1996 Congressional Hearings
Intelligence and Security

Toby Gati
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research

February 22, 1996

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Chairman Specter, Senator Kerrey. It is a privilege to join you to

present the views of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and

Research on the current and projected worldwide threats to our national

interests. In his "State of the Union" address, President Clinton

defined seven threats to the security and national interests of the

United States: the threat of terrorism; the spread of weapons of mass

destruction; organized crime; drug trafficking; ethnic and religious

hatred; the behavior of rogue nations; and environmental degradation.

These seven threats are our highest priority. They are our most

immediate dangers, and the ones that Dr. Deutch, General Hughes, and I

will focus on today. Threats of this type involve the actions of hostile

states or groups or transnational phenomena with global consequences

(e.g., narcotrafficking and proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction). Such threats are now widely recognized and reasonably well

understood. The intelligence community makes an invaluable contribution

to our national security by effectively targeting these threats for

collection and analysis.

There is a second kind of threat that often goes unrecognized, akin to

Sherlock Holmes' dog that didn't bark. Such threats derive from missed

or unexploited opportunities to advance our national agenda. If we fail

to recognize such opportunities, or pursue them with ill-founded and

misguided strategies, we can exacerbate existing dangers or create new

ones. Intelligence can play a vital role in identifying opportunities

for diplomatic intervention and provide critical support to our nation's

policymakers as they seek to resolve problems before they endanger U.S.

citizens, soldiers, or interests, and as they negotiate solutions to

festering problems. This is the essence of "intelligence in support of

diplomacy," an often ignored but vital component of our national security.

Our experiences in Bosnia and North Korea underscore the importance of

intelligence in support of diplomacy and the consequences had we failed

to exploit diplomatic opportunities when they arise. Similar

opportunities for conflict resolution exist elsewhere; it is vital that

we seize the moments to resolve problems through negotiations and thereby

prevent missed opportunities from turning into threats to our interests.

For example, early detection of the emerging crisis in the Aegean

recently and timely intelligence during the critical hours of possible

Greek-Turkish clashes proved invaluable in preventing a major eruption

among NATO allies.

Our diplomats, the military, and intelligence professionals play

critical, complementary, and mutually supportive roles in the

identification, analysis, and response to threats to U.S. security and

national interests. Believing strongly that all three are critical to

this joint effort, I must issue a warning: the threats outlined in my

testimony and in that of Dr. Deutch -and General Hughes, are being

exacerbated by actions that degrade our worldwide diplomatic presence.

Simply stated, budget cuts are forcing the closing of overseas posts, the

elimination of literally thousands of foreign service positions, the

forced retirement of foreign service professionals, and the reduction or

curtailment of several of our programs. This has already impacted our

ability to identify, interpret, and ameliorate the threats we will

discuss today.

Foreign service reporting is the lowest cost, least-risk source of

intelligence on most threats, and diplomatic intervention and well

targeted foreign assistance are the first-used, lowest-cost way to

address every one of them. What we can no longer acquire via our

diplomatic presence and foreign service reporting must be collected using

more expensive, higher-risk methods. The problem is compounded by the

loss or degradation of diplomatic platforms for collection by military

attaches, commercial officers, and other U.S. government personnel. Even

more dangerous is the erosion of our ability to ameliorate threats

through diplomacy and the consequent increase in the likelihood that they

will have to be addressed through costly and dangerous military


The shrinking foreign affairs budget has direct and detrimental

consequences for our intelligence capabilities. When foreign service

operations contract, intelligence suffers. We lose critical types of

information and we diminish our capability to provide feedback to

analysts and collectors. We also lose the insights of foreign service

officers able to assess directly the behavior of officials in other

nations as we seek to persuade them to work with us against rogue states

and malevolent transnational actors.

I would be happy to discuss the latter types of threats in greater

detail, but will turn now to the central focus of this hearing. The

threats discussed below are grouped geographically and functionally, but

are not necessarily rank ordered; all warrant serious concern and

concerted efforts to reduce the risk to U.S. interests.

