Congressional Record: November 21, 2003 (Senate)
Page S15335-S15358


  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I now move to proceed to the consideration 
of H.R. 2417, the Intelligence authorization conference report. Before 
the Chair puts the question, this conference report has been cleared on 
both sides, and I hope that we can finish action on it very quickly.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to 
  The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, in response to the leader's statement, we 
also believe in energy independence and the security of the Nation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is not a debatable motion.
  Mr. REID. Fine. I will withhold.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to 
  The motion was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The report will be stated.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Committee of Conference on the disagreeing votes of the 
     two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 
     2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for 
     intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 
     United States Government, the Community Management Account, 
     and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability 
     System, and for other purposes, having met, have agreed that 
     the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of 
     the Senate, and agree to the same with an amendment and the 
     Senate agree to the same, signed by a majority of the 
     conferees on the part of both Houses.

  The Senate proceeded to consider the conference report.
  (The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the 
Record of November 19, 2003.)
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I am happy to yield to the distinguished 
assistant Democratic leader for a question.


  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas is recognized.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the pending 
business before the Senate is the Intelligence conference report; is 
that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to urge Senate passage of 
the conference report for the Fiscal Year 2004 Intelligence 
Authorization Act.
  On November 20 the conference report was approved by the House of 
Representatives. In order to quickly provide the Intelligence Community 
the authorities it requires in order to pay, house, and equip its 
personnel for our most sensitive and critical national security work, 
this legislation should be sent to the President without delay. The 
horrible terrorist attacks in Turkey underscore the urgency of our 
  This conference report is good legislation with important management 
and budget authorities. I will review just a few of them for you.
  In the conference report, the Senate receded to a number of 
significant House provisions of interest. The most significant of these 
is a provision that will consolidate and organize existing 
intelligence-related functions in the Department of the Treasury by 
creating a new Office of Intelligence and Analysis. This 
administration-supported provision also creates a new Assistant 
Secretary position.
  Senate managers also accepted a House provision intended to foster 
better information-sharing among Federal, State and local government 
officials. The bombings in Turkey illustrate that terrorists remain 
capable of striking at the heart of peaceful societies. We must be 
prepared to meet this continuing threat.
  The conference report retains a Senate provision on Central 
Intelligence Agency Compensation Reform, with a House amendment to 
ensure that Congress will have an opportunity to assess the impact of 
such reform before it becomes permanent.
  The conference report provides important new personal services 
contracting authority to the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations. This authority is intended to permit the Director to 
exercise greater hiring flexibility as was recommended post-9/11 in 
order to bring aboard certain categories of critically-needed skills 
more quickly.
  Turning to the budget, when we began to review the President's fiscal 
year 2004 request I became very concerned at the recent growth in 
intelligence funding. I am still concerned.
  There is clearly not enough money in future years to fully fund the 
intelligence programs in this year's budget request. That is the sad 
reality of this budget. The intelligence community is stretched thin, 
with far more requirements than available funds. Too many projects and 
activities have been started that cannot be accommodated in the top 
line. It does not matter what caused this problem. The problem exists. 
Unless the President directs a dramatic and sustained increase to the 
intelligence budget next year, we will have to make the hard choices 
  A significant issue that must be addressed by the executive branch is 
the manner in which cost estimates for the procurement of major 
intelligence community systems are conducted. The magnitude and 
consistency in the cost growth on recent acquisitions indicates a 
systemic intelligence community bias to underestimate the cost of major 
  This ``perceived affordability'' creates difficulties in the out 
years as the National Foreign Intelligence Program becomes burdened 
with content that is

