1994 Congressional Hearings
Intelligence and Security


Basis Date:
T. Bevill
House Appropriations
Docfile Number:
Hearing Date:
DOE Lead Office:
Energy and Water Development
Hearing Subject:
Witness Name:
V. Reis/J. Keliher
Hearing Text:



      Mr. Bevill. Can you describe the state of the Russian nuclear
 weapons laboratories?
      Dr. Keliher.               Deleted
      Deleted                                       Deleted
      Mr. Bevill.  How concerned should we be about the possible
 diversion of Russian nuclear weapons scientists to other countries?
 What can be done to mitigate the danger?
      Dr. Keliher. Observations to date by the DOE's National
 Laboratory scientists, as they interact on a project working level with
 their counterparts in the Former Soviet Union (FSU), indicate that this
 is not presently a major concern. However, economic conditions are
 rapidly deteriorating and the desire of FSU weapons scientists to feed
 themselves and their families will increase the probability that some
 will leave.
 Since early 1992, the Department of Energy has strongly
 encouraged technical collaborations between its laboratories and FSU
 weapons institutes. As of this date, initial technical exchange visits
 in March 1992 have led to over $5,000,000 in direct contracts between
 DOE and FSU weapons institutes. This contracting is employing thousands
 of scientists, engineers and technicians in non-weapons related work
 that maintains their professional integrity. Professional relationships
 are being established that provide a continuing basis for education in
 market economics. The success of direct laboratory-to-institute
 contracting is now leading to other programs that include U.S.
 industrial and academic participation, which will foster long- term
 commercial enterprises. This direct contracting for goods and services
 benefits Newly Independent States (NIS) institutes with employment and
 education in western business practices and provides the U.S. access to
 a large highly talented scientific pool of knowledge. These activities
 should be strengthened and given long-term support so as to minimize
 the developing proliferation risk and establish lasting economic
      In addition to these laboratory-to-institute exchanges, the DOE
 is supporting the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in
 Moscow. The Director of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation
 is the U.S. representative to the board of governors and two National
 Laboratory scientists are providing technical support to the center.
 The DOE strongly supports the nonproliferation goals of the ISTC and we
 encourage enhanced support to the center.

                           NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS
      Mr. Bevill. Dr. Smith, what is the current DOD thinking on the
 most likely national security threat this Nation faces?
      Dr. Smith. We believe that there are four new post-cold war
 dangers faced by the Nation. These are: regional threats to U.S.
 interests, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and possible
 failure of democratic reforms (both in Russia and elsewhere in the
 world,). The fourth, although not a traditional military threat, but
 one that could have significant impact, is negative national economic

                        Nuclear Safeguards and Security
      Mr. Bevill. How is DOE coordinating with DOD in its current
 efforts to declassify information? Are there any instances of
 disagreement between the two organizations on how the declassification
 effort should proceed?
      Dr. Keliher. DOE coordinates its declassification efforts with
 two primary offices in the DOD: The Assistant to the Secretary of
 Defense for Atomic Energy, and the Assistant Deputy to the Under
 Secretary of Defense for Security Policy. DOE has notified DOD of
 current declassification efforts thorough DOE's Defense Program Office.
 DOD was also invited and participated in DOE's internal review of
 declassification proposals on March 3, 1994. A formal memorandum of
 recommended declassifications will be sent to DOD by April 1, 1994. We
 anticipate a response from DOD by the end of April 1994. There have
 been no disagreements between the two organizations on how the
 declassification effort should proceed; however, there have been
 disagreements  on certain declassification proposals in the past.

     Mr. Bevill. Please identify all countries known or suspected to
 have nuclear weapons and include the number of strategic and tactical
 nuclear weapons held by each.
     Dr. Keliher. The countries known to have nuclear weapons are the
 Former Soviet Union, China, France and the United Kingdom, as well as
 the United States. Countries suspected of having nuclear weapons are
 Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea. Estimates 'on the numbers of
 weapons are classified.

      Mr. Bevill. Describe the nonproliferation activities funded in
 this program and explain why they are not included in the Department's
 arms control and nonproliferation budget.
      Dr. Reis: As part of our effort to make the Research and
 Development budget justification more accurately descriptive of the
 work performed by the laboratories in support of the weapons program,
 certain high priority, high visibility programs were broken out as
 separate activities within Research and Development. Among these
 Programs and Initiatives is N-PACTA, Nonproliferation, Arms Control,
 and Threat Assessment.
