1993 Congressional Hearings
Intelligence and Security


Basis Date:
T. Bevill
House Appropriations
Docfile Number:
Hearing Date:
DOE Lead Office:
DP, et al SUB
Energy and Water Development
Hearing Subject:
Witness Name:
E. Beckner, et al.
Hearing Text:

      Mr. Bevill. How has the focus of this program changed since the
 breakup of the former Soviet Union?
      Dr. Alessi. Since the breakup of the former Soviet Union, the
 focus of the Verification and Control Technology (V&CT) program has
 been reoriented to reflect the increasing importance of the
 proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and
 the means to deliver them to U.S. national security interest.
 Specifically the development of arms control-related verification
 technologies and systems under our Detection Technology activity has
 been reoriented to include the development of technologies and systems
 for enhancing U.S. and international capabilities for detecting the
 proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Our
 Analytical Support activity has been reoriented to include
 establishing a baseline technical analysis program at the national
 laboratories in support of U.S. and international nonproliferation
      In addition, under our Analytical Support activity, we have been
 playing an increasing role in coordinating Department of Energy
 efforts in support of U.S. activities aimed at assisting Russian
 and other states of the former Soviet Union, in a number of
 critical areas such as nuclear warhead dismantlement and emergency
 response capabilities.
      Lastly, beginning in FY 1994, funding for the Office of Arms
 Control and Nonproliferation's Offices of Nonproliferation Policy
 and Export Control and International Safeguards is included in the
 V&CT program rather than under the Departmental Administration and
 Nuclear Safeguards and Security programs as in previous years. As
 reflected in our FY 1994 budget request, funding for these offices
 will be significantly increased to: expand our activities in support
 of U.S. regional nonproliferation efforts; accelerate development and
 implementation of a U.S. national and international Proliferation
 Information Network System; expand other activities needed to support
 U.S. and international export control regimes; expand International
 Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and other safeguards and
 physical protection support activities; and expand technology
 development programs needed to enhance safeguards and IAEA special
 inspection activities.
      Mr. Bevill. Please describe any role you have had in discussions
 with Russia regarding control, storage and dismantlement of their
 nuclear weapons.
      Dr. Alessi. In November 1991, a Soviet Union delegation was
 invited to Washington to discuss measures for cooperation and
 assistance in control, storage, and dismantlement of Soviet nuclear
 weapons. DOE participated in the delegation meetings, as well as in
 a technical working group meeting. At this first U.S./Soviet meeting
 on such technical issues, the U.S. presented an overview of how
 the U.S. manages nuclear weapons, with particular emphasis on control,
 storage, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. In this meeting, as
 well as in all following meetings, Soviet (and subsequently, Russian)
 delegations insisted that direct assistance in control, storage, and
 dismantlement of their nuclear weapons was neither necessary nor
 desired. The sensitivity of weapon design information, as well as
 the reluctance to reveal any possible weakness with respect to
 nuclear weapons issues, were believed to be the basis for this
 Russian position.
      The Soviet delegation informed the U.S that the most important
 way in which the U.S. could help the Soviet Union achieve its goal
 of dismantling tactical, INF, and START nuclear warheads by the year
 2000, was to support construction of a specially designed storage
 facility and procurement of containers for nuclear materials
 removed from dismantled weapons. The U.S. has agreed to provide
 assistance in both these areas. This assistance also includes, among
 other things, a design of the system for control, accounting,
 and physical protection of fissile material in the facility. Many
 Department of Energy and national laboratory staff members are
 working to apply the very best technical expertise to these
 problems. Since November 1991, DOE has participated in frequent
 U.S. delegations to Russia and technical information exchanges both
 in Russia and in the U.S. to discuss issues associated with
 facilitating dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons (on average
 at least monthly).
      In summary, we have placed emphasis on providing assistance
 which is believed important to Russia in maintaining control,
 safeguarding stored weapons, and performing safe and ecologically
 sound dismantlement of nuclear warheads. The attached table lists
 agreements in which DOE is involved in implementing or on-going
 negotiations. As our technical partnership as nuclear weapon states
 improves and we are able to become increasingly open with each
 other in addressing these problems of mutual concern, it is realistic
 to expect further initiatives in these areas.
      Agreements with the states of the Former Soviet Union:
      Agreements with Russia:
           -    Technical assistance in design of a fissile material
                storage facility (now being implemented)
           -    Fissile material storage containers (now being
           -    Flexible armor blankets (now being implemented)
           -    Security upgrade kits for railcars (now being
           -    Accident response equipment (now being implemented)
           -    International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)
                in Moscow (awaiting Russian signature)
           -    Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) purchase (agreement
                signed, contract being negotiated)
           -    Equipment for the storage facility (awaiting Russian
           -    Technical assistance for establishing a state system
                for nuclear material control, accounting, and physical
                protection (awaiting Russian signature)
           -    Assistance in the elimination of strategic offensive arms
                (awaiting Russian signature)
      Agreements with Belarus:
           -    Emergency response equipment (now being implemented)
           -    Government-to-government communication link equipment
                (now being implemented)
           -    Assistance in export control (now being implemented)
      Agreements with Ukraine:
           -     Emergency response equipment (awaiting Ukrainian approval)
           -     Government-to-government communication link equipment (awaiting
                 Ukrainian approval)
           -     Assistance in nuclear material control, accounting, and physical
                 protection (awaiting Ukrainian approval)
           -     Assistance in export control (awaiting Ukrainian approval)
           -     Science and Technology Center of Ukraine (STCU) in Kiev (awaitin
                 Ukrainian approval)
      Agreements with Kazakhstan:
           -    Emergency response equipment (now being negotiated)
           -    Government-to-government communication link equipment
                (now being negotiated)
           -    Assistance in nuclear material control, accounting, and
                physical protection (now being negotiated)
           -    Assistance in export control (now being negotiated)
      Mr. Bevill. Please describe the activities of DOE in arms control
 negotiations. What activities will be conducted in FY 1994.
      Dr. Alessi. DOE serves on U.S. delegations involved in bilateral
 and multilateral consultations and negotiations related to arms control.
 For example:
      DOE representatives served on the Nuclear Testing Talks, the START,
      Defense and Space, and Chemical Weapons Convention and US/Russian
      bilateral Chemical Weapons delegations and on U.S. delegations for
      Review Conferences on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the
      Biological Weapons Convention. DOE also provides representatives
      and/or expert advisors to consultative committees associated with
      the completed treaties, e.g. START, INF, and TTBT.
