imagination'' as cited by the 
Commission.
  The bill also incorporates H.R. 4914, the Aviation Biometic 
Technology Utilization Act, which I introduced with Chairman Mica. 
Biometric technologies can improve aviation security, and the TSA must 
act quickly to promulgate guidelines and standards for biometrics so 
that airports can equip with biometric access control technology.
  In addition, the bill incorporates H.R. 4056, the Commercial Aviation 
MANPADS Defense Act of 2004, which I also introduced with Chairman 
Mica. MANPADS have been used against commercial airplanes and we must 
do what we can to reduce the threat of MANPADS by working to reduce 
their availability and developing plans to secure airports and the 
aircrafts arriving and departing from airports against MANPADS attacks.
  The bill contains several other important provisions including a 
pilot program to determine whether federal flight deck officers can be 
permitted to carry weapons on their persons, as well as directing TSA 
to: conduct a pilot program for the use of blast resistant cargo 
containers; continue its efforts to develop technology to screen cargo; 
conduct a study on the viability of technologies that would provide 
discreet methods of communication for flight cabin crew to notify 
pilots in the event of a security breach, and a study on the costs and 
benefits associated with the use of secondary flight deck barriers. In 
addition, I am pleased a provision was included to require the Director 
of the Federal Air Marshal Service to develop operational procedures 
that ensure the anonymity of Federal air marshals.
  I am also pleased that this legislation implements the core 
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission--creation of a National 
Intelligence Director. While the bill may not create quite as robust an 
NID as the Senate legislation, it does represent a useful step in 
bringing accountability to the intelligence community and improving 
coordination.
  Despite the aviation security provisions I mentioned previously, 
there are shortcomings in the transportation security provisions of 
H.R. 10. For example, there is no money to deploy explosive detection 
systems to screen checked baggage. In the security bill approved by the 
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, on which I sit, we 
included an additional $250 million in mandatory spending to deploy 
these critical devices. Unfortunately, this provision was stripped out 
of the version of H.R. 10 on the floor today. Further, H.R. 10 does 
next to nothing to improve rail, mass transit, or port security. These 
shortcomings need to be addressed in the conference with the Senate.
  I am also concerned that H.R. 10 is weak on combating the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The bill just requires a 
study of how to strengthen our non-proliferation programs. We don't 
need another study. We already know what needs to be done. In 2001, a 
bipartisan commission recommended tripling funding to $3 billion a year 
for programs to help secure nuclear materials around the world from 
terrorists. The non-proliferation programs under Nunn-Lugar should also 
be expanded beyond the states of the former Soviet Union in order to 
secure nuclear materials in other countries, notably Pakistan. The non-
proliferation provisions of H.R. 10 should be strengthened in 
conference.
  I am opposed to a provision in H.R. 10 that would violate U.S. 
obligations under the Convention on Torture by allowing the U.S. to 
deport suspects to countries that might torture them. While I supported 
an amendment that was adopted during consideration of H.R. 10 to 
slightly improve the provision in H.R. 10 authorizing deportation of 
suspects to countries with atrocious human rights records so it wasn't 
quite as objectionable, I would rather see the provision removed all 
together during the conference with the Senate.
  I am concerned that the civil liberties protections in H.R. 10 are 
too weak. H.R. 10 creates a Civil Liberties Protection Officer that is 
appointed by and reports to the NID, which means he or she is not 
independent. Under these circumstances, the officer is unlikely to 
provide robust protection for civil liberties. By contrast, the 9/11 
Commission and the Senate legislation propose an independent Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. The Senate legislation also 
includes an Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties as well as a 
Privacy Officer within the National Intelligence Authority. The Board 
would continually review legislation, regulations and policies for 
their impact on privacy and civil liberties. The Board would be 
required to issue reports to Congress at least twice a year and to make 
the reports available to the public. I hope that the Senate

[[Page H8913]]

provisions on civil liberties oversight will be included in any final 
legislation that emerges from conference.
  Finally, I have serious concerns about a number of provisions in H.R. 
10 that will expand the law enforcement powers of the federal 
government. As one who voted against the so-called USA PATRIOT Act 
because of my concerns about its impact on the civil liberties of 
average American citizens, I am concerned that H.R. 10 will 
unnecessarily expand the reach of the federal government in ways that 
are not necessary to defeat terrorists, but will pose a lasting threat 
to the rights we are guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. I would 
rather that these provisions be considered carefully by Congress next 
year during the debate over whether to renew the PATRIOT Act rather 
than having them slipped into H.R. 10 with little debate.
  Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. Mr. Chairman, I rise to express my concern on 
the course our Congress has taken.
  We had a clear choice before us to have passed the Menendez 
substitute, a bipartisan approach that followed the recommendations of 
the 9/11 Commission--a Commission that for three years studied the 
vulnerabilities of our national intelligence community and homeland 
security and then provided thoughtful, nonpartisan recommendations.
  Or pass a partisan House Republican bill that was slapped together in 
a matter of months to address immediate political measures.
  Unfortunately, this Republican led Congress chose the quick fix.
  It is important to note that the Senate took these same nonpartisan 
recommendations to heart and passed a bipartisan bill overwhelmingly 
96-2.
  As legislators and as leaders of this country, our job is incomplete. 
We will be revisiting these measures again--and again--until we get it 
right.
  Because, Mr. Chairman, we cannot afford to get this wrong. At stake 
is the safety and security of the American people and the future of our 
children.
  H.R. 10 implements only eleven of the forty-one 9/11 Commission 
recommendations. However, included in this legislation are more than 
fifty extraneous provisions not recommended by the 9/11 Commission.
  As a senior member on the House Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee, I am appalled that this legislation has not done more to 
protect our ports, our national transit systems and our overall 
transportation infrastructure.
  These are obvious vulnerabilities that are not being addressed! Think 
about the not so obvious vulnerabilities that are being overlooked!
  It was our transportation vulnerabilities that the 9/11 terrorists 
used to attack us on that fateful day and it is likely that it will be 
transportation that these terrorists will target again.
  Aside from the Aviation Subcommittee, our Full Committee was not 
consulted on the drafting of this bill and I believe that some of the 
aviation provisions do not go far enough.
  For example, H.R. 10 simply states that priority be given to improved 
explosive detection. This is disingenuous. As the Menendez substitute 
clearly states all high-risk passengers must be screened for explosives 
until the explosive detection technology is improved. We must be clear 
and we must be direct when we address the security of the American 
people.
  On that note, I would like to commend one provision that is in this 
bill. H.R. 10 took the Commission's recommendation on blast resistant 
containers and language that I recently introduced to create a blast 
resistant container pilot program that integrates this technology with 
our aviation system. This is an important step and one that is long 
over due.
  Since 9/11, the Transportation and Infrastructure has embraced a 
bipartisan approach in reviewing and addressing the transportation 
vulnerabilities that face our Nation.
  We have accomplished much.
  Last week our Committee unanimously reported a bipartisan transit 
security bill last week that would provide critically needed funding 
for security improvements for our public transit systems.
  Unfortunately, these measures will not be included or addressed in 
H.R. 10.
  Mr. Chairman, it is because of these reasons that we will return to 
this Chamber and revisit these vital issues again and again until we 
get it right.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, our antiquated federal pay 
system does not adequately account for the unique needs of federal law 
enforcement officers.
  For example, the current salary, including all overtime payments, for 
a FBI Special Agent in San Francisco is $56,453. But even a ``low-
income home'' within a 60 to 90 minute commute from San Francisco costs 
$300,000, requiring a mandatory income of $86,000. As a result, agents 
commonly face four hour daily commutes on top of their regular ten hour 
plus shifts. Because staffing decisions are based on the needs of the 
nation, today many federal law enforcement officers are being asked to 
live beyond their means in order to serve their country.
  Mr. Chairman, the 9/11 Commission Report's specific policy 
recommendations are underpinned by two important general conclusions. 
First, that the FBI is central to the war on terrorism and second, the 
need to provide adequate resources to FBI Agents. In fact, on pages 
425-426 of their report, the 9/11 Commission says:

       A specialized and integrated national security workforce 
     should be established at the FBI consisting of agents, 
     analysts, linguist, and surveillance specialists who are 
     recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the 
     development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep 
     expertise in intelligence and national security.

  Mr. Chairman, developing and maintaining an ``institutional culture 
imbued with deep expertise'' is severely undermined by the Bureau's 
inability to retain highly skilled agents in high-cost of living areas. 
Often, agents will seek to transfer out of high-cost of living areas, 
like New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, to name a few. The 
disincentive to stay in high-cost of living areas makes it more 
difficult for the FBI to recruit the best agents to serve in 
supervisory positions, and thus creates an obstacle to creating the 
type of institutional culture the Report calls for. If the high-cost of 
living in certain areas was mitigated, this disincentive could be 
removed, and it would be easier to create a more healthy seniority 
system that would allow a strong intelligence culture to flourish.
  Also on page 426, the 9/11 Commission says ``The FBI should fully 
implement a recruiting, hiring, and selection process for agents and 
analysts that enhances its ability to target and attract individuals 
with educational and professional backgrounds in intelligence, 
international relations, language, technology, and other relevant 
skills.''
  Mr. Chairman, the status quo's inability to fairly compensate FBI 
agents in high-cost areas is undermining the Bureau's ability to 
recruit and retain highly skilled individuals in crucial locations. For 
instance, cities such as New York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco are 
uniquely vulnerable to terrorist threats. The Report makes it clear 
that Congress must undertake efforts to ensure that the FBI is able to 
attract and retain employees possessing high-level skills. These 
employees must be fairly compensated with consideration of the cost of 
living in these areas in order for the Bureau to retain their services.
  Mr. Chairman, H.R. 10 takes a positive first step by providing 
recruitment and retention bonuses to federal law enforcement, 
particularly the FBI. However, it is imperative that this Congress act 
on fundamental pay reform in an expeditious manner.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, the bill before the House today is 
intelligence reform more in name than in reality. In fact, the 
Republican Leadership's bill, H.R. 10, ignores most of the 
recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission. Of the 41 recommendations 
made by the Commission, H.R. 10 fully implements only 11 of them.
  On October 2, the Family Steering Committee, which is made up of the 
families of 
9/11 victims, issued a statement that said, ``House of Representatives 
bill H.R. 10, drafted in response to the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations, is flawed because it does not provide for a strong 
National Intelligence Director. It also contains controversial, 
divisive provisions which may have merit but warrant separate debate.'' 
The Family Steering Committee's statement called on the House to adopt 
the bipartisan Senate bill, which has been championed in the House by 
Representatives Shays, Maloney and Menendez.
  It should come as a surprise to no one that the Republican 
Leadership, which long opposed the creation of the 9/11 Commission, 
turned a deaf ear to the views of the Commission and the 9/11 families. 
The more than 50 extraneous provisions that were not recommended by the 
9/11 Commission remain in the bill. Some of these provisions are very 
controversial. To add insult to injury, the House Leadership restricted 
the opportunity of Members to amend and strengthen the bill.
  There have been two distinctly different approaches followed in the 
House and Senate on the critical issue of implementing the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. In the Senate, there has been 
an open and bipartisan process used to develop a bill that truly 
reflects the recommendations of the Commission. The Collins-Lieberman 
legislation in the Senate has been endorsed by the 9/11 Commission, the 
9/11 Family Steering Committee, and even the White House. The Senate 
bill, which was adopted on a vote of 96 to 2, was the product of 
extensive deliberation and bipartisan cooperation.
  The Republican Leadership in the House took a different road. They 
introduced a bill

[[Page H8914]]

that was developed in secret with no meaningful input from Democrats. 
This partisan process has produced a weak bill that does not reflect 
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. For all these reasons, I 
voted for the Menendez substitute, which is based on the bipartisan 
Senate bill and fully implements the reforms recommended by the 9/11 
Commission. The Menendez substitute is supported by the 9/11 families. 
I regret that the House narrowly defeated this proposal last night.
  By supporting the Menendez substitute, and opposing the flawed and 
wholly insufficient underlying bill, I hope we can send a clear message 
that we stand with the 9/11 Commission and the 9/11 families in 
supporting genuine, meaningful intelligence reform. I hope this message 
will be heard by the House and Senate conferees as they work to 
reconcile the House and Senate bills.
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to H.R. 10, 
the so-called 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act. At a time when 
our national security is at risk and our brave troops are fighting 
overseas, it is shameful that the Republican leadership has chosen to 
present a partisan bill that does not effectively implement the 
recommendations of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission. In fact, of the 
Commission's 41 recommendations, H.R. 10 only fully implemented eleven. 
Fifteen are not implemented at all, and another 15 are incomplete.
  On the other hand, many of the provisions in H.R. 10 go far beyond 
the recommendations of the September 11th Commission. This is obviously 
an attempt by the Republican leadership to insert previously rejected 
proposals into this important bill at the final hour. In fact, the 9/11 
Commission's Republican Chairman, Thomas Kean, said that the 
contentious provisions were being promoted by ``people who don't want 
the intelligence legislation to pass.'' Former Representative Lee 
Hamilton, the Commission's vice chairman, said, ``Consideration of 
controversial provisions at this late hour can harm our shared 
purpose.'' The Family Steering Committee of the victims of September 
11th is concerned that if H.R. 10 is passed by the House, ``the hard 
work of the Commission and the dedication of the 9/11 families will be 
undermined, as will the safety of our nation.''
  Many of the controversial and mean-spirited measures included in this 
bill are extremely harmful to immigrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees. 
These measures have been included although they do not make our nation 
any safer. H.R. 10 allows immigration officials to deport foreign 
nationals for whatever reason they see fit, devoid of judicial review, 
to countries that openly use torture when interrogating prisoners.
  Unbelievably, H.R. 10 places an extreme burden of proof on asylum-
seekers, many of whom have been victims of brutality in their native 
lands, requiring them to provide evidence that he or she would be 
tortured if returned to his or her point of origin. This violates the 
current standards established under the U.N. Convention Against Torture 
already in place. And what kind of message does it send to our troops 
engaged in combat? If the United States is seen by the world as being 
willing to outsource torture, how can we be sure that our military men 
and women captured overseas will be treated decently?

  In addition, H.R. 10 would further undermine the right to basic due 
process protections for non-citizens by prohibiting habeas corpus 
review of many immigration decisions and by prohibiting federal courts 
from granting stays of deportation while cases are pending.
  This bill even includes language blocking use of matricula consular 
cards, for identification purposes, even though the House voted to 
allow their use. This provision has nothing to do with the 9/11 
Commission and protecting national security. It is simply an irrelevant 
action.
  Furthermore, this legislation does not properly refocus our 
intelligence efforts on Afghanistan, the nation which harbored the 
terrorists who attacked us on September 11, as the 9/11 Commission 
recommended. H.R. 10 also does not include Commission recommendations 
to provide strong budgetary authority for the newly-created National 
Intelligence Director, protect civil liberties through the creation of 
an effective and independent civil liberties board, or address the need 
for Congressional reform. That is simply unacceptable.
  I supported the Menendez amendment which institutes the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, is a closer reflection of the 
bipartisan legislation passed in the Senate, and does not include the 
dangerous and extraneous provisions in H.R. 10. Unfortunately, that 
amendment was not successful; but fortunately those conferees will have 
one more opportunity to get it right. We should now support the Senate 
bill and move to protect our nation's safety while preserving the 
beliefs and traditions of liberty and freedom we cherish. H.R. 10 does 
not make the United States as safe as it can be. I urge my colleagues 
to vote no on H.R. 10.
  Mr. NETHERCUTT. Mr. Chairman, it is clear that our current 
intelligence system has failed us in recent years.
  I do not doubt the capacities of individual analysts within our 
intelligence agencies and know them to be talented and capable 
individuals. But the configuration of the present intelligence system 
has denied our leaders the information we need to adequately warn of 
and respond to terrorist threat.
  Our current intelligence structure dates to the National Security Act 
of 1947. It is a structure directed to a threat that no longer exists, 
the Soviet Union. We won the Cold War and it is time to reconfigure our 
intelligence capabilities to fight the next major threat of our 
generation, the threat of international terrorism.
  The bill before us, H.R. 10, responds substantively to the broad 
range of recommendations offered by the 9/11 Commission. It creates a 
strong National Intelligence Director with strengthened budget 
authorities and new flexibility to redirect funding to urgent needs. 
All management of tasking, collection, analysis and dissemination of 
intelligence will be centralized within the office of the NID.
  At the same time, the legislation acknowledges the very real 
requirements of the largest user of national intelligence products, the 
Department of Defense. H.R. 10 maintains full support for DOD during a 
time of war--efforts to integrate our national intelligence effort 
should not come at the expense of the requirements of warfighters. 
Indeed the 9/11 Report recommended that DOD military intelligence 
programs should remain part of that Department's responsibility.
  We should reject the criticisms we have heard today about the scope 
of the House bill. The House shouldn't be a rubber stamp for 
legislation considered by the other body, any more than the other body 
should be the rubber stamp for the broad recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission. Passage of this bill today will allow both chambers to move 
to conference to reconcile the differences between the two pieces of 
legislation.
  Similarly, I disagree with the notion argued here today that because 
opponents consider certain provisions to somehow be ``extraneous,'' we 
should refuse to consider them. The preface to the 9/11 Report 
succinctly describes the mandate of the Commission: ``How did this 
happen, and how can we avoid such a tragedy again?'' Such also is our 
mandate--and we should not consider our work done with a retooling of 
our intelligence apparatus.
  The scope of Public Law 107-306, establishing the 9/11 Commission, 
was far broader than an examination of the intelligence agencies. It 
directed an investigation of the ``facts and circumstances relating to 
the terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001, including those relating 
to intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, diplomacy, 
immigration issues and border control, the flow of assets to terrorist 
organizations, commercial aviation, the role of congressional oversight 
and resource allocation, and other areas determined relevant by the 
Commission.''
  Improvements to our border security, restrictions on terrorist travel 
and enhanced authorities to deport illegal aliens all respond to the 
concerns raised in the 9/11 Report and all provide substantive 
improvements to the security of our nation.
  Intelligence reform only matters if we are able to do something with 
the information our agencies gather. A strong and effective National 
Intelligence Director is only relevant if we give other agencies of the 
government the tools they need to act on that improved intelligence.
  It would be irresponsible for Congress to take a pass on acting on 
the clear security deficiencies described in the 9/11 Report and H.R. 
10 answers that challenge.
  In my decade of service in this institution, I have taken seriously 
my responsibility to cautiously weigh the consequences of our action on 
the Constitutional rights of citizens and to carefully evaluate the 
expansion of federal powers. I reflect on the perspective of that 
service as I consider H.R. 10.
  H.R. 10 takes a significant step forward in recognizing this inherent 
tension in a democracy by requiring the National Intelligence Director 
to appoint a Civil Liberties Protection Officer to be responsible for 
ensuring that privacy and civil liberties are protected. All proposed 
and final rules would also be subject to an assessment of privacy 
rights. I believe this legislation achieves the necessary balance 
between protecting our society and protecting individuals.
  There will still be more to do--both bodies have a responsibility to 
reorganize internally to consolidate congressional oversight. I am 
concerned that the other body has adopted a process that is a hollow 
semblance of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Far from 
consolidating oversight, amendments adopted by the other body will have 
the effect of pretending at consolidation while continuing business as 
usual. This should not stand and the House must take the lead in 
demonstrating the resolve to actually act upon the

[[Page H8915]]

call of the Commission to streamline oversight by the legislative 
branch.
  I encourage my colleagues to support this measure so that we may take 
the next step of moving this legislation to conference with the other 
body and producing a final product that will comprehensively address 
the range of recommendations presented by the 9/11 Commission.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of efforts 
that have been taken to address the concerns of the private security 
industry in the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act. Under the wise 
guidance of the Judiciary Committee leadership, provisions have been 
included in this bill that will have a positive effect on the overall 
dependability of private security services. While I would contend that 
these provisions do not go far enough, they are a clear improvement, 
and I urge my colleagues to support their inclusion in the law.
  The relevant provisions, which were included in H.R. 10 with 
industry-wide support, allow private security guard companies to have 
access to federal background checks unless prohibited by their home 
state, and also provide for the creation of a national clearinghouse to 
be used in processing these requests. Federal background checks will 
ensure a safer, more secure private security industry, and will allow 
private security companies to protect themselves against the increased 
liability that could come with hiring an individual with a relevant 
criminal history. In addition, the realization of the national 
clearinghouse is absolutely essential, given the excessive delays that 
are often incurred within the varied state systems that are currently 
used in processing these background check requests.
  While allowing private security companies to receive criminal 
background information on prospective employees through a streamlined 
process is certainly a positive development, I contend that more should 
be done to secure this vital industry. Background checks should be 
required for all private security guards, to ensure that dangerous 
criminals and terrorists are never employed in positions of such power 
and responsibility.
  Again, I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Judiciary 
Committee for their efforts in addressing this important issue, and I 
hope to continue working with them in the future to ensure that all of 
our nation's assets are adequately secured.
  Mr. STARK. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 10, the 
Republican's so-called 
9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act.
  The 9/11 Commission has worked for months in a thoughtful, thorough 
and bipartisan manner to recommend concrete ways to reorganize and 
restructure Federal counterterrorism efforts to ensure we are better 
able to prevent future attacks. Congress should have immediately 
adopted those recommendations, but Republicans have blocked that effort 
today.
  Americans should not be fooled by the House Republicans' cynical 
exercise today. They are circumventing real reform of our Nation's 
intelligence community. Republicans may say they have listened to the 
9/11 Commission. But, make no mistake, the bill before us does not 
fully implement the Commission's recommendations--it doesn't even come 
close. Instead, it flies in the face of the Commission's sound and 
deliberative efforts.
  I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this bill. House Republicans 
are simply trying to score political points by passing a bill with the 
same title as the 9/11 Commission hoping no one reads the fine print. 
If the Republican leadership were serious about reform, they would have 
gotten their caucus in line and come forth with a bipartisan bill that 
mirrors the Commission recommendations like the bill the Senate has 
passed. Republicans chose not to do so.
  Let's stand with the families of September 11 and pass real 
intelligence reform. Let's put the Republican's election politics aside 
and get on with the business of protecting the American people.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment in the 
nature of a substitute, as amended.
  The amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, was agreed 
to.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Hastings of Washington) having assumed the chair, Mr. Linder, Chairman 
pro tempore of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the 
Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the 
bill (H.R. 10) to provide for reform of the intelligence community, 
terrorism prevention and prosecution, border security, and 
international cooperation and coordination, and for other purposes, 
pursuant to House Resolution 827, he reported the bill back to the 
House with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment in the 
nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the Whole?
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I demand a separate vote on amendment 
No. 14 offered by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is a separate vote demanded on any other 
amendment?
  The Clerk will designate the amendment on which a separate vote has 
been demanded.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment:
       Strike section 3006 (page 242, line 18 through page 244, 
     line 9) and redesignate provisions and conform the table of 
     contents accordingly.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the amendment.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 203, 
noes 210, not voting 19, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 521]

                               AYES--203

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Bartlett (MD)
     Becerra
     Bell
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carson (IN)
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costello
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Tom
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dooley (CA)
     Doyle
     Emanuel
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Gerlach
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green (TX)
     Greenwood
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hoeffel
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley (OR)
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     King (NY)
     Kirk
     Kleczka
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lynch
     Maloney
     Markey
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mollohan
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Petri
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sabo
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Shays
     Sherman
     Simmons
     Skelton
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Turner (TX)
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walsh
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (PA)
     Wexler
     Wilson (NM)
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                               NOES--210

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Beauprez
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boyd
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burns
     Burr
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carson (OK)
     Carter
     Case
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Chocola
     Coble
     Cole
     Collins
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Deal (GA)
     DeFazio
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)

[[Page H8916]]


     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Issa
     Istook
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson, Sam
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     King (IA)
     Kingston
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     LaHood
     Latham
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     Marshall
     Matheson
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Saxton
     Schrock
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (TX)
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Turner (OH)
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden (OR)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (SC)
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--19

     Ballenger
     Boehlert
     Cunningham
     Filner
     Franks (AZ)
     Gephardt
     Hinojosa
     Jones (NC)
     Kaptur
     Lipinski
     Majette
     Matsui
     Meek (FL)
     Norwood
     Ortiz
     Paul
     Slaughter
     Tauzin
     Towns


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington) (during the 
vote). Members are advised 2 minutes remain in this vote.

                              {time}  1500

  Mr. GILCHREST changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 521, I was in my 
Congressional District on official business. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``aye.''
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the amendment in the 
nature of a substitute, as amended.
  The amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, was agreed 
to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.


               Motion to Recommit Offered by Mrs. Maloney

  Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentlewoman opposed to the bill?
  Mrs. MALONEY. I am, Mr. Speaker, in its current form.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:
       Mrs. Maloney moves to recommit the bill H.R. 10 to the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence with instructions 
     to report the same back to the House forthwith with the 
     following amendment:
       Strike all after the enacting clause and insert Attachment 
     1, as modified by the additional attachments:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``National 
     Intelligence Reform Act of 2004''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

                TITLE I--NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

              Subtitle A--National Intelligence Authority

Sec. 101. National Intelligence Authority.
Sec. 102. National Intelligence Director.

 Subtitle B--Responsibilities and Authorities of National Intelligence 
                                Director

Sec. 111. Provision of national intelligence.
Sec. 112. Responsibilities of National Intelligence Director.
Sec. 113. Authorities of National Intelligence Director.
Sec. 114. Enhanced personnel management.
Sec. 115. Security clearances.
Sec. 116. National Intelligence Reserve Corps.
Sec. 117. Appointment and termination of certain officials responsible 
              for intelligence-related activities.
Sec. 118. Reserve for Contingencies of the National Intelligence 
              Director.

        Subtitle C--Office of the National Intelligence Director

Sec. 121. Office of the National Intelligence Director.
Sec. 122. Deputy national intelligence directors.
Sec. 123. National Intelligence Council.
Sec. 124. General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority.
Sec. 125. Intelligence Comptroller.
Sec. 126. Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National 
              Intelligence Authority.
Sec. 127. Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence Authority.
Sec. 128. Chief Information Officer of the National Intelligence 
              Authority.
Sec. 129. Chief Human Capital Officer of the National Intelligence 
              Authority.
Sec. 130. Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence 
              Authority.
Sec. 131. National Counterintelligence Executive.

   Subtitle D--Additional Elements of National Intelligence Authority

Sec. 141. Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority.
Sec. 142. Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority.
Sec. 143. National Counterterrorism Center.
Sec. 144. National intelligence centers.

 Subtitle E--Education and Training of Intelligence Community Personnel

Sec. 151. Framework for cross-disciplinary education and training.
Sec. 152. Intelligence Community Scholarship Program.

 Subtitle F--Additional Authorities of National Intelligence Authority

Sec. 161. Use of appropriated funds.
Sec. 162. Acquisition and fiscal authorities.
Sec. 163. Personnel matters.
Sec. 164. Ethics matters.

        TITLE II--OTHER IMPROVEMENTS OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

          Subtitle A--Improvements of Intelligence Activities

Sec. 201. Availability to public of certain intelligence funding 
              information.
Sec. 202. Merger of Homeland Security Council into National Security 
              Council.
Sec. 203. Joint Intelligence Community Council.
Sec. 204. Improvement of intelligence capabilities of the Federal 
              Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 205. Federal Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Career Service.
Sec. 206. Information sharing.

                Subtitle B--Privacy and Civil Liberties

Sec. 211. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
Sec. 212. Privacy and civil liberties officers.

           Subtitle C--Independence of Intelligence Agencies

Sec. 221. Independence of National Intelligence Director.
Sec. 222. Independence of intelligence.
Sec. 223. Independence of National Counterterrorism Center.
Sec. 224. Access of congressional committees to national intelligence.
Sec. 225. Communications with Congress.

  TITLE III--MODIFICATIONS OF LAWS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                               MANAGEMENT

              Subtitle A--Conforming and Other Amendments

Sec. 301. Restatement and modification of basic authority on the 
              Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 302. Conforming amendments relating to roles of National 
              Intelligence Director and Director of the Central 
              Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 303. Other conforming amendments
Sec. 304. Modifications of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence 
              under National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 305. Elements of intelligence community under National Security 
              Act of 1947.
Sec. 306. Redesignation of National Foreign Intelligence Program as 
              National Intelligence Program.
Sec. 307. Conforming amendment on coordination of budgets of elements 
              of the intelligence community within the Department of 
              Defense.
Sec. 308. Repeal of superseded authorities.
Sec. 309. Clerical amendments to National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 310. Modification of authorities relating to National 
              Counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 311. Conforming amendment to Inspector General Act of 1978.
Sec. 312. Conforming amendment relating to Chief Financial Officer of 
              the National Intelligence Authority.

                 Subtitle B--Transfers and Terminations

Sec. 321. Transfer of Office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 
              for Community Management.
Sec. 322. Transfer of National Counterterrorism Executive.
Sec. 323. Transfer of Terrorist Threat Integration Center.
Sec. 324. Termination of certain positions within the Central 
              Intelligence Agency.

[[Page H8917]]

                  Subtitle C--Other Transition Matters

Sec. 331. Executive Schedule matters.
Sec. 332. Preservation of intelligence capabilities.
Sec. 333. Reorganization.
Sec. 334. National Intelligence Director report on implementation of 
              intelligence community reform.
Sec. 335. Comptroller General reports on implementation of intelligence 
              community reform.
Sec. 336. General references.

                       Subtitle D--Effective Date

Sec. 341. Effective date.

                       Subtitle E--Other Matters

Sec. 351. Severability.
Sec. 352. Authorization of appropriations.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) The term ``intelligence'' includes foreign intelligence 
     and counterintelligence.
       (2) The term ``foreign intelligence'' means information 
     relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of 
     foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign 
     organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorists.
       (3) The term ``counterintelligence'' means information 
     gathered, and activities conducted, to protect against 
     espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or 
     assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign 
     governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, 
     foreign persons, or international terrorists.
       (4) The term ``intelligence community'' includes the 
     following:
       (A) The National Intelligence Authority.
       (B) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (C) The National Security Agency.
       (D) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (E) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (F) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (G) Other offices within the Department of Defense for the 
     collection of specialized national intelligence through 
     reconnaissance programs.
       (H) The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the 
     Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, and the Department of Energy.
       (I) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the 
     Department of State.
       (J) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the 
     Department of the Treasury.
       (K) The elements of the Department of Homeland Security 
     concerned with the analysis of intelligence information, 
     including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard.
       (L) Such other elements of any department or agency as may 
     be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the 
     National Intelligence Director and the head of the department 
     or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence 
     community.
       (5) The terms ``national intelligence'' and ``intelligence 
     related to the national security''--
       (A) each refer to intelligence which pertains to the 
     interests of more than one department or agency of the 
     Government; and
       (B) do not refer to counterintelligence or law enforcement 
     activities conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     except to the extent provided for in procedures agreed to by 
     the National Intelligence Director and the Attorney General, 
     or otherwise as expressly provided for in this title.
       (6) The term ``National Intelligence Program''--
       (A)(i) refers to all national intelligence programs, 
     projects, and activities of the elements of the intelligence 
     community;
       (ii) includes all programs, projects, and activities 
     (whether or not pertaining to national intelligence) of the 
     National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence 
     Agency, the National Security Agency, the National 
     Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance 
     Office, the Office of Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, and the Office of Information Analysis of the 
     Department of Homeland Security; and
       (iii) includes any other program, project, or activity of a 
     department, agency, or element of the United States 
     Government relating to national intelligence unless the 
     National Intelligence Director and the head of the 
     department, agency, or element concerned determine otherwise; 
     but
       (B) except as provided in subparagraph (A)(ii), does not 
     refer to any program, project, or activity of the military 
     departments, including any program, project, or activity of 
     the Defense Intelligence Agency that is not part of the 
     National Foreign Intelligence Program as of the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, to acquire intelligence principally 
     for the planning and conduct of joint or tactical military 
     operations by the United States Armed Forces.
       (7) The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' 
     means--
       (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.

                TITLE I--NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

              Subtitle A--National Intelligence Authority

     SEC. 101. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY.

       (a) Independent Establishment.--There is hereby established 
     as an independent establishment in the executive branch of 
     government the National Intelligence Authority.
       (b) Composition.--The National Intelligence Authority is 
     composed of the following:
       (1) The Office of the National Intelligence Director.
       (2) The elements specified in subtitle D.
       (3) Such other elements, offices, agencies, and activities 
     as may be established by law or by the President or the 
     National Intelligence Director.
       (c) Primary Missions.--The primary missions of the National 
     Intelligence Authority are as follows:
       (1) To unify and strengthen the efforts of the intelligence 
     community of the United States Government.
       (2) To ensure the organization of the efforts of the 
     intelligence community of the United States Government in a 
     joint manner relating to intelligence missions rather than 
     through intelligence collection disciplines.
       (3) To provide for the operation of the National 
     Counterterrorism Center and national intelligence centers 
     under subtitle D.
       (4) To eliminate barriers that impede coordination of the 
     counterterrorism activities of the United States Government 
     between foreign intelligence activities located abroad and 
     foreign intelligence activities located domestically while 
     ensuring the protection of civil liberties.
       (5) To establish clear responsibility and accountability 
     for counterterrorism and other intelligence matters relating 
     to the national security of the United States.
       (d) Seal.--The National Intelligence Director shall have a 
     seal for the National Intelligence Authority. The design of 
     the seal is subject to the approval of the President. 
     Judicial notice shall be taken of the seal.

     SEC. 102. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR.

       (a) National Intelligence Director.--There is a National 
     Intelligence Director who shall be appointed by the 
     President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
       (b) Individuals Eligible for Nomination.--Any individual 
     nominated for appointment as National Intelligence Director 
     shall have extensive national security expertise.
       (c) Prohibition on Simultaneous Service in Other Capacity 
     in Intelligence Community.--The individual serving as 
     National Intelligence Director may not, while so serving, 
     serve in any capacity in any other element of the 
     intelligence community, except to the extent that the 
     individual serving as National Intelligence Director does so 
     in an acting capacity.
       (d) Principal Duties and Responsibilities.--The National 
     Intelligence Director shall--
       (1) serve as head of the intelligence community in 
     accordance with the provisions of this Act, the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), and other 
     applicable provisions of law;
       (2) act as a principal adviser to the President for 
     intelligence related to the national security;
       (3) serve as the head of the National Intelligence 
     Authority; and
       (4) direct and oversee the National Intelligence Program.
       (e) General Responsibilities and Authorities.--In carrying 
     out the duties and responsibilities set forth in subsection 
     (c), the National Intelligence Director shall have the 
     responsibilities set forth in section 112 and the authorities 
     set forth in section 113 and other applicable provisions of 
     law.

 Subtitle B--Responsibilities and Authorities of National Intelligence 
                                Director

     SEC. 111. PROVISION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) In General.--The National Intelligence Director shall 
     be responsible for providing national intelligence--
       (1) to the President;
       (2) to the heads of other departments and agencies of the 
     executive branch;
       (3) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior 
     military commanders;
       (4) to the Senate and House of Representatives and the 
     committees thereof; and
       (5) to such other persons or entities as the President 
     shall direct.
       (b) National Intelligence.--Such national intelligence 
     shall be timely, objective, independent of political 
     considerations, and based upon all sources available to the 
     intelligence community.

     SEC. 112. RESPONSIBILITIES OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR.

       (a) In General.--The National Intelligence Director shall--
       (1) determine the annual budget for the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the United States by--
       (A) providing to the heads of the departments containing 
     agencies or elements within the intelligence community and 
     that have one or more programs, projects, or activities 
     within the National Intelligence program, and to the heads of 
     such agencies and elements, guidance for development the 
     National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such 
     agencies or elements;
       (B) developing and presenting to the President an annual 
     budget for the National Intelligence Program after 
     consultation with the heads of agencies or elements, and the 
     heads of their respective departments, under subparagraph 
     (A);
       (C) providing budget guidance to each element of the 
     intelligence community that does not have one or more 
     program, project, or activity within the National 
     Intelligence Program regarding the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of such element; and

[[Page H8918]]

       (D) participating in the development by the Secretary of 
     Defense of the annual budgets for the military intelligence 
     programs, projects, and activities not included in the 
     National Intelligence Program;
       (2) manage and oversee the National Intelligence Program, 
     including--
       (A) the execution of funds within the National Intelligence 
     Program;
       (B) the reprogramming of funds appropriated or otherwise 
     made available to the National Intelligence Program; and
       (C) the transfer of funds and personnel under the National 
     Intelligence Program;
       (3) establish the requirements and priorities to govern the 
     collection, analysis, and dissemination of national 
     intelligence by elements of the intelligence community;
       (4) establish collection and analysis requirements for the 
     intelligence community, determine collection and analysis 
     priorities, issue and manage collection and analysis tasking, 
     and resolve conflicts in the tasking of elements of the 
     intelligence community within the National Intelligence 
     Program, except as otherwise agreed with the Secretary of 
     Defense pursuant to the direction of the President;
       (5) provide advisory tasking on the collection of 
     intelligence to elements of the United States Government 
     having information collection capabilities that are not 
     elements of the intelligence community;
       (6) manage and oversee the National Counterterrorism Center 
     under section 143, and establish, manage, and oversee 
     national intelligence centers under section 144;
       (7) establish requirements and priorities for foreign 
     intelligence information to be collected under the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.), and provide assistance to the Attorney General to 
     ensure that information derived from electronic surveillance 
     or physical searches under that Act is disseminated so it may 
     be used efficiently and effectively for foreign intelligence 
     purposes, except that the Director shall have no authority to 
     direct, manage, or undertake electronic surveillance or 
     physical search operations pursuant to that Act unless 
     otherwise authorized by statute or Executive order;
       (8) develop and implement, in consultation with the heads 
     of other agencies or elements of the intelligence community, 
     and the heads of their respective departments, personnel 
     policies and programs applicable to the intelligence 
     community that--
       (A) encourage and facilitate assignments and details of 
     personnel to the National Counterterrorism Center under 
     section 143, to national intelligence centers under section 
     144, and between elements of the intelligence community;
       (B) set standards for education, training, and career 
     development of personnel of the intelligence community;
       (C) encourage and facilitate the recruitment and retention 
     by the intelligence community of highly qualified individuals 
     for the effective conduct of intelligence activities;
       (D) ensure that the personnel of the intelligence community 
     is sufficiently diverse for purposes of the collection and 
     analysis of intelligence through the recruitment and training 
     of women, minorities, and individuals with diverse ethnic, 
     cultural, and linguistic backgrounds;
       (E) make service in more than one element of the 
     intelligence community a condition of promotion to such 
     positions within the intelligence community as the Director 
     shall specify;
       (F) ensure the effective management of intelligence 
     community personnel who are responsible for intelligence 
     community-wide matters;
       (G) provide for the effective management of human capital 
     within the intelligence community, including--
       (i) the alignment of human resource policies and programs 
     of the elements of the intelligence community with the 
     missions, goals, and organizational objectives of such 
     elements and of the intelligence community overall;
       (ii) the assessment of workforce characteristics and future 
     needs and the establishment of workforce development 
     strategies to meet those needs based on relevant 
     organizational missions and strategic plans;
       (iii) the sustainment of a culture that encourages and 
     allows for the development of a high performing workforce; 
     and
       (iv) the alignment of expectations for personnel 
     performance with relevant organizational missions and 
     strategic plans;
       (H) are consistent with the public employment principles of 
     merit and fitness set forth under section 2301 of title 5, 
     United States Code; and
       (I) include the enhancements required under section 114;
       (9) promote and evaluate the utility of national 
     intelligence to consumers within the United States 
     Government;
       (10) ensure that appropriate officials of the United States 
     Government and other appropriate individuals have access to a 
     variety of intelligence assessments and analytical views;
       (11) protect intelligence sources and methods from 
     unauthorized disclosure;
       (12) establish requirements and procedures for the 
     classification of intelligence information and for access to 
     classified intelligence information;
       (13) establish requirements and procedures for the 
     dissemination of classified information by elements of the 
     intelligence community;
       (14) establish intelligence reporting guidelines that 
     maximize the dissemination of information while protecting 
     intelligence sources and methods;
       (15) develop, in consultation with the heads of appropriate 
     departments and agencies of the United States Government, an 
     integrated communications network that provides interoperable 
     communications capabilities among all elements of the 
     intelligence community and such other entities and persons as 
     the Director considers appropriate;
       (16) establish standards for information technology and 
     communications for the intelligence community;
       (17) ensure that the intelligence community makes efficient 
     and effective use of open-source information and analysis;
       (18) ensure compliance by elements of the intelligence 
     community with the Constitution and all laws, regulations, 
     Executive orders, and implementing guidelines of the United 
     States applicable to the intelligence and intelligence-
     related activities of the United States Government, including 
     the provisions of the Constitution and all laws, regulations, 
     Executive orders, and implementing guidelines of the United 
     States applicable to the protection of the privacy and civil 
     liberties of United States persons;
       (19) eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication within the 
     intelligence community; and
       (20) perform such other functions as the President may 
     direct.
       (b) Uniform Procedures for Sensitive Compartmented 
     Information.--The President, acting through the National 
     Intelligence Director, shall establish uniform standards and 
     procedures for the grant to sensitive compartmented 
     information in accordance with section 115.
       (c) Performance of Common Services.--(1) The National 
     Intelligence Director shall, in consultation with the heads 
     of departments and agencies of the United States Government 
     containing elements within the intelligence community and 
     with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, direct 
     and coordinate the performance by the elements of the 
     intelligence community within the National Intelligence 
     Program of such services as are of common concern to the 
     intelligence community, which services the National 
     Intelligence Director determines can be more efficiently 
     accomplished in a consolidated manner.
       (2) The services performed under paragraph (1) shall 
     include research and development on technology for use in 
     national intelligence missions.
       (d) Regulations.--The National Intelligence Director may 
     prescribe regulations relating to the discharge and 
     enforcement of the responsibilities of the Director under 
     this section.

     SEC. 113. AUTHORITIES OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR.

       (a) Access to Intelligence.--Unless otherwise directed by 
     the President, the National Intelligence Director shall have 
     access to all intelligence related to the national security 
     which is collected by any department, agency, or other 
     element of the United States Government.
       (b) Determination of Budgets for NIP and Other Intelligence 
     Activities.--The National Intelligence Director shall 
     determine the annual budget for the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the United States 
     Government under section 112(a)(1) by--
       (1) providing to the heads of the departments containing 
     agencies or elements within the intelligence community and 
     that have one or more programs, projects, or activities 
     within the National Intelligence program, and to the heads of 
     such agencies and elements, guidance for development the 
     National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such 
     agencies or elements;
       (2) developing and presenting to the President an annual 
     budget for the National Intelligence Program after 
     consultation with the heads of agencies or elements, and the 
     heads of their respective departments, under paragraph (1), 
     including, in furtherance of such budget, the review, 
     modification, and approval of budgets of the agencies or 
     elements of the intelligence community with one or more 
     programs, projects, or activities within the National 
     Intelligence Program utilizing the budget authorities in 
     subsection (c)(1);
       (3) providing guidance on the development of annual budgets 
     for each element of the intelligence community that does not 
     have any program, project, or activity within the National 
     Intelligence Program utilizing the budget authorities in 
     subsection (c)(2);
       (4) participating in the development by the Secretary of 
     Defense of the annual budget for military intelligence 
     programs and activities outside the National Intelligence 
     Program;
       (4) receiving the appropriations for the National 
     Intelligence Program as specified in subsection (d) and 
     allotting and allocating funds to agencies and elements of 
     the intelligence community; and
       (5) managing and overseeing the execution by the agencies 
     or elements of the intelligence community, and, if necessary, 
     the modification of the annual budget for the National 
     Intelligence Program, including directing the reprogramming 
     and transfer of funds, and the transfer of personnel, among 
     and between elements of the intelligence community within the 
     National Intelligence Program utilizing the authorities in 
     subsections (f) and (g).

