1998 Congressional Hearings

Prepared Statement by Gen. Howell M. Estes III, USAF

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:

I am once again pleased and honored to appear before you today to discuss the promise and potential of space to our national and economic security. The United States Space Command, as the nation's single focal point for military space operations, has been hard at work building the foundation to make good on this promise. In a few moments, I will share with you the significant progress we have made since the last time I spoke to this committee. First, as this is most likely the last time I will testify before you as Commander in Chief, United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), I would like to register my concern that Americans remain largely ill-informed about their growing dependence on space systems. I believe our nation faces tough choices on the horizon and we must work together to ensure the public understands the issues involved. Let me illustrate using oil as an example.

When World War II-era Americans understood oil's value to military operations, they could more readily accept a North Africa strategy in lieu of direct, perhaps expedient, attacks on German soil. They also had a framework to put the high cost of air raids on Axis oil fields and refineries into context. The oil shock of the 1970s forced Americans to also recognize their dependence on oil to commerce and their way of life. The result is an ingrained sense of oil as a military and economic center of gravity. Thus, the public debate surrounding oil is now very sophisticated. Americans recognize the need for a separate unified command covering the oil region, they accepted a permanent overseas presence there, they were ready to endure thousands of projected casualties in the Gulf War, they have maintained international sanctions against Iraq for an unprecedented duration.

The same level of sophistication is in its infancy for space. Americans seem unaware that just as oil drives the engine of today's industrial society, space will drive the engine of tomorrow's information society. As an emerging center of gravity, space capabilities impact almost every industry, every person, and every military strategy. The problem may lie in the general complacency for most things military following the Cold War or from associating the space race with superpower competition. But, I believe the public must come to a better understanding of their basic dependence on space systems.

With this in mind, I have focused USSPACECOM, a cohesive and spirited team, not only on supporting the warfighter, but also planning for our nation's expansion in space during the next quarter century. The President recently acknowledged USSPACECOM as the organization most appropriate to assume the responsibility and focus for space defense operations, all military-related space operations, requirements and architectures. We believe our joint space organization is the right structure for today and the future.

The men and women of USSPACECOM are the reason we are able to provide such high quality space operations to our nation. Military operations continue to demand great sacrifice and dedication from our people--and they--the men and women of USSPACEOM--continue to exceed our expectations. They energetically defend this great nation because they believe in our democratic system of government, and they offer themselves as a guarantee it will remain so for future generations. In exchange for this service, our people must be treated with dignity, compassionately cared for, and fairly compensated. We must not break the trust upon which this relationship is founded by reaffirming the importance of our "people priorities"--compensation, medical benefits, and personal dignity.

Congress deserves credit for supporting the 1998 2.8% pay increase and the .5% increase in dislocation allowance, but it remains bothersome to me that so many of our young men and women have trouble making ends meet. DoD's total end strength has been reduced and we've moved substantially to a US-based contingency force, resulting in a significant increase in the number of deployments for our people. The difficult life-style and devotion-to-duty of these young men and women deserve recognition through adequate compensation. Congress and DoD need to jointly ensure that compensation for all our members is competitive with that available in the private sector. We must account for inflation, and we must continue to provide a strong benefits program to attract, retain, and motivate our all-volunteer force.

With the decrease in military medical assets, maintaining an adequate level of health care for our military members, dependents and retirees, is a critical quality-of-life issue. Availability of quality health care remains a primary non-pay priority for active, retired, and DoD civilian members. We need to support the preservation of civilian employees' access to quality, affordable health care for themselves and their families. Within DoD, we need to work at transitioning health delivery from intervention to prevention to build towards a healthier community. The TRICARE system isn't available to retirees 65 and older but recent Congressional approval to test the subvention concept is a welcome step at fulfilling this important obligation we have to those who served our country so valiantly in the past. Just as with the retirement system, we made a commitment to these people, and we should not change it for those who are already enrolled. We need to ensure TRICARE meets the objectives of providing our people and their families continued and quality medical coverage.