      DOE expertise is often requested by the interagency in preparing
 for negotiations and other arms control related meetings.
      For instance, in preparation for international meetings on
      potential verification measures which might be applied to the
      Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), DOE was asked to prepare a
      series of papers evaluating specific types of technologies. The
      papers were prepared by the Laboratories, coordinated with the
      interagency through DOE's Office of Arms Control and will be
      presented as U.S. papers at the BWC meeting in Geneva next month.
 Assistance to the Former Soviet Union
      DOE is heavily involved in the U.S. effort to assist the Former
 Soviet Union in activities related to Safe Secure Dismantlement (SSD)
 of its nuclear weapons. DOE-laboratories are providing technical
 support to production of containers for shipment and storage of
 fissile materials, emergency response equipment, security upgrades
 for railcars, and technical assistance in design of a secure storage
 facility for special nuclear materials. Moreover, DOE weapons
 laboratories have held several meetings with their Russian counterparts
 and identified a series of peaceful activities on which they can
 Treaty Negotiations  DOE will provide policy and technical support,
 including experts for delegations and analytical studies of policy
 and technical issues as noted above for on going negotiations,
 including: review of verification proposals for the Biological
 Weapons Convention, the Preparatory Commission for the Chemical
 Weapons Convention, the Conference on Disarmament and the Preparatory
 Committee meetings for the Nonproliferation Treaty Extension Conference
 to be held in 1995. In addition, the Department will continue to
 prepare for expected negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban and for
 the possibility of negotiations on a global ban on production of
 fissile materials for weapons purposes. In that regard, the Office
 of Arms Control will continue to call on Laboratory scientific and
 expertise both for analytical support of technical issues and
 identification and application of technologies to meet specific
 treaty needs.
 Treaty Implementation DOE facilities are subject to overflights under
 Open Skies and to suspect site inspections under the Chemical Weapons
 Convention.  The Department must prepare to meet its obligations both
 under the treaties and under U.S. laws protecting Secret Restricted
 Data (SRD). The Office of Arms Control must play a significant role
 in that effort. Among the activities which will be pursued are:
      (1) analytical tools for assessing treaty requirements and SRD
      vulnerabilities and,
      (2) strategies for demonstrating treaty compliance without
      revealing SRD
      As in Fiscal Year 1993, DOE again will provide policy and technical
 support for consultative commissions associated with existing treaties
 such as START, INF and TTBT.
                           LABORATORY ROLES
      Mr. Bevill. Please describe the roles performed by each DOE
 laboratory or facility for arms control activities. Who has the lead
 in each programmatic area?
      Dr. Alessi. The Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation
 conducts research and development (R&D) to support national-level
 arms control and proliferation policies. Detection Technology is
 being developed for current and future nuclear and chemical weapons
 arms reduction treaties and for proliferation detection via on-site
 verification, regional effluent monitoring, and remote (satellite)
 detection. Listed below are the laboratories and the major projects
 currently underway. At the end of this section there is a table
 addressing lead laboratories.
      Argonne National Laboratory (ANL):
           The major projects support warhead dismantlement and
           detection of nuclear material. Technology is being developed
           to track containers and treaty limited items using commercial
           technology and to develop a detector which will remotely
           measure emission signatures of key molecules released from
           exhaust and vent stacks of a plant.
      Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL):
           Current R&D projects will develop a Raman Spectrometry/Chemical
           Analysis system to detect chemical effluent in concentrations
           of less than 10 parts per million at a one kilometer range.
           Also under development is a Controlled Intrusiveness
           Verification Technology (CIVET) to identify, with a
           high-confidence level, nuclear warheads while minimizing
           intrusiveness and protecting classified information.
      Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL):
           Major projects focus on supporting the Chemical Weapons (CW)
           Bilateral Agreement and the START II requirements for on-site
           inspection of re-entry vehicles. Development is underway
           on-the Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy (PINS) system
           as a nondestructive assay system to identify the contents of
           suspected or declared CW containers or munitions. INEL is
           developing an experimental system, Fission Assay Tomography,
           as a passive verification tool for counting nuclear warheads
           on missiles without moving the missile or shroud. In support
           of proliferation detection, INEL is developing a Surface
           Analysis Molecular Beam ion trap mass spectrometer for rapid
           detection (<5 minutes) and chemical identification of
           nonvolatile and low volatility compounds.
      Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL):
           Major projects here are in the following program areas:
           - Development of technologies which will improve our ability
           to detect nuclear proliferation activities from space-borne
           observation platforms. Included are multi-spectral thermal
           imagery, multi-spectral transient radiometry, low light-level
           imagery, and others.
           - Development and fabrication of satellite instrumentation
           which supports nuclear detonation detection for nuclear treaty
           verification, proliferation detection, and collateral military
           - Development of advanced Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR)
           systems for noncooperative proliferation detection scenarios.
           - Development of Continuous Reflectometry for Radius versus
           Time Experiment (CORRTEX) and advanced hydrodynamic yield
           technologies for nuclear threshold testing treaties.
           - The study of the generation and propagation of shock waves
           in a geologic media surrounding underground nuclear tests.
      Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL):
           The major R&D projects support current and future treaty
           verification requirements and the development of new
           proliferation detection technologies. The major projects are:
           - Development of a Temperature Imaging System Infrared Camera
           which corrects atmospheric effects so that temperature
           determinations to 0.1 degree C (absolute) and 0.01 degree C
           (relative) are feasible. This system will have broad
           application in analyzing thermal emission from CW and nuclear
           suspect sites and possibly in detecting nuclear warheads.
           - Development of an advanced seismic verification and analysis
           capability to distinguish nuclear from chemical explosions.
           - Development of an Advanced Forensic Science Laboratory to
           advance the knowledge base for optical characterization and
           mass spectrometry technologies for effluent signatures and
           chemical collection/analysis.
           - Development of on-site monitoring technologies for
           measurements of nuclear testing sites as prescribed by a
           very low-yield threshold treaty, comprehensive test ban
           treaty, or an enhanced nonproliferation treaty.
           - Development and commercialization of high security
           electronic tags and seals for treaty applications.
      Nevada Operations Field Office (NV)/Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL):
           The R&D projects here support the development and engineering
           of airborne applications of technologies for the experimental
           collection of data for testing data/knowledge fusion concepts.
           RSL also develops advanced radiometric detection technologies.
