The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, we are on the pending amendment, that is the amendment by the Senator from Virginia, the Senator from Florida, the Senator from Arizona, to establish a Presidential Commission.
Momentarily the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Specter], will address it. But in the meantime, I suggest perhaps our colleague from New York be given an opportunity.
Mr. DeCONCINI. How much time does the Senator from Arizona have remaining on the bill?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona controls 21 minutes on the bill; 12 1/2 minutes on the pending amendment.
Mr. DeCONCINI. I yield to the Senator from New York 10 minutes on the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, it is with no pleasure I rise on this occasion. Rather, I rise with a sense of responsibility to the committee and to the body, to recount experiences of another time in which the intelligence community has been very much less than candid and open with respect to matters that the Intelligence Committee should have been informed about.
There has been some discussion in recent days concerning the failure of the intelligence community to notify the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence of the new headquarters of the National Reconnaissance Office. This is not new. This is not the first time such a thing has happened, nor will it be, I fear, the last such incident, while the existing culture--if I could use that large word--of the intelligence community, of the national security state, of the secrecy system, stays in place.
I served for 8 years on the Intelligence Committee. I joined it the first year after it was created. And in those 8 years I was very closely associated with Barry Goldwater, a man revered in this institution not least because he was incapable of lying. For 4 years I was the vice chairman of the committee and he was chairman and we spent a very great deal of time together. At that time there was an understanding, which I am sure exists today, that there are some matters which, if the chairman and vice chairman are notified about, it can be considered that the Senate has been informed. Unfortunately, this is an Agency which has lied to Congress before. Egregiously.
Perhaps the most extraordinary example was the concerted campaign launched in the spring of 1984 when it emerged that the Central Intelligence Agency had mined harbors in Nicaragua--arguably a violation of international law and treaty, but inarguably a significant anticipated action. As I recall the language of the statute, `the committee will be informed of significant anticipated activities.' We were not.
The world knew about the mining of the harbors immediately--it was the intention that the world should know. But that our Government had done this, was not known.
In the spring, the Wall Street Journal reported that this had been an action of the Agency--Mr. David Rogers, specifically. Barry Goldwater was outraged. He had not been told of something as important as the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors, and he so stated. Whereupon the Agency began what Robert R. Simmons, the former staff director of the committee, said `can only be described as a domestic disinformation campaign against the U.S. Congress in which they alleged that the intelligence committees had been fully briefed on the harbor mining program.' The attack on Chairman Goldwater was vicious.
They went to the New York Times--which was concerned about this--and told the Times that, no, Senator Goldwater was informed. It is simply that Senator Goldwater is not as keen as he may once have been; that he does not remember everything that happens; that, in effect, senility had set in. And the Times--given the seriousness of the charge and the manifest sincerity with which they were told by Agency officials, regretfully, reported that the Senator has begun to lose it. Repeatedly the Agency claimed that he was told, he just cannot recall having been told. It was a lie, an audacious lie, about a revered Member of this body. And faced with it, and the proposition that it was not going to be retracted, I--then acting chairman in Senator Goldwater's absence--announced I would resign in protest.
When the announcement appeared--it was Easter time and Senator Goldwater was in the Far East--it caused something of a ruckus. And, in time, the then-director, Mr. William J. Casey, came to the committee, we then met up on the 4th floor of the Capitol here, and apologized. He acknowledged the committee had not been adequately informed.
Part of the disinformation operation involved an address given at the Naval Academy--the Naval Academy, I say to Senator Warner--where we teach standards of truthfulness. Mr. McFarland, then National Security Adviser to the President, went to the Naval Academy and told the cadets that Senator Goldwater and the committee had been informed--lied to the cadets.
Subsequently, Mr. McFarland testified before the Iran-Contra Committees on May 12, 1987--we are now more than 3 years from then.
In many ways, Iran-Contra arose out of the mining of the harbors, money was cut off, and so forth.
Here is an exchange between Senator Sarbanes and Mr. McFarland who, I want to say, has made clear he wished he had never done any of those things.
Reading from transcript:
Mr. Sarbanes. Did you know about the mining of the Nicaraguan harbor?
Mr. McFarland. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sarbanes. Did you think that should have been consulted with the Intelligence Committees?
Mr. McFarland. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sarbanes: It wasn't done.
