RESPONSES TO

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Asked of

Assistant Secretary of State

for

Intelligence and Research

Carl W. Ford, Jr.

By the

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

February 6, 2002

The Intelligence Community's Ability to Monitor Terrorist Activity

1) The Intelligence Community is America's early warning system against threats to American lives and property both here and overseas. What are the Intelligence Community's greatest strengths and deficiencies in monitoring terrorism? What lessons have you learned from September 11, 2001, to address any shortcomings? Do you all believe that you have sufficient resources to fight the war on terrorism?

A: PERHAPS THE GREATEST LESSON LEARNED FROM AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE WITH REGARDS TO THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS ARE THE DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH IDENTIFYING "CLEAN" TERRORISTS. THOSE TERRORISTS WITH NO PRIOR RECORD EITHER IN INTELLIGENCE OR POLICE FILES WILL REMAIN A SIGNIFICANT THREAT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. EFFORTS ARE, HOWEVER, CURRENTLY UNDERWAY TO IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION WORLDWIDE AND, AS A RESULT, WE HAVE SEEN SEVERAL HIGH-PROFILE ARRESTS IN EUROPE, ASIA, AND ELSEWHERE. WE WOULD DIRECT YOU TO CIA AND FBI FOR ASSESSMENTS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN PARTICULAR INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORECEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE PARTNERSHIPS.

Duration of the War on Terror

2) In his speech to the Joint Session of Congress last September 20, President Bush said of the war on terrorism that "it will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated." In your opinion, how long will it take to attain this objective?

A. THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CAN BETTER RESPOND TO QUESTIONS REGARDING PROPOSED TIMELINES FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE VARIOUS PHASES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. WITH REGARDS TO STATE DEPARTMENT'S INITIATIVES IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM, AS YOU ARE AWARE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ARE ONGOING AT ALL TIMES.

Nations Supporting Terrorism

3) In his Speech to a Joint Session of Congress last September 20, President Bush stated that "from this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime." The Secretary of State maintains a list of countries that have "repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism." Currently, the seven countries on this terrorism list are: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. How good is our intelligence on the terrorist related activities of these countries? Has the intelligence community noted any increase or diminution of these countries support to terrorism since last September 11, 2001?

A: INFORMATION DRAWN FROM NUMEROUS SOURCES ALLOWS US TO DETERMINE THAT ALL SEVEN STATE SPONSORS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT TERRORISM TO SOME DEGREE.

SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, THE COUNTRIES LISTED HAVE DONE THE FOLLOWING:

IRAN: PRESIDENT KHATAMI CONDEMNED THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND OFFERED CONDOLENCES TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. ALTHOUGH SOME ARAB AFGHANS, INCLUDING AL QA'IDA MEMBERS, HAVE USED IRAN AS A TRANSIT ROUTE TO AND FROM AFGHANISTAN, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF IRANIAN OR HIZBALLAH SPONSORSHIP OR FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS.

IRAQ: A COMMENTARY ON THE OFFICIAL TELEVISION IRAQI STATION ON SEPTEMBER 11 STATED THAT AMERICA WAS "...REAPING THE FRUITS OF [ITS] CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY." A SUBSEQUENT COMMENTARY IN A NEWSPAPER RUN BY ONE OF SADDAM'S SONS EXPRESSED SYMPATHY FOR USAMA BIN LADIN FOLLOWING INITIAL US RETALIATORY STRIKES.

SYRIA DENOUNCED THE 11 SEPTEMBER ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. IT HAS BEEN CONSISTENT IN ITS OPPOSITION TO THE PRESENCE OF BIN LADIN-RELATED TERRORISTS IN SYRIA AND HAS EXPELLED SEVERAL. DAMASCUS ALSO EXPRESSED ITS WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT US EFFORTS TO TRACK AND CAPTURE AL-QA'IDA MEMBERS.

LIBYA: ON SEPTEMBER 11TH LIBYAN LEADER QADHAFI ISSUED A PRESS STATEMENT CALLING THE ATTACKS HORRIFIC AND GRUESOME, AND URGED LIBYANS TO DONATE BLOOD FOR THE VICTIMS. HE LATER SAID THAT US RETALIATION WOULD BE AN ACT OF SELF-DEFENSE.

NORTH KOREA: PYONGYANG MADE SEVERAL OFFICIAL STATEMENTS CONDEMNING THE 11 SEPTEMBER ATTACKS, AND EXTENDED CONDOLENCES TO THE UNITED STATES. FOLLOWING THE 11 SEPTEMBER ATTACKS, NORTH KOREA SIGNED TWO ANTI-TERRORISM CONVENTIONS AND INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO SIGN ALL REMAINING CONVENTIONS.

CUBA: SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER, HE HAS SIGNED ALL 12 UN COUNTERTERRORISM CONVENTIONS AS WELL AS TO THE IBERO-AMERICAN DECLARATION ON TERRORISM AT THIS YEAR'S SUMMIT IN AN EFFORT TO DEMONSTRATE CUBAN SUPPORT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL WAR ON TERRORISM. MOREOVER, CUBA SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT OBSTRUCT THE DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS AT THE U.S. NAVAL BASE IN GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, DESPITE ITS DIFFERENCES WITH THE U.S. OVER HOW TO COMBAT TERRORISM.

SUDAN CONDEMNED THE 11 SEPTEMBER ATTACKS AND PLEDGED ITS COMMITMENT TO COMBATING TERRORISM AND FULLY COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED STATES. THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT HAS STEPPED UP ITS COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION WITH VARIOUS US AGENCIES, AND SUDANESE AUTHORITIES HAVE INVESTIGATED AND APPREHENDED EXTREMISTS SUSPECTED OF INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

Embassy and Overseas Facilities Security

Q. 4) What is the nature and extend to the terrorist threat to U.S. Diplomatic and military facilities overseas and how has it changed since September 11, 2001? Do you believe that the Departments of Defense and State have taken appropriate security measures to address the terrorist threat to all of their overseas facilities?

A. WE CONTINUALLY RECEIVE THREAT RELATED REPORTING THAT CONCERNS US INTERESTS AND FACILITIES BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD. WE ASSESS THAT A PORTION OF THESE REPORTS REFLECT ACTUAL TERRORIST PLANNING TO ATTACK THE US OR ITS ALLIES. DESPITE THE IMPACT OF OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, WE BELIEVE THAT AL-QAIDA AND ITS AFFILIATES REMAIN CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING ATTACKS, AS DO NON-AL-QAIDA RELATED TERRORIST GROUPS. AS THIS IS THE CASE US FACILITIES OVERSEAS FREQUENTLY REVIEW AND ADJUST THEIR SECURITY POSTURE BASED ON CHANGES IN THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT. ADDITIONALLY, THE DEPARTMENT REGULARLY REVIEWS THREAT INFORMATION FOR RELEASE IN A MODIFIED FORMAT TO US PERSONS AND BUSINESSES ABROAD. WE WOULD DIRECT YOU TO DEFENSE DEPARTMENT FOR INFORMATION REGARDING THEIR WORLDWIDE SECURITY POSTURE.

Possible Terrorist use of "Conflict Diamonds"

Q. 5) The mining and sales of diamonds by parties to armed conflicts -- particularly Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democraic Republic of the Congo -- are regarded as a significant factor fueling such hostilities. These diamonds, known as "conflict diamonds" comprise an estimated 3.7 to 15% of the value of the global diamond trade. Do you have any information that "conflict diamonds" are being used to subsidize the activities of terrorist groups, including Al-Qa'ida?

A: MEDIA REPORTS HAVE RECENTLY RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN THE "CONFLICT DIAMOND" TRADE. WE CANNOT CONFIRM ANY LINKS BETWEEN TERRORIST GROUPS SUCH AS HIZBALLAH OR AL-QAIDA AND THE USE OF ILLEGAL DIAMONDS TO RAISE FUNDS OR LAUNDER MONEY, HOWEVER WE CONTINUE TO INVESTIGATE THE ALLEGATIONS.

The Situation in Iraq

Q.6) What is the likelihood that Saddam Hussein will be in power one year from now? How good is the Intelligence Community's ability to ascertain what is going on in Iraq? What is the likeliest scenario for Iraq when Saddam is removed from the scene? How will Iran and other neighboring countries react to Saddam's departure (e.g., invasion)? What evidence does the Intelligence Community have that Iraq may have been involved in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks? If the U.S. were to take military action to remove Saddam from power, what would be the likely reaction to this from U.S. allies, as well as other countries in the region?