In USSPACECOM, we practice zero tolerance for any form of discrimination or harassment. We've had no formal complaints for over three years. I strive to maintain a climate in which everyone can achieve his or her full potential, and an environment that encourages our people to remain in the military. I can't overemphasize the importance of personal dignity because I can't make the demands of people that I do if I don't allow them to achieve their full potential. It's important that we continue to create a climate where people believe they have a stake in the action, which is free of discrimination, and in which they can achieve their full potential with a quality of life that may offset, in some part, what some perceive as inadequate pay.

As I said, the men and women of USSPACECOM are the reason we're able to provide this nation what it needs from military space. Without them, all the technological breakthroughs and advanced capabilities we see today would fail to contribute to our national power as we carry out the important mission of promoting a free and democratic world.


Today, the region of space is a military and economic center of gravity. Life on earth is rapidly being inextricably linked to space capabilities. Because of our military strategy, economic investment, and social dependence on space systems, space has become a region of vital national interest. To fully capitalize on this growing source of military, economic and political power and to prepare for the future security environment, we will not only provide "support from" space as we do today, but will also "operate in" space tomorrow. Competitors and adversaries already recognize our reliance on space power. We must guard against turning our dependence into a vulnerability. Protecting our freedom to use space assets will become increasingly important. As adversaries also increase their ability to exploit space systems, it may become unacceptable to share this high ground in times of crisis or war. To keep our troops out of danger, we may need to deny an adversary's access to space or use of his space systems.


During our nearly forty years of space exploitation, advantages in technology have allowed us to migrate substantial portions of five missions to space: ballistic missile warning, communications, weather, intelligence and navigation.

Our ballistic missile warning capabilities are as crucial today--and in the future--as they were during the Cold War. Initially developed to warn of intercontinental ballistic missile attack, additionally, these systems now provide theater-level warning. They have evolved over time to warn of missile launches anywhere in the world. This capability is important for US forces and our allies around the world. Today's system is good, but it needs replacing. Our programmed replacements, the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High and Low, are the right answer.

Another very important area is communications. We've made tremendous strides here--both in the commercial and military sectors. The Iridium, Globalstar and Teledesic constellations (to name a few) will soon shrink physical separation by connecting the entire globe through the telephone and Internet. Systems such as these revolutionize our ability to communicate with each other, and it will tie people together in a way never before available.

Global weather and space environment monitoring is the third mission that has migrated to space. Satellites in various orbits provide information not previously available in the past. As the sensors on our satellites improve, the quality of the products we derive from them also improves. We must continue to modernize these systems to ensure they not only remain uninterrupted, but mature in capability as technology improves.

Intelligence is another area we've migrated to space. Many of the sensors the US uses, as well as those provided by other countries, offer us tremendous and timely insight into global developments. For DoD this information can be more than a force multiplier, it very often helps formulate courses of action for military activities. This is an area in which I have worked closely with Mr. Keith Hall of the National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO) this past year to try to bring our combined operations closer together to better support the warfighter. We have made significant progress in the past 12 months with more to come in the future. An example of this cooperative effort is the recent decision by DARPA, NRO, and the USAF to explore a Moving Target Indicator (MTI) space-based capability. The primary purpose of this system, if it becomes operational, would be to provide an all-weather picture of moving targets to the warfighter anywhere in the world in near real time from tasking to receipt of product.

And the final mission I'll mention which we've migrated to space is navigation. The Global Positioning System's (GPS) contributions to the civil, commercial, and military sectors are well known. By the year 2000, this system will represent a $15.2B investment. GPS is the first global navigation system, and could become the global standard for international military and civilian air navigation. Companies use GPS to better control their transportation fleets through vehicle tracking and route optimization. Farmers use GPS and remote sensing systems to know the health of their fields and to determine crop rotation and the correct amount of water, fertilizer and seed to apply, and the list goes on. We are just starting to understand the many varied uses that a system like GPS can provide to improve life here on earth.

So while the five capabilities I've described were built to support our nation's military, more and more the civil and commercial applications for these systems are being expanded.


Today, over 550 satellites are in orbit. Nearly half of those belong to the US and half of the US satellites are commercial. Our space surveillance systems track more than 8,000 man-made objects in space. Forty-six countries have national space programs. A recent study cited in Space News reports that 1600+ additional satellites are expected to be placed in orbit in the next nine years.