[[Page S15355]]

more costly than the budgeted funding. This underestimation of future 
costs has resulted in significant re-shuffling of NFIP funds to meet 
emerging shortfalls.
  In an attempt to correct this problem, the conference report contains 
a provision which would mandate a fundamentally more sound approach to 
cost estimates for major systems. The business-as-usual approach must 
  There is another area I wish to mention in general terms concerning 
the analytical capabilities of the intelligence community. All recent 
after-action reports or studies of intelligence failures point to the 
inability of analysts to process ever-growing quantities of 
information. In an effort to correct this problem, the conferees agreed 
to move funds to programs at the Defense Intelligence Agency, the 
National Security Agency, and the CIA to improve the community's 
analytic capabilities.
  My key objectives in formulating the conference report were to ensure 
our Nation's continuing effort to prosecute the war on terrorism and to 
ensure that the ``longer view'' about intelligence community 
requirements is taken into account. I believe that this conference 
report meets both objectives.
  We met those objectives because we had bipartisan cooperation when 
and where it counted. I wish to thank the distinguished vice chairman, 
Senator Rockefeller, as well as the distinguished House chairman, 
Representative Goss, and his ranking member, Representative Harman, for 
their assistance in making the conference report possible. The staff of 
both intelligence Committees must also be commended for their diligent 
work on this important legislation.
  There is no opposition on our side of the aisle. We have worked very 
hard with the House to come up with a good compromise. This bill is 
vitally needed on behalf of national security. A similar bill passed 
the Senate several weeks ago by unanimous consent.
  I yield to my distinguished colleague, the vice chairman, Senator 
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I agree with the chairman of the 
committee, the Senator from Kansas. There is no objection on this side. 
It has been cleared. There is no objection on our side. I presume the 
bill will be voted through.
  Mr. President, I am pleased to join the distinguished chairman of the 
Select Committee on Intelligence in recommending passage of the 
conference report on H.R. 2417, the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2004.
  The bill authorizes appropriations for the Central Intelligence 
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, 
and the intelligence components of the F.B.I. and other U.S. government 
agencies. It also contains a number of important provisions intended to 
lay the foundation for process and organizational changes in the 
intelligence community.
  The classified nature of U.S. intelligence activities prevents us 
from disclosing publicly the details of our budgetary recommendations. 
As I described to the Senate when our bill was considered in July, 10 
years ago I joined a majority of Senate colleagues in voting to express 
the sense of Congress that the aggregate amount requested, authorized, 
and spent for intelligence should be disclosed to the public in an 
appropriate manner. The House opposed the provision. I continue to 
believe that we should find a means, consistent with national security, 
of sharing with the American taxpayer information about the total 
amount, although not the details, of our intelligence spending. In 
holding the intelligence community accountable for performance, and the 
Congress and the President accountable for the resources they provide 
to the Intelligence Community, citizens should know the Nation's 
overall investment in intelligence.
  The bill includes a number of provisions intended to promote 
innovations in information sharing, human intelligence, and 
counterintelligence, among other things. Many of these initiatives 
represent initial steps rather than solutions, but they are necessary 
to raise the level of awareness in Congress and the executive branch 
regarding a variety of urgent and complex challenges and to lay the 
foundation for reforms the committee will be considering next year.
  Section 351 of the bill requires a report on the threat posed by 
espionage in an era when secrets are stored on powerful, classified 
U.S. computer networks rather than on paper. A single spy today can 
remove more information on a disk than spies of yesteryear could remove 
with a truck. We have already suffered losses, for example, in the 
Ames, Regan, and Hanssen cases, where sloppy computer security 
permitted traitors to exploit large quantities of highly classified 
information. Unfortunately, these cases provide a warning that appears 
to have gone largely unheeded. We still do not have a cohesive set of 
policies and procedures to protect our classified networks from cleared 
insiders who seek to betray their country, Our reliance on classified 
information systems for warfighting and intelligence is growing daily, 
yet hundreds of thousands of individuals have virtually unrestricted 
access to these critical networks.
  All but a few Government personnel are honest and patriotic 
Americans, but the sad fact is that there has not been a day since WWII 
when we have not had spies within our Government. There have been over 
80 espionage convictions in the last 25 years. They include personnel 
from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, NSA, CIA, FBI, State 
Department, the National Reconnaissance Office and the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense. It is a very real and continuing problem and 
there will undoubtedly be more espionage arrests in the months and 
years ahead. Espionage is an unfortunate fact of life, and we simply 
cannot afford to operate classified systems in which thousands of 
individuals enjoy the ability to download or upload classified 
information at will.
  Other countries are seeking to exploit this situation to collect 
defense secrets, and no doubt contemplate blinding our Government and 
troops in time of war. We would never permit such broad access to 
weapons in an armory, yet these classified systems are of much greater 
strategic significance than M-16 rifles, tanks, or 500 pound gravity 
bombs. We simply must develop the policies and capabilities necessary 
to control input and output devices on these systems and monitor their 
  Section 352 of the bill calls for a review of our cumbersome, 
outmoded, and many would say ineffective personnel security system. It 
is a fact that almost every spy has held high-level security 
clearances. It is also a fact that few, if any of these individuals 
were identified through routine security clearance updates.
  Most people who become spies join the government with no intention of 
betraying their country. Research by the Defense Department shows that 
most spies are people who develop grievances as their careers progress, 
at times having developed money and alcohol problems as well, and then 
turn to espionage as a way of feeding their egos and their bank 
  Yet, we give a young, single Navy recruit seeking an intelligence 
assignment the same scrutiny as a 30-year intelligence operative with 
financial troubles who routinely travels to countries of concern. 
Further, even when derogatory information surfaces, sometimes even very 
disturbing information which raises serious espionage issues, the 
government rarely revokes the clearances we rely on so heavily and 
which cost so much.
  In the information age, we cannot wait 5 to10 years to identify 
employee problems that may be related to espionage. Too much damage can 
be done too quickly. We need fresh thinking and recommendations that 
will provide more effective security for the large sums of money the 
taxpayer is investing.
  Section 354 of our bill calls for a review of classified information 
sharing policies within the Federal Government. This is an issue 
closely related to the foregoing provisions regarding inadequate 
security policies. ATM machines, for example, are a wonderfully 
convenient and effective means of providing access to banking 
resources--but they could not exist without magnetic cards, personal 

