Good morning, Chairman
Wolf, Congressman Serrano, and members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate
this opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee today and discuss
the recently announced FBI reorganization plan that was submitted to
the Congress. I am pleased that the second phase of my on-going reorganization
has been cleared by the Attorney General and the Administration and
transmitted to the Congress for review.
A New FBI Focus
Since becoming Director, I have been able to observe firsthand the volatile
environment in which the FBI is called to operate. I have become increasingly
convinced that success in the post-9/11 environment depends upon the
FBI becoming more flexible, agile, and mobile in its capacity to respond
to the array of difficult and challenging national security and criminal
threats facing the United States. The FBI must become better at shaping
its workforce, collaborating with its partners, applying technology
to support investigations, operations, and analyses protecting our information,
and developing core competencies.
I am equally convinced that success demands the FBI become more proactive
in its approaches to dealing with the threats and crime problems facing
the United States, especially in the areas of counterterrorism, counterintelligence,
and cyber-crime/infrastructure protection. Prevention of terrorist attacks
is our top priority. It will become even more important for the FBI
to continue to develop and maintain close working relationships with
international law enforcement partners if we are to prevent terrorist
groups from gaining footholds and bases of operation for launching attacks
against the United States.
in this new environment requires the FBI undertake a series of management
actions built upon three key inter-related elements: (1) refocusing
FBI mission and priorities; (2) realigning the FBI workforce to address
these priorities; and (3) shifting FBI management and operational cultures
to enhance flexibility, agility, effectiveness, and accountability.
This new focus and the accompanying organizational changes being proposed
are intended to strengthen and guide the Bureau through these challenging
times and are in direct response to the shortcomings and issues that
have been identified over the last several months. More importantly,
these proposals are in direct response to the tragic events of 9/11
and the clearly charted new course for the FBI mandated by the paramount
mission of prevention of terrorist attacks.
Mission and Priorities
Even though our
nation faces great challenges from those who seek to destroy our freedoms,
the basic mission of the FBI remains constant. First, and foremost,
the FBI must protect and defend the United States against terrorism
and foreign intelligence threats. Second, the FBI must uphold and enforce
the criminal laws of the United States. And third, the FBI must provide
and enhance assistance to its federal, state, municipal, and international
While the FBI's
core missions remain constant, its priorities have shifted since the
previous FBI Strategic Plan was issued in 1998 and the terrorist acts
of September 11, 2001. Under the new alignment, the FBI's focus is to:
1. Protect the
United States from terrorist attack.
2. Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations
3. Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology
4. Combat public corruption at all levels.
5. Protect civil rights.
6. Combat transnational and national criminal organizations and enterprises.
7. Combat major white-collar crime.
8. Combat significant violent crime.
9. Support federal, state, municipal, and international partners.
10. Upgrade technology to successfully perform the FBI's mission.
These are the FBI's
priorities, not only for the Bureau in its role as a national agency,
but also for each local FBI field office. The first eight priorities
reflect the core of the FBI's national security and criminal investigative
responsibilities. The last two, while not investigative in nature, are
equally critical to enabling the FBI to successfully achieve its goals
In pursuing these
priorities, I expect the FBI and its employees to be true to, and exemplify,
certain core values. These core values are:
- adherence to
the rule of law and the rights conferred to all under the United States
- integrity through everyday ethical behavior;
- accountability by accepting responsibility for our actions and decisions
and the consequences of our actions and decisions;
- fairness in dealing with people; and
- leadership through example, both at work and in our communities.
These missions and priorities are consistent with the existing authorities
conferred and jurisdictions established by law and executive order for
the FBI. I believe these missions and priorities represent the expectations
that the American people, the law enforcement community, the Congress,
and the Administration hold for the FBI.
the Workforce to Address Priorities
of the continuing terrorist threat facing the United States from the
Al-Qaeda network and of the urgent need to continue building the FBI's
capacity to prevent future terrorist acts through improved analytical
and intelligence information sharing capabilities, I am proposing a
permanent shift of 518 field agents from criminal investigations to
augment our counterterrorism investigations and activities (480 agents),
implement critical security improvements (13 agents), and support the
training of new Special Agents at the FBI Academy (25 agents). The FBI
will need to sustain its present level of commitment to combating and
preventing terrorism for the foreseeable future and be sufficiently
flexible to quickly shift whatever additional resources are necessary
to meet any counterterrorism investigative demand that materializes.
