The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 179 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 1775.
Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 1775) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1998 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. Thornberry in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] and the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] will each control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss].
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the members of the House Intelligence Committee who have worked so hard in putting this bill together. In particular, I appreciate the very fine work of the gentleman from California [Mr. Lewis] and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum], our subcommittee chairmen.
But I also have to point out that the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], the committee's ranking Democrat, and other Democratic members of the committee have played an extraordinarily constructive and helpful role in the formulation of this legislation. It is truly bipartisan.
Finally, I would like to say to the staff on both sides of the aisle, `Thank you for a job well done.' They are a dedicated, talented, and professional group who have very special knowledge that serves the United States of America extremely well.
This bill, which the committee reported out unanimously, is the product of a lot of work, intensive deliberation, and cooperation. The committee held seven full committee and two subcommittee budget hearings. In addition, there were over 100 staff and member briefings on programs, specific activities, and budget requests.
H.R. 1775 authorizes the funds for fiscal year 1998 for all of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government. The National Security Act requires that spending for intelligence be specifically authorized. This is the only route we have.
The intelligence budget has three major components: the national foreign intelligence program, known as NFIP; the tactical intelligence and related activities program, known as TIARA; and the joint military intelligence program, known as JMIP.
NFIP funds activities providing intelligence to national policymakers and includes programs administered by such agencies as the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. TIARA, or Tactical Intelligence Activities, reside exclusively in the Department of Defense. They consist in large part of numerous reconnaissance and target acquisition programs that are a functional part of the basic military force structure and provide direct information in support of military operations. The Joint Military Intelligence Program provides military intelligence principally to defensewide or theater-level consumers.
Although our committee has jurisdiction over these three intelligence programs, we must work closely with the Committee on National Security, particularly in the oversight and authorization of the TIARA and JMIP programs where we share jurisdiction. I would like to publicly acknowledge and personally thank the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] for the extraordinary cooperation that we received from him, the members of his committee and the members of his committee staff.
I would be remiss if I did not also mention the cooperation we have received from the Committee on Appropriations, particularly and most importantly from my colleague on this committee, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Young], who also chairs the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations and sits, of course, on HIPCE.
Due to the classified nature of much of the work of the Committee on Intelligence, I cannot discuss many of the specifics of the bill before the House except in the broadest terms. In order to understand those specifics, I strongly urge those Members who have not already done so to read the classified annex to this bill. The annex is available in the committee office in the Capitol. It is about a 2-minute walk from here, for those who are interested, and I hope all are interested.
Despite classification restrictions, there are several major elements of the bill that I can discuss here today. In this year's budget review, the committee continued to place heavy emphasis on understanding and addressing the future needs of the intelligence community, preparing for those needs and the several distinct roles that intelligence is going to play in our national security in what is, in fact, a different world situation today.
Based on the threats we believe the United States will confront in the future, the committee's budget review focused on two specific areas. First, we looked at which intelligence programs are properly structured and sufficiently prepared to meet future needs and requirements. Second, we looked at the intelligence community's collection and analytical shortfalls.
Unfortunately, the committee review revealed few areas where the intelligence community is well situated for the future, and an overabundance of shortfalls were found. These shortfalls are due, in part, to the fact
that intelligence resources are stretched too thin while handling an ever-increasing multitude of issues.
I would like to point out that this is not any kind of a shock to the intelligence community. It is realizing the fact that we are stretched thin and need to deal with it. Nonetheless, the committee is concerned that the intelligence community is not moving fast enough in some of the areas to address the threats of the future.
Given these concerns, the committee has begun to address the shortfalls we see in the intelligence community's budgeting and responsibilities. In this year's mark the committee has specifically addressed the following issues:
First, we have taken actions to help the intelligence community improve its analytic depth and breadth through improved training, targeted hiring, and the use of analytic tools. There is no point to have information if you cannot value enhance with the proper analysis.
Second, the intelligence community places too much emphasis on intelligence collection at the expense of downstream activities. Downstream activities are processing the information we get, analyzing, disseminating, and so forth. We have to get a better balance. If we spend all our money collecting and none for analyzing, we will be awash in information that is not going to do us much good.
Third, our espionage capabilities are limited and dependent on ad hoc funding. We have taken steps to tie funding for clandestine operations to the long-term needs of analysts, policymakers, and the military. That is putting it where we need it. I think that is almost the most critical part of this whole bill, from my personal perspective.
Fourth, we have pushed the intelligence community toward developing, acquiring, investing in, and deploying more flexible technological capabilities in order to collect key information on the highest priority targets.
Finally, we have continued our efforts from the last Congress to make the intelligence community work corporately across traditional bureaucratic boundaries and to enhance flexibility. The committee believes that such efforts are absolutely essential if the intelligence community is to succeed in dealing with increasingly complex threats to U.S. national interests.
Very clearly, turf wars have no place in national security. Again, I congratulate the gentleman from California [Mr. Thomas], the former chairman, and the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] for the work they did to bring this matter forward in the previous Congress, and we are following forward on that.
Those threats and concerns are broader and more diverse to our national security than they ever have been. Among them are those issues that have been called the transnational threats. Those include terrorism, the proliferation of advanced weapons and weapons of mass destruction, narcotics trafficking and global criminal racketeering. Such problems demand that the intelligence community have a worldwide view and a highly flexible set of resources. Given the nature of these threats, our intelligence eyes and ears and brains are more important than they ever have been.
As an example, in the realm of counterterrorism, we are aware of the recent success our intelligence community has had in locating international terrorists so as to allow law enforcement agencies to apprehend them and bring them to justice. Less well known, however, because we must guard against revealing intelligence methods, are the numerous successes intelligence has had in recent months in detecting terrorist activities in advance and foiling them, so Members did not read about them in the paper. U.S. facilities that would have been destroyed are intact today. American lives that could have been lost have been saved.