Mr. McFarland: No, sir.
But the disinformation campaign almost prevailed and never really got resolved.
Following that episode, Director Casey signed the agreements negotiated with the Intelligence Committees which came to be known as the Casey accords. They were specifically designed to see that something like the mining of the harbors never happened again without the committee being informed. Not that the President could not do what he ordered done, but the committee would be informed.
One was signed while Mr. Goldwater and I were chairman and ranking member, and another one was signed a year later. Whereupon the Agency proceeded to lie to the committees again. During all of this period, the Iran-Contra episode took place and the committee was never involved. Indeed, a second agreement was made the following year which confirmed how well it was working, but it was never informed.
Madam President, I discussed this disinformation matter with Mr. Gates when he was under consideration for the post of--Madam President, may I have 2 additional minutes, if I may ask Senator DeConcini?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Boxer). Does the Senator yield 2 minutes?
Mr. DeCONCINI. I yield up to 5 minutes and I ask the time come off the pending amendment.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, I will not take that much time.
At the time Mr. Gates was being considered for the Director of the Agency, I raised with him specifically the question of the disinformation campaign directed against Senator Goldwater, and he undertook to look into this and to clear up the record, which now all agree Mr. Casey and Mr. McFarland had lied about Barry Goldwater.
Mr. Gates did not do a thing. He was there, I recall, for 4 years and never lifted a finger to say the Agency had done what it ought never have done and what it ought not do again.
If I can say, Dean Acheson saw all this coming. In his book, `Present at the Creation,' he wrote:
I had the gravest foreboding about this organization and warned the President that * * * neither he, the National Security Council, nor anyone else would be in a position to know what (the CIA) was doing or to control it.
It is a simple thought that secrecy corrupts. It corrupts analysis. Two years before the Berlin Wall came down, the CIA formally estimated the per capita gross domestic product in East Germany to be higher than West Germany. In his memoir, George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, recalls in 1986 when then President Reagan and he were thinking that perhaps they might have some success with Mr. Gorbachev, Mr. Gates, then the Director of Intelligence, informed him, Mr. Secretary, `the Soviet Union is a despotism that works.'
You can reach out and touch the day that the Soviet Union would collapse but, no, secrecy inhibits the correction of error. The error simply gets compounded and extended, and it leads to events such as misleading the Congress. It has done so in the past and will do so in the future, so long as it continues.
The secrecy system is still in place. You may know that we have an Information Security Oversight Office which counts the annual creation of secrets. Its most recent report shows that last year, 6,408,688 secrets were created. Can you imagine that we know there were 6,408,688 secrets created last year, a 1-percent increase in the first year of the Clinton administration?
This will go on until we do something about it, addressing it directly. We have created a Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, which is even now in the process of being assembled. I understand Mr. Hamilton in the House has agreed to be on the Commission and I have done so on the Senate side. Other Members of Congress and private citizens will be appointed. The mission of the Commission is of singular importance to the Republic. It is no less than examining ways to reclaim the liberties of the people. I welcome the proposal by the Senator from Virginia for a review of current intelligence needs. I ask to be made a cosponsor.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, will the Senator yield on my time?
We will most assuredly add him as a cosponsor. His cosponsorship has a special meaning because he has, again, served on this committee some 8 years, and has identified himself over these many years with the Intelligence Committee.
But also, Madam President, as I conceived of the idea of the Presidential Commission, I thought back on the Social Security Commission, which was one of the most successful in the 16 years I have been privileged to serve in this body. That is a Commission that laid down a format that was quite readily adopted by the Congress and the executive branch.
The distinguished Senator from New York has a far clearer recollection of the work done by that Commission. And given the fact that this administration at the moment is not wholeheartedly in support of the idea of the Senator from Virginia of a Presidential Commission, I wonder if he might address that Commission and how it could likewise have a parallel effect on supporting this Commission.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Yes. The Nation's largest domestic program, the Social Security Administration, was in imminent danger of bankruptcy. It would have shaken the society in an extraordinary way. The danger was not perhaps as grave as was perceived, but the unthinkable would have occurred: The checks would not go out.