These 518 agents will be taken primarily from FBI drug investigations
(400), although there will be some shift from white-collar (59) and
violent crimes (59 agents).
The decision to propose reducing the FBI's level of involvement in drug
investigations came after careful consultation with FBI Special Agents
in Charge (SACs), United States Attorneys, state and municipal law enforcement,
Members of Congress, and others - including DEA Administrator Asa Hutchinson
who also sits on the Department of Justice Strategic Management Council.
The FBI will still participate in Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task
Forces (OCDETF) with other federal, state, and municipal law enforcement.
Our resources for OCDETF cases are not affected by the realignment of
drug resources. Even after the proposed reduction of 400 agents, the
FBI will still be devoting nearly 1,000 agents to drug-related cases.
What I am asking
our SACs to do is reevaluate the level of FBI involvement in other drug
cases and, where possible and without jeopardizing current investigations,
reduce FBI resources. Where in the past we might have contributed 10
to 12 agents for day-to-day involvement in a task force or investigation,
we might contribute 5 to 6. SACs may augment that day-to-day commitment
with additional resources to meet special needs, such as the execution
of search warrants or coordination of multiple arrests. We will also
be more deliberate in opening cases involving drug cartels and drug
trafficking organizations, making sure our efforts do not overlap or
duplicate those of the DEA. As a result of the realignment of 400 FBI
Special Agents, I believe the FBI and the DEA working together can ensure
that federal resources are appropriately applied, so that the critically
important war on drugs is not impaired in any way and that support to
state and local agencies is not diminished.
Similarly, in the areas of white-collar crime and violent crime, I am
proposing relatively modest reductions of agent personnel B roughly
2.5 percent in white-collar and 3 percent in violent crime. Again, I
will expect SACs to evaluate day-to-day levels of commitment to Safe
Streets Task Forces and make adjustments. In the area of white-collar
crime, we may adjust some of the thresholds used for determining whether
to proceed with an investigation and defer other cases to agency inspector
generals who posses the necessary expertise to handle criminal investigations.
But, I expect the impact on our state and municipal partners in these
two areas to be relatively minor. Let me assure you of one thing: if
a state and municipal law enforcement agency does not possess a needed
expertise, the FBI will provide the assistance and expertise needed.
This reallocation of field agent staffing should enable each SAC to
satisfy both the near-term investigative requirements and the national
programmatic objectives for the FBI's top three priorities - counterterrorism,
counterintelligence/espionage, and cyber-crime/infrastructure protection.
Our foremost mission is to protect the United States from terrorist
attacks, foreign intelligence operations, and cyber attacks. These are
dynamic challenges that threaten the very security of the United States
and the safety of the American people. Consequently, I consider the
Agents provided to each field office for these three priorities to be
the minimum level of investigative effort for these programs for the
foreseeable future. Moreover, it is my expectation that in addition
to these resources, each SAC will, on an ongoing basis and in consultation
with national Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, and Cyber executive
management at FBIHQ, be prepared to devote whatever additional resources
are necessary to fully address and resolve every emerging threat and
every situation that may arise in these three critical areas.
3. Shifting FBI Management and Operating Culture to Enhance Flexibility,
Agility, and Accountability
revised FBI priorities outlined above and redirecting the FBI workforce
toward these priorities requires a concurrent shift in how the FBI manages
these cases from a national perspective. These changes will also require
changes in how we operate within our offices and perform our work.
In support of our
top three priorities, I am directing a series of changes to strengthen
the FBI's national management and oversight of counterterrorism, counterintelligence,
and cyber-crime investigations and programs. These cases and investigations
are critical to the very foundation of the FBI's ability to protect
national security. These cases often involve parallel efforts in multiple
locations within the United States and foreign countries, and require
extensive coordination and collaboration with other Intelligence Community,
state, municipal and international partners. These cases also are complex
in terms of inter-relationships among groups and individuals, a complexity
that requires continuity and specialized expertise and skills. Most
importantly, these cases require an organizational capacity to quickly
respond and deploy personnel and technology to emerging and developing
These changes are also intended to create a centralized body of subject
matter experts and historical case knowledge that, in the past, has
been largely resident in a few FBI field offices. While this field-based
concentration of such expertise and knowledge often worked well in terms
of contributing to successful prosecutions of terrorists and spies,
such expertise and knowledge was often not available or easily shared
with other FBI Field Offices and our partners. The FBI's shift toward
terrorism prevention necessitates the building of a national level expertise
and body of knowledge that can be accessed by and deployed to all field
offices and that can be readily shared with our Intelligence Community
and law enforcement partners.