As another example, in the area of counterproliferation, I would direct my colleagues' attention to this unclassified report which has been prepared by the CIA which describes the role of various countries in providing technologies and material for the development of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems by various rogue regimes around the world. This report, entitled `The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction Advanced Conventional Munitions,' put out by the Director of Central Intelligence, covers the time between July and December 1996 at the request of this committee. It is a very important report. The media has picked it up. It is unclassified. It tells us the world is real, the world is dangerous and there are people involved in serious mischief. It has received a great deal of attention in the press because of its rather extraordinary findings. When we read the classified evidence that is behind that report, we find it is even more extraordinary. That includes a great deal of specific and reliable intelligence that has given our policymakers and our military excellent insights into the activities of various countries and what we must do in response. Anyone who does not see the immense value to our national security to such work by the intelligence community I think is probably living in blissful ignorance of the dangers growing around us from rogue regimes that are getting closer and closer to being able to threaten Americans anywhere in the world with terrible weapons of extraordinary power.
In closing, I strongly urge all Members to support this authorization. It is the unanimously accepted product of a bipartisan committee. It makes significant improvements, measured by over 200 cuts, yes, I said cuts, and some additions to the President's budget request, and yet it comes in at less than 1 percent above the President's request when all is said and done. I am convinced that in supporting it, we are supporting the development of critically important intelligence capabilities that will make us all safer and will surely save the lives of many Americans, whether they be soldiers in the field, tourists on their vacation abroad, common Americans at home going about their business and their lives, all of this for today and for the years ahead.
Mr. Chairman, before I close, I would like to take one more moment to acknowledge an individual who is, I am sure, celebrating his last authorization process on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I said we had extraordinarily good staff. We do. But this year an individual, Mr. Ken Kodama, the senior substantive expert on the minority side, is retiring later this year after 9 years on the committee. Mr. Kodama represents the finest level of professionalism that other staff should emulate. His service to the full committee has been invaluable as well as to the subcommittee. In fact, Mr. Chairman, the reason that I could make some of the comments that I did at the beginning of this statement was in large part due to our ability to interact with Mr. Kodama in a truly bipartisan nature. To put it simply, he will be sorely missed. We wish him the best in his future endeavors, and I personally want to thank him for his assistance.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I rise in support of the pending legislation.
Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me say that I really agree with what the chairman has just mentioned. Ken Kodama has served this committee extraordinarily well. He has been a part of our senior Democratic staff and just one of the most professional people we have. We wish him and his family well in his future endeavors and compliment him again on his outstanding work.
I want to congratulate the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], the chairman, for the effort he has made to ensure that the committee functions in a bipartisan fashion as much as possible. This bill reflects this effort. He is to be commended for it. Few legislative products can achieve total harmony, and we do have some differences with the majority on this measure. Those differences, while relatively few in number, do concern some important matters. But I very much appreciate the determination of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] that the issues on which we could not reach agreement within the committee would have a substantive rather than a political basis. I also want to applaud the committee staff for their outstanding work and professionalism on this bill and on the other work of the committee.
H.R. 1775 provides for a slight increase in funding over the amounts authorized by the Congress for intelligence and intelligence-related activities in fiscal year 1997 and the amounts requested by the President for fiscal year 1998. Although these increases are small, 1.7 percent above the amount authorized by Congress last year, and 0.7 percent above the amount requested by the President this year, I recognize that there are some who believe that we are already spending too much money on intelligence. I would say to those holding that view that the provision of accurate and timely intelligence to policymakers and military commanders is absolutely critical to our national security. The collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of intelligence is in many cases reliant on technologies which are both rapidly changing and quite expensive. The alternative to making the investments necessary to maintain superiority in these areas is to accept an increased risk of not obtaining that critical information which might make a difference in a trade negotiation, disrupt the plans of a terrorist or permit the tracking of chemical warfare agents.
In my judgment, the authorization levels in this bill are adequate to ensure that the intelligence agencies continue to provide the kind of information essential to sound policy determinations and successful military operations. I do not believe that a reduction in those amounts would be wise.
Although it is important that intelligence activities be adequately funded, it is equally important that the available funds be used in ways which maximize their impact. Spreading resources too thinly by trying to cover everything is a good way of ensuring a general level of inadequate performance.
We should remember that, although intelligence is information, not all information used by policymakers or military commanders is provided appropriately by intelligence agencies. In my judgment, the intelligence community best performs its function when it concentrates on providing information unobtainable by other means. It is essential that intelligence agencies not be tasked either by others or by themselves to acquire information which is more readily available from other parts of Government or is of little utility.
The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], the chairman, has described the bill, but I want to note my concern with section 608, which would terminate the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office [DARO]. I believe it is clear that changes are coming to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and support offices generally in the Pentagon. These offices can and should be streamlined. But that result should be the product of decisions made after all available evidence is gathered rather than before. In the case of section 608, the committee took action without a single hearing. In fact, the only evidence formally presented to the committee was laudatory of DARO and strongly advocated its continuation. I expect that we will use some of the time before conference to better explore DARO's role and its future. I also expect that we will review some of the other actions taken in the bill on certain National Reconnaissance Office programs. Changes in the direction of highly complex activities should be undertaken with a clear understanding of their likely consequences.
Mr. Chairman, despite these areas of reservation and disagreement, this is on balance a good bill, which I intend to support. It can be made better in conference, and I shall work with the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], the chairman, toward that end. The bill deserves the support of the House today, however, and I urge that it be approved.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Pelosi] for the purpose of a colloquy with the chairman because of her responsibilities as the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs of the Committee on Appropriations.
(Ms. PELOSI asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)
Ms. PELOSI. I thank the distinguished ranking member for yielding me this time and for his leadership on this important committee.
Mr. Chairman, I rise to engage the gentleman from Florida, chairman of the committee, in a colloquy concerning section 305 of the bill.
As the chairman knows, this section of the bill extends for 1 year the authority of the President to delay the imposition of a sanction upon a determination that to proceed with the sanction would risk a compromise of an ongoing criminal investigation or an intelligence source or method. My first question, Mr. Chairman, is whether the legislative history of this provision, enacted in 1995, would be applicable to this extension of the authority for 1 more year?