President Reagan, with the vigorous assistance of the then majority leader, Mr. Baker, and Mr. O'Neill, the Speaker of the House, assembled a Commission, a bipartisan Commission, with representatives of the President, the House, the Senate, and with Alan Greenspan as our executive director, now the distinguished head of the Federal Reserve, and Senator Dole, who was a leading member. It took us a year to get our work done.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator from New York that his 5 minutes he was yielded has expired.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I ask for 1 additional minute.
Mr. DeCONCINI. I yield 1 additional minute from the pending amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time is yielded.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. As Senator Dole said, when you first hear about these matters, they seem insoluble. And many people thought this whole Social Security thing could never ever be sound in the first place. But he said the more you learn--it had taken a lot of learning and reading--we can fix this thing. He said it the day after he had been reelected, in the Chamber, sitting right over there. He had written an article in the New York Times to that effect.
I went up to him. I said, `We cannot officially work it out.' I said, `We can fix this thing, can't we? Do you think so? Why don't we?' And with the help of James A. Baker III, in about 10 days' time it was done.
But a lot of learning had taken place, a lot of facts had been assembled, and it was bipartisan. And it was something that was not forced on the President. To the contrary, the President welcomed the solution in the end. A secure Social Security System emerged.
If I may say, the last of the recommendations to be concluded was that the Social Security Administration be an independent agency. The Senate adopted a conference report to that effect about 2 weeks ago. The House did yesterday afternoon by a unanimous vote. This kind of unanimity comes out of the bipartisanship and cross-relationship between the Congress and the Executive.
I think we have an excellent idea. It is not a moment too soon. And I wish the Senator very well, every success, and I am honored to be a cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will state that the Senator's time has now expired, and the Senator from Virginia has no further time remaining on this amendment.
Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, would the distinguished Senator seeking recognition just allow me to thank my colleague from New York.
My understanding is the Senator from Pennsylvania is now to be recognized.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct. The Senator has 15 minutes.
The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I thank the Chair.
At the outset, I compliment the distinguished chairman, Senator DeConcini, and the distinguished ranking member, Senator Warner, for their leadership of the Intelligence Committee and for bringing to the floor the Intelligence Authorization Act and the pending amendment for the creation of an independent commission to review the roles and capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community, which I support.
The public may wonder why a commission is necessary, but the fact is that the work of the Senate and the House, too, is so involved with so many varied matters that a review by a commission, which can spend the time necessary, is very much in the national interest.
I am glad to see that the final report date has been advanced from December 31, 1996 to March 1, 1996. It would have been my hope that the commission could have finished its work at an earlier date so we would have the advantage of their thinking, but it does take time for clearances. It is important that the commission have enough time to do its work right, but the sooner the better.
I had the privilege of serving on the Intelligence Committee for some 6 years and have been off the committee now for 3 1/2 years and look forward to rejoining the Intelligence Committee next year, hopefully as the chairman, assuming a Republican majority, or in the absence of a Republican majority, then as the vice chairman.
The committee has very, very important work to do. The comments I wish to make today--and I had hoped to be here earlier today but was working with a group meeting on health insurance--relate to the threat of terrorism and how we are going to deal with terrorism and the need institutionally to establish an international criminal court.
Our overhead satellites tell us a great deal, but the most important work is done by what is called in the trade `HUMINT,' which means human intelligence. I believe that past limitations of funds set back the intelligence community on human intelligence which is a very slow, time-consuming process to build agents who have the capacity to work within the networks of the terrorists and to work within the networks of those who are planning ill for the world, to find out what is going on so that we can respond.
The recent incident with Aldrich Ames has set back human intelligence even further by his disclosures and by the tragedy of so many of intelligence agents being murdered, being eliminated.
I am hopeful that the intelligence community will work on this very time-consuming, difficult matter to reestablish HUMINT.
With the decrease of international hijacking of airplanes, there may be a public perception that terrorism is on the wane. But the fact is, as disclosed by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, international terrorism is on the increase, with some 427 terrorist incidents worldwide last year, which represents a significant increase over the 362 incidents in 1992. The Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, pointed out in open testimony the activities of Iran in continuing to support the Lebanese Hezbollah who are violently opposing progress on the Mideast Peace Accord between Israel and the PLO and now between Israel and Jordan.
We saw the recent bombings of the Israeli Embassy and Jewish Center in Buenos Aires which is linked to foreign terrorism. We saw not too long ago, the bombing of the World Trade Center.