[[Page H8919]]

       (c) Budget Authorities.--(1)(A) In developing and 
     presenting an annual budget for the elements of the 
     intelligence community within the National Intelligence 
     Program under subsection (b)(1), the National Intelligence 
     Director shall coordinate, prepare, and present to the 
     President the annual budgets of those elements, in 
     consultation with the heads of those elements.
       (B) If any portion of the budget for an element of the 
     intelligence community within the National Intelligence 
     Program is prepared outside the Office of the National 
     Intelligence Director, the Director--
       (i) shall approve such budget before submission to the 
     President; and
       (ii) may require modifications of such budget to meet the 
     requirements and priorities of the Director before approving 
     such budget under clause (i).
       (C) The budget of an agency or element of the intelligence 
     community with one or more programs, projects, or activities 
     within the National Intelligence Program may not be provided 
     to the President unless the Director has first approved such 
     budget.
       (2)(A) The Director shall provide guidance for the 
     development of the annual budgets for each agency or element 
     of the intelligence community that does not have any program, 
     project, or activity within the National Intelligence 
     Program.
       (B) The heads of the agencies or elements of the 
     intelligence community, and the heads of their respective 
     departments, referred to in subparagraph (A) shall coordinate 
     closely with the Director in the development of the budgets 
     of such agencies or elements, before the submission of their 
     recommendations on such budgets to the President.
       (d) Jurisdiction of Funds Under NIP.--(1) Notwithstanding 
     any other provision of law and consistent with section 504 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), any 
     amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the 
     National Intelligence Program shall be appropriated to the 
     National Intelligence Authority and, pursuant to subsection 
     (e), under the direct jurisdiction of the National 
     Intelligence Director.
       (2) The Director shall manage and oversee the execution by 
     each element of the intelligence community of any amounts 
     appropriated or otherwise made available to such element 
     under the National Intelligence Program.
       (e) Accounts for Administration of NIP Funds.--(1) The 
     Secretary of the Treasury shall, in consultation with the 
     National Intelligence Director, establish accounts for the 
     funds under the jurisdiction of the Director under subsection 
     (d) for purposes of carrying out the responsibilities and 
     authorities of the Director under this Act with respect to 
     the National Intelligence Program.
       (2) The National Intelligence Director shall--
       (A) control and manage the accounts established under 
     paragraph (1); and
       (B) with the concurrence of the Director of the Office of 
     Management and Budget, establish procedures governing the use 
     (including transfers and reprogrammings) of funds in such 
     accounts.
       (3)(A) To the extent authorized by law, a certifying 
     official shall follow the procedures established under 
     paragraph (2)(B) with regard to each account established 
     under paragraph (1). Disbursements from any such account 
     shall only be made against a valid obligation of such 
     account.
       (B) In this paragraph, the term ``certifying official', 
     with respect to an element of the intelligence community, 
     means an employee of the element who has responsibilities 
     specified in section 3528(a) of title 31, United States Code.
       (4) The National Intelligence Director shall allot funds 
     deposited in an account established under paragraph (1) 
     directly to the head of the elements of the intelligence 
     community concerned in accordance with the procedures 
     established under paragraph (2)(B).
       (5) Each account established under paragraph (1) shall be 
     subject to chapters 13 and 15 of title 31, United States 
     Code, other than sections 1503 and 1556 of that title.
       (6) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to impair 
     or otherwise affect the authority granted by subsection 
     (g)(3) or by section 5 or 8 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f, 403j).
       (f) Role in Reprogramming or Transfer of NIP Funds by 
     Elements of Intelligence Community.--(1) No funds made 
     available under the National Intelligence Program may be 
     reprogrammed or transferred by any agency or element of the 
     intelligence community without the prior approval of the 
     National Intelligence Director except in accordance with 
     procedures issued by the Director.
       (2) The head of the department concerned shall consult with 
     the Director before reprogramming or transferring funds 
     appropriated or otherwise made available to an agency or 
     element of the intelligence community that does not have any 
     program, project, or activity within the National 
     Intelligence Program.
       (3) The Director shall, before reprogramming funds 
     appropriated or otherwise made available for an element of 
     the intelligence community within the National Intelligence 
     Program, consult with the head of the department or agency 
     having jurisdiction over such element regarding such 
     reprogramming.
       (4)(A) The Director shall consult with the appropriate 
     committees of Congress regarding modifications of existing 
     procedures to expedite the reprogramming of funds within the 
     National Intelligence Program.
       (B) Any modification of procedures under subparagraph (A) 
     shall include procedures for the notification of the 
     appropriate committees of Congress of any objection raised by 
     the head of a department or agency to a reprogramming 
     proposed by the Director as a result of consultations under 
     paragraph (3).
       (g) Transfer or Reprogramming of Funds and Transfer of 
     Personnel Within NIP.--(1) In addition to any other 
     authorities available under law for such purposes, the 
     National Intelligence Director, with the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget and after 
     consultation with the heads of the departments containing 
     agencies or elements within the intelligence community to the 
     extent their subordinate agencies or elements are affected, 
     with the heads of such subordinate agencies or elements, and 
     with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to the 
     extent the Central Intelligence Agency is affected, may--
       (A) transfer or reprogram funds appropriated for a program 
     within the National Intelligence Program to another such 
     program;
       (B) review, and approve or disapprove, any proposal to 
     transfer or reprogram funds from appropriations that are not 
     for the National Intelligence Program to appropriations for 
     the National Intelligence Program;
       (C) in accordance with procedures to be developed by the 
     National Intelligence Director, transfer personnel of the 
     intelligence community funded through the National 
     Intelligence Program from one element of the intelligence 
     community to another element of the intelligence community; 
     and
       (D) in accordance with procedures to be developed by the 
     National Intelligence Director and the heads of the 
     departments and agencies concerned, transfer personnel of the 
     intelligence community not funded through the National 
     Intelligence Program from one element of the intelligence 
     community to another element of the intelligence community.
       (2) A transfer of funds or personnel may be made under this 
     subsection only if--
       (A) the funds or personnel are being transferred to an 
     activity that is a higher priority intelligence activity;
       (B) the transfer does not involve a transfer of funds to 
     the Reserve for Contingencies of the National Intelligence 
     Director; or
       (C) the transfer does not exceed applicable ceilings 
     established in law for such transfers.
       (3) Funds transferred under this subsection shall remain 
     available for the same period as the appropriations account 
     to which transferred.
       (4) Any transfer of funds under this subsection shall be 
     carried out in accordance with existing procedures applicable 
     to reprogramming notifications for the appropriate 
     congressional committees. Any proposed transfer for which 
     notice is given to the appropriate congressional committees 
     shall be accompanied by a report explaining the nature of the 
     proposed transfer and how it satisfies the requirements of 
     this subsection. In addition, the congressional intelligence 
     committees shall be promptly notified of any transfer of 
     funds made pursuant to this subsection in any case in which 
     the transfer would not have otherwise required reprogramming 
     notification under procedures in effect as of October 24, 
     1992.
       (5)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall promptly 
     submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on 
     any transfer of personnel made pursuant to this subsection. 
     The Director shall include in any such report an explanation 
     of the nature of the transfer and how it satisfies the 
     requirements of this subsection.
       (B) In this paragraph, the term ``appropriate committees of 
     Congress'' means--
       (i)(I) the Committee on Appropriations and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (II) the Committee on Appropriations and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (ii) in the case of a transfer of personnel to or from the 
     Department of Defense--
       (I) the committees and select committees referred to in 
     clause (i);
       (II) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and
       (III) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (iii) in the case of a transfer of personnel to or from the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation--
       (I) the committees and select committees referred to in 
     clause (i);
       (II) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and
       (III) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (iv) in the case of a transfer of personnel to or from the 
     Department of Homeland Security--
       (I) the committees and select committees referred to in 
     clause (i);
       (II) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate; 
     and
       (III) the Select Committee on Homeland Security of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (h) Information Technology and Communications.--(1) In 
     conforming with section 205, in carrying out section 
     112(a)(16), the National Intelligence Director shall--
       (A) establish standards for information technology and 
     communications across the intelligence community;
       (B) develop an integrated information technology network 
     and enterprise architecture for the intelligence community, 
     including interface standards for interoperability to enable 
     automated information-sharing

[[Page H8920]]

     among elements of the intelligence community;
       (C) maintain an inventory of critical information 
     technology and communications systems, and eliminate 
     unnecessary or duplicative systems;
       (D) establish contingency plans for the intelligence 
     community regarding information technology and 
     communications; and
       (E) establish policies, doctrine, training, and other 
     measures necessary to ensure that the intelligence community 
     develops an integrated information technology and 
     communications network that ensures information-sharing.
       (2) Consistent with section 205, the Director shall take 
     any action necessary, including the setting of standards for 
     information technology and communications across the 
     intelligence community, to develop an integrated information 
     technology and communications network that ensures 
     information-sharing across the intelligence community.
       (i) Coordination With Foreign Governments.--In a manner 
     consistent with section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 
     1980 (22 U.S.C. 3927), the National Intelligence Director 
     shall oversee and direct the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency in coordinating, under section 103(f) of 
     the National Security Act of 1947, the relationships between 
     elements of the intelligence community and the intelligence 
     or security services of foreign governments on all matters 
     involving intelligence related to the national security or 
     involving intelligence acquired through clandestine means.
       (j) Open Source Information Collection.--The National 
     Intelligence Director shall establish and maintain within the 
     intelligence community an effective and efficient open-source 
     information collection capability.
       (k) Access to Information.--Except as otherwise directed by 
     the President, the head of each element of the intelligence 
     community shall promptly provide the National Intelligence 
     Director such information in the possession or under the 
     control of such element as the Director may request in order 
     to facilitate the exercise of the authorities and 
     responsibilities of the Director under this Act.

     SEC. 114. ENHANCED PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.

       (a) Rewards for Service in Certain Positions.--(1) The 
     National Intelligence Director shall prescribe regulations to 
     provide incentives for service on the staff of the national 
     intelligence centers, on the staff of the National 
     Counterterrorism Center, and in other positions in support of 
     the intelligence community management functions of the 
     Director.
       (2) Incentives under paragraph (1) may include financial 
     incentives, bonuses, and such other awards and incentives as 
     the Director considers appropriate.
       (b) Enhanced Promotion for Service Under NID.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the National 
     Intelligence Director shall ensure that personnel of an 
     element of the intelligence community who are assigned or 
     detailed to service under the National Intelligence Director 
     shall be promoted at rates equivalent to or better than 
     personnel of such element who are not so assigned or 
     detailed.
       (c) Joint Career Matters.--(1) In carrying out section 
     112(a)(8), the National Intelligence Director shall prescribe 
     mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the 
     intelligence community through various elements of the 
     intelligence community in the course of their careers in 
     order to facilitate the widest possible understanding by such 
     personnel of the variety of intelligence requirements, 
     methods, and disciplines.
       (2) The mechanisms prescribed under paragraph (1) may 
     include the following:
       (A) The establishment of special occupational categories 
     involving service, over the course of a career, in more than 
     one element of the intelligence community.
       (B) The provision of rewards for service in positions 
     undertaking analysis and planning of operations involving two 
     or more elements of the intelligence community.
       (C) The establishment of requirements for education, 
     training, service, and evaluation that involve service in 
     more than one element of the intelligence community.
       (3) It is the sense of Congress that the mechanisms 
     prescribed under this subsection should, to the extent 
     practical, seek to duplicate within the intelligence 
     community the joint officer management policies established 
     by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 
     Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433) and the amendments on joint 
     officer management made by that Act.

     SEC. 115. SECURITY CLEARANCES.

       (a) In General.--The President, in consultation with the 
     National Intelligence Director, the department, agency, or 
     element selected under (b), and other appropriate officials 
     shall--
       (1) establish uniform standards and procedures for the 
     grant of access to classified information for employees and 
     contractor personnel of the United States Government who 
     require access to such information;
       (2) ensure the consistent implementation of the standards 
     and procedures established under paragraph (1) throughout the 
     departments, agencies, and elements of the United States 
     Government and under contracts entered into by such 
     departments, agencies, and elements;
       (3) ensure that an individual who is granted or continued 
     eligibility for access to classified information is treated 
     by each department, agency, or element of the executive 
     branch as eligible for access to classified information at 
     that level for all purposes of each such department, agency, 
     or element, regardless of which department, agency, or 
     element of the executive branch granted or continued the 
     eligibility of such individual for access to classified 
     information;
       (4) establish uniform requirements and standards, including 
     for security questionnaires, financial disclosure 
     requirements, and standards for administering polygraph 
     examinations, to be utilized for the performance of security 
     clearance investigations, including by the contractors 
     conducting such investigations; and
       (5) ensure that the database established under subsection 
     (b)(2)(B) meets the needs of the intelligence community.
       (b) Performance of Security Clearance Investigations.--(1) 
     Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the President shall select a single department, 
     agency, or element of the executive branch to conduct all 
     security clearance investigations of employees and contractor 
     personnel of the United States Government who require access 
     to classified information and to provide and maintain all 
     security clearances of such employees and contractor 
     personnel.
       (2) The department, agency, or element selected under 
     paragraph (1) shall--
       (A) take all necessary actions to carry out the 
     requirements of this section, including entering into a 
     memorandum of understanding with any agency carrying out 
     responsibilities relating to security clearances or security 
     clearance investigations before the date of the enactment of 
     this Act;
       (B) as soon as practicable, establish and maintain a single 
     database for tracking security clearance applications, 
     security clearance investigations, and determinations of 
     eligibility for security clearances, which database shall 
     incorporate applicable elements of similar databases in 
     existence on the date of the enactment of this Act; and
       (C) ensure that security clearance investigations are 
     conducted in accordance with uniform standards and 
     requirements established under subsection (a)(4), including 
     uniform security questionnaires and financial disclosure 
     requirements.
       (c) Adjudication and Grant of Security Clearances.--(1) 
     Each agency that adjudicates and grants security clearances 
     as of the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to 
     adjudicate and grant security clearances after that date.
       (2) Each agency that adjudicates and grants security 
     clearances shall specify to the department, agency, or 
     element selected under subsection (b) the level of security 
     clearance investigation required for an individual under its 
     jurisdiction.
       (3) Upon granting or continuing eligibility for access to 
     classified information to an individual under its 
     jurisdiction, an agency that adjudicates and grants security 
     clearances shall submit to the department, agency, or element 
     selected under subsection (b) notice of that action, 
     including the level of access to classified information 
     granted.
       (d) Utilization of Personnel.--There shall be transferred 
     to the department, agency, or element selected under 
     subsection (b) any personnel of any executive agency whose 
     sole function as of the date of the enactment of this Act is 
     the performance of security clearance investigations.
       (e) Transition.--The President shall take appropriate 
     actions to ensure that the performance of security clearance 
     investigations under this section commences not later than 
     one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 116. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE RESERVE CORPS.

       (a) Establishment.--The National Intelligence Director may 
     provide for the establishment and training of a National 
     Intelligence Reserve Corps (in this section referred to as 
     ``National Intelligence Reserve Corps'') for the temporary 
     reemployment on a voluntary basis of former employees of 
     elements of the intelligence community during periods of 
     emergency, as determined by the Director.
       (b) Eligible Individuals.--An individual may participate in 
     the National Intelligence Reserve Corps only if the 
     individual previously served as a full time employee of an 
     element of the intelligence community.
       (c) Limitation on Membership.--The total number of 
     individuals who are members of the National Intelligence 
     Reserve Corps at any given time may not exceed 200 
     individuals.
       (d) Terms of Participation.--The National Intelligence 
     Director shall prescribe the terms and conditions under which 
     eligible individuals may participate in the National 
     Intelligence Reserve Corps.
       (e) Expenses.--The National Intelligence Director may 
     provide members of the National Intelligence Reserve Corps 
     transportation and per diem in lieu of subsistence for 
     purposes of participating in any training that relates to 
     service as a member of the Reserve Corps.
       (f) Treatment of Annuitants.--(1) If an annuitant receiving 
     an annuity from the Civil Service Retirement and Disability 
     Fund becomes temporarily reemployed pursuant to this section, 
     such annuity shall not be discontinued thereby.
       (2) An annuitant so reemployed shall not be considered an 
     employee for the purposes of chapter 83 or 84 of title 5, 
     United States Code.

[[Page H8921]]

       (g) Treatment Under National Intelligence Authority 
     Personnel Ceiling.--A member of the National Intelligence 
     Reserve Corps who is reemployed on a temporary basis pursuant 
     to this section shall not count against any personnel ceiling 
     applicable to the National Intelligence Authority.

     SEC. 117. APPOINTMENT AND TERMINATION OF CERTAIN OFFICIALS 
                   RESPONSIBLE FOR INTELLIGENCE-RELATED 
                   ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Recommendation of NID in Certain Appointment.--In the 
     event of a vacancy in the position of Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, the National Intelligence Director shall 
     recommend to the President an individual for nomination to 
     fill the vacancy.
       (b) Concurrence of Secretary of Defense in Certain 
     Appointments Recommended by NID.--(1) In the event of a 
     vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the 
     National Intelligence Director shall obtain the concurrence 
     of the Secretary of Defense before recommending to the 
     President an individual for nomination to fill such vacancy. 
     If the Secretary does not concur in the recommendation, the 
     Director may make the recommendation to the President without 
     the concurrence of the Secretary, but shall include in the 
     recommendation a statement that the Secretary does not concur 
     in the recommendation.
       (2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
       (A) The Director of the National Security Agency.
       (B) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.
       (C) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
     Agency.
       (c) Concurrence of NID in Certain Appointments.--(1) In the 
     event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph 
     (2), the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction 
     over the position shall obtain the concurrence of the 
     National Intelligence Director before appointing an 
     individual to fill the vacancy or recommending to the 
     President an individual to be nominated to fill the vacancy. 
     If the Director does not concur in the recommendation, the 
     head of the department or agency concerned may fill the 
     vacancy or make the recommendation to the President (as the 
     case may be) without the concurrence of the Director, but 
     shall notify the President that the Director does not concur 
     in appointment or recommendation (as the case may be).
       (2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
       (A) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
       (B) The Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for 
     Information Analysis.
       (C) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (D) The Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence of 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (d) Recommendation of NID on Termination of Service.--(1) 
     The National Intelligence Director may recommend to the 
     President or the head of the department or agency concerned 
     the termination of service of any individual serving in any 
     position covered by this section.
       (2) In the event the Director intends to recommend to the 
     President the termination of service of an individual under 
     paragraph (1), the Director shall seek the concurrence of the 
     head of the department or agency concerned. If the head of 
     the department or agency concerned does not concur in the 
     recommendation, the Director may make the recommendation to 
     the President without the concurrence of the head of the 
     department or agency concerned, but shall notify the 
     President that the head of the department or agency concerned 
     does not concur in the recommendation.

     SEC. 118. RESERVE FOR CONTINGENCIES OF THE NATIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR.

       (a) Establishment.--There is hereby established on the 
     books of the Treasury an account to be known as the Reserve 
     for Contingencies of the National Intelligence Director.
       (b) Elements.--The Reserve shall consist of the following 
     elements:
       (1) Amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Reserve.
       (2) Any amounts authorized to be transferred to or 
     deposited in the Reserve by law.
       (c) Availability.--Amounts in the Reserve shall be 
     available for such purposes as are provided by law.
       (d) Transfer of Funds of Reserve for Contingencies of 
     CIA.--There shall be transferred to the Reserve for 
     Contingencies of the National Intelligence Director all 
     unobligated balances of the Reserve for Contingencies of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency as of the date of the enactment 
     of this Act.

        Subtitle C--Office of the National Intelligence Director

     SEC. 121. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR.

       (a) Office of National Intelligence Director.--There is 
     within the National Intelligence Authority an Office of the 
     National Intelligence Director.
       (b) Function.--The function of the Office of the National 
     Intelligence Director is to assist the National Intelligence 
     Director in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of 
     the Director under this Act, the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), and other applicable provisions 
     of law, and to carry out such other duties as may be 
     prescribed by the President or by law.
       (c) Composition.--The Office of the National Intelligence 
     Director is composed of the following:
       (1) The Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director.
       (2) Any Deputy National Intelligence Director appointed 
     under section 122(b).
       (3) The National Intelligence Council.
       (4) The General Counsel of the National Intelligence 
     Authority.
       (5) The Intelligence Comptroller.
       (6) The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the 
     National Intelligence Authority.
       (7) The Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence 
     Authority.
       (8) The Chief Information Officer of the National 
     Intelligence Authority.
       (9) The Chief Human Capital Officer of the National 
     Intelligence Authority.
       (10) The Chief Financial Officer of the National 
     Intelligence Authority.
       (11) The National Counterintelligence Executive (including 
     the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive).
       (12) Such other offices and officials as may be established 
     by law or the Director may establish or designate in the 
     Office.
       (d) Staff.--(1) To assist the National Intelligence 
     Director in fulfilling the duties and responsibilities of the 
     Director, the Director shall employ and utilize in the Office 
     of the National Intelligence Director a professional staff 
     having an expertise in matters relating to such duties and 
     responsibilities, and may establish permanent positions and 
     appropriate rates of pay with respect to that staff.
       (2) The staff of the Office of the National Intelligence 
     Director under paragraph (1) shall include the staff of the 
     Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Community Management that is transferred to the Office of the 
     National Intelligence Director under section 321.
       (e) Prohibition on Co-Location With Other Elements of 
     Intelligence Community.--Commencing as of October 1, 2006, 
     the Office of the National Intelligence Director may not be 
     co-located with any other element of the intelligence 
     community.

     SEC. 122. DEPUTY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORS.

       (a) Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director.--(1) 
     There is a Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director 
     who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the 
     advice and consent of the Senate.
       (2) In the event of a vacancy in the position of Principal 
     Deputy National Intelligence Director, the National 
     Intelligence Director shall recommend to the President an 
     individual for appointment as Principal Deputy National 
     Intelligence Director.
       (3) Any individual nominated for appointment as Principal 
     Deputy National Intelligence Director shall have extensive 
     national security experience and management expertise.
       (4) The individual serving as Principal Deputy National 
     Intelligence Director may not, while so serving, serve in any 
     capacity in any other element of the intelligence community, 
     except to the extent that the individual serving as Principal 
     Deputy National Intelligence Director is doing so in an 
     acting capacity.
       (5) The Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director 
     shall assist the National Intelligence Director in carrying 
     out the duties and responsibilities of the Director.
       (6) The Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director 
     shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the National 
     Intelligence Director during the absence or disability of the 
     National Intelligence Director or during a vacancy in the 
     position of National Director of Intelligence.
       (b) Deputy National Intelligence Directors.--(1) There may 
     be not more than four Deputy National Intelligence Directors 
     who shall be appointed by the President.
       (2) In the event of a vacancy in any position of Deputy 
     National Intelligence Director established under this 
     subsection, the National Intelligence Director shall 
     recommend to the President an individual for appointment to 
     such position.
       (3) Each Deputy National Intelligence Director appointed 
     under this subsection shall have such duties, 
     responsibilities, and authorities as the National 
     Intelligence Director may assign or are specified by law.

     SEC. 123. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL.

       (a) National Intelligence Council.--There is a National 
     Intelligence Council.
       (b) Composition.--(1) The National Intelligence Council 
     shall be composed of senior analysts within the intelligence 
     community and substantive experts from the public and private 
     sector, who shall be appointed by, report to, and serve at 
     the pleasure of, the National Intelligence Director.
       (2) The Director shall prescribe appropriate security 
     requirements for personnel appointed from the private sector 
     as a condition of service on the Council, or as contractors 
     of the Council or employees of such contractors, to ensure 
     the protection of intelligence sources and methods while 
     avoiding, wherever possible, unduly intrusive requirements 
     which the Director considers to be unnecessary for this 
     purpose.
       (c) Duties and Responsibilities.--(1) The National 
     Intelligence Council shall--
       (A) produce national intelligence estimates for the United 
     States Government, including alternative views held by 
     elements of the intelligence community and other information 
     as specified in paragraph (2);

[[Page H8922]]

       (B) evaluate community-wide collection and production of 
     intelligence by the intelligence community and the 
     requirements and resources of such collection and production; 
     and
       (C) otherwise assist the National Intelligence Director in 
     carrying out the responsibilities of the Director under 
     section 111.
       (2) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that 
     the Council satisfies the needs of policymakers and other 
     consumers of intelligence by ensuring that each national 
     intelligence estimate under paragraph (1)--
       (A) states separately, and distinguishes between, the 
     intelligence underlying such estimate and the assumptions and 
     judgments of analysts with respect to such intelligence and 
     such estimate;
       (B) describes the quality and reliability of the 
     intelligence underlying such estimate;
       (C) presents and explains alternative conclusions, if any, 
     with respect to the intelligence underlying such estimate and 
     such estimate; and
       (D) characterizes the uncertainties, if any, and confidence 
     in such estimate.
       (d) Service as Senior Intelligence Advisers.--Within their 
     respective areas of expertise and under the direction of the 
     National Intelligence Director, the members of the National 
     Intelligence Council shall constitute the senior intelligence 
     advisers of the intelligence community for purposes of 
     representing the views of the intelligence community within 
     the United States Government.
       (e) Authority To Contract.--Subject to the direction and 
     control of the National Intelligence Director, the National 
     Intelligence Council may carry out its responsibilities under 
     this section by contract, including contracts for substantive 
     experts necessary to assist the Council with particular 
     assessments under this section.
       (f) Staff.--The National Intelligence Director shall make 
     available to the National Intelligence Council such staff as 
     may be necessary to permit the Council to carry out its 
     responsibilities under this section.
       (g) Availability of Council and Staff.--(1) The National 
     Intelligence Director shall take appropriate measures to 
     ensure that the National Intelligence Council and its staff 
     satisfy the needs of policymaking officials and other 
     consumers of intelligence.
       (2) The Council shall be readily accessible to policymaking 
     officials and other appropriate individuals not otherwise 
     associated with the intelligence community.
       (h) Support.--The heads of the elements of the intelligence 
     community shall, as appropriate, furnish such support to the 
     National Intelligence Council, including the preparation of 
     intelligence analyses, as may be required by the National 
     Intelligence Director.

     SEC. 124. GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   AUTHORITY.

       (a) General Counsel of National Intelligence Authority.--
     There is a General Counsel of the National Intelligence 
     Authority who shall be appointed from civilian life by the 
     President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
       (b) Prohibition on Dual Service as General Counsel of 
     Another Agency.--The individual serving in the position of 
     General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority may 
     not, while so serving, also serve as the General Counsel of 
     any other department, agency, or element of the United States 
     Government.
       (c) Scope of Position.--The General Counsel of the National 
     Intelligence Authority is the chief legal officer of the 
     National Intelligence Authority.
       (d) Functions.--The General Counsel of the National 
     Intelligence Authority shall perform such functions as the 
     National Intelligence Director may prescribe.

     SEC. 125. INTELLIGENCE COMPTROLLER.

       (a) Intelligence Comptroller.--There is an Intelligence 
     Comptroller who shall be appointed from civilian life by the 
     National Intelligence Director.
       (b) Supervision.--The Intelligence Comptroller shall report 
     directly to the National Intelligence Director.
       (c) Duties.--The Intelligence Comptroller shall--
       (1) assist the National Intelligence Director in the 
     preparation and execution of the budget of the elements of 
     the intelligence community within the National Intelligence 
     Program;
       (2) assist the Director in participating in the development 
     by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budget for military 
     intelligence programs and activities outside the National 
     Intelligence Program;
       (3) provide unfettered access to the Director to financial 
     information under the National Intelligence Program;
       (4) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the 
     Director or specified by law.

     SEC. 126. OFFICER FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF THE 
                   NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY.

       (a) Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of 
     National Intelligence Authority.--There is an Officer for 
     Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence 
     Authority who shall be appointed by the President.
       (b) Supervision.--The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil 
     Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority shall report 
     directly to the National Intelligence Director.
       (c) Duties.--The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil 
     Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority shall--
       (1) assist the National Intelligence Director in ensuring 
     that the protection of civil rights and civil liberties, as 
     provided in the Constitution, laws, regulations, and 
     Executive orders of the United States, is appropriately 
     incorporated in--
       (A) the policies and procedures developed for and 
     implemented by the National Intelligence Authority;
       (B) the policies and procedures regarding the relationships 
     among the elements of the intelligence community within the 
     National Intelligence Program; and
       (C) the policies and procedures regarding the relationships 
     between the elements of the intelligence community within the 
     National Intelligence Program and the other elements of the 
     intelligence community;
       (2) oversee compliance by the Authority, and in the 
     relationships described in paragraph (1), with requirements 
     under the Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive 
     orders, and implementing guidelines relating to civil rights 
     and civil liberties;
       (3) review, investigate, and assess complaints and other 
     information indicating possible abuses of civil rights or 
     civil liberties, as provided in the Constitution, laws, 
     regulations, and Executive orders of the United States, in 
     the administration of the programs and operations of the 
     Authority, and in the relationships described in paragraph 
     (1), unless, in the determination of the Inspector General of 
     the National Intelligence Authority, the review, 
     investigation, or assessment of a particular complaint or 
     information can better be conducted by the Inspector General;
       (4) coordinate with the Privacy Officer of the National 
     Intelligence Authority to ensure that programs, policies, and 
     procedures involving civil rights, civil liberties, and 
     privacy considerations are addressed in an integrated and 
     comprehensive manner; and
       (5) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the 
     Director or specified by law.

     SEC. 127. PRIVACY OFFICER OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   AUTHORITY.

       (a) Privacy Officer of National Intelligence Authority.--
     There is a Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence 
     Authority who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence 
     Director.
       (b) Duties.--(1) The Privacy Officer of the National 
     Intelligence Authority shall have primary responsibility for 
     the privacy policy of the National Intelligence Authority 
     (including in the relationships among the elements of the 
     intelligence community within the National Intelligence 
     Program and the relationships between the elements of the 
     intelligence community within the National Intelligence 
     Program and the other elements of the intelligence 
     community).
       (2) In discharging the responsibility under paragraph (1), 
     the Privacy Officer shall--
       (A) assure that the use of technologies sustain, and do not 
     erode, privacy protections relating to the use, collection, 
     and disclosure of personal information;
       (B) assure that personal information contained in Privacy 
     Act systems of records is handled in full compliance with 
     fair information practices as set out in the Privacy Act of 
     1974;
       (C) conduct privacy impact assessments when appropriate or 
     as required by law; and
       (D) coordinate with the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil 
     Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority to ensure 
     that programs, policies, and procedures involving civil 
     rights, civil liberties, and privacy considerations are 
     addressed in an integrated and comprehensive manner.

     SEC. 128. CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE NATIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY.

       (a) Chief Information Officer of National Intelligence 
     Authority.--There is a Chief Information Officer of the 
     National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the 
     National Intelligence Director.
       (b) Duties.--The Chief Information Officer of the National 
     Intelligence Authority shall--
       (1) assist the National Intelligence Director in 
     implementing the responsibilities and executing the 
     authorities related to information technology under 
     paragraphs (15) and (16) of section 112(a) and section 
     113(h); and
       (2) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the 
     Director or specified by law.

     SEC. 129. CHIEF HUMAN CAPITAL OFFICER OF THE NATIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY.

       (a) Chief Human Capital Officer of National Intelligence 
     Authority.--There is a Chief Human Capital Officer of the 
     National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the 
     National Intelligence Director.
       (b) Duties.--The Chief Human Capital Officer of the 
     National Intelligence Authority shall--
       (1) have the functions and authorities provided for Chief 
     Human Capital Officers under sections 1401 and 1402 of title 
     5, United States Code, with respect to the National 
     Intelligence Authority; and
       (2) advise and assist the National Intelligence Director in 
     exercising the authorities and responsibilities of the 
     Director with respect to the workforce of the intelligence 
     community as a whole.

     SEC. 130. CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF THE NATIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY.

       (a) Chief Financial Officer of National Intelligence 
     Authority.--There is a Chief Financial Officer of the 
     National Intelligence Authority who shall be designated by 
     the President, in consultation with the National Intelligence 
     Director.
       (b) Designation Requirements.--The designation of an 
     individual as Chief Financial

[[Page H8923]]

     Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall be 
     subject to applicable provisions of section 901(a) of title 
     31, United States Code.
       (c) Authorities and Functions.--The Chief Financial Officer 
     of the National Intelligence Authority shall have such 
     authorities, and carry out such functions, with respect to 
     the National Intelligence Authority as are provided for an 
     agency Chief Financial Officer by section 902 of title 31, 
     United States Code, and other applicable provisions of law.
       (d) Coordination With NIA Comptroller.--(1) The Chief 
     Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority 
     shall coordinate with the Comptroller of the National 
     Intelligence Authority in exercising the authorities and 
     performing the functions provided for the Chief Financial 
     Officer under this section.
       (2) The National Intelligence Director shall take such 
     actions as are necessary to prevent duplication of effort by 
     the Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence 
     Authority and the Comptroller of the National Intelligence 
     Authority.
       (e) Integration of Financial Systems.--Subject to the 
     supervision, direction, and control of the National 
     Intelligence Director, the Chief Financial Officer of the 
     National Intelligence Authority shall take appropriate 
     actions to ensure the timely and effective integration of the 
     financial systems of the National Intelligence Authority 
     (including any elements or components transferred to the 
     Authority by this Act), and of the financial systems of the 
     Authority with applicable portions of the financial systems 
     of the other elements of the intelligence community, as soon 
     as possible after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (f) Protection of Annual Financial Statement From 
     Disclosure.--The annual financial statement of the National 
     Intelligence Authority required under section 3515 of title 
     31, United States Code--
       (1) shall be submitted in classified form; and
       (2) notwithstanding any other provision of law, shall be 
     withheld from public disclosure.

     SEC. 131. NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.

       (a) National Counterintelligence Executive.--The National 
     Counterintelligence Executive under section 902 of the 
     Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of 
     Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402b et seq.), as amended by 
     section 309 of this Act, is a component of the Office of the 
     National Intelligence Director.
       (b) Duties.--The National Counterintelligence Executive 
     shall perform the duties provided in the Counterintelligence 
     Enhancement Act of 2002, as so amended, and such other duties 
     as may be prescribed by the National Intelligence Director or 
     specified by law.

   Subtitle D--Additional Elements of National Intelligence Authority

     SEC. 141. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   AUTHORITY.

       (a) Office of Inspector General of National Intelligence 
     Authority.--There is within the National Intelligence 
     Authority an Office of the Inspector General of the National 
     Intelligence Authority.
       (b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector 
     General of the National Intelligence Authority is to--
       (1) create an objective and effective office, appropriately 
     accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct 
     independently investigations, inspections, and audits 
     relating to--
       (A) the programs and operations of the National 
     Intelligence Authority;
       (B) the relationships among the elements of the 
     intelligence community within the National Intelligence 
     Program; and
       (C) the relationships between the elements of the 
     intelligence community within the National Intelligence 
     Program and the other elements of the intelligence community;
       (2) recommend policies designed--
       (A) to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in 
     the administration of such programs and operations, and in 
     such relationships; and
       (B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such programs, 
     operations, and relationships;
       (3) provide a means for keeping the National Intelligence 
     Director fully and currently informed about--
       (A) problems and deficiencies relating to the 
     administration of such programs and operations, and to such 
     relationships; and
       (C) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective 
     actions; and
       (4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure that 
     the congressional intelligence committees are kept similarly 
     informed of--
       (A) significant problems and deficiencies relating to the 
     administration of such programs and operations, and to such 
     relationships; and
       (B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective 
     actions.
       (c) Inspector General of National Intelligence Authority.--
     (1) There is an Inspector General of the National 
     Intelligence Authority, who shall be the head of the Office 
     of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence 
     Authority, who shall be appointed by the President, by and 
     with the advice and consent of the Senate.
       (2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as 
     Inspector General shall be made--
       (A) without regard to political affiliation;
       (B) solely on the basis of integrity, compliance with the 
     security standards of the National Intelligence Authority, 
     and prior experience in the field of intelligence or national 
     security; and
       (C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting, 
     financial analysis, law, management analysis, public 
     administration, or auditing.
       (3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be 
     under the general supervision of the National Intelligence 
     Director.
       (4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only 
     by the President. The President shall immediately communicate 
     in writing to the congressional intelligence committees the 
     reasons for the removal of any individual from the position 
     of Inspector General.
       (d) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty and 
     responsibility of the Inspector General of the National 
     Intelligence Authority--
       (1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, conduct, 
     supervise, and coordinate independently, the investigations, 
     inspections, and audits relating to the programs and 
     operations of the National Intelligence Authority, the 
     relationships among the elements of the intelligence 
     community within the National Intelligence Program, and the 
     relationships between the elements of the intelligence 
     community within the National Intelligence Program and the 
     other elements of the intelligence community to ensure they 
     are conducted efficiently and in accordance with applicable 
     law and regulations;
       (2) to keep the National Intelligence Director fully and 
     currently informed concerning violations of law and 
     regulations, violations of civil liberties and privacy, and 
     fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies 
     that may occur in such programs and operations, and in such 
     relationships, and to report the progress made in 
     implementing corrective action;
       (3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence 
     sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued 
     by the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with 
     the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures 
     as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of 
     intelligence sources and methods described in such reports; 
     and
       (4) in the execution of the duties and responsibilities 
     under this section, to comply with generally accepted 
     government auditing standards.
       (e) Limitations on Activities.--(1) The National 
     Intelligence Director may prohibit the Inspector General of 
     the National Intelligence Authority from initiating, carrying 
     out, or completing any investigation, inspection, or audit if 
     the Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to 
     protect vital national security interests of the United 
     States.
       (2) If the Director exercises the authority under paragraph 
     (1), the Director shall submit an appropriately classified 
     statement of the reasons for the exercise of such authority 
     within seven days to the congressional intelligence 
     committees.
       (3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the 
     time a report under paragraph (1) is submitted, and, to the 
     extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources 
     and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of 
     such report.
       (4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the 
     Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the 
     Inspector General considers appropriate.
       (f) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the National 
     Intelligence Authority shall have direct and prompt access to 
     the National Intelligence Director when necessary for any 
     purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the 
     Inspector General.
       (2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any 
     employee, or any employee of a contractor, of the National 
     Intelligence Authority, and of any other element of the 
     intelligence community within the National Intelligence 
     Program, whose testimony is needed for the performance of the 
     duties of the Inspector General.
       (B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all 
     records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, 
     recommendations, or other material which relate to the 
     programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector 
     General has responsibilities under this section.
       (C) The level of classification or compartmentation of 
     information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient 
     rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any 
     materials under subparagraph (B).
       (D) Failure on the part of any employee or contractor of 
     the National Intelligence Authority to cooperate with the 
     Inspector General shall be grounds for appropriate 
     administrative actions by the Director, including loss of 
     employment or the termination of an existing contractual 
     relationship.
       (3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and 
     investigate complaints or information from any person 
     concerning the existence of an activity constituting a 
     violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, 
     gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial 
     and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once 
     such complaint or information has been received from an 
     employee of the Federal government--
       (A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity 
     of the employee without the

[[Page H8924]]

     consent of the employee, unless the Inspector General 
     determines that such disclosure is unavoidable during the 
     course of the investigation or the disclosure is made to an 
     official of the Department of Justice responsible for 
     determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken; and
       (B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of 
     reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any 
     employee in a position to take such actions, unless the 
     complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the 
     knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its 
     truth or falsity.
       (4) The Inspector General shall have authority to 
     administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, 
     or affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the 
     duties of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or 
     affidavit when administered or taken by or before an employee 
     of the Office of the Inspector General of the National 
     Intelligence Authority designated by the Inspector General 
     shall have the same force and effect as if administered or 
     taken by or before an officer having a seal.
       (5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the 
     Inspector General is authorized to require by subpoena the 
     production of all information, documents, reports, answers, 
     records, accounts, papers, and other data and documentary 
     evidence necessary in the performance of the duties and 
     responsibilities of the Inspector General.
       (B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other 
     elements of the United States Government, the Inspector 
     General shall obtain information, documents, reports, 
     answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and 
     evidence for the purpose specified in subparagraph (A) using 
     procedures other than by subpoenas.
       (C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for or 
     on behalf of any other element or component of the Authority.
       (D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena 
     issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be 
     enforceable by order of any appropriate district court of the 
     United States.
       (g) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Inspector General of 
     the National Intelligence Authority shall be provided with 
     appropriate and adequate office space at central and field 
     office locations, together with such equipment, office 
     supplies, maintenance services, and communications facilities 
     and services as may be necessary for the operation of such 
     offices.
       (2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the 
     National Intelligence Director, the Inspector General shall 
     select, appoint and employ such officers and employees as may 
     be necessary to carry out the functions of the Inspector 
     General.
       (B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the 
     Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and 
     employees have the requisite training and experience to 
     enable the Inspector General to carry out the duties of the 
     Inspector General effectively.
       (C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the 
     Inspector General shall create within the Office of the 
     Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority a 
     career cadre of sufficient size to provide appropriate 
     continuity and objectivity needed for the effective 
     performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
       (3)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the 
     Inspector General may request such information or assistance 
     as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and 
     responsibilities of the Inspector General from any 
     department, agency, or other element of the United States 
     Government.
       (B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information 
     or assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the 
     department, agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is 
     practicable and not in contravention of any existing 
     statutory restriction or regulation of the department, 
     agency, or element, furnish to the Inspector General, or to 
     an authorized designee, such information or assistance.
       (h) Reports.--(1)(A) The Inspector General of the National 
     Intelligence Authority shall, not later than January 31 and 
     July 31 of each year, prepare and submit to the National 
     Intelligence Director a classified semiannual report 
     summarizing the activities of the Office of the Inspector 
     General of the National Intelligence Authority during the 
     immediately preceding six-month periods ending December 31 
     (of the preceding year) and June 30, respectively.
       (B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a 
     minimum, the following:
       (i) A list of the title or subject of each investigation, 
     inspection, or audit conducted during the period covered by 
     such report.
       (ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, and 
     deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and 
     operations of the National Intelligence Authority identified 
     by the Inspector General during the period covered by such 
     report.
       (iii) A description of the recommendations for corrective 
     action made by the Inspector General during the period 
     covered by such report with respect to significant problems, 
     abuses, or deficiencies identified in clause (ii).
       (iv) A statement whether or not corrective action has been 
     completed on each significant recommendation described in 
     previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective 
     action has been completed, a description of such corrective 
     action.
       (v) An assessment of the effectiveness of all measures in 
     place in the Authority for the protection of civil liberties 
     and privacy of United States persons.
       (vi) A certification whether or not the Inspector General 
     has had full and direct access to all information relevant to 
     the performance of the functions of the Inspector General.
       (vii) A description of the exercise of the subpoena 
     authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector General 
     during the period covered by such report.
       (viii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General 
     considers appropriate for legislation to promote economy and 
     efficiency in the administration of programs and operations 
     undertaken by the Authority, and to detect and eliminate 
     fraud and abuse in such programs and operations.
       (C) Not later than the 30 days after the date of receipt of 
     a report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit 
     the report to the congressional intelligence committees 
     together with any comments the Director considers 
     appropriate.
       (2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to 
     the Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of 
     particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or 
     deficiencies relating to the administration of programs or 
     operations of the Authority, a relationship between the 
     elements of the intelligence community within the National 
     Intelligence Program, or a relationship between an element of 
     the intelligence community within the National Intelligence 
     Program and another element of the intelligence community.
       (B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A) 
     within seven calendar days of receipt of such report, 
     together with such comments as the Director considers 
     appropriate.
       (3) In the event that--
       (A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any 
     differences with the Director affecting the execution of the 
     duties or responsibilities of the Inspector General;
       (B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out by 
     the Inspector General should focus on any current or former 
     Authority official who holds or held a position in the 
     Authority that is subject to appointment by the President, by 
     and with the advice and consent of the Senate, including such 
     a position held on an acting basis;
       (C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General to 
     the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by a 
     current or former official described in subparagraph (B);
       (D) the Inspector General receives notice from the 
     Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of 
     possible criminal conduct of any current or former official 
     described in subparagraph (B); or
       (E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible 
     alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary 
     information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or 
     audit,

     the Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit a 
     report on such matter to the congressional intelligence 
     committees.
       (4) Pursuant to title V of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), the Director shall submit to 
     the congressional intelligence committees any report or 
     findings and recommendations of an investigation, inspection, 
     or audit conducted by the office which has been requested by 
     the Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of either committee.
       (5)(A) An employee of the Authority, an employee of an 
     entity other than the Authority who is assigned or detailed 
     to the Authority, or an employee of a contractor to the 
     Authority who intends to report to Congress a complaint or 
     information with respect to an urgent concern may report such 
     complaint or information to the Inspector General.
       (B) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day period 
     beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a 
     complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the 
     Inspector General shall determine whether the complaint or 
     information appears credible. Upon making such a 
     determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the 
     Director a notice of that determination, together with the 
     complaint or information.
       (C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector 
     General under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 
     seven calendar days of such receipt, forward such transmittal 
     to the congressional intelligence committees, together with 
     any comments the Director considers appropriate.
       (D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible 
     under subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted 
     under subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or 
     information to the Director in accurate form under 
     subparagraph (B), the employee (subject to clause (ii)) may 
     submit the complaint or information to Congress by contacting 
     either or both of the congressional intelligence committees 
     directly.
       (ii) An employee may contact the intelligence committees 
     directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee--
       (I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the 
     Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the 
     employee's complaint or information and notice of the 
     employee's intent to contact the congressional intelligence 
     committees directly; and
       (II) obtains and follows from the Director, through the 
     Inspector General, direction on how to contact the 
     intelligence committees

[[Page H8925]]

     in accordance with appropriate security practices.
       (iii) A member or employee of one of the congressional 
     intelligence committees who receives a complaint or 
     information under clause (i) does so in that member or 
     employee's official capacity as a member or employee of such 
     committee.
       (E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who 
     reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General 
     under this paragraph of each action taken under this 
     paragraph with respect to the complaint or information. Such 
     notice shall be provided not later than three days after any 
     such action is taken.
       (F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector 
     General under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial 
     review.
       (G) In this paragraph, the term ``urgent concern'' means 
     any of the following:
       (i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law 
     or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the funding, 
     administration, or operations of an intelligence activity 
     involving classified information, but does not include 
     differences of opinions concerning public policy matters.
       (ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful 
     withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact 
     relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an 
     intelligence activity.
       (iii) An action, including a personnel action described in 
     section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code, 
     constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under 
     subsection (f)(3)(B) of this section in response to an 
     employee's reporting an urgent concern in accordance with 
     this paragraph.
       (H) In support of this paragraph, Congress makes the 
     findings set forth in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 
     701(b) of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection 
     Act of 1998 (title VII of Public Law 105-272; 5 U.S.C. App. 
     8H note).
       (6) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United 
     States Code, the Inspector General shall report to the 
     Attorney General any information, allegation, or complaint 
     received by the Inspector General relating to violations of 
     Federal criminal law that involve a program or operation of 
     the Authority, consistent with such guidelines as may be 
     issued by the Attorney General pursuant to subsection (b)(2) 
     of such section. A copy of each such report shall be 
     furnished to the Director.
       (i) Separate Budget Account.--The National Intelligence 
     Director shall, in accordance with procedures to be issued by 
     the Director in consultation with the congressional 
     intelligence committees, include in the National Intelligence 
     Program budget a separate account for the Office of Inspector 
     General of the National Intelligence Authority.

     SEC. 142. OMBUDSMAN OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY.

       (a) Ombudsman of National Intelligence Authority.--There is 
     within the National Intelligence Authority an Ombudsman of 
     the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by 
     the National Intelligence Director.
       (b) Duties.--The Ombudsman of the National Intelligence 
     Authority shall--
       (1) counsel, arbitrate, or offer recommendations on, and 
     have the authority to initiate inquiries into, real or 
     perceived problems of politicization, biased reporting, or 
     lack of objective analysis within the National Intelligence 
     Authority, or any element of the intelligence community 
     within the National Intelligence Program, or regarding any 
     analysis of national intelligence by any element of the 
     intelligence community;
       (2) monitor the effectiveness of measures taken to deal 
     with real or perceived politicization, biased reporting, or 
     lack of objective analysis within the Authority, or any 
     element of the intelligence community within the National 
     Intelligence Program, or regarding any analysis of national 
     intelligence by any element of the intelligence community; 
     and
       (3) conduct reviews of the analytic product or products of 
     the Authority, or any element of the intelligence community 
     within the National Intelligence Program, or of any analysis 
     of national intelligence by any element of the intelligence 
     community, with such reviews to be conducted so as to ensure 
     that analysis is timely, objective, independent of political 
     considerations, and based upon all sources available to the 
     intelligence community.
       (c) Analytic Review Unit.--(1) There is within the Office 
     of the Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority an 
     Analytic Review Unit.
       (2) The Analytic Review Unit shall assist the Ombudsman of 
     the National Intelligence Authority in performing the duties 
     and responsibilities of the Ombudsman set forth in subsection 
     (b)(3).
       (3) The Ombudsman shall provide the Analytic Review Unit a 
     staff who possess expertise in intelligence analysis that is 
     appropriate for the function of the Unit.
       (4) In assisting the Ombudsman, the Analytic Review Unit 
     shall, subject to the direction and control of the Ombudsman, 
     conduct detailed evaluations of intelligence analysis by the 
     following:
       (A) The National Intelligence Council.
       (B) The elements of the intelligence community within the 
     National Intelligence Program.
       (C) To the extent involving the analysis of national 
     intelligence, other elements of the intelligence community.
       (D) The divisions, offices, programs, officers, and 
     employees of the elements specified in subparagraphs (B) and 
     (C).
       (5) The results of the evaluations under paragraph (4) 
     shall be provided to the congressional intelligence 
     committees and, upon request, to appropriate heads of other 
     departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch.
       (d) Access to Information.--In order to carry out the 
     duties specified in subsection (c), the Ombudsman of the 
     National Intelligence Authority shall, unless otherwise 
     directed by the President, have access to all analytic 
     products, field reports, and raw intelligence of any element 
     of the intelligence community, and to any reports or other 
     material of an Inspector General, that might be pertinent to 
     a matter under consideration by the Ombudsman.
       (e) Annual Reports.--The Ombudsman of the National 
     Intelligence Authority shall submit to the National 
     Intelligence Director and the congressional intelligence 
     committees on an annual basis a report that includes--
       (1) the assessment of the Ombudsman of the current level of 
     politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objective 
     analysis within the National Intelligence Authority, or any 
     element of the intelligence community within the National 
     Intelligence Program, or regarding any analysis of national 
     intelligence by any element of the intelligence community;
       (2) such recommendations for remedial measures as the 
     Ombudsman considers appropriate; and
       (3) an assessment of the effectiveness of remedial measures 
     previously taken within the intelligence community on matters 
     addressed by the Ombudsman.
       (f) Referral of Certain Matters for Investigation.--In 
     addition to carrying out activities under this section, the 
     Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority may refer 
     serious cases of misconduct related to politicization of 
     intelligence information, biased reporting, or lack of 
     objective analysis within the intelligence community to the 
     Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority for 
     investigation.

     SEC. 143. NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER.