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. PELOSI. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. GOSS. I would assure the gentlewoman from California that it is the intent of the committee that the legislative history of this provision as it was developed in the debate in 1995 is applicable to the exercise of this authority. Indeed, the report to accompany H.R. 1775 reiterates the joint explanatory statement of the committee of conference on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 to make completely clear that the original legislative history of this provision continues to govern its implementation.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, is it then the case that the committee intends this provision will be narrowly construed and only used in the most serious of circumstances, when a specific sensitive intelligence source or method or criminal investigation is at risk?
Mr. GOSS. That is certainly the intent of the committee.
Ms. PELOSI. Is it also the case that the law requires the intelligence source or method or law enforcement matter in question must be related to the activities giving rise to the sanction, and the provision is not to be used to protect generic or speculative intelligence or law enforcement concerns?
Mr. GOSS. That is also the case.
Ms. PELOSI. Finally, Mr. Chairman, does the committee expect that reports concerning a decision to stay the imposition of a sanction shall include a determination that the delay in the imposition of a sanction will not be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of the United States' nonproliferation objectives or significantly increase the threat or risk to U.S. military forces?
Mr. GOSS. Yes, it does.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of the committee for engaging in this colloquy, and for his confirmation of the understanding that we had when this provision was first enacted.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. PELOSI. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. I wanted to just say that I concur in all the statements made by the chairman. This is also the understanding that I have of this provision.
Ms. PELOSI. I appreciate the ranking member's cooperation in that.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of an amendment to be offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum]. I have been concerned for some time about the coordination of our Government's response to any intelligence activities which may be undertaken by the People's Republic of China, including those in the United States. The McCollum amendment will contribute to our ability to respond appropriately to any Chinese espionage activities which may occur. I urge its adoption and commend his leadership for bringing it to the floor.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster].
(Mr. SHUSTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, we should not be beguiled into thinking that because the cold war is over that we face a safer world in which we live, because in many respects it is just as dangerous or even more dangerous. Two threats that I want to focus on are the twin evils of illegal drugs and terrorism and the relationship to our intelligence activities. When I had the privilege of serving as the ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I was deeply involved in the creation of the counternarcotics center out at the Central Intelligence Agency. Today that center is known as the crime and counternarcotics center. It indeed has matured into one of the most effective of the DCI centers. In fact, some of its successes have been published but many of its successes still must remain classified.
Some of us are concerned, however, about the number and functions of Federal counternarcotics intelligence programs, and therefore in this year's authorization we have asked that the intelligence community, in coordination with the Office of National Drug Control Policy, develop a new drug intelligence architecture based on an assessment of the effectiveness of the national security and law enforcement drug intelligence systems, the drug intelligence architecture.
Indeed, Mr. Chairman, this year's Intelligence Authorization Act also authorizes the National Drug Intelligence Center. It was chartered in 1991. It became a reality largely because of the strong support envisioned of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Murtha]. The National Drug Intelligence Center was included in the intelligence budget last year, and I am pleased to report that this year's intelligence authorization continues to provide support for the program. This center provides strategic drug analysis to policymakers.
With regard to terrorism, Mr. Chairman, it is a growing concern because of the growing access which terrorists have to weapons of mass destruction, and in fighting terrorism the capability of our human intelligence assets is of extraordinary importance; and indeed I am fearful that our clandestine service is in danger of being destroyed, in danger of being destroyed by an atmosphere of risk aversion, an atmosphere which permeates from the highest levels and filters down into the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies.
Indeed, the case officers in our intelligence service who handle the agents around the world are involved in very risky business. It is risky business, and it is dangerous business, and it takes years to develop a productive agent, particularly in hostile places of the world.
So I would urge my colleagues to support this legislation, to recognize the successes of our intelligence service and to also recognize the problems we face.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon] who has been one of the most attentive, hardworking members of our committee.
Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member for yielding me time, and, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this time to make a report to the body on the CIA contra crack cocaine investigation being conducted by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
As all of my colleagues may recall beginning last August 18, the San Jose Mercury News published a three-part series alleging that Nicaraguan drug traffickers introduced, financed, and distributed crack cocaine into the African-American community of Los Angeles. The article further stated that the profits from the drug sales were used to provide lethal and nonlethal assistance to the Nicaraguan contras to support their struggle against the Sandinista government. Lastly the article implied, and very seriously implied, that the CIA either backed or condoned the drug activities.
In September 1996, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence initiated a formal investigation into the charges levied in the San Jose Mercury articles. The scope of our investigation is as follows:
First, we are asking the question and investigating whether there were any CIA operatives or assets involved in the supply of sales or drugs in the Los Angeles area; second, if CIA operatives or assets were involved, did the CIA have knowledge of the supply or sale of drugs in the Los Angeles area by anyone associated with the agency; third, did any other U.S. Government agency or employee within the intelligence community have knowledge of the supply or sale of drugs in the Los Angeles area between 1979 and 1996; fourth, were any CIA officers involved in the supply or sale of drugs in the Los Angeles area since 1979; fifth, did the Nicaraguan contras receive any financial support through the sale of drugs in the United States during the period when the CIA was supporting the contra effort? If so, were any CIA officials aware of this activity? And finally, sixth, what is the validity of the allegations in the San Jose Mercury News?
The Justice Department Inspector General and the CIA Inspector General have both launched probes into the allegations contained in these newspaper articles. At the beginning of their investigation, both inspector generals expected to have their investigations completed by the fall of this year. The committee has received periodic updates on the status of the two reviews and at this point it is expected that the inspector generals will complete their task this fall and will issue reports.
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has a practice of not completing its investigation of a matter until the committee has had the opportunity to review the work of the inspector general. We will not complete our investigation until we have an opportunity to review the results of the inspector generals' reports as part of the committee's inquiry into this very important and relevant matter.