A: WE HAVE NOTED REPORTS OF CONTACT BETWEEN AN IRAQI OFFICIAL AND MOHAMED ATTA, A KEY FIGURE IN THE WORLD TRADE CENTER ATTACKS. THIS CONTACT CONCERNS US AND REMAINS UNDER INVESTIGATION BUT IT DOES NOT DEFINITIVELY LINK IRAQ TO THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS. IRAQ, HOWEVER, REMAINS A STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM AND AS SUCH ITS ACTIVITIES REQUIRE A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF OUR ATTENTION. IT PROVIDES BASES TO VARIOUS TERRORIST GROUPS INCLUDING THE PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT, THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION. IN EARLY DECEMBER, ISRAELI AUTHORITIES ANNOUNCED THE ARREST OF A PLF MEMBER WHO HAD ALLEGEDLY TRAINED IN IRAQ AND WAS SUSPECTED OF PARTICIPATING IN ANTI-ISRAELI ATTACKS. IN A MEETING WITH FORMER PFLP SECRETARY GENERAL HABASH IN BAGHDAD IN JANUARY 2001, THE IRAQI VICE PRESIDENT SAID IRAQ CONTINUED TO SUPPORT THE INTIFADA USING ALL AVAILABLE MEANS, ACCORDING TO IRAQI STATE RADIO. IN MID-SEPTEMBER A SENIOR DELEGATION FROM THE PFLP MET WITH THE IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER. THE LEADER OF THE PFLP DELEGATION THANKED IRAQ FOR ITS SUPPORT THAT ENCOURAGED AND MAINTAINED THE INTIFADA. BAGHDAD ALSO CONTINUES TO HOST THE 15 MAY ORGANIZATION, THE MUJAHEDIN E KHALQ, AND THE KURDISH WORKER'S PARTY. THE CZECHS EXPELLED AN IRAQI INTELLIGENCE OFFICER IN APRIL 2001 FOLLOWING REPORTS THAT IRAQI OPERATIVES MIGHT RETALIATE AGAINST THE US FUNDED RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY FOR BROADCASTS CRITICAL OF THE IRAQI REGIME. SEPARATELY THE SAME IRAQI OFFICIAL WAS IDENTIFIED BY CZECH AUTHORITIES AS HAVING MET WITH ATTA.

Q. Is the Iraqi military's readiness at a high enough level to pose a significant threat to neighboring countries? What is the status of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability?

A.

• Baghdad has refused since December 1998 to allow United Nations inspectors into Iraq as required by Security Council Resolution 687. Having lost this on-the-ground access, it is more difficult to accurately assess the current state of Iraq's WMD programs.

• Iraq's past behavior, it is likely that Baghdad has used the intervening period to take steps toward reconstituting prohibited programs. Iraq's failure to submit an accurate Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure(FFCD) in either 1995 or 1997, coupled with its extensive concealment efforts, suggest that the BW program has continued.

• Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use, as well as its missile production facilities.

• Baghdad is assessed to be capable of reinitiating its CW programs within a few weeks to months. In addition, Iraq appears to be installing or repairing dual-use equipment at CW-related facilities. Some of these facilities could be converted fairly quickly for production of CW agents.

• Iraq has also rebuilt a plant that produces castor oil, allegedly for brake fluid. The mash left over from this production could be used to produce ricin, a biological toxin. Iraq has continued dual-use research that could improve BW agent R&D capabilities. With the absence of a monitoring regime and Iraq's growing industrial self-sufficiency, we remain concerned that Iraq may again be producing biological warfare agents.

• Iraq has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use. This equipment (in principle subject to UN scrutiny) could be diverted for WMD purposes.

• Iraq has probably continued low-level theoretical R&D associated with its nuclear program. Baghdad may be attempting to acquire materials and equipment that could aid in reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.

• Iraq continues to pursue development of SRBM systems that are not prohibited by UN Security Council resolutions, and may be expanding to longer-range systems. The Intelligence Community believes that Iraq probably also retains a small, covert force of Scud-type missiles.

Situation in Iran

Q. 7) What is the status of President Khatami's hold onpower? To what extent has he been an agent for democratic reform? Would it be accurate to characterize Iran as being as democratic a government as any other nation in the Islamic world?

PRESIDENT KHATAMI'S POLITICAL STRENGTH HAS ALWAYS RESTED ON POPULAR SUPPORT, NOT CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY. THE REAL POWER IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC IS HELD BY SUPREME LEADER KHAMENEI. IN HIS FIRST TERM, KHATAMI MANAGED TO SHAKE UP THE ESTABLISHMENT, ADVANCING THE RULE OF LAW THROUGH CABINET REFORMS AND INCREASING DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION BY INSTITUTING LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS IN 1999 AND OVERSEEING A REFORMIST TAKEOVER OF THE PARLIAMENT IN 2000. EVER SINCE THE CONSERVATIVES STRUCK BACK THROUGH THE HARD-LINE JUDICIARY, HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT EFFECTIVELY DEFENDED THOSE REFORM GAINS OR THEIR PROPONENTS. IN FAILING TO MAKE GOOD ON REFORMIST PROMISES, KHATAMI THUS HAS LOST MUCH PERSONAL CREDIBILITY AT HOME--BOTH AS A FORMIDABLE ADVERSARY AMONG HIS C0NSERVATIVE OPPONENTS, AND AS THE CHAMPION OF CHANGE AMONG THE GENERAL PUBLIC. NONETHELESS, PRESSURE FOR REFORM CONTINUES; THE BATTLE IS FAR FROM OVER. IRAN, DESPITE THE SETBACKS OF THE LAST COUPLE OF YEARS, STANDS AMONG THE MOST DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD.

Q. What is your assessment of the nature and extent of Iran's support for international terrorism? Does Iran continue to provide assistance to Hizballah in Lebanon and to Islamic-oriented Palestinian groups that oppose the Arab-Israeli peace process, such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)? To what extent has the Iranian government provided support to the effort against al-Qa'ida and the Taliban since September 11, 2001?

A: IRAN'S INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST-RELATED ACTIVITIES REMAINED FOCUSED ON SUPPORT FOR GROUPS OPPOSED TO ISRAEL. THIS SUPPORT APPEARS TO HAVE INTENSIFIED SINCE THE INTIFADA BEGAN IN SEPTEMBER 2000. DURING 2001 IRAN SOUGHT A HIGH-PROFILE POLITICAL ROLE IN ENCOURAGING ANTI-ISRAELI ACTIVITY, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME INCREASING ITS SUPPORT FOR GROUPS ENGAGED IN TERRORIST-RELATED ACTIVITIES. IRAN CONTINUED TO PROVIDE LEBANESE HIZBALLAH AND THE PALESTINIAN REJECTIONIST GROUPS--NOTABLY HAMAS, THE PALESTINE ISLAMIC JIHAD, AND THE PFLP-GC--WITH VARYING AMOUNTS OF FUNDING, SAFEHAVEN, TRAINING, AND WEAPONS. IT ALSO ENCOURAGED HIZBALLAH AND THE PALESTINIAN GROUPS TO COORDINATE THEIR PLANNING AND TO ESCALATE THEIR ACTIVITIES AGAINST ISRAEL. IRAN ALSO PROVIDED LIMITED SUPPORT TO EXTREMIST GROUPS IN THE PERSIAN GULF, AFRICA, TURKEY, AND CENTRAL ASIA. THIS SUPPORT IS AT A CONSIDERABLY LOWER LEVEL THAN THAT PROVIDED TO THE GROUPS OPPOSED TO ISRAEL AND HAS BEEN DECREASING IN RECENT YEARS.

Q. What is the status of Iran's WMD efforts? Does Iran continue to receive weaponry and WMD-related technology from China, Russia and North Korea?

A: IRAN IS ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP AN INDIGENOUS CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE ALL TYPES OF WMD -- NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS -- AND ASSORTED SYSTEMS TO DELIVER SUCH WEAPONS. IN DOING SO, IT HAS ATTEMPTED TO ACQUIRE RELEVANT TECHNICAL EXPERTISE, MATERIALS, AND TECHNOLOGIES FROM A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, BUT HAS FOCUSED TO VARYING DEGREES WITHIN THE WMD DISCIPLINES ON ENTITIES IN RUSSIA, CHINA, AND NORTH KOREA.