Space products and services permeate all aspects of our way of life, from identifying resources for extraction of mineral deposits to local government planning and disaster response. Whereas in the past, military space investments far outpaced commercial space investments, the opposite is now the case. Commercial space revenues outpaced military expenditures in 1996 (53% to 47%), and this gap will continue to grow. Roughly $500B in the next five years will be invested/returned from space. Space industries continue to grow and develop at a 20 percent annual growth rate with $1.5 Trillion in space spin-offs added to the US economy.

As a result of our efforts to migrate missions to space, all military operations from humanitarian relief to major theater war clearly depend on space-based capabilities. As we look to the capabilities envisioned in the next decade, our smaller military force will be much more effective because of the information available to it. Much of this information will come from space-based sensors and virtually all of it will flow through space to our forces. The information we receive from space, and what we do with it, is and will be a key enabler for achieving full spectrum dominance and the four operational concepts (Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Focused Logistics, and Full-Dimensional Protection) of the Joint Vision 2010. Our ability to see and hear what's going on across the globe allows us to more effectively achieve these four operational concepts. Our goal is to ensure that tailored and relevant information is available directly to the right person in order to precisely hit the right target at the right time.

Clearly there is a risk here because we have already started to posture and size our forces as though this level of information dominance exists today. For instance, we face the unusual circumstance of fighting the next war sharing the advantage of space's high ground side-by-side with an adversary. Our smaller armies cannot accomplish a DESERT STORM-like undetected left hook and our smaller navies cannot hide in the vastness of the oceans unless we have some ability to control the information that comes from space. Moreover, without the enabling technologies provided by space, our commanders will lose the advantage of time and situational awareness so essential for smaller forces to prevail. Finally, if we fail to come through in space, it will be far more difficult to project and protect our forces nor will we be able to quickly reconstitute the capabilities we have already cut today.

Having said all that, I want to share with you what we're doing in USSPACECOM, the progress we're making on our programs and our gameplan for the future.


One of my jobs at US Space Command is to ensure that the US can protect our interests and investments in space when they are threatened. Preparing for the future has been the number one priority of my tenure. I am proud to report that we have made significant progress over the past year in fulfilling this responsibility. For example, the Unified Command Plan has been recently updated to better integrate space into the unified command structures that have served our combatant commands so well in the past. With USSPACECOM as the recognized single focal point for military space operations, with most of the traditional responsibilities shared by other regional commanders, we are now in the right position to start working the doctrine, command and control, CINC-to-CINC relationships, and other military space challenges to ensure space becomes a normalized, seamless, and integrated part of the joint fight.

In the past year, we have spent a significant portion of our time and talent creating a long range plan for our space requirements. For the first time, in one place, we list the capabilities of our legacy systems and our needs to take us from where we are today to our vision for 2020--a vision built to complement Joint Vision 2010. There are several programs outlined in our long range plan, however, there are a few key issues and systems that deserve our closer attention today. We believe what follows is essential, and your continued support is critical to establishing space dominance now and in the future.


The most secure, efficient and cost-effective sensors supporting a future BMD capability reside in space. USSPACECOM will play a major role in BMD by providing space-based sensors, data reduction, message generation and training. Built on the strength of nearly thirty years of experience and numerous experiments designed to explore new techniques, space-based sensors of the future will permit earlier detection, typing and discrimination of increasingly sophisticated threats. Planned improvements of new algorithms, processing and data fusion will make for a more robust BMD capability.

I remain concerned about the ability to protect this nation and our deployed in-theater military forces in theater from ballistic missile threats. This force protection issue remains a key warfighter concern. USSPACECOM's mission is to provide national and theater missile warning. We need to do better in early notification of incoming threats, and provide better geolocation predictions of launch and impact points. Ultimately, we want to not only better defend against this threat, but to make the enemy aware that if he launches we will not only intercept the missile but kill the launcher. The Theater Airborne Warning System (TAWS)-like technology can help us do that. The TAWS demonstration fuses overhead and air-breather infrared data to improve our ability to locate and react to missile launches. The FY98 Congressional plus-up of $5.6M for this demonstration is allowing us to complete software development and to demonstrate this capability against live-fire missile launches. We hope to brief the results of our work in early summer.