Reviewing the conclusions of the inspector generals' reports as part of the committee's investigation should not be construed by anyone as though we are relying on the results of the inspector general. Quite the contrary. Since the beginning of the committee's investigation, the committee has made trips to Los Angeles and Managua, Nicaragua to interview individuals allegedly possessing information on these allegations. Additionally, the committee has had one witness brought to Washington for the purpose of conducting an interview. Committee staff is in the process of reviewing over 6 feet of documents compiled by the CIA pertaining to this issue. Additionally, the Drug Enforcement Agency has briefed staff and provided information on certain aspects of this investigation.
The Congressional Research Service, pursuant to the request of the committee, is compiling background data on the Iran-contra investigations, and Iran-contra documents have been retrieved from the National Archives and reviewed to determine what light they may shed on this matter.
Finally, the committee attended and participated in two town hall meetings in south central Los Angeles where citizens expressed their concerns and views of this case. Last year when the fiscal year 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act was being considered on the floor, members of the committee pledged to our colleagues and to the American public that a full and thorough investigation into these allegations would be conducted. On March 12 of this year, the committee reviewed and ratified its ongoing inquiry into the San Jose Mercury News allegations. This year for the 105th Congress, the committee ratified the scope of this investigation.
While many may have differences of opinions and draw different conclusions from our committee's report when it is finally made, I hope that we will all agree on its thoroughness, its professionalism, and the bipartisanship that has surrounded the investigation.
I want to once again assure the American public and all of my colleagues that this investigation is moving in a detailed and thorough manner.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from California [Ms. Millender-McDonald].
Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. Mr. Chairman, I rise today because of the concerns that I have, given the bill that is on the floor before us, and certainly one that I intend to vote on. I have several questions especially pertaining to the report that the gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon] has just articulated, and I am sorry I came in on the tail end.
As my colleagues very well know, my district was the hardest hit with reference to the drug proliferation and the drug trafficking and the allegations that the CIA was involved in that. As my colleagues know, my district represents that of Watts in south central California as well as Compton. Since that time, I have called for investigations, that of the Department of Justice as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, and I have been in conversations with the gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon] on what the Select Committee on Intelligence is all about and what they are doing.
The questions that I have for either the chairman, the ranking member, or the gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon] is what is going on in terms of the hearings, or are there hearings in terms of a select committee on intelligence?
Is the intelligence community cooperating with this committee by any means?
And what is the timetable for getting a report to us so that I can articulate that to my community with reference to the ongoing investigation, if in fact they have begun to do that?
Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, first of all I would like to compliment the gentlewoman for her participation. As I indicated in my remarks, there have been two hearings in Los Angeles, both of them coordinated by her and her office, one with the director of the Central Intelligence Agency and one with the inspector general from the Justice Department. Both, hearings, gave an opportunity to see the people that would be conducting the investigations from Justice and the CIA and give the community a chance to have some input.
As it relates to hearings, no decision has been made but I do think that there will be a discussion about the appropriate hearings that could be conducted. But it really will be based on the conclusions that the committee comes to.
Certainly I think that the committee will have called before it and examined the reports of the CIA respectively and the Justice Department as to the findings that the inspector generals make.
And as it relates to a timetable, I would think that no earlier than October-November would we be prepared to make a report to the House. Perhaps even longer. I think it is more important, rather than being on a timetable, but to be thorough and cover each base of these serious allegations.
Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. And upon the report that the gentleman is talking about, will he then return back to my community, as was suggested at the hearing when the director came to south central? Will he then bring that report to the community that has been devastated by the drugs when that report is completed?
Mr. DIXON. It is my personal view, and I cannot speak for the committee, but there must be some public document on this issue that is released to the community. Whether or not there will be another hearing in Los Angeles I think will be a committee decision that the chairman and ranking member certainly will have input into.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I would respond, if the gentlewoman will yield, that it is very much my intention to make sure that where taxpayers' dollars are used there is an appropriate accounting; if there is anything classified that justifies classification, we will have to deal with that. But it is not my intent to do that. It is my intent to report back what we find. That is the purpose of the investigation, and we will be dealing with the work of not only our own investigation but the investigation, as the gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon] has said, with the other IG's that are doing work, and frankly there is another committee in the other body working also.
So I believe we do not know all of the answers yet, but I think the gentlewoman can go forward in good faith, understanding we are going to do our best to be fully accountable.
Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the gentleman's continuous dialog with me.
Mr. GOSS. Assuredly.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] my colleague who serves us well on the committee and serves well on the Committee on the Judiciary as well.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Intelligence, Analysis, and Counterintelligence, I am pleased to report that this year's authorization bill identifies and corrects some of the fundamental shortfalls in the investments we must make to ensure that this Nation will have an intelligence community that can take the national security challenges of this country into the 21st century.
Particularly, this authorization bill makes the investments in human intelligence, in analysis, and in counterintelligence that will be necessary to future efforts against narcotics, terrorism, proliferation, and other transnational threats, areas that require human interaction on the ground to answer some of our most vexing questions.
I think complacency is probably much greater today than it should be in the minds of most Americans. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dismantling of the Soviet Union, most Americans think we are a more secure world. I, quite frankly, having viewed matters daily from the purview of the Committee on Intelligence, question that we are in a more secure world. We are in a less stable world. We are in a world where intelligence is more necessary than ever.
We have in Russia KGB, former KGB members, who are engaged in organized crime. We have the potential threat of proliferation and movement of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons that once were fairly secure. At least we knew where they were going to be, over in Russia. They may go anywhere now: into the Middle East, into the hands of terrorists, into the seven terrorist states that we have to be involved with and concerned with, from Iran and Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Sudan, Syria, all of those; Cuba. Then there is China, the question of what happens in the future. We have continuing, ongoing concerns in drug trafficking, and so on goes the list.
Mr. Chairman, no technology can replace the critical role of the human collector of intelligence on the plans and intentions of our adversaries and terrorists, traffickers, and proliferators. I am happy to report that the collectors of human intelligence, or human as we call them in the CIA and elsewhere in the intelligence community, are hard-working, and they are working hard against the high priority targets we have set.