The overall list of threats discussed in this report is very similar to

the one contained in my 1995 testimony to this committee, but the nature

and intensity of specific threats has changed, often as a result of U.S.

diplomacy. For example, although North Korea continues to pose

significant collection, analytical, and military challenges, successful

implementation of the Framework Agreement has frozen Pyongyang's nuclear

program and Americans are now working at the Yongbyon nuclear complex to

ensure the safety and security of spent fuel. The US-led diplomatic

effort culminating in the Dayton Agreements has brought peace to Bosnia

but we now face the threat of attacks against U.S. personnel (including

U.S. troops) by stay-behind mujahidin and irreconcilables on all sides.

U.S. diplomacy also has transformed, and somewhat diminished, threats to

Americans and American interests in the Middle East. Progress toward a

comprehensive peace has eroded support for Hamas and other terrorist

groups while strengthening the resolve of others to do even more to

derail the peace process.

However, some of the threats noted last year have become more worrisome.

In South Asia, commentators in India and Pakistan are publicly urging

their governments to acknowledge -- and intensify-their nuclear programs,

and to develop and deploy new missile systems. China's military build-up

continues and Beijing has staged a series of threatening military

exercises to intimidate Taiwan. Both in South Asia and in the Taiwan

Straits situation the role of diplomacy may yet prove critical to a

peaceful resolution, but both require careful monitoring by the

intelligence community.


The June presidential elections will be a seminal political event in

Russia. An open and fair election will mark an important step forward in

Russia's evolution toward a rule-of-law state. But Russia's

transformation into a more open society is not assured. Indeed Russia's

development since 1991 has been fraught with difficulties. These result,

in part, from the enormity of the task, but self-inflicted wounds, such

as the military intervention in Chechnya and the legacy of the Soviet

past also play a role.

A great deal has been accomplished in the last five years. Steps have

been taken both to marketize and demilitarize the economy. A free press,

open debate and political pluralism have been introduced. Russia has

said that it accepts the independence of the other former Soviet states

-- welcome words which we must see reflected in practice -- and

established cooperative relationships with Western states and


Russia has been moving, on schedule, to meet the nuclear arms and missile

reductions agreed to in START I. On non-proliferation, though we may not

agree with every Russian undertaking -- for example, sales of nuclear

reactors to Iran -- we would generally give Russia high marks for its

support for and compliance with international proliferation norms.

The strong showing by Communist and nationalist candidates in the

December 1995 Duma elections reflects popular dissatisfaction with the

downside of the reforms -- the rise in economic and political

uncertainty, crime, economic inequality, and corruption. There is a good

deal of nostalgia for the old Soviet Union: many now remember the inertia

and stagnation of the communist system as stability and security. This

is particularly so among social groups who have suffered most in the last

five years, and among the many Russians who resent the diminution of

Russia's place in the world. A victory by staunch opponents of reform in

the June elections would mark a setback for Russia. It could hamper

Russian integration into the world economy, limit U.S. opportunities to

cooperate with Russia, and narrow the opportunities for Western business

to contribute to the rebuilding of Russia's economy. Conversely, if

Russia elects a more reform-minded President in June, the chances are

greater that we will face a more stable, more democratic, and more

outward-looking Russia.

But whatever the outcome, we are in for a period of rising nationalist

rhetoric, coupled with assertive calls for strengthening the Russian

state and Russia's role abroad, especially in the CIS states. In the

short term, we should not anticipate dramatic changes in Russian foreign

policy. The new Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, knows the outside

world and understands that Russia's global influence is enhanced more by

engagement than by isolation. Russia has far less ability to project

power beyond its borders and challenge Western interests in third

countries than did the Soviet Union. Equally important, the domestic

levers of control that harnessed the country's economic wealth for

political and military goals have eroded, regional leaders have gained

new power, and the Newly Independent States and Central European nations

the USSR once controlled are determined to keep their independence.

At the same time, the war in Chechnya has exposed serious problems within

the Russian military and unleashed brutal military operations that have

violated human rights and galvanized opposition within Russia while

failing to break the Chechen opposition. As incidents involving the

other parts of the North Caucasus widen the circle of devastation, the

risks to Moscow's authority grow.

EAST ASIA -- Despite several territorial disputes, relations among states

in the region are more extensive and more mutually beneficial than at any

time in modern history. Preserving the peace and stability that have

brought unprecedented prosperity to the region -- and to the U.S. -- is a

shared objective. Within this generally positive context, developments

on the Korean Peninsula pose the most serious potential threat to U.S.