NUCLEAR. IRAN HAS AN ORGANIZED STRUCTURE DEDICATED TO DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY TRYING TO ESTABLISH THE CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE BOTH HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM. IT HAS ATTEMPTED TO USE ITS CIVILIAN NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM, WHICH IS QUITE MODEST IN SCOPE, TO JUSTIFY EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH DOMESTICALLY OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRE FUEL CYCLE CAPABILITIES. SUCH CAPABILITIES, HOWEVER, CAN SUPPORT FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION, WHICH WE BELIEVE IS THE DRIVING OBJECTIVE BEHIND IRAN'S ACQUISITION EFFORTS. RUSSIAN ENTITIES REMAIN THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF SUPPORT TO IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. THE POTENTIAL AVAILABILITY OF BLACK MARKET FISSILE MATERIAL ALSO MIGHT PROVIDE A SHORTCUT BY WHICH IRAN COULD ACQUIRE THE FISSILE MATERIAL NEEDED FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

CHEMICAL. IRAN BEGAN ITS CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) PROGRAM DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, BUT DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE ITS EXISTENCE UNTIL A MAY, 1998 SESSION OF THE CWC CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES. IRAN HAS MANUFACTURED AND STOCKPILED BLISTER, BLOOD, AND CHOKING CHEMICAL AGENTS AND HAS SUCCESSFULLY WEAPONIZED SOME OF THESE AGENTS. IRAN ALSO CONTINUES TO SEEK PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY, EXPERTISE AND CHEMICAL PRECURSORS FROM ENTITIES IN RUSSIA, CHINA, AND WESTERN EUROPE, WITH THE GOAL OF CREATING A SELF-SUFFICIENT CW INFRASTRUCTURE.

BIOLOGICAL. IRAN HAS A ROWING BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY, SIGNIFICANT PHARMACEUTICAL EXPERIENCE, AND THE OVERALL INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT A BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) PROGRAM. IRAN IS ASSESSED TO BE ACTIVELY PURSUING OFFENSIVE BW CAPABILITIES AND MAY HAVE SMALL QUANTITIES OF USEABLE AGENT FOR LIMITED DEPLOYMENT. TEHRAN HAS EXPANDED ITS EFFORTS TO SEEK CONSIDERABLE DUAL-USE BIO-TECHNICAL MATERIALS AND EXPERTISE FROM ENTITIES IN RUSSIA AND CHINA. OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE WILL BE CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF AN IRANIAN BW PROGRAM AND WILL BE DIFFICULT TO THWART OWING TO THE DUAL-USE NATURE OF THE MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT INVOLVED.

MISSILES. IRAN HAS INCREASED EMPHASIS ON ITS BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM. IT CURRENTLY HAS A FORCE OF 300-KILOMETER RANGE SCUD B, 500-KM RANGE SCUD C, AND CHINESE-MADE SHORT-RANGE (150-KM) BALLISTIC MISSILES AND HAS THE CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE SCUDS. ITS CURRENT MAIN FOCUS APPEARS TO BE ON PRODUCTION OF THE SHAHAB-3 MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE, WHICH IS BASED ON THE NORTH KOREAN NO DONG AND IS EXPECTED TO HAVE A 1,300-KM RANGE. IRAN HAS ATTEMPTED TO FLIGHT TEST THE SHAHAB-3 SEVERAL TIMES, WITH LIMITED SUCCESS; THE MISSILE REMAINS IN THE DEVELOPMENT STAGE. IRAN IS ALSO INTERESTED IN EVEN LONGER-RANGE SYSTEMS, BUT IN OUR JUDGMENT IT WILL BE AT LEAST SEVERAL YEARS BEFORE EVEN THE CRUDEST OF THESE SYSTEMS IS COMPLETED -- ABSENT MASSIVE AND SUSTAINED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.

IRAN HISTORICALLY HAS RECEIVED CRITICAL ASSISTANCE IN ITS MISSILE DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS FROM EMTIES IN RUSSIA, CHINA, AND NORTH KOREA. IT REMAINS DEPENDENT UPON SUCH ASSISTANCE FOR ITS CURRENT MISSILE DEVELOPMENT WORK.

Iranian Missile Capabilities

Q. 8) Last December's NIE on the ballistic missile threat states that "Iran is pursuing short- and long-range missile capabilities." Iran has one of the largest missile inventories in the Middle East. The Iranian missile program is designed to confront what specific security threats? Under what circumstances, if any, would Iran be likely to curtail its missile program?

A: IRAN CONSIDERS ITS MISSILE FORCES TO BE A KEY ELEMENT OF ITS STRATEGIC DETERRENCE CAPABILITY, INTENDED TO COUNTER POTENTIAL MILITARY AGGRESSION (AS WHEN IRAQ CARRIED OUT A SERIES OF MISSILE ATTACKS AGAINST IRANIAN CITIES IN THE 1980-88 IRAN-IRAQ WAR). AT PRESENT, TEHRAN VIEWS ITS PRIMARY NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS AS COMING FROM IRAQ, ISRAEL, AND THE UNITED STATES. A WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES FROM THE PERSIAN GULF REGION, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFGHANISTAN, AND A REGION-WIDE MUTUAL DISARMAMENT PROGRAM OR SECURITY PACT THAT DEFINES REDUCED FORCE LIMITS MIGHT PERSUADE IRAN TO CURTAIL ITS STRATEGIC MISSILE PROGRAM.

Stability of the Jordanian Regime

Q. 9) How stable is the Jordanian regime of King Abdullah? What threats does King Abdullah face from Islamic fundamentalists? What is the likelihood that resurgent Palestinian nationalism will destabilize Jordan?

JORDAN'S KING ABDULLAH HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY SELF-ASSURED DURING HIS THREE YEARS ON THE THRONE AND HAS BEGUN TO CLARIFY AND PURSUE A DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRAM DESIGNED TO ADDRESS SOME OF HIS COUNTRY'S BASIC PROBLEMS. THE KING MOVED FORCEFULLY TO BACK THE U.S. IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM AND HAS ACTED AS A MODERATING INFLUENCE IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT. HOWEVER 17-MONTHS OF INTIFADA VIOLENCE, ONGOING UNCERTAINTY OVER IRAQ, NEWP RESSURES ARISING FROM SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE CONTINUED SLUGGISHNESS OF THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY FORCE THE KING TO DEFEND HIS POLICIES TO A JORDANIAN PUBLIC THAT IS DISSATISFIED AND APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE REGIONAL SITUATION, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO U.S. POLICY ON IRAQ AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT.

JORDANIAN ISLAMIC GROUPS PARTICIPATE OPENLY IN JORDANIAN POLITICS. THEY TEND TO BE CRITICAL OF THE REGIME, BUT HAVE A VESTED INTEREST IN CONTINUING TO WORK WITHIN THE SYSTEM. THE PRIMARY THREAT THE JORDANIAN REGIME FACES FROM THESE GROUPS IS ONE TO PUBLIC ORDER. LARGE-SCALE DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVELY BANNED IN JORDAN SINCE SHORTLY AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE "AL-AQSA INTIFADA" DUE TO THE DIFFICULTIES JORDANIAN SECURITY SERVICES WERE HAVING IN CONTAINING THE STRONG EMOTIONS OF DEMONSTRATORS PROTESTING ISRAEL'S TREATMENT OF PALESTINIANS ON THE WEST BANK AND IN GAZA. ISLAMIC GROUPS HAVE GENERALLY RESPECTED THE BAN, BUT EPISODIC DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE BEEN HELD.

WELL OVER HALF OF ALL JORDANIANS ARE PALESTINIAN IN ORIGIN AND THEY ARE EQUALLY EMOTIONAL WHEN IT COMES TO THE PLIGHT OF WEST BANK AND GAZAN PALESTINIANS. THE THREAT OF POTENTIALLY VIOLENT STREET DEMONSTRATIONS RISES WHEN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE RISES. UNLIKE THE PALESTINIAN POPULATIONS IN SURROUNDING ARAB COUNTRIES, PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN ENJOY CITIZENSHIP AND PARTICIPATE IN THE JORDANIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM. THEY DO NOT ADVOCATE REPLACING KING ABDULLAH AND VOICE THEIR POLITICAL OPINIONS THROUGH THE LEGAL AND DEMOCRATIC MEANS AVAILABLE TO ALL JORDANIANS.

Saudi Arabia

Q: 10) How stable is the Saudi Government?

A:
• FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE FORCES FOR STABILITY IN SAUDI ARABIA OUTWEIGH THOSE AGAINST STABILITY.

  FORCES FOR STABILITY:

  --CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH IS ONE OF THE MOST POPULAR SAUDI LEADERS EVER, IN LARGE PART BECAUSE OF HIS ABILITY TO EXPRESS COMMONLY HELD FEELINGS AND TO SPEAK IN TERMS EASILY UNDERSTOOD BY THE SAUDI PEOPLE. ABDULLAH ALSO IS SEEN AS RELIGIOUS AND LIVING ACCORDING TO ISLAMIC TEACHINGS. HIS C0MMON TOUCH IS DEMONSTRATED BY HIS VISITS TO ORDINARY SHOPS, RURAL VILLAGES, AND REMOTE AREAS OF THE COUNTRY. ABDULLAH ALSO IS KNOWN AS A REFORMER AND HAS SPOKEN OUT (THOUGH NOT YET MADE MUCH ACTUAL PROGRESS) ON ISSUES SUCH AS IMPROVING EDUCATION AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS.