      N-PACTA is a relatively small activity, $11.7 million in FY 1994
 and $6.4 million in FY 1995, but because of the high priority the
 Congress and the President are placing on nonproliferation activities
 we have chosen to highlight it. The activities collected within this
 category are not duplicative of the activities funded within the
 Materials Support and Other Defense Programs account. Rather, they are
 concentrated around nuclear weapons design-specific engineering and
 technology concepts and issues, and therefore a part of the R&D budget.
 In general, these activities are activities which are captured by
 the Department's Nonproliferation crosscut but which do not fall under
 the purview of the Office of NonProliferation and National Security
 because the requirement for these activities is driven by the.needs of
 the U.S. stockpile, as opposed to the need to monitor non-U.S. weapons
      Specifically, the activities within the N-PACTA category either
 are activities that are necessary for the Weapons Research and
 Development program to meet its responsibilities and fit under a broad
 definition of nonproliferation, such as international device design
 assessments, military implication assessments, and limited R&D efforts
 to guard against technology surprise; or they are efforts in support of
 the Department's treaty negotiation efforts which utilize the weapons
 program's unique talents and capabilities, such as technical support
 for the nuclear test talks.
      In no case does this category support activities which should be,
 or are, funded through the Materials Support and Other Defense Programs
 account which is primarily involved in the monitoring of non-U.S.
 weapons stockpile activities.

      Mr. Bevill. How has the focus of this program changed since the
 breakup of the former Soviet Union?
      Dr. Keliher. As a result of the dissolution of the former Soviet
 Union, the Verification and Control Technology Program has shifted its
 focus from the verification of arms control agreements primarily with
 the USSR to activities to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
 destruction on a global scale. The threat of proliferation had always
 existed, but events of the past few years have brought the subject to
 the top of the arms control agenda. With the collapse of Communism and
 the break-up of the former Soviet bloc, we can confront the ambitions
 which fuel proliferation not through the prism of Cold War alliances,
 but through the examination of regional tensions which cause such
      The program has adapted significantly to confront the
 proliferation threat from successor states of the former Soviet Union
 themselves, which has resulted from decades of militarized economies
 and is worsened now by economic hard times. As a result, the program
 has extended its training programs to encourage consolidation of
 residual nuclear weapons and materials in Russia and to help selected
 states of the former Soviet Union develop improved nuclear material
 control and accountability and export control systems. These new types
 of assistance were initiated through intensive diplomatic bilateral
 dialogue in 1992, approximately one year after the dissolution of the
 U.S.S.R.. As such, the focus of this assistance program to enhance or
 establish national export control and nuclear material and
 accountability  systems in all of the former republics has remained
 constant, with workplan adjustments found primarily in funding levels
 and project priorities as articulated by each recipient country,
 (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan).
      In addition, since the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., the program
 has been active in the effort to establish the International Science
 and Technology Center (ISTC) in Russia and the Science and Technology
 Center in Ukraine (STCU) and to facilitate direct U.S.-Russian
 Laboratory-to-Laboratory interactions. The purpose of these three
 activities is to provide non-weapons collaborative research projects to
 former Soviet weapons scientists to prevent "brain drain" to
 proliferant states.
      It should be mentioned that technical support for negotiations to
 verify arms control agreements with the primary successor state of the
 former Soviet nuclear arsenal, Russia, remains a high priority in the
 Verification and Control Technology Program.  Partly a nonproliferation
 and partly an arms control measure, the U.S. purchase of 500 metric
 tons of Russia highly-enriched uranium and its corresponding
 revenue-sharing agreement with Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan continue
 to be subject for negotiation and supported by the program.
 Transparency measures between the U.S. and the Russians have been
 agreed upon to ensure that HEU being purchased is actually derived
 from dismantled nuclear weapons.  The program also supports negotiation
 of transparency measures relating to the entire nuclear weapon
 dismantlement process. The program is now exploring new technology
 Which will allow our dismantlement process at Pantex to be more
 transparent without revealing sensitive nuclear weapon design
 information. The program has supported efforts to provide more direct
 assistance to the Russians on dismantlement., including assistance for
 the design of a storage facility for fissile material derived from
 dismantled weapons.

      Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list of treaties under negotiation
 and anticipated treaties through the 1990's in which DOE will be
      Dr. Keliher.  DOE is involved in support of treaties, agreements,
 and reciprocal unilateral initiatives either under negotiation or
 anticipated. Treaties that are in effect include:
      - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) (awaiting Ukrainian
      - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) (awaiting both
        U.S. and Russian ratification)
      - Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
      - Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
      - Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)
      - Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)
      - Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET)
      - Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
      - Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
      - Bilateral U.S./Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement
        (awaiting both U.S. and Russian signature)
      - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
      - Wyoming MOU and BOA
      - Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
      - Open Skies Treaty
 Treaties and agreements that are under negotiation include:
      - Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
      - Chemical Weapons Convention Preparatory Commission
      - African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
 Treaties, agreements, and initiatives we expect to come to fruition
 through the 1990's include:
      - Global Ban on the Production of Fissionable Material for Nuclear
        Weapons Purposes
       - U.S. voluntary offer to place fissile materials no longer
         needed for nuclear deterrence under international safeguards

      Mr. Bevill. How has the proposed declassification of some of the
 U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear materials information impacted this
      Dr. Keliher. There have been no impacts to date.
      Mr. Bevill. Has the arrest of a suspected spy at the CIA impacted
 this program?
      Dr. Keliher. The arrest of the CIA employee and the subsequent
 media coverage has made the foreign intelligence service threat message
 more credible to DOE employees and contractors. While the end of the
 Cold War caused many employees to become skeptical concerning the
 existence of an espionage threat, employees are now more receptive to
 the message of the Department's counterintelligence awareness
 program. No other impacts have been observed.
      Mr. Bevill. The Inspector General issued a report criticizing the
 Department's classified intelligence and special access work-for-others
 projects. What steps has the Department taken to address these
      Dr. Keliher. The Office of Nonproliferation and National Security
 has coordinated a Departmental position and Action Plan to implement
 the Inspector General's recommendations. The Departmental position
 concurs with the 46 Inspector General recommendations. All
 recommendations have been accepted and assigned Target Completion
 Dates. Eleven recommendations have already been implemented.
      Mr. Bevill. What performance measures can be used to measure the
 effectiveness of intelligence programs?
      Dr. Keliher. There are four primary measures of the effectiveness
 of intelligence programs: "timeliness, accuracy, impact," and the
 "cost/benefit ratio." For strategic warning and finished intelligence,
 the measures should be applied to the products each program produces.
 For current intelligence, the measures should be applied to the
 aggregated function. "Timeliness" addresses the receipt by the customer
 in time to influence a targeted decision. "Accuracy" examines whether
 the correct issue was addressed in the analysis; if the appropriate
 analytic  approach was applied; if the research appears to be
 exhaustive and if appropriate data was located and incorporated; and,
 if the answer was correct (if validated by events). "Impact" measures
 the level of influence the product had on a customer's decision, asking
 if actions were taken that otherwise would not have been and assessing
 the outcomes of those actions. "Cost to benefit ratio" addresses
 whether  or not the impact (benefit) justifies the cost.


      Mr. Bevill. Please describe the current threat assessment. Have
 any DOE facilities experienced any threat in the past five years that
 approaches the threat guidance now in effect?
      Dr. Keliher. The current Department of Energy (DOE) threat policy
 is founded on a January 31, 1992, DOE/Department of Defense, (DOD)
 "Memorandum of Agreement on the Security Threats to DOE and DOD Nuclear
 Weapons Programs and Facilities." The Memorandum of Agreement was based
 on a Defense Intelligence Agency review of worldwide threats to United
 States Government interests. The 'Design Basis Threat Policy for
 Department of Energy Programs and Facilities" dated July 28, 1993
 describes a spectrum of threats to DOE Programs and activities ranging
 from terrorist threats to Departmental nuclear weapons and production
 programs to the threats posed by criminals, psychotics, radical
 environmentalists, foreign agents, and other insiders. The Design Basis
 Threat Policy, classified Confidential, National Security Information,
 provides guidance on the characteristics of the various threats types
 and describes the capabilities of the adversary. The Design Basis
 Threat Policy also describes Safeguards and Security Program strategies
 for addressing the threat spectrum. It requires the development of site
 specific considerations in mitigating threats. The Office of Security
 Affairs performs an annual review of the threat policy for validity and
 currency. The current policy replaces an April 1, 1992 version. These
 revisions replaced the 1983 Generic Threat Statement. Both the April
 1992 and July 1993 versions are consistent with the January 1992
 interagency Memorandum of Agreement. Currently, the Office of Security
 Affairs is working with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to draft a
 document similar to the 1992 agreement with the Department of Defense.