Division. A significant restructuring and expansion of the Counterterrorism
Division at FBI Headquarters is being proposed for three basic reasons.
First, the more direct role envisioned for the Counterterrorism Division
in managing investigations, providing operational support to field offices,
and collaborating with law enforcement and Intelligence Community partners
requires additional staff at Headquarters. Second, implementing a more
proactive approach to preventing terrorist acts and denying terrorist
groups the ability to operate and raise funds requires a centralized
and robust analytical capacity that does not exist in the present Counterterrorism
Division. Third, processing and exploiting the information gathered
domestically and from abroad during the course of the PENTTBOM and related
investigations requires an enhanced analytical and data mining capacity
that is not presently available.
Among the significant features and capabilities of the enhanced Counterterrorism
Division will be:
of a new multi-agency National Joint Terrorism Task Force at FBI Headquarters
to complement task forces established in local FBI field offices and
to improve collaboration and information sharing with other agencies;
of "flying squads" at Headquarters and specialized regional
assets to augment local field investigative capabilities with specialized
personnel, support deployments of FBI Rapid Deployment Teams, and provide
a surge capacity for quickly responding to fast-breaking situations
and developments in locations where there is not an FBI presence;
- augmentation of
FBI capabilities to perform financial, communications, and strategic
analyses of terrorist groups and networks; and
- support for the
Department of Justice's Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force and terrorism
prevention outreach efforts.
Many of you had
the opportunity to visit the FBI Strategic Information Operations Center,
better known as SIOC, after the terrorist acts of September 11. SIOC's
operations were a true inter-agency, collaborative environment where
information flowed quickly between agencies. Others of you saw a similar
environment created at the field office level in Salt Lake City to coordinate
security and intelligence for the Winter Olympic Games.
What we must do in our new Counterterrorism Division is create a similar
collaborative and information sharing environment. Preventing future
terrorist acts necessitates that the Counterterrorism Division operate
at a near-SIOC like capacity for the foreseeable future. Any less of
an effort is not acceptable. Maintaining such an operating capacity,
however, is extremely labor intensive and well beyond the pre-9/11 resource
levels, capacity and structure of the Counterterrorism Division. The
proposed Counterterrorism Division reorganization is my commitment to
establishing the necessary organizational environment and framework
where such a level of commitment can be sustained and where necessary
cultural and behavioral changes can become institutionalized over time.
to the success of the Counterterrorism Division reorganization is changing
the underlying operations of the division to emphasize the importance
and necessity of sharing information on a timely basis, creating an
intelligence awareness among employees -- FBI employees and those of
other agencies. We must change how we look at information so that we
not only consider its case-related value, but also its relevance to
the larger, strategic view of a group or organization. We must also
develop and sustain national-level knowledge and expertise that can
be made available at a moments notice to any FBI Field Office and our
Finally, with respect
to Counterterrorism, I cannot overstate the importance of building and
maintaining effective international partnerships to combating terrorism.
Our investigation of the September 11, 2001 attacks underscores the
global nature of terrorism and the ability of terrorists to plan, finance,
and conduct operations in a variety of countries around the world. Our
Legal Attaches played an extremely valuable role in the PENTTBOM investigation
and continue to be critical to our ongoing efforts to deny Al-Qaeda
the ability to mount future attacks. These partnerships will only grow
more important in the future. Consequently, I believe it may be necessary
for the FBI to consider additional Legal Attache offices in key locations,
especially in Africa.
Division. Within our Counterintelligence Division, the FBI is proposing
a new espionage section that will focus on the so-called "811"
referrals and investigations of espionage. This will allow our operational
counterintelligence sections to concentrate solely on detecting and
countering foreign intelligence operations, focus on emerging strategic
threats, and protecting United States secrets from compromise. Additionally,
the management of our Counterintelligence Division is reorienting the
focus of the FBI counterintelligence program to work more closely with
other government agencies, sensitive facilities, and the private sector
to identify and protect United States secrets from being compromised
by foreign agents and spies.