  --SAUDI ARABIA IS A CONSERVATIVE SOCIETY, VERY RESPECTFUL OF AUTHORITY, AND WANTING TO AVOID CIVIL UNREST. IN THE NEAR TERM, IT IS UNLIKELY THE MAJORITY OF SAUDIS WOULD SUPPORT AN OVERTHROW THE AL SAUD GOVERNMENT.

  --IN ADDITION TO ROYAL FAMILY MEMBERS, THE MERCHANT CLASS, BUSINESS CLASS, MANY OF THE ISLAMIC CLERICS, AND MANY ORDINARY SAUDIS WOULD NOT WANT A GOVERNMENT RUN BY EXTREMISTS.

  FORCES AGAINST STABILITY:
  --THE SAUDI HIGH POPULATION GROWTH RATE (OVER THREE PERCENT A YEAR) AND YOUTH BULGE (HALF THE POPULATION IS UNDER 15) PLUS AN ECONOMY OVERLY DEPENDENT ON OIL AND OFFERING TOO FEW JOBS IS A POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING SITUATION.

  --SAUDI SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES HAVE NOT ADEQUATELY EDUCATED YOUNG PEOPLE FOR JOBS NEEDED IN A MODERN ECONOMY. EVEN IF EDUCATIONAL REFORMS ARE IMPLEMENTED SOON IT WILL TAKE MANY YEARS TO PRODUCE A GENERATION OF COMPETENT WORKERS. UNEMPLOYED AND DISCONTENT YOUTH ARE VULNERABLE TO THE INFLUENCE OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM.

  --THE GROWING NUMBER OF AL SAUD ROYAL FAMILY MEMBERS (POSSIBLY AS MANY AS 8,000 PRINCES) ALL OF WHOM RECEIVE STIPENDS AND PRIVILEGES MAY EVENTUALLY BE CONSIDERED AN UNNECESSARY DRAIN ON THE ECONOMY. SOME ROYALS ARE SEEN TO LIVE EXCESSIVELY AND NOT ACCORDING TO ISLAMIC TEACHINGS.

Q. What factors would be most likely to bring about change in that country?

A:
• ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND REFORM THAT WOULD OPEN UP THE JOB MARKET TO THE SAUDI POPULATION, AND ALLOW THE COUNTRY TO MOVE FROM UNDER HEAVY DEPENDENCE ON OIL.

• REFORM OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM (NOW RECOGNIZED BY SAUDI LEADERS AS IMPORTANT) SO THAT YOUNG PEOPLE ARE PROVIDED A MORE ROUNDED EDUCATION ABOUT VARIOUS SUBJECTS AND CULTURES, AND ARE BETTER PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MODERN ECONOMY.

Q: To what extent are the Saudi government and public supportive of the U.S. led campaign against UBL and terrorism?

• THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT HIGHLY SUPPORTS THE US LED CAMPAIGN AGAINST USAMA BIN LADEN WHO SEEKS THE DOWNFALL OF THE AL SAUD REGIME AND FAMILY AS HIS KEY GOAL. THE CROWN PRINCE HAS DENOUNCED THE AL QAIDA, SUICIDE BOMBINGS, AND ALL KILLING OF INNOCENT PEOPLE. HE HAS ASKED SAUDI CLERICAL LEADERS TO EMPHASIZE PEACE AND AVOID STIRRING UP ANTI-MUSLIM SENTIMENT. SAUDI PRACTICE, HOWEVER, MAKES COOPERATION ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM CAMPAIGN DIFFICULT AND SLOW. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SAUDI BANKING SYSTEM IS NOT TOTALLY TRANSPARENT, AND RIYADH HAS NOT MAINTAINED STRICT OVERSIGHT ON NGOS ABROAD. THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT IS MAKING CHANGES, BUT THESE WILL LIKELY COME SLOWLY.

• THE SAUDI PEOPLE MAY HAVE MIXED SENTIMENTS ABOUT THE US LED WAR ON TERRORISM. WHILE MOST SAUDIS CONDEMNED THE KILLING OF INNOCENT PEOPLE ON SEPTEMBER 11, SINCE THE INTIFADA BEGAN 17 MONTHS AGO, ANTI-US SENTIMENT HAS GROWN AMONG THE SAUDIS WHO HOLD THE UNITED STATES RESPONSIBLE FOR ISRAEL'S ACTIONS AGAINST THE PALESTINIANS. SAUDIS WIDELY BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES IS BIASED TOWARD ISRAEL AND KEEPS ISRAEL WELL SUPPLIED WITH ARMS NO MATTER WHAT ISRAEL DOES. THEY SEE THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AS VICTIMS WHOSE LANDS ARE UNFAIRLY "OCCUPIED" BY ISRAEL THROUGH THE USE OF WEAPONS PROVIDED BY WASHINGTON. WHILE MANY SAUDIS WOULD NOT WANT USAMA BIN LADEN OR ANY "EXTREMIST" RUNNING THEIR GOVERNMENT, MANY AGREE WITH HIS MESSAGE CONCERNING THE PALESTINIANS AND HIS CRITICISM OF THE US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL.

Q. To what extent would the removal of US military forces from Saudi Arabia diminish anti-U.S. sentiment both within Saudi Arabia and throughout the Islamic world?

• REMOVAL OF US MILITARY FORCES FROM SAUDI ARABIA MAY DIMINISH ANTI-US SENTIMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA AND IN OTHER PARTS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD, ESPECIALLY AMONG RADICALS AND ACTIVISTS. BUT SUCH AN ACT MAY ALSO EMBOLDEN MILITANTS ESPECIALLY IF IT IS SEEN AS A RESULT OF USAMA BIN LADEN'S CALL FOR THE REMOVAL OF US TROOPS.

Stability of the Syrian Regime

Q. 11) How stable is the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad? What are the most significant threats to his regime? What is the status of Syria's weapons of mass destruction infrastructure, as well as its support for international terrorism?

WITH NEARLY TWO YEARS UNDER HIS BELT AS SYRIAN PRESIDENT, BASHAR AL ASAD IS TAKING STEPS TO CONSOLIDATE HIS AUTHORITY. HIS REGIME APPEARS STABLE, WITH FEW INTERNAL THREATS TO HIS POWER. IN DECEMBER, ASAD EFFECTED A MAJOR CABINET RESHUFFLE THAT REPLACED NUMEROUS OLD GUARD ELITE WITH MORE REFORM-ORIENTED TECHNOCRATS. OF THE EIGHTEEN NEW CABINET MEMBERS, TWO STANDOUTS INCLUDE THE REPLACEMENT OF THE LONGSTANDING ECONOMICS MINISTER WITH A LIBERAL-MINDED, WORLD BANK ECONOMIST AND THE APPOINTMENT OF A FORMER IMF OFFICIAL AS FINANCE MINISTER. IN ADDITION, ASAD SIGNALED HIS DESIRE TO TRIM GOVERNMENT EXCESS BY ABOLISHING FOUR MINISTRIES. THOUGH THE FOCUS OF ASAD'S EFFORTS CENTER ON ECONOMIC RATHER THAN POLITICAL REFORM, RECENT INDICATORS--NAMELY, THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF LONG-TIME DEFENSE MINISTER MUSTAFA TLAS'S RESIGNATION NEXT JULY--SUGGEST HE MAY BE MOVING TO ASSERT HIMSELF MORE FORCEFULLY IN THE POLITICAL ARENA AS WELL.