The Korean Peninsula. The threat to American troops and to South Korea

from the large, well-equipped and forward-deployed North Korean army

remains high. But on top of long-standing concerns about North Korea's

intentions, we must now add uncertainty about the domestic situation in

the North and the possibility that domestic economic or political turmoil

could change the decision making calculus that has long prevented

conflict. Worsening economic conditions, severe food shortages, and

somewhat unusual -- though for now quite limited -- military training

patterns underscore the unprecedented stresses afflicting the regime in

Pyongyang. Pyongyang's response to its growing economic and, possibly,

political difficulties is extremely difficult to predict but will likely

have important spillover impacts on neighboring countries. North Korea's

tight security and closed society makes it one of the most difficult

intelligence challenges we face.

At the same time, we have begun to engage the North Koreans

diplomatically, gaining experience and insights as we go. We are slowly

beginning to address critical issues in direct talks aimed at

implementing the Agreed Framework. In addition to the nuclear reactor

aspects I will address later, North Korea has allowed the Korean

Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to begin monitoring with

high-technology U.S. equipment the use of heavy fuel oil provided under

the Agreed Framework. Issues such as POW/MIAs also can more effectively

be brought to the table.

Consequently, intelligence and analysis on North Korea increasingly are

being called on to go beyond their traditional Indications and Warning

focus to provide a basis for policies aimed at defusing tensions. As I

testified last year, the danger of conflict remains unacceptably high.

But, with our allies in South Korea and Japan, we are using diplomacy to

create new economic and political opportunities for ensuring peace and

stability on the peninsula.

China. The importance of a strong, stable, prosperous, and open China

working in concert with its Asian neighbors and the U.S. cannot be

overemphasized. China is seeking a global stature commensurate with its

size, population, and permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council,

participating actively in multilateral organizations like APEC and the

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

At the same time, China is modernizing its armed forces, acquiring

advanced military systems, including fighter aircraft and surface-to-air

missiles, to complement indigenous weapons development programs which

have achieved only limited success. The People's Liberation Army (PLA)

is also allocating resources to support more sophisticated training and

the transition from a cumbersome ground army primarily oriented to the

Soviet threat to a more mobile, streamlined force capable of dealing with

regional conflicts, defending territorial claims in the South China Sea,

or enforcing claimed sovereignty over Taiwan. The new Chinese threat

buzzwords -- "local and limited conflicts" -- are thinly veiled reference

to the Spratly Islands and Taiwan.

In 1995, Beijing attempted to allay concerns prompted by its military

modernization by publishing its first-ever defense "white paper." This

modest step towards transparency largely repeated Chinese positions on a

range of military, security and arms control issues, but, concurrently,

Beijing pushed ahead with confidence-building measures and security

dialogues with its neighbors that ranged from low-level and modest (e.g.,

with Japan and India) to top-level and robust (e.g., with Russia and

Burma). Running counter to these efforts, however, were China's

construction of a new outpost in the disputed Spratly Islands and saber

rattling in the Taiwan Strait.

China's emergence as a major regional power affects long-time American

allies, who are unsure of China's capabilities and intentions during a

period of leadership transition. Fueled by strong economic growth,

China's neighbors are also modernizing their forces, primarily in

response to new uncertainties about regional stability.

Beijing does many things which we find objectionable or problematic

(e.g., its treatment of dissidents, strong-arm tactics in Tibet, failure

adequately to protect intellectual property rights, and cooperation with

Pakistan's and Iran's nuclear and missile programs), all of which are

widely reported. But we also have many shared interests, including

preservation of stability on Korean peninsula, narcotics control, crime

prevention, and protection of the environment.


Peace and stability in the former Yugoslavia is possible only if U.S. and

other participating forces, diplomats, and humanitarian and civil

reconstruction organizations build on the achievements of American

diplomacy in the Dayton agreements. The threat of hostile action remains

high, both among the parties and on the part of foreign-origin terrorist

elements. Securing the peace will be difficult and its prospects

doubtful unless military separation and confidence-building measures are

accompanied by success in the far more difficult tasks of economic

reconstruction and societal reconciliation. These tasks will take not

one, not two, but many years.