       (a) National Counterterrorism Center.--There is within the 
     National Intelligence Authority a National Counterterrorism 
     Center.
       (b) Director of National Counterterrorism Center.--(1) 
     There is a Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, 
     who shall be the head of the National Counterterrorism 
     Center, and who shall be appointed by the President, by and 
     with the advice and consent of the Senate.
       (2) Any individual nominated for appointment as the 
     Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall have 
     significant expertise in matters relating to the national 
     security of the United States and matters relating to 
     terrorism that threatens the national security of the United 
     States.
       (3) The individual serving as the Director of the National 
     Counterterrorism Center may not, while so serving, serve in 
     any capacity in any other element of the intelligence 
     community, except to the extent that the individual serving 
     as Director of the National Counterterrorism Center is doing 
     so in an acting capacity.
       (c) Supervision.--(1) The Director of the National 
     Counterterrorism Center shall report to the National 
     Intelligence Director on--
       (A) the budget and programs of the National 
     Counterterrorism Center; and
       (B) the activities of the Directorate of Intelligence of 
     the National Counterterrorism Center under subsection (g).
       (2) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center 
     shall report to the President and the National Intelligence 
     Director on the planning and progress of joint 
     counterterrorism operations.
       (d) Primary Missions.--The primary missions of the National 
     Counterterrorism Center shall be as follows:
       (1) To develop and unify strategy for the civilian and 
     military counterterrorism efforts of the United States 
     Government.
       (2) To integrate counterterrorism intelligence activities 
     of the United States Government, both inside and outside the 
     United States.
       (3) To develop interagency counterterrorism plans, which 
     plans shall--
       (A) involve more than one department, agency, or element of 
     the executive branch (unless otherwise directed by the 
     President); and
       (B) include the mission, objectives to be achieved, courses 
     of action, parameters for such courses of action, 
     coordination of agency operational activities, 
     recommendations for operational plans, and assignment of 
     departmental or agency responsibilities.
       (4) To ensure that the collection of counterterrorism 
     intelligence, and the conduct of counterterrorism operations, 
     by the United States Government are informed by the analysis 
     of all-source intelligence.
       (e) Duties and Responsibilities of Director of National 
     Counterterrorism Center.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
     of law, at the direction of the President, the National 
     Security Council, and the National Intelligence Director, the 
     Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall--
       (1) serve as the principal adviser to the President and the 
     National Intelligence Director on joint operations relating 
     to counterterrorism;
       (2) provide unified strategic direction for the civilian 
     and military counterterrorism

[[Page H8926]]

     efforts of the United States Government and for the effective 
     integration and deconfliction of counterterrorism 
     intelligence and operations across agency boundaries, both 
     inside and outside the United States;
       (3) advise the President and the National Intelligence 
     Director on the extent to which the counterterrorism program 
     recommendations and budget proposals of the departments, 
     agencies, and elements of the United States Government 
     conform to the priorities established by the President and 
     the National Security Council;
       (4) in accordance with subsection (f), concur in, or advise 
     the President on, the selections of personnel to head the 
     operating entities of the United States Government with 
     principal missions relating to counterterrorism; and
       (5) perform such other duties as the National Intelligence 
     Director may prescribe or are prescribed by law.
       (f) Role of Director of National Counterterrorism Center in 
     Certain Appointments.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a 
     position referred to in paragraph (2), the head of the 
     department or agency having jurisdiction over the position 
     shall obtain the concurrence of the Director of the National 
     Counterterrorism Center before appointing an individual to 
     fill the vacancy or recommending to the President an 
     individual for nomination to fill the vacancy. If the 
     Director does not concur in the recommendation, the head of 
     the department or agency concerned may fill the vacancy or 
     make the recommendation to the President (as the case may be) 
     without the concurrence of the Director, but shall notify the 
     President that the Director does not concur in the 
     appointment or recommendation (as the case may be).
       (2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
       (A) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency's 
     Counterterrorist Center.
       (B) The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation in charge of the Counterterrorism Division.
       (C) The Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the Department 
     of State.
       (D) The head of such other operating entities of the United 
     States Government having principal missions relating to 
     counterterrorism as the President may designate for purposes 
     of this subsection.
       (3) The President shall notify Congress of the designation 
     of an operating entity of the United States Government under 
     paragraph (2)(D) not later than 30 days after the date of 
     such designation.
       (g) Directorate of Intelligence.--(1) The Director of the 
     National Counterterrorism Center shall establish and maintain 
     within the National Counterterrorism Center a Directorate of 
     Intelligence.
       (2) The Directorate shall utilize the capabilities of the 
     Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) transferred to the 
     Directorate by section 323 and such other capabilities as the 
     Director of the National Counterterrorism Center considers 
     appropriate.
       (3) The Directorate shall have primary responsibility 
     within the United States Government for analysis of terrorism 
     and terrorist organizations from all sources of intelligence, 
     whether collected inside or outside the United States.
       (4) The Directorate shall--
       (A) be the principal repository within the United States 
     Government for all-source information on suspected 
     terrorists, their organizations, and their capabilities;
       (B) propose intelligence collection requirements for action 
     by elements of the intelligence community inside and outside 
     the United States;
       (C) have primary responsibility within the United States 
     Government for net assessments and warnings about terrorist 
     threats, which assessments and warnings shall be based on a 
     comparison of terrorist intentions and capabilities with 
     assessed national vulnerabilities and countermeasures; and
       (D) perform such other duties and functions as the Director 
     of the National Counterterrorism Center may prescribe.
       (h) Directorate of Planning.--(1) The Director of the 
     National Counterterrorism Center shall establish and maintain 
     within the National Counterterrorism Center a Directorate of 
     Planning.
       (2) The Directorate shall have primary responsibility for 
     developing interagency counterterrorism plans, as described 
     in subsection (d)(3).
       (3) The Directorate shall--
       (A) provide guidance, and develop strategy and interagency 
     plans, to counter terrorist activities based on policy 
     objectives and priorities established by the National 
     Security Council;
       (B) develop interagency plans under subparagraph (A) 
     utilizing input from personnel in other departments, 
     agencies, and elements of the United States Government who 
     have expertise in the priorities, functions, assets, 
     programs, capabilities, and operations of such departments, 
     agencies, and elements with respect to counterterrorism;
       (C) assign responsibilities for counterterrorism operations 
     to the departments and agencies of the United States 
     Government (including the Department of Defense, the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
     Department of Homeland Security, and other departments and 
     agencies of the United States Government), consistent with 
     the authorities of such departments and agencies;
       (D) monitor the implementation of operations assigned under 
     subparagraph (C) and update interagency plans for such 
     operations as necessary;
       (E) report to the President and the National Intelligence 
     Director on the compliance of the departments, agencies, and 
     elements of the United States with the plans developed under 
     subparagraph (A); and
       (F) perform such other duties and functions as the Director 
     of the National Counterterrorism Center may prescribe.
       (4) The Directorate may not direct the execution of 
     operations assigned under paragraph (3).
       (i) Staff.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may 
     appoint deputy directors of the National Counterterrorism 
     Center to oversee such portions of the operations of the 
     Center as the National Intelligence Director considers 
     appropriate.
       (2) To assist the Director of the National Counterterrorism 
     Center in fulfilling the duties and responsibilities of the 
     Director of the National Counterterrorism Center under this 
     section, the National Intelligence Director shall employ in 
     the National Counterterrorism Center a professional staff 
     having an expertise in matters relating to such duties and 
     responsibilities.
       (3) In providing for a professional staff for the National 
     Counterterrorism Center under paragraph (2), the National 
     Intelligence Director may establish as positions in the 
     excepted service such positions in the Center as the National 
     Intelligence Director considers appropriate.
       (4) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that 
     the analytical staff of the National Counterterrorism Center 
     is comprised primarily of experts from elements in the 
     intelligence community and from such other personnel in the 
     United States Government as the National Intelligence 
     Director considers appropriate.
       (5)(A) In order to meet the requirements in paragraph (4), 
     the National Intelligence Director shall, from time to time--
       (i) specify the transfers, assignments, and details of 
     personnel funded within the National Intelligence Program to 
     the National Counterterrorism Center from any other element 
     of the intelligence community that the National Intelligence 
     Director considers appropriate; and
       (ii) in the case of personnel from a department, agency, or 
     element of the United States Government and not funded within 
     the National Intelligence Program, request the transfer, 
     assignment, or detail of such personnel from the department, 
     agency, or other element concerned.
       (B)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community 
     shall promptly effect any transfer, assignment, or detail of 
     personnel specified by the National Intelligence Director 
     under subparagraph (A)(i).
       (ii) The head of a department, agency, or element of the 
     United States Government receiving a request for transfer, 
     assignment, or detail of personnel under subparagraph (A)(ii) 
     shall, to the extent practicable, approve the request.
       (6) Personnel employed in or assigned or detailed to the 
     National Counterterrorism Center under this subsection shall 
     be under the authority, direction, and control of the 
     Director of the National Counterterrorism Center on all 
     matters for which the Center has been assigned responsibility 
     and for all matters related to the accomplishment of the 
     missions of the Center.
       (7) Performance evaluations of personnel assigned or 
     detailed to the National Counterterrorism Center under this 
     subsection shall be undertaken by the supervisors of such 
     personnel at the Center.
       (8) The supervisors of the staff of the National 
     Counterterrorism Center may, with the approval of the 
     National Intelligence Director, reward the staff of the 
     Center for meritorious performance by the provision of such 
     performance awards as the National Intelligence Director 
     shall prescribe.
       (9) The National Intelligence Director may delegate to the 
     Director of the National Counterterrorism Center any 
     responsibility, power, or authority of the National 
     Intelligence Director under paragraphs (1) through (8).
       (10) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that 
     the staff of the National Counterterrorism Center has access 
     to all databases maintained by the elements of the 
     intelligence community that are relevant to the duties of the 
     Center.
       (j) Support and Cooperation of Other Agencies.--(1) The 
     elements of the intelligence community and the other 
     departments, agencies, and elements of the United States 
     Government shall support, assist, and cooperate with the 
     National Counterterrorism Center in carrying out its missions 
     under this section.
       (2) The support, assistance, and cooperation of a 
     department, agency, or element of the United States 
     Government under this subsection shall include, but not be 
     limited to--
       (A) the implementation of interagency plans for operations, 
     whether foreign or domestic, that are developed by the 
     National Counterterrorism Center in a manner consistent with 
     the laws and regulations of the United States and consistent 
     with the limitation in subsection (h)(4);
       (B) cooperative work with the Director of the National 
     Counterterrorism Center to ensure that ongoing operations of 
     such department, agency, or element do not conflict with 
     joint operations planned by the Center;
       (C) reports, upon request, to the Director of the National 
     Counterterrorism Center on

[[Page H8927]]

     the progress of such department, agency, or element in 
     implementing responsibilities assigned to such department, 
     agency, or element through joint operations plans; and
       (D) the provision to the analysts of the National 
     Counterterrorism Center electronic access in real time to 
     information and intelligence collected by such department, 
     agency, or element that is relevant to the missions of the 
     Center.
       (3) In the event of a disagreement between the National 
     Intelligence Director and the head of a department, agency, 
     or element of the United States Government on a plan 
     developed or responsibility assigned by the National 
     Counterterrorism Center under this subsection, the National 
     Intelligence Director may either accede to the head of the 
     department, agency, or element concerned or notify the 
     President of the necessity of resolving the disagreement.

     SEC. 144. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTERS.

       (a) National Intelligence Centers.--(1) The National 
     Intelligence Director may establish within the National 
     Intelligence Authority one or more centers (to be known as 
     ``national intelligence centers'') to address intelligence 
     priorities established by the National Security Council.
       (2) Each national intelligence center established under 
     this section shall be assigned an area of intelligence 
     responsibility.
       (3) National intelligence centers shall be established at 
     the direction of the President, as prescribed by law, or upon 
     the initiative of the National Intelligence Director.
       (b) Establishment of Centers.--(1) In establishing a 
     national intelligence center, the National Intelligence 
     Director shall assign lead responsibility for administrative 
     support for such center to an element of the intelligence 
     community selected by the Director for that purpose.
       (2) The Director shall determine the structure and size of 
     each national intelligence center.
       (3) The Director shall notify Congress of the establishment 
     of each national intelligence center before the date of the 
     establishment of such center.
       (c) Directors of Centers.--(1) Each national intelligence 
     center shall have as its head a Director who shall be 
     appointed by the National Intelligence Director for that 
     purpose.
       (2) The Director of a national intelligence center shall 
     serve as the principal adviser to the National Intelligence 
     Director on intelligence matters with respect to the area of 
     intelligence responsibility assigned to the center.
       (3) In carrying out duties under paragraph (2), the 
     Director of a national intelligence center shall--
       (A) manage the operations of the center;
       (B) coordinate the provision of administration and support 
     by the element of the intelligence community with lead 
     responsibility for the center under subsection (b)(1);
       (C) submit budget and personnel requests for the center to 
     the National Intelligence Director;
       (D) seek such assistance from other departments, agencies, 
     and elements of the United States Government as is needed to 
     fulfill the mission of the center; and
       (E) advise the National Intelligence Director of the 
     information technology, personnel, and other requirements of 
     the center for the performance of its mission.
       (4) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that 
     the Director of a national intelligence center has sufficient 
     authority, direction, and control to effectively accomplish 
     the mission of the center.
       (d) Mission of Centers.--Pursuant to the direction of the 
     National Intelligence Director, each national intelligence 
     center shall, in the area of intelligence responsibility 
     assigned to the center by the Director pursuant to 
     intelligence priorities established by the National Security 
     Council--
       (1) have primary responsibility for providing all-source 
     analysis of intelligence based upon foreign intelligence 
     gathered both abroad and domestically;
       (2) have primary responsibility for identifying and 
     proposing to the National Intelligence Director intelligence 
     collection and analysis requirements;
       (3) have primary responsibility for net assessments and 
     warnings;
       (4) ensure that appropriate officials of the United States 
     Government and other appropriate officials have access to a 
     variety of intelligence assessments and analytical views; and
       (5) perform such other duties as the National Intelligence 
     Director shall specify.
       (e) Information Sharing.--(1) The National Intelligence 
     Director shall ensure that the Directors of the national 
     intelligence centers and the other elements of the 
     intelligence community undertake appropriate sharing of 
     intelligence analysis and plans for operations in order to 
     facilitate the activities of the centers.
       (2) In order to facilitate information sharing under 
     paragraph (1), the Directors of the national intelligence 
     centers shall--
       (A) report directly to the National Intelligence Director 
     regarding their activities under this section; and
       (B) coordinate with the Principal Deputy National 
     Intelligence Director regarding such activities.
       (f) Staff.--(1) In providing for a professional staff for a 
     national intelligence center, the National Intelligence 
     Director may establish as positions in the excepted service 
     such positions in the center as the National Intelligence 
     Director considers appropriate.
       (2)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall, from time 
     to time--
       (i) specify the transfers, assignments, and details of 
     personnel funded within the National Intelligence Program to 
     a national intelligence center from any other element of the 
     intelligence community that the National Intelligence 
     Director considers appropriate; and
       (ii) in the case of personnel from a department, agency, or 
     element of the United States Government not funded within the 
     National Intelligence Program, request the transfer, 
     assignment, or detail of such personnel from the department, 
     agency, or other element concerned.
       (B)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community 
     shall promptly effect any transfer, assignment, or detail of 
     personnel specified by the National Intelligence Director 
     under subparagraph (A)(i).
       (ii) The head of a department, agency, or element of the 
     United States Government receiving a request for transfer, 
     assignment, or detail of personnel under subparagraph (A)(ii) 
     shall, to the extent practicable, approve the request.
       (3) Personnel employed in or assigned or detailed to a 
     national intelligence center under this subsection shall be 
     under the authority, direction, and control of the Director 
     of the center on all matters for which the center has been 
     assigned responsibility and for all matters related to the 
     accomplishment of the mission of the center.
       (4) Performance evaluations of personnel assigned or 
     detailed to a national intelligence center under this 
     subsection shall be undertaken by the supervisors of such 
     personnel at the center.
       (5) The supervisors of the staff of a national center may, 
     with the approval of the National Intelligence Director, 
     reward the staff of the center for meritorious performance by 
     the provision of such performance awards as the National 
     Intelligence Director shall prescribe.
       (6) The National Intelligence Director may delegate to the 
     Director of a national intelligence center any 
     responsibility, power, or authority of the National 
     Intelligence Director under paragraphs (1) through (6).
       (7) The Director of a national intelligence center may 
     recommend to the National Intelligence Director the 
     reassignment to the home element concerned of any personnel 
     previously assigned or detailed to the center from another 
     element of the intelligence community.
       (g) Termination.--(1) The National Intelligence Director 
     may terminate a national intelligence center if the National 
     Intelligence Director determines that the center is no longer 
     required to meet an intelligence priority established by the 
     National Security Council.
       (2) The National Intelligence Director shall notify 
     Congress of any determination made under paragraph (1) before 
     carrying out such determination.

 Subtitle E--Education and Training of Intelligence Community Personnel

     SEC. 151. FRAMEWORK FOR CROSS-DISCIPLINARY EDUCATION AND 
                   TRAINING.

       The National Intelligence Director shall establish an 
     integrated framework that brings together the educational 
     components of the intelligence community in order to promote 
     a more effective and productive intelligence community 
     through cross-disciplinary education and joint training.

     SEC. 152. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' means each element of the 
     intelligence community as determined by the National 
     Intelligence Director.
       (2) Institution of higher education.--The term 
     ``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given 
     that term under section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 
     1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001).
       (3) Program.--The term ``Program'' means the Intelligence 
     Community Scholarship Program established under subsection 
     (b).
       (b) Establishment.--
       (1) In general.--The National Intelligence Director, in 
     consultation with the head of each agency, shall establish a 
     scholarship program (to be known as the ``Intelligence 
     Community Scholarship Program'') to award scholarships to 
     individuals that is designed to recruit and prepare students 
     for civilian careers in the intelligence community to meet 
     the critical needs of the intelligence community agencies.
       (2) Selection of recipients.--
       (A) Merit and agency needs.--Individuals shall be selected 
     to receive scholarships under this section through a 
     competitive process primarily on the basis of academic merit 
     and the needs of the agency.
       (B) Demonstrated commitment.--Individuals selected under 
     this section shall have a demonstrated commitment to the 
     field of study for which the scholarship is awarded.
       (3) Contractual agreements.--To carry out the Program the 
     head of each agency shall enter into contractual agreements 
     with individuals selected under paragraph (2) under which the 
     individuals agree to serve as full-time employees of the 
     agency, for the period described in subsection (h)(1), in 
     positions needed by the agency and for which the individuals 
     are qualified, in exchange for receiving a scholarship.
       (c) Eligibility.--In order to be eligible to participate in 
     the Program, an individual shall--

[[Page H8928]]

       (1) be enrolled or accepted for enrollment as a full-time 
     student at an institution of higher education and be pursuing 
     or intend to pursue undergraduate or graduate education in an 
     academic field or discipline described in the list made 
     available under subsection (e);
       (2) be a United States citizen; and
       (3) at the time of the initial scholarship award, not be an 
     employee (as defined under section 2105 of title 5, United 
     States Code).
       (d) Application.-- An individual seeking a scholarship 
     under this section shall submit an application to the 
     National Intelligence Director at such time, in such manner, 
     and containing such information, agreements, or assurances as 
     the Director may require.
       (e) Programs and Fields of Study.--The National 
     Intelligence Director shall--
       (1) make publicly available a list of academic programs and 
     fields of study for which scholarships under the Program may 
     be used; and
       (2) update the list as necessary.
       (f) Scholarships.--
       (1) In general.--The National Intelligence Director may 
     provide a scholarship under the Program for an academic year 
     if the individual applying for the scholarship has submitted 
     to the Director, as part of the application required under 
     subsection (d), a proposed academic program leading to a 
     degree in a program or field of study on the list made 
     available under subsection (e).
       (2) Limitation on years.--An individual may not receive a 
     scholarship under this section for more than 4 academic 
     years, unless the National Intelligence Director grants a 
     waiver.
       (3) Student responsibilities.--Scholarship recipients shall 
     maintain satisfactory academic progress.
       (4) Amount.--The dollar amount of a scholarship under this 
     section for an academic year shall be determined under 
     regulations issued by the National Intelligence Director, but 
     shall in no case exceed the cost of tuition, fees, and other 
     authorized expenses as established by the Director.
       (5) Use of scholarships.--A scholarship provided under this 
     section may be expended for tuition, fees, and other 
     authorized expenses as established by the National 
     Intelligence Director by regulation.
       (6) Payment to institution of higher education.--The 
     National Intelligence Director may enter into a contractual 
     agreement with an institution of higher education under which 
     the amounts provided for a scholarship under this section for 
     tuition, fees, and other authorized expenses are paid 
     directly to the institution with respect to which the 
     scholarship is provided.
       (g) Special Consideration for Current Employees.--
       (1) Set aside of scholarships.--Notwithstanding paragraphs 
     (1) and (3) of subsection (c), 10 percent of the scholarships 
     awarded under this section shall be set aside for individuals 
     who are employees of agencies on the date of enactment of 
     this section to enhance the education of such employees in 
     areas of critical needs of agencies.
       (2) Full- or part-time education.--Employees who are 
     awarded scholarships under paragraph (1) shall be permitted 
     to pursue undergraduate or graduate education under the 
     scholarship on a full-time or part-time basis.
       (h) Employee Service.--
       (1) Period of service.--Except as provided in subsection 
     (j)(2), the period of service for which an individual shall 
     be obligated to serve as an employee of the agency is 24 
     months for each academic year for which a scholarship under 
     this section is provided. Under no circumstances shall the 
     total period of obligated service be more than 8 years.
       (2) Beginning of service.--
       (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     obligated service under paragraph (1) shall begin not later 
     than 60 days after the individual obtains the educational 
     degree for which the scholarship was provided.
       (B) Deferral.--In accordance with regulations established 
     by the National Intelligence Director, the Director or 
     designee may defer the obligation of an individual to provide 
     a period of service under paragraph (1) if the Director or 
     designee determines that such a deferral is appropriate.
       (i) Repayment.--
       (1) In general.--Scholarship recipients who fail to 
     maintain a high level of academic standing, as defined by the 
     National Intelligence Director, who are dismissed from their 
     educational institutions for disciplinary reasons, or who 
     voluntarily terminate academic training before graduation 
     from the educational program for which the scholarship was 
     awarded, shall be in breach of their contractual agreement 
     and, in lieu of any service obligation arising under such 
     agreement, shall be liable to the United States for repayment 
     within 1 year after the date of default of all scholarship 
     funds paid to them and to the institution of higher education 
     on their behalf under the agreement, except as provided in 
     subsection (j)(2). The repayment period may be extended by 
     the Director when determined to be necessary, as established 
     by regulation.
       (2) Liability.--Scholarship recipients who, for any reason, 
     fail to begin or complete their service obligation after 
     completion of academic training, or fail to comply with the 
     terms and conditions of deferment established by the National 
     Intelligence Director under subsection (h)(2)(B), shall be in 
     breach of their contractual agreement. When recipients breach 
     their agreements for the reasons stated in the preceding 
     sentence, the recipient shall be liable to the United States 
     for an amount equal to--
       (A) the total amount of scholarships received by such 
     individual under this section; and
       (B) the interest on the amounts of such awards which would 
     be payable if at the time the awards were received they were 
     loans bearing interest at the maximum legal prevailing rate, 
     as determined by the Treasurer of the United States, 
     multiplied by 3.
       (j) Cancellation, Waiver, or Suspension of Obligation.--
       (1) Cancellation.--Any obligation of an individual incurred 
     under the Program (or a contractual agreement thereunder) for 
     service or payment shall be canceled upon the death of the 
     individual.
       (2) Waiver or suspension.--The National Intelligence 
     Director shall prescribe regulations to provide for the 
     partial or total waiver or suspension of any obligation of 
     service or payment incurred by an individual under the 
     Program (or a contractual agreement thereunder) whenever 
     compliance by the individual is impossible or would involve 
     extreme hardship to the individual, or if enforcement of such 
     obligation with respect to the individual would be contrary 
     to the best interests of the Government.
       (k) Regulations.--The National Intelligence Director shall 
     prescribe regulations necessary to carry out this section.

 Subtitle F--Additional Authorities of National Intelligence Authority

     SEC. 161. USE OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS.

       (a) Disposal of Property.--(1) If specifically authorized 
     to dispose of real property of the National Intelligence 
     Authority under any law enacted after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence Director 
     shall, subject to paragraph (2), exercise such authority in 
     strict compliance with subchapter IV of chapter 5 of title 
     40, United States Code.
       (2) The Director shall deposit the proceeds of any disposal 
     of property of the National Intelligence Authority into the 
     miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury in accordance with 
     section 3302(b) of title 31, United States Code.
       (b) Gifts.--Gifts or donations of services or property of 
     or for the National Intelligence Authority may not be 
     accepted, used, or disposed of unless specifically permitted 
     in advance in an appropriations Act and only under the 
     conditions and for the purposes specified in such 
     appropriations Act.

     SEC. 162. ACQUISITION AND FISCAL AUTHORITIES.

       (a) Acquisitions of Major Systems.--(1) For each 
     intelligence program for the acquisition of a major system, 
     the National Intelligence Director shall--
       (A) require the development and implementation of a program 
     management plan that includes cost, schedule, and performance 
     goals and program milestone criteria;
       (B) subject to paragraph (4), serve as the exclusive 
     milestone decision authority; and
       (C) periodically--
       (i) review and assess the progress made toward the 
     achievement of the goals and milestones established in such 
     plan; and
       (ii) submit to Congress a report on the results of such 
     review and assessment.
       (2) The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe 
     guidance for the development and implementation of program 
     management plans under this subsection. In prescribing such 
     guidance, the Director shall review Department of Defense 
     guidance on program management plans for Department of 
     Defense programs for the acquisition of major systems and, to 
     the extent feasible, incorporate the principles of the 
     Department of Defense guidance into the Director's guidance 
     under this subsection.
       (3) Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit 
     the authority of the National Intelligence Director to 
     delegate to any other official any authority to perform the 
     responsibilities of the Director under this subsection.
       (4)(A) The authority conferred by paragraph (1)(B) shall 
     not apply to Department of Defense programs until the 
     National Intelligence Director, in consultation with the 
     Secretary of Defense, determines that the National 
     Intelligence Authority has the personnel and capability to 
     fully and effectively carry out such authority.
       (B) The National Intelligence Director may assign any 
     authority under this subsection to the Secretary of Defense. 
     The assignment of such authority shall be made pursuant to a 
     memorandum of understanding between the Director and the 
     Secretary.
       (5) In this subsection:
       (A) The term ``intelligence program'', with respect to the 
     acquisition of a major system, means a program that--
       (i) is carried out to acquire such major system for an 
     element of the intelligence community; and
       (ii) is funded in whole out of amounts available for the 
     National Intelligence Program.
       (B) The term ``major system'' has the meaning given such 
     term in section 4(9) of the Federal Property and 
     Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 403(9)).
       (b) Availability of Funds.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law (other than the provisions of this Act), 
     sums appropriated or otherwise made available to the National 
     Intelligence Authority may be expended for purposes necessary 
     to carry out

[[Page H8929]]

     its functions, including any function performed by the 
     National Intelligence Authority that is described in section 
     8(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
     U.S.C. 403j(a)).
       (c) Relationship of Director's Authority to Other Laws on 
     Acquisition and Management of Property and Services.--Section 
     113(e) of title 40, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) by striking ``or'' at the end of paragraph (18);
       (B) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (19) and 
     inserting ``; or''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(20) the National Intelligence Director.''.
       (d) National Intelligence Director Report on Enhancement of 
     NSA and NGIA Acquisition Authorities.--Not later than one 
     year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     National Intelligence Director shall--
       (1) review--
       (A) the acquisition authority of the Director of the 
     National Security Agency; and
       (B) the acquisition authority of the Director of the 
     National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and
       (2) submit to the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the 
     Senate and the Committee on Government Reform of the House of 
     Representatives a report setting forth any recommended 
     enhancements of the acquisition authorities of the Director 
     of the National Security Agency and the Director of the 
     National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency that the National 
     Intelligence Director considers necessary.
       (e) Comptroller General Report on Acquisition Policies and 
     Procedures.--Not later than two years after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall submit to Congress a report on the extent to 
     which the policies and procedures adopted for managing the 
     acquisition of major systems for national intelligence 
     purposes, as identified by the National Intelligence 
     Director, are likely to result in successful cost, schedule, 
     and performance outcomes.

     SEC. 163. PERSONNEL MATTERS.

       (a) In General.--In addition to the authorities provided in 
     section 114, the National Intelligence Director may exercise 
     with respect to the personnel of the National Intelligence 
     Authority any authority of the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency with respect to the personnel of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency under the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.), and other 
     applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the enactment 
     of this Act to the same extent, and subject to the same 
     conditions and limitations, that the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency may exercise such authority with respect 
     to personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
       (b) Rights and Protections of Employees and Applicants.--
     Employees and applicants for employment of the National 
     Intelligence Authority shall have the same rights and 
     protections under the Authority as employees of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency have under the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949, and other applicable provisions of law, 
     as of the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 164. ETHICS MATTERS.

       (a) Political Service of Personnel.--Section 
     7323(b)(2)(B)(i) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subclause (XII), by striking ``or'' at the end; and
       (2) by inserting after subclause (XIII) the following new 
     subclause:
       ``(XIV) the National Intelligence Authority; or''.
       (b) Deletion of Information About Foreign Gifts.--Section 
     7342(f)(4) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(4)'';
       (2) in subparagraph (A), as so designated, by striking 
     ``the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``the 
     Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(B) In transmitting such listings for the National 
     Intelligence Authority, the National Intelligence Director 
     may delete the information described in subparagraphs (A) and 
     (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the Director certifies in 
     writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of 
     such information could adversely affect United States 
     intelligence sources.''.
       (c) Exemption from Financial Disclosures.--Section 
     105(a)(1) of the Ethics in Government Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is 
     amended by inserting ``the National Intelligence Authority,'' 
     before ``the Central Intelligence Agency''.

        TITLE II--OTHER IMPROVEMENTS OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

          Subtitle A--Improvements of Intelligence Activities

     SEC. 201. AVAILABILITY TO PUBLIC OF CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE 
                   FUNDING INFORMATION.

       (a) Amounts Requested Each Fiscal Year.--The President 
     shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after 
     fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of appropriations 
     requested in the budget of the President for such fiscal year 
     for the National Intelligence Program.
       (b) Amounts Authorized and Appropriated Each Fiscal Year.--
     Congress shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year 
     after fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of funds 
     authorized to be appropriated, and the aggregate amount of 
     funds appropriated, by Congress for such fiscal year for the 
     National Intelligence Program.
       (c) Study of Disclosure of Additional Information.--(1) The 
     National Intelligence Director shall conduct a study to 
     assess the advisability of disclosing to the public amounts 
     as follows:
       (A) The aggregate amount of appropriations requested in the 
     budget of the President for each fiscal year for each element 
     of the intelligence community.
       (B) The aggregate amount of funds authorized to be 
     appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds appropriated, 
     by Congress for each fiscal year for each element of the 
     intelligence community.
       (2) The study under paragraph (1) shall--
       (A) address whether or not the disclosure to the public of 
     the information referred to in that paragraph would harm the 
     national security of the United States; and
       (B) take into specific account concerns relating to the 
     disclosure of such information for each element of the 
     intelligence community.
       (3) Not later than 180 days after the effective date of 
     this section, the Director shall submit to Congress a report 
     on the study under paragraph (1).

     SEC. 202. MERGER OF HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL INTO NATIONAL 
                   SECURITY COUNCIL.

       (a) Merger of Homeland Security Council Into National 
     Security Council.--Section 101 of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402) is amended--
       (1) in the fourth undesignated paragraph of subsection (a), 
     by striking clauses (5) and (6) and inserting the following 
     new clauses:
       ``(5) the Attorney General;
       ``(6) the Secretary of Homeland Security;''; and
       (2) in subsection (b)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting a semicolon; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(3) assess the objectives, commitments, and risks of the 
     United States in the interests of homeland security and make 
     recommendations to the President based on such assessments;
       ``(4) oversee and review the homeland security policies of 
     the Federal Government and make recommendations to the 
     President based on such oversight and review; and
       ``(5) perform such other functions as the President may 
     direct.''.
       (c) Repeal of Superseded Authority.--(1) Title IX of the 
     Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 491 et seq.) is 
     repealed.
       (2) The table of contents for that Act is amended by 
     striking the items relating to title IX.

     SEC. 203. JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNCIL.

       Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 
     et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 101 the 
     following new section:


                 ``joint intelligence community council

       ``Sec. 101A. (a) Joint Intelligence Community Council.--
     There is a Joint Intelligence Community Council.
       ``(b) Membership.--The Joint Intelligence Community Council 
     shall consist of the following:
       ``(1) The National Intelligence Director, who shall chair 
     the Council.
       ``(2) The Secretary of State.
       ``(3) The Secretary of the Treasury.
       ``(4) The Secretary of Defense.
       ``(5) The Attorney General.
       ``(6) The Secretary of Energy.
       ``(7) The Secretary of Homeland Security.
       ``(8) Such other officers of the United States Government 
     as the President may designate from time to time.
       ``(c) Functions.--The Joint Intelligence Community Council 
     shall assist the National Intelligence Director to in 
     developing and implementing a joint, unified national 
     intelligence effort to protect national security by--
       ``(1) advising the Director on establishing requirements, 
     developing budgets, financial management, and monitoring and 
     evaluating the performance of the intelligence community, and 
     on such other matters as the Director may request; and
       ``(2) ensuring the timely execution of programs, policies, 
     and directives established or developed by the Director.
       ``(d) Meetings.--The Joint Intelligence Community Council 
     shall meet upon the request of the National Intelligence 
     Director.''.

     SEC. 204. IMPROVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE 
                   FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
     United States in its final report stated that, under Director 
     Robert Mueller, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has made 
     significant progress in improving its intelligence 
     capabilities.
       (2) In the report, the members of the Commission also urged 
     that the Federal Bureau of Investigation fully 
     institutionalize the shift of the Bureau to a preventive 
     counterterrorism posture.
       (b) Improvement of Intelligence Capabilities.--The Director 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall continue efforts 
     to improve the intelligence capabilities of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation and to develop and maintain within 
     the Bureau a national intelligence workforce.

[[Page H8930]]

       (c) National Intelligence Workforce.--(1) In developing and 
     maintaining a national intelligence workforce under 
     subsection (b), the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation shall, subject to the direction and control of 
     the President, develop and maintain a specialized and 
     integrated national intelligence workforce consisting of 
     agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who 
     are recruited, trained, and rewarded in a manner which 
     ensures the existence within the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation an institutional culture with substantial 
     expertise in, and commitment to, the intelligence mission of 
     the Bureau.
       (2) Each agent employed by the Bureau after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act shall receive basic training in both 
     criminal justice matters and national intelligence matters.
       (3) Each agent employed by the Bureau after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act shall, to the maximum extent 
     practicable, be given the opportunity to undergo, during such 
     agent's early service with the Bureau, meaningful assignments 
     in criminal justice matters and in national intelligence 
     matters.
       (4) The Director shall--
       (A) establish career positions in national intelligence 
     matters for agents and analysts of the Bureau; and
       (B) in furtherance of the requirement under subparagraph 
     (A) and to the maximum extent practicable, afford agents and 
     analysts of the Bureau the opportunity to work in the career 
     specialty selected by such agents and analysts over their 
     entire career with the Bureau.
       (5) The Director shall carry out a program to enhance the 
     capacity of the Bureau to recruit and retain individuals with 
     backgrounds in intelligence, international relations, 
     language, technology, and other skills relevant to the 
     intelligence mission of the Bureau.
       (6) The Director shall, to the maximum extent practicable, 
     afford the analysts of the Bureau training and career 
     opportunities commensurate with the training and career 
     opportunities afforded analysts in other elements of the 
     intelligence community.
       (7) Commencing as soon as practicable after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, each direct supervisor of a Field 
     Intelligence Group, and each Bureau Operational Manager at 
     the Section Chief and Assistant Special Agent in Charge 
     (ASAC) level and above, shall be a certified intelligence 
     officer.
       (8) The Director shall, to the maximum extent practicable, 
     ensure that the successful discharge of advanced training 
     courses, and of one or more assignments to another element of 
     the intelligence community, is a precondition to advancement 
     to higher level intelligence assignments within the Bureau.
       (d) Field Office Matters.--(1) In improving the 
     intelligence capabilities of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation under subsection (b), the Director of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation shall ensure that each Field 
     Intelligence Group reports directly to a field office senior 
     manager responsible for intelligence matters.
       (2) The Director shall provide for such expansion of the 
     secure facilities in the field offices of the Bureau as is 
     necessary to ensure the discharge by the field offices of the 
     intelligence mission of the Bureau.
       (3) The Director shall require that each Field Intelligence 
     Group manager ensures the integration of analysts, agents, 
     linguists, and surveillance personnel in the field.
       (e) Budget Matters.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation shall, in consultation with the Director of the 
     Office of Management and Budget, modify the budget structure 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in order to organize 
     the budget according to the four principal missions of the 
     Bureau as follows:
       (1) Intelligence.
       (2) Counterterrorism and counterintelligence.
       (3) Criminal Enterprises/Federal Crimes.
       (4) Criminal justice services.
       (f) Reports.--(1) Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation shall submit to Congress a report on the 
     progress made as of the date of such report in carrying out 
     the requirements of this section.
       (2) The Director shall include in each annual program 
     review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that is 
     submitted to Congress a report on the progress made by each 
     field office of the Bureau during the period covered by such 
     review in addressing Bureau and national program priorities.
       (3) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter, the Director 
     shall submit to Congress a report assessing the 
     qualifications, status, and roles of analysts at Bureau 
     headquarters and in the field offices of the Bureau.
       (4) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter, the Director 
     shall submit to Congress a report on the progress of the 
     Bureau in implementing information-sharing principles.

     SEC. 205. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION INTELLIGENCE CAREER 
                   SERVICE.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the 
     ``Federal Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Career Service 
     Authorization Act of 2005''.
       (b) Establishment of Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     Intelligence Career Service.--
       (1) In general.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, in consultation with the Director of the 
     Office of Personnel Management--
       (A) may establish positions for intelligence analysts, 
     without regard to chapter 51 of title 5, United States Code;
       (B) shall prescribe standards and procedures for 
     establishing and classifying such positions; and
       (C) may fix the rate of basic pay for such positions, 
     without regard to subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, 
     United States Code, if the rate of pay is not greater than 
     the rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive 
     Schedule.
       (2) Levels of performance.--Any performance management 
     system established for intelligence analysts shall have at 
     least 1 level of performance above a retention standard.
       (c) Reporting Requirement.--Not less than 60 days before 
     the date of the implementation of authorities authorized 
     under this section, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation shall submit an operating plan describing the 
     Director's intended use of the authorities under this section 
     to--
       (1) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the 
     House of Representatives;
       (2) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
       (3) the Committee on Government Reform of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (4) the congressional intelligence committees; and
       (5) the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the 
     House of Representatives.
       (d) Annual Report.--Not later than December 31, 2005, and 
     annually thereafter for 4 years, the Director of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation shall submit an annual report of the 
     use of the permanent authorities provided under this section 
     during the preceding fiscal year to--
       (1) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the 
     House of Representatives;
       (2) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
       (3) the Committee on Government Reform of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (4) the congressional intelligence committees; and
       (5) the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the 
     House of Representatives.

     SEC. 206. INFORMATION SHARING.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Advisory board.--The term ``Advisory Board'' means the 
     Advisory Board on Information Sharing established under 
     subsection (i).
       (2) Executive council.--The term ``Executive Council'' 
     means the Executive Council on Information Sharing 
     established under subsection (h).
       (3) Homeland security information.--The term ``homeland 
     security information'' means all information, whether 
     collected, produced, or distributed by intelligence, law 
     enforcement, military, homeland security, or other activities 
     relating to--
       (A) the existence, organization, capabilities, plans, 
     intentions, vulnerabilities, means of finance or material 
     support, or activities of foreign or international terrorist 
     groups or individuals, or of domestic groups or individuals 
     involved in transnational terrorism;
       (B) threats posed by such groups or individuals to the 
     United States, United States persons, or United States 
     interests, or to those of other nations;
       (C) communications of or by such groups or individuals; or
       (D) groups or individuals reasonably believed to be 
     assisting or associated with such groups or individuals.
       (4) Network.--The term ``Network'' means the Information 
     Sharing Network described under subsection (c).
       (b) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 
     Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The effective use of information, from all available 
     sources, is essential to the fight against terror and the 
     protection of our homeland. The biggest impediment to all-
     source analysis, and to a greater likelihood of ``connecting 
     the dots'', is resistance to sharing information.
       (2) The United States Government has access to a vast 
     amount of information, including not only traditional 
     intelligence but also other government databases, such as 
     those containing customs or immigration information. However, 
     the United States Government has a weak system for processing 
     and using the information it has.
       (3) In the period preceding September 11, 2001, there were 
     instances of potentially helpful information that was 
     available but that no person knew to ask for; information 
     that was distributed only in compartmented channels, and 
     information that was requested but could not be shared.
       (4) Current security requirements nurture over-
     classification and excessive compartmentalization of 
     information among agencies. Each agency's incentive structure 
     opposes sharing, with risks, including criminal, civil, and 
     administrative sanctions, but few rewards for sharing 
     information.
       (5) The current system, in which each intelligence agency 
     has its own security practices, requires a demonstrated 
     ``need to know'' before sharing. This approach assumes that 
     it is possible to know, in advance, who will need to use the 
     information. An outgrowth of the cold war, such a system 
     implicitly assumes that the risk of inadvertent disclosure 
     outweighs the benefits of

[[Page H8931]]

     wider sharing. Such assumptions are no longer appropriate. 
     Although counterintelligence concerns are still real, the 
     costs of not sharing information are also substantial. The 
     current ``need-to-know'' culture of information protection 
     needs to be replaced with a ``need-to-share'' culture of 
     integration.
       (6) A new approach to the sharing of intelligence and 
     homeland security information is urgently needed. An 
     important conceptual model for a new ``trusted information 
     network'' is the Systemwide Homeland Analysis and Resource 
     Exchange (SHARE) Network proposed by a task force of leading 
     professionals assembled by the Markle Foundation and 
     described in reports issued in October 2002 and December 
     2003.
       (7) No single agency can create a meaningful information 
     sharing system on its own. Alone, each agency can only 
     modernize stovepipes, not replace them. Presidential 
     leadership is required to bring about governmentwide change.
       (c) Information Sharing Network.--
       (1) Establishment.--The President shall establish a trusted 
     information network and secure information sharing 
     environment to promote sharing of intelligence and homeland 
     security information in a manner consistent with national 
     security and the protection of privacy and civil liberties, 
     and based on clearly defined and consistently applied 
     policies and procedures, and valid investigative, analytical 
     or operational requirements.
       (2) Attributes.--The Network shall promote coordination, 
     communication and collaboration of people and information 
     among all relevant Federal departments and agencies, State, 
     tribal, and local authorities, and relevant private sector 
     entities, including owners and operators of critical 
     infrastructure, by using policy guidelines and technologies 
     that support--
       (A) a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated 
     environment that connects existing systems where appropriate 
     and allows users to share information among agencies, between 
     levels of government, and, as appropriate, with the private 
     sector;
       (B) the sharing of information in a form and manner that 
     facilitates its use in analysis, investigations and 
     operations;
       (C) building upon existing systems capabilities currently 
     in use across the Government;
       (D) utilizing industry best practices, including minimizing 
     the centralization of data and seeking to use common tools 
     and capabilities whenever possible;
       (E) employing an information access management approach 
     that controls access to data rather than to just networks;
       (F) facilitating the sharing of information at and across 
     all levels of security by using policy guidelines and 
     technologies that support writing information that can be 
     broadly shared;
       (G) providing directory services for locating people and 
     information;
       (H) incorporating protections for individuals' privacy and 
     civil liberties;
       (I) incorporating strong mechanisms for information 
     security and privacy and civil liberties guideline 
     enforcement in order to enhance accountability and facilitate 
     oversight, including--
       (i) multifactor authentication and access control;
       (ii) strong encryption and data protection;
       (iii) immutable audit capabilities;
       (iv) automated policy enforcement;
       (v) perpetual, automated screening for abuses of network 
     and intrusions; and
       (vi) uniform classification and handling procedures;
       (J) compliance with requirements of applicable law and 
     guidance with regard to the planning, design, acquisition, 
     operation, and management of information systems; and
       (K) permitting continuous system upgrades to benefit from 
     advances in technology while preserving the integrity of 
     stored data.
       (d) Immediate Actions.--Not later than 90 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office 
     of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Executive 
     Council, shall--
       (1) submit to the President and to Congress a description 
     of the technological, legal, and policy issues presented by 
     the creation of the Network described in subsection (c), and 
     the way in which these issues will be addressed;
       (2) establish electronic directory services to assist in 
     locating in the Federal Government intelligence and homeland 
     security information and people with relevant knowledge about 
     intelligence and homeland security information; and
       (3) conduct a review of relevant current Federal agency 
     capabilities, including--
       (A) a baseline inventory of current Federal systems that 
     contain intelligence or homeland security information;
       (B) the money currently spent to maintain those systems; 
     and
       (C) identification of other information that should be 
     included in the Network.
       (e) Guidelines and Requirements.--As soon as possible, but 
     in no event later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall--
       (1) in consultation with the Executive Council--
       (A) issue guidelines for acquiring, accessing, sharing, and 
     using information, including guidelines to ensure that 
     information is provided in its most shareable form, such as 
     by separating out data from the sources and methods by which 
     that data are obtained; and
       (B) on classification policy and handling procedures across 
     Federal agencies, including commonly accepted processing and 
     access controls;
       (2) in consultation with the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
     Oversight Board established under section 211, issue 
     guidelines that--
       (A) protect privacy and civil liberties in the development 
     and use of the Network; and
       (B) shall be made public, unless, and only to the extent 
     that, nondisclosure is clearly necessary to protect national 
     security; and
       (3) require the heads of Federal departments and agencies 
     to promote a culture of information sharing by--
       (A) reducing disincentives to information sharing, 
     including overclassification of information and unnecessary 
     requirements for originator approval; and
       (B) providing affirmative incentives for information 
     sharing, such as the incorporation of information sharing 
     performance measures into agency and managerial evaluations, 
     and employee awards for promoting innovative information 
     sharing practices.
       (f) Enterprise Architecture and Implementation Plan.--Not 
     later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, the Director of Management and Budget shall submit to 
     the President and to Congress an enterprise architecture and 
     implementation plan for the Network. The enterprise 
     architecture and implementation plan shall be prepared by the 
     Director of Management and Budget, in consultation with the 
     Executive Council, and shall include--
       (1) a description of the parameters of the proposed 
     Network, including functions, capabilities, and resources;
       (2) a delineation of the roles of the Federal departments 
     and agencies that will participate in the development of the 
     Network, including identification of any agency that will 
     build the infrastructure needed to operate and manage the 
     Network (as distinct from the individual agency components 
     that are to be part of the Network), with the delineation of 
     roles to be consistent with--
       (A) the authority of the National Intelligence Director 
     under this Act to set standards for information sharing and 
     information technology throughout the intelligence community; 
     and
       (B) the authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security and 
     the role of the Department of Homeland Security in 
     coordinating with State, tribal, and local officials and the 
     private sector;
       (3) a description of the technological requirements to 
     appropriately link and enhance existing networks and a 
     description of the system design that will meet these 
     requirements;
       (4) an enterprise architecture that--
       (A) is consistent with applicable laws and guidance with 
     regard to planning, design, acquisition, operation, and 
     management of information systems;
       (B) will be used to guide and define the development and 
     implementation of the Network; and
       (C) addresses the existing and planned enterprise 
     architectures of the departments and agencies participating 
     in the Network;
       (5) a description of how privacy and civil liberties will 
     be protected throughout the design and implementation of the 
     Network;
       (6) objective, systemwide performance measures to enable 
     the assessment of progress toward achieving full 
     implementation of the Network;
       (7) a plan, including a time line, for the development and 
     phased implementation of the Network;
       (8) total budget requirements to develop and implement the 
     Network, including the estimated annual cost for each of the 
     5 years following the date of the enactment of this Act; and
       (9) proposals for any legislation that the Director of 
     Management and Budget determines necessary to implement the 
     Network.
       (g) Director of Management and Budget Responsible for 
     Information Sharing Across the Federal Government.--
       (1) Additional duties and responsibilities.--
       (A) In general.--The Director of Management and Budget, in 
     consultation with the Executive Council, shall--
       (i) implement and manage the Network;
       (ii) develop and implement policies, procedures, 
     guidelines, rules, and standards as appropriate to foster the 
     development and proper operation of the Network; and
       (iii) assist, monitor, and assess the implementation of the 
     Network by Federal departments and agencies to ensure 
     adequate progress, technological consistency and policy 
     compliance; and regularly report the findings to the 
     President and to Congress.
       (B) Content of policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and 
     standards.--The policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and 
     standards under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall--
       (i) take into account the varying missions and security 
     requirements of agencies participating in the Network;
       (ii) address development, implementation, and oversight of 
     technical standards and requirements;
       (iii) address and facilitate information sharing between 
     and among departments and agencies of the intelligence 
     community, the Department of Defense, the Homeland Security 
     community and the law enforcement community;
       (iv) address and facilitate information sharing between 
     Federal departments and agencies and State, tribal and local 
     governments;