SYRIA'S PRIMARY WMD FOCUS IS ON OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL WEAPONS; EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT SYRIA HAS ACHIEVED A TACTICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY AND IS PURSUING THE DEVELOPMENT OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. SYRIA IS LIKEWISE WORKING TO UPGRADE ITS BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITIES TO DEVELOP OR ACQUIRE LONGER-RANGE REPLACEMENTS FOR SCUD-B AND SCUD-C MISSILES CURRENTLY DEPLOYED. WE CONTINUE TO MONITOR SYRIA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM FOR ANY SIGNS OF INTEREST IN DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

SYRIA DID NOT SPONSOR DIRECTLY AN ACT OF TERRORISM DURING 2001, ALTHOUGH IT CONTINUED TO PROVIDE SAFEHAVEN AND SOME LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO A NUMBER OF TERRORIST GROUPS. SYRIA CONTINUED TO ALLOW SEVERAL PALESTINIAN REJECTIONIST GROUPS -- INCLUDING HAMAS, THE PALESTINE ISLAMIC JIHAD (PIJ), THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE-GENERAL COMMAND (PFLP-GC), FATAH-THE INTIFADA, AND THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP) -- TO MAINTAIN OFFICES IN DAMASCUS. IN ADDITION, SYRIA CONTINUED TO GRANT A VARIETY OF TERRORIST GROUPS -- INCLUDING LEBANESE HIZBALLAH, HAMAS, THE PFLP-GC, AND THE PIJ --BASING PRIVILEGES OR REFUGE IN AREAS OF LEBANON'S BEKAA VALLEY UNDER SYRIAN CONTROL. DAMASCUS, HOWEVER, GENERALLY UPHELD ITS AGREEMENT WITH ANKARA NOT TO SUPPORT THE KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK). DAMASCUS ALSO SERVED AS THE PRIMARY TRANSIT POINT FOR TERRORIST OPERATIVES TRAVELING TO LEBANON AND FOR THE RESUPPLY OF WEAPONS TO HIZBALLAH. ALTHOUGH SYRIA CONTINUED IN 2001 TO MAINTAIN A BAN ON ATTACKS LAUNCHED FROM SYRIAN TERRITORY OR AGAINST WESTERN TARGETS, IT HAS NOT ACTED TO STOP ANTI-ISRAELI ATTACKS BY HIZBALLAH AND THE PALESTINIAN GROUPS, WHICH IT CLAIMS ARE ENGAGED IN A JUST STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAEL'S OCCUPATION OF PALESTINIAN TERRITORY.

SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, SYRIAN AND LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES HAVE SHARED INTELLIGENCE ON EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES AND ACTED TO CURB AL-QAIDA AFFILIATED GROUPS. SYRIAN COOPERATION DOES NOT, HOWEVER, EXTEND TO HIZBALLAH AND PALESTINIAN REJECTIONIST GROUPS. SYRIA CONTINUES TO DENY APPLICATION OF THE "TERRORIST" DESIGNATION TO SUCH GROUPS, INSISTING ON THEIR RIGHT TO RESISTANCE. SYRIA WILL LIKELY CONTINUE ITS SUPPORT OF HIZBALLAH AND OTHERS, WHILE REMAINING WARY OF PROVOKING DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL.

Qadhafi's Hold on Power in Libya

Q. 12) What is your assessment of Qadhafi's hold on power in Libya? What is your assessment of Qadhafi's ability to both further and frustrate Western policy objectives in the region? What is the status of Libya's weapons of mass destruction infrastructure, as well as its support for international terrorism?

A: QADHAFI'S HOLD ON POWER CURRENTLY IS FAIRLY SOLID. HE HAS GREATLY REDUCED THE EXTENT AND INTENSITY OF THE ONLY REAL INTERNAL CHALLENGE HE HAS FACED SINCE THE EARLY 1990'S--ARMED ISLAMIC MILITANT GROUPS OPERATING MAINLY IN EASTERN LIBYA. HE STILL RETAINS SOME ABILITY TO FRUSTRATE WESTERN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REGIONS. THAT CAPABILITY IS LIMITED IN THE MIDDLE EAST BY THE GENERALLY LOW REGARD IN WHICH LIBYA IS HELD BY SO MANY OTHER GOVERNMENTS. BUT RELATIVELY HIGH OIL PRICES HAVE GIVEN HIM THE FINANCIAL WHEREWITHAL TO EXERCISE SOME INFLUENCE, ESPECIALLY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. HIS INTERVENTIONS IN BOTH REGIONS, HOWEVER, HAVE HAD A MIXED IMPACT ON WESTERN POLICY.

WE ASSESS THAT TRIPOLI HAS A CONTINUING INTEREST IN ACQUIRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SUSPENDED UK SANCTIONS MAY CREATE NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE LIBYANS TO SECURE THE SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REQUIRED TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS. LIBYA ALSO CONTINUES EFFORTS TO OBTAIN BALLISTIC MISSILE ASSISTANCE FROM FOREIGN SOURCES (WHICH COULD RESULT IN AN MRBM OR EXTENDED-RANGE SCUD CAPABILITY) AND APPARENTLY RETAINS ITS GOAL OF AN OFFENSIVE CW CAPABILITY. EVIDENCE ALSO SUGGESTS THAT LIBYA IS TRYING TO ACQUIRE THE CAPABILITY TO DEVELOP AND PRODUCE BW AGENTS.

LIBYA APPEARS TO HAVE LARGELY CURTAILED ITS SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. HOWEVER IT MAY MAINTAIN RESIDUAL TIES TO A FEW GROUPS IN ORDER TO BURNISH ITS REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS AND TO MONITOR ITS OWN OPPOSITIONISTS. TRIPOLI'S PAST RECORD OF TERRORISM CONTINUES TO CROP UP PUBLICLY. ON 31 JANUARY 2001 A SCOTTISH COURT FOUND ABDEL BASSET AL-MEGRAHI GUILTY OF MURDER, CONCLUDING THAT HE CAUSED AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE TO DETONATE ON BOARD PAN AM FLIGHT 103 "IN FURTHERANCE OF THE PURPOSES OF ... LIBYAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES." AT YEAR'S END, LIBYA HAD YET TO COMPLY FULLY WITH THE REMAINING UN SECURITY COUNCIL REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO PAN AM 103: ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY, PAYING APPROPRIATE COMPENSATION, DISCLOSING ALL IT KNOWS, AND RENOUNCING TERRORISM. ALSO IN LATE 2001, A GERMAN COURT CONVICTED FOUR DEFENDANTS IN THE 1986 "LA BELLE DISCO" BOMBING. IN RENDERING HIS DECISION, THE JUDGE STATED THAT THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT WAS CLEARLY CULPABLE. TRIPOLI HAS IN RECENT YEARS SOUGHT TO RECAST ITSELF AS A PEACEMAKER AND HAS THUS INSERTED ITSELF INTO A VARIETY OF ISSUES, SUCH AS NEGOTIATION IN THE SUDANESE AND ETHIOPIA-ERITREA CONFLICTS. LIBYA ACTED AS A HIGH-PROFILE NEGOTIATOR--AND RANSOM PAYER--IN THE SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL KIDNAPPING INCIDENT IN 2000.

Possibility of Support to Terrorists by the Palestinian Authority

Q. 13) Is there any evidence suggesting that the Palestinian Authority (PA) has been involved with or supported terrorist activities in the last year?

• WE HAVE CONCERNS ABOUT THIS ISSUE. IN EARLY JANUARY, ISRAEL INTERDICTED A SHIP IN THE RED SEA THAT HAD WEAPONS THAT WERE HEADED FOR THE PA-HELD AREAS. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT SEVERAL SENIOR MEMBERS OF ARAFAT'S FATAH FACTION, WHO HELD POSITIONS WITHIN THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) AND POSSIBLY ALSO THE PA, WERE INVOLVED IN AN ATTEMPT TO SMUGGLE ARMS TO THE PA-HELD AREAS.

• THERE IS ALSO EVIDENCE THAT SOME PA ELEMENTS HAVE ENGAGED IN ANTI-ISRAELI ATTACKS BOTH IN THE WEST BANK, GAZA AND IN ISRAEL PROPER. THERE IS NOT EVIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN TOLD TO DO SO BY SENIOR PA OFFICIALS, BUT THE PA HAS MADE ONLY SPORADIC EFFORTS TO ENFORCE TRUE DISCIPLINE IN ITS RANKS.

• MEANWHILE, ARAFAT AND OTHER PA OFFICIALS HAVE STRONGLY AND PUBLICLY SUPPORTED COALITION ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND HAVE DEFENDED THE U.S. POSITION IN REGIONAL FORA LIKE THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (OIC).

Q: Who would be the likely successor to Arafat as the head of the Palestinian Authority?

• WE SHOULD DRAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PA AND THE PLO. UNDER A DRAFT LAW, AHMED QURAI (ABU ALAA), 63 AND THE PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL SPEAKER, WOULD TAKE OVER THE PA TEMPORARILY AND CALL ELECTIONS WITHIN 45 DAYS THEREBY "SUCCEEDING" ARAFAT IN THAT ROLE.

• UNDER PLO RULES, MAHMOUD ABBAS (ABU MAZEN), 65, A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE PLO'S RULING EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND COFOUNDER OF FATAH, WOULD STEP IN TO LEAD THE PLO AND ALSO LIKELY FATAH.

• IT'S POSSIBLE THAT, AFTER ARAFAT, BOTH ABU MAZEN AND ABU ALAA, NEITHER OF WHOM HAVE ARAFAT'S STATURE, WILL HAVE TO POWER SHARE THESE OFFICIAL BODIES. IT IS ALSO LIKELY THAT BOTH WILL NEED SUPPORT FROM OTHER INFLUENTIAL PALESTINIAN POLITICAL ELEMENTS, SUCH AS THE SECURITY SERVICES, TO SECURE THEIR POSITIONS.