      A review of incidents at DOE facilities since 1990 indicates that
 several events categorized as insider threat activity have occurred.
 These incidents vary from tampering with systems, vandalism and threats
 directed against other personnel. A series of incidents at one facility
 were believed to have been caused by disgruntled employees resulting
 from labor/management disputes. Because of the significant insider
 controls, these incidents were quickly identified, investigated and
 resolved with no significant negative or adverse impact to the
 safeguard and security systems of the facility or the public's health
 and safety. These incidents were referred to the Federal Bureau of
 Investigation for further action.
      Threats of violence to individuals have occurred at several DOE
 facilities. To the best of our knowledge, however, none have been
 carried out.
      There are also clear indications that the Department continues
 to be actively targeted by foreign interests in the areas of nuclear
 proliferation and advance technology.- The Department maintains active
 security and counter intelligence programs that protect against such
 threats. There have been no incidents of terrorism directed at DOE
 facilities. There is a growing concern for terrorism in the United
 States, particularly in light of the World Trade Center terrorist
 bombing. The ability and readiness of safeguards and security programs
 at field and Headquarters facilities to detect and respond to terrorist
 events continues to be frequently tested and certainly provides a
 deterrence to any group considering such an act. One of the objective's
 of the program is to provide a high degree of assurance of the
 programs' ability to successfully respond to the spectrum of threats to
 include terrorism.
      The strategy to guard against threats to facilities emphasizes
 providing a high degree of assurance of a capability to detect, assess,
 delay, and inhibit unauthorized access to nuclear materials, nuclear
 weapons, and nuclear weapons design information. Safeguards and
 security measures are also designed to prevent acts of sabotage.
                      THREATS TO DOE FACILITIES
      Mr. Bevill. What is the most likely threat to DOE facilities and
 what is the least likely?
      Dr. Keliher. Notwithstanding the 1993 World Trade Center bombing
 attack, terrorist acts directed against DOE programs and facilities,
 while potentially resulting in catastrophic consequences, are the least
 likely to occur partly due to the,deterrence in place. The threat posed
 by cleared and authorized insiders is perhaps the most likely and
 includes theft of material and equipment, espionage and sabotage. The
 threat posed by insiders is also potentially exacerbated by the current
 downsizing of some Departmental programs, as well as other major
 changes in our programs. Some Departmental locations have also been
 targeted by anti-nuclear and/or radical environmental extremist groups.
 Those actions have resulted in demonstrations, acts of civil
 disobedience and trespass.
                         DECLASSIFICATION EFFORT
      Mr. Bevill. Please describe the current effort to declassify
 information including the funding for each year and milestones.
      Dr. Keliher. As a followup to the Secretary's December 7, 1993
 press conference, the Office of Declassification issued a second call
 for information declassification proposals at the end of December 1993.
 The first joint DOE/DOD meeting to discuss these new proposed
 declassifications was completed on March 3. A new call will be issued
 for additional information declassification proposals by July 1994.
      Additionally, we are involved in a comprehensive, fundamental
 review of DOE classification policy to determine what information is
 still truly sensitive and requires protection. This review is scheduled
 to be completed within 12 months after initiation. To assist in
 accomplishing this review, four additional full-time employees and four
 additional contractor support personnel have been selected and should
 be on the job within the next 45 days. This policy review will be
 followed by a review and revision of DOE classification guidance,
 scheduled to be completed at the end of one additional year. This
 classification guidance consists of detailed instructions describing
 what is classified and is used as the basis for the declassification
 review of documents.
      To accelerate the review and declassification of documents,
 additional derivative declassifies must be trained.  Therefore, a
 substantial increase in the number of authorized derivative
 declassifies required to support this initiative in the field are in
 the process of being trained (as many as 300 more). Each authorized
 derivative declassifier must attend a training course conducted by DOE
 Headquarters. Funding for the declassifies is not included in this
 budget request; they are funded by the program offices. In addition,
 there will be a substantial increase in the number of Headquarters
 Office of Declassification Federal positions as well as support
 contractors who will require training as derivative declassifies.