[[Page H8932]]

       (v) address and facilitate, as appropriate, information 
     sharing between Federal departments and agencies and the 
     private sector;
       (vi) address and facilitate, as appropriate, information 
     sharing between Federal departments and agencies with foreign 
     partners and allies; and
       (vii) ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberties.
       (2) Appointment of principal officer.--Not later than 30 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Director of Management and Budget shall appoint, with 
     approval of the President, a principal officer in the Office 
     of Management and Budget whose primary responsibility shall 
     be to carry out the day-to-day duties of the Director 
     specified in this section. The officer shall report directly 
     to the Director of Management and Budget, have the rank of a 
     Deputy Director and shall be paid at the rate of pay payable 
     for a position at level III of the Executive Schedule under 
     section 5314 of title 5, United States Code.
       (h) Executive Council on Information Sharing.--
       (1) Establishment.--There is established an Executive 
     Council on Information Sharing that shall assist the Director 
     of Management and Budget in the execution of the Director's 
     duties under this Act concerning information sharing.
       (2) Membership.--The members of the Executive Council shall 
     be--
       (A) the Director of Management and Budget, who shall serve 
     as Chairman of the Executive Council;
       (B) the Secretary of Homeland Security or his designee;
       (C) the Secretary of Defense or his designee;
       (D) the Attorney General or his designee;
       (E) the Secretary of State or his designee;
       (F) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or 
     his designee;
       (G) the National Intelligence Director or his designee;
       (H) such other Federal officials as the President shall 
     designate;
       (I) representatives of State, tribal, and local 
     governments, to be appointed by the President; and
       (J) individuals who are employed in private businesses or 
     nonprofit organizations that own or operate critical 
     infrastructure, to be appointed by the President.
       (3) Responsibilities.--The Executive Council shall assist 
     the Director of Management and Budget in--
       (A) implementing and managing the Network;
       (B) developing policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and 
     standards necessary to establish and implement the Network;
       (C) ensuring there is coordination among departments and 
     agencies participating in the Network in the development and 
     implementation of the Network;
       (D) reviewing, on an ongoing basis, policies, procedures, 
     guidelines, rules, and standards related to the 
     implementation of the Network;
       (E) establishing a dispute resolution process to resolve 
     disagreements among departments and agencies about whether 
     particular information should be shared and in what manner; 
     and
       (F) considering such reports as are submitted by the 
     Advisory Board on Information Sharing under subsection 
     (i)(2).
       (4) Inapplicability of federal advisory committee act.--The 
     Council shall not be subject to the requirements of the 
     Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).
       (5) Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director 
     of Management and Budget, in the capacity of Chair of the 
     Executive Council, shall submit a report to the President and 
     to Congress that shall include--
       (A) a description of the activities and accomplishments of 
     the Council in the preceding year; and
       (B) the number and dates of the meetings held by the 
     Council and a list of attendees at each meeting.
       (6) Informing the public.--The Executive Council shall--
       (A) make its reports to Congress available to the public to 
     the greatest extent that is consistent with the protection of 
     classified information and applicable law; and
       (B) otherwise inform the public of its activities, as 
     appropriate and in a manner consistent with the protection of 
     classified information and applicable law.
       (i) Advisory Board on Information Sharing.--
       (1) Establishment.--There is established an Advisory Board 
     on Information Sharing to advise the President and the 
     Executive Council on policy, technical, and management issues 
     related to the design and operation of the Network.
       (2) Responsibilities.--The Advisory Board shall advise the 
     Executive Council on policy, technical, and management issues 
     related to the design and operation of the Network. At the 
     request of the Executive Council, or the Director of 
     Management and Budget in the capacity as Chair of the 
     Executive Council, or on its own initiative, the Advisory 
     Board shall submit reports to the Executive Council 
     concerning the findings and recommendations of the Advisory 
     Board regarding the design and operation of the Network.
       (3) Membership and qualifications.--The Advisory Board 
     shall be composed of no more than 15 members, to be appointed 
     by the President from outside the Federal Government. The 
     members of the Advisory Board shall have significant 
     experience or expertise in policy, technical and operational 
     matters, including issues of security, privacy, or civil 
     liberties, and shall be selected solely on the basis of their 
     professional qualifications, achievements, public stature and 
     relevant experience.
       (4) Chair.--The President shall designate one of the 
     members of the Advisory Board to act as chair of the Advisory 
     Board.
       (5) Administrative support.--The Office of Management and 
     Budget shall provide administrative support for the Advisory 
     Board.
       (j) Reports.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter, the 
     President through the Director of Management and Budget shall 
     submit a report to Congress on the state of the Network and 
     of information sharing across the Federal Government.
       (2) Content.--Each report under this subsection shall 
     include--
       (A) a progress report on the extent to which the Network 
     has been implemented, including how the Network has fared on 
     the government-wide and agency-specific performance measures 
     and whether the performance goals set in the preceding year 
     have been met;
       (B) objective systemwide performance goals for the 
     following year;
       (C) an accounting of how much was spent on the Network in 
     the preceding year;
       (D) actions taken to ensure that agencies procure new 
     technology that is consistent with the Network and 
     information on whether new systems and technology are 
     consistent with the Network;
       (E) the extent to which, in appropriate circumstances, all 
     terrorism watch lists are available for combined searching in 
     real time through the Network and whether there are 
     consistent standards for placing individuals on, and removing 
     individuals from, the watch lists, including the availability 
     of processes for correcting errors;
       (F) the extent to which unnecessary roadblocks, 
     impediments, or disincentives to information sharing, 
     including the inappropriate use of paper-only intelligence 
     products and requirements for originator approval, have been 
     eliminated;
       (G) the extent to which positive incentives for information 
     sharing have been implemented;
       (H) the extent to which classified information is also made 
     available through the Network, in whole or in part, in 
     unclassified form;
       (I) the extent to which State, tribal, and local 
     officials--
       (i) are participating in the Network;
       (ii) have systems which have become integrated into the 
     Network;
       (iii) are providing as well as receiving information; and
       (iv) are using the Network to communicate with each other;
       (J) the extent to which--
       (i) private sector data, including information from owners 
     and operators of critical infrastructure, is incorporated in 
     the Network; and
       (ii) the private sector is both providing and receiving 
     information;
       (K) where private sector data has been used by the 
     Government or has been incorporated into the Network--
       (i) the measures taken to protect sensitive business 
     information; and
       (ii) where the data involves information about individuals, 
     the measures taken to ensure the accuracy of such data;
       (L) the measures taken by the Federal Government to ensure 
     the accuracy of other information on the Network and, in 
     particular, the accuracy of information about individuals;
       (M) an assessment of the Network's privacy and civil 
     liberties protections, including actions taken in the 
     preceding year to implement or enforce privacy and civil 
     liberties protections and a report of complaints received 
     about interference with an individual's privacy or civil 
     liberties; and
       (N) an assessment of the security protections of the 
     Network.
       (k) Agency Responsibilities.--The head of each department 
     or agency possessing or using intelligence or homeland 
     security information or otherwise participating in the 
     Network shall--
       (1) ensure full department or agency compliance with 
     information sharing policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, 
     and standards established for the Network under subsections 
     (c) and (g);
       (2) ensure the provision of adequate resources for systems 
     and activities supporting operation of and participation in 
     the Network; and
       (3) ensure full agency or department cooperation in the 
     development of the Network and associated enterprise 
     architecture to implement governmentwide information sharing, 
     and in the management and acquisition of information 
     technology consistent with applicable law.
       (l) Agency Plans and Reports.--Each Federal department or 
     agency that possesses or uses intelligence and homeland 
     security information, operates a system in the Network or 
     otherwise participates, or expects to participate, in the 
     Network, shall submit to the Director of Management and 
     Budget--
       (1) not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, a report including--
       (A) a strategic plan for implementation of the Network's 
     requirements within the department or agency;

[[Page H8933]]

       (B) objective performance measures to assess the progress 
     and adequacy of the department or agency's information 
     sharing efforts; and
       (C) budgetary requirements to integrate the agency into the 
     Network, including projected annual expenditures for each of 
     the following 5 years following the submission of the report; 
     and
       (2) annually thereafter, reports including--
       (A) an assessment of the progress of the department or 
     agency in complying with the Network's requirements, 
     including how well the agency has performed on the objective 
     measures developed under paragraph (1)(B);
       (B) the agency's expenditures to implement and comply with 
     the Network's requirements in the preceding year; and
       (C) the agency's or department's plans for further 
     implementation of the Network in the year following the 
     submission of the report.
       (m) Periodic Assessments.--
       (1) Comptroller general.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and periodically thereafter, the 
     Comptroller General shall evaluate the implementation of the 
     Network, both generally and, at the discretion of the 
     Comptroller General, within specific departments and 
     agencies, to determine the extent of compliance with the 
     Network's requirements and to assess the effectiveness of the 
     Network in improving information sharing and collaboration 
     and in protecting privacy and civil liberties, and shall 
     report to Congress on the findings of the Comptroller 
     General.
       (B) Information available to the comptroller general.--Upon 
     request by the Comptroller General, information relevant to 
     an evaluation under subsection (a) shall be made available to 
     the Comptroller General under section 716 of title 31, United 
     States Code.
       (C) Consultation with congressional committees.--If a 
     record is not made available to the Comptroller General 
     within a reasonable time, before the Comptroller General 
     files a report under section 716(b)(1) of title 31, United 
     States Code, the Comptroller General shall consult with the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the 
     Senate, and the Committee on Government Reform of the House 
     of Representatives concerning the Comptroller's intent to 
     file a report.
       (2) Inspectors general.--The Inspector General in any 
     Federal department or agency that possesses or uses 
     intelligence or homeland security information or that 
     otherwise participates in the Network shall, at the 
     discretion of the Inspector General--
       (A) conduct audits or investigations to--
       (i) determine the compliance of that department or agency 
     with the Network's requirements; and
       (ii) assess the effectiveness of that department or agency 
     in improving information sharing and collaboration and in 
     protecting privacy and civil liberties; and
       (B) issue reports on such audits and investigations.
       (n) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated--
       (1) $50,000,000 to the Director of Management and Budget to 
     carry out this section for fiscal year 2005; and
       (2) such sums as are necessary to carry out this section in 
     each fiscal year thereafter, to be disbursed and allocated in 
     accordance with the Network implementation plan required by 
     subsection (f).

                Subtitle B--Privacy and Civil Liberties

     SEC. 211. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD.

       (a) In General.--There is established within the Executive 
     Office of the President a Privacy and Civil Liberties 
     Oversight Board (referred to in this subtitle as the 
     ``Board'').
       (b) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) In conducting the war on terrorism, the Government may 
     need additional powers and may need to enhance the use of its 
     existing powers.
       (2) This shift of power and authority to the Government 
     calls for an enhanced system of checks and balances to 
     protect the precious liberties that are vital to our way of 
     life and to ensure that the Government uses its powers for 
     the purposes for which the powers were given.
       (c) Purpose.--The Board shall--
       (1) analyze and review actions the executive branch takes 
     to protect the Nation from terrorism; and
       (2) ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately 
     considered in the development and implementation of laws, 
     regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the 
     Nation against terrorism.
       (d) Functions.--
       (1) Advice and counsel on policy development and 
     implementation.--The Board shall--
       (A) review proposed legislation, regulations, and policies 
     related to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism, 
     including the development and adoption of information sharing 
     guidelines under section 205(g);
       (B) review the implementation of new and existing 
     legislation, regulations, and policies related to efforts to 
     protect the Nation from terrorism, including the 
     implementation of information sharing guidelines under 
     section 205(g);
       (C) advise the President and the departments, agencies, and 
     elements of the executive branch to ensure that privacy and 
     civil liberties are appropriately considered in the 
     development and implementation of such legislation, 
     regulations, policies, and guidelines; and
       (D) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance a 
     particular governmental power, consider whether the 
     department, agency, or element of the executive branch has 
     explained--
       (i) that the power actually materially enhances security;
       (ii) that there is adequate supervision of the use by the 
     executive branch of the power to ensure protection of privacy 
     and civil liberties; and
       (iii) that there are adequate guidelines and oversight to 
     properly confine its use.
       (2) Oversight.--The Board shall continually review--
       (A) the regulations, policies, and procedures, and the 
     implementation of the regulations, policies, and procedures, 
     of the departments, agencies, and elements of the executive 
     branch to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are 
     protected;
       (B) the information sharing practices of the departments, 
     agencies, and elements of the executive branch to determine 
     whether they appropriately protect privacy and civil 
     liberties and adhere to the information sharing guidelines 
     prescribed under section 205(g) and to other governing laws, 
     regulations, and policies regarding privacy and civil 
     liberties; and
       (C) other actions by the executive branch related to 
     efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism to determine 
     whether such actions--
       (i) appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties; and
       (ii) are consistent with governing laws, regulations, and 
     policies regarding privacy and civil liberties.
       (3) Relationship with privacy and civil liberties 
     officers.--The Board shall--
       (A) review and assess reports and other information from 
     privacy officers and civil liberties officers described in 
     section 212;
       (B) when appropriate, make recommendations to such privacy 
     officers and civil liberties officers regarding their 
     activities; and
       (C) when appropriate, coordinate the activities of such 
     privacy officers and civil liberties officers on relevant 
     interagency matters.
       (4) Testimony.--The Members of the Board shall appear and 
     testify before Congress upon request.
       (e) Reports.--
       (1) In general.--The Board shall--
       (A) receive and review reports from privacy officers and 
     civil liberties officers described in section 212; and
       (B) periodically submit, not less than semiannually, 
     reports--
       (i)(I) to the appropriate committees of Congress, including 
     the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House 
     of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of 
     the Senate, the Committee on Government Reform of the House 
     of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
       (II) to the President; and
       (ii) which shall be in unclassified form to the greatest 
     extent possible, with a classified annex where necessary.
       (2) Contents.--Not less than 2 reports submitted each year 
     under paragraph (1)(B) shall include--
       (A) a description of the major activities of the Board 
     during the preceding period; and
       (B) information on the findings, conclusions, and 
     recommendations of the Board resulting from its advice and 
     oversight functions under subsection (d).
       (f) Informing the Public.--The Board shall--
       (1) make its reports, including its reports to Congress, 
     available to the public to the greatest extent that is 
     consistent with the protection of classified information and 
     applicable law; and
       (2) hold public hearings and otherwise inform the public of 
     its activities, as appropriate and in a manner consistent 
     with the protection of classified information and applicable 
     law.
       (g) Access to Information.--
       (1) Authorization.--If determined by the Board to be 
     necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this 
     section, the Board is authorized to--
       (A) have access from any department, agency, or element of 
     the executive branch, or any Federal officer or employee, to 
     all relevant records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, 
     papers, recommendations, or other relevant material, 
     including classified information consistent with applicable 
     law;
       (B) interview, take statements from, or take public 
     testimony from personnel of any department, agency, or 
     element of the executive branch, or any Federal officer or 
     employee;
       (C) request information or assistance from any State, 
     tribal, or local government; and
       (D) require, by subpoena issued at the direction of a 
     majority of the members of the Board, persons (other than 
     departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch) 
     to produce any relevant information,

[[Page H8934]]

     documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and 
     other documentary or testimonial evidence.
       (2) Enforcement of subpoena.--In the case of contumacy or 
     failure to obey a subpoena issued under paragraph (1)(D), the 
     United States district court for the judicial district in 
     which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be 
     found may issue an order requiring such person to produce the 
     evidence required by such subpoena.
       (3) Agency cooperation.--Whenever information or assistance 
     requested under subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) is, 
     in the judgment of the Board, unreasonably refused or not 
     provided, the Board shall report the circumstances to the 
     head of the department, agency, or element concerned without 
     delay. The head of the department, agency, or element 
     concerned shall ensure that the Board is given access to the 
     information, assistance, material, or personnel the Board 
     determines to be necessary to carry out its functions.
       (h) Membership.--
       (1) Members.--The Board shall be composed of a full-time 
     chairman and 4 additional members, who shall be appointed by 
     the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
     Senate.
       (2) Qualifications.--Members of the Board shall be selected 
     solely on the basis of their professional qualifications, 
     achievements, public stature, expertise in civil liberties 
     and privacy, and relevant experience, and without regard to 
     political affiliation, but in no event shall more than 3 
     members of the Board be members of the same political party.
       (3) Incompatible office.--An individual appointed to the 
     Board may not, while serving on the Board, be an elected 
     official, officer, or employee of the Federal Government, 
     other than in the capacity as a member of the Board.
       (4) Term.--Each member of the Board shall serve a term of 
     six years, except that--
       (A) a member appointed to a term of office after the 
     commencement of such term may serve under such appointment 
     only for the remainder of such term;
       (B) upon the expiration of the term of office of a member, 
     the member shall continue to serve until the member's 
     successor has been appointed and qualified, except that no 
     member may serve under this subparagraph--
       (i) for more than 60 days when Congress is in session 
     unless a nomination to fill the vacancy shall have been 
     submitted to the Senate; or
       (ii) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the 
     Senate in which such nomination is submitted; and
       (C) the members initially appointed under this subsection 
     shall serve terms of two, three, four, five, and six years, 
     respectively, from the effective date of this Act, with the 
     term of each such member to be designated by the President.
       (5) Quorum and meetings.--After its initial meeting, the 
     Board shall meet upon the call of the chairman or a majority 
     of its members. Three members of the Board shall constitute a 
     quorum.
       (i) Compensation and Travel Expenses.--
       (1) Compensation.--
       (A) Chairman.--The chairman shall be compensated at the 
     rate of pay payable for a position at level III of the 
     Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United 
     States Code.
       (B) Members.--Each member of the Board shall be compensated 
     at a rate of pay payable for a position at level IV of the 
     Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United 
     States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged 
     in the actual performance of the duties of the Board.
       (2) Travel expenses.--Members of the Board shall be allowed 
     travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, 
     at rates authorized for persons employed intermittently by 
     the Government under section 5703(b) of title 5, United 
     States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of 
     business in the performance of services for the Board.
       (j) Staff.--
       (1) Appointment and compensation.--The Chairman, in 
     accordance with rules agreed upon by the Board, shall appoint 
     and fix the compensation of a full-time executive director 
     and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the 
     Board to carry out its functions, without regard to the 
     provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing 
     appointments in the competitive service, and without regard 
     to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 
     53 of such title relating to classification and General 
     Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under 
     this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable for 
     a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 
     5316 of title 5, United States Code.
       (2) Detailees.--Any Federal employee may be detailed to the 
     Board without reimbursement from the Board, and such detailee 
     shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of the 
     detailee's regular employment without interruption.
       (3) Consultant services.--The Board may procure the 
     temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants 
     in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States 
     Code, at rates that do not exceed the daily rate paid a 
     person occupying a position at level IV of the Executive 
     Schedule under section 5315 of such title.
       (k) Security Clearances.--The appropriate departments, 
     agencies, and elements of the executive branch shall 
     cooperate with the Board to expeditiously provide the Board 
     members and staff with appropriate security clearances to the 
     extent possible under existing procedures and requirements.
       (l) Treatment as Agency, Not as Advisory Committee.--The 
     Board--
       (1) is an agency (as defined in section 551(1) of title 5, 
     United States Code); and
       (2) is not an advisory committee (as defined in section 
     3(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.)).

     SEC. 212. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OFFICERS.

       (a) Designation and Functions.--The Attorney General, the 
     Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary 
     of the Treasury, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security, the National Intelligence 
     Director, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
     and the head of any other department, agency, or element of 
     the executive branch designated by the Privacy and Civil 
     Liberties Oversight Board to be appropriate for coverage 
     under this section shall designate not less than 1 senior 
     officer to--
       (1) assist the head of such department, agency, or element 
     and other officials of such department, agency, or element in 
     appropriately considering privacy and civil liberties 
     concerns when such officials are proposing, developing, or 
     implementing laws, regulations, policies, procedures, or 
     guidelines related to efforts to protect the Nation against 
     terrorism;
       (2) periodically investigate and review department, agency, 
     or element actions, policies, procedures, guidelines, and 
     related laws and their implementation to ensure that such 
     department, agency, or element is adequately considering 
     privacy and civil liberties in its actions;
       (3) ensure that such department, agency, or element has 
     adequate procedures to receive, investigate, respond to, and 
     redress complaints from individuals who allege such 
     department, agency, or element has violated their privacy or 
     civil liberties; and
       (4) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance a 
     particular governmental power the officer shall consider 
     whether such department, agency, or element has explained--
       (i) that the power actually materially enhances security;
       (ii) that there is adequate supervision of the use by such 
     department, agency, or element of the power to ensure 
     protection of privacy and civil liberties; and
       (iii) that there are adequate guidelines and oversight to 
     properly confine its use.
       (b) Exception to Designation Authority.--
       (1) Privacy officers.--In any department, agency, or 
     element referred to in subsection (a) or designated by the 
     Board, which has a statutorily created privacy officer, such 
     officer shall perform the functions specified in subsection 
     (a) with respect to privacy.
       (2) Civil liberties officers.--In any department, agency, 
     or element referred to in subsection (a) or designated by the 
     Board, which has a statutorily created civil liberties 
     officer, such officer shall perform the functions specified 
     in subsection (a) with respect to civil liberties.
       (c) Supervision and Coordination.--Each privacy officer or 
     civil liberties officer described in subsection (a) or (b) 
     shall--
       (1) report directly to the head of the department, agency, 
     or element concerned; and
       (2) coordinate their activities with the Inspector General 
     of such department, agency, or element to avoid duplication 
     of effort.
       (d) Agency Cooperation.--The head of each department, 
     agency, or element shall ensure that each privacy officer and 
     civil liberties officer--
       (1) has the information, material, and resources necessary 
     to fulfill the functions of such officer;
       (2) is advised of proposed policy changes;
       (3) is consulted by decision makers; and
       (4) is given access to material and personnel the officer 
     determines to be necessary to carry out the functions of such 
     officer.
       (e) Reprisal for Making Complaint.--No action constituting 
     a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making a complaint or 
     for disclosing information to a privacy officer or civil 
     liberties officer described in subsection (a) or (b), or to 
     the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, that 
     indicates a possible violation of privacy protections or 
     civil liberties in the administration of the programs and 
     operations of the Federal Government relating to efforts to 
     protect the Nation from terrorism shall be taken by any 
     Federal employee in a position to take such action, unless 
     the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with 
     the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for 
     its truth or falsity.
       (f) Periodic Reports.--
       (1) In general.--The privacy officers and civil liberties 
     officers of each department, agency, or element referred to 
     or described in subsection (a) or (b) shall periodically, but 
     not less than quarterly, submit a report on the activities of 
     such officers--
       (A)(i) to the appropriate committees of Congress, including 
     the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House 
     of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of 
     the Senate, the Committee on Government Reform of the House 
     of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives;

[[Page H8935]]

       (ii) to the head of such department, agency, or element; 
     and
       (iii) to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; 
     and
       (B) which shall be in unclassified form to the greatest 
     extent possible, with a classified annex where necessary.
       (2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall include information on the discharge of each of the 
     functions of the officer concerned, including--
       (A) information on the number and types of reviews 
     undertaken;
       (B) the type of advice provided and the response given to 
     such advice;
       (C) the number and nature of the complaints received by the 
     department, agency, or element concerned for alleged 
     violations; and
       (D) a summary of the disposition of such complaints, the 
     reviews and inquiries conducted, and the impact of the 
     activities of such officer.
       (g) Informing the Public.--Each privacy officer and civil 
     liberties officer shall--
       (1) make the reports of such officer, including reports to 
     Congress, available to the public to the greatest extent that 
     is consistent with the protection of classified information 
     and applicable law; and
       (2) otherwise inform the public of the activities of such 
     officer, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the 
     protection of classified information and applicable law.
       (h) Savings Clause.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to limit or otherwise supplant any other 
     authorities or responsibilities provided by law to privacy 
     officers or civil liberties officers.

           Subtitle C--Independence of Intelligence Agencies

     SEC. 221. INDEPENDENCE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR.

       (a) Location Outside Executive Office of the President.--
     The National Intelligence Director shall not be located 
     within the Executive Office of the President.
       (b) Provision of National Intelligence.--The National 
     Intelligence Director shall provide to the President and 
     Congress national intelligence that is timely, objective, and 
     independent of political considerations, and has not been 
     shaped to serve policy goals.

     SEC. 222. INDEPENDENCE OF INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Director of National Counterterrorism Center.--The 
     Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall 
     provide to the President, Congress, and the National 
     Intelligence Director national intelligence related to 
     counterterrorism that is timely, objective, and independent 
     of political considerations, and has not been shaped to serve 
     policy goals.
       (b) Directors of National Intelligence Centers.--Each 
     Director of a national intelligence center established under 
     section 144 shall provide to the President, Congress, and the 
     National Intelligence Director intelligence information that 
     is timely, objective, and independent of political 
     considerations, and has not been shaped to serve policy 
     goals.
       (c) Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--The Director 
     of the Central Intelligence Agency shall ensure that 
     intelligence produced by the Central Intelligence Agency is 
     objective and independent of political considerations, and 
     has not been shaped to serve policy goals.
       (d) National Intelligence Council.--The National 
     Intelligence Council shall produce national intelligence 
     estimates for the United States Government that are timely, 
     objective, and independent of political considerations, and 
     have not been shaped to serve policy goals.

     SEC. 223. INDEPENDENCE OF NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER.

       No officer, department, agency, or element of the executive 
     branch shall have any authority to require the Director of 
     the National Counterterrorism Center--
       (1) to receive permission to testify before Congress; or
       (2) to submit testimony, legislative recommendations, or 
     comments to any officer or agency of the United States for 
     approval, comments, or review prior to the submission of such 
     recommendations, testimony, or comments to Congress if such 
     recommendations, testimony, or comments include a statement 
     indicating that the views expressed therein are those of the 
     agency submitting them and do not necessarily represent the 
     views of the Administration.

     SEC. 224. ACCESS OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES TO NATIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Documents Required To Be Provided to Congressional 
     Committees.--The National Intelligence Director, the Director 
     of the National Counterterrorism Center, and the Director of 
     a national intelligence center shall provide to the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, 
     and any other committee of Congress with jurisdiction over 
     the subject matter to which the information relates, all 
     intelligence assessments, intelligence estimates, sense of 
     intelligence community memoranda, and daily senior executive 
     intelligence briefs, other than the Presidential Daily Brief 
     and those reports prepared exclusively for the President.
       (b) Response to Requests From Congress Required.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), in 
     addition to providing material under subsection (a), the 
     National Intelligence Director, the Director of the National 
     Counterterrorism Center, or the Director of a national 
     intelligence center shall, not later than 15 days after 
     receiving a request for any intelligence assessment, report, 
     or estimate or other intelligence information from the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, or 
     any other committee of Congress with jurisdiction over the 
     subject matter to which the information relates, make 
     available to such committee such intelligence assessment, 
     report, or estimate or other intelligence information.
       (2) Certain members.--In addition to requests described in 
     paragraph (1), the National Intelligence Director shall 
     respond to requests from the Chairman and Vice Chairman of 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 
     Chairman and Ranking Member of the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. Upon making 
     a request covered by this paragraph, the Chairman, Vice 
     Chairman, or Ranking Member, as the case may be, of such 
     committee shall notify the other of the Chairman, Vice 
     Chairman, or Ranking Member, as the case may be, of such 
     committee of such request.
       (3) Assertions of privilege.--In response to requests 
     described under paragraph (1) or (2), the National 
     Intelligence Director, the Director of the National 
     Counterterrorism Center, or the Director of a national 
     intelligence center shall provide information, unless the 
     President certifies that such information is not being 
     provided because the President is asserting a privilege 
     pursuant to the United States Constitution.

     SEC. 225. COMMUNICATIONS WITH CONGRESS.

       (a) Disclosure of Certain Information Authorized.--
       (1) In general.--Employees of covered agencies and 
     employees of contractors carrying out activities under 
     classified contracts with covered agencies may disclose 
     information described in paragraph (2) to the individuals 
     referred to in paragraph (3) without first reporting such 
     information to the appropriate Inspector General.
       (2) Covered information.--Paragraph (1) applies to 
     information, including classified information, that an 
     employee reasonably believes provides direct and specific 
     evidence of a false or inaccurate statement to Congress 
     contained in, or withheld from Congress, any intelligence 
     information material to, any intelligence assessment, report, 
     or estimate, but does not apply to information the disclosure 
     of which is prohibited by rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of 
     Criminal Procedure.
       (3) Covered individuals.--
       (A) In general.--The individuals to whom information in 
     paragraph (2) may be disclosed are--
       (i) a Member of a committee of Congress having primary 
     responsibility for oversight of a department, agency, or 
     element of the United States Government to which the 
     disclosed information relates and who is authorized to 
     receive information of the type disclosed;
       (ii) any other Member of Congress who is authorized to 
     receive information of the type disclosed; and
       (iii) an employee of Congress who has the appropriate 
     security clearance and is authorized to receive information 
     of the type disclosed.
       (B) Presumption of need for information.--An individual 
     described in subparagraph (A) to whom information is 
     disclosed under paragraph (2) shall be presumed to have a 
     need to know such information.
       (b) Construction With Other Reporting Requirements.--
     Nothing in this section may be construed to modify, alter, or 
     otherwise affect--
       (1) any reporting requirement relating to intelligence 
     activities that arises under this Act, the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), or any other provision 
     of law; or
       (2) the right of any employee of the United States 
     Government to disclose to Congress in accordance with 
     applicable law information not described in this section.
       (c) Covered Agencies Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``covered agencies'' means the following:
       (1) The National Intelligence Authority, including the 
     National Counterterrorism Center.
       (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (4) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (5) The National Security Agency.
       (6) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (7) Any other Executive agency, or element or unit thereof, 
     determined by the President under section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) 
     of title 5, United States Code, to have as its principal 
     function the conduct of foreign intelligence or 
     counterintelligence activities.

  TITLE III--MODIFICATIONS OF LAWS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                               MANAGEMENT

              Subtitle A--Conforming and Other Amendments

     SEC. 301. RESTATEMENT AND MODIFICATION OF BASIC AUTHORITY ON 
                   THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by striking sections 
     102 through 104 and inserting the following new sections:


                     ``central intelligence agency

       ``Sec. 102. (a) Central Intelligence Agency.--There is a 
     Central Intelligence Agency.

[[Page H8936]]

       ``(b) Function.--The function of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency is to assist the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency in carrying out the responsibilities specified in 
     section 103(d).


             ``director of the Central Intelligence Agency

       ``Sec. 103. (a) Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--
     There is a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who 
     shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice 
     and consent of the Senate.
       ``(b) Supervision.--The Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall report to the National Intelligence 
     Director regarding the activities of the Director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency.
       ``(c) Duties.--The Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency shall--
       ``(1) serve as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency; 
     and
       ``(2) carry out the responsibilities specified in 
     subsection (d).
       ``(d) Responsibilities.--The Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall--
       ``(1) collect intelligence through human sources and by 
     other appropriate means, except that the Director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency shall have no police, subpoena, 
     or law enforcement powers or internal security functions;
       ``(2) correlate and evaluate intelligence related to the 
     national security and provide appropriate dissemination of 
     such intelligence;
       ``(3) provide overall direction for and coordination of the 
     collection of national intelligence outside the United States 
     through human sources by elements of the intelligence 
     community authorized to undertake such collection and, in 
     coordination with other departments, agencies, or elements of 
     the United States Government which are authorized to 
     undertake such collection, ensure that the most effective use 
     is made of resources and that appropriate account is taken of 
     the risks to the United States and those involved in such 
     collection; and
       ``(4) perform such other functions and duties pertaining to 
     intelligence relating to the national security as the 
     President or the National Intelligence Director may direct.
       ``(e) Termination of Employment of CIA Employees.--(1) 
     Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Director 
     of the Central Intelligence Agency may, in the discretion of 
     the Director, terminate the employment of any officer or 
     employee of the Central Intelligence Agency whenever the 
     Director considers the termination of employment of such 
     officer or employee necessary or advisable in the interests 
     of the United States.
       ``(2) Any termination of employment of an officer or 
     employee under paragraph (1) shall not affect the right of 
     the officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any 
     other department, agency, or element of the United States 
     Government if declared eligible for such employment by the 
     Office of Personnel Management.
       ``(f) Coordination With Foreign Governments.--Under the 
     direction of the National Intelligence Director and in a 
     manner consistent with section 207 of the Foreign Service Act 
     of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3927), the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall coordinate the relationships 
     between elements of the intelligence community and the 
     intelligence or security services of foreign governments on 
     all matters involving intelligence related to the national 
     security or involving intelligence acquired through 
     clandestine means.''.
       (b) Transformation of Central Intelligence Agency.--The 
     Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall, in 
     accordance with standards developed by the Director in 
     consultation with the National Intelligence Director--
       (1) enhance the analytic, human intelligence, and other 
     capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency;
       (2) develop and maintain an effective language program 
     within the Agency;
       (3) emphasize the hiring of personnel of diverse 
     backgrounds for purposes of improving the capabilities of the 
     Agency;
       (4) establish and maintain effective relationships between 
     human intelligence and signals intelligence within the Agency 
     at the operational level; and
       (5) achieve a more effective balance within the Agency with 
     respect to unilateral operations and liaison operations.
       (c) Reports.--(1) Not later than 180 days after the 
     effective date of this section, and annually thereafter, the 
     Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to 
     the National Intelligence Director and the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report setting forth the following:
       (A) A strategy for improving the conduct of analysis 
     (including strategic analysis) by the Central Intelligence 
     Agency, and the progress of the Agency in implementing the 
     strategy.
       (B) A strategy for improving the human intelligence and 
     other capabilities of the Agency, and the progress of the 
     Agency in implementing the strategy, including--
       (i) the recruitment, training, equipping, and deployment of 
     personnel required to address the current and projected 
     threats to the national security of the United States during 
     each of the 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year periods beginning on 
     the date of such report, including personnel with the 
     backgrounds, education, and experience necessary for ensuring 
     a human intelligence capability adequate for such projected 
     threats;
       (ii) the achievement of a proper balance between unilateral 
     operations and liaison operations;
       (iii) the development of language capabilities (including 
     the achievement of high standards in such capabilities by the 
     use of financial incentives and other mechanisms);
       (iv) the sound financial management of the Directorate of 
     Operations; and
       (v) the identification of other capabilities required to 
     address the current and projected threats to the national 
     security of the United States during each of the 2-year, 5-
     year, and 10-year periods beginning on the date of such 
     report.
       (C) In conjunction with the Director of the National 
     Security Agency, a strategy for achieving integration between 
     signals and human intelligence capabilities, and the progress 
     in implementing the strategy.
       (D) Metrics and milestones for measuring progress in the 
     implementation of each such strategy.
       (2)(A) The information in each report under paragraph (1) 
     on the element of the strategy referred to in paragraph 
     (1)(B)(i) shall identify the number and types of personnel 
     required to implement the strategy during each period 
     addressed in such report, include a plan for the recruitment, 
     training, equipping, and deployment of such personal, and set 
     forth an estimate of the costs of such activities.
       (B) If as of the date of a report under paragraph (1), a 
     proper balance does not exist between unilateral operations 
     and liaison operations, such report shall set forth the steps 
     to be taken to achieve such balance.
       (C) The information in each report under paragraph (1) on 
     the element of the strategy referred to in paragraph 
     (1)(B)(v) shall identify the other capabilities required to 
     implement the strategy during each period addressed in such 
     report, include a plan for developing such capabilities, and 
     set forth an estimate of the costs of such activities.

     SEC. 302. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO ROLES OF NATIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR AND DIRECTOR OF THE 
                   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) National Security Act of 1947.--(1) The National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by 
     striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it 
     appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National 
     Intelligence Director'':
       (A) Section 3(5)(B) (50 U.S.C. 401a(5)(B)).
       (B) Section 101(h)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 402(h)(2)(A)).
       (C) Section 101(h)(5) (50 U.S.C. 402(h)(5)).
       (D) Section 101(i)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 402(i)(2)(A)).
       (E) Section 101(j) (50 U.S.C. 402(j)).
       (F) Section 105(a) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)).
       (G) Section 105(b)(6)(A) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(b)(6)(A)).
       (H) Section 105B(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(a)(1)).
       (I) Section 105B(b) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(b)).
       (J) Section 110(b) (50 U.S.C. 404e(b)).
       (K) Section 110(c) (50 U.S.C. 404e(c)).
       (L) Section 112(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404g(a)(1)).
       (M) Section 112(d)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)).
       (N) Section 113(b)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 404h(b)(2)(A)).
       (O) Section 114(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404i(a)(1)).
       (P) Section 114(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404i(b)(1)).
       (R) Section 115(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404j(a)(1)).
       (S) Section 115(b) (50 U.S.C. 404j(b)).
       (T) Section 115(c)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404j(c)(1)(B)).
       (U) Section 116(a) (50 U.S.C. 404k(a)).
       (V) Section 117(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404l(a)(1)).
       (W) Section 303(a) (50 U.S.C. 405(a)), both places it 
     appears.
       (X) Section 501(d) (50 U.S.C. 413(d)).
       (Y) Section 502(a) (50 U.S.C. 413a(a)).
       (Z) Section 502(c) (50 U.S.C. 413a(c)).
       (AA) Section 503(b) (50 U.S.C. 413b(b)).
       (BB) Section 504(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(2)).
       (CC) Section 504(a)(3)(C) (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(C)).
       (DD) Section 504(d)(2) (50 U.S.C. 414(d)(2)).
       (EE) Section 506A(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(a)(1)).
       (FF) Section 603(a) (50 U.S.C. 423(a)).
       (GG) Section 702(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432(a)(1)).
       (HH) Section 702(a)(6)(B)(viii) (50 U.S.C. 
     432(a)(6)(B)(viii)).
       (II) Section 702(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432(b)(1)), both places 
     it appears.
       (JJ) Section 703(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432a(a)(1)).
       (KK) Section 703(a)(6)(B)(viii) (50 U.S.C. 
     432a(a)(6)(B)(viii)).
       (LL) Section 703(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432a(b)(1)), both places 
     it appears.
       (MM) Section 704(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432b(a)(1)).
       (NN) Section 704(f)(2)(H) (50 U.S.C. 432b(f)(2)(H)).
       (OO) Section 704(g)(1)) (50 U.S.C. 432b(g)(1)), both places 
     it appears.
       (PP) Section 1001(a) (50 U.S.C. 441g(a)).
       (QQ) Section 1102(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(a)(1)).
       (RR) Section 1102(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)(1)).
       (SS) Section 1102(c)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(c)(1)).
       (TT) Section 1102(d) (50 U.S.C. 442a(d)).
       (2) That Act is further amended by striking ``of Central 
     Intelligence'' each place it appears in the following 
     provisions:
       (A) Section 105(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(2)).
       (B) Section 105B(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(a)(2)).
       (C) Section 105B(b) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(b)), the second place 
     it appears.
       (3) That Act is further amended by striking ``Director'' 
     each place it appears in the following provisions and 
     inserting ``National Intelligence Director'':
       (A) Section 114(c) (50 U.S.C. 404i(c)).
       (B) Section 116(b) (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)).

[[Page H8937]]

       (C) Section 1001(b) (50 U.S.C. 441g(b)).
       (C) Section 1001(c) (50 U.S.C. 441g(c)), the first place it 
     appears.
       (D) Section 1001(d)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 441g(d)(1)(B)).
       (E) Section 1001(e) (50 U.S.C. 441g(e)), the first place it 
     appears.
       (4) Section 114A of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) is amended 
     by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and 
     inserting ``National Intelligence Director, the Director of 
     the Central Intelligence Agency''
       (5) Section 701 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 431) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``Operational files of 
     the Central Intelligence Agency may be exempted by the 
     Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``The 
     Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, with the 
     coordination of the National Intelligence Director, may 
     exempt operational files of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency''; and
       (B) in subsection (g)(1), by striking ``Director of Central 
     Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency and the National Intelligence Director''.
       (6) The heading for section 114 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 
     404i) is amended to read as follows:


 ``additional annual reports from the national intelligence director''.

       (b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--(1) Section 1 
     of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 
     403a) is amended--
       (A) by redesignating paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) as 
     paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively; and
       (B) by striking paragraph (2), as so redesignated, and 
     inserting the following new paragraph (2):
       ``(2) `Director' means the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency; and''.
       (2) That Act (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is further amended by 
     striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it 
     appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National 
     Intelligence Director'':
       (A) Section 6 (50 U.S.C. 403g).
       (B) Section 17(f) (50 U.S.C. 403q(f)), both places it 
     appears.
       (3) That Act is further amended by striking ``of Central 
     Intelligence'' in each of the following provisions:
       (A) Section 2 (50 U.S.C. 403b).
       (B) Section 16(c)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 403p(c)(1)(B)).
       (C) Section 17(d)(1) (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(1)).
       (D) Section 20(c) (50 U.S.C. 403t(c)).
       (4) That Act is further amended by striking ``Director of 
     Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in the following 
     provisions and inserting ``Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency'':
       (A) Section 14(b) (50 U.S.C. 403n(b)).
       (B) Section 16(b)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403p(b)(2)).
       (C) Section 16(b)(3) (50 U.S.C. 403p(b)(3)), both places it 
     appears.
       (D) Section 21(g)(1) (50 U.S.C. 403u(g)(1)).
       (E) Section 21(g)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403u(g)(2)).
       (c) Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section 
     101 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 
     U.S.C. 2001) is amended by striking paragraph (2) and 
     inserting the following new paragraph (2):
       ``(2) Director.--The term `Director' means the Director of 
     the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
       (d) CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act.--Subsection (a)(1) of 
     section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary 
     Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 2001 note) is amended to read 
     as follows:
       ``(1) the term `Director' means the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency;''.
       (e) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.--(1) The 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 
     et seq.) is amended by striking ``Director of Central 
     Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``National 
     Intelligence Director''.
       (f) Classified Information Procedures Act.--Section 9(a) of 
     the Classified Information Procedures Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is 
     amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and 
     inserting ``National Intelligence Director''.
       (g) Intelligence Authorization Acts.--
       (1) Public law 103-359.--Section 811(c)(6)(C) of the 
     Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994 
     (title VIII of Public Law 103-359) is amended by striking 
     ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``National 
     Intelligence Director''.
       (2) Public law 107-306.--(A) The Intelligence Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306) is amended by 
     striking ``Director of Central Intelligence, acting as the 
     head of the intelligence community,'' each place it appears 
     in the following provisions and inserting ``National 
     Intelligence Director'':
       (i) Section 313(a) (50 U.S.C. 404n(a)).
       (ii) Section 343(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404n-2(a)(1))
       (B) Section 341 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404n-1) is amended 
     by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence, acting as the 
     head of the intelligence community, shall establish in the 
     Central Intelligence Agency'' and inserting ``National 
     Intelligence Director shall establish within the Central 
     Intelligence Agency''.
       (C) Section 352(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404-3 note) is 
     amended by striking ``Director'' and inserting ``National 
     Intelligence Director''.
       (3) Public law 108-177.--(A) The Intelligence Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177) is amended by 
     striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it 
     appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National 
     Intelligence Director'':
       (i) Section 317(a) (50 U.S.C. 403-3 note).
       (ii) Section 317(h)(1).
       (iii) Section 318(a) (50 U.S.C. 441g note).
       (iv) Section 319(b) (50 U.S.C. 403 note).
       (v) Section 341(b) (28 U.S.C. 519 note).
       (vi) Section 357(a) (50 U.S.C. 403 note).
       (vii) Section 504(a) (117 Stat. 2634), both places it 
     appears.
       (B) Section 319(f)(2) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is 
     amended by striking ``Director'' the first place it appears 
     and inserting ``National Intelligence Director''.
       (C) Section 404 of that Act (18 U.S.C. 4124 note) is 
     amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and 
     inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''.

     SEC. 303. OTHER CONFORMING AMENDMENTS

       (a) National Security Act of 1947.--(1) Section 101(j) of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402(j)) is 
     amended by striking ``Deputy Director of Central 
     Intelligence'' and inserting ``Principal Deputy National 
     Intelligence Director''.
       (2) Section 112(d)(1) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)) is 
     amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of this Act'' and 
     inserting ``section 112(a)(11) of the National Intelligence 
     Reform Act of 2004''.
       (3) Section 116(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is 
     amended by striking ``to the Deputy Director of Central 
     Intelligence, or with respect to employees of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, the Director may delegate such authority 
     to the Deputy Director for Operations'' and inserting ``to 
     the Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director, or, with 
     respect to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, to 
     the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''.
       (4) Section 504(a)(2) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(2)) is 
     amended by striking ``Reserve for Contingencies of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency'' and inserting ``Reserve for 
     Contingencies of the National Intelligence Director''.
       (5) Section 506A(b)(1) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(b)(1)) 
     is amended by striking ``Office of the Deputy Director of 
     Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Office of the National 
     Intelligence Director''.
       (6) Section 701(c)(3) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 431(c)(3)) is 
     amended by striking ``or the Office of the Director of 
     Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``the Office of the 
     Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or the Office of 
     the National Intelligence Director''.
       (7) Section 1001(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 441g(b)) is 
     amended by striking ``Assistant Director of Central 
     Intelligence for Administration'' and inserting ``Office of 
     the National Intelligence Director''.
       (b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--Section 6 of 
     the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) 
     is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(7) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))'' and inserting 
     ``section 112(a)(11) of the National Intelligence Reform Act 
     of 2004''.
       (c) Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section 
     201(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 
     U.S.C. 2011(c)) is amended by striking ``paragraph (6) of 
     section 103(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-3(c)) that the Director of Central Intelligence'' 
     and inserting ``section 112(a)(11) of the National 
     Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 that the National 
     Intelligence Director''.
       (d) Intelligence Authorization Acts.--
       (1) Public law 107-306.--Section 343(c) of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 
     50 U.S.C. 404n-2(c)) is amended by striking ``section 
     103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     403-3((c)(6))'' and inserting ``section 112(a)(11) of the 
     National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004''.
       (2) Public law 108-177.--Section 317 of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 
     50 U.S.C. 403-3 note) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (g), by striking ``Assistant Director of 
     Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production'' and 
     inserting ``Principal Deputy National Intelligence 
     Director''; and
       (B) in subsection (h)(2)(C), by striking ``Assistant 
     Director'' and inserting ``Principal Deputy National 
     Intelligence Director''.