Q: What is the likelihood that the Palestinian leadership will become more radical after Arafat leaves the scene?

• IF THE INTIFADA IS STILL RAGING WHEN ARAFAT DIES, WE BELIEVE IT VERY LIKELY THAT VIOLENCE WILL GET WORSE AS HIS SUCCESSORS ARE LIKELY TO SUPPORT A CERTAIN LEVEL OF VIOLENCE, AS THE BEST WAY TO MAINTAIN CREDIBILITY AND TO QUASH COMPETITORS.

• MEANWHILE, REJECTIONIST ELEMENTS, SUCH AS HAMAS AND PIJ, WHOSE POPULARITY HAS BEEN RISING THROUGHOUT THE INTIFADA, WOULD SEIZE UPON THE POST-ARAFAT CONFUSION TO INCREASE THE ANTI-ISRAELI ACTIVITIES WHICH THEY BELIEVE ARE THE FOUNDATION OF THEIR RENEWED STRENGTH.

• ARAFAT'S SUCCESSOR WILL BE EVEN LESS LIKELY TO CONFRONT THESE ELEMENTS, AS THE PALESTINIAN POPULATION WILL SEE THEM AS LESS LEGITIMATE.

Vietnam POW/MIA

Q. 14) What is your assessment of the level of assistance provided by the government of Vietnam to the U.S. on POW/MIA issues? Do you believe that there is any room for improvement in this area?

A:
• YES, BUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, WHILE PERIODICALLY ASSISTING IN SOME SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THIS ISSUE, SUCH AS RESOLVING ALLEGED LIVE SIGHTING CASES, DOES NOT FOLLOW THIS ISSUE ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS.

The India-Pakistan Conflict

Q. 18) What is the likelihood that India and Pakistan will go to war within the next year? What is the likelihood that such a conflict would result in an exchange of nuclear weapons? Which nation would likely prevail in such a conflict7 Why? what is the likelihood that both India and Pakistan will ultimately agree to accept the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir as their international border?

A. IN THE ABSENCE OF A PROCESS OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES, THE TWO SIDES ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO TRADE SMALL ARMS, MORTAR, AND ARTILLERY FIRE ACROSS THE LOC IN KASHMIR. THE CHANCES FOR A BROADER CONFLICT INVOLVING THE ARMIES OF BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN ACROSS WIDE STRETCHES OF THE LOC AND POSSIBLY INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER, THOUGH PERHAPS LOWER THAN ONLY A FEW MONTHS AGO, CANNOT BE RULED OUT.

SINCE THE END OF 2001, BOTH ARMIES HAVE DEPLOYED FACING EACH OTHER ACROSS BOTH THE LOC AND INTERNATIONAL BORDER SOUTH OF KASHMIR. THIS FACT OF FULL DEPLOYMENT AND THE HEIGHTENED ALERT RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT, BY ACCIDENT, MISCALCULATION, OR EVEN DELIBERATE DECISION SERIOUS CONFLICT COULD BE INITIATED, LEADING TO CONCEIVABLY ESCALATORY RETALIATION THAT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO CONTROL, EVEN WITH EARLY INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT. THE POSSIBILITY OF INDIAN ATTACK ON SOME SCALE RISES AGAIN IF OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS INDIA DECIDES THAT NO DIMINUTION OF CROSS-BORDER INFILTRATION FROM PAKISTAN HAS OCCURRED.

PAKISTAN, UNLIKE INDIA, HAS NOT PLEDGED NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIRST. THE REASONING BEHIND THIS IS THAT, AS THE SMALLER OF THE TWO POWERS THE POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACTS TO DETER THE SUPERIOR CONVENTIONAL FORCES OF INDIA. BUT INDIA STILL FEELS IT IS POSSIBLE TO FIGHT A "LIMITED WAR" WITHOUT CROSSING PAKISTAN'S THRESHOLD FOR NUCLEAR USE. THE PROBLEM, OF COURSE, IS THAT THESE THRESHOLDS ARE NOT CLEARLY SPELLED OUT, MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR INDIA TO THREATEN, INADVERTENTLY, ONE OF PAKISTAN'S "RED LINES," WHICH COULD TRIGGER THE RELEASE OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON. INDIA, NATURALLY, LIKELY WOULD RESPOND TO SUCH NUCLEAR USE WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF ITS OWN.

WHILE A NUCLEAR WAR IN SOUTH ASIA WOULD BE AN IMMENSE TRAGEDY FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS AS WELL AS FOR THE REST OF THE WORLD, IT IS LIKELY THAT INDIA WOULD "PREVAIL" IN SUCH A CONFLICT -- IF WE CAN USE THAT WORD -- IF ONLY BECAUSE IT IS SEVEN TIMES LARGER THAN PAKISTAN. IT IS LESS LIKELY THAN PAKISTAN TO BE COMPLETELY CRIPPLED BY ONE OR EVEN SEVERAL NUCLEAR STRIKES, AND IS MOREOVER SUFFICIENTLY DECENTRALIZED TO ENSURE THE SURVIVAL OF KEY FACILITIES -- BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY.

PAKISTAN, MORE THAN INDIA, IS A LONG WAY FROM ACCEPTING THE LOC AS THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER. IN THE MEANTIME, HOWEVER, WE HAVE ASKED BOTH SIDES TO RESPECT THE SANCTITY OF THE LOC AS AN INTERIM DIVIDING LINE, A PRINCIPLE THAT WAS RE-AFFIRMED AS RECENTLY AS MID-1999, WHEN THE US PERSUADED PAKISTAN TO WITHDRAW FORCES THAT HAD CROSSED THE LOC INTO THE KARGIL SECTOR OF INDIAN KASHMIR, AND ASKED INDIA NOT TO CROSS THE LOC INTO PAKISTANI KASHMIR IN ITS ATTEMPT TO PUSH THE INFILTRATORS BACK OUT OF INDIAN TERRITORY.

The Situation in North Korea

Q. 19) What is the likelihood that North and South Korea will unify within the next 5 years? What is the likelihood that unification between North and South Korea will be a peaceful process? Under what circumstances would a war be likely? How strong is Kim Jong Il's hold on power? Who will likely succeed him?

A:
• INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS HAVE IMPROVED OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS AS A RESULT OF PRESIDENT KIM DAE JUNG'S "SUNSHINE POLICY," BUT WE SEE LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE TWO KOREAS WILL REUNIFY WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, BECAUSE NEITHER SIDE WANTS TO DO SO. THE KOREAN PENINSULA REMAINS ONE OF THE MOST HEAVILY MILITARIZED AREAS IN THE WORLD. BETTER TIES BETWEEN SEOUL AND PYONGYANG HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO ENHANCED CRISIS STABILITY ON THE PENINSULA.

• PYONGYANG HAS MADE A BIG PUSH TO BOOST ITS DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC CONTACTS IN RECENT YEARS--AND HAS HAD SOME SUCCESS IN THIS EFFORT. THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN NORTH KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY OVER THE LAST DECADE HAS BEEN ITS DRIVE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. AS LONG AS THE NORTH REMAINS ON THIS PATH, WE THINK THE CHANCES OF ANOTHER WAR ARE LOW. PYONGYANG MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO INITIATE A CONFLICT IF IT FELT IT WAS UNDER DIRECT THREAT AS A RESULT OF A SHARP DETERIORATION OF ITS SECURITY ENVIRONMENT.

• CHAIRMAN KIM JONG IL APPEARS TO BE FIRMLY IN CONTROL. HE HAS MANAGED STATE, PARTY, AND MILITARY AFFAIRS FOR ALMOST THREE DECADES, HAS LOYALISTS IN ALL KEY POSTS, AND HAS WEATHERED SEVERAL MAJOR CRISES--INCLUDING THE DEATH OF HIS FATHER, THE BREAKDOWN OF THE SOCIALIST BLOC, THE COLLAPSE OF THE NORTH'S ECONOMY, AND A FAMINE THAT CLAIMED MORE THAN A MILLION LIVES. AS IF TO UNDERSCORE HIS HOLD ON POWER, KIM MADE A TRAIN JOURNEY THROUGH RUSSIA LAST YEAR FOR NEARLY A MONTH. WE KNOW OF NO SERIOUS CHALLENGES TO HIS AUTHORITY.

• WE HAVE LITTLE INFORMATION ABOUT KIM'S PLANS FOR HIS OWN SUCCESSION. IT IS TOO EARLY IN THE PROCESS TO CONCLUDE, AS SOME PRESS REPORTS HAVE, THAT A PARTICULAR MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY WILL SUCCEED HIM.