[[Page S15356]]

numbers, cameras and locks. Similarly, improved security is not a 
barrier to more flexible information sharing, it is a fundamental 
ingredient. The Joint Inquiry report on the 9/11 attacks highlighted 
information sharing as a critical shortcoming that prevented the 
interception of several hijackers. To help accelerate reform, the Joint 
Inquiry requested an administration report by this past June 30 on 
progress to reduce barriers among intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies engaged in counterterrorism. Unfortunately, no report has been 

  We have the technology for improved information sharing, and 
significant progress is being made. A Terrorist Threat Integration 
Center has been established, and new guidelines regarding sharing of 
grand jury information have been promulgated. These are very important 
steps forward. But to truly break down the barriers to information 
sharing, rather than relying on work-arounds, we need revised policies 
on sharing classified information which recognize and exploit the 
opportunities provided by modern information technology. This is 
especially important as we look to bridging the gap between the 
Intelligence Community and organizations charged with Homeland 
  Section 355 of the bill identifies a problem that would probably stun 
most taxpayers. Simply stated, notwithstanding the many billions of 
dollars invested in complex intelligence systems, ranging from 
satellites, to aircraft, to ships, and land-based collection platforms, 
there is no capability in the executive branch to independently and 
comprehensively model the performance of these systems. Consequently, 
new multi-billion-dollar systems are procured without the ability to 
rigorously evaluate potential trade-offs with other systems.
  Questions such as these should be asked: Given projected satellite, 
aircraft and UAV constellations, what is the marginal value of adding 
space-based radar satellites? Are there alternative investments that 
can better satisfy intelligence requirements? Don't senior policymakers 
need the ability to systematically examine the interactions of these 
many systems to identify trade-offs that can be achieved?
  Currently, most of the analysis of proposed collection systems is 
performed by the agencies seeking to justify their programs, or by 
senior policy officials who struggle to apply common sense and spread-
sheet level analysis to systems that often have overlapping 
capabilities. There is no reason that a rigorous, independent and 
comprehensive capability cannot be developed to support the 
programmatic reviews of the DCI and the Defense Department. This is but 
one example, though an important one, of the ways in which we believe 
the intelligence community can improve its strategic planning and 
decisionmaking processes.
  Section 356 of the bill raises an issue of profound strategic 
significance for the United States, namely the growing reliance of our 
country on hardware and software produced overseas. Although specific 
cases are classified, this is clearly a growing problem.
  After 1973, when the risks inherent in America's reliance on foreign 
oil became clear, many positive steps were taken to ameliorate our 
national vulnerabilities. Those steps included establishment of a 
strategic petroleum reserve, establishment of the Central Command, and 
research into alternative fuels. Unlike our dependence on foreign oil, 
however, our rapidly growing dependence on foreign hardware and 
software creates numerous opportunities for espionage and information 
operations that are extremely difficult to detect. Ironically, the 
countries identified by the FBI as most actively engaged in economic 
espionage against the United States are leading producers of the 
hardware and software we all use on a daily basis.
  The plain truth is that even the Defense Department does not know 
where most of the hardware and software it uses originates. Moreover, 
the Government does not have the right to examine source code unless 
voluntarily supplied. Further, at the present time, there are limited 
capabilities for analyzing source code that is made available. This 
situation requires serious attention by senior policymakers, including 
Congress, and the report required by section 356 should help to prompt 