     SEC. 304. MODIFICATIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND 
                   COUNTERINTELLIGENCE UNDER NATIONAL SECURITY ACT 
                   OF 1947.

       Section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     401a) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``or foreign persons, or 
     international terrorist activities'' and inserting ``foreign 
     persons, or international terrorists''; and
       (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``or foreign persons, or 
     international terrorist activities'' and inserting ``foreign 
     persons, or international terrorists''.

     SEC. 305. ELEMENTS OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY UNDER NATIONAL 
                   SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

       Paragraph (4) of section 3 of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(4) The term `intelligence community' includes the 
     following:
       ``(A) The National Intelligence Authority.
       ``(B) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       ``(C) The National Security Agency.
       ``(D) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       ``(E) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       ``(F) The National Reconnaissance Office.

[[Page H8938]]

       ``(G) Other offices within the Department of Defense for 
     the collection of specialized national intelligence through 
     reconnaissance programs.
       ``(H) The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the 
     Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, and the Department of Energy.
       ``(I) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the 
     Department of State.
       ``(J) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the 
     Department of the Treasury.
       ``(K) The elements of the Department of Homeland Security 
     concerned with the analysis of intelligence information, 
     including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard.
       ``(L) Such other elements of any department or agency as 
     may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by 
     the National Intelligence Director and the head of the 
     department or agency concerned, as an element of the 
     intelligence community.''.

     SEC. 306. REDESIGNATION OF NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
                   PROGRAM AS NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

       (a) Redesignation.--Section 3 of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a), as amended by this Act, is further 
     amended--
       (1) by striking paragraph (6); and
       (2) by redesignating paragraph (7) as paragraph (6).
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--(1) The National Security Act 
     of 1947, as amended by this Act, is further amended by 
     striking ``National Foreign Intelligence Program'' each place 
     it appears in the following provisions and inserting 
     ``National Intelligence Program'':
       (A) Section 105(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(2)).
       (B) Section 105(a)(3) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(3)).
       (C) Section 506(a) (50 U.S.C. 415a(a)).
       (2) Section 17(f) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(f)) is amended by striking ``National 
     Foreign Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``National 
     Intelligence Program''.
       (c) Heading Amendments.--(1) The heading of section 105 of 
     that Act is amended to read as follows:


   ``responsibilities of the secretary of defense pertaining to the 
                    national intelligence program''.

       (2) The heading of section 506 of that Act is amended to 
     read as follows:


   ``specificity of national intelligence program budget amounts for 
     counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, and 
                         counterintelligence''.

     SEC. 307. CONFORMING AMENDMENT ON COORDINATION OF BUDGETS OF 
                   ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WITHIN 
                   THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

       Section 105(a)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-5(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``ensure'' and 
     inserting ``assist the Director in ensuring''.

     SEC. 308. REPEAL OF SUPERSEDED AUTHORITIES.

       (a) Appointment of Certain Intelligence Officials.--Section 
     106 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6) is 
     repealed.
       (b) Collection Tasking Authority.--Section 111 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404f) is repealed.

     SEC. 309. CLERICAL AMENDMENTS TO NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 
                   1947.

       The table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947 
     is amended--
       (1) by inserting after the item relating to section 101 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 101A. Joint Intelligence Community Council.'';

       (2) by striking the items relating to sections 102 through 
     104 and inserting the following new items:

``Sec. 102. Central Intelligence Agency.
``Sec. 103. Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.'';

       (3) by striking the item relating to section 105 and 
     inserting the following new item:

``Sec 105. Responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense pertaining to 
              the National Intelligence Program.'';

       (4) by striking the item relating to section 114 and 
     inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 114. Additional annual reports from the National Intelligence 
              Director.'';

     and
       (5) by striking the item relating to section 506 and 
     inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 506. Specificity of National Intelligence Program budget amounts 
              for counterterrorism, counterproliferation, 
              counternarcotics, and counterintelligence''.

     SEC. 310. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES RELATING TO NATIONAL 
                   COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.

       (a) Appointment of National Counterintelligence 
     Executive.--Subsection (a)(2) of section 902 of the 
     Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of 
     Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2432; 50 U.S.C. 402b) is 
     amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and 
     inserting ``National Intelligence Director, and Director of 
     the Central Intelligence Agency''.
       (b) Component of Office of National Intelligence 
     Director.--Such section is further amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections 
     (c) and (d), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new 
     subsection (b):
       ``(b) Component of Office of National Intelligence 
     Director.--The National Counterintelligence Executive is a 
     component of the Office of the National Intelligence Director 
     under subtitle C of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 
     2004.''.
       (c) Duties.--Subsection (d) of such section, as 
     redesignated by subsection (a)(1) of this section, is amended 
     by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(5) To perform such other duties as may be provided under 
     section 131(b) of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 
     2004.''.
       (d) Office of National Counterintelligence Executive.--
     Section 904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 
     2002 (116 Stat. 2434; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Office of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence'' each place it appears in subsections (c) and 
     (l)(1) and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence 
     Director'';
       (2) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each 
     place it appears in subsections (e)(4), (e)(5), (h)(1), and 
     (h)(2) and inserting ``National Intelligence Director''; and
       (3) in subsection (m), by striking ``Director of Central 
     Intelligence'' and inserting ``National Intelligence 
     Director, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''.

     SEC. 311. CONFORMING AMENDMENT TO INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 
                   1978.

       Section 8H(a)(1) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 
     U.S.C. App.) is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new subparagraph:
       ``(D) An employee of the National Intelligence Authority, 
     an employee of an entity other than the Authority who is 
     assigned or detailed to the Authority, or of a contractor of 
     the Authority, who intends to report to Congress a complaint 
     or information with respect to an urgent concern may report 
     the complaint or information to the Inspector General of the 
     National Intelligence Authority in accordance with section 
     141(h)(5) of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.''.

     SEC. 312. CONFORMING AMENDMENT RELATING TO CHIEF FINANCIAL 
                   OFFICER OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY.

       Section 901(b)(1) of title 31, United States Code, is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(Q) The National Intelligence Authority.''.

                 Subtitle B--Transfers and Terminations

     SEC. 321. TRANSFER OF OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE FOR COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT.

       (a) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the Office of 
     the National Intelligence Director the staff of the Office of 
     the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community 
     Management as of the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     including all functions and activities discharged by the 
     Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Community Management as of that date.
       (b) Administration.--The National Intelligence Director 
     shall administer the staff of the Office of the Deputy 
     Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act as a component of 
     the Office of the National Intelligence Director under 
     section 121(d).

     SEC. 322. TRANSFER OF NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM EXECUTIVE.

       (a) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the Office of 
     the National Intelligence Director the National 
     Counterintelligence Executive and the Office of the National 
     Counterintelligence Executive under the Counterintelligence 
     Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 
     U.S.C. 402b et seq.), as amended by section 309 of this Act, 
     including all functions and activities discharged by the 
     National Counterintelligence Executive and the Office of the 
     National Counterintelligence Executive as of the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
       (b) Administration.--The National Intelligence Director 
     shall treat the National Counterintelligence Executive, and 
     administer the Office of the National Counterintelligence 
     Executive, after the date of the enactment of this Act as 
     components of the Office of the National Intelligence 
     Director under section 121(c).

     SEC. 323. TRANSFER OF TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER.

       (a) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the National 
     Counterterrorism Center the Terrorist Threat Integration 
     Center (TTIC), including all functions and activities 
     discharged by the Terrorist Threat Integration Center as of 
     the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (b) Administration.--The Director of the National 
     Counterterrorism Center shall administer the Terrorist Threat 
     Integration Center after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act as a component of the Directorate of Intelligence of the 
     National Counterterrorism Center under section 143(g)(2).

     SEC. 324. TERMINATION OF CERTAIN POSITIONS WITHIN THE CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Termination.--The positions within the Central 
     Intelligence Agency referred to in subsection (b) are hereby 
     abolished.
       (b) Covered Positions.--The positions within the Central 
     Intelligence Agency referred to in this subsection are as 
     follows:
       (1) The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Community Management.
       (2) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Collection.
       (3) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Analysis and Production.

[[Page H8939]]

       (4) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Administration.

                  Subtitle C--Other Transition Matters

     SEC. 331. EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE MATTERS.

       (a) Executive Schedule Level I.--Section 5312 of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding the end the 
     following new item:
       ``National Intelligence Director.''.
       (b) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking the item relating to the Director of 
     Central Intelligence; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new items:
       ``Deputy National Intelligence Directors (5).
       ``Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.''.
       (c) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating 
     to the Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence and inserting 
     the following new item:
       ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
       (d) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating 
     to the Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence.

     SEC. 332. PRESERVATION OF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES.

       The National Intelligence Director, the Director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency, and the Secretary of Defense 
     shall jointly take such actions as are appropriate to 
     preserve the intelligence capabilities of the United States 
     during the establishment of the National Intelligence 
     Authority under this Act.

     SEC. 333. REORGANIZATION.

       (a) Reorganization.--The National Intelligence Director 
     may, with the approval of the President and after 
     consultation with the department, agency, or element 
     concerned, allocate or reallocate functions among the 
     officers of the National Intelligence Program, and may 
     establish, consolidate, alter, or discontinue organizational 
     units within the Program, but only after providing notice of 
     such action to Congress, which shall include an explanation 
     of the rationale for the action.
       (b) Limitation.--The authority under subsection (a) does 
     not extend to any action inconsistent with law.
       (c) Congressional Review.--An action may be taken under the 
     authority under subsection (a) only with the approval of the 
     following:
       (1) Each of the congressional intelligence committees.
       (2) Each of the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the 
     Senate and the Committee on Government Reform of the House of 
     Representatives.

     SEC. 334. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR REPORT ON 
                   IMPLEMENTATION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                   REFORM.

       Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the National Intelligence Director shall submit to 
     Congress a report on the progress made in the implementation 
     of this Act, including the amendments made by this Act. The 
     report shall include a comprehensive description of the 
     progress made, and may include such recommendations for 
     additional legislative or administrative action as the 
     Director considers appropriate.

     SEC. 335. COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORTS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REFORM.

       (a) Reports.--(1) Not later than two years after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the 
     United States shall submit to Congress a comprehensive report 
     on the implementation of this Act and the amendments made by 
     this Act.
       (2) The Comptroller General may submit to Congress at any 
     time during the two-year period beginning on the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, such reports on the progress made in 
     the implementation of this Act and the amendments made by 
     this Act as the Comptroller General considers appropriate.
       (b) Report Elements.--Each report under subsection (a) 
     shall include the following:
       (1) The assessment of the Comptroller General of the 
     progress made in the implementation of this Act (and the 
     amendments made by this Act) as of the date of such report.
       (2) A description of any delays or other shortfalls in the 
     implementation of this Act that have been identified by the 
     Comptroller General.
       (3) Any recommendations for additional legislative or 
     administrative action that the Comptroller General considers 
     appropriate.
       (c) Agency Cooperation.--Each department, agency, and 
     element of the United States Government shall cooperate with 
     the Comptroller General in the assessment of the 
     implementation of this Act, and shall provide the Comptroller 
     General timely and complete access to relevant documents in 
     accordance with section 716 of title 31, United States Code.

     SEC. 336. GENERAL REFERENCES.

       (a) Director of Central Intelligence as Head of 
     Intelligence Community.--Any reference to the Director of 
     Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of 
     the intelligence community in any law, regulation, document, 
     paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed 
     to be a reference to the National Intelligence Director.
       (b) Director of Central Intelligence as Head of CIA.--Any 
     reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the 
     Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's 
     capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency in 
     any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the 
     United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the 
     Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
       (c) Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 
     for Community Management.--Any reference to the Office of the 
     Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community 
     Management in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other 
     record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference 
     to the staff of such office within the Office of the National 
     Intelligence Director under section 121.

                       Subtitle D--Effective Date

     SEC. 341. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), this 
     Act, and the amendments made by this Act, shall take effect 
     180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (b) Earlier Effective Date.--In order to ensure the rapid 
     implementation of this Act while simultaneously ensuring a 
     smooth transition that will safeguard the national security 
     of the United States, the President may provide that this Act 
     (including the amendments made by this Act), or one or more 
     particular provisions of this Act (including the amendments 
     made by such provision or provisions), shall take effect on 
     such date that is earlier than the date otherwise provided 
     under subsection (a) as the President shall specify.
       (c) Notification of Effective Dates.--If the President 
     exercises the authority in subsection (b), the President 
     shall--
       (1) notify Congress of the exercise of such authority; and
       (2) publish in the Federal Register notice of the earlier 
     effective date or dates involved, including each provision 
     (and amendment) covered by such earlier effective date.

                       Subtitle E--Other Matters

     SEC. 351. SEVERABILITY.

       If any provision of this Act, or an amendment made by this 
     Act, or the application of such provision to any person or 
     circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this Act, or 
     the application of such provision to persons or circumstances 
     other than those to which such provision is held invalid, 
     shall not be affected thereby.

     SEC. 352. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There are specifically authorized to be appropriated for 
     fiscal year 2005 such sums as may be necessary to carry out 
     this title and titles I and II and the amendments made by 
     those titles.
 TITLE IV--IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
                TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

     SEC. 401. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``9/11 Commission Report 
     Implementation Act of 2004''.
Subtitle A--The Role of Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, and the Military in the 
                            War on Terrorism

     SEC. 411. FINDINGS.

       Consistent with the report of the National Commission on 
     Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the 
     following findings:
       (1) Long-term success in the war on terrorism demands the 
     use of all elements of national power, including diplomacy, 
     military action, intelligence, covert action, law 
     enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, 
     and homeland defense.
       (2) To win the war on terrorism, the United States must 
     assign to economic and diplomatic capabilities the same 
     strategic priority that is assigned to military capabilities.
       (3) The legislative and executive branches of the 
     Government of the United States must commit to robust, long-
     term investments in all of the tools necessary for the 
     foreign policy of the United States to successfully 
     accomplish the goals of the United States.
       (4) The investments referred to in paragraph (3) will 
     require increased funding to United States foreign affairs 
     programs in general, and to priority areas as described in 
     this subtitle in particular.

     SEC. 412. TERRORIST SANCTUARIES.

       (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Complex terrorist operations require locations that 
     provide such operations sanctuary from interference by 
     government or law enforcement personnel.
       (2) A terrorist sanctuary existed in Afghanistan before 
     September 11, 2001.
       (3) The terrorist sanctuary in Afghanistan provided direct 
     and indirect value to members of al Qaeda who participated in 
     the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 
     2001, and in other terrorist operations.
       (4) Terrorist organizations have fled to some of the least 
     governed and most lawless places in the world to find 
     sanctuary.
       (5) During the 21st century, terrorists are focusing on 
     remote regions and failing states as locations to seek 
     sanctuary.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the United States Government should identify and 
     prioritize locations that are or that could be used as 
     terrorist sanctuaries;

[[Page H8940]]

       (2) the United States Government should have a realistic 
     strategy that includes the use of all elements of national 
     power to keep possible terrorists from using a location as a 
     sanctuary; and
       (3) the United States Government should reach out, listen 
     to, and work with countries in bilateral and multilateral 
     fora to prevent locations from becoming sanctuaries and to 
     prevent terrorists from using locations as sanctuaries.

     SEC. 413. ROLE OF PAKISTAN IN COUNTERING TERRORISM.

       (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Government of Pakistan has a critical role to 
     perform in the struggle against Islamist terrorism.
       (2) The endemic poverty, widespread corruption, and 
     frequent ineffectiveness of government in Pakistan create 
     opportunities for Islamist recruitment.
       (3) The poor quality of education in Pakistan is 
     particularly worrying, as millions of families send their 
     children to madrassahs, some of which have been used as 
     incubators for violent extremism.
       (4) The vast unpoliced regions in Pakistan make the country 
     attractive to extremists seeking refuge and recruits and also 
     provide a base for operations against coalition forces in 
     Afghanistan.
       (5) A stable Pakistan, with a moderate, responsible 
     government that serves as a voice of tolerance in the Muslim 
     world, is critical to stability in the region.
       (6) There is a widespread belief among the people of 
     Pakistan that the United States has long treated them as 
     allies of convenience.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the United States should make a long-term commitment to 
     fostering a stable and secure future in Pakistan, as long as 
     its leaders remain committed to combatting extremists and 
     extremism, ending the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction, securing its borders, and gaining internal 
     control of all its territory while pursuing policies that 
     strengthen civil society, promote moderation and advance 
     socio-economic progress;
       (2) Pakistan should make sincere efforts to transition to 
     democracy, enhanced rule of law, and robust civil 
     institutions, and United States policy toward Pakistan should 
     promote such a transition;
       (3) the United States assistance to Pakistan should be 
     maintained at the overall levels requested by the President 
     for fiscal year 2005;
       (4) the United States should support the Government of 
     Pakistan with a comprehensive effort that extends from 
     military aid to support for better education;
       (5) the United States Government should devote particular 
     attention and resources to assisting in the improvement of 
     the quality of education in Pakistan; and
       (6) the Government of Pakistan should devote additional 
     resources of such Government to expanding and improving 
     modern public education in Pakistan.

     SEC. 414. AID TO AFGHANISTAN.

       (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The United States and its allies in the international 
     community have made progress in promoting economic and 
     political reform within Afghanistan, including the 
     establishment of a central government with a democratic 
     constitution, a new currency, and a new army, the increase of 
     personal freedom, and the elevation of the standard of living 
     of many Afghans.
       (2) A number of significant obstacles must be overcome if 
     Afghanistan is to become a secure and prosperous democracy, 
     and such a transition depends in particular upon--
       (A) improving security throughout the country;
       (B) disarming and demobilizing militias;
       (C) curtailing the rule of the warlords;
       (D) promoting equitable economic development;
       (E) protecting the human rights of the people of 
     Afghanistan;
       (F) holding elections for public office; and
       (G) ending the cultivation and trafficking of narcotics.
       (3) The United States and the international community must 
     make a long-term commitment to addressing the deteriorating 
     security situation in Afghanistan and the burgeoning 
     narcotics trade, endemic poverty, and other serious problems 
     in Afghanistan in order to prevent that country from 
     relapsing into a sanctuary for international terrorism.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--
       (1) Actions for afghanistan.--It is the sense of Congress 
     that the Government of the United States should take, with 
     respect to Afghanistan, the following actions:
       (A) Working with other nations to obtain long-term 
     security, political, and financial commitments and 
     fulfillment of pledges to the Government of Afghanistan to 
     accomplish the objectives of the Afghanistan Freedom Support 
     Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7501 et seq.), especially to ensure a 
     secure, democratic, and prosperous Afghanistan that respects 
     the rights of its citizens and is free of international 
     terrorist organizations.
       (B) Using the voice and vote of the United States in 
     relevant international organizations, including the North 
     Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations Security 
     Council, to strengthen international commitments to assist 
     the Government of Afghanistan in enhancing security, building 
     national police and military forces, increasing counter-
     narcotics efforts, and expanding infrastructure and public 
     services throughout the country.
       (C) Taking appropriate steps to increase the assistance 
     provided under programs of the Department of State and the 
     United States Agency for International Development throughout 
     Afghanistan and to increase the number of personnel of those 
     agencies in Afghanistan as necessary to support the increased 
     assistance.
       (2) Revision of afghanistan freedom support act of 2002.--
     It is the sense of Congress that Congress should, in 
     consultation with the President, update and revise, as 
     appropriate, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002.
       (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated to 
     the President for each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2009 
     such sums as may be necessary to provide assistance for 
     Afghanistan, unless otherwise authorized by Congress, for the 
     following purposes:
       (A) For development assistance under sections 103, 105, and 
     106 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151a, 
     2151c, and 2151d).
       (B) For children's health programs under the Child Survival 
     and Health Program Fund under section 104 of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151b).
       (C) For economic assistance under the Economic Support Fund 
     under chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.).
       (D) For international narcotics and law enforcement under 
     section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
     2291).
       (E) For nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and 
     related programs.
       (F) For international military education and training under 
     section 541 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
     2347).
       (G) For Foreign Military Financing Program grants under 
     section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763).
       (H) For peacekeeping operations under section 551 of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2348).
       (2) Conditions for assistance.--Assistance provided by the 
     President under this subsection--
       (A) shall be consistent with the Afghanistan Freedom 
     Support Act of 2002; and
       (B) shall be provided with reference to the ``Securing 
     Afghanistan's Future'' document published by the Government 
     of Afghanistan.

     SEC. 415. THE UNITED STATES-SAUDI ARABIA RELATIONSHIP.

       (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Despite a long history of friendly relations with the 
     United States, Saudi Arabia has been a problematic ally in 
     combating Islamist extremism.
       (2) Cooperation between the Governments of the United 
     States and Saudi Arabia has traditionally been carried out in 
     private.
       (3) Counterterrorism cooperation between the Governments of 
     the United States and Saudi Arabia has improved significantly 
     since the terrorist bombing attacks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 
     on May 12, 2003, especially cooperation to combat terror 
     groups operating inside Saudi Arabia.
       (4) The Government of Saudi Arabia is now pursuing al Qaeda 
     within Saudi Arabia and has begun to take some modest steps 
     toward internal reform.
       (5) Nonetheless, the Government of Saudi Arabia has been at 
     times unresponsive to United States requests for assistance 
     in the global war on Islamist terrorism.
       (6) The Government of Saudi Arabia has not done all it can 
     to prevent nationals of Saudi Arabia from funding and 
     supporting extremist organizations in Saudi Arabia and other 
     countries.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the problems in the relationship between the United 
     States and Saudi Arabia must be confronted openly, and the 
     opportunities for cooperation between the countries must be 
     pursued openly by those governments;
       (2) both governments must build a relationship that they 
     can publicly defend and that is based on other national 
     interests in addition to their national interests in oil;
       (3) this relationship should include a shared commitment to 
     political and economic reform in Saudi Arabia;
       (4) this relationship should also include a shared interest 
     in greater tolerance and respect for other cultures in Saudi 
     Arabia and a commitment to fight the violent extremists who 
     foment hatred in the Middle East; and
       (5) the Government of Saudi Arabia must do all it can to 
     prevent nationals of Saudi Arabia from funding and supporting 
     extremist organizations in Saudi Arabia and other countries.

     SEC. 416. EFFORTS TO COMBAT ISLAMIST TERRORISM.

       (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress makes the following findings:

[[Page H8941]]

       (1) While support for the United States has plummeted in 
     the Islamic world, many negative views are uninformed, at 
     best, and, at worst, are informed by coarse stereotypes and 
     caricatures.
       (2) Local newspapers in Islamic countries and influential 
     broadcasters who reach Islamic audiences through satellite 
     television often reinforce the idea that the people and 
     Government of the United States are anti-Muslim.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the Government of the United States should offer an 
     example of moral leadership in the world that includes a 
     commitment to treat all people humanely, abide by the rule of 
     law, and be generous to the people and governments of other 
     countries;
       (2) the United States should cooperate with governments of 
     Islamic countries to foster agreement on respect for human 
     dignity and opportunity, and to offer a vision of a better 
     future that includes stressing life over death, individual 
     educational and economic opportunity, widespread political 
     participation, contempt for indiscriminate violence, respect 
     for the rule of law, openness in discussing differences, and 
     tolerance for opposing points of view;
       (3) the United States should encourage reform, freedom, 
     democracy, and opportunity for Arabs and Muslims and promote 
     moderation in the Islamic world; and
       (4) the United States should work to defeat extremist 
     ideology in the Islamic world by providing assistance to 
     moderate Arabs and Muslims to combat extremist ideas.

     SEC. 417. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD DICTATORSHIPS.

       (a) Finding.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress finds that short-term gains enjoyed by the United 
     States through cooperation with repressive dictatorships have 
     often been outweighed by long-term setbacks for the stature 
     and interests of the United States.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) United States foreign policy should promote the value 
     of life and the importance of individual educational and 
     economic opportunity, encourage widespread political 
     participation, condemn indiscriminate violence, and promote 
     respect for the rule of law, openness in discussing 
     differences among people, and tolerance for opposing points 
     of view; and
       (2) the United States Government must prevail upon the 
     governments of all predominantly Muslim countries, including 
     those that are friends and allies of the United States, to 
     condemn indiscriminate violence, promote the value of life, 
     respect and promote the principles of individual education 
     and economic opportunity, encourage widespread political 
     participation, and promote the rule of law, openness in 
     discussing differences among people, and tolerance for 
     opposing points of view.

     SEC. 418. PROMOTION OF UNITED STATES VALUES THROUGH BROADCAST 
                   MEDIA.

       (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Although the United States has demonstrated and 
     promoted its values in defending Muslims against tyrants and 
     criminals in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, 
     this message is not always clearly presented and understood 
     in the Islamic world.
       (2) If the United States does not act to vigorously define 
     its message in the Islamic world, the image of the United 
     States will be defined by Islamic extremists who seek to 
     demonize the United States.
       (3) Recognizing that many Arab and Muslim audiences rely on 
     satellite television and radio, the United States Government 
     has launched promising initiatives in television and radio 
     broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran, and Afghanistan.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the United States must do more to defend and promote 
     its values and ideals to the broadest possible audience in 
     the Islamic world;
       (2) United States efforts to defend and promote these 
     values and ideals are beginning to ensure that accurate 
     expressions of these values reach large audiences in the 
     Islamic world and should be robustly supported;
       (3) the United States Government could and should do more 
     to engage the Muslim world in the struggle of ideas; and
       (4) the United States Government should more intensively 
     employ existing broadcast media in the Islamic world as part 
     of this engagement.
       (c) Authorizations of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the President for each of the fiscal 
     years 2005 through 2009 such sums as may be necessary to 
     carry out United States Government broadcasting activities 
     under the United States Information and Educational Exchange 
     Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1431 et seq.), the United States 
     International Broadcasting Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6201 et 
     seq.), and the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act 
     of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6501 et seq.), and to carry out other 
     activities under this section consistent with the purposes of 
     such Acts, unless otherwise authorized by Congress.

     SEC. 419. EXPANSION OF UNITED STATES SCHOLARSHIP AND EXCHANGE 
                   PROGRAMS IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD.

       (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Exchange, scholarship, and library programs are 
     effective ways for the United States Government to promote 
     internationally the values and ideals of the United States.
       (2) Exchange, scholarship, and library programs can expose 
     young people from other countries to United States values and 
     offer them knowledge and hope.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the United States should expand its exchange, scholarship, 
     and library programs, especially those that benefit people in 
     the Arab and Muslim worlds.
       (c) Authority To Expand Educational and Cultural 
     Exchanges.--The President is authorized to substantially 
     expand the exchange, scholarship, and library programs of the 
     United States, especially such programs that benefit people 
     in the Arab and Muslim worlds.
       (d) Availability of Funds.--Of the amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated for educational and cultural exchange programs 
     in each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2009, there is 
     authorized to be made available to the Secretary of State 
     such sums as may be necessary to carry out programs under 
     this section, unless otherwise authorized by Congress.

     SEC. 420. INTERNATIONAL YOUTH OPPORTUNITY FUND.

       (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Education that teaches tolerance, the dignity and value 
     of each individual, and respect for different beliefs is a 
     key element in any global strategy to eliminate Islamist 
     terrorism.
       (2) Education in the Middle East about the world outside 
     that region is weak.
       (3) The United Nations has rightly equated literacy with 
     freedom.
       (4) The international community is moving toward setting a 
     concrete goal of reducing by half the illiteracy rate in the 
     Middle East by 2010, through the implementation of education 
     programs targeting women and girls and programs for adult 
     literacy, and by other means.
       (5) To be effective, efforts to improve education in the 
     Middle East must also include--
       (A) support for the provision of basic education tools, 
     such as textbooks that translate more of the world's 
     knowledge into local languages and local libraries to house 
     such materials; and
       (B) more vocational education in trades and business 
     skills.
       (6) The Middle East can benefit from some of the same 
     programs to bridge the digital divide that already have been 
     developed for other regions of the world.
       (b) International Youth Opportunity Fund.--
       (1) Establishment.--The President shall establish an 
     International Youth Opportunity Fund to provide financial 
     assistance for the improvement of public education in the 
     Middle East.
       (2) International participation.--The President shall seek 
     the cooperation of the international community in 
     establishing and generously supporting the Fund.
       (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the President for the establishment of 
     the International Youth Opportunity Fund, in addition to any 
     amounts otherwise available for such purpose, such sums as 
     may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2005 through 
     2009, unless otherwise authorized by Congress.

     SEC. 421. THE USE OF ECONOMIC POLICIES TO COMBAT TERRORISM.

       (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) While terrorism is not caused by poverty, breeding 
     grounds for terrorism are created by backward economic 
     policies and repressive political regimes.
       (2) Policies that support economic development and reform 
     also have political implications, as economic and political 
     liberties are often linked.
       (3) The United States is working toward creating a Middle 
     East Free Trade Area by 2013 and implementing a free trade 
     agreement with Bahrain, and free trade agreements exist 
     between the United States and Israel and the United States 
     and Jordan.
       (4) Existing and proposed free trade agreements between the 
     United States and Islamic countries are drawing interest from 
     other countries in the Middle East region, and Islamic 
     countries can become full participants in the rules-based 
     global trading system, as the United States considers 
     lowering its barriers to trade with the poorest Arab 
     countries.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) a comprehensive United States strategy to counter 
     terrorism should include economic policies that encourage 
     development, open societies, and opportunities for people to 
     improve the lives of their families and to enhance prospects 
     for their children's future;
       (2) one element of such a strategy should encompass the 
     lowering of trade barriers with the poorest countries that 
     have a significant population of Arab or Muslim individuals;

[[Page H8942]]

       (3) another element of such a strategy should encompass 
     United States efforts to promote economic reform in countries 
     that have a significant population of Arab or Muslim 
     individuals, including efforts to integrate such countries 
     into the global trading system; and
       (4) given the importance of the rule of law in promoting 
     economic development and attracting investment, the United 
     States should devote an increased proportion of its 
     assistance to countries in the Middle East to the promotion 
     of the rule of law.

     SEC. 422. MIDDLE EAST PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for each of the fiscal years 2005 through 
     2009 such sums as may be necessary for the Middle East 
     Partnership Initiative, unless otherwise authorized by 
     Congress.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that, 
     given the importance of the rule of law and economic reform 
     to development in the Middle East, a significant portion of 
     the funds authorized to be appropriated under subsection (a) 
     should be made available to promote the rule of law in the 
     Middle East.

     SEC. 423. COMPREHENSIVE COALITION STRATEGY FOR FIGHTING 
                   TERRORISM.

       (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Almost every aspect of the counterterrorism strategy of 
     the United States relies on international cooperation.
       (2) Since September 11, 2001, the number and scope of 
     United States Government contacts with foreign governments 
     concerning counterterrorism have expanded significantly, but 
     such contacts have often been ad hoc and not integrated as a 
     comprehensive and unified approach.
       (b) International Contact Group on Counterterrorism.--
       (1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the President--
       (A) should seek to engage the leaders of the governments of 
     other countries in a process of advancing beyond separate and 
     uncoordinated national counterterrorism strategies to develop 
     with those other governments a comprehensive coalition 
     strategy to fight Islamist terrorism; and
       (B) to that end, should seek to establish an international 
     counterterrorism policy contact group with the leaders of 
     governments providing leadership in global counterterrorism 
     efforts and governments of countries with sizable Muslim 
     populations, to be used as a ready and flexible international 
     means for discussing and coordinating the development of 
     important counterterrorism policies by the participating 
     governments.
       (2) Authority.--The President is authorized to establish an 
     international counterterrorism policy contact group with the 
     leaders of governments referred to in paragraph (1) for 
     purposes as follows:
       (A) To develop in common with such other countries 
     important policies and a strategy that address the various 
     components of international prosecution of the war on 
     terrorism, including policies and a strategy that address 
     military issues, law enforcement, the collection, analysis, 
     and dissemination of intelligence, issues relating to 
     interdiction of travel by terrorists, counterterrorism-
     related customs issues, financial issues, and issues relating 
     to terrorist sanctuaries.
       (B) To address, to the extent (if any) that the President 
     and leaders of other participating governments determine 
     appropriate, such long-term issues as economic and political 
     reforms that can contribute to strengthening stability and 
     security in the Middle East.

     SEC. 424. TREATMENT OF FOREIGN PRISONERS.

       (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Carrying out the global war on terrorism requires the 
     development of policies with respect to the detention and 
     treatment of captured international terrorists that are 
     adhered to by all coalition forces.
       (2) Article 3 of the Convention Relative to the Treatment 
     of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 
     3316) was specifically designed for cases in which the usual 
     rules of war do not apply, and the minimum standards of 
     treatment pursuant to such Article are generally accepted 
     throughout the world as customary international law.
       (b) Policy.--The policy of the United States is as follows:
       (1) It is the policy of the United States to treat all 
     foreign persons captured, detained, interned or otherwise 
     held in the custody of the United States (hereinafter 
     ``prisoners'') humanely and in accordance with standards that 
     the United States would consider legal if perpetrated by the 
     enemy against an American prisoner.
       (2) It is the policy of the United States that all 
     officials of the United States are bound both in wartime and 
     in peacetime by the legal prohibition against torture, cruel, 
     inhuman or degrading treatment.
       (3) If there is any doubt as to whether prisoners are 
     entitled to the protections afforded by the Geneva 
     Conventions, such prisoners shall enjoy the protections of 
     the Geneva Conventions until such time as their status can be 
     determined pursuant to the procedures authorized by Army 
     Regulation 190-8, Section 1-6.
       (4) It is the policy of the United States to expeditiously 
     prosecute cases of terrorism or other criminal acts alleged 
     to have been committed by prisoners in the custody of the 
     United States Armed Forces at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in order 
     to avoid the indefinite detention of prisoners, which is 
     contrary to the legal principles and security interests of 
     the United States.
       (c) Reporting.--The Department of Defense shall submit to 
     the appropriate congressional committees:
       (1) A quarterly report providing the number of prisoners 
     who were denied Prisoner of War (POW) status under the Geneva 
     Conventions and the basis for denying POW status to each such 
     prisoner.
       (2) A report setting forth--
       (A) the proposed schedule for military commissions to be 
     held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and
       (B) the number of individuals currently held at Guantanamo 
     Bay, Cuba, the number of such individuals who are unlikely to 
     face a military commission in the next six months, and each 
     reason for not bringing such individuals before a military 
     commission.
       (3) All International Committee of the Red Cross reports, 
     completed prior to the enactment of this Act, concerning the 
     treatment of prisoners in United States custody at Guantanamo 
     Bay, Cuba, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Such ICRC reports should be 
     provided, in classified form, not later than 15 days after 
     enactment of this Act.
       (4) A report setting forth all prisoner interrogation 
     techniques approved by officials of the United States.
       (d) Annual Training Requirement.--The Department of Defense 
     shall certify that all Federal employees and civilian 
     contractors engaged in the handling or interrogating of 
     prisoners have fulfilled an annual training requirement on 
     the laws of war, the Geneva Conventions and the obligations 
     of the United States under international humanitarian law.
       (e) Prohibition on Torture or Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading 
     Treatment or Punishment.--
       (1) In general.--No prisoner shall be subject to torture or 
     cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment that is 
     prohibited by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
     United States.
       (2) Relationship to geneva conventions.--Nothing in this 
     section shall affect the status of any person under the 
     Geneva Conventions or whether any person is entitled to the 
     protections of the Geneva Conventions.
       (f) Rules, Regulations, and Guidelines.--
       (1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary and the Director 
     shall prescribe the rules, regulations, or guidelines 
     necessary to ensure compliance with the prohibition in 
     subsection (e)(1) by all personnel of the United States 
     Government and by any person providing services to the United 
     States Government on a contract basis.
       (2) Report to congress.--The Secretary and the Director 
     shall submit to Congress the rules, regulations, or 
     guidelines prescribed under paragraph (1), and any 
     modifications to such rules, regulations, or guidelines--
       (A) not later than 30 days after the effective date of such 
     rules, regulations, guidelines, or modifications; and
       (B) in a manner and form that will protect the national 
     security interests of the United States.
       (g) Reports on Possible Violations.--
       (1) Requirement.--The Secretary and the Director shall each 
     submit, on a timely basis and not less than twice each year, 
     a report to Congress on the circumstances surrounding any 
     investigation of a possible violation of the prohibition in 
     subsection (e)(1) by United States Government personnel or by 
     a person providing services to the United States Government 
     on a contract basis.
       (2) Form of report.--A report required under paragraph (1) 
     shall be submitted in a manner and form that--
       (A) will protect the national security interests of the 
     United States; and
       (B) will not prejudice any prosecution of an individual 
     involved in, or responsible for, a violation of the 
     prohibition in subsection (e)(1).
       (h) Report on a Coalition Approach Toward the Detention and 
     Humane Treatment of Captured Terrorists.--Not later than 180 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     President shall submit to Congress a report describing the 
     efforts of the United States Government to develop an 
     approach toward the detention and humane treatment of 
     captured international terrorists that will be adhered to by 
     all countries that are members of the coalition against 
     terrorism.
       (i) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or 
     punishment.--The term ``cruel, inhumane, or degrading 
     treatment or punishment'' means the cruel, unusual, and 
     inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the fifth 
     amendment, eighth amendment, or fourteenth amendment to the 
     Constitution.
       (2) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the National 
     Intelligence Director.
       (3) Geneva conventions.--The term ``Geneva Conventions'' 
     means--

[[Page H8943]]

       (A) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
     the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, done at 
     Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3114);
       (B) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
     the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at 
     Sea, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3217);
       (C) the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
     of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316); and
       (D) the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
     Persons in Time of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 
     3516).
       (4) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
     of Defense.
       (5) Torture.--The term ``torture'' has the meaning given 
     that term in section 2340 of title 18, United States Code.

     SEC. 425. PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

       (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Al Qaeda and other terror groups have tried to acquire 
     or make weapons of mass destruction since 1994 or earlier.
       (2) The United States doubtless would be a prime target for 
     use of any such weapon by al Qaeda.
       (3) Although the United States Government has supported the 
     Cooperative Threat Reduction, Global Threat Reduction 
     Initiative, and other nonproliferation assistance programs, 
     nonproliferation experts continue to express deep concern 
     about the adequacy of such efforts to secure weapons of mass 
     destruction and related materials that still exist in Russia 
     other countries of the former Soviet Union, and around the 
     world.
       (4) The cost of increased investment in the prevention of 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related 
     materials is greatly outweighed by the potentially 
     catastrophic cost to the United States of the use of such 
     weapons by terrorists.
       (5) The Cooperative Threat Reduction, Global Threat 
     Reduction Initiative, and other nonproliferation assistance 
     programs are the United States primary method of preventing 
     the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related 
     materials from Russia and the states of the former Soviet 
     Union, but require further expansion, improvement, and 
     resources.
       (6) Better coordination is needed within the executive 
     branch of government for the budget development, oversight, 
     and implementation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction, 
     Global Threat Reduction Initiative, and other 
     nonproliferation assistance programs, and critical elements 
     of such programs are operated by the Departments of Defense, 
     Energy, and State.
       (7) The effective implementation of the Cooperative Threat 
     Reduction, Global Threat Reduction Initiative, and other 
     nonproliferation assistance programs in the countries of the 
     former Soviet Union is hampered by Russian behavior and 
     conditions on the provision of assistance under such programs 
     that are unrelated to bilateral cooperation on weapons 
     dismantlement.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) maximum effort to prevent the proliferation of weapons 
     of mass destruction and related materials, wherever such 
     proliferation may occur, is warranted;
       (2) the Cooperative Threat Reduction, Global Threat 
     Reduction Initiative, and other nonproliferation assistance 
     programs should be expanded, improved, accelerated, and 
     better funded to address the global dimensions of the 
     proliferation threat; and
       (3) the Proliferation Security Initiative is an important 
     counterproliferation program that should be expanded to 
     include additional partners.
       (c) Cooperative Threat Reduction, Global Threat Reduction 
     Initiative, and other nonproliferation assistance programs.--
     In this section, the term ``Cooperative Threat Reduction, 
     Global Threat Reduction Initiative, and other 
     nonproliferation assistance programs'' includes--
       (1) the programs specified in section 1501(b) of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 
     (Public Law 104-201; 50 U.S.C. 2362 note);
       (2) the activities for which appropriations are authorized 
     by section 3101(a)(2) of the National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136; 117 Stat. 
     1742);
       (3) the Department of State program of assistance to 
     science centers;
       (4) the Global Threat Reduction Initiative of the 
     Department of Energy; and
       (5) a program of any agency of the Federal Government 
     having the purpose of assisting any foreign government in 
     preventing nuclear weapons, plutonium, highly enriched 
     uranium, or other materials capable of sustaining an 
     explosive nuclear chain reaction, or nuclear weapons 
     technology from becoming available to terrorist 
     organizations.
       (d) Strategy and Plan.--
       (1) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to 
     Congress--
       (A) a comprehensive strategy for expanding and 
     strengthening the Cooperative Threat Reduction, Global Threat 
     Reduction Initiative, and other nonproliferation assistance 
     programs; and
       (B) an estimate of the funding necessary to execute such 
     strategy.
       (2) Plan.--The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall 
     include a plan for securing the nuclear weapons and related 
     materials that are the most likely to be acquired or sought 
     by, and susceptible to becoming available to, terrorist 
     organizations, including--
       (A) a prioritized list of the most dangerous and vulnerable 
     sites;
       (B) measurable milestones for improving United States 
     nonproliferation assistance programs;
       (C) a schedule for achieving such milestones; and
       (D) initial estimates of the resources necessary to achieve 
     such milestones under such schedule.

     SEC. 426. FINANCING OF TERRORISM.

       (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) While efforts to designate and freeze the assets of 
     terrorist financiers have been relatively unsuccessful, 
     efforts to target the relatively small number of al Qaeda 
     financial facilitators have been valuable and successful.
       (2) The death or capture of several important financial 
     facilitators has decreased the amount of money available to 
     al Qaeda, and has made it more difficult for al Qaeda to 
     raise and move money.
       (3) The capture of al Qaeda financial facilitators has 
     provided a windfall of intelligence that can be used to 
     continue the cycle of disruption.
       (4) The United States Government has rightly recognized 
     that information about terrorist money helps in understanding 
     terror networks, searching them out, and disrupting their 
     operations.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) a critical weapon in the effort to stop terrorist 
     financing should be the targeting of terrorist financial 
     facilitators by intelligence and law enforcement agencies; 
     and
       (2) efforts to track terrorist financing must be paramount 
     in United States counter-terrorism efforts.
       (c) Report on Terrorist Financing.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to 
     Congress a report evaluating the effectiveness of United 
     States efforts to curtail the international financing of 
     terrorism.
       (2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
     evaluate and make recommendations on--
       (A) the effectiveness of efforts and methods to the 
     identification and tracking of terrorist financing;
       (B) ways to improve multinational and international 
     governmental cooperation in this effort;
       (C) ways to improve the effectiveness of financial 
     institutions in this effort;
       (D) the adequacy of agency coordination, nationally and 
     internationally, including international treaties and 
     compacts, in this effort and ways to improve that 
     coordination; and
       (E) recommendations for changes in law and additional 
     resources required to improve this effort.

     SEC. 427. REPORT TO CONGRESS.