      Current program expectations for declassifying documents in the
 following areas are as follows:
      Responses to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Requests - At the
 end of FY 1993, the backlog in FOIA classified documents was
 approximately 2 years. By the end of FY 1994, provided the public
 demand for access does not increase, the backlog should be reduced to
 18 months, and by the end of FY 1995 and future years the backlog
 should be less than 1 year.
      Support to Declassify Historical Documents at the National
 Archives and Records Administration (NARA) - In FY 1994, we will hire
 and train six qualified document reviewers. By mid-March 1994, we plan
 to have an average of three document reviewers to directly support NARA
 in the review of DOE and predecessor agency documents. During FY 1995,
 the target is to support NARA with six fully qualified and trained
 document reviewers.
      Other Document Reviews (includes documents involved in litigation,
 congressional testimony, draft documents intended for public release,
 etc.) Maintain the close support of operational needs of our clients.
      Funding to support the information declassification initiative is
 as follows: FY 1994 - $5,900,000 and FY 1995 $6,536,000.
      Mr. Bevill. What is the total cost of operating the Central.
 Training Academy and the FTEs in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995? Are
 funds provided from any sources other than this budget?
      Dr. Keliher. The costs for the Central Training Academy (CTA) are
 as follows:
                                      FY 1993    FY 1994   FY 1995
                                        (In Thousands of Dollars)
 Program                              $ 7,323    $ 7,933   $ 8,867
 Program  Direction/Other Services        393*       700       709
   Total Central Training Academy     $ 7,716    $ 8,633   $ 9,576
 FTEs                                       5          5         5
 *In FY 1993, the funding for Program Direction was provided by the
 Weapons Production and Surveillance budget. In FY 1994, Program
 Direction funding increases due to the funding of janitorial services
 and costs associated with replacement of mechanical systems.
      In addition to the above funding, CTA receives approximately
 $200,000 annually from other Departmental programs to cover CTA staff
 travel and adjunct costs related to specially requested Mobile Training
 Team activities. These Mobile Training Teams are in addition to
 normally scheduled and budgeted CTA classes.
      Since the establishment of the CTA, the Albuquerque Operations
 Office has provided funding for CTA's rent, electricity, etc. (it is
 estimated that approximately $500,000 is expended annually).
      In FY 1993, the CTA received $2,000,000 in General Plant Project
 funding. The CTA in FY 1994 and FY 1995 has zero General Plant Project
                             GUARD OVERTIME COSTS
      Mr. Bevill. There have been reports of excessive overtime costs
 for guards at several facilities. Can you discuss this issue?
      Dr. Keliher. Based upon data from the Rocky Flats Operations
 Office, there are indications that protective force personnel at this
 location are working excessive overtime hours based upon existing
 protective force contract allowances. Based on Fiscal Year 1992 data,
 in some instances, the annual wage of an armed guard is supplemented in
 excess of 90 percent by overtime compensation.
      Based upon data compilation, information analysis, and research by
 Department of Energy Headquarters staff personnel and an independent
 research group, the following working hour guidelines are being
 examined to help standardize duty hour application:
   -  No more than 12 total hours worked per continuous 24 hour period,
      inclusive of shift change briefings and uniform and equipment
   -  No more than 60 total hours worked per seven day week.
      These guidelines are intended as a tool that can assist managers
 and contract officers in future negotiations dealing with protective
 forces. It is believed that cost savings can be realized from the
 enactment of these guidelines.
      Mr. Bevill. Describe the actions taken to date to reduce
 Department-wide Safeguards and Security (S&S) costs.
      Dr. Keliher. In fiscal year 1993, DOE mandated a complex-wide
 S&S resource review designed to identify opportunities for program
 savings while ensuring appropriate and effective security for DOE
 assets and personnel. This effort was coordinated by the Office
 of Security Affairs.
      This effort identified over 400 cost saving initiatives.  These
 initiatives offer a potential estimated cost-savings of approximately
 $200M in FY 1995 when compared to the original FY 1992 cost estimate
 for complex-wide expenditures of $1.2B. Estimated complex-wide S&S
 expenditures for FY 1995 are approximately $62M below actual FY 1993
      In addition to the 400 specific initiatives submitted by the
 Operations Offices, the Office of Security Affairs resource review
 identified consolidation of special nuclear materials as a significant
 opportunity for resource savings. Examples are:
      - fewer hardened storage facilities.
      - reduced equipment and accountability requirements.
      - smaller number of protective force personnel.
      The Office of Security Affairs has instituted measures to
 assure the continuation of an ongoing system to identify and pursue
 cost saving activities.