Our SBIRS system consolidates DoD's non-imaging infrared systems that fulfill national security needs in areas of missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence and battlespace characterization. It consists of high and low components. We need to get SBIRS High on-orbit first as a replacement for the Defense Support Program (DSP). We're going to put four satellites up to replace four DSPs. This will improve our location identification and tracking capabilities by better identifying the missile launch point, impact point and azimuth. It will also give us another level of refinement in those areas as we work the missile defense issue. The advantage of SBIRS Low is that it can track "cold bodies" in space. SBIRS Low is important for the ballistic missile defense systems. With SBIRS High, you can only track infrared signatures which means the rocket motor has to be burning. These systems will significantly improve our ability to provide much more precise launch and impact point of theater missiles to forces in a theater of operations. They are key to our ability to cue systems that we'll use for active defense as part of both theater and national missile defense.


In the late 1980s, we first looked at the feasibility of using the DSP to support tactical operations. JTAGS became the transportable in-theater element to provide theater commanders a continuous 24-hour capability to receive and process direct down-linked data from DSP sensors and to disseminate warning and alert information on tactical ballistic missile and other tactical events of interest throughout the theater. We continue to work JTAGS enhancements and improvements to increase capabilities to support the warfighter. In the near-term, we're working enhancements to accuracy, timeliness and connectivity. Communications improvements will provide direct sensor-to-shooter connectivity and improve timeliness of data dissemination in-theater. We'll be able to more accurately pinpoint the exact location of the DSP satellite which in turn will improve launch point identification. When SBIRS comes on line in high and low orbits, JTAGS will transition to the Multi-Mission Mobile Processor with direct data downlink--providing both a theater and strategic capability. We will also have worldwide coverage and pinpoint sensor capability.

Assured Access

Assured Access is the "on-demand use" of space lines of communication to enable unimpeded operations in and through space. What this means is that we'll have the transport to get to space and the ability to operate once there. My immediate concerns about Assured Access are twofold: 1) as a matter of priority, we need to significantly reduce the cost of getting to space so we can afford to pay for the capabilities we need to put there, and 2) we need to protect sufficient frequency spectrum to ensure our space-based assets are able to operate on behalf of the warfighters.

We have already started down the right path to reducing our tremendous spacelift costs. In the near-term, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) will provide a 25-50 percent reduction in cost. As a bonus, it will greatly improve flexibility and responsiveness which, in turn, will help me to be more proactive in meeting warfighter needs for space-based data. A key acquisition strategy change made this past year, which I fully supported, was to retain both of the current EELV competitors--we will no longer down-select to one. This is clearly the right step to make, both for the warfighter and this nation. As a warfighter, having two different viable launch systems reduces my mission risk--I no longer have all my "eggs in the same basket" such as we experienced during the Challenger mishap era. Also, the competition, not only in the military but more importantly in the commercial sector, will apply pressure to keep the prices down. The other good news for this nation is that retaining both EELV competitors will enhance our international competitiveness in the launch industry. EELV is a good example of how partnering with commercial industry is mutually beneficial. As I mentioned earlier, EELV is a step in the right direction, but there are additional steps we need to actively pursue if we are to continue to bring spacelift costs down. I'm talking about going from $5,000-$9,000 per pound to orbit today to less than $1,000 by 2015. Achieving this may require reusable systems which NASA has the lead to develop. There are also strong commercial efforts on-going here as well. We are working closely with NASA to understand our unique military needs that drive design. Military reusable launch vehicles, such as Space Operations Vehicles and Space Maneuvering Vehicles, as well as commercial systems, are integral to the implementation of the USSPACECOM's Vision for 2020. Also, I promised in last year's testimony before the SASC that we would have a fully developed concept of operations for military spaceplane (now called Space Operations Vehicle). That document is finished and will be submitted for review shortly.

My second element of concern under Assured Access is ensuring sufficient radio frequency spectrum to operate. One risk to assured frequency access for our forces and our allies is spectrum reallocation. Spectrum reallocations come at the expense of systems that protect the nation such as early warning radars, space surveillance and other sensor systems. Reallocations impair our ability to protect, train and fight, and ultimately will lead to serious operational consequences due to lack of bandwidth. As the private sector continues to influence national and international regulatory processes, we must work together with civil spectrum users for a national spectrum strategy to ensure equitable access by all. We cannot achieve the information superiority of Joint Vision 2010 while incurring on-going losses of this critical finite asset.