       (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 
     submit to Congress a report on the activities of the 
     Government of the United States to carry out the provisions 
     of this subtitle.
       (b) Content.--The report required under this section shall 
     include the following:
       (1) Terrorist sanctuaries.--A description of the strategy 
     of the United States to address and, where possible, 
     eliminate terrorist sanctuaries, including--
       (A) a description of actual and potential terrorist 
     sanctuaries, together with an assessment of the priorities of 
     addressing and eliminating such sanctuaries;
       (B) an outline of strategies for disrupting or eliminating 
     the security provided to terrorists by such sanctuaries;
       (C) a description of efforts by the United States 
     Government to work with other countries in bilateral and 
     multilateral fora to address or eliminate actual or potential 
     terrorist sanctuaries and disrupt or eliminate the security 
     provided to terrorists by such sanctuaries; and
       (D) a description of long-term goals and actions designed 
     to reduce the conditions that allow the formation of 
     terrorist sanctuaries, such as supporting and strengthening 
     host governments, reducing poverty, increasing economic 
     development, strengthening civil society, securing borders, 
     strengthening internal security forces, and disrupting 
     logistics and communications networks of terrorist groups.
       (2) Support for pakistan.--A description of the efforts of 
     the United States Government to support Pakistan and 
     encourage moderation in that country, including--
       (A) an examination of the desirability of establishing a 
     Pakistan Education Fund to direct resources toward improving 
     the quality of secondary schools in Pakistan, and an 
     examination of the efforts of the Government of Pakistan to 
     fund modern public education;
       (B) recommendations on the funding necessary to provide 
     various levels of educational support;
       (C) an examination of the current composition and levels of 
     United States military aid to Pakistan, together with any 
     recommendations for changes in such levels and composition 
     that the President considers appropriate; and

[[Page H8944]]

       (D) an examination of other major types of United States 
     financial support to Pakistan, together with any 
     recommendations for changes in the levels and composition of 
     such support that the President considers appropriate.
       (3) Support for afghanistan.--
       (A) Specific objectives.--A description of the strategy of 
     the United States to provide aid to Afghanistan during the 5-
     year period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, 
     including a description of the resources necessary during the 
     next 5 years to achieve specific objectives in Afghanistan in 
     the following areas:
       (i) Fostering economic development.
       (ii) Curtailing the cultivation of opium.
       (iii) Achieving internal security and stability.
       (iv) Eliminating terrorist sanctuaries.
       (v) Increasing governmental capabilities.
       (vi) Improving essential infrastructure and public 
     services.
       (vii) Improving public health services.
       (viii) Establishing a broad-based educational system.
       (ix) Promoting democracy and the rule of law.
       (x) Building national police and military forces.
       (B) Progress.--A description of--
       (i) the progress made toward achieving the objectives 
     described in clauses (i) through (x) of subparagraph (A); and
       (ii) any shortfalls in meeting such objectives and the 
     resources needed to fully achieve such objectives.
       (4) Collaboration with saudi arabia.--A description of the 
     strategy of the United States for expanding collaboration 
     with the Government of Saudi Arabia on subjects of mutual 
     interest and of importance to the United States, including a 
     description of--
       (A) the utility of the President undertaking a periodic, 
     formal, and visible high-level dialogue between senior United 
     States Government officials of cabinet level or higher rank 
     and their counterparts in the Government of Saudi Arabia to 
     address challenges in the relationship between the two 
     governments and to identify areas and mechanisms for 
     cooperation;
       (B) intelligence and security cooperation between the 
     United States and Saudi Arabia in the fight against Islamist 
     terrorism;
       (C) ways to advance Saudi Arabia's contribution to the 
     Middle East peace process;
       (D) political and economic reform in Saudi Arabia and 
     throughout the Middle East;
       (E) ways to promote greater tolerance and respect for 
     cultural and religious diversity in Saudi Arabia and 
     throughout the Middle East; and
       (F) ways to assist the Government of Saudi Arabia in 
     preventing nationals of Saudi Arabia from funding and 
     supporting extremist groups in Saudi Arabia and other 
     countries.
       (5) Struggle of ideas in the islamic world.--A description 
     of a cohesive, long-term strategy of the United States to 
     help win the struggle of ideas in the Islamic world, 
     including the following:
       (A) A description of specific goals related to winning this 
     struggle of ideas.
       (B) A description of the range of tools available to the 
     United States Government to accomplish such goals and the 
     manner in which such tools will be employed.
       (C) A list of benchmarks for measuring success and a plan 
     for linking resources to the accomplishment of such goals.
       (D) A description of any additional resources that may be 
     necessary to help win this struggle of ideas.
       (E) Any recommendations for the creation of, and United 
     States participation in, international institutions for the 
     promotion of democracy and economic diversification in the 
     Islamic world, and intraregional trade in the Middle East.
       (F) An estimate of the level of United States financial 
     assistance that would be sufficient to convince United States 
     allies and people in the Islamic world that engaging in the 
     struggle of ideas in the Islamic world is a top priority of 
     the United States and that the United States intends to make 
     a substantial and sustained commitment toward winning this 
     struggle.
       (6) Outreach through broadcast media.--A description of a 
     cohesive, long-term strategy of the United States to expand 
     its outreach to foreign Muslim audiences through broadcast 
     media, including the following:
       (A) The initiatives of the Broadcasting Board of Governors 
     with respect to outreach to foreign Muslim audiences.
       (B) An outline of recommended actions that the United 
     States Government should take to more regularly and 
     comprehensively present a United States point of view through 
     indigenous broadcast media in countries with sizable Muslim 
     populations, including increasing appearances by United 
     States Government officials, experts, and citizens.
       (C) An assessment of potential incentives for, and costs 
     associated with, encouraging United States broadcasters to 
     dub or subtitle into Arabic and other relevant languages 
     their news and public affairs programs broadcast in the 
     Muslim world in order to present those programs to a much 
     broader Muslim audience than is currently reached.
       (D) Any recommendations the President may have for 
     additional funding and legislation necessary to achieve the 
     objectives of the strategy.
       (7) Visas for participants in united states programs.--A 
     description of--
       (A) any recommendations for expediting the issuance of 
     visas to individuals who are entering the United States for 
     the purpose of participating in a scholarship, exchange, or 
     visitor program described in subsection (c) of section __09 
     without compromising the security of the United States; and
       (B) a proposed schedule for implementing any 
     recommendations described in subparagraph (A).
       (8) Basic education in muslim countries.--A description of 
     a strategy, that was developed after consultation with 
     nongovernmental organizations and individuals involved in 
     education assistance programs in developing countries, to 
     promote free universal basic education in the countries of 
     the Middle East and in other countries with significant 
     Muslim populations designated by the President. The strategy 
     shall include the following elements:
       (A) A description of the manner in which the resources of 
     the United States and the international community shall be 
     used to help achieve free universal basic education in such 
     countries, including--
       (i) efforts of the United states to coordinate an 
     international effort;
       (ii) activities of the United States to leverage 
     contributions from members of the Group of Eight or other 
     donors; and
       (iii) assistance provided by the United States to leverage 
     contributions from the private sector and civil society 
     organizations.
       (B) A description of the efforts of the United States to 
     coordinate with other donors to reduce duplication and waste 
     at the global and country levels and to ensure efficient 
     coordination among all relevant departments and agencies of 
     the Government of the United States.
       (C) A description of the strategy of the United States to 
     assist efforts to overcome challenges to achieving free 
     universal basic education in such countries, including 
     strategies to target hard to reach populations to promote 
     education.
       (D) A listing of countries that the President determines 
     are eligible for assistance under the International Youth 
     Opportunity Fund described in section 420 and related 
     programs.
       (E) A description of the efforts of the United States to 
     encourage countries in the Middle East and other countries 
     with significant Muslim populations designated by the 
     President to develop and implement a national education plan.
       (F) A description of activities carried out as part of the 
     International Youth Opportunity Fund to help close the 
     digital divide and expand vocational and business skills in 
     such countries.
       (G) An estimate of the funds needed to achieve free 
     universal basic education by 2015 in each country described 
     in subparagraph (D), and an estimate of the amount that has 
     been expended by the United States and by each such country 
     during the previous fiscal year.
       (H) A description of the United States strategy for 
     garnering programmatic and financial support from countries 
     in the Middle East and other countries with significant 
     Muslim populations designated by the President, international 
     organizations, and other countries that share the objectives 
     of the International Youth and Opportunity Fund.
       (9) Economic reform.--A description of the efforts of the 
     United States Government to encourage development and promote 
     economic reform in countries that have a significant 
     population of Arab or Muslim individuals, including a 
     description of--
       (A) efforts to integrate countries with significant 
     populations of Arab or Muslim individuals into the global 
     trading system; and
       (B) actions that the United States Government, acting alone 
     and in partnership with governments in the Middle East, can 
     take to promote intraregional trade and the rule of law in 
     the region.

     SEC. 428. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       Notwithstanding section 341 or any other provision of this 
     Act, this subtitle shall take effect on the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
          Subtitle B--Terrorist Travel and Effective Screening

     SEC. 431. COUNTERTERRORIST TRAVEL INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Travel documents are as important to terrorists as 
     weapons since terrorists must travel clandestinely to meet, 
     train, plan, case targets, and gain access to attack sites.
       (2) International travel is dangerous for terrorists 
     because they must surface to pass through regulated channels, 
     present themselves to border security officials, or attempt 
     to circumvent inspection points.
       (3) Terrorists use evasive, but detectable, methods to 
     travel, such as altered and counterfeit passports and visas, 
     specific travel methods and routes, liaisons with corrupt 
     government officials, human smuggling networks, supportive 
     travel agencies, and immigration and identity fraud.
       (4) Before September 11, 2001, no Federal agency 
     systematically analyzed terrorist travel strategies. If an 
     agency had done so, the agency could have discovered the ways 
     in which the terrorist predecessors to al Qaeda had been 
     systematically, but detectably, exploiting weaknesses in our 
     border security since the early 1990s.

[[Page H8945]]

       (5) Many of the hijackers were potentially vulnerable to 
     interception by border authorities. Analyzing their 
     characteristic travel documents and travel patterns could 
     have allowed authorities to intercept some of the hijackers 
     and a more effective use of information available in 
     Government databases could have identified some of the 
     hijackers.
       (6) The routine operations of our immigration laws and the 
     aspects of those laws not specifically aimed at protecting 
     against terrorism inevitably shaped al Qaeda's planning and 
     opportunities.
       (7) New insights into terrorist travel gained since 
     September 11, 2001, have not been adequately integrated into 
     the front lines of border security.
       (8) The small classified terrorist travel intelligence 
     collection and analysis program currently in place has 
     produced useful results and should be expanded.
       (b) Strategy.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall submit to Congress unclassified and classified versions 
     of a strategy for combining terrorist travel intelligence, 
     operations, and law enforcement into a cohesive effort to 
     intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and 
     constrain terrorist mobility domestically and 
     internationally. The report to Congress should include a 
     description of the actions taken to implement the strategy.
       (2) Accountability.--The strategy submitted under paragraph 
     (1) shall--
       (A) describe a program for collecting, analyzing, 
     disseminating, and utilizing information and intelligence 
     regarding terrorist travel tactics and methods; and
       (B) outline which Federal intelligence, diplomatic, and law 
     enforcement agencies will be held accountable for 
     implementing each element of the strategy.
       (3) Coordination.--The strategy shall be developed in 
     coordination with all relevant Federal agencies, including--
       (A) the National Counterterrorism Center;
       (B) the Department of Transportation;
       (C) the Department of State;
       (D) the Department of the Treasury;
       (E) the Department of Justice;
       (F) the Department of Defense;
       (G) the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
       (H) the Drug Enforcement Agency; and
       (I) the agencies that comprise the intelligence community.
       (4) Contents.--The strategy shall address--
       (A) the intelligence and law enforcement collection, 
     analysis, operations, and reporting required to identify and 
     disrupt terrorist travel practices and trends, and the 
     terrorist travel facilitators, document forgers, human 
     smugglers, travel agencies, and corrupt border and 
     transportation officials who assist terrorists;
       (B) the initial and ongoing training and training materials 
     required by consular, border, and immigration officials to 
     effectively detect and disrupt terrorist travel described 
     under subsection (c)(3);
       (C) the new procedures required and actions to be taken to 
     integrate existing counterterrorist travel and mobility 
     intelligence into border security processes, including 
     consular, port of entry, border patrol, maritime, immigration 
     benefits, and related law enforcement activities;
       (D) the actions required to integrate current terrorist 
     mobility intelligence into military force protection 
     measures;
       (E) the additional assistance to be given to the 
     interagency Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center for 
     purposes of combatting terrorist travel, including further 
     developing and expanding enforcement and operational 
     capabilities that address terrorist travel;
       (F) the additional resources to be given to the Department 
     of Homeland Security to aid in the sharing of information 
     between the frontline border agencies of the Department of 
     Homeland Security, the Department of State, and classified 
     and unclassified sources of counterterrorist travel 
     intelligence and information elsewhere in the Federal 
     Government, including the Human Smuggling and Trafficking 
     Center;
       (G) the development and implementation of procedures to 
     enable the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center to timely 
     receive terrorist travel intelligence and documentation 
     obtained at consulates and ports of entry, and by law 
     enforcement officers and military personnel;
       (H) the use of foreign and technical assistance to advance 
     border security measures and law enforcement operations 
     against terrorist travel facilitators;
       (I) the development of a program to provide each consular, 
     port of entry, and immigration benefits office with a 
     counterterrorist travel expert trained and authorized to use 
     the relevant authentication technologies and cleared to 
     access all appropriate immigration, law enforcement, and 
     intelligence databases;
       (J) the feasibility of digitally transmitting passport 
     information to a central cadre of specialists until such time 
     as experts described under subparagraph (I) are available at 
     consular, port of entry, and immigration benefits offices; 
     and
       (K) granting consular officers and immigration 
     adjudicators, as appropriate, the security clearances 
     necessary to access law enforcement sensitive and 
     intelligence databases.
       (c) Frontline Counterterrorist Travel Technology and 
     Training.--
       (1) Technology acquisition and dissemination plan.--Not 
     later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the 
     Secretary of State, shall submit to Congress a plan 
     describing how the Department of Homeland Security and the 
     Department of State can acquire and deploy, to all 
     consulates, ports of entry, and immigration benefits offices, 
     technologies that facilitate document authentication and the 
     detection of potential terrorist indicators on travel 
     documents.
       (2) Contents of plan.--The plan submitted under paragraph 
     (1) shall--
       (A) outline the timetable needed to acquire and deploy the 
     authentication technologies;
       (B) identify the resources required to--
       (i) fully disseminate these technologies; and
       (ii) train personnel on use of these technologies; and
       (C) address the feasibility of using these technologies to 
     screen every passport or other documentation described in 
     section __04(b) submitted for identification purposes to a 
     United States consular, border, or immigration official.
       (3) Training program.--
       (A) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
     Secretary of State shall develop and implement initial and 
     ongoing annual training programs for consular, border, and 
     immigration officials who encounter or work with travel or 
     immigration documents as part of their duties to teach such 
     officials how to effectively detect and disrupt terrorist 
     travel.
       (B) Terrorist travel intelligence.--The Secretary may 
     assist State, local, and tribal governments, and private 
     industry, in establishing training programs related to 
     terrorist travel intelligence.
       (C) Training topics.--The training developed under this 
     paragraph shall include training in--
       (i) methods for identifying fraudulent documents;
       (ii) detecting terrorist indicators on travel documents;
       (iii) recognizing travel patterns, tactics, and behaviors 
     exhibited by terrorists;
       (iv) the use of information contained in available 
     databases and data systems and procedures to maintain the 
     accuracy and integrity of such systems; and
       (v) other topics determined necessary by the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security and the Secretary of State.
       (D) Certification.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act--
       (i) the Secretary of Homeland Security shall certify to 
     Congress that all border and immigration officials who 
     encounter or work with travel or immigration documents as 
     part of their duties have received training under this 
     paragraph; and
       (ii) the Secretary of State shall certify to Congress that 
     all consular officers who encounter or work with travel or 
     immigration documents as part of their duties have received 
     training under this paragraph.
       (4) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Secretary for each of the fiscal 
     years 2005 through 2009 such sums as may be necessary to 
     carry out the provisions of this subsection.
       (d) Enhancing Classified Counterterrorist Travel Efforts.--
       (1) In general.--The National Intelligence Director shall 
     significantly increase resources and personnel to the small 
     classified program that collects and analyzes intelligence on 
     terrorist travel.
       (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated for each of the fiscal years 2005 through 
     2009 such sums as may be necessary to carry out this 
     subsection.

     SEC. 432. INTEGRATED SCREENING SYSTEM.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
     develop a plan for a comprehensive integrated screening 
     system.
       (b) Design.--The system planned under subsection (a) shall 
     be designed to--
       (1) encompass an integrated network of screening points 
     that includes the Nation's border security system, 
     transportation system, and critical infrastructure or 
     facilities that the Secretary determines need to be protected 
     against terrorist attack;
       (2) build upon existing border enforcement and security 
     activities, and to the extent practicable, private sector 
     security initiatives, in a manner that will enable the 
     utilization of a range of security check points in a 
     continuous and consistent manner throughout the Nation's 
     screening system;
       (3) allow access to government databases to detect 
     terrorists; and
       (4) utilize biometric identifiers that the Secretary 
     determines to be appropriate, feasible, and if practicable, 
     compatible with the biometric entry and exit data system 
     described in section 433.
       (c) Standards for Screening Procedures.--
       (1) Authorization.--The Secretary may promulgate standards 
     for screening procedures for--
       (A) entering and leaving the United States;
       (B) accessing Federal facilities that the Secretary 
     determines need to be protected against terrorist attack;
       (C) accessing critical infrastructure that the Secretary 
     determines need to be protected against terrorist attack; and

[[Page H8946]]

       (D) accessing modes of transportation that the Secretary 
     determines need to be protected against terrorist attack.
       (2) Scope.--Standards prescribed under this subsection may 
     address a range of factors, including technologies required 
     to be used in screening and requirements for secure 
     identification.
       (3) Requirements.--In promulgating standards for screening 
     procedures, the Secretary shall--
       (A) consider and incorporate appropriate civil liberties 
     and privacy protections;
       (B) comply with the Administrative Procedure Act; and
       (C) consult with other Federal, State, local, and tribal 
     governments, private parties, and other interested parties, 
     as appropriate.
       (4) Limitation.--This section does not confer to the 
     Secretary new statutory authority, or alter existing 
     authorities, over systems, critical infrastructure, and 
     facilities.
       (5) Notification.--If the Secretary determines that 
     additional regulatory authority is needed to fully implement 
     the plan for an integrated screening system, the Secretary 
     shall immediately notify Congress.
       (d) Compliance.--The Secretary may issue regulations to 
     ensure compliance with the standards promulgated under this 
     section.
       (e) Consultation.--For those systems, critical 
     infrastructure, and facilities that the Secretary determines 
     need to be protected against terrorist attack, the Secretary 
     shall consult with other Federal agencies, State, local, and 
     tribal governments, and the private sector to ensure the 
     development of consistent standards and consistent 
     implementation of the integrated screening system.
       (f) Biometric Identifiers.--In carrying out this section, 
     the Secretary shall continue to review biometric technologies 
     and existing Federal and State programs using biometric 
     identifiers. Such review shall consider the accuracy rate of 
     available technologies.
       (g) Maintaining Accuracy and Integrity of the Integrated 
     Screening System.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary shall establish rules, 
     guidelines, policies, and operating and auditing procedures 
     for collecting, removing, and updating data maintained in, 
     and adding information to, the integrated screening system 
     that ensure the accuracy and integrity of the data.
       (2) Data maintenance procedures.--Each head of a Federal 
     agency that has databases and data systems linked to the 
     integrated screening system shall establish rules, 
     guidelines, policies, and operating and auditing procedures 
     for collecting, removing, and updating data maintained in, 
     and adding information to, such databases or data systems 
     that ensure the accuracy and integrity of the data.
       (3) Requirements.--The rules, guidelines, policies, and 
     procedures established under this subsection shall--
       (A) incorporate a simple and timely method for--
       (i) correcting errors;
       (ii) determining which government agency or entity provided 
     data so that the accuracy of the data can be ascertained; and
       (iii) clarifying information known to cause false hits or 
     misidentification errors; and
       (B) include procedures for individuals to--
       (i) seek corrections of data contained in the databases or 
     data systems; and
       (ii) appeal decisions concerning data contained in the 
     databases or data systems.
       (h) Implementation.--
       (1) Phase i.--The Secretary shall--
       (A) develop plans for, and begin implementation of, a 
     single program for registered travelers to expedite travel 
     across the border, as required under section 433(g);
       (B) continue the implementation of a biometric exit and 
     entry data system that links to relevant databases and data 
     systems, as required by subsections (c) through (f) of 
     section 433 and other existing authorities;
       (C) centralize the ``no-fly'' and ``automatic-selectee'' 
     lists, making use of improved terrorists watch lists, as 
     required by section 433;
       (D) develop plans, in consultation with other relevant 
     agencies, for the sharing of terrorist information with 
     trusted governments, as required by section 435;
       (E) initiate any other action determined appropriate by the 
     Secretary to facilitate the implementation of this paragraph; 
     and
       (F) report to Congress on the implementation of phase I, 
     including--
       (i) the effectiveness of actions taken, the efficacy of 
     resources expended, compliance with statutory provisions, and 
     safeguards for privacy and civil liberties; and
       (ii) plans for the development and implementation of phases 
     II and III.
       (2) Phase ii.--The Secretary shall--
       (A) complete the implementation of a single program for 
     registered travelers to expedite travel across the border, as 
     required by section 433(g);
       (B) complete the implementation of a biometric entry and 
     exit data system that links to relevant databases and data 
     systems, as required by subsections (c) through (f) of 
     section 433, and other existing authorities;
       (C) in cooperation with other relevant agencies, engage in 
     dialogue with foreign governments to develop plans for the 
     use of common screening standards;
       (D) initiate any other action determined appropriate by the 
     Secretary to facilitate the implementation of this paragraph; 
     and
       (E) report to Congress on the implementation of phase II, 
     including--
       (i) the effectiveness of actions taken, the efficacy of 
     resources expended, compliance with statutory provisions, and 
     safeguards for privacy and civil liberties; and
       (ii) the plans for the development and implementation of 
     phase III.
       (3) Phase iii.--The Secretary shall--
       (A) finalize and deploy the integrated screening system 
     required by subsection (a);
       (B) in cooperation with other relevant agencies, promote 
     the implementation of common screening standards by foreign 
     governments; and
       (C) report to Congress on the implementation of Phase III, 
     including--
       (i) the effectiveness of actions taken, the efficacy of 
     resources expended, compliance with statutory provisions, and 
     safeguards for privacy and civil liberties; and
       (ii) the plans for the ongoing operation of the integrated 
     screening system.
       (i) Report.--After phase III has been implemented, the 
     Secretary shall submit a report to Congress every 3 years 
     that describes the ongoing operation of the integrated 
     screening system, including its effectiveness, efficient use 
     of resources, compliance with statutory provisions, and 
     safeguards for privacy and civil liberties.
       (j) Authorizations.--There are authorized to be 
     appropriated to the Secretary for each of the fiscal years 
     2005 through 2009, such sums as may be necessary to carry out 
     the provisions of this section.

     SEC. 433. BIOMETRIC ENTRY AND EXIT DATA SYSTEM.

       (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress finds that completing a biometric entry and exit 
     data system as expeditiously as possible is an essential 
     investment in efforts to protect the United States by 
     preventing the entry of terrorists.
       (b) Definition.--In this section, the term ``entry and exit 
     data system'' means the entry and exit system required by 
     applicable sections of--
       (1) the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
     Responsibility Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-208);
       (2) the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data 
     Management Improvement Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-205);
       (3) the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act (Public Law 106-
     396);
       (4) the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act 
     of 2002 (Public Law 107-173); and
       (5) the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
     Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
     Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56).
       (c) Plan and Report.--
       (1) Development of plan.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall develop a plan to accelerate the full 
     implementation of an automated biometric entry and exit data 
     system.
       (2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to 
     Congress on the plan developed under paragraph (1), which 
     shall contain--
       (A) a description of the current functionality of the entry 
     and exit data system, including--
       (i) a listing of ports of entry and other Department of 
     Homeland Security and Department of State locations with 
     biometric entry data systems in use and whether such 
     screening systems are located at primary or secondary 
     inspection areas;
       (ii) a listing of ports of entry and other Department of 
     Homeland Security and Department of State locations with 
     biometric exit data systems in use;
       (iii) a listing of databases and data systems with which 
     the entry and exit data system are interoperable;
       (iv) a description of--

       (I) identified deficiencies concerning the accuracy or 
     integrity of the information contained in the entry and exit 
     data system;
       (II) identified deficiencies concerning technology 
     associated with processing individuals through the system; 
     and
       (III) programs or policies planned or implemented to 
     correct problems identified in subclause (I) or (II); and

       (v) an assessment of the effectiveness of the entry and 
     exit data system in fulfilling its intended purposes, 
     including preventing terrorists from entering the United 
     States;
       (B) a description of factors relevant to the accelerated 
     implementation of the biometric entry and exit data system, 
     including--
       (i) the earliest date on which the Secretary estimates that 
     full implementation of the biometric entry and exit data 
     system can be completed;
       (ii) the actions the Secretary will take to accelerate the 
     full implementation of the biometric entry and exit data 
     system at all ports of entry through which all aliens must 
     pass that are legally required to do so; and
       (iii) the resources and authorities required to enable the 
     Secretary to meet the implementation date described in clause 
     (i);
       (C) a description of any improvements needed in the 
     information technology employed for the biometric entry and 
     exit data system;
       (D) a description of plans for improved or added 
     interoperability with any other databases or data systems; 
     and
       (E) a description of the manner in which the Department of 
     Homeland Security's US-VISIT program--
       (i) meets the goals of a comprehensive entry and exit 
     screening system, including both entry and exit biometric; 
     and

[[Page H8947]]

       (ii) fulfills the statutory obligations under subsection 
     (b).
       (d) Collection of Biometric Exit Data.--The entry and exit 
     data system shall include a requirement for the collection of 
     biometric exit data for all categories of individuals who are 
     required to provide biometric entry data, regardless of the 
     port of entry where such categories of individuals entered 
     the United States.
       (e) Integration and Interoperability.--
       (1) Integration of data system.--Not later than 2 years 
     after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall 
     fully integrate all databases and data systems that process 
     or contain information on aliens, which are maintained by--
       (A) the Department of Homeland Security, at--
       (i) the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
       (ii) the United States Customs and Border Protection; and
       (iii) the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
     Services;
       (B) the Department of Justice, at the Executive Office for 
     Immigration Review; and
       (C) the Department of State, at the Bureau of Consular 
     Affairs.
       (2) Interoperable component.--The fully integrated data 
     system under paragraph (1) shall be an interoperable 
     component of the entry and exit data system.
       (3) Interoperable data system.--Not later than 2 years 
     after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall 
     fully implement an interoperable electronic data system, as 
     required by section 202 of the Enhanced Border Security and 
     Visa Entry Reform Act (8 U.S.C. 1722) to provide current and 
     immediate access to information in the databases of Federal 
     law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community that 
     is relevant to determine--
       (A) whether to issue a visa; or
       (B) the admissibility or deportability of an alien.
       (f) Maintaining Accuracy and Integrity of Entry and Exit 
     Data System.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary shall establish rules, 
     guidelines, policies, and operating and auditing procedures 
     for collecting, removing, and updating data maintained in, 
     and adding information to, the entry and exit data system 
     that ensure the accuracy and integrity of the data.
       (2) Data maintenance procedures.--Heads of agencies that 
     have databases or data systems linked to the entry and exit 
     data system shall establish rules, guidelines, policies, and 
     operating and auditing procedures for collecting, removing, 
     and updating data maintained in, and adding information to, 
     such databases or data systems that ensure the accuracy and 
     integrity of the data.
       (3) Requirements.--The rules, guidelines, policies, and 
     procedures established under this subsection shall--
       (A) incorporate a simple and timely method for--
       (i) correcting errors;
       (ii) determining which government agency or entity provided 
     data so that the accuracy of the data can be ascertained; and
       (iii) clarifying information known to cause false hits or 
     misidentification errors; and
       (B) include procedures for individuals to--
       (i) seek corrections of data contained in the databases or 
     data systems; and
       (ii) appeal decisions concerning data contained in the 
     databases or data systems.
       (g) Expediting Registered Travelers Across International 
     Borders.--
       (1) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress finds that--
       (A) expediting the travel of previously screened and known 
     travelers across the borders of the United States should be a 
     high priority; and
       (B) the process of expediting known travelers across the 
     borders of the United States can permit inspectors to better 
     focus on identifying terrorists attempting to enter the 
     United States.
       (2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term ``registered 
     traveler program'' means any program designed to expedite the 
     travel of previously screened and known travelers across the 
     borders of the United States.
       (3) Registered travel program.--
       (A) In general.--As soon as is practicable, the Secretary 
     shall develop and implement a registered traveler program to 
     expedite the processing of registered travelers who enter and 
     exit the United States.
       (B) Participation.--The registered traveler program shall 
     include as many participants as practicable by--
       (i) minimizing the cost of enrollment;
       (ii) making program enrollment convenient and easily 
     accessible; and
       (iii) providing applicants with clear and consistent 
     eligibility guidelines.
       (C) Integration.--The registered traveler program shall be 
     integrated into the automated biometric entry and exit data 
     system described in this section.
       (D) Review and evaluation.--In developing the registered 
     traveler program, the Secretary shall--
       (i) review existing programs or pilot projects designed to 
     expedite the travel of registered travelers across the 
     borders of the United States;
       (ii) evaluate the effectiveness of the programs described 
     in clause (i), the costs associated with such programs, and 
     the costs to travelers to join such programs;
       (iii) increase research and development efforts to 
     accelerate the development and implementation of a single 
     registered traveler program; and
       (iv) review the feasibility of allowing participants to 
     enroll in the registered traveler program at consular 
     offices.
       (4) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to Congress 
     a report describing the Department's progress on the 
     development and implementation of the registered traveler 
     program.
       (h) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Secretary, for each of the fiscal 
     years 2005 through 2009, such sums as may be necessary to 
     carry out the provisions of this section.

     SEC. 434. TRAVEL DOCUMENTS.

       (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress finds that--
       (1) existing procedures allow many individuals to enter the 
     United States by showing minimal identification or without 
     showing any identification;
       (2) the planning for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
     2001, demonstrates that terrorists study and exploit United 
     States vulnerabilities; and
       (3) additional safeguards are needed to ensure that 
     terrorists cannot enter the United States.
       (b) Biometric Passports.--
       (1) Development of plan.--The Secretary of State, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall 
     develop and implement a plan as expeditiously as possible to 
     require biometric passports or other identification deemed by 
     the Secretary of State to be at least as secure as a 
     biometric passport, for all travel into the United States by 
     United States citizens and by categories of individuals for 
     whom documentation requirements have previously been waived 
     under section 212(d)(4)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality 
     Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(4)(B)).
       (2) Requirement to produce documentation.--The plan 
     developed under paragraph (1) shall require all United States 
     citizens, and categories of individuals for whom 
     documentation requirements have previously been waived under 
     section 212(d)(4)(B) of such Act, to carry and produce the 
     documentation described in paragraph (1) when traveling from 
     foreign countries into the United States.
       (c) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--After the 
     complete implementation of the plan described in subsection 
     (b)--
       (1) neither the Secretary of State nor the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security may exercise discretion under section 
     212(d)(4)(B) of such Act to waive documentary requirements 
     for travel into the United States; and
       (2) the President may not exercise discretion under section 
     215(b) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1185(b)) to waive documentary 
     requirements for United States citizens departing from or 
     entering, or attempting to depart from or enter, the United 
     States except--
       (A) where the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, determines that the 
     alternative documentation that is the basis for the waiver of 
     the documentary requirement is at least as secure as a 
     biometric passport;
       (B) in the case of an unforeseen emergency in individual 
     cases; or
       (C) in the case of humanitarian or national interest 
     reasons in individual cases.
       (d) Transit Without Visa Program.--The Secretary of State 
     shall not use any authorities granted under section 
     212(d)(4)(C) of such Act until the Secretary, in conjunction 
     with the Secretary of Homeland Security, completely 
     implements a security plan to fully ensure secure transit 
     passage areas to prevent aliens proceeding in immediate and 
     continuous transit through the United States from illegally 
     entering the United States.

     SEC. 435. EXCHANGE OF TERRORIST INFORMATION AND INCREASED 
                   PREINSPECTION AT FOREIGN AIRPORTS.

       (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress finds that--
       (1) the exchange of terrorist information with other 
     countries, consistent with privacy requirements, along with 
     listings of lost and stolen passports, will have immediate 
     security benefits; and
       (2) the further away from the borders of the United States 
     that screening occurs, the more security benefits the United 
     States will gain.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the United States Government should exchange terrorist 
     information with trusted allies;
       (2) the United States Government should move toward real-
     time verification of passports with issuing authorities;
       (3) where practicable the United States Government should 
     conduct screening before a passenger departs on a flight 
     destined for the United States;
       (4) the United States Government should work with other 
     countries to ensure effective inspection regimes at all 
     airports;
       (5) the United States Government should work with other 
     countries to improve passport standards and provide foreign 
     assistance to countries that need help making the transition 
     to the global standard for identification; and

[[Page H8948]]

       (6) the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination 
     with the Department of State and other agencies, should 
     implement the initiatives called for in this subsection.
       (c) Report Regarding the Exchange of Terrorist 
     Information.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, working with other agencies, 
     shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
     report on Federal efforts to collaborate with allies of the 
     United States in the exchange of terrorist information.
       (2) Contents.--The report shall outline--
       (A) strategies for increasing such collaboration and 
     cooperation;
       (B) progress made in screening passengers before their 
     departure to the United States; and
       (C) efforts to work with other countries to accomplish the 
     goals described under this section.
       (d) Preinspection at Foreign Airports.--
       (1) In general.--Section 235A(a)(4) of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1225a(a)(4)) is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``(4) Subject to paragraph (5), not later than January 1, 
     2008, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation 
     with the Secretary of State, shall establish preinspection 
     stations in at least 25 additional foreign airports, which 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the 
     Secretary of State, determines, based on the data compiled 
     under paragraph (3) and such other information as may be 
     available, would most effectively facilitate the travel of 
     admissible aliens and reduce the number of inadmissible 
     aliens, especially aliens who are potential terrorists, who 
     arrive from abroad by air at points of entry within the 
     United States. Such preinspection stations shall be in 
     addition to those established prior to September 30, 1996, or 
     pursuant to paragraph (1).''.
       (2) Report.--Not later than June 30, 2006, the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security and the Secretary of State shall submit a 
     report on the progress being made in implementing the 
     amendment made by paragraph (1) to--
       (A) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
       (B) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
       (D) the Committee on International Relations of the House 
     of Representatives.

     SEC. 436. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR BIRTH CERTIFICATES.

       (a) Definition.--In this section, the term `birth 
     certificate' means a certificate of birth--
       (1) for an individual (regardless of where born)--
       (A) who is a citizen or national of the United States at 
     birth; and
       (B) whose birth is registered in the United States; and
       (2) that--
       (A) is issued by a Federal, State, or local government 
     agency or authorized custodian of record and produced from 
     birth records maintained by such agency or custodian of 
     record; or
       (B) is an authenticated copy, issued by a Federal, State, 
     or local government agency or authorized custodian of record, 
     of an original certificate of birth issued by such agency or 
     custodian of record.
       (b) Standards for Acceptance by Federal Agencies.--
       (1) In general.--Beginning 2 years after the promulgation 
     of minimum standards under paragraph (3), no Federal agency 
     may accept a birth certificate for any official purpose 
     unless the certificate conforms to such standards.
       (2) State certification.--
       (A) In general.--Each State shall certify to the Secretary 
     of Health and Human Services that the State is in compliance 
     with the requirements of this section.
       (B) Frequency.--Certifications under subparagraph (A) shall 
     be made at such intervals and in such a manner as the 
     Secretary of Health and Human Services, with the concurrence 
     of the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Commissioner of 
     Social Security, may prescribe by regulation.
       (C) Compliance.--Each State shall ensure that units of 
     local government and other authorized custodians of records 
     in the State comply with this section.
       (D) Audits.--The Secretary of Health and Human Services may 
     conduct periodic audits of each State's compliance with the 
     requirements of this section.
       (3) Minimum standards.--Not later than 1 year after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health and 
     Human Services shall by regulation establish minimum 
     standards for birth certificates for use by Federal agencies 
     for official purposes that--
       (A) at a minimum, shall require certification of the birth 
     certificate by the State or local government custodian of 
     record that issued the certificate, and shall require the use 
     of safety paper or an alternative, equally secure medium, the 
     seal of the issuing custodian of record, and other features 
     designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, or otherwise 
     duplicating the birth certificate for fraudulent purposes;
       (B) shall establish requirements for proof and verification 
     of identity as a condition of issuance of a birth 
     certificate, with additional security measures for the 
     issuance of a birth certificate for a person who is not the 
     applicant;
       (C) shall establish standards for the processing of birth 
     certificate applications to prevent fraud;
       (D) may not require a single design to which birth 
     certificates issued by all States must conform; and
       (E) shall accommodate the differences between the States in 
     the manner and form in which birth records are stored and 
     birth certificates are produced from such records.
       (4) Consultation with government agencies.--In promulgating 
     the standards required under paragraph (3), the Secretary of 
     Health and Human Services shall consult with--
       (A) the Secretary of Homeland Security;
       (B) the Commissioner of Social Security;
       (C) State vital statistics offices; and
       (D) other appropriate Federal agencies.
       (5) Extension of effective date.--The Secretary of Health 
     and Human Services may extend the date specified under 
     paragraph (1) for up to 2 years for birth certificates issued 
     by a State if the Secretary determines that the State made 
     reasonable efforts to comply with the date under paragraph 
     (1) but was unable to do so.
       (c) Grants to States.--
       (1) Assistance in meeting federal standards.--
       (A) In general.--Beginning on the date a final regulation 
     is promulgated under subsection (b)(3), the Secretary of 
     Health and Human Services shall award grants to States to 
     assist them in conforming to the minimum standards for birth 
     certificates set forth in the regulation.
       (B) Allocation of grants.--The Secretary shall award grants 
     to States under this paragraph based on the proportion that 
     the estimated average annual number of birth certificates 
     issued by a State applying for a grant bears to the estimated 
     average annual number of birth certificates issued by all 
     States.
       (C) Minimum allocation.--Notwithstanding subparagraph (B), 
     each State shall receive not less than 0.5 percent of the 
     grant funds made available under this paragraph.
       (2) Assistance in matching birth and death records.--
       (A) In general.--The Secretary of Health and Human 
     Services, in coordination with the Commissioner of Social 
     Security and other appropriate Federal agencies, shall award 
     grants to States, under criteria established by the 
     Secretary, to assist States in--
       (i) computerizing their birth and death records;
       (ii) developing the capability to match birth and death 
     records within each State and among the States; and
       (iii) noting the fact of death on the birth certificates of 
     deceased persons.
       (B) Allocation of grants.--The Secretary shall award grants 
     to qualifying States under this paragraph based on the 
     proportion that the estimated annual average number of birth 
     and death records created by a State applying for a grant 
     bears to the estimated annual average number of birth and 
     death records originated by all States.
       (C) Minimum allocation.--Notwithstanding subparagraph (B), 
     each State shall receive not less than 0.5 percent of the 
     grant funds made available under this paragraph.
       (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Secretary for each of the fiscal 
     years 2005 through 2009 such sums as may be necessary to 
     carry out this section.
       (e) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--Section 656 of 
     the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
     Act of 1996 (5 U.S.C. 301 note) is repealed.

     SEC. 437. DRIVER'S LICENSES AND PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION 
                   CARDS.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Driver's license.--The term `driver's license' means a 
     motor vehicle operator's license as defined in section 
     30301(5) of title 49, United States Code.
       (2) Personal identification card.--The term `personal 
     identification card' means an identification document (as 
     defined in section 1028(d)(3) of title 18, United States 
     Code) issued by a State.
       (b) Standards for Acceptance by Federal Agencies.--
       (1) In general.--
       (A) Limitation on acceptance.--No Federal agency may 
     accept, for any official purpose, a driver's license or 
     personal identification card newly issued by a State more 
     than 2 years after the promulgation of the minimum standards 
     under paragraph (2) unless the driver's license or personal 
     identification card conforms to such minimum standards.
       (B) Date for conformance.--The Secretary of Transportation, 
     in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
     shall establish a date after which no driver's license or 
     personal identification card shall be accepted by a Federal 
     agency for any official purpose unless such driver's license 
     or personal identification card conforms to the minimum 
     standards established under paragraph (2). The date shall be 
     as early as the Secretary determines it is practicable for 
     the States to comply with such date with reasonable efforts.
       (C) State certification.--
       (i) In general.--Each State shall certify to the Secretary 
     of Transportation that the State is in compliance with the 
     requirements of this section.
       (ii) Frequency.--Certifications under clause (i) shall be 
     made at such intervals and

[[Page H8949]]

     in such a manner as the Secretary of Transportation, with the 
     concurrence of the Secretary of Homeland Security, may 
     prescribe by regulation.
       (iii) Audits.--The Secretary of Transportation may conduct 
     periodic audits of each State's compliance with the 
     requirements of this section.
       (2) Minimum standards.--Not later than 18 months after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     Transportation, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security, shall by regulation, establish minimum 
     standards for driver's licenses or personal identification 
     cards issued by a State for use by Federal agencies for 
     identification purposes that shall include--
       (A) standards for documentation required as proof of 
     identity of an applicant for a driver's license or personal 
     identification card;
       (B) standards for the verifiability of documents used to 
     obtain a driver's license or personal identification card;
       (C) standards for the processing of applications for 
     driver's licenses and personal identification cards to 
     prevent fraud;
       (D) security standards to ensure that driver's licenses and 
     personal identification cards are--
       (i) resistant to tampering, alteration, or counterfeiting; 
     and
       (ii) capable of accommodating and ensuring the security of 
     a digital photograph or other unique identifier; and
       (E) a requirement that a State confiscate a driver's 
     license or personal identification card if any component or 
     security feature of the license or identification card is 
     compromised.
       (3) Content of regulations.--The regulations required by 
     paragraph (2)--
       (A) shall facilitate communication between the chief driver 
     licensing official of a State, an appropriate official of a 
     Federal agency and other relevant officials, to verify the 
     authenticity of documents, as appropriate, issued by such 
     Federal agency or entity and presented to prove the identity 
     of an individual;
       (B) may not infringe on a State's power to set criteria 
     concerning what categories of individuals are eligible to 
     obtain a driver's license or personal identification card 
     from that State;
       (C) may not require a State to comply with any such 
     regulation that conflicts with or otherwise interferes with 
     the full enforcement of State criteria concerning the 
     categories of individuals that are eligible to obtain a 
     driver's license or personal identification card from that 
     State;
       (D) may not require a single design to which driver's 
     licenses or personal identification cards issued by all 
     States must conform; and
       (E) shall include procedures and requirements to protect 
     the privacy and civil and due process rights of individuals 
     who apply for and hold driver's licenses and personal 
     identification cards.
       (4) Negotiated rulemaking.--
       (A) In general.--Before publishing the proposed regulations 
     required by paragraph (2) to carry out this subtitle, the 
     Secretary of Transportation shall establish a negotiated 
     rulemaking process pursuant to subchapter IV of chapter 5 of 
     title 5, United States Code (5 U.S.C. 581 et seq.).
       (B) Representation on negotiated rulemaking committee.--Any 
     negotiated rulemaking committee established by the Secretary 
     of Transportation pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall include 
     representatives from--
       (i) among State offices that issue driver's licenses or 
     personal identification cards;
       (ii) among State elected officials;
       (iii) the Department of Homeland Security; and
       (iv) among interested parties, including organizations with 
     technological and operational expertise in document security 
     and organizations that represent the interests of applicants 
     for such licenses or identification cards.
       (C) Time requirement.--The process described in 
     subparagraph (A) shall be conducted in a timely manner to 
     ensure that--
       (i) any recommendation for a proposed rule or report is 
     provided to the Secretary of Transportation not later than 9 
     months after the date of enactment of this Act; and
       (ii) a final rule is promulgated not later than 18 months 
     after the date of enactment of this Act.
       (c) Grants to States.--
       (1) Assistance in meeting federal standards.--Beginning on 
     the date a final regulation is promulgated under subsection 
     (b)(2), the Secretary of Transportation shall award grants to 
     States to assist them in conforming to the minimum standards 
     for driver's licenses and personal identification cards set 
     forth in the regulation.
       (2) Allocation of grants.--The Secretary of Transportation 
     shall award grants to States under this subsection based on 
     the proportion that the estimated average annual number of 
     driver's licenses and personal identification cards issued by 
     a State applying for a grant bears to the average annual 
     number of such documents issued by all States.
       (3) Minimum allocation.--Notwithstanding paragraph (2), 
     each State shall receive not less than 0.5 percent of the 
     grant funds made available under this subsection.
       (d) Extension of Effective Date.--The Secretary of 
     Transportation may extend the date specified under subsection 
     (b)(1)(A) for up to 2 years for driver's licenses issued by a 
     State if the Secretary determines that the State made 
     reasonable efforts to comply with the date under such 
     subsection but was unable to do so.
       (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Secretary of Transportation for 
     each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2009, such sums as may 
     be necessary to carry out this section.

     SEC. 438. SOCIAL SECURITY CARDS.

       (a) Security Enhancements.--The Commissioner of Social 
     Security shall--
       (1) not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of 
     this section, issue regulations to restrict the issuance of 
     multiple replacement social security cards to any individual 
     to minimize fraud;
       (2) within 1 year after the date of enactment of this 
     section, require independent verification of all records 
     provided by an applicant for an original social security 
     card, other than for purposes of enumeration at birth; and
       (3) within 18 months after the date of enactment of this 
     section, add death, fraud, and work authorization indicators 
     to the social security number verification system.
       (b) Interagency Security Task Force.--The Commissioner of 
     Social Security, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security, shall form an interagency task force for 
     the purpose of further improving the security of social 
     security cards and numbers. Not later than 1 year after the 
     date of enactment of this section, the task force shall 
     establish security requirements, including--
       (1) standards for safeguarding social security cards from 
     counterfeiting, tampering, alteration, and theft;
       (2) requirements for verifying documents submitted for the 
     issuance of replacement cards; and
       (3) actions to increase enforcement against the fraudulent 
     use or issuance of social security numbers and cards.
       (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Commissioner of Social Security for 
     each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2009, such sums as may 
     be necessary to carry out this section.

     SEC. 439. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, this 
     subtitle shall take effect on the date of enactment of this 
     Act.

                  Subtitle C--Transportation Security

     SEC. 441. DEFINITIONS.

       In this subtitle, the terms ``air carrier'', ``air 
     transportation'', ``aircraft'', ``airport'', ``cargo'', 
     ``foreign air carrier'', and ``intrastate air 
     transportation'' have the meanings given such terms in 
     section 40102 of title 49, United States Code.

     SEC. 442. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR TRANSPORTATION SECURITY.

       (a) Requirement for Strategy.--
       (1) Responsibilities of secretary of homeland security.--
     The Secretary of Homeland Security shall--
       (A) develop and implement a National Strategy for 
     Transportation Security; and
       (B) revise such strategy whenever necessary to improve or 
     to maintain the currency of the strategy or whenever the 
     Secretary otherwise considers it appropriate to do so.
       (2) Consultation with secretary of transportation.--The 
     Secretary of Homeland Security shall consult with the 
     Secretary of Transportation in developing and revising the 
     National Strategy for Transportation Security under this 
     section.
       (b) Content.--The National Strategy for Transportation 
     Security shall include the following matters:
       (1) An identification and evaluation of the transportation 
     assets within the United States that, in the interests of 
     national security, must be protected from attack or 
     disruption by terrorist or other hostile forces, including 
     aviation, bridge and tunnel, commuter rail and ferry, 
     highway, maritime, pipeline, rail, urban mass transit, and 
     other public transportation infrastructure assets that could 
     be at risk of such an attack or disruption.
       (2) The development of the risk-based priorities, and 
     realistic deadlines, for addressing security needs associated 
     with those assets.
       (3) The most practical and cost-effective means of 
     defending those assets against threats to their security.
       (4) A forward-looking strategic plan that assigns 
     transportation security roles and missions to departments and 
     agencies of the Federal Government (including the Armed 
     Forces), State governments (including the Army National Guard 
     and Air National Guard), local governments, and public 
     utilities, and establishes mechanisms for encouraging private 
     sector cooperation and participation in the implementation of 
     such plan.
       (5) A comprehensive delineation of response and recovery 
     responsibilities and issues regarding threatened and executed 
     acts of terrorism within the United States.
       (6) A prioritization of research and development objectives 
     that support transportation security needs, giving a higher 
     priority to research and development directed toward 
     protecting vital assets.
       (7) A budget and recommendations for appropriate levels and 
     sources of funding to meet the objectives set forth in the 
     strategy.
       (c) Submissions to Congress.--
       (1) The national strategy.--
       (A) Initial strategy.--The Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall submit the National Strategy for Transportation 
     Security

[[Page H8950]]

     developed under this section to Congress not later than April 
     1, 2005.
       (B) Subsequent versions.--After 2005, the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security shall submit the National Strategy for 
     Transportation Security, including any revisions, to Congress 
     not less frequently than April 1 of each even-numbered year.
       (2) Periodic progress report.--
       (A) Requirement for report.--Each year, in conjunction with 
     the submission of the budget to Congress under section 
     1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security shall submit to Congress an assessment of 
     the progress made on implementing the National Strategy for 
     Transportation Security.
       (B) Content.--Each progress report under this paragraph 
     shall include, at a minimum, the following matters:
       (i) An assessment of the adequacy of the resources 
     committed to meeting the objectives of the National Strategy 
     for Transportation Security.
       (ii) Any recommendations for improving and implementing 
     that strategy that the Secretary, in consultation with the 
     Secretary of Transportation, considers appropriate.
       (3) Classified material.--Any part of the National Strategy 
     for Transportation Security that involves information that is 
     properly classified under criteria established by Executive 
     order shall be submitted to Congress separately in classified 
     form.
       (d) Priority Status.--
       (1) In general.--The National Strategy for Transportation 
     Security shall be the governing document for Federal 
     transportation security efforts.
       (2) Other plans and reports.--The National Strategy for 
     Transportation Security shall include, as an integral part or 
     as an appendix--
       (A) the current National Maritime Transportation Security 
     Plan under section 70103 of title 46, United States Code;
       (B) the report required by section 44938 of title 49, 
     United States Code; and
       (C) any other transportation security plan or report that 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security determines appropriate for 
     inclusion.