As with Counterterrorism,
success in the counterintelligence area will depend upon the ability
of the FBI in acquiring agents, analysts, translators, and others with
specialized skills and backgrounds and training existing counterintelligence
personnel. The FBI is also establishing a career path for counterintelligence
agents to encourage retention of personnel in this highly specialized
field. In the end, we will have a new structure operating pursuant to
a new, differently focused strategy that recognizes the critically important
Office of Intelligence. The December 2001 reorganization created
a new Office of Intelligence to support our counterterrorism and counterintelligence
programs. Building a strategic and tactical intelligence analytical
capacity is critical if the FBI is to be successful at pulling together
bits and pieces of information that often come from separate sources
and providing analytic products to policy makers and investigators that
will allow us to prevent terrorist acts.
This Congress is
all too familiar with the FBI's analytical shortcomings. These shortcomings
have been documented by the FBI and others, discussed in prior hearings
and briefings and need not be restated again. Fixing these shortcomings
is going to require investments in additional personnel, basic and advanced
training, technology, and, perhaps most importantly, time. Building
subject area expertise or developing an awareness of the potential value
of an isolated piece of information does not occur overnight; it is
developed over time. That is why I am grateful to Director of Central
Intelligence George Tenet for his willingness to detail experienced
CIA analysts to the FBI to work at both the field and Headquarters level,
and to set up and manage our Office of Intelligence. These personnel,
expected to arrive over the next several weeks, are needed to provide
the FBI with a critical near-term analytical capacity while we recruit,
hire, train, and build our analytic cadre.
Cyber Division. Last December, the Administration and Congress approved
the establishment of a Cyber Division at FBI Headquarters. The Cyber
Division will coordinate, oversee, and facilitate FBI investigations
in which the Internet, on-line services, and computer systems and networks
are the principal instruments or targets of foreign intelligence or
terrorists and for criminal violations where the use of such systems
is essential to the illegal activity. The FBI will consolidate under
a single national program manager headquarters and field resources associated
with the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), the Internet
Fraud Complaint Center, and cyber-related criminal investigations delegated
to the FBI for investigation, such as intellectual property rights-related
investigations involving theft of trade secrets and signals; copyright
infringement investigations involving computer software; and Innocent
Images National Initiative investigations and training. The new division
will continue a direct connection between NIPC and the Counterterrorism
and Counterintelligence Divisions regarding national security cases.
Additionally, the division will work closely with the proposed Investigative
Technologies Division regarding support for the Computer Analysis Response
Team program and deployment of Regional Computer Forensic Laboratories.
Dealing with the
problem of cyber-crime requires skills and understanding of technology
that the FBI does not possess in great numbers. Consequently, the FBI
will develop new and expand existing alliances with other federal, state,
and municipal agencies, academia, and the private sector.
At the field level, the approach the Cyber Division is considering is
inter-agency Cyber Task Forces. In large FBI Field Offices, I envision
the FBI maintaining existing stand-alone National Infrastructure Protection
Center (NIPC) squads to handle computer intrusions, critical infrastructure
protection issues, and the INFRAGARD program. Complementary Cyber Crime
Squads will be established to consolidate management and investigation
of cyber-related violations currently handled under the White-Collar
and Violent Crime programs, as well as investigate non-terrorist and
non-intelligence computer hacking and intrusion cases. In small or medium
FBI Field Offices, the FBI will either use the above model or create
hybrid cyber squads that consolidate NIPC and criminal resources into
a single squad. Regardless of the size of office, the FBI will reach
out to invite participation from other federal, state, and municipal
agencies on Cyber Crime Squads to reduce duplication of effort and maximize
resources. FBI Cyber Crime Squads and task forces will be allied with
Department of Justice Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (CHiP)
units in those 13 United States cities where CHiP units are being established.
The FBI will continue its partnership with the National White-Collar
Crime Center to operate the Internet Fraud Complaint Center.
Technologies Division. I am proposing to split the current Laboratory
Division into two divisions: Laboratory and Investigative Technologies.
Recent growth in the mission, staffing, and funding of the programs
encompassed by the Laboratory Division presents potential problems in
the areas of management span of control and effective project management.
The technical nature of many of the multi-year projects being carried
out by division project leaders requires a degree of management oversight
and involvement that can be best achieved by splitting the current division.