International spectrum reallocations are also raising risk to our national systems. Frequency spectrum used by the Global Positioning System (GPS) frequency allocation was at risk of incursion because of the mobile satellite industry at the World Radio Conference in Geneva. The mobile satellite industry needs generated world support to operate consumer mobile telephone services in a portion of the aviation safety band used by GPS. This effort was postponed for technical study only through last-minute efforts by the Secretaries of State and Defense. The battle is not over.

Selling frequencies has substantial costs. While we do collect the money, we absorb spectrum losses and re-engineer equipment to maintain national security, we have not been fully reimbursed. Reimbursement for reallocation should be addressed in future legislation if we are to maintain our spectrum.

Finally, the Federal Communications Commission must impose receiver and transmitter sensitivity standards on commercial radio frequency equipment to reduce potential out-of-band interference between federal and commercial radio frequency users. The bottom line is that we must develop an equitable long-range spectrum strategy based on warfighting requirements and commercial needs. However, let there be no mistake, we stand firm on the position that there will be no further-directed reallocation of radio spectrum.


GPS provides tremendous benefits to both the military and civilian communities. It's critical for national security, public safety and economic growth. In March 1996, the President stated our intent to discontinue Selective Availability (SA) no later than 2006. We continue to work this with the Department of Transportation. US forces need their own distinct frequency and encryption capability to prevent the adversary from altering or denying the GPS signal to our warfighters. If civil/commercial entities share the same signal or the same part of the spectrum, they are vulnerable to jamming, deception and other electronic warfare techniques. Knowing this, we've been working with industry on the NAVWAR initiative to identify the most promising and affordable measures to ensure GPS availability to our warfighters engaged in military operations while minimizing the impacts on civil and commercial GPS users outside the theater. The three pillars of NAVWAR are:

Assured access to the GPS signal in a stressed environment,

Selective denial to adversaries, and

Minimal non-adversary impact

Signal restructuring offers the potential to enhance NAVWAR capabilities without impacting civil and commercial users. We are also pursuing additional frequency options to meet warfighter requirements, satisfy NAVWAR concerns and improve performance for civilian users.


There is strong agreement within DoD on the future course of action for MILSATCOM activities. These activities provide the architecture that will satisfy warfighter needs into the 21st Century. However, without continued support, not only will existing systems become obsolete, but newer, more capable systems will be saturated with the ever-increasing information needs of tomorrow's warfighters. Current DoD-owned MILSATCOM systems will be more at risk in the 2003-2006 timeframe. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) recently approved the course of action developed by the senior warfighters from the Unified Commands. It's clear that DoD will continue to invest heavily in precision warfighting and combat support systems that rely on space-based systems for their information. We plan to use commercial systems whenever possible to meet these requirements, but we still see the need for some DoD-owned systems. We're incorporating commercial technology into the DoD systems where feasible. In 2004 and 2005, we plan to launch three new DoD-owned, high capacity, commercial-like wideband satellites, focused on supporting deployed warfighters. These satellites will supplement the remaining Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) constellation and Global Broadcast System (GBS) capability on the Ultra High Frequency Follow On (UFO) satellites. This "gapfiller" satellite will give DoD a dramatic increase in tactical wideband capability two years earlier than the systems originally envisioned, and allows us time to assess the performance and cost of emerging commercial services. We're working with the users on alternatives to accommodate the growing requirements of non-tactical users and intelligence activities, and hope to define that approach later this year. We'll stay the course with MILSTAR for our projected requirements, following it with a new system launching in 2006 and 2007. In the coming decade we will fly out UFO, extracting maximum utility through implementation of Demand Assigned Multiple Access technology. The Navy continues to examine a successor to UFO for mobile user services, with launch planned in about 2007.

These programs are dependent on the successful resolution of the Year 2000 situation. NORAD/USSPACECOM and our components are well underway on an aggressive program to identify and resolve all Year 2000 issues relative to our space and warning systems.