a long overdue discussion of these issues.
  In concluding my remarks, I would like to look beyond our current 
bill to the issues the Intelligence Committee must contend with next 
year. Other committees share responsibility for reviewing the funding 
and systems needed by the intelligence community, but our committee is 
uniquely positioned to evaluate the intelligence community's 
performance--both its successes and failures--and to identify the 
changes required to meet the challenges of the future.
  In my view, money alone is not sufficient to enable the intelligence 
community to reach its full potential. The current structure of the 
intelligence community is fundamentally unchanged from its 
establishment in 1947. Serious change is long overdue. I strongly 
believe that new structures and authorities, coupled with able and 
aggressive leadership, are required to dramatically improve our 
intelligence community's efficiency and effectiveness.
  In many respects, the organizational issues confronting the 
intelligence community are analogous to those confronting the Defense 
Department prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The fundamental problem 
confronting the Department of Defense prior to Goldwater-Nichols was 
excessive military service control over military operations, policies 
and budgets. In response, Congress strengthened the weak integrating 
mechanisms in DoD, specifically the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and 
the Commanders of the Combatant Commands. The difference in military 
performance before Goldwater-Nichols--e.g., Desert 1, Lebanon, and 
Grenada--and after--Panama, Haiti, and Iraq--is stark and clear. In 
fact, I am convinced that the Goldwater-Nichols Act did more to enhance 
U.S. national security than any weapons system ever procured by the 
Department of Defense.
  Although the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization is not a precise 
template for restructuring the intelligence community, the problems are 
fundamentally similar: towering vertical structures--NSA, CIA, DIA, 
NRO, NIMA, the service intelligence components--and relatively weak 
integrating mechanisms--the DCI and his Community Management Staff. Any 
reorganization proposal needs to address this fundamental problem of 
inadequate integration and coordination. In that regard, I would 
suggest that the intelligence community's lack of responsiveness to the 
DCI's declaration of war on al- Qaida prior to 9/11 was in part a 
result of the DCI's weak community management authorities and inability 
to move the system. I am convinced that a strengthened DCI could more 
effectively manage the intelligence community, leading to performance 
improvements comparable to those achieved by the military in the wake 
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
  A conservative, incremental approach would involve the creation of a 
permanent cadre to staff the DCI much as the Secretary of Defense has 
an OSD staff. This simple change, coupled with aggressive business 
process reengineering and ``year of execution budget authority'' for 
the DCI over NFIP programs, would significantly strengthen the DCI's 
ability to manage the intelligence community and respond to new threats 
and opportunities.
  A more aggressive and far-reaching plan would have to address the 
fundamental changes that have occurred since the current structure was 
established by the National Security Act of 1947. Specifically, it 
would recognize that the once useful distinction between home and 
abroad has become not only irrelevant, but dysfunctional. This is not 
to suggest any need to reduce the protections afforded U.S. persons 
under the Constitution, merely that globalization and the development 
of cyberspace, combined with the rise of apocalyptic terrorists groups 
empowered by lethal new technologies, require a different, more agile 
structure that is not impeded by outmoded geographic distinctions. In 
that regard, we should find ways to more effectively coordinate foreign 
and domestic intelligence.
  Achievement of any substantial reorganization will require meticulous 
research by the congressional oversight committees, a substantial 
hearing record, and sustained interest by the administration. At the 
end of the day,