In the budget request, however, the committee found a significant shortfall in technical and other supports these collectors will need in future years to continue their fine efforts to gather human intelligence to these threats. We cannot expect the collectors to overcome high technology employed by drug traffickers, for example, without technology of their own.
The committee also found a lack of long-term planning in the focus and funding of collection operations. We cannot expect human collectors to perform well when funded on an ad hoc basis year to year. I am pleased to report that this authorization bill does indeed provide adequate support for the eyes and ears of the intelligence community upon which so much of the knowledge about national and transnational threats depend.
We have directed the community to develop a system for projecting the long-term funding needs of these vital collection efforts so we may continue to provide these efforts with adequate support. The all-source analyst stands at the center of the planning of this committee and the intelligence community for the needs of the policymakers of the next century.
We will look at the all-source analyst to anticipate future needs for intelligence, and to provide support to the policymakers and to the military: Where will the next Iraq or Somalia be? What are the terrorist threats in a specific country? What successes is a rogue regime having in developing chemical or biological weapons?
We will also look to that analyst for direction in what information about these crises we may obtain through open sources and what we must obtain through human or technical clandestine collection. In that light, Mr. Chairman, the authorization bill directs and begins to fund the restoration of an analyst cadre pared too lean over the past couple of years to cover the projected needs of policymakers.
As our report makes clear, this committee will remain engaged in that restoration and will look to the all-source analyst to guide the intelligence community.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I note with grim satisfaction that during the past 2 months we have seen the final sentencing phase of the successful prosecutions of an FBI agent and a CIA officer arrested for spying on behalf of the Soviet Union and Russia. The success of both prosecutions depended first of all upon the counterintelligence officers within the FBI and the CIA who were able to do and to think the unthinkable; that is, that an American agent, an officer, could engage in such treachery, and to pursue investigations to such a conclusion. Success depended as well upon the willingness on the part of the leadership of the FBI and the CIA to make the sacrifices that would have been necessary to prosecute these cases through a course to full trial.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to report that the authorization bill as reported reflects recognition of this committee of the efforts of the counterintelligence officers, and supports the means by which their vigilance may be continued.
In sum, this authorization bill acknowledges and supports the focused efforts of the human intelligence collector, the crucial role of the analyst, and the difficult but necessary role of the counterintelligence officer. The bill makes surgical cuts and strategic adds that are necessary to the effectiveness of the intelligence community in providing the support to policymakers we need well into the next century.
I want to thank Chairman Goss for the direction and guidance he has given to both this committee and to the subcommittee, and I conclude my remarks by saying I certainly support this bill.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 1/2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Jane Harman, a very outstanding member of our committee and a member of the Committee on Armed Services.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member for yielding time to me.
Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to serve as a new member of the Committee on Intelligence. I commend our chairman and the ranking member and the staff for their bipartisanship and professionalism.
I sought appointment to this committee during two terms of Congress because I have a keen interest in issues relating to technology and satellite architecture. I often boast that I represent the aerospace center of the universe, the 36th district in California. Surely it is the satellite center of the universe. Also, as the ranking member said, I serve on the Committee on National Security, which gives me some additional insight into the defense functions served by our intelligence agencies.
I rise in support of this bill, although I would like to share with our colleagues several reservations. My reservations concern a comment made by our chairman as part of his opening remarks. He said, in part, and I quote, `We have pushed the intelligence community toward developing, acquiring, investing in, and deploying more flexible technological capabilities in order to collect key information on the highest priority targets.'
I certainly agree that we should push technology and that we should do collection on the highest priority targets, but I would also suggest that the consequences of doing this could lead to some bad results: First, program instability, and, second, proceeding with change without a full understanding of its consequences. This is a point made by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] in his opening remarks. It seems to me that our goal here is to make the right choices and the right changes among competing technologies.
As to levels of funding, I support the level in this bill, the product of a thoughtful and professional exercise. Could we spend some dollars better? Sure, and we should. But let us do that, rather than mandate across-the-board cuts which may result in limiting our technological options.
As I said in debate on this bill in the last Congress, intelligence funding is intelligent funding. Better information earlier is better offense and better defense. Our judgments about our worldwide geopolitical options and our defense strategic options on a particular battlefield depend in substantial part on good intelligence. To shortchange intelligence funding is to shortchange U.S. national security.
Finally, I just want to comment on the colloquy we just had between the gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon], the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Millender-McDonald] and our chairman. I support what the committee is doing to thoroughly understand and study whether or not the CIA played any role in drug trafficking in California.
I would tell our colleagues that this issue is of intense interest in the Los Angeles community, and I hope that we share whatever we can appropriately share with the affected communities as soon as we can appropriately do so.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentlewoman on her statement. One of the things that I hope as we go through the rest of this process is that we can blend together our great respect for the all-source analyst, but also recognize that we have the finest national technical means in the world in terms of gathering intelligence. That should not be undervalued. In fact, I think what we need to do is blend these capabilities of human intelligence and our national technical means, and remember the gulf war, where we had a very major problem in the dissemination of imagery.
I just made a visit to Molesworth in England and saw the improvements in dissemination of imagery to the people who are serving us so well in Bosnia. I have been to the CAOC, the all-source center in Italy, have seen the combination of all these intelligence sources, from satellites to UAV's, human, everything coming into one room, and then being made immediately available to the battlefield commander in Bosnia.
So I just want the House to know that a lot of very important improvements have been made. I just want to make certain that we do not, in the rush to cut various programs, cut some of these things that are crucial both in signals and in imagery to giving us the kind of advantage that our military commanders need. This is very, very important to keep a balanced approach.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his comments. I think all of us on the committee would agree that the revolution in military affairs for the future contains a huge technology component.
I was just urging that as we proceed to push the envelope, we not throw out technologies that function well in pursuit of some future technology.