The scale of reconstruction required is staggering. The war in Bosnia

has caused the greatest refugee flows since World War II; infrastructure

and housing stock requires major repair; warring factions must be

disarmed, elections held and public security restored. Radical

extremists from within and outside of Bosnia will try to derail this

peace process. Indicted war criminals may seek to avoid prosecution by

the International War Crimes Tribunal by fomenting discord and fanning

old animosities. It is essential that American diplomats, as well as

U.S. and allied troops, be accorded the full support of the entire

intelligence community.

Reconciliation in Croatia has taken a strong step forward with an

agreement for peaceful integration of Serb-occupied Eastern Slavonia

under the guidance of a United Nations Transitional Authority. But

again, there is a real danger that extremists and criminals will seek to

block demilitarization, the return of displaced persons, and the

protection of local minorities, all of which must be accomplished to

ensure tranquility and social justice. If the peace does not hold in

Bosnia and Croatia, there is a serious risk that the conflict will spread

by igniting latent disputes within and among the other countries of the

former Yugoslavia.

Across East Central Europe, fledgling democracies are struggling to

cement reforms, maintain the momentum of democratic evolution, and vest

authority over military forces and security services in civilian hands.

Stability is not yet assured in this region; the U.S., working with the

European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE), and a host of capable partners continues to press for measures

with which to strengthen and anchor these nations into Western

institutions and patterns of cooperation.


The goal of U.S. policy in the Middle East is a stable, peaceful,

economically prosperous and politically open region, in which Israel is

fully accepted and secure, the flow of oil fully guaranteed, and the

impetus to acquire more deadly arms is redirected into constructive

endeavors. Completion of the Middle East peace process is key to

achieving these objectives.

Despotic regimes, faltering pursuit of economic reform, popular resort to

religious extremism, and high birth rates still threaten political and

economic stability. More to the point, Iran, Iraq, and Libya continue to

threaten their neighbors. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq mounted two

catastrophic military invasions and pursued an active program to build

nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Baghdad has for several years

obstructed the work of the U.N. Commission charged with dismantling its

capacity to build such weapons. U.S. Intelligence support has assisted

UNSCOM in carrying out its WMD monitoring and verification activities in

Iraq. Iraq and Iran continue to threaten two vital U.S. interests:

regional stability and the free flow of energy resources in the Gulf.

Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Sudan continue to harbor terrorists. All

except the latter engage in or plan programs to acquire weapons of mass

destruction and missile technology. These policies are particularly

dangerous and worrisome when pursued by authoritarian regimes with proven

interest in regional destabilization. Syria, which is also on the

terrorist state sponsors list and engaged in acquisition of CW and

advanced missile technology, is also actively negotiating with Israel to

achieve a peace agreement. Reaching an agreement would obviously have an

impact on Syrian behavior in these areas.


The original motive for India to acquire a nuclear weapons capability --

the threat it perceived from China, which fought a war with India in 1962

-- remains salient in Delhi. India's nuclear program drove Pakistan to

acquire a matching capability to counter the perceived threat from India.

Mutual suspicions on the subcontinent, increasing acceptance in both

India and Pakistan of the idea that nuclear weapons are an essential

attribute of major power status, and reluctance of either country to rely

on an external protector make this one of the most troubling regions on

the globe.

The half-century Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir worsened with the

surge in discontent against India by Kashmir's Muslim population

beginning five years ago. India charges that Pakistan's assistance to

secessionist militants in Kashmir impedes political resolution of the

problem; Pakistan claims that it offers only moral assistance. The

Kashmir dispute is not easily susceptible to resolution and remains a

possible flash point for regional war, with the potential to escalate

into a nuclear exchange.

Another persistent and troubling regional issue is the fighting in

Afghanistan, a country riven by ethnic, tribal, ideological, and personal

differences. Despite ongoing U.N. mediation efforts, there is no end in

sight to the civil war. Afghanistan is a focus of meddling by its

neighbors, a continuing source of training and weaponry for international

terrorists, a center of narcotics trafficking, and a generator of

instability in the region.


Latin America and Africa illustrate dramatically the importance of

transnational threats to security. Although no nation on either

continent militarily threatens the U.S. directly, activities within and

across national boundaries impact U.S. society and feed regional


Latin America. No American or Caribbean nation threatens U.S. military

or economic security, and no regional equivalent of Iraq or North Korea

has the military might to threaten regional peace and stability.