           Concurrently, NV is leading the operational/logistical support
           for a one kilo-ton underground chemical test experiment to
           evaluate ground motion data. This test will enhance
           discrimination between chemical explosions and decoupled
           low-yield nuclear explosions.
      Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL):
           Major R&D supports the development of field portable
           instrumentation for.future bilateral/multilateral
           international inspections. Technologies include Microchip
           Liquid Chromatograph and Surface Enhanced Raman Scattering
           Monitors which can theoretically provide chemical resolving
           power equivalent to conventional laboratory devices, but with
           much less sample preparation. ORNL is also developing a
           Centrifugal Concentrator for organic molecules to enhance
           sample collection and analysis.
      Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL):
           Major projects here include:
           - Development of advanced radiation detection technologies and
           effluent collection and analysis for nuclear proliferation
           - Leading in a tag and seal demonstration project to support
           the U.S. purchase of highly enriched uranium from Russia.
           - Development of a rigorous statistical assessment for both
           current and future analytical methodologies to enhance
           monitoring of proliferation and testing weapons of mass
           - Improving commercial technologies for arms control and
           noncooperative proliferation detection scenarios. Ultrasonic
           measurement and acoustic technology is investigated to verify
           selected liquid properties (e.g., speed of sound, density, and
      Sandia National Laboratories (SNL):
           Major projects include:
           Development of technologies which will improve our ability to
           detect nuclear proliferation activities from space-borne
           observation platforms. Included are multi-spectral thermal
           imagery, multi-spectral transient radiometry, low light-level
           imagery, and others.
           - Development of detection/sensor technologies for satellite
           flight systems. This program provides a number of operational
           payloads supporting DOE requirements for continuously
           monitoring and categorizing atmospheric nuclear events.
           - Development of seismic instrumentation and analysis methods
           to ensure effective monitoring of underground nuclear testing.
           - The SNL Tags/Seals program is the lead developer of new
           concepts for treaty and nonproliferation application.
           - SNL is developing signal and image processing algorithms to
           improve and augment national technical means (NTM) and
           advanced remote sensing technology.
           - SNL is responsible for fielding a pod mounted synthetic
           aperture radar and integrating optical and hyperspectral
           instruments in an accompanying airborne pod.
      Savannah River Technical Center (SRTC):
           The major R&D projects at SRTC are to develop systems to
           support nonproliferation initiatives by improving
           analytical methods. SRTC is developing a method for
           chemical analysis by fiber optic spectrometry. This
           technology will be designed into an automated
           in-line/in-tank analytical system capable of identifying
           chemical agents and measuring their concentration in disposal
           incinerators and in phosphate based pesticide manufacturing
           plants. Also SRTC is developing an improved Radio Frequency
           Glow Discharge/Fourier Transform Mass Spectrometer with
           resolving power necessary to unambiguously identify the
           isotopes present in bulk and/or particulate samples.
      Lead Laboratories. The lead laboratory in each programmatic area
      is not in all cases discernable, but is generally reflected as
      =    On-site Monitoring: Lead - LANL, Second - LLNL.
      =    Satellite Instrumentation: Joint lead - LANL/SNL.
      =    Seismic Verification: Lead - LLNL, Second - LANL/SNL.
      =    Samples/Debris Detection and Analysis: Multilaboratory program
           area with no clear programmatic leader, but the larger
           laboratories dominate (LANL/LLNL/PNL/SNL).
      =    Nonseismic Verification: Lead - LANL.
      =    Directed Energy Verification: Lead - LANL.
      =    Technology and Advanced Concepts: Multilaboratory program
           with no clear leader, but the larger laboratories dominate.
      =    Radiation Detection Technology: Multilaboratory program with
           no clear leader, but the larger laboratories dominate.
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide a lead table as shown in the budget that
 includes only arms control funding, excluding intelligence activities.
      Dr. Alessi.                  [Deleted)
      Mr. Bevill. In the treaty implementation activity, how many U.S.
 and Soviet tests were monitored in FY 1992 and how many planned for
 FY 1993 and FY 1994?
      Dr. Alessi. During FY 1992, Russia monitored one U.S. underground
 nuclear test. That test was named JUNCTION. No Russian (Soviet) tests
 were conducted.
      No decisions have yet been made about the U.S. FY 1993 and FY 1994
 test programs. Because of the TTBT Protocol requirements, it is now too
 late for any Russian monitoring of U.S. tests in FY 1993 and too early
 to project activities for FY 1994.
      Current guidance provides for the United States to exercise all of
 its verification rights under the TTBT Protocol. This would mean
 conducting on-site verification activities for all eligible Russian
 nuclear tests.
      A Russian test is in the planning stage and the United States plans
 to exercise its full monitoring rights when it is executed.
      Mr. Bevill. What are the treaty verification assumptions on which
 the budget is based?
      Dr. Alessi. The Treaty Implementation activity budget request for
 FY 1994 assumes: (1) that the U.S. will exercise its full spectrum of
 monitoring and inspection rights on every Russian test or explosion
 under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
 Treaty verification protocols; (2) that the Department of Energy will
 continue to be required to maintain a capability to support three
 verification deployments; and (3) that the Department of Energy will
 maintain a capability to support three verification efforts by the
 Russians at the Nevada Test Site.
                  THE 1990'S IN WHICH DOE WILL BE INVOLVED
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list of treaties in effect; treaties
 under negotiation; and anticipated treaties through the 1990's in
 which DOE will be involved.
      Dr. Alessi. The treaties and agreements which are in effect
      -    Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) (awaiting Ukrainian
      -    Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) (awaiting both U.S.
           and Russian ratification)
      -    Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
      -    Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
      -    Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)
      -    Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)
      -    Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET)
      -    "Hot Line" Agreement
      -    "Hot Line" Modernization Agreement
      -    "Hot Line" Expansion Agreement
      -    "Accidents Measures" Agreement
      -    Incidents at Sea Agreement
      -    Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
      -    Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers Agreement
      -    Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement
      -    Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement
      -    U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement
      -    Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
      -    Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
      -    Outer Space Treaty
      -    Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
      -    Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
      -    Bilateral U.S.-Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement
           (awaiting both U.S. and Russian signature)
      -    Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
           Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
           Methods of Warfare
      -    Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
      -    Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
      -    Open Skies
      -    Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
      -    Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Document
      -    Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD)
      -    Seabed Arms Control Treaty
      -    Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin-American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone)
      -    Treaty of Raratonga (South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone)
      -    Antarctic Treaty
 The treaties which are under negotiation include:
      -    Chemical Weapons Convention Preparatory Commission
      -    Radiological Weapons Convention (RWC)
 The treaties we anticipate DOE will be involved with through the 1990's
      -    Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
      -    Global Ban on the Production of Fissionable Material for
           Nuclear Weapons Purposes
      Mr. Bevill. Provide the total funding by program activity included
 in the budget for implementation of the TTBT and PNET in FY 1992,
 FY 1993 and FY 1994.