      Mr. Bevill. Provide a crosscut by location of all Safeguards and
 Security funding throughout the Department for FY 1993, FY 1994 and FY
 1995. Dr. Keliher. The following information is provided:
                         DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
                     FY 1995 Congressional Budget
              Safeguards and Security Crosscut Estimates
                              BY FACILITY
                             (in thousands)
                                          FY 1993    FY 1994    FY 1995
 Organization/Facility                    Actuals    Estimate   Request
 ---------------------------------------- ---------  ---------  --------
      Albuquerque Direct                  83,911      86,676     85,954
      Allied (Kansas City)                 6,994       7,516      6,203
      Central Training Academy             9,186       8,857      9,639
      Grand Junction Project Off.            932       1,055      1,091
      Los Alamos Natl. Lab.               66,934      74,385     74,677
      Mound                                8,603       6,885      5,673
      Pantex                              34,356      56,284     54,858
      Pinellas                             4,974       4,450      1,523
      Rocky Flats                         76,661      75,129     65,820
      Sandia Natl. Lab.                   52,768      64,443     63,452
                                        ---------    --------  ---------
        Total, Albuquerque               344,629     385,680    368,890
      Chicago Direct                       1,493       1,445      1,532
      Ames Natl. Lab.                        448         215        223
      Argonne Natl. Lab.                  13,390      14,098     14,839
      Brookhaven Natl. Lab.                7,016       7,518      7,766
      Fermi National Lab.                  2,065       2,365      3,351
      New Brunswick Lab.                   4,253       4,215      4,295
      Princeton Plasma Physics Lab.        1,213       1,212      1,291
                                         --------- --------  ---------
        Total, Chicago                    29,878      31,068     33,297
 National Renewable Energy Laboratory        675       1,000      1,049
 Superconducting Super Collider            1,300       1,400      1,446
 Idaho                                    40,093      39,141     43,148
 Nevada                                   68,434      73,083     67,081
 Naval Petroleum Reserves                  1,180       1,245      1,269
 Oak Ridge
      Oak Ridge                           24,271      25,975     25,952
      Cont. Electron Beam Accelerator Fac.   330         345        355
      FERMCO                               3,025       2,788      2,644
      Oak Ridge Institute for Sci. & Ed.     851         714        925
      Oak Ridge Natl. Lab.                 6,950       7,726      7,304
      Paducah Gaseous Diffusion           11,560       3,888      1,323
      Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion        22,532      22,059     10,463
      Y- 12                               40,905      27,921     29,344
                                         ---------  --------    --------
      Total Oak Ridge                    110,424      91,416     78,310
 Pittsburgh Naval Reactors                12,342      12,223     10,774
 File Name: BYSITE95.WK3
                           DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
                       FY 1995 Congressional Budget
                Safeguards and Security Crosscut Estimates
                               BY FACILITY
                              (in thousands)
                                          FY 1993   FY 1994    FY 1995
 Organization/Facility                    Actuals   Estimate   Request
 --------------------------------------  ---------  ---------- ---------
 Richland                                60,865      56,311      39,693
 San Francisco
      San Francisco (Oakland Ops Office)  8,014        7,617      8,158
      Lawrence Livermore Natl, Lab.      37,370       34,842     35,177
      Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory        1,137        1,033      1,062
      Stanford Linear Accelerator           834          812        852
                                         ---------   --------- ---------
         Total, San Francisco            47,355       44,304     45,249
 Savannah River                         140,331      110,781    125,567
 Schenectady Naval Reactors              13,208       13,534     14,182
 Bartlesville Project Office                 61          232        239
 Office of Scientific & Tech. Infor.        635          725        760
 Strategic Petroleum Reserve Off.        19,468       16,801     16,250
 Western Area Power Admin.                  870          870        890
 Morgantown Energy Tech. Ctr.               499          725        529
 Pittsburgh Energy Tech. Ctr.             1,600        1,600      1,515
 Headquarters                           101,640       93,629     83,012
                                      ---------     --------   -------
 Total DOE Safeguards & Security        995,487      975,768    933,150
 File Name:BYSITE95.WK3
                        GUARD FORCE SIZE AND EXPENDITURE
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide a table showing the size of guard
 forces and expenditures for guard forces by location for FY 1993, FY
 1994 and FY 1995.