Moreover, no regional actor is an imminent WMD proliferator or

Iranian-style sponsor of international terrorism.

Two developments in the region do threaten U.S. interests: drug

trafficking and uncontrolled migrations. The flow of cocaine out of

source countries in the Andes (Bolivia, Peru, Colombia) and into the U.S.

through a number of transit points -- especially Mexico -- poses a

continuing threat to our social fabric. Potential migration flows from

countries like Cuba and Haiti, as well as increasingly sophisticated and

persistent alien smuggling operations, tax the response capabilities of

U.S. government agencies at all levels and create the potential for

humanitarian disasters.

Cuba is in desperate economic straits, no longer a model to any Latin

nation or an active conduit for destabilization. Cuba's isolation from

the general progress made in the Americas towards democracy increases the

likelihood of rapid, destabilizing social and political change with the

potential for yet another mass migration.

In Haiti, the demobilization of the armed forces, successful deployment

of the new Haitian National Police, and recent democratic transition have

reduced the threat of a massive new wave of boat people. However, lack

of tangible economic improvement, or failure to interdict and promptly

return intending migrants to Haiti, could trigger some increased

activity. The threat to U.S. forces in Haiti will diminish as numbers

are reduced and the scope of their mission narrows: U.S. forces will

stand down to force protection mode by the end of February, and the

concluding phase of the UNMIH mission will end in early April. It is

expected that the UNMIH-II mission, which does not employ U.S. forces,

will ensure adequate security for U.S. military engineers and other

specialists that may do brief rotational stints in Haiti over the coming


Africa. Africa's recurring human tragedies -- genocidal ethnic

conflicts, civil wars, massive refugee flows, starvation and

malnutrition, AIDs and other deadly diseases -- remain in the spotlight.

While these do not threaten our nation's security, they frequently

require commitment of resources, mostly for humanitarian purposes but

also military resources that are then unavailable for deployment

elsewhere. Collapsing states and humanitarian crises also threaten

attainment of the important U.S. objectives of democratization,

protection of the environment, and expansion of the global economy.

African peacekeeping initiatives in Liberia, the multinational forces in

Angola and U.S. support for the peace process in Mozambique, our

commitment to a democratic, multi-racial government in South Africa, and

efforts to change the policies of Nigeria's leadership are essential to

the attainment of lasting peace and sustainable development everywhere on

the continent.


International terrorism poses one of the most alarming threats to the

security of U.S. government personnel, civilians, and such other

interests as the Middle East peace process. In 1995, terrorists killed

two U.S. officials in a shooting in Karachi and five more in a bombing in

Riyadh. Effective counterterrorism operations prevented a much higher

number of casualties by thwarting attempts by terrorists linked to the

World Trade Center conspirators to bomb several U.S. commercial airlines

in East Asia. Indeed, our security resources are constantly stretched

thin by the plethora of threats to our diplomats and facilities abroad.

Hostage takers throughout the world seek out Americans; terrorists in

Colombia and Kashmir hold Americans for ransom and/or political leverage

and Americans in several countries are targeted by terrorists. The World

Trade Center bombing is a constant reminder that Americans at home remain

vulnerable to foreign terrorists seeking bigger headlines and intent on

inflicting mass casualties.

Despite a proliferation of new, non-state terrorist groups, state

sponsorship of terrorism poses a special challenge. The most serious

offender is Iran, which provides money, training, and weapons to secular

and Islamic radicals who use violence to undermine our efforts to

facilitate peace between Arabs and Israelis. Sudan harbors many

terrorist groups, including the Egyptian Islamic Gama'at, which tried to

destabilize Egypt with its plot to kill President Mubarak in Ethiopia

last June.

Newer terrorism threats emanate from the chaos of postwar Afghanistan

where training camps continue to turn out "graduates" eager to return to

fight against conservative regimes. Ethnic conflict in Russia recently

spilled over into the international arena as Chechen separatists hijacked

a Turkish Black Sea ship. Peacekeeping in Bosnia is endangered by

potential terrorist threats from local and foreign elements.


Major drug producing and smuggling organizations continue to flood the

United States with illegal narcotics and overwhelm our demand reduction

efforts. They often exploit the vulnerability of the less advantaged

segments of our society and exacerbate existing social ills. Our

interest in strengthening the trend toward democratization in our own

hemisphere, so pronounced in the last decade, is jeopardized by the

corrosive impact of traffickers. The impunity enjoyed by many kingpins

severely undermines popular confidence in government.