As I look to the future, it is clear that resources will remain constrained. To ensure that we provide space capabilities to our fighting forces, we must partner with the civil and commercial sectors. It is also clear that resources will remain constrained, so it is important that we build a series of partnerships with other parties in our country, and in some cases, with our allies to achieve our vision for the future. We have aggressively pursued a partnering relationship with NRO, NASA and industry--all key players in space that were separate stovepipes in the past. By working more closely with the NRO, we can begin to meld black and white space operations and break down organizational stovepipes in a way that provides one-stop shopping with greater access to intelligence products for our warriors. Partnering with NASA will help us develop and field systems much quicker by cross-sharing lab efforts. Working with industry gives us the chance to share best practices as well as providing us with access to greater capability. Finally, we must work with our allies to ensure that we have the interoperability that is a prerequisite to conducting coalition operations. If done correctly, our partnerships will leverage existing development efforts with a limited amount of DoD funding to develop the required military capabilities, and achieve the concepts outlined in Joint Vision 2010.


I've talked about some of our more significant USSPACECOM programs today; however, all space capabilities remain critical. Senator Gramm (R-TX) recently remarked that today's defense spending is lower than it was at the outset of our entry into World War II. The 1999 budget request actually represents a 1.1 percent decline when adjusted for inflation. So far, we've managed to maintain funding for some of our largest aerospace defense space programs, such as SBIRS, EELV, MILSATCOM and GPS. Other programs haven't fared as well. We need to stabilize our launch range modernization funding. This is critical if we are to improve obsolete range equipment and restore the capabilities of our launch ranges to accommodate not only military but civil and commercial launches as well. We need to maintain funding of the low-Earth orbit segment of SBIRS to enable effective theater and national missile defense systems on our planned schedules. We also must improve space surveillance by pursuing real-time, full coverage, space surveillance to enable future space control. In addition, real-time, space-based earth surveillance of earth is key to providing the "dominant battlefield awareness" so essential for Joint Vision 2010's full spectrum dominance. We need to leverage advances made by the civil and commercial sectors in order to provide the capabilities we'll need to quickly respond to emerging threats.

"USSPACECOM's Vision for 2020" identifies the military space operational concepts that will support Joint Vision 2010. Our just-completed long range plan implements that vision, showing the level of today's capabilities and identifying what we need to do to achieve our vision.


Simply put, Joint Vision 2010 cannot be implemented without space forces linking all the members of the joint team together and serving as the joint team's eyes and ears in our adversary's camp. Nor, can Joint Vision 2010 be implemented without other decisive core competencies of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. All of these are inextricably linked and dependent on space systems.


Space contributions to economic and military success will only grow in the future. Future battlefields will be made transparent in part by space-based surveillance systems. This transparency will lay bare the hostile intentions of adversaries, and it will help deter our adversaries. It will also help our combined air, land, sea-based and space forces in carrying out the direction of our national leaders when defending our vital national interests.

Our Long Range Plan (LRP) lays out the capabilities of our legacy systems and our needs for the future. This planning effort was not done in isolation but rather with all our partners mentioned earlier, including strategic planners from industry.

To attain Joint Vision 2010, we developed four operational concepts that provide the conceptual framework that will transform USSPACECOM's Vision for 2020 into reality:

Full Force Integration

Control of Space

Global Engagement, and

Global Partnerships

Full force integration is the integration of space-derived information and space forces with land, sea and air-derived information and forces. Space power will be instrumental in getting the right military capability to the right forces, at the right time. Space forces must be seamlessly integrated within all of our fighting forces. The ability to successfully exercise control of space becomes a critical enabler to the overall joint plan. Assured access to space guarantees the US the ability to launch and reconstitute satellite constellations without impediment from our adversaries. The ability to protect our space assets is imperative---we must have a robust capability to deny other nations the ability to use their space systems against us. Global Engagement is the third concept--the possible application of precision force from, and through, space. This combines global surveillance with a national missile defense and a force application capability should our civilian leadership decide such an effort is needed to protect US national interests. Finally, Global Partnerships augment military space capabilities through the leveraging of civil, commercial, and international space systems. They offer the opportunity for the US to enhance military capabilities in a cost-effective manner. The emerging synergy of space superiority with land, sea and air superiority will enable full spectrum dominance and the Chairman's Joint Vision 2010.