[[Page S15357]]

incremental steps will be better than none, and a more aggressive 
reorganization require a consensus not only on the Intelligence 
Authorization Committees, but with the Armed Services Committees as 
well. As challenging as these issues are, we simply cannot fulfill our 
duty to the American people unless we confront these crucial issues 
when Congress returns next year.
  In conclusion, the important steps we have taken with this measure, 
to include full funding of the administration's requests for 
intelligence activities, are the result of lengthy deliberations on 
matters as complex as they are vital. It is gratifying to see the work 
that has been done in both Chambers come together today in a bill we 
can send to the President. It is a useful first step, but only a first 
step, towards the development of an intelligence community better able 
to adapt to the rapidly evolving threats confronting our great nation.
  Finally, I would like to thank the chairman and the Committee staff 
for their arduous work on this bill. I look forward to making great 
strides together next year.
  I urge support for this measure.


  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise in my capacity as the chairman of 
the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs regarding the 
Conference Report to accompany H.R. 2417, the Intelligence 
Authorization Act of 2004. Section 105 of the act will create a new 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis within the Department of the 
Treasury. The Office is to be headed by a newly authorized Assistant 
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate. It will enhance the Department's access to 
intelligence community information and permit a reorganization and 
upgrading of the scope and capacities of Treasury's intelligence 
functions in light of the Nation's counterterrorist and economic 
sanctions programs. This section was drafted with bipartisan 
participation and close coordination with the Department of the 
  The particular terms governing the new office are important to me as 
chairman of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs over 
legislative and oversight matters relating, inter alia, to the Nation's 
economic sanctions laws and the Bank Secrecy Act, and, more generally, 
because of the importance of carefully delineating the limitations on 
any part of the U.S. intelligence community that lie within the 
structure of an executive department of the Government. I have a letter 
signed by the ranking member of the Banking Committee, Senator Paul S. 
Sarbanes, and myself addressed to Secretary of the Treasury John W. 
Snow, as well as Secretary Snow's response. This letter reflects the 
agreement of Treasury about the organization, structure and role of the 
new Office and Assistant Secretary position created and important 
related organizational matters concerning the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network and the Office of Foreign Assets Control.
  I request unanimous consent that the two letters be included in the 
Record. They provide, I believe, a good statement of congressional 
intent with regard to the establishment of the new Office and the new 
Assistant Secretary position. At this time I would yield the floor to 
the ranking member of the committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs, Senator Sarbanes.
  Mr. SARBANES. I thank the Senator. I simply want to note my agreement 
with the chairman and with his request to include the two letters in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