China

Q. 20) What is the likelihood that China will decrease its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles?

A. CHINA HAS MADE SEVERAL NONPROLIFERATION COMMITMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES, AND ITS PROLIFERATION BEHAVIOR HAS IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY COMPARED WITH TEN YEARS AGO, WHEN CHINESE ENTITIES WERE EXPORTING COMPLETE BALLISTIC MISSILES AND HAD AN UNEVEN RECORD ON NUCLEAR DEALINGS WITH STATES OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN. THERE IS STILL ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT, AND WE EXPECT TRANSFERS OF WMD AND MISSILE-RELATED TECHNOLOGY TO CONTINUE. MANY OF THE FIRMS ENGAGED IN PROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES ARE SPIN-OFFS FROM STATE-OWNED DEFENSE INDUSTRIES, BUT THEY MAY OPERATE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

ENFORCEMENT IS LIKELY TO IMPROVE AS CHINA SETS UP COMPREHENSIVE MISSILE-RELATED EXPORT CONTROLS PURSUANT TO A NOVEMBER, 2000, PLEDGE TO THE UNITED STATES, BUT IN THE MEANTIME CHINESE AUTHORITIES WILL CONTINUE TO BE HAMPERED BY THEIR INABILITY TO POLICE PRODUCERS AND VENDORS ADEQUATELY. A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN CHINESE PROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES IS NOT LIKELY, EVEN IN RETALIATION FOR STEPS TAKEN BY THE U.S. ON (FOR EXAMPLE) SANCTIONS, MISSILE DEFENSE, OR TAIWAN THAT THE BEIJING LEADERSHIP MAY NOT LIKE.

PROGRESS IN CURBING SALES -- ESPECIALLY IN DUAL-USE AREAS -- WILL NO DOUBT BE GRADUAL, IF NOT SPOTTY. CHINA WILL CERTAINLY CONTINUE ACTIVITIES WITH PAKISTAN THAT IT HAS NOT FORESWORN, INCLUDING CONVENTIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND CIVILIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION INVOLVING SAFEGUARDED FACILITIES, SOMETIMES CREATING AMBIGUITIES ABOUT ITS COMPLIANCE AND INTENTIONS. WE ASSESS THAT CHINA CONTINUES TO TAKE ITS NON-PROLIFERATION PLEDGES SERIOUSLY AND IS UNLIKELY TO ABROGATE ANY OF THEM.

Q. To what extent have you observed an improvement in China's human rights policy?

A. WE WELCOME RECENT RELEASES OF SEVERAL DETAINEES, BUT WE NOTE THAT THERE CONTINUE TO BE SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. WE HAVE NOT OBSERVED, OVER THE PAST YEAR, AN IMPROVEMENT IN CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY.

Q. How cooperative has China been with the U.S. on the war on terror?

A. IMMEDIATELY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP EXPRESSED ITS CONDOLENCE AND SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT JIANG REITERATED THIS SUPPORT WHEN HE MET WITH PRESIDENT BUSH IN SHANGHAI IN OCTOBER 2001 AND IN BEIJING IN FEBRUARY 2002. CHINA HAS WORKED WITH THE U.S. BILATERALLY AND IN THE U.N. TO COMBAT TERRORISM.

Q. To what extent have close US-Taiwan relations been an impediment to closer US-China ties?

A. US SUPPORT FOR TAIWAN IS THE MOST PROBLEMATIC ISSUE FOR THE PRC IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE US. HOWEVER, BEIJING HAS TAKEN SOME STEPS TO REDUCE TENSIONS IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT, AND IT APPEARS UNLIKELY TO UNDERTAKE ANY INITIATIVES IN CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE AS IT GRAPPLES WITH OTHER MORE PRESSING DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PRIORITIES. THE TAIWAN ISSUE SHOULD NOT DETER EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN US-CHINA COOPERATION ON COUNTER-TERRORISM AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 AND TO SEEK IMPROVEMENTS IN OTHER AREAS OF US-CHINA RELATIONS.

The Security of U.S. Interests in the Philippines

Q. 21) U.S. forces are providing training to the Philippine military. To what extent are U.S. personnel and interests in the Philippines at risk by Philippine Communist groups and Islamic extremists? To what extent has President Macapagal-Arroyo been made politically vulnerable by maintaining close ties to the U.S. and receiving counter terrorism support from the U.S. military?

A:
• U.S. FORCES HAVE LONG BEEN CONSIDERED TARGETS BY MILITANT COMMUNIST GROUPS SUCH AS THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY (NPA) AND THE ALEX BONCAYO BRIGADE (ABB), A BREAKAWAY FACTION RESPONSIBLE FOR MURDERING COL. JAMES ROWE IN 1989. LOCAL NPA ELEMENTS MAY HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR KILLING AN AMERICAN TOURIST ON MT. PINATUBO LAST WEEK, ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNIST SPOKESMAN DENIED NPA INVOLVEMENT.

• IN MUSLIM DOMINATED AREAS OF MINDANAO, ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG) REBELS, WHO HOLD TWO AMERICAN CITIZENS HOSTAGE AND BEHEADED A THIRD LAST YEAR, MAY TARGET U.S. FORCES TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE AREA WHERE THEY ARE HIDING. THEY MAY BELIEVE THAT KILLING U.S. MILITARY OR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WOULD CONVINCE WASHINGTON TO PULL ITS COUNTER TERRORISM TRAINERS OUT OF THE PHILIPPINES. A BREAKAWAY FACTION OF THE MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT ALSO MAY TRY SUCH A MOVE TO AVENGE THE RECENT ARREST OF THEIR LEADER.

• OPINION POLLS SHOW SUPPORT FOR U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES IS HIGH - ONE POLL SHOWS SUPPORT AT 84%. BUT THERE ARE MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE SCOPE AND PARAMETERS OF THIS EXERCISE ROOTED IN NATIONALIST SENSITIVITSS ABOUT OUR FORMER MILITARY BASES AND THIS HIGH LEVEL OF PUBLIC SUPPORT COULD DISSIPATE. POLITICAL OPPONENTS OF PRESIDENT MACAPAGAL-ARROYO MAY SEEK TO USE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE EXERCISES AS A WAY TO WEAKEN HER AS SHE LOOKS TO REELECTION IN 2004.

Colombia

Q: 23) Colombia: To what extent is Colombia's weak economy -- falling exports, lack of progress on fiscal reforms, high unemployment -- having an impact on Colombia's government reform initiatives? What is the likelihood that President Pastrana will be able to reach a final settlement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) within the next year?

A:
• COLOMBIA'S MINIMAL PROGRESS 0N ITS REFORM PROGRAM HAS MANY CAUSES, INCLUDING ITS WEAK ECONOMY. OTHER FACTORS IMPEDING REFORM INCLUDE A DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION, ELECTION YEAR POLITICS, AND PRESIDENT PASTRANA'S LACK OF POLITICAL CAPITAL. THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT FOR FURTHER REFORM IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

• THERE IS ALMOST NO POSSIBILITY THAT PRESIDENT PASTRANA WILL REACH A FINAL SETTLEMENT WITH THE FARC WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR. PASTRANA TERMINATED THE PEACE PROCESS WITH THE FARC ON FEBURARY 20, AFTER FARC MEMBERS HIJACKED A PLANE AND KIDNAPPED A SENATOR FROM IT, AN ACT THAT CULMINATED A MONTH-LONG WAVE OF TERRORIST BOMBINGS. THE MILITARY HAS ENTERED THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND THE FARC HAS FLED FROM IT. ALTHOUGH BOTH SIDES PUBLICLY DECLARE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO RETURN TO THE TABLE, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THIS WILL OCCUR. PASTRANA'S TERM ENDS IN AUGUST, AND THE MAIN CANDIDATES TO SUCCEED HIM ALL SAY THAT THEY PREFER A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. NEVERTHELESS, THE RECENT INCREASE IN VIOLENCE WILL PRECLUDE ANY RE-STARTING OF TALKS FOR SOME TIME.

Mexico

Q. 25) In the year since his inauguration, how successful has Mexico's President Fox been in bringing about an end to corruption, stepping up the fight against illicit narcotics, focusing more on human rights and generally bringing effective governance to his country?

A:

PRESIDENT FOX SEEMS INTENT ON REMOVING ANY OFFICIAL WHO EVEN HAS THE APPEARANCE OF BEING CORRUPT. HE HAS FIRED 43 HIGH-LEVEL CUSTOMS OFFICIALS AND FORCED THE RESIGNATION OF A SENIOR ATTORNEY GENERAL OFFICER FOR INVOLVEMENT IN QUESTIONABLE PRACTICES. MORE IMPORTANTLY, PRESIDENT FOX APPOINTED FRANCISCO BARRIO TERRAZAS AS THE ANTI-CORRUPTION CZAR WITH THE BROAD AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAMS IN FEDERAL AGENCIES. THAT SAID, THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO DOUBTLESS REALIZES THAT PUTTING A PERMANENT DENT IN CORRUPTION WILL TAKE YEARS TO ACHIEVE.