     SEC. 443. USE OF WATCHLISTS FOR PASSENGER AIR TRANSPORTATION 
                   SCREENING.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting 
     through the Transportation Security Administration, as soon 
     as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act 
     but in no event later than 180 days after that date, shall--
       (1) implement a procedure under which the Transportation 
     Security Administration compares information about passengers 
     who are to be carried aboard a passenger aircraft operated by 
     an air carrier or foreign air carrier in air transportation 
     or intrastate air transportation for flights and flight 
     segments originating in the United States with a 
     comprehensive, consolidated database containing information 
     about known or suspected terrorists and their associates; and
       (2) use the information obtained by comparing the passenger 
     information with the information in the database to prevent 
     known or suspected terrorists and their associates from 
     boarding such flights or flight segments or to subject them 
     to specific additional security scrutiny, through the use of 
     ``no fly'' and ``automatic selectee'' lists or other means.
       (b) Air Carrier Cooperation.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, in coordination with the Secretary of 
     Transportation, shall by order require air carriers to 
     provide the passenger information necessary to implement the 
     procedure required by subsection (a).
       (c) Maintaining the Accuracy and Integrity of the ``No 
     Fly'' and ``Automatic Selectee'' Lists.--
       (1) Watchlist database.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, in consultation with the Director of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation, shall design guidelines, policies, 
     and operating procedures for the collection, removal, and 
     updating of data maintained, or to be maintained, in the 
     watchlist database described in subsection (a)(1) that are 
     designed to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the 
     database.
       (2) Accuracy of entries.--In developing the ``no fly'' and 
     ``automatic selectee'' lists under subsection (a)(2), the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a simple and 
     timely method for correcting erroneous entries, for 
     clarifying information known to cause false hits or 
     misidentification errors, and for updating relevant 
     information that is dispositive in the passenger screening 
     process. The Secretary shall also establish a process to 
     provide individuals whose names are confused with, or similar 
     to, names in the database with a means of demonstrating that 
     they are not a person named in the database.

     SEC. 444. ENHANCED PASSENGER AND CARGO SCREENING.

       (a) Aircraft Passenger Screening at Checkpoints.--
       (1) Detection of explosives.--
       (A) Improvement of capabilities.--As soon as practicable 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security shall take such action as is necessary to 
     improve the capabilities at passenger screening checkpoints, 
     especially at commercial airports, to detect explosives 
     carried aboard aircraft by passengers or placed aboard 
     aircraft by passengers.
       (B) Interim action.--Until measures are implemented that 
     enable the screening of all passengers for explosives, the 
     Secretary shall take immediate measures to require 
     Transportation Security Administration or other screeners to 
     screen for explosives any individual identified for 
     additional screening before that individual may board an 
     aircraft.
       (2) Implementation report.--
       (A) Requirement for report.--Within 90 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall transmit to the Senate and the House of 
     Representatives a report on how the Secretary intends to 
     achieve the objectives of the actions required under 
     paragraph (1). The report shall include an implementation 
     schedule.
       (B) Classified information.--The Secretary may submit 
     separately in classified form any information in the report 
     under subparagraph (A) that involves information that is 
     properly classified under criteria established by Executive 
     order.
       (b) Acceleration of Research and Development on, and 
     Deployment of, Detection of Explosives.--
       (1) Required action.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, 
     in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall 
     take such action as may be necessary to accelerate research 
     and development and deployment of technology for screening 
     aircraft passengers for explosives during or before the 
     aircraft boarding process.
       (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Secretary such sums as are 
     necessary to carry out this subsection for each of fiscal 
     years 2005 through 2009.
       (c) Improvement of Screener Job Performance.--
       (1) Required action.--The Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall take such action as may be necessary to improve the job 
     performance of airport screening personnel.
       (2) Human factors study.--In carrying out this subsection, 
     the Secretary shall, not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, conduct a human factors study 
     in order better to understand problems in screener 
     performance and to set attainable objectives for individual 
     screeners and screening checkpoints.
       (d) Checked Baggage and Cargo.--
       (1) In-line baggage screening.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall take such action as may be necessary to 
     expedite the installation and use of advanced in-line 
     baggage-screening equipment at commercial airports.
       (2) Cargo security.--The Secretary shall take such action 
     as may be necessary to ensure that the Transportation 
     Security Administration increases and improves its efforts to 
     screen potentially dangerous cargo.
       (e) Blast-resistant Cargo and Baggage Containers.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
     coordination with the Secretary of Transportation--
       (A) shall assess the feasibility of requiring the use of 
     blast-resistant containers for cargo and baggage on passenger 
     aircraft to minimize the potential effects of detonation of 
     an explosive device; and
       (B) may require their use on some or all flights on 
     aircraft for which such containers are available.
       (2) Pilot program.--Before requiring the use of such 
     containers on any such flights, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall conduct a pilot program to evaluate the use of 
     currently available blast-resistant containers for cargo and 
     baggage on passenger aircraft. In conducting the pilot 
     program the Secretary--
       (A) shall test the feasibility of using the containers by 
     deploying them on participating air carrier flights; but
       (B) may not disclose to the public the number of blast-
     resistant containers being used in the program or publicly 
     identify the flights on which the containers are used.
       (3) Assistance for participation in pilot program.--
       (A) In general.--As part of the pilot program, the 
     Secretary may provide assistance to air carriers to volunteer 
     to test the use of blast-resistant containers for cargo and 
     baggage on passenger aircraft.
       (B) Applications.--To volunteer to participate in the 
     incentive program, an air carrier shall submit to the 
     Secretary an application that is in such form and contains 
     such information as the Secretary requires.
       (C) Types of Assistance.--Assistance provided by the 
     Secretary to air carriers that volunteer to participate in 
     the pilot program may include the use of blast-resistant 
     containers and financial assistance to cover increased costs 
     to the carriers associated with the use and maintenance of 
     the containers, including increased fuel costs.
       (4) Technological improvements.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, in cooperation with the Secretary of 
     Transportation, shall--
       (A) support efforts to further the development and 
     improvement of blast-resistant containers for potential use 
     on aircraft, including designs that--
       (i) will work on a variety of aircraft, including narrow 
     body aircraft; and
       (ii) minimize the weight of such containers without 
     compromising their effectiveness; and
       (B) explore alternative technologies for minimizing the 
     potential effects of detonation of an explosive device on 
     cargo and passenger aircraft.
       (5) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to 
     the Congress

[[Page H8951]]

     on the results of the pilot program and on progress made in 
     developing improved containers and equivalent technologies. 
     The report may be submitted in classified and redacted 
     formats.
       (6) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland Security such 
     sums as are necessary to carry out this section. Such sums 
     shall remain available until expended.
       (f) Cost-Sharing.--Not later than 45 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, in consultation with representatives of air 
     carriers, airport operators, and other interested parties, 
     shall submit to the Senate and the House of Representatives--
       (1) a proposed formula for cost-sharing, for the advanced 
     in-line baggage screening equipment required by this 
     subtitle, between and among the Federal Government, State and 
     local governments, and the private sector that reflects 
     proportionate national security benefits and private sector 
     benefits for such enhancement; and
       (2) recommendations, including recommended legislation, for 
     an equitable, feasible, and expeditious system for defraying 
     the costs of the advanced in-line baggage screening equipment 
     required by this subtitle, which may be based on the formula 
     proposed under paragraph (1).

     SEC. 445. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       Notwithstanding section 341, this subtitle takes effect on 
     the date of the enactment of this Act.

                   Subtitle D--National Preparedness

     SEC. 451. THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM.

       (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The attacks on September 11, 2001, demonstrated that 
     even the most robust emergency response capabilities can be 
     overwhelmed if an attack is large enough.
       (2) Teamwork, collaboration, and cooperation at an incident 
     site are critical to a successful response to a terrorist 
     attack.
       (3) Key decision makers who are represented at the incident 
     command level help to ensure an effective response, the 
     efficient use of resources, and responder safety.
       (4) Regular joint training at all levels is essential to 
     ensuring close coordination during an actual incident.
       (5) Beginning with fiscal year 2005, the Department of 
     Homeland Security is requiring that entities adopt the 
     Incident Command System and other concepts of the National 
     Incident Management System in order to qualify for funds 
     distributed by the Office of State and Local Government 
     Coordination and Preparedness.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt the 
     Incident Command System;
       (2) when multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are 
     involved, they should follow a unified command system; and
       (3) the Secretary of Homeland Security should require, as a 
     further condition of receiving homeland security preparedness 
     funds from the Office of State and Local Government 
     Coordination and Preparedness, that grant applicants document 
     measures taken to fully and aggressively implement the 
     Incident Command System and unified command procedures.

     SEC. 452. NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION MUTUAL AID.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Authorized representative of the federal government.--
     The term ``authorized representative of the Federal 
     Government'' means any individual or individuals designated 
     by the President with respect to the executive branch, the 
     Chief Justice with respect to the Federal judiciary, or the 
     President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives with respect to Congress, or their designees, 
     to request assistance under a Mutual Aid Agreement for an 
     emergency or public service event.
       (2) Chief operating officer.--The term ``chief operating 
     officer'' means the official designated by law to declare an 
     emergency in and for the locality of that chief operating 
     officer.
       (3) Emergency.--The term ``emergency'' means a major 
     disaster or emergency declared by the President, or a state 
     of emergency declared by the Mayor of the District of 
     Columbia, the Governor of the State of Maryland or the 
     Commonwealth of Virginia, or the declaration of a local 
     emergency by the chief operating officer of a locality, or 
     their designees, that triggers mutual aid under the terms of 
     a Mutual Aid Agreement.
       (4) Employee.--The term ``employee'' means the employees of 
     the party, including its agents or authorized volunteers, who 
     are committed in a Mutual Aid Agreement to prepare for or who 
     respond to an emergency or public service event.
       (5) Locality.--The term ``locality'' means a county, city, 
     or town within the State of Maryland or the Commonwealth of 
     Virginia and within the National Capital Region.
       (6) Mutual aid agreement.--The term ``Mutual Aid 
     Agreement'' means an agreement, authorized under subsection 
     (b) for the provision of police, fire, rescue and other 
     public safety and health or medical services to any party to 
     the agreement during a public service event, an emergency, or 
     pre-planned training event.
       (7) National capital region or region.--The term ``National 
     Capital Region'' or ``Region'' means the area defined under 
     section 2674(f)(2) of title 10, United States Code, and those 
     counties with a border abutting that area and any 
     municipalities therein.
       (8) Party.--The term ``party'' means the State of Maryland, 
     the Commonwealth of Virginia, the District of Columbia, and 
     any of the localities duly executing a Mutual Aid Agreement 
     under this section.
       (9) Public service event.--The term ``public service 
     event''--
       (A) means any undeclared emergency, incident or situation 
     in preparation for or response to which the Mayor of the 
     District of Columbia, an authorized representative of the 
     Federal Government, the Governor of the State of Maryland, 
     the Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, or the chief 
     operating officer of a locality in the National Capital 
     Region, or their designees, requests or provides assistance 
     under a Mutual Aid Agreement within the National Capital 
     Region; and
       (B) includes Presidential inaugurations, public gatherings, 
     demonstrations and protests, and law enforcement, fire, 
     rescue, emergency health and medical services, 
     transportation, communications, public works and engineering, 
     mass care, and other support that require human resources, 
     equipment, facilities or services supplemental to or greater 
     than the requesting jurisdiction can provide.
       (10) State.--The term ``State'' means the State of 
     Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the District of 
     Columbia.
       (11) Training.--The term ``training'' means emergency and 
     public service event-related exercises, testing, or other 
     activities using equipment and personnel to simulate 
     performance of any aspect of the giving or receiving of aid 
     by National Capital Region jurisdictions during emergencies 
     or public service events, such actions occurring outside 
     actual emergency or public service event periods.
       (b) Mutual Aid Authorized.--
       (1) In general.--The Mayor of the District of Columbia, any 
     authorized representative of the Federal Government, the 
     Governor of the State of Maryland, the Governor of the 
     Commonwealth of Virginia, or the chief operating officer of a 
     locality, or their designees, acting within his or her 
     jurisdictional purview, may, subject to State law, enter 
     into, request or provide assistance under Mutual Aid 
     Agreements with localities, the Washington Metropolitan Area 
     Transit Authority, the Metropolitan Washington Airports 
     Authority, and any other governmental agency or authority 
     for--
       (A) law enforcement, fire, rescue, emergency health and 
     medical services, transportation, communications, public 
     works and engineering, mass care, and resource support in an 
     emergency or public service event;
       (B) preparing for, mitigating, managing, responding to or 
     recovering from any emergency or public service event; and
       (C) training for any of the activities described under 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B).
       (2) Facilitating localities.--The State of Maryland and the 
     Commonwealth of Virginia are encouraged to facilitate the 
     ability of localities to enter into interstate Mutual Aid 
     Agreements in the National Capital Region under this section.
       (3) Application and effect.--This section--
       (A) does not apply to law enforcement security operations 
     at special events of national significance under section 
     3056(e) of title 18, United States Code, or other law 
     enforcement functions of the United States Secret Service;
       (B) does not diminish any authorities, express or implied, 
     of Federal agencies to enter into Mutual Aid Agreements in 
     furtherance of their Federal missions; and
       (C) does not--
       (i) preclude any party from entering into supplementary 
     Mutual Aid Agreements with fewer than all the parties, or 
     with another party; or
       (ii) affect any other agreement in effect before the date 
     of enactment of this Act among the States and localities, 
     including the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.
       (4) Rights described.--Other than as described in this 
     section, the rights and responsibilities of the parties to a 
     Mutual Aid Agreement entered into under this section shall be 
     as described in the Mutual Aid Agreement.
       (c) District of Columbia.--
       (1) In general.--The District of Columbia may purchase 
     liability and indemnification insurance or become self 
     insured against claims arising under a Mutual Aid Agreement 
     authorized under this section.
       (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out 
     paragraph (1).
       (d) Liability and Actions at Law.--
       (1) In general.--Any responding party or its officers or 
     employees rendering aid or failing to render aid to the 
     District of Columbia, the Federal Government, the State of 
     Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, or a locality, under 
     a Mutual Aid Agreement authorized under this section, and any 
     party or its officers or employees engaged in training 
     activities with another party under such a Mutual Aid 
     Agreement, shall be liable on account of any act or omission 
     of its officers or employees while so engaged or on account 
     of the maintenance or use of any related equipment, 
     facilities, or supplies, but only to

[[Page H8952]]

     the extent permitted under the laws and procedures of the 
     State of the party rendering aid.
       (2) Actions.--Any action brought against a party or its 
     officers or employees on account of an act or omission in the 
     rendering of aid to the District of Columbia, the Federal 
     Government, the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of 
     Virginia, or a locality, or failure to render such aid or on 
     account of the maintenance or use of any related equipment, 
     facilities, or supplies may be brought only under the laws 
     and procedures of the State of the party rendering aid and 
     only in the Federal or State courts located therein. Actions 
     against the United States under this section may be brought 
     only in Federal courts.
       (3) Good faith exception.--
       (A) Definition.--In this paragraph, the term ``good faith'' 
     shall not include willful misconduct, gross negligence, or 
     recklessness.
       (B) Exception.--No State or locality, or its officers or 
     employees, rendering aid to another party, or engaging in 
     training, under a Mutual Aid Agreement shall be liable under 
     Federal law on account of any act or omission performed in 
     good faith while so engaged, or on account of the maintenance 
     or use of any related equipment, facilities, or supplies 
     performed in good faith.
       (4) Immunities.--This section shall not abrogate any other 
     immunities from liability that any party has under any other 
     Federal or State law.
       (d) Workers Compensation.--
       (1) Compensation.--Each party shall provide for the payment 
     of compensation and death benefits to injured members of the 
     emergency forces of that party and representatives of 
     deceased members of such forces if such members sustain 
     injuries or are killed while rendering aid to the District of 
     Columbia, the Federal Government, the State of Maryland, the 
     Commonwealth of Virginia, or a locality, under a Mutual Aid 
     Agreement, or engaged in training activities under a Mutual 
     Aid Agreement, in the same manner and on the same terms as if 
     the injury or death were sustained within their own 
     jurisdiction.
       (2) Other state law.--No party shall be liable under the 
     law of any State other than its own for providing for the 
     payment of compensation and death benefits to injured members 
     of the emergency forces of that party and representatives of 
     deceased members of such forces if such members sustain 
     injuries or are killed while rendering aid to the District of 
     Columbia, the Federal Government, the State of Maryland, the 
     Commonwealth of Virginia, or a locality, under a Mutual Aid 
     Agreement or engaged in training activities under a Mutual 
     Aid Agreement.
       (e) Licenses and Permits.--If any person holds a license, 
     certificate, or other permit issued by any responding party 
     evidencing the meeting of qualifications for professional, 
     mechanical, or other skills and assistance is requested by a 
     receiving jurisdiction, such person will be deemed licensed, 
     certified, or permitted by the receiving jurisdiction to 
     render aid involving such skill to meet a public service 
     event, emergency or training for any such events.

     SEC. 453. URBAN AREA COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES.

       (a) In General.--Title V of the Homeland Security Act of 
     2002 (6 U.S.C. 311 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:

     ``SEC. 510. HIGH RISK URBAN AREA COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES.

       ``The Secretary, in consultation with the Federal 
     Communications Commission and the Secretary of Defense, and 
     with appropriate governors, mayors, and other State and local 
     government officials, shall encourage and support the 
     establishment of consistent and effective communications 
     capabilities in the event of an emergency in urban areas 
     determined by the Secretary to be at consistently high levels 
     of risk from terrorist attack. Such communications 
     capabilities shall ensure the ability of all levels of 
     government agencies, including military authorities, and of 
     first responders, hospitals, and other organizations with 
     emergency response capabilities to communicate with each 
     other in the event of an emergency. Additionally, the 
     Secretary, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense, 
     shall develop plans to provide back-up and additional 
     communications support in the event of an emergency.''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--Section 1(b) of 
     that Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
     section 509 the following:

``Sec. 510. High risk urban area communications capabilities.''.

     SEC. 454. PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS.

       (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Private sector organizations own 85 percent of the 
     Nation's critical infrastructure and employ the vast majority 
     of the Nation's workers.
       (2) Unless a terrorist attack targets a military or other 
     secure government facility, the first people called upon to 
     respond will likely be civilians.
       (3) Despite the exemplary efforts of some private entities, 
     the private sector remains largely unprepared for a terrorist 
     attack, due in part to the lack of a widely accepted standard 
     for private sector preparedness.
       (4) Preparedness in the private sector and public sector 
     for rescue, restart and recovery of operations should 
     include--
       (A) a plan for evacuation;
       (B) adequate communications capabilities; and
       (C) a plan for continuity of operations.
       (5) The American National Standards Institute recommends a 
     voluntary national preparedness standard for the private 
     sector based on the existing American National Standard on 
     Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity 
     Programs (NFPA 1600), with appropriate modifications. This 
     standard would establish a common set of criteria and 
     terminology for preparedness, disaster management, emergency 
     management, and business continuity programs.
       (6) The mandate of the Department of Homeland Security 
     extends to working with the private sector, as well as 
     government entities.
       (b) Private Sector Preparedness Program.--
       (1) In general.--Title V of the Homeland Security Act of 
     2002 (6 U.S.C. 311 et seq.), as amended by section 453, is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 511. PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM.

       ``The Secretary shall establish a program to promote 
     private sector preparedness for terrorism and other 
     emergencies, including promoting the adoption of a voluntary 
     national preparedness standard such as the private sector 
     preparedness standard developed by the American National 
     Standards Institute and based on the National Fire Protection 
     Association 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management 
     and Business Continuity Programs.''.
       (2) Technical and conforming amendment.--Section 1(b) of 
     that Act, as amended by section 453, is amended by inserting 
     after the item relating to section 510 the following:

``Sec. 511. Private sector preparedness program.''.

       (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     insurance and credit-rating industries should consider 
     compliance with the voluntary national preparedness standard, 
     the adoption of which is promoted by the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security under section 511 of the Homeland Security 
     Act of 2002, as added by subsection (b), in assessing 
     insurability and credit worthiness.

     SEC. 455. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND READINESS ASSESSMENTS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) Under section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
     (6 U.S.C 121), the Department of Homeland Security, through 
     the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and 
     Infrastructure Protection, has the responsibility--
       (A) to carry out comprehensive assessments of the 
     vulnerabilities of the key resources and critical 
     infrastructure of the United States, including the 
     performance of risk assessments to determine the risks posed 
     by particular types of terrorist attacks within the United 
     States;
       (B) to identify priorities for protective and supportive 
     measures; and
       (C) to develop a comprehensive national plan for securing 
     the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United 
     States.
       (2) Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, 
     issued on December 17, 2003, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security was given 1 year to develop a comprehensive plan to 
     identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of 
     critical infrastructure and key resources.
       (3) Consistent with the report of the National Commission 
     on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security should--
       (A) identify those elements of the United States' 
     transportation, energy, communications, financial, and other 
     institutions that need to be protected;
       (B) develop plans to protect that infrastructure; and
       (C) exercise mechanisms to enhance preparedness.
       (b) Reports on Risk Assessment and Readiness.--Not later 
     than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act and 
     annually thereafter, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
     submit a report to Congress on--
       (1) the Department of Homeland Security's progress in 
     completing vulnerability and risk assessments of the Nation's 
     critical infrastructure;
       (2) the adequacy of the Government's plans to protect such 
     infrastructure; and
       (3) the readiness of the Government to respond to threats 
     against the United States.

     SEC. 456. REPORT ON NORTHERN COMMAND AND DEFENSE OF THE 
                   UNITED STATES HOMELAND.

       (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Department of Defense has primary responsibility 
     for the military defense of the United States.
       (2) Prior to September 11, 2001, the North American 
     Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which had responsibility 
     for defending United States airspace, focused on threats 
     coming from outside the borders of the United States.
       (3) The United States Northern Command has been established 
     to assume responsibility for the military defense of the 
     United

[[Page H8953]]

     States, as well as to provide military support to civil 
     authorities.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the Secretary of Defense should regularly assess the adequacy 
     of the plans and strategies of the United States Northern 
     Command with a view to ensuring that the United States 
     Northern Command is prepared to respond effectively to all 
     threats within the United States, should it be called upon to 
     do so by the President.
       (c) Annual Report.--
       (1) Requirement for report.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
     submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and 
     the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives an annual report describing the plans and 
     strategies of the United States Northern Command to defend 
     the United States against all threats within the United 
     States, in the case that it is called upon to do so by the 
     President.
       (2) Submission of report.--The annual report required by 
     paragraph (1) shall be submitted in conjunction with the 
     submission of the President's budget request to Congress.

     SEC. 457. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       Notwithstanding section 341 or any other provision of this 
     Act, this subtitle takes effect on the date of the enactment 
     of this Act.

     Subtitle E--Privacy and Passenger Identification Verification

     SEC. 461. PRIVACY AND PASSENGER IDENTIFICATION VERIFICATION 
                   TECHNOLOGIES.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
     consult with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
     in the development of any program to use passenger 
     identification verification technologies.
       (b) Delay of Program for Report.--
       (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, no Federal program for passenger verification 
     identification technologies shall begin until after the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security has submitted a report to 
     Congress and to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
     Board about the program.
       (2) Report contents.--The report shall address the privacy 
     and civil liberty implications of the program, including the 
     accuracy and reliability of the technologies used, and 
     whether the program incorporates the necessary architectural, 
     operational, technological, and procedural safeguards to 
     protect privacy and civil liberties.

                  Subtitle F--Homeland Security Grants

     SEC. 461. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Homeland Security Grant 
     Enhancement Act of 2004''.

     SEC. 462. DEFINITIONS.

       In this subtitle, the following definitions shall apply:
       (1) Insular area.--The term ``insular area'' means American 
     Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the 
     Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.
       (2) Large high-threat state fund.--The term ``Large High-
     Threat State Fund'' means the fund containing amounts 
     authorized to be appropriated for States that elect to 
     receive Federal financial assistance through a per capita 
     share of 38.625 percent of the amount appropriated for the 
     State Homeland Security Grant Program.
       (3) Local government.--The term ``local government'' has 
     the same meaning given that term in section 2 of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101).
       (4) State.--The term ``State'' means each of the several 
     States of the United States and the District of Columbia.
       (5) State homeland security grant program.--The term 
     ``State Homeland Security Grant Program'' means the program 
     receiving 75 percent of the amount appropriated for the 
     Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant Program.
       (6) Threat-based homeland security grant program.--The term 
     ``Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant Program'' means the 
     program authorized under section 6.
       (7) Urban area security initiative grant program.--The term 
     ``Urban Area Security Initiative Grant Program'' means the 
     program receiving 25 percent of the amount appropriated for 
     the Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant Program.

     SEC. 463. PRESERVATION OF PRE-9/11 GRANT PROGRAMS FOR 
                   TRADITIONAL FIRST RESPONDER MISSIONS.

       (a) In General.--This subtitle shall not be construed to 
     affect any authority to award grants under any Federal grant 
     program listed under subsection (b), which existed on 
     September 10, 2001, to enhance traditional missions of State 
     and local law enforcement, firefighters, ports, emergency 
     medical services, or public health missions.
       (b) Programs Included.--The programs referred to in 
     subsection (a) are the following:
       (1) The Firefighter Assistance Program authorized under 
     section 33 of the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 
     1974 (15 U.S.C. 2229).
       (2) The Emergency Management Performance Grant Program and 
     the Urban Search and Rescue Grant program authorized under--
       (A) title VI of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
     Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5195 et seq.);
       (B) the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and 
     Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations 
     Act, 2000 (Public Law 106-74; 113 Stat. 1047 et seq.); and
       (C) the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 (42 U.S.C. 
     7701 et seq.).
       (4) The Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law 
     Enforcement Assistance Programs authorized under part E of 
     title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
     1968 (42 U.S.C. 3750 et seq.).
       (5) The Public Safety and Community Policing (COPS ON THE 
     BEAT) Grant Program authorized under part Q of title I of the 
     Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 
     3796dd et seq.).
       (6) Grant programs under the Public Health Service Act 
     regarding preparedness for bioterrorism and other public 
     health emergencies and the Emergency Response Assistance 
     Program authorized under section 1412 of the Defense Against 
     Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2312).

     SEC. 464. INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE TO COORDINATE AND STREAMLINE 
                   HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAMS.

       (a) In General.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
     U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 801 
     the following:

     ``SEC. 802. INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE TO COORDINATE AND 
                   STREAMLINE HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAMS.

       ``(a) Establishment.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary, in coordination with the 
     Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
     the Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of the 
     Environmental Protection Agency, and other agencies providing 
     assistance for first responder preparedness, as identified by 
     the President, shall establish the Interagency Committee to 
     Coordinate and Streamline Homeland Security Grant Programs 
     (referred to in this subtitle as the `Interagency 
     Committee').
       ``(2) Composition.--The Interagency Committee shall be 
     composed of--
       ``(A) a representative of the Department;
       ``(B) a representative of the Department of Health and 
     Human Services;
       ``(C) a representative of the Department of Transportation;
       ``(D) a representative of the Department of Justice;
       ``(E) a representative of the Environmental Protection 
     Agency; and
       ``(F) a representative of any other department or agency 
     determined to be necessary by the President.
       ``(3) Responsibilities.--The Interagency Committee shall--
       ``(A) report on findings to the Information Clearinghouse 
     established under section 801(d);
       ``(B) consult with State and local governments and 
     emergency response providers regarding their homeland 
     security needs and capabilities;
       ``(C) advise the Secretary on the development of 
     performance measures for homeland security grant programs and 
     the national strategy for homeland security;
       ``(D) compile a list of homeland security assistance 
     programs;
       ``(E) not later than 1 year after the effective date of the 
     Homeland Security Grant Enhancement Act of 2004--
       ``(i) develop a proposal to coordinate, to the maximum 
     extent practicable, the planning, reporting, application, and 
     other guidance documents contained in homeland security 
     assistance programs to eliminate all redundant and 
     duplicative requirements; and
       ``(ii) submit the proposal developed under clause (i) to 
     Congress and the President.
       ``(b) Administration.--The Department shall provide 
     administrative support to the Interagency Committee, which 
     shall include--
       ``(1) scheduling meetings;
       ``(2) preparing agenda;
       ``(3) maintaining minutes and records; and
       ``(4) producing reports.
       ``(c) Chairperson.--The Secretary shall designate a 
     chairperson of the Interagency Committee.
       ``(d) Meetings.--The Interagency Committee shall meet--
       ``(1) at the call of the Secretary; or
       ``(2) not less frequently than once every 1 month.''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of 
     contents for the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 
     et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
     section 801 the following:

``Sec. 802. Interagency Committee to Coordinate and Streamline Homeland 
              Security Grant Programs.''.

     SEC. 465. STREAMLINING FEDERAL HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS.

       (a) Director of State and Local Government Coordination and 
     Preparedness.--Section 801(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 
     2002 (6 U.S.C. 361(a)) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(a) Establishment.--
       ``(1) In general.--There is established within the Office 
     of the Secretary the Office for State and Local Government 
     Coordination and Preparedness, which shall oversee and 
     coordinate departmental programs for, and relationships with, 
     State and local governments.
       ``(2) Executive director.--The Office established under 
     paragraph (1) shall be headed by the Executive Director of 
     State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, who 
     shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice 
     and consent of the Senate.''.
       (b) Office for Domestic Preparedness.--The Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended--

[[Page H8954]]

       (1) by redesignating section 430 as section 803 and 
     transferring that section to the end of subtitle A of title 
     VIII, as amended by section 4; and
       (2) in section 803, as redesignated by paragraph (1)--
       (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``the Directorate of 
     Border and Transportation Security'' and inserting ``the 
     Office for State and Local Government Coordination and 
     Preparedness'';
       (B) in subsection (b), by striking ``who shall be appointed 
     by the President'' and all that follows and inserting ``who 
     shall report directly to the Executive Director of State and 
     Local Government Coordination and Preparedness.'';
       (C) in subsection (c)--
       (i) in paragraph (7)--

       (I) by striking ``other'' and inserting ``the'';
       (II) by striking ``consistent with the mission and 
     functions of the Directorate''; and
       (III) by striking ``and'' at the end; and

       (ii) in paragraph (8)--

       (I) by inserting ``carrying out'' before ``those 
     elements'';
       (II) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; 
     and'' ; and

       (iii) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(9) managing the Homeland Security Information 
     Clearinghouse established under section 801(d).'';
       (D) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
       (E) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
       ``(d) Training and Exercises Office Within the Office for 
     Domestic Preparedness.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall create within the 
     Office for Domestic Preparedness an internal office that 
     shall be the proponent for all national domestic 
     preparedness, training, education, and exercises within the 
     Office for State and Local Government Coordination.
       ``(2) Office head.--The Secretary shall select an 
     individual with recognized expertise in first-responder 
     training and exercises to head the office, and such person 
     shall report directly to the Director of the Office of 
     Domestic Preparedness.''.
       (c) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--The table of 
     contents for the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 
     et seq.) is amended--
       (1) by striking the item relating to section 430;
       (2) by amending section 801 to read as follows:

``Sec. 801. Office of State and Local Government Coordination and 
              Preparedness.''; and

       (3) by inserting after the item relating to section 802, as 
     added by this Act, the following:

``Sec. 803. Office for Domestic Preparedness.''.

       (d) Establishment of Homeland Security Information 
     Clearinghouse.--Section 801 of the Homeland Security Act of 
     2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.), as amended by subsection (a), is 
     further amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(d) Homeland Security Information Clearinghouse.--
       ``(1) Establishment.--There is established within the 
     Office for State and Local Government Coordination a Homeland 
     Security Information Clearinghouse (referred to in this 
     section as the `Clearinghouse'), which shall assist States, 
     local governments, and first responders in accordance with 
     paragraphs (2) through (5).
       ``(2) Homeland security grant information.--The 
     Clearinghouse shall create a new website or enhance an 
     existing website, establish a toll-free number, and produce a 
     single publication that each contain information regarding 
     the homeland security grant programs identified under section 
     802(a)(4).
       ``(3) Technical assistance.--The Clearinghouse, in 
     consultation with the Interagency Committee established under 
     section 802, shall provide information regarding--
       ``(A) technical assistance provided by any Federal agency 
     to States and local governments to conduct threat analyses 
     and vulnerability assessments; and
       ``(B) templates for conducting threat analyses and 
     vulnerability assessments.
       ``(4) Best practices.--The Clearinghouse shall work with 
     States, local governments, emergency response providers and 
     the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, and private 
     organizations to gather, validate, and disseminate 
     information regarding successful State and local homeland 
     security programs and practices.
       ``(5) Use of federal funds.--The Clearinghouse shall 
     compile information regarding equipment, training, and other 
     services purchased with Federal funds provided under the 
     homeland security grant programs identified under section 
     802(a)(4), and make such information, and information 
     regarding voluntary standards of training, equipment, and 
     exercises, available to States, local governments, and first 
     responders.
       ``(6) Other information.--The Clearinghouse shall provide 
     States, local governments, and first responders with any 
     other information that the Secretary determines necessary.''.

     SEC. 466. THREAT-BASED HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM.

       (a) Grants Authorized.--The Secretary of Homeland Security 
     (referred to in this section as the ``Secretary'') may award 
     grants to States and local governments to enhance homeland 
     security.
       (b) Use of Funds.--
       (1) In general.--Grants awarded under subsection (a)--
       (A) shall be used to address homeland security matters 
     related to acts of terrorism or major disasters and related 
     capacity building; and
       (B) shall not be used to supplant ongoing first responder 
     expenses or general protective measures.
       (2) Allowable uses.--Grants awarded under subsection (a) 
     may be used to--
       (A) develop State plans or risk assessments (including the 
     development of the homeland security plan) to respond to 
     terrorist attacks and strengthen all hazards emergency 
     planning and communitywide plans for responding to terrorist 
     or all hazards emergency events that are coordinated with the 
     capacities of applicable Federal, State, and local 
     governments, first responders, and State and local government 
     health agencies;
       (B) develop State, regional, or local mutual aid 
     agreements;
       (C) purchase or upgrade equipment based on State and local 
     needs as identified under a State homeland security plan;
       (D) conduct exercises to strengthen emergency preparedness 
     of State and local first responders including law 
     enforcement, firefighting personnel, and emergency medical 
     service workers, and other emergency responders identified in 
     a State homeland security plan;
       (E) pay for overtime expenses relating to--
       (i) training activities consistent with the goals outlined 
     in a State homeland security plan;
       (ii) as determined by the Secretary, activities relating to 
     an increase in the threat level under the Homeland Security 
     Advisory System; and
       (iii) any other activity relating to the State Homeland 
     Security Strategy, and approved by the Secretary;
       (F) promote training regarding homeland security 
     preparedness including--
       (i) emergency preparedness responses to a use or threatened 
     use of a weapon of mass destruction; and
       (ii) training in the use of equipment, including detection, 
     monitoring, and decontamination equipment, and personal 
     protective gear; and
       (G) conduct any activity permitted under the Law 
     Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Grant Program.
       (3) Prohibited uses.--
       (A) Construction.--Grants awarded under subsection (a) may 
     not be used to construct buildings or other physical 
     facilities, except those described in section 611 of the 
     Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
     Act (42 U.S.C. 5196) and approved by the Secretary in the 
     homeland security plan certified under subsection (d), or to 
     acquire land.
       (B) Cost sharing.--Grant funds provided under this section 
     shall not be used for any State or local government cost 
     sharing contribution request under this section.
       (c) Application.--
       (1) Submission.--A State may apply for a grant under this 
     section by submitting to the Secretary an application at such 
     time, and in such manner, and containing such information the 
     Secretary may reasonably require.
       (2) Revisions.--A State may revise a homeland security plan 
     certified under subsection (d) at the time an application is 
     submitted under paragraph (1) after receiving approval from 
     the Secretary.
       (3) Approval.--The Secretary shall not award a grant under 
     this section unless the application submitted by the State 
     includes a homeland security plan meeting the requirements of 
     subsection (d).
       (4) Release of funds.--The Secretary shall release grant 
     funds to States with approved plans after the approval of an 
     application submitted under this subsection.
       (d) Homeland Security Plan.--
       (1) In general.--An application submitted under subsection 
     (c) shall include a certification that the State has prepared 
     a 3-year State homeland security plan (referred to in this 
     subsection as the ``plan'') to respond to terrorist attacks 
     and strengthen all hazards emergency planning that has been 
     approved by the Secretary.
       (2) Contents.--The plan shall contain measurable goals and 
     objectives that--
       (A) establish a 3-year strategy to set priorities for the 
     allocation of funding to political subdivisions based on the 
     risk, capabilities, and needs described under paragraph 
     (3)(C);
       (B) provide for interoperable communications;
       (C) provide for local coordination of response and recovery 
     efforts, including procedures for effective incident command 
     in conformance with the National Incident Management System;
       (D) ensure that first responders and other emergency 
     personnel have adequate training and appropriate equipment 
     for the threats that may occur;
       (E) provide for improved coordination and collaboration 
     among police, fire, and public health authorities at State 
     and local levels;
       (F) coordinate emergency response and public health plans;
       (G) mitigate risks to critical infrastructure that may be 
     vulnerable to terrorist attacks;
       (H) promote regional coordination among contiguous local 
     governments;
       (I) identify necessary protective measures by private 
     owners of critical infrastructure;

[[Page H8955]]

       (J) promote orderly evacuation procedures when necessary;
       (K) ensure support from the public health community for 
     measures needed to prevent, detect and treat bioterrorism, 
     and radiological and chemical incidents;
       (L) increase the number of local jurisdictions 
     participating in local and statewide exercises;
       (M) meet preparedness goals as determined by the Secretary; 
     and
       (N) include a report from the relevant advisory committee 
     established under paragraph (3)(D) that documents the areas 
     of support, disagreement, or recommended changes to the plan 
     before its submission to the Secretary.
       (3) Development process.--
       (A) In general.--In preparing the plan under this section, 
     a State shall--
       (i) provide for the consideration of all homeland security 
     needs;
       (ii) follow a process that is continuing, inclusive, 
     cooperative, and comprehensive, as appropriate; and
       (iii) coordinate the development of the plan with the 
     homeland security planning activities of local governments.
       (B) Coordination with local planning activities.--The 
     coordination under subparagraph (A)(iii) shall contain input 
     from local stakeholders, including--
       (i) local officials, including representatives of rural, 
     high-population, and high-threat jurisdictions;
       (ii) first responders and emergency response providers; and
       (iii) private sector companies, such as railroads and 
     chemical manufacturers.
       (C) Scope of planning.--Each State preparing a plan under 
     this section shall, in conjunction with the local 
     stakeholders under subparagraph (B), address all the 
     information requested by the Secretary, and complete a 
     comprehensive assessment of--
       (i) risk, including a--

       (I) vulnerability assessment;
       (II) threat assessment; and
       (III) public health assessment, in coordination with the 
     State bioterrorism plan; and

       (ii) capabilities and needs, including--

       (I) an evaluation of current preparedness, mitigation, and 
     response capabilities based on such assessment mechanisms as 
     shall be determined by the Secretary;
       (II) an evaluation of capabilities needed to address the 
     risks described under clause (i); and
       (III) an assessment of the shortfall between the 
     capabilities described under subclause (I) and the required 
     capabilities described under subclause (II).

       (D) Advisory committee.--
       (i) In general.--Each State preparing a plan under this 
     section shall establish an advisory committee to receive 
     comments from the public and the local stakeholders 
     identified under subparagraph (B).
       (ii) Composition.--The Advisory Committee shall include 
     local officials, local first responders, and emergency 
     response providers that are representative of the counties, 
     cities, and towns within the State, and which shall include 
     representatives of rural, high-population, and high-threat 
     jurisdictions.
       (4) Plan approval.--The Secretary shall approve a plan upon 
     finding that the plan meets the requirements of--
       (A) paragraphs (2) and (3);
       (B) the interim performance measurements under subsection 
     (g)(1), or the national performance standards under 
     subsection (g)(2); and
       (C) any other criteria the Secretary determines necessary 
     to the approval of a State plan.
       (5) Review of advisory committee report.--The Secretary 
     shall review the recommendations of the advisory committee 
     report incorporated into a plan under subsection (d)(2)(N), 
     including any dissenting views submitted by advisory 
     committee members, to ensure cooperation and coordination 
     between local and State jurisdictions in planning the use of 
     grant funds under this section.
       (e) Tentative Allocation.--
       (1) Urban area security initiative grant program.--
       (A) In general.--The Secretary shall allocate 25 percent of 
     the funds appropriated under the Threat-Based Homeland 
     Security Grant Program for discretionary grants to be 
     provided directly to local governments, including multistate 
     entities established by a compact between 2 or more States, 
     in high threat areas, as determined by the Secretary based on 
     the criteria under subparagraph (B).
       (B) Criteria.--The Secretary shall ensure that each local 
     government receiving a grant under this paragraph--
       (i) has a large population or high population density;
       (ii) has a high degree of threat, risk, and vulnerability 
     related to critical infrastructure or not less than 1 key 
     asset identified by the Secretary or State homeland security 
     plan;
       (iii) has an international border with Canada or Mexico, or 
     coastline bordering international waters of Canada, Mexico, 
     or bordering the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, or the 
     Gulf of Mexico; or
       (iv) are subject to other threat factors specified in 
     writing by the Secretary.
       (C) Consistency.--Any grant awarded under this paragraph 
     shall be used to supplement and support, in a consistent and 
     coordinated manner, those activities and objectives described 
     under subsection (b) or a State homeland security plan.
       (D) Coordination.--The Secretary shall ensure that any 
     grants made under this paragraph encourage multiple 
     contiguous units of local government and mutual aid partners 
     to coordinate any homeland security activities.
       (2) State homeland security grant program.--
       (A) States.--Each State whose application is approved under 
     subsection (c) shall receive, for each fiscal year, the 
     greater of--
       (i) 0.75 percent of the amounts appropriated for the State 
     Homeland Security Grant Program; or
       (ii) the State's per capita share, as defined by the 2002 
     census population estimate, of 38.625 percent of the State 
     Homeland Security Grant Program.
       (B) Insular areas.--Each insular area shall receive, for 
     each fiscal year, the greater of--
       (i) 0.075 percent of the amounts appropriated for the State 
     Homeland Security Grant Program; or
       (ii) the insular area's per capita share, as defined by the 
     2002 census population estimate, of 38.625 percent of the 
     State Homeland Security Grant Program.
       (3) Secondary distribution.--After the distribution of 
     funds under paragraph (2), the Secretary shall, from the 
     remaining funds for the State Homeland Security Grant Program 
     and 10.8 percent of the amount appropriated for the Threat-
     Based Homeland Security Grant Program pursuant to subsection 
     (j)(1), distribute amounts to each State that--
       (A) has a substantial percentage of its population residing 
     in Metropolitan Statistical Areas, as defined by the Office 
     of Management and Budget;
       (B) has a high degree of threat, risk, and vulnerability 
     related to critical infrastructure or not less than 1 key 
     asset identified by the Secretary or State homeland security 
     plan;
       (C) has an international border with Canada or Mexico, or 
     coastline bordering international waters of Canada, Mexico, 
     or bordering the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, or the 
     Gulf of Mexico; or
       (D) are subject to other threat factors specified in 
     writing by the Secretary.
       (4) Distribution of funds.--If the amounts tentatively 
     allocated under paragraphs (1) through (3) equal the sum of 
     the amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (j), the 
     Secretary shall distribute the appropriated amounts based on 
     the tentative allocation.
       (5) Proportional reduction.--If the amount appropriated for 
     the Large High-Threat State Fund pursuant to subsection 
     (j)(2) is less than 10.8 percent of the amount appropriated 
     for the Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant Program pursuant 
     to subsection (j)(1), the Secretary shall proportionately 
     reduce the amounts tentatively allocated under paragraphs (1) 
     through (3) so that the amount distributed is equal to the 
     sum of the amounts appropriated for such programs.
       (6) Funding for local entities and first responders.--The 
     Secretary shall require recipients of the State Homeland 
     Security Grant to provide local governments and first 
     responders, consistent with the applicable State homeland 
     security plan, with not less than 80 percent of the grant 
     funds, the resources purchased with such grant funds, or a 
     combination thereof, not later than 60 days after receiving 
     grant funding.
       (7) Supplement not supplant.--Amounts appropriated for 
     grants under this subsection shall be used to supplement and 
     not supplant other State and local public funds obligated for 
     the purposes provided under this Act.
       (8) Law enforcement terrorism prevention program.--
       (A) In general.--The Secretary shall designate not more 
     than 25 percent of the amounts allocated through the State 
     Homeland Security Grant Program to be used for the Law 
     Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program to provide grants to 
     law enforcement agencies to enhance capabilities for 
     terrorism prevention.
       (B) Use of funds.--Grants awarded under this paragraph may 
     be used for--
       (i) information sharing to preempt terrorist attacks;
       (ii) target hardening to reduce the vulnerability of 
     selected high value targets;
       (iii) threat recognition to recognize the potential or 
     development of a threat;
       (iv) intervention activities to interdict terrorists before 
     they can execute a threat;
       (v) interoperable communication systems;
       (vi) overtime expenses related to the State Homeland 
     Security Strategy approved by the Secretary; and
       (vii) any other terrorism prevention activity authorized by 
     the Secretary.
       (f) Report on Homeland Security Spending.--Each recipient 
     of a grant under this section shall annually submit a report 
     to the Secretary that contains--
       (A) an accounting of the amount of State and local funds 
     spent on homeland security activities under the applicable 
     State homeland security plan; and
       (B) information regarding the use of grant funds by units 
     of local government as required by the Secretary.
       (g) Accountability.--
       (1) Interim performance measures.--
       (A) In general.--Before establishing performance standards 
     under paragraph (2), the Secretary shall assist each State in 
     establishing interim performance measures based upon--

[[Page H8956]]

       (i) the goals and objectives under subsection (d)(2); and
       (ii) any other factors determined by the Secretary.
       (B) Annual report.--Before establishing performance 
     measures under paragraph (2), each State with an approved 
     State plan shall submit to the Secretary a report detailing 
     the progress the State has made in meeting the interim 
     performance measures established under subparagraph (A).
       (2) National performance standards.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall set national 
     performance standards based in part on the goals and 
     objectives under subsection (d)(2) and any other factors the 
     Secretary determines relevant.
       (B) Compliance.--The Secretary shall ensure that State 
     plans are in conformance with the standards set under 
     subparagraph (A).
       (C) Annual report.--After the establishment of performance 
     standards under subparagraph (A), each State with an approved 
     State homeland security plan shall submit to the Secretary a 
     report on the progress the State has made in meeting such 
     standards.
       (3) General accounting office access to information.--Each 
     recipient of a grant under this section and the Department of 
     Homeland Security shall provide the General Accounting Office 
     with full access to information regarding the activities 
     carried out under this section.
       (4) Audit.--Grant recipients that expend $500,000 or more 
     in Federal funds during any fiscal year shall submit to the 
     Secretary an organization wide financial and compliance audit 
     report in conformance with the requirements of chapter 75 of 
     title 31, United States Code.
       (h) Remedies for Non-Compliance.--
       (1) In general.--If the Secretary finds, after reasonable 
     notice and an opportunity for a hearing, that a recipient of 
     a grant under this section has failed to substantially comply 
     with any provision of this section, the Secretary shall--
       (A) terminate any payment of grant funds to be made to the 
     recipient under this section;
       (B) reduce the amount of payment of grant funds to the 
     recipient by an amount equal to the amount of grants funds 
     that were not expended by the recipient in accordance with 
     this section; or
       (C) limit the use of grant funds received under this 
     section to programs, projects, or activities not affected by 
     the failure to comply.
       (2) Duration of penalty.--The Secretary shall apply an 
     appropriate penalty under paragraph (1) until such time as 
     the Secretary determines that the grant recipient is in full 
     compliance with this section.
       (3) Direct funding.--If a State fails to substantially 
     comply with any provision of this section, including failing 
     to provide local governments with grant funds or resources 
     purchased with grant funds in a timely fashion, a local 
     government entitled to receive such grant funds or resources 
     may petition the Secretary, at such time and in such manner 
     as determined by the Secretary, to request that grant funds 
     or resources be provided directly to the local government.
       (i) Reports to Congress.--The Secretary shall submit an 
     annual report to Congress that provides--
       (1) findings relating to the performance standards 
     established under subsection (g);
       (2) the status of preparedness goals and objectives;
       (3) an evaluation of how States and local governments are 
     meeting preparedness goals and objectives;
       (4) the total amount of resources provided to the States;
       (5) the total amount of resources provided to units of 
     local government; and
       (6) a list of how these resources were expended.
       (j) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) Threat-based homeland security grant program.--There 
     are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary 
     to carry out this section.
       (2) Large high-threat state fund.--There are authorized to 
     be appropriated 10.8 percent of the funds appropriated in any 
     fiscal year pursuant to paragraph (1), which shall be used to 
     carry out the Large High-Threat State Fund.