Terrorism remains an enormous problem internationally. What has to be understood publicly is that just because the incidence of international hijackings has decreased, the security of innocent civilians has not increased. Unfortunately, the public focus is too short-lived, and that is understandable because there are so many problems that confront the country. But those of us in Washington who work on intelligence must pursue the threat in a professional, systematic manner.
One area on which we have not had the progress is in the establishment of an international criminal court which I have spoken about many times during my 14 years in this body and which the Senate and the House have endorsed on many occasions.
Quite candidly, it has not received the support of either Republican or Democrat administrations. If we are to stem the tide of international crimes, it is very important that we move ahead to institutionalize a mechanism to deal with such crimes--an international criminal court. We do have a war crimes tribunal which has been set up for the crimes against humanity and probable genocide in Bosnia. The Senate has debated, as has the House, many times trying to take action against these atrocities. We talk about bombing, which has been limited. We talk about land operations, which have been rejected for very practical reasons. We talk about unilaterally lifting the arms embargo.
But one thing we could do--which we owe victims of war crimes in Bosnia--is not so complicated. It is to bring the war criminals to trial and to show that there is an international rule of law. The United Nations, with U.S. support, did establish a war crimes tribunal and finally laboriously a chief prosecutor. The court must now act.
I took the floor a year ago to earmark some $3 million for the war crimes tribunal to investigate and gather evidence together. The Senate, the House and the administration ought to be pushing much harder for prosecutions and accountability.
Now we have the atrocities in Rwanda. I am gratified to note that the Secretary of State has called for an international criminal court to try the war criminals in Rwanda. But we cannot expect a war crimes tribunal to be established for each and every violation of internationally accepted law. The solution is to establish a permanent international court. There was strong public support years ago for such a court with the hijacking of the Achille Lauro and the murder of Leon Klinghoffer, and for what happened when Abu Abbas left Egypt on an airliner to Tunisia, was forced down in Italy, where Abbas was released by Italian authorities, later tried in absentia, and finally received a 30-year jail sentence, which meant absolutely nothing.
I had an opportunity back in 1986 to discuss the incident with the then Prime Minister of Italy, Prime Minister Craxi and then with Yugoslavian President Mojsov, who were concerned about the terrorism implications for their country. Had we had an international criminal court, I think the Italians, the Yugoslavs or Egypt would have turned over Abbas to an international criminal court.
There is a matter of national sovereignty, and Egypt was not prepared to turn over Abu Abbas to the United States. When the Egyptian airliner was forced down in Sicily, there was a standoff between United States military personnel and Italian military personnel, and, as a result, we did not get our hands on Abu Abbas for trial in the United States. Questions had been raised at that time of whether the United States had jurisdiction over terrorism committed against U.S. citizens abroad.
Fortunately, we did correct U.S. law with the 1984 Omnibus Crime Control Act, which gives U.S. courts jurisdiction over hijackers, terrorists, and the 1986 Terrorist Prosecution Act which I introduced and which was passed after the terrorist murders in the Rome and Vienna airports.
We also need a permanent international criminal court to try international drug traffickers.
Examples for this need are the incidents of international drug dealers residing in Colombia, and the U.S. difficulty in gaining their extradition to the United States. Former President Gaveria of Colombia told me that it would have been easier to extradite and try these criminals in an international criminal court.
I would like to focus now on the enormous problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--nuclear, chemical, and biological, and their missile delivery systems. In North Korea we have good reason to believe that a nuclear bomb is being developed but have insufficient proof to really confront the North Koreans. The same nuclear weapons development problem was true in Iraq and with the so-called `Big Gun,' it is true in India, Pakistan, and Iran.
Those are problems of overwhelming importance in nations with despots like Saddam Hussein, the despots who run Iran, and the uncertainty and unpredictability in North Korea's reaction as to efforts to persuade them to comply with international conventions such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. There is still a great and concerted need for intelligence, especially human intelligence even when these violations are not hitting the front pages.
So I think the Intelligence Authorization Act is important. I think the creation of the new independent commission can give us further insight. But I think most importantly, we have to work institutionally to develop human intelligence, and institutionally we have to work to develop the international criminal court.