      Dr. Alessi. The attached chart shows by major areas of activity
 (maintenance of core capability, support for Russian verification
 activities at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and support for U.S.
 verification deployments in Russia) and organization (Nevada Operations
 Office contractor support, Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National
 Laboratories) the budget for implementation of the Threshold Test Ban
 Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET) in FY 1992,
 FY 1993 and FY 1994.
      Mr. Bevill. How many FTEs support each activity?
      Dr. Alessi. Also, the Full Time Equivalents supporting each
 activity are indicated on the chart.
                        FY 1992            FY 1993           FY 1994
                      DOLLARS    FTE     DOLLARS    FTE    DOLLARS   FTE
                    IN THOUSANDS      IN THOUSANDS       IN THOUSANDS
 Nevada Oper Office
 -Core Capability      $4,300   30.8     $3,716   27.04     $3,400   24.74
 -NTS Activities          665    4.6       -        -          300    2.08
 -Deployments             -       -          35    0.30         35    0.30
                       -------  -----    ------   -----     ------   -----
      Subtotal         $4,965   35.4     $3,751   27.34     $3,735   27.12
 Lawrence Livermore
 -Core Capability      $1,150    5.03    $1,100    4.40     $  800    3.20
 -NTS Activities          800    5.0        -        -         400    2.50
 -Deployments             -       -         250    1.07        250    1.07
                       -------  -----    ------   -----      -----   -----
      Subtotal         $1,950   10.03    $1,350    5.47     $1,450    6.77
 Los Alamos
 -Core Capability      $2,845   10.32    $2,788   10.85     $2,600   10.12
 -NTS Activities        1,040    3.80       -       -          515    1.88
 -Deployments             -       -         911    3.33        500    1.83
                       ------   -----    ------   -----     ------   -----
      Subtotal         $3,885   14.12    $3,699   14.18     $3,615   13.83
      Total           $10,800   59.55    $8,800   46.99     $8,800   47.72
      Mr. Bevill. What is the Status of the Follow-on Early Warning
      Dr. Alessi. In light of the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the
 shift in emphasis to detecting emerging proliferants, the intelligence
 community has been reevaluating monitoring requirements for nuclear
 tests in space.  Awaiting final decisions, the Department of Energy
 (DOE) has ceased almost all effort related to the Follow-on Early
 Warning System, except for minimal coordination with the Air Force
 and its related contractors. In the absence of a strong statement
 supporting exoatmospheric monitoring requirements from the intelligence
 community or the Department of Defense, DOE has no plans to continue
 funding this program in FY 1994.
      Mr. Bevill. In the absence of nuclear testing in this country and
 Russia, what onsite monitoring activities are being conducted and at
 what funding levels in FY 1993 and FY 1994.
      Dr. Alessi.                  [Deleted]
 As called for in the Coordinated Schedule for carrying out activities
 related to verification of the Russian test that has been agreed upon
 by Russia and the United States,              [Deleted]     Total DOE
 funding in FY 1993 and FY 1994 for these monitoring activities is
 estimated to be $1.2 million.  Should the Russians conduct additional
 tests (Deleted] similar funding would be required for DOE monitoring
 activities for each test conducted. These costs are incremental costs
 for actual onsite monitoring activities and do not include the costs
 for maintaining a core capability for conducting such monitoring
 activities. In addition, should the Russians decide to monitor any
 U.S. tests conducted in FY 1993 or FY 1994, additional funding would be
 required to support their monitoring activities at the Nevada Test Site.
      Mr. Bevill. Please describe fully each of the activities being
 conducted under the Satellite Instrumentation program including
 milestones through completion, annual funding requirements, and total
 estimated cost of each.
      Dr. Alessi. The activities being conducted under the Satellite
 Instrumentation program are described in our draft plan for that
 program, which is included in the written material we are providing.
 That draft plan describes a program which is undergoing a major shift
 in emphasis. The draft plan will be reviewed by the Community
 Nonproliferation Committee Research and Development Subcommittee
 before it is implemented. The review will assure that the plan
 addresses the most urgent needs of the U.S. nonproliferation community.
 While we will continue to provide space-borne instrumentation to detect
 and characterize atmospheric nuclear explosions, most new investment
 will be directed at technologies for detecting proliferation
 activities prior to the occurrence of any nuclear test.
      Mr. Bevill. The budget request for detection technology consists of
 many separate tasks to be performed by the Department. Can you discuss
 the overall framework for this request; explain how the components fit
 together; and discuss what the overall priorities of the program are?
      Dr. Alessi. As shown in the attached chart, the Detection
 Technology activities are grouped in three program areas: on-site
 verification, regional measurements, and remote sensing. This
 programmatic structure is organized around the primary physical arenas
 in which the technologies are likely to be deployed. The program areas
 cover the spectrum of our technology development programs that are
 aimed at providing technologies and systems to enhance U.S. and
 international capabilities that range from cooperative on-site
 inspections and monitoring to remote satellite verification and
 monitoring. The overall priorities of the program have shifted from
 arms control verification to the development of technologies for
 detecting proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass
 destruction as a result of the increasing importance of weapons
 proliferation to U.S. national security interest.
      Mr. Bevill. How does the international safeguards program differ
 from the activities performed by the nuclear safeguards and security
      Mr. Alessi. The International Safeguards Program, administered by
 the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, and the Nuclear
 Safeguards and Security Program, under the Office of Safeguards and
 Security, have unique missions and serve fundamentally different
 national security goals. The two programs differ substantially in the
 threats they address and the technologies they use to accomplish their
 objectives. The International Safeguards Program is managed expressly
 to support the international nonproliferation regime, International
 Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and U.S. government initiatives
 in bilateral and multilateral fora to prevent the proliferation of
 nuclear weapons. The Program provides the DOE technical basis for
 development of nonproliferation policy. It also provides the long-term
 technology base for U.S. support of IAEA and other international
 safeguards activities.