The long range plan lays out operations concepts, key technologies required and lays the groundwork to examine migrating missions to space. We have, from the start, involved NASA, NRO, NOAA, and industry to ensure a credible plan (yes, industry sent their strategic planners to help build this LRP). We used a comprehensive top-down analysis with a bottom-up integration approach to implement USSPACECOM's Vision for 2020. Then we developed specified objectives to support each concept, developed tasks, and finally, a detailed roadmap of goals, emerging systems, technologies, concepts of operations and organizations to support the warfighting capabilities. These roadmaps are the foundation of the long range plan.

To achieve Full Force Integration, we must infuse space concepts and knowledge into four areas: people, policy and doctrine, information, and organization. Full Force Integration is attainable by 2020. By 2010, space concepts will be fully integrated into service education and training programs. The DoD-wide common operating environment will provide the connectivity and interoperability for a system of interoperable Battle Managers. It will evolve naturally as local Battle Managers are developed and interconnected. A single point of contact for military space operational matters is established to fully support the warfighter. Standardized tasking and reporting is our ultimate goal. Strengthening partnerships is essential to establishing the single point of contact, and will change the way we operate as a community and provide the warfighter the capability he needs, when and where he needs it.

As our nation's dependency on space products and services grow, space systems become lucrative targets for potential adversaries. Future foes could gain significant advantages in a crisis or conflict through attempts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy our ability to access and use space. As USCINCSPACE, I have been given the responsibility to prepare, protect and defend our vital national space interests. I accomplish this responsibility through Control of Space.

Control of Space is the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and the ability to deny others the use of space, if required. Achieving and maintaining Control of Space will directly influence all national and military objectives. It consists of the proper execution of five interrelated tasks: (1) Assuring the means to get to space and operate once there, (2) Surveillance of the region of space to achieve and maintain situational understanding, (3) Protecting our critical space systems from hostile actions, (4) Preventing unauthorized access to and exploitation of US space data or products, and (5) When required, negating hostile space systems that place US and allied interests at risk. By 2020, we will need to integrate these five objectives by developing new systems, CONOPS, and organizations to assure space dominance.

Assured Access in 2020 will require reliable, flexible cost effective means to launch space payloads and operate them once there. To assure space support is there for the warfighter when needed vice when available, access must be reliable, low-cost and on-demand. We envision a mix of re-usable and expendable launch vehicles, much of it commercial, as well as the means to command, control, and assess the health and status of our critical satellites on demand.

Surveillance provides the situational understanding for the region of space necessary to assure freedom of operations and de-conflict activities to, in, and from space. It is the cornerstone on which our ability to "enforce the peace" in space will be built. 2020 will require us to characterize high-interest objects in near real-time and to quickly and accurately detect changes in satellite configurations to assess intent. We envision a mix of ground- and space-based sensors, integrated with much more capable processing and Command and Control (Battle Managers) systems.

Protection of our vital space systems is critical if they are going to be there for the warfighter when and where needed. Indeed, a robust, well-integrated protection capability, by itself, may act as a significant deterrent to hostile actions against our satellites. Protection requires warning of possible threats, notification of possible attacks, cross-cueing other owner/operators and directing possible responses. We envision a suite of on-board sensors to detect and report attacks as well as the means to quickly report unexplained space system malfunctions. This information would be integrated with a Battle Management system that receives, correlates and disseminates information reliably, unambiguously and quickly.

Prevention denies an adversary the advantage gained by exploiting US or allied space capabilities, at least temporarily, through international, diplomatic, legal, or military means. Prevention concepts and systems must be able to identify, report, and distribute information on unauthorized access to, and exploitation of, US and allied space systems. Partnerships with commercial entities who may be selling space products and services as well as international agreements on denying satellite access will be key to the success of this objective. USSPACECOM's primary role will be to provide technical expertise for accomplishing such agreements as well as providing the battle management functions to detect and report unauthorized use and to assess impacts.

Finally, conceptually negation means applying military force to affect an adversary's space capability by targeting the ground links or orbital segments of a space systems. We envision technologies that support a full range of flexible, temporary and permanent on-demand effects for precise defense against the most appropriate node. Our response must consider such collateral effects as third-party use of the space capability, impacts on the space environment, and possible fratricide to our own systems. Again, as with prevention, a robust Battle Management capability is crucial to the execution of these objectives in order to identify the appropriate target, select the correct response, direct negation actions, and assess the effect of those actions.