The Laboratory Division will continue to focus upon the collection,
processing and analysis of evidence, training, and forensic research
and development. The proposed Investigative Technologies Division will
concentrate on providing technical and tactical services in support
of investigators and the Intelligence Community, such as electronic
surveillance, physical surveillance, cyber technology, and wireless
and radio communications, as well as the development of new investigative
technologies and techniques and the training of technical agents and
The American people look to the FBI for leadership in investigating
the most serious national and international crimes and criminal enterprises
and for cooperating and assisting other federal, state, municipal and
foreign law enforcement authorities. As a national law enforcement agency,
FBI Field Offices should draw upon national criminal investigative priorities
to develop local crime-fighting strategies. The national priorities
I have identified will serve the FBI as a critical common denominator
that links criminal investigative activities across field offices.
In developing local criminal priorities and resource allocation plans,
each SAC should also take into account the ability of state, municipal,
and other federal law enforcement to handle the full range of criminal
violations which may vary widely among jurisdictions and agencies. This
requires the FBI to be more flexible and collaborative in its approaches
to its criminal investigative mission. At the same time, SACs should,
in consultation with the United States Attorney and appropriate state
and municipal authorities, develop and implement appropriate strategies
and resource allocations for addressing the FBI's other criminal investigative
priorities. These five areas are: public corruption, civil rights, transnational
and national criminal organizations, major white-collar crime, and significant
Given the near-term
requirement to ensure the resource needs of our top three priorities
are satisfied, SACs must be more focused and deliberate in his/her management
of resources allocated to criminal priorities. Consequently, it is imperative
that SACs avoid duplicating the efforts of other agencies or direct
resources against crime problems that can be more appropriately handled
by other agencies. We must be prepared, for the time being, to defer
criminal cases to others, even in significant cases, if other agencies
possess the expertise to handle the matter adequately. In situations
where other federal, state, and municipal capabilities are not sufficient
to handle a case or situation, SACs should be prepared to step in and
provide FBI resources as needed. However, once the immediate situation
is under control or resolved I expect SACs to reevaluate the level of
FBI commitment and make necessary adjustments.
Within the conduct of our criminal investigative mission and in our
day-to-day interactions with state and municipal law enforcement partners,
all FBI personnel must remain alert for indications of criminal or suspicious
activities that might be precursors of possible terrorist operational
and logistical activities. The PENTTBOM investigation has demonstrated
how a group of terrorists were able to infiltrate our country and carry
out extensive planning, operational, and logistical activities without
apprehension by law enforcement. Other terrorist investigations have
revealed patterns of low-level criminal activity by terrorists. It is
the duty of every FBI employee to remain vigilant for suspicious activity
or informant information that could be a tip-off to a future terrorist
Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Serrano, and members of the Subcommittee, the unpredictable and unconventional
threats to our national security and the serious crime problems that
often reach beyond our borders necessitate changes in the FBI, changes
in our priorities, changes in our workforce, and changes in our approach
to performing our mission. Critics often characterize the FBI as being
resistant to change, citing an "insular" culture. I have had
the opportunity to work closely with the fine men and women of the FBI
under the extreme circumstances of the last nine months. I am confident
of their recognition of the importance of this critical moment in our
history and I am confident that change is being embraced. I will not
pretend it will be easy but I also do not doubt that a different FBI
is emerging post-9/11.
What I am proposing is an evolving road map for moving the FBI forward
through this time of uncertainty and unpredictability. As an evolving
strategy, it will be adjusted to meet changes in the world in which
we must operate. Our adversaries, whether they are terrorists, foreign
intelligence agents, or criminals, are not static or complacent -- we
must not be either. The challenges facing the FBI requires a workforce
that possess specialized skills and backgrounds, that is equipped with
the proper investigative, technical, and analytical tools, and possesses
the managerial and administrative competencies necessary to deal with
a complex and volatile environment. Beyond the changes and proposals
I have outlined today are the challenges of changing and revitalizing
internal processes to eliminate "stove-pipes" and barriers
that prevent us from being more collaborative among ourselves and with
our external partners.
I welcome your
comments and suggestions relative to the management and organizational
changes that I have submitted to the Congress. I appreciate the support
that this Committee has given to what we are trying to accomplish and
I particularly appreciate the recognition of the urgency with which
I believe these issues must be addressed.