      In addition, DOE's International Safeguards Program implements U.S.
 technical exchanges and cooperation with other countries in
 international safeguards, including training programs conducted in
 support of IAEA objectives and as part of the U.S. Government's
 ongoing nonproliferation policy objectives. International safeguards
 are implemented by the IAEA to assure, through detection and deterrence,
 that all declared nuclear material under safeguards is used for
 peaceful purposes. International safeguards provide for independent
 verification by the IAEA of a country's commitment to peaceful uses of
 nuclear energy, and continuity of knowledge of peaceful nuclear
      On the other hand, DOE's Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS)
 implements safeguards and security measures for DOE's nuclear assets
 (including the nuclear weapons complex). The OSS safeguards and security
 program aims to protect DOE nuclear material and facilities against
 theft or sabotage by external or internal adversaries (e.g.,
 terrorists, criminals, etc.). This contrasts with the objective of
 international safeguards to verify that declared nuclear material in
 countries accepting safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities has
 not been diverted to some non-peaceful use.
      Because international safeguards objectives and philosophy differ
 from the safeguards and security measures employed at DOE for its own
 facilities, the technologies employed to implement the two programs
 also differ. Domestic safeguards in the United States are based on
 rigorous, technically intrusive control and accountability for
 nuclear material, and physical protection of nuclear material and
 facilities which address a specific "design basis threat." Conversely,
 international safeguards rely primarily on material accounting,
 complemented by methods of material containment and surveillance.
 Information on the status of nuclear material is collected and analyzed
 through periodic inspections by IAEA staff.
 Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
      To meet responsibilities for radiological monitoring and
 assessment as set forth in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response
 Plan, the Department of Energy is responsible for establishing and
 managing the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
 (FRMAC). The FRMAC is an operational center at or near the scene of a
 radiological incident, which provides a focal point for coordination
 and compilation of all offsite Federal radiological monitoring and
 assessment activities. All Federal, state and local agencies concerned
 with the radiologic incident are represented in the Center. Information
 related to offsite radiological risks resulting from
 accidents/incidents is consolidated and analyzed in the FRMAC. This
 information is made available to the lead Federal agency, state and/or
 local  official(s) to aid in formulating policy decisions and for
 taking appropriate protective actions.
      Field Program Management for FRMAC is performed by the Nevada
 Operations Office.
                             RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
                                 FUNDING SUMMARY
                              (Dollars in Thousands)
                          FY 1992           FY 1993           FY 1994
 Operating Funding          $770              $660            $1,000
 Nuclear Emergency Search Team
      The Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) is a group of diverse
 and specially trained engineers, scientists, and technicians from the
 weapons complex, along with specialized equipment providing technical
 assistance in response to a malevolent nuclear threat. NEST provides
 the Department with the unique capability to assess the validity of
 communicated nuclear threats and to counter any attempts by terrorists
 or extortionists to achieve their objectives by utilization of stolen
 nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear devices, or radioactive dispersal
 devices. Within the United States and its territories, the Federal
 Bureau of Investigation has primary responsibility for such incidents.
 In incidents involving foreign locations, the Department of State would
 be the lead Federal agency for the United States. NEST assets are
 located primarily at the Department's facility at Nellis AFB, Nevada,
 with a smaller initial response/advanced party capability located at
 Andrews AFB, Maryland.
      Field Program Management for NEST is performed by the Nevada
 Operations Office.
                             RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
                          NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM
                                 FUNDING SUMMARY
                              (Dollars in Thousands)
                           FY 1992           FY 1993           FY 1994
 Operating Funding         $23,014           $23,920           $27,477
 Radiological Assistance Program
      The DOE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) provides a Federal
 emergency radiological response capability at the local level. Eight
 RAP regions provide initial "first responder" assistance, as they are
 located at DOE field or area offices, providing regional coordination
 and serving as the point of contact for providing the initial DOE
 response. RAP teams are usually staffed with certified Health
 Physicists and Registered Radiation Protection Technicians, providing
 an excellent resource to assist state, local and tribal governments
 with expert advice and support for accidents involving radioactive
 materials. A RAP Team's assistance is scenario-dependent and consists
 typically of the ability to conduct localized searches with hand-held
 instruments to identify nature and extent of local contamination and to
 provide non-clinical advice on health affect of radiation.
      Field Program Management for the RAP is performed by geographical
 regions: Brookhaven Area Office (Region 1); Oak Ridge Operations
 Office (Region II); Savannah River Operations Office (Region III);
 Albuquerque Operations Office (Region IV); Chicago Operations Office
 (Region V); Idaho Operations Office (Region VI); San Francisco
 Operations Office (Region VII); and Richland Operations Office (Region
                                 STOCKPILE SUPPORT
                                  FUNDING SUMMARY
                               (Dollars in Thousands)
                       FY 1992            FY 1993            FY 1994
 Operating Funding      $1,460             $1,387             $2,000
 Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site
      The Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS)
 provides direct or consultative assistance with medical and health
 physics support following radiation accidents. REAC/TS provides DOE
 with a core capability for handling the medical aspects of radiation
 accident/incident response, training of professional and technical
 personnel in related specialty areas, and in resolving medical-legal
 issues relating to alleged radiation exposure and subsequent health
 issues. REAC/TS is designated by World Health Organization as the World
 Collaboration Center for Radiation Accident Management. A comprehensive
 medical assistance/treatment course for accidents involving radiation,
 which is sponsored by DOE, is offered at the training site in Oak
 Ridge, Tennessee, and is open to all government agencies as well as the
 private sector.
      Field Program Management for REAC/TS is performed by the Oak
 Ridge Operations Office.
                                STOCKPILE SUPPORT
                                 FUNDING SUMMARY
                             (Dollars in Thousands)
                        FY 1992           FY 1993           FY 1994
 Operating Funding         $663              $669              $705
                       NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM
        Mr. Bevill. What level of funding was provided for NEST in the
 FY 1992, FY 1993, FY 1994? What emergencies were responded to in each
        Dr. Beckner. Over the past 3 fiscal years, there have been no
 NEST deployments in response to malevolent nuclear threats. NEST did,
 however, conduct seven threat assessments of alleged nuclear or
 radiation dispersal devices and participated regularly in exercises, in
 addition to its training and readiness requirements. (The information
                       NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM
                             FUNDING SUMMARY
                          (Dollars in Thousands)
                             FY 1992       FY 1993        FY 1994
 Operating                   $23,014       $23,920        $27,477
 Capital Equipment             4,000             0          4,724
 Total                       $27,014       $23,920        $32,201
                                EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
       Mr. Bevill. How are these programs coordinated with the Office
 of Emergency Management?