Mr. Chairman, I also want to complete my comment about the importance of disseminating information to Los Angeles residents. As I think everyone on our committee knows, certainly the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dixon] knows, and other Members from Los Angeles know, this issue has garnered intense interest.
If this committee can put it to rest finally by virtue of a very careful and thorough study, we need to communicate the results of that study to the residents of Los Angeles. I would urge us to do that as soon as possible.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds to assure the gentlewoman from California that I am interested in the truth. All of the resources and assets that we have and are bringing to bear on this are designed to bring the truth to the people of the United States of America, and particularly to those who are affected in Los Angeles.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. Boehlert], a member of the committee who is not only my great friend, but has shown me the way forward on some of these issues. I think we are going to hear about that.
(Mr. BOEHLERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, the bill before us today provides the necessary, and I emphasize necessary, funding for the operations of our Nation's intelligence functions. It also provides continuing support, in keeping with the committee's work over the previous 2 years in building the intelligence community for the 21st century.
This bill makes major improvements to the President's budget request by taking some critically needed steps forward, particularly in the areas of building up human intelligence capabilities and analysis and improving technical collection abilities. It puts some needed logic in the area of unmanned aerial vehicle management, and it builds on some existing directions forged last year in such areas as the national reconnaissance program.
Mr. Chairman, to do all of this the bill increases the President's budget by only about seven-tenths of a percent, so I want to congratulate the chairman of the committee and the ranking member for the outstanding work and guidance they have provided.
The worldwide scene and many of our national interests have changed, Mr. Chairman, since the dissolution of the Soviet empire. However, the world is not necessarily a significantly safer place since the end of the cold war. This bill recognizes the fact that despite the very real lessening of a threat to our national being, several rogue states, radical movements, and transnational threats such as terrorism, organized crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continue to clearly present a danger to our Nation and our people.
It is important to understand that the focus of our intelligence community in peacetime is to maintain a knowledge level of the world that allows us to maintain that peace we so dearly cherish. Our intelligence services are, for example, fully employed now around the world helping to ensure that we are not caught by some surprise in places such as Bosnia or the Persian Gulf or the Korean Peninsula. This bill focuses on right-sizing and right-equipping our intelligence services, both civilian and military, to perform their critical functions to preserve that peace.
Mr. Chairman, it should be noted that during the preparation of this bill each budgetary line item in the President's request was valued on its individual merits in relation to the whole of the U.S. intelligence efforts. The committee did not work to a specific or artificially developed top line number. Instead, the committee added funding as necessary to critical programs and made some cuts to programs that it considered overfunded. The resulting authorization is therefore highly defensible in the aggregate and in a line-by-line analysis. This is a view I am sure is shared by those Members of the House who have examined the classified annex wherein each budgetary line is explained in detail.
Mr. Chairman, this is a good product brought forward by a committee that has worked cooperatively, and it is a pleasure for me and a privilege to be a new member of the committee and watch the high degree of professionalism that exists in all its deliberations, not only high degree of professionalism, but a high degree of bipartisanship.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to my colleague, the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Sanford Bishop, a new member of the committee and a person who has spent considerable time and effort on intelligence matters.
Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1775, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998. I also stand before the Members today to commend and congratulate Chairman Goss and the ranking Democratic member, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], for their efforts in producing a bipartisan measure that enhances our Nation's intelligence collection, analytical, and dissemination processes.
Mr. Chairman, one only has to look at any one of our Nation's major newspapers on any given day to learn of the unstable and unpredictable world in which we now live. Just last weekend Cambodia erupted in violence as forces loyal to Cambodia's two prime ministers took to the streets of Phnom Penh and engaged in armed clashes. This year alone we have witnessed the spread of civil strife in a number of countries, including Albania, Kenya, Congo, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, to name just a few.
When violence erupts in these countries, it is the intelligence community that is called upon to sort out what the threat is to U.S. persons, what the facts are, who the players are, what the likely outcome is, and what ramifications such actions may have for the region and most importantly for our Nation's security.
We need to consider whether a shortage of qualified intelligence analysts exists in many regions of the world that have been inflicted with unexpected violence that threatens the stability of that region. H.R. 1775 addresses this problem by providing additional resources to be directed and enhancing and expanding the analytical talent pool throughout the intelligence community. This is especially important to our military personnel who are often called upon to perform noncombatant evacuations of U.S. citizens from regions that are beset with violence.
Prior to the military conducting an evacuation, intelligence must be collected and analyzed so as to protect our military forces who perform these important and valuable missions. Additionally, the military has in the past and will in the future be called upon as part of the U.N. peacekeeping force. The Department of Defense needs qualified analysts for force protection, counterterrorism and to assess the plans and intentions of hostile forces. Let us not forget that the military has drawn down more than any other Federal agency, and the reduction in personnel in dollars continues today.
Intelligence acts as a force multiplier. And if we are to continue on a downward path in funding our Nation's armed services, which concerns me greatly, then we certainly need to take every step to ensure that our intelligence capabilities are sufficient to provide policymakers with the necessary information they need to make key decisions affecting our national security.
In addition to the ever-increasing number of contingencies that await us in the future, old enemies combined with the explosion of technology create new challenges for our intelligence communities. Russia, China, Iran, Iraq, the Korean peninsula, Bosnia, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose a threat to the national security of the United States.
The measure before us this afternoon provides funding for our country to aggressively collect intelligence against those important targets. One of the best methods used to collect intelligence on these targets is human intelligence.
I am pleased to report that this measure before us enhances the human intelligence collection capabilities throughout our intelligence community. Technology provides us a window into areas that are often hidden and protected against physical intrusion. While technical means of collecting intelligence may shed light on a number of programs, including proliferation activities, human intelligence is one sure-fire way of gathering information on plans and intentions as well as timetables. We must retool our human officer cadre to provide them with the skills and the tools necessary to accomplish their mission in the next century. This bill provides the requisite tools and enhances training to meet these future challenges.