Global Engagement depends on Integrated Focused Surveillance, Missile Defense and Force Application. In 2018, with the advent of robust day/night all-weather sensors and a fully capable BMD, Integrated Focused Surveillance will be in reasonable condition. We must, however, focus and harness the technology to provide the required levels of global coverage. The National Missile Defense-derived Ground-Based Interceptor, when added to theater defense systems, provides adequate but marginal capabilities in Missile Defense. To reach full capability, Integrated Focused Surveillance shortfalls must be addressed, national policy must be reviewed and modified, and some treaties such as the ABM Treaty may have to be amended when and if and when the national decision to deploy an NMD system is made. Development of coalition support for collective security may be necessary. Force Application has the potential to be in good shape in 2020 with the possible capabilities offered by the concepts of the Space Operations Vehicle, Space Based Interceptor, Space-Based Laser and High Powered Microwave should a national decision to puruse such systems be made. However, widespread proliferation of advanced surveillance techniques could reduce capabilities by degrading accurate target information

Global Partnerships is based on dramatic growth in commercial and international space-based capabilities, constrained military spending and growth in multi-national operations and alliances. Global Partnerships represents an integrated approach to maintaining US space superiority in the 21st Century. The synergy achieved through partnerships between domestic/international and commercial/civil/military must be carefully harnessed to optimize results. Global Partnering is fundamental to attaining the USSPACECOM Vision for 2020.

Now is the time to develop the space capabilities, concepts for warfighting, and organizations required for the first quarter of the 21st Century. Military operations in the 21st Century will rely heavily upon space capabilities to mass effects, conduct precision engagement campaigns, execute dominant maneuver and to deal with new, emerging threats. US interests and investment in space must be fully protected to ensure our nation's freedom of action in space. Sufficient planning and resources must be committed to protect and enhance our access to and use of space--the long range plan provides that integrated plan.

This is the second document I promised the committee in last year's testimony we would produce. I highly recommend the USSPACECOM Long Range Plan to you for reading. It will provide a blueprint for the US military in space from today to 2020.


Space is emerging as a center of gravity for many nations around the world, especially the United States. Once a domain restricted to governments whose national treasures could support fielding a limited number of reconnaissance, surveillance and communications satellites, we now see space being populated far more by commercial enterprises than by states--a trend we see continuing indefinitely. The high-quality products and services, available to anyone in the marketplace, will generate vast wealth, improve standards of living and undoubtedly directly impact the way of life for hundreds of millions of people.

We must make the space vision a reality. With USSPACECOM now named in the Unified Command Plan as the single operational focal point for military space, we can better implement our declared strategy to shape, prepare and respond to events impacting the global security environment as it relates to space and provide the unity of effort so necessary to military operations. We must also reduce the cost of access to space, migrate more terrestrially-based missions to space, and deepen our partnerships with NRO and NASA. As we find new ways to partner with civil, commercial and international space programs, we will increase efficiencies and effectiveness in a resource-constrained environment. And I cannot overemphasize the critical nature of access to space-- every dollar we spend getting to space is one less dollar available to spend on needed space capabilities. The freedom to operate in space, both commercially and militarily, cannot be taken for granted. America must be prepared to meet the challenges passed to our space forces in the next millennium.

As I see it, we cannot turn back the clock---the Information Age is upon us, the rush to exploit orbital space is unmistakable, and forces have been cut in anticipation of space's promise. The chance to find the resources needed will come---most probably from the four broad areas outlined above---if we have the foresight to recognize these opportunities as they appear. The risk is in delaying too long. Given the lead-time required to develop cutting-edge technologies into military utility, today's budget decisions will not begin to influence capability for another decade and a half--more than halfway down the road to our vision for 2020.

In summary, I appreciate the opportunity to outline the importance of space to our nation. I am proud to recount our progress from the past year to make good on our vision. Your continued support of our most critical programs and in promoting greater space awareness is essential. I will work closely with this committee to build upon the successes we have already achieved.