       Dr. Beckner. The "Emergency Management" activities funded under
 Atomic Energy Defense Activities maintain the Department's seven
 radiological emergency response assets or capabilities, which include:
 the Accident Response Group; Aerial Measurement System; Atmospheric
 Release Advisory Capability; Federal Radiological Monitoring and
 Assessment Center; Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site;
 and eight Radiological Assistance Program Teams.
       Other "emergency management" functions within the Department are
 the responsibility of the newly created Office of Intelligence and
 National Security and are involved with certain aspects of all
 emergencies of concern to the Department. This organization operates
 the Headquarters Emergency Operations Center and ensures integration
 and compatibility of all departmental Emergency Operations Centers.
       The management of the Defense Programs' radiological response
 program is the responsibility of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
 Military Application. Coordination between Defense Programs and the
 Office of Intelligence and National Security takes place as required --
 primarily to assure the effective functioning of the operations centers
 to support radiological accidents or incidents.


                         MISSION, ROLE, AND PRIORITIES
      Mr. Bevill.   Please describe how your mission, role and
 priorities have hanged since the disintegration of the Soviet
 Union and the significant downsizing of the U.S. weapons
 production mission.
      Mr. Ford.  The mission of the Office of Intelligence is to provide
 the Department, other U.S. Government policy makers, and the
 Intelligence 30 Community with timely, accurate, high impact foreign
 intelligence analyses; to deter and neutralize foreign intelligence
 service actions in the U.S. to acquire classified and sensitive
 unclassified information involving Departmental programs, facilities,
 technology, and personnel; and provide threat assessment support to
 both Headquarters and field operations. Our mission, from a
 counterintelligence perspective, has been refocused from the
 traditional communist and hostile intelligence service threats to
 nontraditional adversaries and economic intelligence threats. Foreign
 intelligence priorities have also changed. The Weapons Intelligence
 Program is focusing on the safety, security, and use control of
 Russian nuclear weapons, while no longer emphasizing the strategic
 weapons threat. Increased attention is being focused on foreign nuclear
 reactors, in view of the growing concerns about foreign nuclear reactor
 accidents. The Science and Technology Intelligence Program is focusing
 on economic and environmental science and technology, which is a change
 from the defense science and technology emphasis of the past.
       Mr. Bevill. Have there been any discussions within the
 Intelligence Community on the appropriate size and focus of DOE's
 intelligence program now that the national security needs have
       Mr. Ford. Yes. The Community Management Staff has informed the
 Department that its priorities and resource request for FY 1994 and
 the out 30 years are consistent with its role with the Intelligence
 Community. In various meetings of the Intelligence Community working
 groups and committees, the role of the Department's intelligence
 component and its contributions to national security has been singled
 out. The Department's role in the Intelligence Community competitive
 analysis of key intelligence questions and issues has been singled out
 for its unique contributions. The Department's technical and analytical
 expertise continues to sustain it as a major player in National
 Intelligence Estimates. The Department will continue to be a major
 contributor in the Intelligence Community assessments of potential
 nuclear proliferant nations and contribute to their Economic Security
 program activities. The Department will continue to be a lead player
 in the Former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons dismantlement, including
 the subsequent disposition of its component parts. In addition, the
 Department will continue to be a lead player in the analysis,
 assessment, and reporting of the Former Soviet Union nuclear weapons
 safety, security, and control.
                          OTHER CABINET-LEVEL AGENCIES
      Mr. Bevill. Now does the size and funding for this Department
 of Energy compare to that of other Cabinet-level agencies in FY  1993
 and FY 1994?
      Mr. Ford. The following table provided by the Director of Central
 Intelligence Community Management Staff reflects the size and funding
 for the Department of Energy activities in comparison with other
 Cabinet-level agencies.
                          (Dollars in Thousands)
 AGENCY                                       DELETED
 Dept. of Defense
 Dept. of Justice (FBI)
 Dept. of State                               DELETED
 Dept. of Energy
 Dept. of Treasury
                              SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
      Mr. Bevill. What science and technology areas are being explored
 in FY 1993 and FY 1994?
      Mr. Ford.                        [Deleted]
                               STUDIES AND REPORTS
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list of all studies or reports
 prepared in each program area in FY 1992, FY 1993 and planned for
 FY 1994. Identify whether these were anticipatory or responsive
       Mr. Ford. The materials that have been requested are being
 prepared and will be provided to the Committee for their files.
      Mr. Bevill. Please Identify all funding in FY 1992, FY 1993, and
 FY 1994, for counternarcotics activities, and describe the activities.
      Mr. Ford. In FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994 funds for
 counternarcotics activities are $570 000; $360,000; and $200,000
 respectively. The three activities being funded are the Vapor Generator,
 Multiple Threat Analyzer, and Associated Particle Imaging. The Vapor
 Generator provides a very precise measurement of cocaine vapor used to
 calibrate detectors.   The Multiple Threat Analyzer detects trace
 amounts of drugs or chemicals used in the drug manufacturing process
 by trapping single molecules for analysis. The current development
 effort reduced the size of the instrument from room size to a two
 cabinet size. The Associated Particle Imaging uses neutrons through a
 special process to image and provide the element content of a closed
 container. The process requires access to only one side of the target
 and may be used to identify contraband inside suspect containers. No
 new funding is required beyond FY 1993 for the Vapor Generator
 and the Multiple Threat Analyzer.
      Mr. Bevill. How has the declassification of U.S. nuclear weapons
 and nuclear materials information impacted this program?
      Mr. Ford. The declassification of U.S. nuclear weapons and
 nuclear materials information has not impacted this program.