Mr. Chairman, let me again thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] and the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] for their leadership in fashioning a bill that provides critical support to our intelligence community.
I urge my colleagues to support this measure and in doing so to support the men and women of the U.S. intelligence community, our military forces and our diplomatic corps around the globe. They are the people who sacrifice often in far-away places that we who live in America can always enjoy a safe, secure, and high quality of life. We owe them and the people of our Nation no less.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Nevada [Mr. Gibbons], a new member of our committee who has brought a wealth of value and experience.
(Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.
Mr. Chairman, I also rise today in support of the Intelligence Authorization Act. As a new member of this intelligence committee, I have had the unique privilege to participate in the development of this act. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], chairman, and the ranking minority member, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], are both to be commended for their incredibly hard work and leadership. Their efforts and stewardship of the committee as a whole and especially the fine work of the committee staff have resulted in an act which provides the United States an intelligence community which is properly equipped, properly funded and properly supervised for the difficult intelligence tasks confronting this Nation well into the future.
This is no easy task, Mr. Chairman. Many people think the United States no longer faces the worldwide threat that we once did during the cold war era. However, it would be foolhardy to say that the threats to this Nation have gone away. In fact, one could say that the number of threats has actually increased. The post-cold war proliferation of relatively cheap weapons of mass destruction, the increase of fanatical terrorism and the rise of transnational threats such as drug cartels dictate that we have a stronger, not weaker intelligence capability.
It could easily be debated that such threats are more diverse and more difficult to monitor and defend against than was the single major threat we faced during the cold war years.
Mr. Chairman, this act works toward an intelligence capability and community that is better postured to deal with these new and diverse threats. There are those who say we spend too much for the Nation's intelligence services and capabilities. Because of security interests, I cannot speak for the specific dollar amount this authorization act recommends for intelligence activities; however, I can say that the security of the Nation does not come cheap.
Intelligence is the foundation for maintaining that security, and it has often been said that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.
I would submit that a relatively small investment in our intelligence, understanding of the threats to our country, is what is worth much more than the cost
of recovering from the damage.
Knowledge of our potential foes is without question worth the investment. Is that investment large in terms of real dollars? Yes, of course it is. But again, an ounce of prevention, the same old adage.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to close with a thought about the future. Specifically with respect to intelligence technology development that this act supports, the Nation's policymakers require valid, useful and up-to-date intelligence on national and transnational threat issues, as I have mentioned. In order to maintain such information in an increasingly complex world, the intelligence community must invest in modern and equally complex technology.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant], my friend and distinguished colleague who was mentioned on the Imus show this morning.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant] is recognized for 2 minutes and 30 seconds.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I do not have as much confidence as everybody else who is here. I may give it a chance. I have respect for the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] and for the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks]. But quite frankly, we heard about the collapse of the Soviet Union on CNN. We learned about the fall of the Berlin Wall on CNN. We learned about the invasion of Kuwait on CNN. I honest to God believe we might save a lot of money by getting rid of our intelligence community and giving the money to CNN.
There is an issue that concerns me, and I know it will be ruled nongermane, but during the Vietnam war we had 450 commandos, South Vietnamese, to perform espionage services. They were captured by the North Vietnamese. The CIA lived up and the DIA and our intelligence community kept their payments and compensation to their families up until 1965, until they were listed as missing. Then they cut off those payments. Even though the Congress of the United States passed $20 million in compensation for those commandos who helped us during Vietnam, the CIA has said, no, and they cite the Totten doctrine, an 1876 Supreme Court ruling, Totten versus the United States, as the grounds for not in fact meeting that compensation level. The Totten doctrine simply bars enforcement of secret contracts making them nonenforceable and not eligible to be adjudicated in a court of law. The Traficant amendment would simply create a three-member panel appointed by the Supreme Court that would rule whether or not these secret cases may be eligible for adjudication and could set them up in camera.
Let me say one last thing. The quality of our field operatives is evidently very bad when we are hearing about all these revolutions on CNN. Word is getting out that if our intelligence community is not going to toe the line and take care of their field operatives, what type of an intelligence community do you have without good street people? In America we call them snitches in the police departments. To the intelligence community we call them spies. Evidently from the amount of spying we have going on, we can use a little more fairness in this whole situation.
I understand this has a bearing and naturally it is more within the purview and jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary.
But listen very carefully, a three-member panel appointed by the Supreme Court that would simply review these cases for cause and then have the option of making them eligible for adjudication and if they did it could be in camera. I think this has much to do with the camaraderie, much to do with the ability of our field operatives or we will have no field operatives. So when that debate comes up, I ask my colleagues to listen, especially Committee on the Judiciary members.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from New Hampshire [Mr. Bass] a member of the committee.
Mr. BASS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida for yielding me the time. I rise in support of the intelligence committee authorization. I would make a couple of points.
First of all, this is not a fat budget. This is a lean budget. It represents a less than 1 percent increase over what the President's request was. I would point out that as we heard the chairman of the Committee on National Security talk last week, the defense budget in this country has gone down for 13 successive years and the intelligence budget as well has suffered from these declines.
I would point out that the Intelligence Committee has spent a considerable amount of time in the last 4 to 5 months examining the priorities in the Intelligence Committee. You have heard other speakers this morning talk about the need for better exploitation of all the information that we are receiving from our various collectors.
Second, the need to pay more attention to the issue of human intelligence and the need to develop better human intelligence around the world, I believe that intelligence is important to this country. It has been important to this country ever since it was founded.
Let me remind my colleagues that when Paul Revere road out of Boston to warn the patriots that the British were coming, he did not do it because the British told him they were coming. It was because he had a spy at the top of the Old North Church.
Intelligence was important in the Civil War. Intelligence was important in the First and Second World Wars. Indeed, the Air Force was founded as a result of the need to get behind enemy lines to understand what was going on.