      Dr. Keliher. The following information is provided:
 original document****
                         ADDITIONAL SUPPORT DETAIL
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide a breakdown of the specific tasks and
 funding associated with the "Additional Support" activity in FY 1993,
 FY 1994, and FY 1995.
      Dr. Keliher. The "Additional Support" breakdown is as follows:
                          (In Thousands of Dollars)
                                        FY 1993     FY 1994    FY 1995
 Chicago Field Office S&S Staff         $ 1,445     $ 1,503    $ 1,532
 Headquarters Physical Security Upgrade
   Technical Assistance                     313         313        313
 Technical Support to Headquarters and
   Field Assistance                       2,825       3,054      2,946
 Support Services Contracts               7,174       9,165      7,695
 AOSS Modernization                           0         900      1,200
 Maintenance of HQ Security Alarm             0         290        350
 Total Additional Support               $11,757     $15,225    $14,036
                            Security Investigations
                         SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS
      Mr. Bevill. What attempts are being made to reduce the number and
 level of clearances throughout the Department?
      Dr. Keliher. As a result of the general downsizing of classified
 activities within the Department, particularly in the nuclear weapons
 program, the number of active security clearances were reduced during
 the interval of April 1993 to March 1994 from about 166,000 to about
 154,000. Additional reductions will be realized again this year
 consistent with the national laboratories' direction to eliminate
 corporate policies that require all employees to be cleared as a
 condition of employment at a Department of Energy owned site. As in the
 past year, the Department's contractor employees will be processed for
 a DOE clearance only when such an action can be justified based upon
 the duties of the employee's position. Efforts continue at DOE
 contractor sites to consolidate classified and special nuclear material
 inventories, which will result in the need for fewer clearances by
 their employees.
      Mr. Bevill. Provide by field office and facility the number and
 types of clearances held by DOE employees, contractors, and other
 Federal employees in FY 1993 and FY 1994.
      Dr. Keliher. There are just under 154,000 clearances currently
 held by DOE Employees, contractors, and other Federal employees.
 Current information will be provided for the record.
 ****CLEARANCE STATISTICS FOR FY 1994 chart is attached to original
                          PERSONNEL CLEARANCE PROGRAM
      Mr. Bevill. How will the change in mission at Rocky Flats, Mound
 and Pinellas impact the number of security clearances in FY 1995?
      Dr. Keliher. I would like to submit the following information
 for the record.
    - Rocky Flats. Mission change will have very little impact in FY
      1995 due to the continued need to consolidate material and
      classified matter.
    - Mound. Mission change will result in the downgrading of a
      significant portion of the work force from "Q" to "L" but current
      estimates do not indicate that the total number of security
      clearances will be affected.
    - Pinellas. Mission changes will result in a 25 percent reduction in
      the number of security clearances in FY 1995 (400 clearances).
                           SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET
      Mr. Bevill. What were the number, by type and performing agency,
 of investigations and reinvestigations performed for FY 1993, FY 1994,
 and FY 1995? Describe the reasons for the increases or decreases.
      Dr. Keliher. The following data on investigations and
 reinvestigations is inserted for the record: (The information
                                          FY 1993    FY 1994    FY 1995
                                          ACTUAL    ESTIMATED   REQUEST
 FBI    Initial Investigations              21          18         15
 OPM    Initial Investigations
           Single Scope Background       9,456       7,144      4,600
           Background                       45          50         50
           Limited Background              936         550        300
 OPM    Reinvestigations
           Periodic - Single Scope      13,517      16,978     13,345
           Limited Background            7,809           0          0
 OPM    National Agency Checks
           Initial                       3,551       5,210      5,500
           Reinvestigations              5,460       7,635      7,900
 TOTAL INVESTIGATIONS                   40,895      37,585     31,710
      FBI investigations have decreased as that agency is now being
 used strictly for initial investigations for individuals who occupy
 positions of a high degree of importance or sensitivity (150 positions
 have such designations within the Department).
      The number of Single Scope Background Investigations (SSBI's)
 continues to decline as the Department emphasizes the need to reduce
 the number and levels of DOE access authorizations to a minimum
 consistent with operating requirements.
      OPM Background Investigations (BI's) decreased beginning in FY
 1993 when the SSBI became available. Currently a BI is only conducted
 on DOE employees who occupy critical sensitive positions, but do not
 require access to classified material in order to perform their
 official duties.