PRESIDENT FOX HAS SHOWN A GENUINE DESIRE TO IMPROVE MEXICO'S DRUG CONTROL EFFORT. THE SUSTAINED OPIUM POPPY AND MARIJUANA CROP SUPPRESSION EFFORT AS WELL AS THE CAPTURE OF SEVERAL IMPORTANT DRUG BOSSES ARE EXAMPLES THAT HE IS KEEPING HIS ANTIDRUG PROMISE. WE ARE STILL AWAITING INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION, BUT RAMON ARELLANO FELIX MAY HAVE BEEN KILLED IN A SHOOT-OUT WITH MEXICAN SECURITY FORCES.

• THE FOX ADMINISTRATION HAS MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN ITS EFFORT TO IMPROVE MEXICO'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD. MOST RECENTLY, FOX REDUCED TO TIME SERVED THE SENTENCE OF GENERAL GALLARDO WHO CALLED FOR A HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN FOR THE ARMED FORCES. LAST NOVEMBER FOX RELEASED FROM PRISON TWO PEASANT ENVIRONMENTALISTS AND HE NAMED A SPECIAL PROSECUTOR TO INVESTIGATE FORCED DISAPPEARANCES DURING THE "DIRTY WAR" IN THE 1970S-8OS. IN JANUARY, THE SUPREME COURT BROADENED THE INVESTIGATION TO INCLUDE THE 1968 MASSACRE OF STUDENTS IN THE PLAZA OF TLATELOLCO IN MEXICO CITY. THE FOX ADMINISTRATION HAS ALSO SUBMITTED A DRAFT "FEDERAL LAW ON TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION" FOR CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.

• PRESIDENT FOX IS PERSONALLY DEDICATED TO DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW AND GOOD GOVERNANCE -- ALL FUNDAMENTALS OF THE PAN PARTY FOR THE LAST 60 YEARS. FOX'S INAUGURATION MARKED THE FIRST CHANGE IN THE GOVERNING POLITICAL PARTY -- FROM THE PRI TO THE PAN -- IN SOME 70 YEARS. AFTER THE FIRST YEAR IN OFFICE, THE SCOPE OF THE CHALLENGES FACING HIM HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY CLEAR. PERHAPS THE MOST DIFFICULT HAS BEEN THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CONGRESS THAT IS STILL IN ITS INFANCY AS A DELIBERATIVE BODY (UNDER THE PRI, IT WAS A RUBBER STAMP ORGANIZATION). LEGISLATORS HAVE NO PREPARATION TO ASSUME THEIR POSITIONS, NO PROFESSIONAL STAFF, NO LIBRARY OF CONGRESS TO RESEARCH ISSUES FOR THEM, NO CONSTITUENCY TO HOLD THEM ACCOUNTABLE (AS THERE IS NO RE-ELECTION) AND THEREFORE NO ACCUMULATED LEGISLATIVE EXPERTISE. FOX'S PRIMARY SUCCESS HAS BEEN IN REORIENTING MEXICO'S FOREIGN POLICY AWAY FROM THE FEAR OF LOSING ITS SOVEREIGNTY TO BECOMING AN ACTIVE PLAYER IN THE HEMISPHERE AND AT THE UNSC.

Implications of U.S. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty

Q. 26) On December 13, 2001, President Bush notified Russia that the U.S. intends to withdraw from the ABM Treaty -- the withdrawal to be completed in June of this year. How will Russia react militarily to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty7 What will China's likely military reaction be? What is the likelihood that the deployment of a U.S. ballistic missile defense will lead to the escalation of ballistic missile and tactical missile defense systems by other countries, as well as a commensurate increase in the number of ballistic and tactical missiles to overwhelm these defensive systems?

A: WHILE EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY WAS A MISTAKE, PRESIDENT PUTIN ALSO SAID THE U.S. DECISION WOULD NOT POSE A THREAT TO RUSSIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY. MOREOVER, RUSSIA HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO ACHIEVING AN AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. ON A NEW STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK WHICH WOULD FEATURE SIGNIFICANT CUTS IN OPERATIONALLY DEPLOYED STRATEGIC FORCES. ONGOING TRENDS IN RUSSIAN STRATEGIC FORCES THAT PRECEDED THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT -- QUANTITATIVE DECLINE AND QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT (IN TERMS OF THE ABILITY TO PENETRATE MISSILE DEFENSES) -- ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE.

CHINA HAS ALSO TAKEN THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL IN STRIDE. WHILE CONTINUING THE GRADUAL MODERNIZATION AND BUILD-UP OF CHINESE STRATEGIC FORCES, WHICH PRECEDED THIS ANNOUNCEMENT, BEIJING DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE CHANGED ITS "MINIMUM DETERRENT" POLICY. CHINA SEEMS TO HAVE ANTICIPATED THE U.S. DECISION AND HAS CONCENTRATED ITS MILITARY RESPONSE ON ENHANCING THE COUNTERMEASURES NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT ITS BALLISTIC MISSILES COULD PENETRATE U.S. MISSILE DEFENSES.

North Korea's Taepo Dong-2

Q. 27) Last December's NIE on the ballistic missile threat states that "North Korea's multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2, which is capable of reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized (several hundred kilogram) payload, may be ready for flight testing." What will be the impact of the continuation of the North's flight-test moratorium on the development of the Taepo Dong-2?

A: IF NORTH KOREA PLANS TO DEPLOY THE TD-2, WE BELIEVE PYONGYANG WILL NEED TO FLIGHT-TEST THE MISSILE AT LEAST ONCE. THE TEST PROBABLY WOULD BE CONDUCTED IN A SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE CONFIGURATION SIMILAR TO THE TD-1 LAUNCH IN 1998. NORTH KOREAN ADHERENCE TO ITS SELF-DECLARED FLIGHT-TEST MORATORIUM WOULD DELAY DEPLOYMENT UNTIL AT LEAST SOMETIME IN 2003, AT THE EARLIEST. (NORTH KOREA HAS SAID IT WILL MAINTAIN THE MORATORIUM UNTIL 2003.)

Q: Under what circumstances would North Korea be likely to use its missile capability against the U.S.?

A: WE BELIEVE THAT PYONGYANG BEGAN ITS MISSILE AND WMD PROGRAMS IN THE 1970S TO COUNTER ROK PROGRAMS THEN UNDERWAY AND TO ESTABLISH A CAPABILITY FOR INTRA-WA DETERRENCE BY HOLDING U.S. BASES IN THE REGION AND ROK AND JAPANESE CITIES HOSTAGE. PYONGYANG MAY HAVE BELIEVED THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS MARRIED TO AN INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILE WOULD PROVIDE A USEFUL "STOPPER," LIMITING U.S. STRIKES SHOULD WAR BREAK OUT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE NORTH KOREA WOULD FIRE ITS MISSILES AGAINST U.S. FORCES IN ANY SITUATION SHORT OF WAR.

Q: What is the current estimate of the size of North Korea's nuclear weapon arsenal?

A: WE ASSESS THAT NORTH KOREA HAS PRODUCED ENOUGH PLUTONIUM FOR AT LEAST ONE NUCLEAR WEAPON OR, POSSIBLY, TWO.

Q: How confident are we that North Korea is complying with the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework regarding plutonium production activities in Yongbyon?

A: THE DPRK HAS NOT RELOADED OR OPERATED ITS 5 MWE REACTOR AT YONGBYON, AND IT HAS HALTED CONSTRUCTION AT THE LARGER 50 AND 200 MWE REACTORS. IT IS NOT PRODUCING FUEL AT THE FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY AT YONGBYON, AND IT HAS FOREGONE REPROCESSING SPENT FUEL AND ALLOWED THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) TO SEAL THE PROCESSING PLANT THERE. IAEA INSPECTORS HAVE MAINTAINED A CONTINUOUS PRESENCE AT THE YONGBYON NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER SINCE 1994, AND THEY REPORT THAT THE FREEZE ON PRODUCTION REMAINS IN EFFECT.

Public Disclosure of the Aggregate Intelligence Budget

Q. 29) For a number of years, individuals have advocated the public disclosure of the aggregate intelligence budget. In your opinion, what would be the specific threat to U.S. national security from publicly disclosing the aggregate intelligence budget?

A:

HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ALREADY KNOW A GREAT DEAL MORE ABOUT US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BUDGETS, RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES THAN WOULD BE REVEALED BY PUBLIC CONFIRMATION OF AN AGGREGATE NUMBER THAT IS REPORTED WITH VARYING ACCURACY IN MEDIA ACCOUNTS.

A DECISION ON THIS MATTER IS A POLICY CALL.