     Mr. Bevill. Has the 1983 Threat Policy Statement been updated? Is
 there a need to modify this guidance? Please describe the revised threat
     Mr. McFadden. The Director of Security Affairs issued a "Design
 Basis Threat Policy for Department of Energy Programs and Facilities,"
 dated April 1992. This policy replaced the 1983 Generic Threat
 Statement and was founded on a January 31, 1992, Department of Energy
 (DOE)/Department of Defense (DOD) "Memorandum of Agreement on the
 Security Threats to DOE and DOD Nuclear Weapons Programs and
 Facilities." The Memorandum of Agreement was based on a Defense
 Intelligence Agency review of worldwide threats to United States
 Government interests. The 1992 Design Basis Threat Policy is undergoing
 review in the Office of Security Affairs for currency. The Design
 Basis Threat Policy describes a spectrum of threats to DOE Programs
 and activities ranging from terrorist threats to Departmental nuclear
 weapons and production programs to the threats posed by criminals,
 psychotics, radical environmentalists, foreign agents, and dissident or
 disgruntled insiders.  The Design Basis Threat Policy, classified
 Confidential, National Security Information, provides guidance on the
 characteristics of the various threats types and describes the
 capabilities of the adversary. The Design Basis Threat Policy also
 describes Safeguards and Security Program strategies for addressing
 the threat spectrum. It also requires the development of site
 specific considerations in mitigating threats.
                         THREATS TO DOE FACILITIES
      Mr. Bevill. What is the most likely threat to DOE facilities and
 what is the least likely?
      Mr. McFadden. Terrorist threats to DOE programs and facilities,
 while potentially resulting in catastrophic consequences, are the
 least likely to occur. The threat posed by cleared and authorized
 insiders is perhaps the most likely and includes theft of material and
 equipment, espionage and sabotage.  Departmental locations have also
 been targeted by anti-nuclear and/or radical environmental extremist
 groups, which has resulted in demonstrations, acts of civil
 disobedience and trespass.
                             THREAT TO DOE FACILITIES
      Mr. Bevill. Have any DOE facilities experienced any threat in
 the past five years that approaches the threat guidance now in effect?
      Mr. McFadden. Threats to Department of Energy (DOE) facilities
 are identified in the Design Basis Threat Policy for the Department of
 Energy Programs and Facilities, April 1992. Based on the eight threat
 categories and associated characteristics detailed in this document,
 no DOE facilities have experienced terrorist threats in the past five
 years.  The strategy to guard against threats to facilities emphasizes
 providing a high degree of assurance of a capability to detect, assess,
 delay, and inhibit unauthorized access to nuclear weapons, test
 devices, and completed nuclear assemblies, Category II or greater
 quantities of special nuclear materials and associated facilities
 while providing command and control to protective forces. Safeguards
 and security measures are also designed to prevent acts of sabotage.
 Safeguards and security systems are performance tested to
 ascertain their effectiveness in countering threats to assets and
      Mr. Bevill. The Office of Security Evaluations stated in response
 to a question in last year's hearing that, "Noticeably absent in the
 overall improvement in safeguards and security posture is an
 improvement in safeguards and security management and oversight.
 The system lacks an integrated approach to planning and implementation
 of the total program. The lack of integration is reflected in the
 inconsistent quality of the programs and the persistence of costly,
 manpower-intensive solutions. The underlying cause of these weaknesses
 is inadequate program management and oversight at all levels." How do
 you respond to this concern?
       Mr. McFadden. The Department's safeguards and security planning
 process is integrated through a number of mechanisms. First and
 foremost is the development of two reports: the Master Safeguards and
 Security Agreements (MSSAs) and the Site Safeguards and Security Plan
 (SSSP). These reports are the product of a standardized and consistent
 process designed to review and evaluate the protection posture of major
 facilities.  Based on this review, cost-effective protection measures
 are selected to safeguard vital assets against vulnerabilities
 identified during the review and planning process. Such measures may
 include the development of line-item construction projects to implement
 cost-effective improvements over a number of years.
       The planning process, as well as the periodic survey program,
 also provides for a regular management review of the protection posture
 of the Department's facilities and any corrective actions in progress
 to improve security. As noted in the 1992 Annual Report to the
 Secretary, most major DOE facilities have an overall satisfactory
 rating. Only six facilities were rated marginal, and, of these, three
 have been uploaded to satisfactory during 1993. In addition, the
 newly developed Safeguards and Security Information Management System
 (SSIMS) serves as an important management tracking system.  SSIMS, which
 is linked electronically between Headquarters and Operations Offices,
 permits management to conduct near "real-time" analysis on the status
 of their respective protection programs.
      In a continuing effort to ensure that safeguards and security is
 a cost-effective program, the Department recently initiated a series
 of resource reviews to identify additional cost-saving possibilities
 which can be implemented while, at the same time, affording appropriate
 protection for DOE assets.  A review of Security Evaluations inspections
 for 1992 indicates that no facilities were rated unsatisfactory in the
 area of Protection Program Management nor were any facilities evaluated
 by the Department as unsatisfactory overall.
      The Office of Security Affairs was established to ensure clearer
 lines of authority, management, and accountability; correct
 organizational fragmentation and provide focused management in policy,
 field oversight, Headquarters operations; and provide integration of
 materials control and accountability and security disciplines; and we
 are committed to making this happen.
       Mr. Bevill. What is the total cost of operating the Central
 Training Academy and the FTEs in FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994? Are
 funds provided from any sources other than this budget?
      Mr. McFadden. The costs for the Central Training Academy (CTA)
 are as follows:
                                   FY 1992     FY 1993    FY 1994
                                      (In Thousands of Dollars)
 Program                          $ 8,823      $ 7,323    $ 8,523
 FTEs (5)                             361*         393*       425
 Total Central Training Academy   $ 9,184      $ 7,716    $ 8,948
 *In FY 1992 and FY 1993, these FTEs were funded from the Weapons
 Production and Surveillance budget.
      In addition to the above funding, CTA receives approximately
 $200,000 annually to cover CTA staff travel and adjunct costs such as
 freight expenses related to specially requested Mobile Training Team
 activities. These Mobile Training Teams are in addition to normally
 scheduled and budgeted CTA classes. These funds come from other
 Departmental programs.
      Since the establishment of the CTA, the Albuquerque Operations
 Office has provided funding for CTA's rent, electricity, etc. (it is
 estimated that approximately $500,000 is expended annually).
      Also, in Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, the CTA received $2,000,000
 annually in General Plant Project funding.