Indeed, Mr. Chairman, intelligence in this country saves lives. It makes it possible for leaders in this country to make informed decisions about what needs to be done. It protects the national security of this Nation. It saves money in the rest of the defense budget and it strengthens this country as we move forward into the 21st century. I am pleased to be a member of this important committee. I am pleased to support this authorization.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
I think Members who are watching well understand that we have a very rich and diverse committee that has worked very hard with the other appropriate committees, the Committee on National Security and the Committee on Appropriations. We take our job very seriously. Everybody has something thoughtful to say and to add. The cold war is over but the danger is not gone. We are doing our best to make sure every intelligence dollar is spent well. Obviously that is a never-ending task.
Quite seriously, those who read the newspaper are not getting the full story, and those who wish to speak, I would hope, would go and read the classified annex so they are dealing with the same support level of fact that we are on the committee.
And, finally, I would simply say I agree with my distinguished colleague, the ranking member, and the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman], who spoke about the need for balance, the proper balance between collection, technology, and all of that. We strive for that proper balance. It is a moving target, it is a moving world, and we will be doing this in a moving way for many years to come. I hope we have it right for now. If we do not, we have a conference ahead of us where we will have a chance to do things again. I urge full support of this bill, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the bill shall be considered under the 5-minute rule by titles and each title shall be considered read. No amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is in order unless printed in the Congressional Record.
The Clerk will designate section 1.
The text of section 1 is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998'.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to section 1?
If not, the Clerk will designate title I.
The text of title I is as follows:
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1998 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(11) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(12) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1998, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 1775 of the 105th Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 1998 under section 102 when the
Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees: The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by this section.
SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations: There is authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1998 the sum of $147,588,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and Development Committee and the Environmental Intelligence and Applications Program shall remain available until September 30, 1999.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels: The elements within the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized a total of 313 fulltime personnel as of September 30, 1998. Such personnel may be permanent employees of the Community Management Account elements or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations: In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) and the personnel authorized by subsection (b)--
(1) there is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1998 such amounts, and
(2) there is authorized such personnel as of September 30, 1998,
for the Community Management Account, as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
(d) Reimbursement: Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (as added by section 304 of this Act), during fiscal year 1998 any officer or employee of the United States or member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to an element of the Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis; except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center:
(1) In general: Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), the amount of $27,000,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, test, and engineering purposes shall remain available until September 30, 1999, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2000.
(2) Transfer of funds: The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General of the United States funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the Center.
(3) Limitation: Amounts available for the Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the Center.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to title I?
If not, the Clerk will designate title II.
The text of title II is as follows:
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1998 the sum of $196,900,000.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to title II?
If not, the Clerk will designate title III.
The text of title III is as follows:
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 303. ADMINISTRATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
Subsection (e) of section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
`(4) The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence shall, for administrative purposes, be within the Central Intelligence Agency.'.
SEC. 304. DETAIL OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSIGNMENT PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
`Sec. 113 (a) Detail.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the head of a department with an element in the intelligence community or the head of an intelligence community agency or element may detail any employee within that department, agency, or element to serve in any position in the Intelligence Community Assignment Program on a reimbursable or a nonreimbursable basis.
`(2) Nonreimbursable details may be for such periods as are agreed to between the heads of the parent and host
agencies, up to a maximum of three years, except that such details may be extended for a period not to exceed 1 year when the heads of the parent and host agencies determine that such extension is in the public interest.
`(b) Benefits, Allowances, Travel, Incentives.--An employee detailed under subsection (a) may be authorized any benefit, allowance, travel, or incentive otherwise provided to enhance staffing by the organization from which they are being detailed.
`(c) Annual report.--(1) Not later than March 1 of each year, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report describing the detail of intelligence community personnel pursuant to subsection (a) for the previous 12-month period, including the number of employees detailed, the identity of parent and host agencies or elements, and an analysis of the benefits of the program.
`(2) The Director shall submit the first of such reports not later than March 1, 1999.
`(d) Termination.--The authority to make details under this section terminates on September 30, 2002.'.
(b) Technical Amendment.--Sections 120, 121, and 110 of the National Security Act of 1947 are hereby redesignated as sections 110, 111, and 112, respectively.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents contained in the first section of such Act is amended by striking the items relating to sections 120, 121, and 110 and inserting the following:
`Sec. 110. National mission of National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
`Sec. 111. Collection tasking authority.
`Sec. 112. Restrictions on intelligence sharing with the United Nations.
`Sec. 113. Detail of intelligence community personnel--intelligence community assignment programs.'.
(d) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) of this section shall apply to an employee on detail on or after January 1, 1997.
SEC. 305. APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441d) is amended by striking `1998' and inserting `1999'.
Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Speaker, I have a brief statement to make about a matter in the bill; and then I believe the chairman will be asking unanimous consent to deal with the program for the rest of the evening. I just wanted Members to be alerted to that. I will be brief.
I just want to talk for a minute about something that is referenced in our report concerning the nonacoustic submarine warfare research program that is conducted by an office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense responsible for intelligence. It is generally referred to by the acronym ASAP, the Advanced Sensor Application Program.
It was created by Congress, and we have always insisted that it be managed independently of the Navy. We have recently learned that there is an effort underway by the Navy and elements within OSD to transfer this program to Navy management, in direct contravention of years of consistent guidance from Congress.
This came too late to be incorporated into our bill, but I want to the make Members aware of it. There is guidance regarding this program in our report. Most particularly, this language was drafted to repeat the congressional intent, and I quote, that `we have repeatedly addressed the need to maintain two separate independent but coordinated nonacoustic submarine warfare programs within the Department of Defense.' And it goes on to state that, `ASAP is expected to continue investigating advanced technology in nonacoustical anti-submarine warfare.'
Mr. Speaker, in my view, this is very important and precludes the Department from transferring this program to the Navy. I think that is the correct course. We have a great deal riding on maintaining the small insurance program in our nonacoustical anti-submarine warfare research programs.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore [Mr. McInnis], having assumed the chair, Mr. Thornberry, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill, (H.R. 1775), to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1998 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.