     SEC. 467. ELIMINATING HOMELAND SECURITY FRAUD, WASTE, AND 
                   ABUSE.

       (a) Annual General Accounting Office Audit and Report.--
       (1) Audit.--The Comptroller General shall conduct an annual 
     audit of the Threat Based Homeland Security Grant Program.
       (2) Report.--The Comptroller General shall provide a report 
     to Congress on the results of the audit conducted under 
     paragraph (1), which includes--
       (A) an analysis of whether the grant recipients allocated 
     funding consistent with the State homeland security plan and 
     the guidelines established by the Department of Homeland 
     Security; and
       (B) the amount of funding devoted to overtime and 
     administrative expenses.
       (b) Reviews of Threat-Based Homeland Security Funding.--The 
     Secretary, through the appropriate agency, shall conduct 
     periodic reviews of grants made through the Threat Based 
     Homeland Security Grant Program to ensure that recipients 
     allocate funds consistent with the guidelines established by 
     the Department of Homeland Security.
       (c) Remedies for Non-Compliance.--If the Secretary 
     determines, after reasonable notice and an opportunity for a 
     hearing, that a recipient of a Threat Based Homeland Security 
     Grant has failed to substantially comply with any regulations 
     or guidelines issues by the Department regarding eligible 
     expenditures, the Secretary shall--
       (1) terminate any payment of grant funds scheduled to be 
     made to the recipient;
       (2) reduce the amount of payment of grant finds to the 
     recipient by an amount equal to the amount of grant funds 
     that were not expended by the recipient in accordance with 
     such guidelines; or
       (3) limit the use of grant funds received under the Threat 
     Based Homeland Security Grant Program to programs, projects, 
     or activities not affected by the failure to comply.
       (d) Duration of Penalty.--The Secretary shall apply an 
     appropriate penalty under subsection (c) until such time as 
     the Secretary determines that the grant recipient is in full 
     compliance with the guidelines established by the Department 
     of Homeland Security.

     SEC. 468. FLEXIBILITY IN UNSPENT HOMELAND SECURITY FUNDS.

       (a) Reallocation of Funds.--The Director of the Office for 
     Domestic Preparedness, Department of Homeland Security, shall 
     allow any State to request approval to reallocate funds 
     received pursuant to appropriations for the State Homeland 
     Security Grant Program under Public Laws 105-277 (112 Stat. 
     2681 et seq.), 106-113 (113 Stat. 1501A-3 et seq.), 106-553 
     (114 Stat. 2762A-3 et seq.), 107-77 (115 Stat. 78 et seq.), 
     or the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003 (Public 
     Law 108-7), among the 4 categories of equipment, training, 
     exercises, and planning.
       (b) Approval of Reallocation Requests.--The Director shall 
     approve reallocation requests under subsection (a) in 
     accordance with the State plan and any other relevant factors 
     that the Secretary of Homeland Security determines to be 
     necessary.
       (c) Limitation.--A waiver under this section shall not 
     affect the obligation of a State to pass through 80 percent 
     of the amount appropriated for equipment to units of local 
     government.

     SEC. 469. CERTIFICATION RELATIVE TO THE SCREENING OF 
                   MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE TRANSPORTED INTO THE 
                   UNITED STATES.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
     deny entry into the United States of any commercial motor 
     vehicle (as defined in section 31101(1) of title 49, United 
     States Code) carrying municipal solid waste unless and until 
     the Secretary certifies to Congress that the methodologies 
     and technologies used by the Bureau of Customs and Border 
     Protection of the Department of Homeland Security to screen 
     for and detect the presence of chemical, nuclear, biological, 
     and radiological weapons in such waste are as effective as 
     the methodologies and technologies used by the Bureau to 
     screen for such materials in other items of commerce entering 
     into the United States by commercial motor vehicle transport.
       (b) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``municipal 
     solid waste'' includes sludge (as defined in section 1004 of 
     the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6903)).

                   Subtitle G--Public Safety Spectrum

     SEC. 471. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Spectrum Availability 
     for Emergency-Response and Law-Enforcement To Improve Vital 
     Emergency Services Act'' or the ``SAVE LIVES Act''.

     SEC. 472. FINDINGS.

       The Congress finds the following:
       (1) In its final report, the 9-11 Commission advocated that 
     Congress pass legislation providing for the expedited and 
     increased assignment of radio spectrum for public safety 
     purposes. The 9-11 Commission stated that this spectrum was 
     necessary to improve communications between local, State and 
     Federal public safety organizations and public safety 
     organizations operating in neighboring jurisdictions that may 
     respond to an emergency in unison.
       (2) Specifically, the 9-11 Commission report stated ``The 
     inability to communicate was a critical element at the World 
     Trade Center, Pentagon and Somerset County, Pennsylvania, 
     crash sites, where multiple agencies and multiple 
     jurisdictions responded. The occurrence of this problem at 
     three very different sites is strong evidence that compatible 
     and adequate communications among public safety organizations 
     at the local, State, and Federal levels remains an important 
     problem.''.
       (3) In the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the Congress 
     directed the FCC to allocate spectrum currently being used by 
     television broadcasters to public safety agencies to use for 
     emergency communications. This spectrum has specific 
     characteristics that make it an outstanding choice for 
     emergency communications because signals sent over these 
     frequencies are able to penetrate walls and travel great 
     distances, and can assist multiple jurisdictions in deploying 
     interoperable communications systems.
       (4) This spectrum will not be fully available to public 
     safety agencies until the completion of the digital 
     television transition. The need for this spectrum is greater 
     than ever. The nation cannot risk further loss of life due to 
     public safety agencies' first responders' inability to 
     communicate effectively in the event of another terrorist act 
     or

[[Page H8957]]

     other crisis, such as a hurricane, tornado, flood, or 
     earthquake.
       (5) In the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress set a date 
     of December 31, 2006, for the termination of the digital 
     television transition. Under current law, however, the 
     deadline will be extended if fewer than 85 percent of the 
     television households in a market are able to continue 
     receiving local television broadcast signals.
       (6) Federal Communications Commission Chairman Michael K. 
     Powell testified at a hearing before the Senate Commerce, 
     Science, and Transportation Committee on September 8, 2004, 
     that, absent government action, this extension may allow the 
     digital television transition to continue for ``decades'' or 
     ``multiples of decades''.
       (7) The Nation's public safety and welfare cannot be put 
     off for ``decades'' or ``multiples of decades''. The Federal 
     government should ensure that this spectrum is available for 
     use by public safety organizations by January 1, 2009.
       (8) Any plan to end the digital television transition would 
     be incomplete if it did not ensure that consumers would be 
     able to continue to enjoy over-the-air broadcast television 
     with minimal disruption. If broadcasters air only a digital 
     signal, some consumers may be unable to view digital 
     transmissions using their analog-only television set. Local 
     broadcasters are truly an important part of our homeland 
     security and often an important communications vehicle in the 
     event of a national emergency. Therefore, consumers who rely 
     on over-the-air television, particularly those of limited 
     economic means, should be assisted.
       (9) The New America Foundation has testified before 
     Congress that the cost to assist these 17.4 million 
     exclusively over-the-air households to continue to view 
     television is less than $1 billion dollars for equipment, 
     which equates to roughly 3 percent of the Federal revenue 
     likely from the auction of the analog television spectrum.
       (10) Specifically, the New America Foundation has estimated 
     that the Federal Government's auction of this spectrum could 
     yield $30-to-$40 billion in revenue to the Treasury. Chairman 
     Powell stated at the September 8, 2004, hearing that 
     ``estimates of the value of that spectrum run anywhere from 
     $30 billion to $70 billion''.
       (11) Additionally, there will be societal benefits with the 
     return of the analog broadcast spectrum. Former FCC Chairman 
     Reed F. Hundt, at an April 28, 2004, hearing before the 
     Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, 
     testified that this spectrum ``should be the fit and proper 
     home of wireless broadband''. Mr. Hundt continued, ``Quite 
     literally, [with this spectrum] the more millions of people 
     in rural America will be able to afford Big Broadband 
     Internet access, the more hundreds of millions of people in 
     the world will be able to afford joining the Internet 
     community.''.
       (12) Due to the benefits that would flow to the Nation's 
     citizens from the Federal Government reclaiming this analog 
     television spectrum--including the safety of our Nation's 
     first responders and those protected by first responders, 
     additional revenues to the Federal treasury, millions of new 
     jobs in the telecommunications sector of the economy, and 
     increased wireless broadband availability to our Nation's 
     rural citizens--Congress finds it necessary to set January 1, 
     2009, as a firm date for the return of this analog television 
     spectrum.

     SEC. 473. SETTING A SPECIFIC DATE FOR THE AVAILABILITY OF 
                   SPECTRUM FOR PUBLIC SAFETY ORGANIZATIONS AND 
                   CREATING A DEADLINE FOR THE TRANSITION TO 
                   DIGITAL TELEVISION.

       (a) In General.--Section 309(j)(14) of the Communications 
     Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 309(j)(14)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``2006.'' in subparagraph (A) and inserting 
     ``2008.'';
       (2) by striking subparagraph (B) and redesignating 
     subparagraphs (C) and (D) as subparagraphs (B) and (C);
       (3) by striking ``subparagraph (A) or (B),'' in 
     subparagraph (B), as redesignated, and inserting 
     ``subparagraph (A),'';
       (4) by striking ``subparagraph (C)(i),'' in subparagraph 
     (C), as redesignated, and inserting ``subparagraph (B)(i),''; 
     and
       (5) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(D) Acceleration of deadline for public safety use.--
       ``(i) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the Commission 
     shall take all action necessary to complete by December 31, 
     2007--

       ``(I) the return of television station licenses operating 
     on channels between 764 and 776 megaHertz and between 794 and 
     806 megaHertz; and
       ``(II) assignment of the electromagnetic spectrum between 
     764 and 776 megahertz, and between 794 and 806 megahertz, for 
     public safety services.

       ``(ii) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the Commission may 
     modify, reassign, or require the return of, the television 
     station licenses assigned to frequencies between 758 and 764 
     megahertz, 776 and 782 megahertz, and 788 and 794 megahertz 
     as necessary to permit operations by public safety services 
     on frequencies between 764 and 776 megahertz and between 794 
     and 806 megahertz, after the date of enactment of the SAVES 
     LIVES Act, but such modifications, reassignments, or returns 
     may not take effect until after December 31, 2007.''.
       (b) Certain Commercial Use Spectrum.--The Commission shall 
     assign the spectrum described in section 337(a)(2) of the 
     Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 337(a)(2)) allocated 
     for commercial use by competitive bidding pursuant to section 
     309(j) of that Act (47 U.S.C. 309(j)) no later than 1 year 
     after the Commission transmits the report required by section 
     474(a) to the Congress.

     SEC. 474. STUDIES OF COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES AND NEEDS.

       (a) In General.--The Commission, in consultation with the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, shall conduct a study to 
     assess strategies that may be used to meet public safety 
     communications needs, including--
       (1) the short-term and long-term need for additional 
     spectrum allocation for Federal, State, and local first 
     responders, including an additional allocation of spectrum in 
     the 700 megaHertz band;
       (2) the need for a nationwide interoperable broadband 
     mobile communications network;
       (3) the ability of public safety entities to utilize 
     wireless broadband applications; and
       (4) the communications capabilities of first receivers such 
     as hospitals and health care workers, and current efforts to 
     promote communications coordination and training among the 
     first responders and the first receivers.
       (b) Reallocation Study.--The Commission shall conduct a 
     study to assess the advisability of reallocating any amount 
     of spectrum in the 700 megaHertz band for unlicensed 
     broadband uses. In the study, the Commission shall consider 
     all other possible users of this spectrum, including public 
     safety.
       (c) Report.--The Commission shall report the results of the 
     studies, together with any recommendations it may have, to 
     the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
     and the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and 
     Commerce within 1 year after the date of enactment of this 
     Act.

     SEC. 475. STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
                   SECURITY'S ``SAFECOM'' PROGRAM.

       Section 302 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 
     182) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(a) In General.--'' before ``The''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(b) SAFECOM Authorized.--
       ``(1) In general.--In carrying out subsection (a), the 
     Under Secretary shall establish a program to address the 
     interoperability of communications devices used by Federal, 
     State, tribal, and local first responders, to be known as the 
     Wireless Public Safety Interoperability Communications 
     Program, or `SAFECOM'. The Under Secretary shall coordinate 
     the program with the Director of the Department of Justice's 
     Office of Science and Technology and all other Federal 
     programs engaging in communications interoperability 
     research, development, and funding activities to ensure that 
     the program takes into account, and does not duplicate, those 
     programs or activities.
       ``(2) Components.--The program established under paragraph 
     (1) shall be designed--
       ``(A) to provide research on the development of a 
     communications system architecture that would ensure the 
     interoperability of communications devices among Federal, 
     State, tribal, and local officials that would enhance the 
     potential for a coordinated response to a national emergency;
       ``(B) to support the completion and promote the adoption of 
     mutually compatible voluntary consensus standards developed 
     by a standards development organization accredited by the 
     American National Standards Institute to ensure such 
     interoperability; and
       ``(C) to provide for the development of a model strategic 
     plan that could be used by any State or region in developing 
     its communications interoperability plan.
       ``(3) Authorization of appropriations.--There are 
     authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary to carry out 
     this subsection--
       ``(A) $22,105,000 for fiscal year 2005;
       ``(B) $22,768,000 for fiscal year 2006;
       ``(C) $23,451,000 for fiscal year 2007;
       ``(D) $24,155,000 for fiscal year 2008; and
       ``(E) $24,879,000 for fiscal year 2009.
       ``(c) National Baseline Study of Public Safety 
     Communications Interoperability.--By December 31, 2005, the 
     Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Science and 
     Technology shall complete a study to develop a national 
     baseline for communications interoperability and develop 
     common grant guidance for all Federal grant programs that 
     provide communications-related resources or assistance to 
     State and local agencies, any Federal programs conducting 
     demonstration projects, providing technical assistance, 
     providing outreach services, providing standards development 
     assistance, or conducting research and development with the 
     public safety community with respect to wireless 
     communications. The Under Secretary shall transmit a report 
     to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
     Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on 
     Energy and Commerce containing the Under Secretary's 
     findings, conclusions, and recommendations from the study.''.

[[Page H8958]]

     SEC. 476. GRANT PROGRAM TO PROVIDE ENHANCED INTEROPERABILITY 
                   OF COMMUNICATIONS FOR FIRST RESPONDERS.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
     establish a program to help State, local, tribal, and 
     regional first responders acquire and deploy interoperable 
     communications equipment, purchase such equipment, and train 
     personnel in the use of such equipment. The Secretary, in 
     cooperation with the heads of other Federal departments and 
     agencies who administer programs that provide communications-
     related assistance programs to State, local, and tribal 
     public safety organizations, shall develop and implement 
     common standards to the greatest extent practicable.
       (b) Applications.--To be eligible for assistance under the 
     program, a State, local, tribal, or regional first responder 
     agency shall submit an application, at such time, in such 
     form, and containing such information as the Under Secretary 
     of Homeland Security for Science and Technology may require, 
     including--
       (1) a detailed explanation of how assistance received under 
     the program would be used to improve local communications 
     interoperability and ensure interoperability with other 
     appropriate Federal, State, local, tribal, and regional 
     agencies in a regional or national emergency;
       (2) assurance that the equipment and system would--
       (A) not be incompatible with the communications 
     architecture developed under section 302(b)(2)(A) of the 
     Homeland Security Act of 2002;
       (B) would meet any voluntary consensus standards developed 
     under section 302(b)(2)(B) of that Act; and
       (C) be consistent with the common grant guidance 
     established under section 302(b)(3) of the Homeland Security 
     Act of 2002.
       (c) Grants.--The Under Secretary shall review applications 
     submitted under subsection (b). The Secretary, pursuant to an 
     application approved by the Under Secretary, may make the 
     assistance provided under the program available in the form 
     of a single grant for a period of not more than 3 years.

     SEC. 477. DIGITAL TRANSITION PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS 
                   GRANT AND CONSUMER ASSISTANCE FUND.

       (a) In General.--There is established on the books of the 
     Treasury a separate fund to be known as the ``Digital 
     Transition Consumer Assistance Fund'', which shall be 
     administered by the Secretary, in consultation with the 
     Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and 
     Information.
       (b) Crediting of Receipts.--The Fund shall be credited with 
     the amount specified in section 309(j)(8)(D) of the 
     Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 309(j)(8)(D)).
       (c) Fund Availability.--
       (1) Appropriations.--
       (A) Consumer assistance program.--There are appropriated to 
     the Secretary from the Fund such sums, not to exceed 
     $1,000,000,000, as are required to carry out the program 
     established under section 478.
       (B) PSO grant program.--To the extent that amounts 
     available in the Fund exceed the amount required to carry out 
     that program, there are authorized to be appropriated to the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, such sums as are required to 
     carry out the program established under section 476, not to 
     exceed an amount, determined by the Director of the Office of 
     Management and Budget, on the basis of the findings of the 
     National Baseline Interoperability study conducted by the 
     SAFECOM Office of the Department of Homeland Security.
       (2) Reversion of unused funds.--Any auction proceeds in the 
     Fund that are remaining after the date on which the programs 
     under section 476 and 478 terminate, as determined by the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Commerce 
     respectively, shall revert to and be deposited in the general 
     fund of the Treasury.
       (d) Deposit of Auction Proceeds.--Paragraph (8) of section 
     309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 309(j)) 
     is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``or subparagraph (D)'' in subparagraph 
     (A) after ``subparagraph (B)''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(D) Disposition of cash proceeds from auction of channels 
     52 through 69.--Cash proceeds attributable to the auction of 
     any eligible frequencies between 698 and 806 megaHertz on the 
     electromagnetic spectrum conducted after the date of 
     enactment of the SAVE LIVES Act shall be deposited in the 
     Digital Transition Consumer Assistance Fund established under 
     section 477 of that Act.''.

     SEC. 478. DIGITAL TRANSITION PROGRAM.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary, in consultation with the 
     Commission and the Director of the Office of Management and 
     Budget, shall establish a program to assist households--
       (1) in the purchase or other acquisition of digital-to-
     analog converter devices that will enable television sets 
     that operate only with analog signal processing to continue 
     to operate when receiving a digital signal;
       (2) in the payment of a one-time installation fee (not in 
     excess of the industry average fee for the date, locale, and 
     structure involved, as determined by the Secretary) for 
     installing the equipment required for residential reception 
     of services provided by a multichannel video programming 
     distributor (as defined in section 602(13) of the 
     Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 602(13)); or
       (3) in the purchase of any other device that will enable 
     the household to receive over-the-air digital television 
     broadcast signals, but in an amount not in excess of the 
     average per-household assistance provided under paragraphs 
     (1) and (2).
       (b) Program Criteria.--The Secretary shall ensure that the 
     program established under subsection (a)--
       (1) becomes publicly available no later than January 1, 
     2008;
       (2) gives first priority to assisting lower income 
     households (as determined by the Director of the Bureau of 
     the Census for statistical reporting purposes) who rely 
     exclusively on over-the-air television broadcasts;
       (3) gives second priority to assisting other households who 
     rely exclusively on over-the-air television broadcasts;
       (4) is technologically neutral; and
       (5) is conducted at the lowest feasible administrative 
     cost.

     SEC. 479. LABEL REQUIREMENT FOR ANALOG TELEVISION SETS.

       (a) In General.--Section 303 of the Communications Act of 
     1934 (47 U.S.C. 303) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(z) Require that any apparatus described in paragraph (s) 
     sold or offered for sale in or affecting interstate commerce 
     after September 30, 2005, that is incapable of receiving and 
     displaying a digital television broadcast signal without the 
     use of an external device that translates digital television 
     broadcast signals into analog television broadcast signals 
     have affixed to it and, if it is sold or offered for sale in 
     a container, affixed to that container, a label that states 
     that the apparatus will be incapable of displaying over-the-
     air television broadcast signals received after December 31, 
     2008, without the purchase of additional equipment.''.
       (b) Shipment Prohibited.--Section 330 of the Communications 
     Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 330) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
       ``(d) Shipment of Unlabeled Obsolescent Television Sets.--
     No person shall ship in interstate commerce or manufacture in 
     the United States any apparatus described in section 303(s) 
     of this Act except in accordance with rules prescribed by the 
     Commission under section 303(z) of this Act.''.
       (c) Point of Sale Warning.--The Commission, in consultation 
     with the Federal Trade Commission, shall require the display 
     at, or in close proximity to, any commercial retail sales 
     display of television sets described in section 303(z) of the 
     Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 303(z)) sold or offered 
     for sale in or affecting interstate commerce after September 
     30, 2005, of a printed notice that clearly and conspicuously 
     states that the sets will be incapable of displaying over-
     the-air television broadcast signals received after December 
     31, 2008, without the purchase or lease of additional 
     equipment.

     SEC. 480. REPORT ON CONSUMER EDUCATION PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.

       Within 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
     Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and 
     Information, after consultation with the Commission, shall 
     transmit a report to the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
     Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives 
     Committee on Energy and Commerce containing recommendations 
     with respect to--
       (1) an effective program to educate consumers about the 
     transition to digital television broadcast signals and the 
     impact of that transition on consumers' choices of equipment 
     to receive such signals;
       (2) the need, if any, for Federal funding for such a 
     program;
       (3) the date of commencement and duration of such a 
     program; and
       (4) what department or agency should have the lead 
     responsibility for conducting such a program.

     SEC. 481. FCC TO ISSUE DECISION IN CERTAIN PROCEEDINGS.

       The Commission shall issue a final decision before--
       (1) January 1, 2005, in the Matter of Carriage of Digital 
     Television Broadcast Signals; Amendments to Part 76 of the 
     Commission's Rules, CS Docket No. 98-120;
       (2) January 1, 2005, in the Matter of Public Interest 
     Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360; 
     and
       (3) January 1, 2006, in the Implementation of the Satellite 
     Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999; Local Broadcast Signal 
     Carriage Issues, CS Docket No. 00-96.

     SEC. 482. DEFINITIONS.

       In this subtitle:
       (1) Commission.--The term ``Commission'' means the Federal 
     Communications Commission.
       (2) Fund.--The term ``Fund'' means the Digital Transition 
     Consumer Assistance Fund established by section 477.
       (3) Secretary.--Except where otherwise expressly provided, 
     the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Commerce.

     SEC. 483. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       Notwithstanding section 341, this subtitle takes effect on 
     the date of enactment of this Act.
       On page 134, line 14, insert ``issue guidelines'' before 
     ``on classification''
       On page 134, strike lines 16 and 17 and insert the 
     following:
     commonly accepted processing and access controls, in the 
     course of which review, the

[[Page H8959]]

     President may consider any comments submitted by the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, and the Committee on International Relations 
     of the House of Representatives regarding--
       (i) the scope of the review the President should undertake 
     in formulating the guidelines under this subparagraph; and
       (ii) the substance of what guidelines should be issued.
       On page 177, after line 17, add the following:

     SEC. 226. CONGRESSIONAL APPEALS OF CLASSIFICATION DECISIONS.

       (a) Redesignation of Public Interest Declassification Board 
     as Independent National Security Classification Board.--(1) 
     Subsection (a) of section 703 of the Public Interest 
     Declassification Act of 2000 (title VII of Public Law 10-567; 
     50 U.S.C. 435 note) is amended by striking `` `Public 
     Interest Declassification Board' '' and inserting `` 
     `Independent National Security Classification Board' ''.
       (2) The heading of such section is amended to read as 
     follows:

     ``SEC. 703. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
                   BOARD.''.

       (b) Review of Classification Decisions.--
       (1) In general.--The Independent National Security 
     Classification Board shall, pursuant to a request under 
     paragraph (3), review any classification decision made by an 
     executive agency with respect to national security 
     information.
       (2) Access.--The Board shall have access to all documents 
     or other materials that are classified on the basis of 
     containing national security information.
       (3) Requests for review.--The Board shall review, in a 
     timely manner, the existing or proposed classification of any 
     document or other material the review of which is requested 
     by the chairman or ranking member of--
       (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations, or the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate; or
       (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     International Relations, or the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
       (4) Recommendations.--
       (A) In general.--The Board may make recommendations to the 
     President regarding decisions to classify all or portions of 
     documents or other material for national security purposes or 
     to declassify all or portions of documents or other material 
     classified for such purposes.
       (B) Implementation.--Upon receiving a recommendation from 
     the Board under subparagraph (A), the President shall 
     either--
       (i) accept and implement such recommendation; or
       (ii) not later than 60 days after receiving the 
     recommendation if the President does not accept and implement 
     such recommendation, transmit in writing to Congress 
     justification for the President's decision not to implement 
     such recommendation.
       (5) Regulations.--The Board shall prescribe regulations to 
     carry out this subsection.
       (6) Executive agency defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``Executive agency'' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 105 of title 5, United States Code .
       On page 39, strike lines 8 through 11 and insert the 
     following:
       (c) Personnel Strength Level.--Congress shall authorize the 
     personnel strength level for the National Intelligence 
     Reserve Corps for each fiscal year.
       At the end of subtitle A of title II, add the following:

     SEC. __. USE OF UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL REMOTE SENSING SPACE 
                   CAPABILITIES FOR IMAGERY AND GEOSPATIAL 
                   INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) In General.--The National Intelligence Director shall 
     take actions to ensure, to the extent practicable, the 
     utilization of United States commercial remote sensing space 
     capabilities to fulfill the imagery and geospatial 
     information requirements of the intelligence community.
       (b) Procedures for Utilization.--The National Intelligence 
     Director may prescribe procedures for the purpose of meeting 
     the requirement in subsection (a).
       (c) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``imagery'' 
     and ``geospatial information'' have the meanings given such 
     terms in section 467 of title 10, United States Code.
       On page 9, line 13, strike ``counterterrorism'' and insert 
     ``intelligence, including counterterrorism,''.
       On page 23, line 1, strike ``may require modifications'' 
     and insert ``may modify, or may require modifications,''.
       On page 28, line 17, strike ``or'' and insert ``and''.
       On page 112, beginning on line 12, strike ``Committee on 
     Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on 
     Government Reform of the House of Representatives'' and 
     insert ``Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on 
     Government Reform of the House of Representatives''.
       On page 200, strike lines 5 through 11 and insert the 
     following:

     SEC. 307. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
                   SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERTAINING TO NATIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

       Section 105(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-5(a)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``ensure'' and inserting 
     ``assist the Director in ensuring''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``appropriate''.
       On page 78, line 19, insert ``regular and detailed'' before 
     ``reviews''.
       On page 79, strike lines 1 and 2 and insert the following 
     political considerations, based upon all sources available to 
     the intelligence community, and performed in a manner 
     consistent with sound analytic methods and tradecraft, 
     including reviews for purposes of determining whether or 
     not--
       (A) such product or products state separately, and 
     distinguish between, the intelligence underlying such product 
     or products and the assumptions and judgments of analysts 
     with respect to the intelligence and such product or 
     products;
       (B) such product or products describe the quality and 
     reliability of the intelligence underlying such product or 
     products;
       (C) such product or products present and explain 
     alternative conclusions, if any, with respect to the 
     intelligence underlying such product or products;
       (D) such product or products characterizes the 
     uncertainties, if any, and the confidence in such product or 
     products; and
       (E) the analyst or analysts responsible for such product or 
     products had appropriate access to intelligence information 
     from all sources, regardless of the source of the 
     information, the method of collection of the information, the 
     elements of the intelligence community that collected the 
     information, or the location of such collection.
       On page 80, line 1, insert ``(A)'' after ``(5)''.
       On page 80, line 3, strike ``, upon request,''.
       On page 80, between lines 5 and 6, insert the following:
       (B) The results of the evaluations under paragraph (4) 
     shall also be distributed as appropriate throughout the 
     intelligence community as a method for training intelligence 
     community analysts and promoting the development of sound 
     analytic methods and tradecraft. To ensure the widest 
     possible distribution of the evaluations, the Analytic Review 
     Unit shall, when appropriate, produce evaluations at multiple 
     classification levels.
       (6) Upon completion of the evaluations under paragraph (4), 
     the Analytic Review Unit may make such recommendations to the 
     National Intelligence Director and to appropriate heads of 
     the elements of the intelligence community for awards, 
     commendations, additional training, or disciplinary or other 
     actions concerning personnel as the Analytic Review Unit 
     considers appropriate in light of such evaluations. Any 
     recommendation of the Analytic Review Unit under this 
     paragraph shall not be considered binding on the official 
     receiving such recommendation.
       On page 80, line 6, strike ``Information.--'' and insert 
     ``Information and Personnel.--(1)''.
       On page 80, line 8, insert ``, the Analytic Review Unit, 
     and other staff of the Office of the Ombudsman of the 
     National Intelligence Authority'' after ``Authority''.
       On page 80 line 10, insert ``operational and'' before 
     ``field reports''.
       On page 80, between lines 13 and 14, insert the following:
       (2) The Ombudsman, the Analytic Review Unit, and other 
     staff of the Office shall have access to any employee, or any 
     employee of a contractor, of the intelligence community whose 
     testimony is needed for the performance of the duties of the 
     Ombudsman.
       On page 108, between lines 8 and 9, insert the following:

     SEC. 153. ADDITIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Foreign language education is essential for the 
     development of a highly-skilled workforce for the 
     intelligence community.
       (2) Since September 11, 2001, the need for language 
     proficiency levels to meet required national security 
     functions has been raised, and the ability to comprehend and 
     articulate technical and scientific information in foreign 
     languages has become critical.
       (b) Linguistic Requirements.--(1) The National Intelligence 
     Director shall--
       (A) identify the linguistic requirements for the National 
     Intelligence Authority;
       (B) identify specific requirements for the range of 
     linguistic skills necessary for the intelligence community, 
     including proficiency in scientific and technical 
     vocabularies of critical foreign languages; and
       (C) develop a comprehensive plan for the Authority to meet 
     such requirements through the education, recruitment, and 
     training of linguists.
       (2) In carrying out activities under paragraph (1), the 
     Director shall take into account education grant programs of 
     the Department of Defense and the Department of Education 
     that are in existence as of the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.
       (3) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director shall 
     submit to Congress a report on the requirements identified 
     under paragraph (1), including the success of the Authority 
     in meeting such requirements. Each report shall notify 
     Congress of any additional resources determined by the 
     Director to be required to meet such requirements.

[[Page H8960]]

       (4) Each report under paragraph (3) shall be in 
     unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
       (c) Professional Intelligence Training.--The National 
     Intelligence Director shall require the head of each element 
     and component within the National Intelligence Authority who 
     has responsibility for professional intelligence training to 
     periodically review and revise the curriculum for the 
     professional intelligence training of the senior and 
     intermediate level personnel of such element or component in 
     order to--
       (1) strengthen the focus of such curriculum on the 
     integration of intelligence collection and analysis 
     throughout the Authority; and
       (2) prepare such personnel for duty with other departments, 
     agencies, and element of the intelligence community.
       On page 97, line 10, insert before the period the 
     following: ``, including through the establishment of 
     mechanisms for the sharing of information and analysis among 
     and between national intelligence centers having adjacent or 
     significantly interrelated geographic regions or functional 
     areas of intelligence responsibility''.
       On page 91, between lines 12 and 13, insert the following:
       (C) Employees of Federally Funded Research and Development 
     Centers (as that term is defined in part 2 of the Federal 
     Acquisition Regulation), including employees of the 
     Department of Energy national laboratories who are associated 
     with field intelligence elements of the Department of Energy, 
     shall be eligible to serve under contract or other mechanism 
     with the National Counterterrorism Center under this 
     paragraph.
       On page 98, between lines 21 and 22, insert the following:
       (C) employees of Federally Funded Research and Development 
     Centers (as that term is defined in part 2 of the Federal 
     Acquisition Regulation), including employees of the 
     Department of Energy national laboratories who are associated 
     with field intelligence elements of the Department of Energy, 
     shall be eligible to serve under contract or other mechanism 
     with a national intelligence center under this paragraph.
       On page 45, between lines 10 and 11, insert the following:
       (11) The Chief Scientist of the National Intelligence 
     Authority.
       On page 45, line 11, strike ``(11)'' and insert ``(12)''.
       On page 45, line 14, strike ``(12)'' and insert ``(13)''.
       On page 59, between lines 14 and 15, insert the following:

     SEC. 131. CHIEF SCIENTIST OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   AUTHORITY.

       (a) Chief Scientist of National Intelligence Authority.--
     There is a Chief Scientist of the National Intelligence 
     Authority who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence 
     Director.
       (b) Requirement Relating to Appointment.--An individual 
     appointed as Chief Scientist of the National Intelligence 
     Authority shall have a professional background and experience 
     appropriate for the duties of the Chief Scientist.
       (c) Duties.--The Chief Scientist of the National 
     Intelligence Authority shall--
       (1) act as the chief representative of the National 
     Intelligence Director for science and technology;
       (2) chair the National Intelligence Authority Science and 
     Technology Committee under subsection (d);
       (3) assist the Director in formulating a long-term strategy 
     for scientific advances in the field of intelligence;
       (4) assist the Director on the science and technology 
     elements of the budget of the National Intelligence 
     Authority; and
       (5) perform other such duties as may be prescribed by 
     Director or by law.
       (d) National Intelligence Authority Science and Technology 
     Committee.--(1) There is within the Office of the Chief 
     Scientist of the National Intelligence Authority a National 
     Intelligence Authority Science and Technology Committee.
       (2) The Committee shall be composed of composed of the 
     principal science officers of the National Intelligence 
     Program.
       (3) The Committee shall--
       (A) coordinate advances in research and development related 
     to intelligence; and
       (B) perform such other functions as the Chief Scientist of 
     the National Intelligence Authority shall prescribe.
       On page 59, line 15, strike ``131.'' and insert ``132.''.
       On page 202, line 16, strike ``131(b)'' and insert 
     ``132(b)''.
       On page 113, between lines 17 and 18, insert the following:
       (b) Termination of Employees.--(1) Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of law, the National Intelligence Director 
     may, in the discretion of the Director, terminate the 
     employment of any officer or employee of the National 
     Intelligence Authority whenever the Director considers the 
     termination of employment of such officer or employee 
     necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.
       (2) Any termination of employment of an officer or employee 
     under paragraph (1) shall not affect the right of the officer 
     or employee to seek or accept employment in any other 
     department, agency, or element of the United States 
     Government if declared eligible for such employment by the 
     Office of Personnel Management.
       On page 113, line 18, strike ``(b) Rights and Protections'' 
     and insert ``(c) Other Rights and Protections''.
       On page 113, after line 24, add the following:
       At the appropriate place, insert the follows:
       (d) Regulations.--The National Intelligence Director shall 
     prescribe regulations on the application of the authorities, 
     rights, and protections in and made applicable by subsection 
     (a), (b), and (c), to the personnel of the National 
     Intelligence Authority.
       On page 119, strike lines 16 through 18 and insert: ``The 
     National Intelligence Director shall convene regular meetings 
     of the Joint Intelligence Community Council.''
       ``(e) Advice and Opinions of Members Other Than Chairman.--
     (1) A member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council 
     (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice 
     or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion 
     in addition to, the advice presented by the National 
     Intelligence Director to the President or the National 
     Security Council, in the role of the Chairman as Chairman of 
     the Joint Intelligence Community Council. If a member submits 
     such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice 
     or opinion of such member at the same time the Chairman 
     presents the advice of the Chairman to the President or the 
     National Security Council, as the case may be.
       ``(2) The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure 
     that the presentation of the advice of the Chairman to the 
     President or the National Security Council is not unduly 
     delayed by reason of the submission of the individual advice 
     or opinion of another member of the Council.
       ``(f) Recommendations to Congress.--Any member of the Joint 
     Intelligence Community Council may make such recommendations 
     to Congress relating to the intelligence community as such 
     member considers appropriate.''.
       On page 84, beginning on line 8, strike ``joint operations 
     relating to counterterrorism'' and insert ``interagency 
     counterterrorism planning and activities''.
       On page 126, strike lines 23 through 25.
       On page 127, line 1, strike ``(2)'' and insert ``(1)''.
       On page 127, line 4, strike ``(3)'' and insert ``(2)''.
       On page 128, strike lines 1 through 3 and insert following:
       (3) Environment.--The term ``Environment'' means the 
     Information Sharing Environment as described under subsection 
     (c).
       On page 130, strike line 10 and insert the following:
       (c) Information Sharing Environment.--
       On page 130, line 20, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 133, lines 5 and 6, delete. ``Director of the 
     Office of Management and Budget'' and insert ``principal 
     officer as designated in subsection 206(g)''
       On page 133, line 10, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 134, line 2, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 134, line 22, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 135, beginning on line 16, strike ``the Director of 
     Management and Budget shall submit to the President and'' and 
     insert ``the President shall submit''.
       On page 135 strike lines 19 through 22 and insert 
     ``Environment. The enterprise architecture and implementation 
     plan shall be prepared by the principal officer in 
     consultation with the Executive council and shall include--''
       On page 135, line 24, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 136, line 3, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 136, line 5, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 136, line 7, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 137, beginning on line 4, strike ``Network'' and 
     insert ``Environment''.
       On page 137, line 8, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 137, line 11, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 137, line 14, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 137, line 16, strike ``Network;'' and insert 
     ``Environment; and''.
       On page 137, line 18, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 137, line 21, strike ``that the Director of 
     Management and Budget determines'' and insert ``determined'' 
     and insert a period.
       On page 138, strike lines 1 through 3 and insert the 
     following:
       (g) Responsibilities of Executive Council for Information 
     Sharing Environment.--
       On page 138, beginning on line 4, insert ``(1) Not later 
     than 120 days after the date of enactment with notification 
     to Congress, the President shall designate an individual as 
     the principal officer responsible for information sharing 
     across the Federal government. That individual shall have and 
     exercise government wide authority and have management 
     expertise in enterprise architecture, information sharing and 
     interoperability.
       On page 138, beginning on line 6, strike ``The Director of 
     Management and Budget'' and insert ``The principal officer 
     designated under this subsection''
       On page 138, beginning on line 9, strike ``Network'' and 
     insert ``Environment''.
       On page 138, line 14, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 138, line 17, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 138, line 21, strike ``to the President and''.

[[Page H8961]]

       On page 139, line 5, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 140, strike lines 5 through 17.
       On page 140, strike lines 18 and 19 and insert the 
     following:
       (h) Establishment of Executive Council.--
       On page 140, beginning on line 22, strike ``line 20 through 
     line 24'' and insert ``There is established an Executive 
     Council on information sharing that shall assist the 
     principal officer as designated under subsection 206(g) in 
     the execution of the duties under this Act concerning 
     information sharing.''.
       On page 141, line 1, insert ``The Executive Council shall 
     be chaired by the principal officer designated in subsection 
     206(g).
       On page 141, beginning on line 4, strike ``, who shall 
     serve as the Chairman of the Executive Council''.
       On page 142, beginning on line 2, strike ``assist the 
     Director of Management and Budget in--'' and insert ``assist 
     the President in--''.
       On page 142, beginning on line 4, strike ``Network'' and 
     insert ``Environment''.
       On page 142, line 8, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 142, line 11, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 142, line 12, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 142, beginning on line 15, strike ``Network;'' and 
     insert ``Environment; and''.
       On page 142, strike lines 22 through 24, and insert (F) 
     considering input provided by persons from outside the 
     federal government with significant experience and expertise 
     in policy technical, and operational matters, including 
     issues of security, privacy, or civil liberties.
       On page 143, beginning on line 7, strike ``the Director of 
     Management and Budget, in the capacity as Chair of the 
     Executive Council,'' and insert ``the principal officer as 
     designated in section 206(g)''.
       On page 144, strike line 3 and all that follows through 
     page 145, line 10.
       On page 145 line 11, strike ``(j)'' and insert ``(i)''.
       On page 145, beginning on line 14, strike ``through the 
     Director of Management and Budget'' and insert ``principal 
     officer as designated in section 206(g).''
       On page 145, line 16, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 145, line 21, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 145, line 22, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 146, line 4, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 146, line 7, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 146, line 9, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 146, line 13, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 147, line 2, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 147, line 6, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 147, line 8, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 147, line 11, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 147, line 17, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 147, line 22, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 148, line 6, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 148, line 8, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 148, line 16, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 148, line 17, strike ``(k)'' and insert ``(j)''.
       On page 148, line 20, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 148, line 24, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 149, line 3, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 149, line 5, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 149, line 10, strike ``(l)'' and insert ``(k)''.
       On page 149, line 13, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 149, line 14, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 149, beginning on line 14, strike ``the Director of 
     Management and Budget'' and insert ``the principal officer as 
     designated in section 206(g)''.
       On page 149, line 19, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 150, line 2, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 150, line 9, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 150, line 13, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 150, line 16, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 150, line 18, strike ``(m)'' and insert ``(l)''.
       On page 150, beginning on line 23, strike ``Network'' and 
     insert ``Environment''.
       On page 151, line 2, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 151, line 3, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 152, line 7, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 152, line 11, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 152, line 19, strike ``(n)'' and insert ``(m)''.
       On page 152, beginning on line 21, strike ``to the Director 
     of Management and Budget''.
       On page 153, line 1, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 133, line 4, strike ``90 days'' and insert ``180 
     days''.
       On page 134, line 4, strike ``180 days'' and insert ``270 
     days''.
       On page 135, line 15, strike ``270 days'' and insert ``1 
     year''.
       On page 140, line 6, strike ``30 days'' and insert ``90 
     days''.
       On page 145, line 12, strike ``1 year'' and insert ``15 
     months''.
       On page 149, line 16, strike ``1 year'' and insert ``15 
     months''.
       On page 150, line 20, strike ``1 year'' and insert ``15 
     months''.
       On page 212, beginning on line 3, strike ``subsection (b), 
     this Act, and the amendments made by this Act,'' and insert 
     ``subsections (b), (c), and (d), titles I through III of this 
     Act, and the amendments made by such titles,''
       On page 212, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following:
       (b) Specified Effective Dates.--(1) The provisions of 
     section 206 shall take effect as provided in such provisions.
       (2) The provisions of sections 211 and 212 shall take 
     effect 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       On page 212, line 7, strike ``(b)'' and all that follows 
     through ``United States'' on line 10 and insert ``(c) Earlier 
     Effective Date.--In order to safeguard the national security 
     of the United States through rapid implementation of titles I 
     through III of this Act while also ensuring a smooth 
     transition in the implementation of such titles,''.
       On page 212, beginning on line 11, strike ``Act (including 
     the amendments made by this Act), or one or more particular 
     provisions of this Act'' and insert ``titles I through III of 
     this Act (including the amendments made by such titles), or 
     one or more particular provisions of such titles''.
       On page 212, between lines 16 and 17, insert the following:
       (d) Delayed Effective Date.--(1) Except with respect to a 
     provision specified in subsection (b), the President may 
     extend the effective date of a provision of titles I through 
     III of this Act (including the amendments made by such 
     provision) for any period up to 180 days after the effective 
     date otherwise provided by this section for such provision.
       (2) The President may extend the effective date of a 
     provision under paragraph (1) only if the President 
     determines that the extension is necessary to safeguard the 
     national security of the United States and after balancing 
     the need for a smooth transition in the implementation of 
     titles I through III of this Act against the need for a rapid 
     implementation of such titles.
       On page 212, line 17, strike ``(c)'' and insert ``(e)''.
       On page 212, line 18, strike ``(b)'' and insert ``(c) or 
     (d)''.
       On page 212, line 23, strike ``earlier'' and insert 
     ``earlier or delayed''.
       On page 212, line 25, strike ``earlier'' and insert 
     ``earlier or delayed''.
       On page 28, beginning on line 16, strike ``of the National 
     Intelligence Director''.
       On page 43, beginning on line 1, strike ``OF THE NATIONAL 
     INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR''.
       On page 43, beginning on line 5, strike ``of the National 
     Intelligence Director'' and insert ``for the National 
     Intelligence Director and the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency''.
       On page 43, line 14, add at the end the following: ``Any 
     use of funds from the Reserve shall be subject to the 
     direction and approval of the National Intelligence Director 
     and in accordance with procedures issued by the Director.''.
       On page 43, beginning on line 17, strike ``of the National 
     Intelligence Director''.
       On page 141, between lines 15 and 16, insert the following:
       (H) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or his 
     designee;
       On page 141, line 16, strike ``(H)'' and insert ``(I)''.
       On page 141, line 18, strike ``(I)'' and insert ``(J)''.
       On page 141, line 21, strike ``(J)'' and insert ``(K)''.
       On page 194, beginning on line 23, strike ``of the National 
     Intelligence Director''.
       On page 153, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:

     SEC. 207. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
                   DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD ON PREVENTING AND 
                   DEFENDING AGAINST CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR ATTACK.

       (a) Finding.--Congress finds that the June 2004 report of 
     the Defense Science Board Task Force on Preventing and 
     Defending Against Clandestine Nuclear Attack--
       (1) found that it would be easy for adversaries to 
     introduce and detonate a nuclear explosive clandestinely in 
     the United States;
       (2) found that clandestine nuclear attack and defense 
     against such attack should be treated as an emerging aspect 
     of strategic warfare and that those matters warrant national 
     and Department of Defense attention; and
       (3) called for a serious national commitment to a 
     multidepartment program to create a multi-element, layered, 
     global, civil/military complex of systems and capabilities 
     that can greatly reduce the likelihood of a successful 
     clandestine attack, achieving levels of protection effective 
     enough to warrant the effort.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the

[[Page H8962]]

     Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the 
     Secretary of Energy, submit to the Committees on Armed 
     Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a 
     report on the actions proposed to be taken to address the 
     recommendations of the Defense Science Board Task Force on 
     Preventing and Defending Against Clandestine Nuclear Attack.
       On page 109, line 6, insert the words ``within the National 
     Intelligence Program'' after the words ``for each 
     intelligence program''
       On page 109, strike lines 12 and 13 and insert the 
     following:
       (B) serve as exclusive milestone decision authority, except 
     that with respect to Department of Defense programs the 
     Director shall serve as milestone decision authority jointly 
     with the Secretary of Defense or the designee of the 
     Secretary; and
       On page 110, strike lines 8 through 18 and insert the 
     following:
       (4) If the National Intelligence Director and the Secretary 
     of Defense are unable to reach agreement on a milestone 
     decision under this subsection, the Director shall assume 
     milestone decision authority subject to review by the 
     President at the request of the Secretary.
       On page 94, between lines 14 and 15, insert the following:
       (3) There may be established under this subsection one or 
     more national intelligence centers having intelligence 
     responsibility for the following:
       (A) The nuclear terrorism threats confronting the United 
     States.
       (B) The chemical terrorism threats confronting the United 
     States.
       (C) The biological terrorism threats confronting the United 
     States.
       On page 94, line 15, strike ``(3)'' and insert ``(4)''.
       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY USE OF NISAC CAPABILITIES.

       The National Intelligence Director shall establish a formal 
     relationship, including information sharing, between the 
     intelligence community and the National Infrastructure 
     Simulation and Analysis Center. Through this relationship, 
     the intelligence community shall take full advantage of the 
     c