I look forward next year to joining the Intelligence Committee. We will be losing a valued member in Senator DeConcini who will regrettably be leaving this body after 18 years of distinguished service. I think that the Intelligence Committee has done outstanding work. It is obvious that vigilance and oversight is necessary at all times especially in light of the recent disclosures about the building of the new NRO establishment. But these are items which have to be addressed.
I look forward to working with my colleagues on these important issues in the future.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I thank the Senator from Pennsylvania. Indeed, he will be a valuable member of the committee. Certainly he will be on the committee next year, and we look forward to his real leadership.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. DeCONCINI. Yes.
Mr. WARNER. I join the distinguished chairman in commending our colleague. Indeed, I had the pleasure of serving on the committee at the same time that he served.
Mr. SPECTER. I thank my colleagues for those generous comments. I look forward to the serving on the committee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator yield the remaining 3 minutes and 31 seconds?
Mr. SPECTER. I yield that time to my colleague from Utah, Senator Hatch, and more time, if necessary, off my time.
Mr. DeCONCINI. I have no objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
Mr. HATCH. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that my remarks are considered as in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Chair inquires how much time the Senator may use?
Mr. HATCH. I am not sure.
Mr. DeCONCINI. May I inquire? How long does the Senator anticipate?
Mr. HATCH. I do not know. It will not be very long; maybe 10 minutes.
Mr. DeCONCINI. I do not want to object to the Senator from Utah, but we are trying to pass this bill and vote by 1 o'clock. We have one more amendment. We have a 30-minute limitation. Could the Senator restrict that to 5 minutes?
Mr. HATCH. I do not know if I can. But I will certainly try.
Mr. GRAMM. Madam President, reserving the right to object, maybe I should notify my colleagues. I would like to have an opportunity to speak for 5 minutes. I will limit it strictly to 5 minutes. It is not my objective to hold up this bill. But I would like to make a comment on another subject. The time in which I speak will be strictly limited to 5 minutes.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Will the Senators let us just put in some statements, and yield the time on the pending Warner amendment? Then we will ask for some 5 minutes time before we go to the next amendment.
Mr. HATCH. Sure.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, the pending amendment is the Warner amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I rise in support of the amendment offered today by Senators Warner and Graham to create a Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
I give Senator Warner, the distinguished vice chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, and Senator Graham, who has made an extremely valuable contribution as a member of the committee, the lion's share of the credit for this initiative. They have for some time now believed such an effort is needed.
I have come to agree with them. Indeed, it has been my hope that the DCI might have initiated such a review, but this has not happened, and, plain and simply, I am tired of waiting. I believe this amendment represents a better way to go.
Madam President, there have been significant changes in the intelligence community since the end of the cold war. There have been personnel reductions and reallocations of resources carried out by individual agencies.
Bu what we are thus far lacking and what is, in my opinion, sorely needed, is an overall revalidation of the roles and capabilities of the intelligence community in the post-cold-war world. We need to have an objective, hard-headed look at the fundamentals: at what we expect intelligence agencies to do, at what levels they should be resourced, at what capabilities they must retain for the future. Everything should be on the table.
I do not think this can be achieved
by the executive branch looking at itself, nor do I think the congressional oversight committees have the capability to do what is needed.
What this amendment proposes is a bipartisan commission with 17 members. Nine would be appointed by the President; two by the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, respectively, and two by the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, respectively. The President would designate a chairman. The Commission would be empowered to hire its own staff and not have to rely on staff from the intelligence agencies.
The end result of its work would be a report to the President and the Congress. To the extent possible, the report would be unclassified and made available to the public. There would necessarily be a classified supplement which would not be made public but which would be provided to the President and the intelligence committees.
The amendment provides the Commission with sufficient time to do its job. These are difficult issues and should not be assessed in a rush. The amendment provides that the final report of the Commission be submitted no later than March 1, 1996. Given the time which will be required for the appointment and security processing of the members of the Commission, we think this will allow more than a year for the Commission to do its substantive work.
Madam President, in my tenure on the Intelligence Committee and in particular during these last 2 years when I've served as chairman, it has become increasingly clear to me that the political consensus that we once had for this function has eroded and continues to erode. We need a new consensus. We need a new rationale--a revalidation of the approach we have been taking by a group of objective, hard-headed people, with no axe to grind and no stake in the outcome. This is what we contemplate in this Commission.
I am convinced this amendment will serve the interests of both the executive and legislative branches and urge my colleagues to support it.
Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, I am pleased to support the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995. This bill does not reduce the intelligence budget by as much as I believe it should. It does represent, however, a sincere effort by the Intelligence Committee to identify those programs that can most readily be cut back without any harm to the national security.
This bill, as amended, will deal with problems that our audit team uncovered in its recent investigation of the new headquarters building for the National Reconnaissance Office. We held a hearing on this subject on Wednesday, where high officials and veteran NRO personnel admitted that the building project should have been presented to the committee as a separate budget item. The witnesses also agreed that, now that the NRO is publicly acknowledged, there would be no reason for covert procurement of a building such as this one in the future.
The DeConcini-Warner amendment, which is similar to the Bryan and Boren amendments to the Defense appropriations bill, will ensure that these problems do not occur in the future. I am happy to support it.
The Intelligence Authorization Act, as amended today, will also bring about needed reforms in the counterintelligence and security field. And it will mandate a presidential commission to examine the roles and missions of our intelligence agencies.
I am especially pleased that we will make it easier for intelligence agencies to track the financial and travel activities of their employees with access to the most sensitive information. Such activities are far better indicators of possible security problems than are the political and sexual questions that security officers have pursued in the past.
I am also pleased that we are moving to create a system of court orders for physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes. The executive branch conducts secret searches of people's homes and offices today, based upon a constitutionally suspect claim of presidential powers which are then delegated to the Attorney General. I think that is a terrible way in which to handle such an intrusive technique.
By contrast, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which was established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, has consistently passed constitutional muster for the control of foreign intelligence wiretaps, which are a similarly invasive technique. Allowing the FISA court to handle physical searches will enable us to bring judicial supervision to an area that surely warrants it.
I should add that I do hope some changes will be made to the physical search provision in conference. For example, the bill before us would allow a person who is in a legal proceeding to object to the use of seized documents only if that person owned the documents or the premises that were searched. But someone could easily have documents about you that were not owned by you, but either were written by you or were authoritative records concerning you.
I think that in such a case, if the Government is going to use those documents against you in a legal proceeding, you should be permitted to contest the legality of the search. I say this especially because the Government will be allowed to undertake that search without showing probable cause that a crime has been committed.
At a recent hearing of the House Intelligence Committee, former Department of Justice official Kenneth Bass had some additional suggestions for the conference committee. He would broaden the circumstances in which a defense attorney may gain access to the documents underlying a physical search order. And he suggests that when the Government seeks a court order authorizing an intelligence search, an officer of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court be instructed to act as an `advocate of the target arguing against the warrant.' All these ideas, which arose after our mark-up, can and should be addressed in conference.
The intelligence authorization bill will put into law a new interagency structure for handling counterintelligence issues. The old system was clearly broke, and the many mistakes surrounding the Aldrich Ames espionage case merely underscore the tragic lack of coordination and cooperation between the various executive branch agencies that handle personnel security and counterespionage matters.
The bill we approve today will give the new National Counterintelligence Policy Board a permanent chairman, rather than relying upon a rotating chair that can only be a prescription for drift and inaction in future years. I can readily believe that a rotating chair was the best that the White House could get competing agencies to accept. But that is no reason for the Congress to limit its efforts to improve counterintelligence policy making. We will do the country a real service by giving that board one chair, and the Attorney General is as fair a person as you are likely to find for the task.
I am a cosponsor of the Warner-Graham-DeConcini bill to establish a Presidential commission on the roles and missions of our intelligence agencies, so I am delighted to see that idea added to the budget bill today. We may not all agree on how well U.S. intelligence is doing or on how much money to spend on it, but all of us know that a careful look is needed at the role of intelligence after the cold war.
The commission we are proposing will be named largely by the President, but will also have members from the House and Senate. I think it will give the President and the country a fresh view of what intelligence is needed, and how to meet those needs.
Let me note, however, that we do not want the intelligence agencies to just stand around while this commission considers their fate. If there are changes or reforms that an agency knows it should make, it should go right ahead and make them. This commission will be no excuse for drift and inaction.
Let me turn now to the issue of disclosing the total figure for the intelligence budget. Last year, of course, the Senate passed a `sense of Congress' provision calling on the President to find a means of disclosing that figure. I regret that we were forced to drop that provision in conference.