Much public attention has focused on Latin America, but heroin, mainly

from Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle of Thailand, Burma and Laos,

continues to make inroads in the U.S. market. Progress in the war on

drugs has been difficult; it cannot be achieved at all without the

cooperation of producing nations. Winning that cooperation is a task for

diplomacy backed by effective programs for countries that are committed

to cooperating with us.

International organized crime knows no borders. It threatens the

operations of U.S. business, disrupts the transition to democracy and

market economies and affects the distribution and effectiveness of U.S.

assistance. Our interest in stability and democracy in the former Soviet

republics and Central Europe is threatened by criminal groups which take

advantage of privatization, corrupting government officials and using

illegally acquired wealth and intimidation to gain control of banks and

commercial enterprises. As Russian organized crime groups have gained

strength, they have reached out to form alliances with well established

criminals in Europe, South America, and Asia.


The spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) poses a serious and

growing threat to U.S. national interests at home and abroad and will

likely continue to do so for years to come. The U.S. has made curbing

proliferation a top priority and a key factor in our diplomatic

consultations and military preparations worldwide. The United States

will continue to lead the international effort to negotiate a

Comprehensive Test Ban treaty (CTBT), which the President has indicated

he wants to sign later this year. The CTBT, in combination with the

indefinite extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty and a future treaty

for the global cessation of fissile material production, will strengthen

significantly the global nonproliferation regime.

In addition to this multilateral approach, the U.S. will continue to

focus on key regional hot spots where proliferation is most likely to

occur or worsen. These regions include the Persian Gulf, the Korean

peninsula, and South Asia. The U.S. will work to ensure that fissile

material does not seep out of the former Soviet Union into the hands of

determined proliferators or terrorists. I would like to say a few words

about each of these concerns.

Fissile Material from the Former USSR. The newest wrinkle in the global

struggle to stop the spread of nuclear weapons is the effort to track and

safeguard fissile material in Russia and the former Soviet Republics. We

regard this as a very serious problem, even as the number of reported

incidents of fissile material smuggling from the former Soviet Union

declined sharply last year compared to cases reported in 1994. We will

need continued international vigilance from the diplomatic,

intelligence, and law enforcement communities to combat smuggling. A

keen understanding of the problem we face will help shape a diplomatic

strategy for the April nuclear summit in Moscow.

North Korea. Pursuant to the Agreed Framework, the North Korean nuclear

reactor program at Yongbyon remains frozen under IAEA observation. The

North and the US-led Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization

(KEDO) recently reached agreement in principle on a light-water reactor

supply contract for the civilian power reactors that will replace the

North's gas-graphite system. Almost inconceivable two years ago, U.S.

technicians today are working with North Korean counterparts to prepare

the North's spent reactor fuel for long-term storage and eventual

shipment out of North Korea. (This fuel contains enough plutonium for a

couple of nuclear weapons.) Despite this progress, the Korean peninsula

remains the most heavily armed region in the world, and it will take

years to complete the Framework and reduce tensions on the peninsula.

Iran/Iraq. The flight of Saddam Hussein's brother-in-law Husayn

Kamal to Jordan last year led to a spate of revelations about ongoing

WMD-related activities in Iraq. We do not believe Kamal's recent return

to Iraq undercuts the value of what he told us last summer. Though we

have never been satisfied with Saddam's cooperation with U.N. weapons

inspectors, this defection produced substantial proof of Iraqi

concealment efforts. UNSCOM experts are sifting through the

documentation that Iraq has since provided, but it will be months before

a determination about Iraqi disclosures can be made. In Iran,

unfortunately we see no let-up in Tehran's efforts to try and acquire WMD

technology. Iran has developed chemical weapons and short-range

missiles, and Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapons program.

Although we cannot relax our vigilance, our diplomatic efforts have

served to limit Iran's nuclear capabilities.