         U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
                                Washington, DC, November 20, 2003.
     Hon. John W. Snowe,
     Secretary of the Treasury, Department of the Treasury, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Secretary Snowe: A proposed amendment to section 105 
     of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2004, H.R. 2417, 
     would create a new Office of Intelligence and Analysis within 
     the Department of the Treasury, The Office would be headed by 
     a newly-authorized Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and 
     Analysis appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
     Senate. The Office would enhance the Department's access to 
     Intelligence Community information and permit a 
     reorganization and upgrading of the scope and capacities of 
     Treasury's intelligence functions in light of the nation's 
     counter-terrorist and economic sanctions programs.
       We are writing to you to confirm formally, before 
     consideration of the amendment proceeds, your and our mutual 
     understanding of the role of the proposed new Office and 
     Assistant Secretary within the Department of the Treasury. 
     Such confirmation is necessary because of the authority of 
     the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
     over legislative and oversight matters relating, inter alia, 
     to the Nation's economic sanctions laws and the Bank Secrecy 
     Act, and, more generally, to the Nation's financial system. 
     In that context, the Committee is necessarily concerned with 
     the careful delineation of the functions, and limitations, of 
     any part of the U.S. Intelligence Community that lies within 
     the structure of the Department of the Treasury.
       Based on discussions between members of our staffs and the 
     Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Legislative Affairs), we 
     understand that:
       1. The new Office is to be responsible for the receipt, 
     collation, analysis, and dissemination of all foreign 
     intelligence and foreign counterintelligence information 
     relevant to the operations and responsibilities of the 
     Treasury Department, and to have such other directly related 
     duties and authorities as the Secretary of the Treasury may 
     assign to it. The new Office will replace and absorb the 
     duties and personnel of Treasury's present Office of 
     Intelligence Support (``OIS'') and will carry on OIS' work in 
     the provision of information for use of the Department's 
     senior policy makers.
       2. The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis 
     will report to an Under Secretary of the Treasury 
     (Enforcement) as required by the statute. The Assistant 
     Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis will at no time 
     supervise any organization other than the new Office or 
     assume any other policy or supervisory duties not directly 
     related to that Office.
       3. The Secretary will seek prompt designation of a new 
     appointee for the vacant position of Under Secretary, and 
     ensure the chain of command will be organized and implemented 
     as outlined above.
       4. Our mutual understanding is that Treasury plans to have 
     an official appointed to a vacant Assistant Secretary 
     position. The official appointed to that position will 
     supervise the Office of Foreign Assets Control (``OFAC'') and 
     the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (``FinCEN'') as well 
     as other functions, but he or she will at no time supervise 
     the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. This Assistant 
     Secretary also will report to the Under Secretary referred to 
     in paragraphs 2. and 3., above.
       5. The general responsibilities of OFAC and FinCEN will not 
     be changed in the course of creating the new Office and these 
     new positions. However, it is anticipated that the new Office 
     will coordinate and oversee all work involving intelligence 
     analysts who work in OFAC and FinCEN (or in other parts of 
     the Treasury) primarily with classified information, in the 
     interest of creating the more robust analytic capability at 
     Treasury that was the articulated reason for the 
     authorization of this new Office. One of the primary tasks of 
     the new Office will be to examine and analyze classified 
     information, in conjunction with the relevant unclassified 
     information already available to OFAC and FinCEN, so that the 
     resultant product can be of use to OFAC and FinCEN as well as 
     to other agencies, under applicable legal rules. Thus, the 
     new Office will have access to all relevant information held 
     by FinCEN and OFAC for national security and anti-terrorism 
       The expertise of the Department of the Treasury is 
     necessary and integral to our Nation's security and to 
     success in the war on terrorism. We expect within the next 
     year to highlight your efforts in this area in one of the 
     series of Terror Finance hearings to be held by the 
     Committee, and we look forward to hearing at that time about 
     the innovative approaches to counter-terrorism efforts that 
     the proposed revitalization of Treasury's capacity for 
     financial intelligence analysis can produce.
     Richard C. Shelby,
       Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.
     Paul S. Sarbanes,
       Ranking Member, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 

                                   Department of the Treasury,

                                Washington, DC, November 21, 2003.
     Hon. Richard Shelby,
     Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 
         Development, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Shelby: Thank you for your letter concerning 
     creation, in section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization 
     Act of 2004, of the proposed Office of Intelligence and 
     Analysis, to be headed by a new Assistant Secretary for 
     Intelligence and Analysis, within the Department of the 
     Treasury. I have reviewed your letter and it correctly states 
     the commitments made to you on behalf about the role of the 
     proposed new Office and new Assistant Secretary within the 
     Department of the Treasury.
       I appreciate your input and look forward to working with 
     you, Senator Sarbanes, and

[[Page S15358]]

     your House colleagues to make sure the Treasury Department 
     meets the Congress' expectations. An identical letter has 
     also been sent to Senator Sarbanes.
       If there is anything that I can do to be of assistance to 
     you, please do not hesitate to contact me.
                                                     John W. Snow.

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask that the Chair put the question to 
the body.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
  If not, the question is on agreeing to the conference report.
  The conference report was agreed to.