Three things have happened since then to give me confidence that we
will eventually win on this issue. First, on November 22 of last year, 11 leaders of Congress joined me in urging the President to disclose the budget figure. The nine Democrats and two Republicans who signed that letter included the majority leader of the Senate, the Speaker and majority leader of the House of Representatives, the chairmen of both the Senate and House Intelligence Committees, and no fewer than six former chairmen or vice chairmen of the Senate Intelligence Committee. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, tht the text of that letter be included in the Record.
The second hopeful sign was a letter of March 23, 1994, from the Director of Central Intelligence, Jim Woolsey, to our vice chairman, Senator John Warner. My colleagues may recall that in last year's debate on this issue, one of Senator Warner's major points was that other countries do not disclose how much they spend on intelligence. That did not bother me, because I am not frightened by the thought of America being a pioneer. We were the first country to establish congressional oversight of intelligence, and now we see more and more countries following our lead.
A month after he raised that argument, Senator Warner asked the DCI to study other countries' practices and report back to us. Director Woolsey's reply listed seven countries that do disclose their intelligence budget totals, including Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Greece and--most recently--our closest intelligence partner, the United Kingdom. Now, I still do not believe that we should be bound by the practices of other countries. But I am delighted to see this specious argument die a peaceful death and to report to my colleagues that more recent statements by opponents of disclosure carefully omit any discussion of what our allies are doing.
Finally, Mr. President, I take heart from the recent vote on this issue in the House of Representatives. I am sorry that the House rejected an amendment proposed by House Intelligence Committee Chairman Dan Glickman to require disclosure of the budget total. But I am very pleased that the margin of defeat was only 27 votes. That compares very favorably with the 95-vote margin by which a weaker proposal was defeated just 1 year ago. It demonstrates, in my view, that the march of history is in our direction.
The bill before us today does not contain any provision regarding budget disclosure. Based on last year's experience, moreover, I know that passage of such a provision by the Senate will not achieve our purpose in the face of the recent vote in the House. I will not take up my colleagues' time, therefore, by proposing disclosure language today.
I am confident, however, that within a year or so, a freshman Democratic Senator from Ohio will join a majority of his colleagues in both houses in enacting legislation to strike this modest, but needed, blow for the American people's right to know how the Government is spending their money.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
Congress of the United States,
Washington, DC, November 22, 1993.
The President of the United States,
The White House Office, Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC
Dear Mr. President: Last February, Senator Metzenbaum sent you a letter proposing that the Executive branch disclose to the public the aggregate amount requested and authorized for, and spent on, intelligence and intelligence-related activities. We are writing you now to reinforce that message and to urge you to take decisive action on this issue.
The world has changed greatly since the Cold War days in which the norm of strict secrecy on the intelligence budget was established. We no longer face a monolithic enemy with a massive intelligence establishment that might somehow use this information to harm us. Neither can we rely upon unquestioning public support for secret operations or for the budgets to support them.
You and your administration are well aware of this. In your campaign and in your months in office, you have stood for both greater openness and greater economy in our government. You have also begun the process of drafting a new Executive order on classified information, even as the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense have created a Joint Security Commission to recommend more rational and economical means of defining and protecting the information that truly requires secrecy in order to protect the national security.
We believe that in the post-Cold War world, and especially in a time of budget stringency when national priorities are being reexamined, the level of intelligence spending (although not the details) must be open to the public. In the absence of a legitimate security justification, the norms of our democratic system require that the public be informed.
We stand with you on the need for new approaches in a changed world. We hope you will bring that spirit of change to the issues of intelligence budget disclosure.
Thomas S. Foley, Richard A. Gephardt, Dan Glickman, Dave Durenberger, David L. Boren, Howard M. Metzenbaum, George J. Mitchell, Daniel K. Inouye, Dennis DeConcini, Patrick Leahy, Frank Murkowski, Daniel Patrick Moynihan.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that a statement by the administration in opposition to, I am sorry to say, our Commission; to section 3 of the bill; and to requiring Senate confirmation of the CIA general counsel, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record as follows:
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
Washington, DC, August 12, 1994.
The Administration supports S. 2082, but opposes this provision requiring the President to nominate and the Senate to confirm the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). All General Counsels serving in the Administration, whether or not the Senate confirms them, are held to the highest standards of professional responsibility. The Administration, while deeply committed to the principles of accountability embodied in the congressional oversight process and to the rule of law, does not believe Senate confirmation of the CIA General Counsel is required at this time.