South Asia. Nowhere in the world are the stakes for the global

nonproliferation regime higher than in South Asia. India and Pakistan

stand at a cross-roads in their history. If they are prepared to cap

their nuclear and missile programs, they can become a force for progress

in the global effort to negotiate a CTBT and a fissile material

production ban treaty. On the other hand, if Delhi and Islamabad choose

instead to accelerate their weapons efforts, they will find themselves

increasingly isolated from the global mainstream. New Delhi's recent

efforts to attach a time-bound pledge on nuclear disarmament to the CTBT

could complicate efforts to get a treaty this year.


We see and understand the immediate national security threats from

nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and drug trafficking, but there are

threats to our security and well-being that are less obvious and

therefore more difficult to target, involving humanitarian and

environmental issues. When the U.S. responds to humanitarian tragedies

or negotiates multilateral environmental accords we do so for altruistic

reasons but also because they affect the long-term safety and prosperity

of our citizens. And more often than not, we do so in cooperative

undertakings involving the United Nations and its specialized agencies,

regional organizations, and coalitions of like-minded states.

Natural and man-made disasters spill across borders, disrupt national

economies, and weaken foreign governments. Increasing population and

economic pressures and deteriorating environments -- from the Horn of

Africa to Central America -- will erode U.S. foreign policy efforts aimed

at promoting regional stability, reducing ethnic tensions, and supporting

democratization. The intelligence community's technical and analytical

capabilities cannot solve disaster-related problems, but they are being

used to better understand disaster-prone areas and to assist US-supported

relief efforts.

Forced population displacements that affect tens of millions of people

worldwide raise tensions with neighboring countries over immigration

policies and border security. The U.S. invests large sums in programs to

assist displaced people and refugees fleeing from civil war and other

crises in part to ease these tensions. Safe refugee repatriation is a

major component of restoring peace, whether in Bosnia or Rwanda. But

voluntary repatriation, whether to the West Bank or Haiti, also depends

on peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts, underscoring the point that

security and humanitarian interests are often intertwined.

This winter's record snowfall in the DC area demonstrated how vulnerable

we are to ecosystem fluctuations. Climatic disruptions in other regions

are often even more destructive, affecting each year hundreds of millions

of people. While global climate change impacts the long-term well-being

and security of us all, more localized environmental crises can have

immediate health, economic, and even political implications in such

countries as Russia and China. Transnational environmental problems,

including deforestation, decreasing biodiversity, water and air

pollution, and hazardous waste dumping also affect U.S. economic

interests. We are just beginning to understand the true, long term costs

of ecological degradation on U.S. security. The intelligence community

has only recently begun to explore the unique role it might play in

helping to assess this type of security threat.

Unfair competition and other economic issues. The success of U.S. firms

in international markets is one of the major underpinnings of this

country's economic growth during the 1990s. But a byproduct of

globalization has been increased efforts by companies and some

governments to avoid playing by the rules. U.S. firms do not shrink from

dealing with tough but essentially fair practices on the part of their

competitors, but, particularly in major aircraft, military, and

infrastructure contracts, they face unfair competition that can include

bribery, political linkage, and other illicit or unfair practices. The

impact of these practices on the well-being of our citizens can be

direct, when contracts and jobs are lost, or corrosive to democratic

institutions, as when governments are corrupted.


The threats to Americans and American interests have changed dramatically

in the last decade. The danger of deliberate -- or accidental -- nuclear

incineration has diminished greatly but the threat of harm in an act of

terrorism or drug-related crime has increased. With the end of the Cold

War, the replacement of authoritarian regimes by fledgling democracies,

and wider acceptance of open markets and shared responsibility for

threats to the global ecosystem, we should feel more secure than most of

us do.

Our heads may tell us we are safer, but our instincts -- and news

reports -- argue otherwise. Head and instinct are both right. The

threat to America's survival has diminished greatly, but threats to our

well-being continue to exist and may even be increasing.

The overview of the most prominent and easily identified threats to our

security presented here and in the other submissions for this hearing

provides a useful guide to the challenges confronting U.S. policymakers,

diplomats, military planners, and the intelligence community. But our

fellow citizens have other fears and feel threatened by dangers that are

less easily defined, let alone quantified. The intelligence community

does a good job ferreting out and interpreting information on the "big"

threats discussed above. But in all of these -- and particularly on

transnational and global issues -- we diminish our intelligence

capabilities, put our soldiers at risk, and weaken our national security

by emasculating diplomatic, foreign aid, and development assistance


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