      OPM Limited Background Investigations (LBI's) conducted for
 reinvestigations have been discontinued as a result of the adoption of
 the Periodic Reinvestigation - Single Scope Background Investigation
 (PRIS) in December 1992. LBI's are currently used only for initial L
 and Secret clearances for DOE employees or if the PRIS must be expanded
 due to special circumstances.
      OPM National Agency Checks with Credit (NACC) will increase as the
 need for the number of initial Q clearances is reduced.
                           PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM
      Mr. Bevill. Describe the effort to develop an electronic transfer
 program for security clearances, including the timetable for completion
 and cost by year.
      Dr. Keliher. The current time between the DOE request for a
 background investigation and receipt of the completed product from the
 investigative agency (Office of Personnel Management (OPM)) is
 approximately 75 days. However, depending on the geographic location,
 it takes another 15 to 30 days in mail time to send and receive the
 case papers and completed investigation.
      This project will implement an electronic transfer system
 (including appropriate safeguards of data) between each of the DOE
 Operations Offices and the OPM's Office of Federal Investigations in
 Boyers, Pennsylvania, which will allow DOE to electronically
 transfer the paperwork requesting a background investigation (including
 fingerprints) to OPM, and when the background investigation is
 completed, to have it electronically transferred to the appropriate DOE
 Operations Office for adjudication. This will also allow transfer of
 security files between DOE Operations Offices. The electronic transfer
 system will eliminate the mail time between DOE and OPM.
      The FY 1995  Security Investigations budget includes $2,200,000
 for this project.
                          SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET,
      Mr. Bevill. Provide an analysis of security investigation programs
 showing the funds for defense and other than defense programs.
      Dr. Keliher. There is approximately a 50/50 split of the FY 1995
 Security Investigations budget allocation between defense and other
 than defense activities, as shown below in the table which I would like
 to insert into the record. (The information follows:)
                            SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
                                   FY 1995
           Defense/Environmental Activities        $19,801,770
           Other than Defense/Environmental         19,025,230
                Total SI Budget                     38,827,000
                     Use of Prior-Year-Funds        -4,000,000
                FY 1995 REQUEST                    $34,827,000
      Mr. Bevill. Provide a breakout, by activity, of the $3.6 million
 requested for Related Security Investigations Activities.
      Dr. Keliher. The breakout of our request for Related Security
 Investigations Activities is shown on a table which I would like to
 insert in the record. (The information follows:)
                                 FY 1995
      Electronic Transfer Program                  $2,200,000
      Implementation of Accelerated Access
        Authorization Program (AAAP)                1,300,000
      National Industrial Security Program
        (NISP) support                                 50,000
         TOTAL - Related SI Activities             $3,550,000

                          ABILITY TO CARRY OUT MISSION
      Mr. Myers. Dr. Keliher, your request for intelligence activities
 is decreased by $2.3 million from the 1994 level of $45.4 million. What
 impact will this decrease have on your ability to carry out your
      Dr. Keliher. The FY 1995 Request will enable the Office of
 Nonproliferation and National Security to meet its intelligence
 responsibilities to the Department in its objectives of ensuring the
 continued credibility of the Nation's nuclear deterrent, assessing
 conditions that pose a nuclear threat, and executing its
 responsibilities for nonproliferation., Although the FY 1995 Request is
 about five percent below our current year funding level, I am confident
 that we can fulfill our intelligence responsibilities within expected
 fiscal constraints by satisfying high priority Departmental
 intelligence needs through effective interaction with the intelligence
      Mr. Myers. Is your decrease in requested funding for security
 clearances due to less information needing to be.classified? Are you
 still doing updates on existing clearances?
      Dr. Keliher. No, the FY 1995 request is not lower due to less
 information being classified. Information declassification involves
 declassifying the facts, data, or knowledge itself. We are involved in
 a comprehensive, fundamental review of the Department of Energy's
 classification policy. The decrease is a result of reduced numbers of
 clearance requirements, facility consolidation efforts, low turnover
 rates, and elimination of the reinvestigations backlog. The Department
 is continuing to do updates (reinvestigations) on existing clearances.
                        DECLASSIFICATION FUNDING
      Mr. Myers: Is any of the funding for nuclear safeguards and
 security activities being used to declassify material? If so, how much?
      Dr. Keliher: Funds within the nuclear safeguards and security
 budget which directly support the declassification of material are as
 follows: FY 1994 $5,900,000 and FY 1995 $6,536,000.