In addition, the Administration would oppose amendments that would mandate the manner in which counterintelligence activities are coordinated within the Executive branch. The Administration is implementing a Presidential Directive that provides for the reorganization of U.S. counterintelligence policy management and coordination. This Directive makes the necessary improvements to U.S. counterintelligence efforts.
The Administration is committed to conducting a review of intelligence roles and missions through the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). This review will be undertaken in full consultation with the Congress. The Administration would oppose amendments that would mandate the establishment of a new Commission for this purpose.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that any time that this Senator has remaining on the pending Warner amendment be applied to the manager's time on this side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, parliamentary inquiry: It is this Senator's understanding that the yeas and nays have been ordered on the Warner amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Mr. WARNER. Accordingly then, I ask unanimous consent that this amendment be temporarily laid aside.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Now, Madam President, the bill is open for further amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, to inform the Senate, it is the intention of the distinguished chairman and myself to offer another amendment which would require perhaps 30 minutes equally divided between the two of us. I, of course, will be a cosponsor of the amendment in which we would debate. And then the Senate could, soon after other developments could occur, would vote in about 45 minutes. The first vote will be on the Warner amendment, the second vote would be on the DeConcini-Warner amendment, and then the third vote would be on final passage of the bill itself.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the remaining time on the previous amendment is yielded.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Arizona [Mr. DeConcini], for himself, Mr. Warner, Mr. Baucus, Mr. D'Amato, and Mr. Metzenbaum, proposes an amendment numbered 2557.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 11, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following new section:
SEC. 504. LIMITATIONS ON FUNDING OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
(a) Review of Project; Compliance with DOD Procurement and Contracting Procedures: Of the funds made available by this Act for the National Reconnaissance Office under the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102 of this Act--
(1) $50,000,000 out of the Miscellaneous Support account of the Mission Support Consolidated Expenditure Center may not be obligated or expended until the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense have completed a review of the National Reconnaissance Office Headquarters Building project and the results of such review have been disclosed to the congressional intelligence committees; and
(2) no such funds made available by this Act may be obligated or expended for the purchase of any real property, or to contract for any construction or acquisition, in connection with the construction of buildings or facilities, unless (and to the extent that)--
(A) such purchase or contract is made or entered into in accordance with the policies and procedures applicable to other elements of the Department of Defense; or
(B) the President determines that the national security interest of the United States requires that such policies and procedures shall not apply to a particular purchase or contract and reports such determination in accordance with subsection (b).
(b) Waiver Procedures: Not later than 30 days after making a determination under subsection (a)(2)(B), the President shall report in writing the determination to the congressional intelligence committees.
(c) Specific Authorization and Appropriations Required: Except to the extent and in the amounts specifically provided in an Act authorizing appropriations and in an appropriation Act, no funds made available under any provision of law may be obligated or expended for the National Reconnaissance Office Headquarters Building project if such funds would cause the total amount obligated or expended for such project to exceed $310,000,000.
(d) Definitions: As used in this section:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees: The term `congressional intelligence committees' means the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) National reconnaissance office headquarters building project: The term `National Reconnaissance Office Headquarters Building project' means the project for the headquarters buildings of the National Reconnaissance Office, situated at the so-called Westfields site, and includes all construction and improvement of facilities (including `fit up') and all actions related to the acquisition of land, communications, computers, furniture and other building furnishings, and vehicle parking facilities.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the pending amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the pending amendment be set aside, and that we proceed in morning business to accommodate the Senator from Utah for not to exceed 8 minutes, and the Senator from Texas for 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, reserving the right to object, it would appear to me that in fairness to the Senate as a whole, given the schedule, that we ought to indicate, the chairman and I, that we would interpose objection to any further matters which might take the Senate's attention from this bill and the amendments.
Mr. HATCH addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
The Chair would ask the two managers, do they wish to reserve their 15 minutes each on the DeConcini-Warner amendment?
Mr. DeCONCINI. That is correct.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. We will now proceed to morning business for 8 minutes to the Senator from Utah, and 5 minutes to the Senator from Texas.
Mr. HATCH. I thank you. I will not take the full 8 minutes.