      Mr. Bevill. How many individuals were approved using the
 Accelerated Access Authorization Program in FY 1993 and FY 1994? What
 activities - (including funding) are included in the Safeguards and
 Security budget and the Security Investigations budget for this
      Mr. McFadden. For the period October 12, 1992, through
 April 26, 1993, 140 individuals were approved for security clearance
 on an interim basis using this program. The average processing time
 under this program (from tests completion to approval) is 30 days. We
 estimate that about 500 individuals will be approved under this program
 in FY 1994. AAAP has been a significant factor in cost avoidance
 without jeopardizing the safeguards and security of our National
 Assets. Funding for this program (which will be funded solely from
 the Security Investigations budget in FY 1995) is shown on a table
 which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:)
                           (In Thousands of Dollars)
                                            FY 1993        FY 1994
 Nuclear Safeguards and Security
     AAAP - Operational Activities        $     500      $    500
     AAAP - Technical Aspects -                   0           210
            guidance documents; research
            and analysis, planning,             500           710
            quality assurance, etc.
 Security Investigations
     AAAP - Full Implementation -                 0         1,100
            Initiate 5-year competitive
            bid contract, and expand
            number of individuals for
            inclusion in program.          $    500        $1,810
      Mr. Bevill. What is the Center for Human Reliability? When was it
 established? What is the total budget in FY 1993 and FY 1994?
      Mr. McFadden. The Center for Human Reliability Studies (CHRS) was
 established in July 1989 to assist the Department of Energy (DOE) in
 developing and implementing the Personnel Security Assurance Program
 (PSAP) and other human reliability program initiatives. It is part
 of the Medical Sciences Division of the Oak Ridge Institute for Science
 and Education, a Management and Operating contractor of the DOE. It
 utilizes a staff of 3 full-time employees and 18 consultants.
      Through a comprehensive process of  policy analysis, program
 development, operational guidance, and followup program evaluation, the
 CHRS supports the DOE in the PSAP and the Accelerated Access
 Authorization Program. The CHRS provides expertise in the following
 disciplines: personnel security; clinical psychology; human resource
 management research and analysis; law, including labor and personnel
 law; financial analysis; organizational and industrial psychology;
 social psychology and sociology; counterintelligence; criminology,
 criminal justice, and investigations; operations research and
 statistics; and computer systems analysis to assist the DOE in
 achieving program goals.
      The total CHRS budget for FY 1993 was $485,000. The same amount
 has been requested for FY 1994.
      Mr. Bevill. Provide a crosscut by location of all Safeguards and
 Security funding throughout the Department for FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY
      Mr. McFadden. The following information is provided:
                            DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
                         FY 1994 Congressional Budget
                    Safeguards and Security Budget Estimates
                                BY FACILITY
                              (in thousands)
                                       FY 1992     FY 1993    FY 1994
                                     Safeguards  Safeguards  Safeguards
 Organization/Facility               & Security  & Security   & Security
   Albuquerque Direct                102,319      93,538       96,199
   Allied (Kansas City)                6,960       7,941        9,069
   Los Alamos Natl. Lab.              84,108      85,721       86,888
   Mound                              10,887       8,837        9,804
   Pantex                             53,473      24,600       45,600
   Pinelies                            7,020       5,590        5,100
   Rocky Flats                        76,153      74,937       73,222
   Sandia Natl. Lab.                  54,370      56,103       54,709
                                  ----------   ---------     --------
     Total, Albuquerque              395,290     357,267      380,591
   Chicago Direct                      1,593       1,493        1,445
   Ames Natl. Lab,                       679         405          381
   Argonne Natl Lab.                   7,515      11,880       12,275
   Brookhaven Natl. Lab.               7,344         635          673
   Fermi National Lab.                 1,732       1,837        2,531
   New Brunswick Lab,                  4,404       4,253        4,252
   Natl. Renewable Energy Lab.           530         675          731
   Princeton Plasma Physics Lab,       1,109       1,089        1,243
   Superconducting Super Collider      1,025       1,300        1,400
                                  ----------  ----------   ----------
     Total, Chicago                   25,931      23,567       24,931
 Idaho                                43,359      45,804       45,081
 Naval Petroleum Reserves              1,097       1,097        1.077
 Nevada                               80,764      81,368       73,407
 Oak Ridge
   Oak Ridge                          82,877      73,885       79,112
   WMCC - FMPC                         2,717       2,510        1,844
   Oak Ridge Assoc. Univ.                802         851          715
   Oak Ridge Natl. Lab.                7,572       7,409        7,306
   Y-12                               59,755      52,775       35,771
                                  ----------  ----------   ----------
     Total Oak Ridge                 153,723     137,430      124,748
 Pittsburgh Naval Reactors            12,497      14,266       12.042
 Richland                             66,030      64,992       68,391
 San Francisco
   San Francisco                       6,892       9,535        9,559
   Lawrence Livermore Natl. Lab.      42,309      38,752       33,179
                                    --------  ----------   ----------
 Total, San Francisco                 49,201      48,287       42,738
 Savannah River                      159,880     157,876      127,754
 Schenectady Naval Reactors           13,522      15,689       16,141
 Office of Scientific & Tech. Infor.     804         851          800
 Strategic Petroleum Reserve Off.     18,572      19,390       24,650
 Western Area Power Admin.               848         870          870
 Morgantown Energy Tech. Ctr.            558         499          725
 Pittsburgh Energy Tech. Ctr.          1,400       1,600        1,916
 Headquarters                        102,805      99,920       99,760
                                  ----------  ----------   ----------
 Total DOE Safeguards & Security   1,126,281   1,070,773    1,045,623
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide a table showing the size of guard
 forces and expenditures for guard forces by location for FY 1992, FY
 1993, and FY 1994.
      Mr. McFadden. During the past six months, protective force
 strength levels have been reduced by approximately 480
 personnel complex-wide. At some Operations Offices, there has been a
 commensurate reduction in Protective Force budgeting. At others,
 budget changes have been less noticeable partly because savings
 realized in personnel reductions are being rolled back into
 automated protective systems. Protective requirements based on
 categories of materials on hand and other unique facility concerns
 are major factors influencing Protective Force strength levels and
 budget considerations. The following table represents FY92-FY94
 Protective Force strength levels and associated budgets.
                      ADDITIONAL SUPPORT DETAIL
     Mr. Bevill. Please provide a breakdown of the specific tasks and
 funding associated with the "Additional Support" activity in FY 1992,
 FY 1993, and FY 1994.
      Mr. McFadden. The "Additional Support" breakdown is as follows:
                          (In Thousands of Dollars)
                                         FY 1992     FY 1993     FY 1994
 Chicago Field Office S&S Staff          $ 1,176     $ 1,445     $ 1,445
 Headquarters Physical Security Upgrade
   Technical Assistance                      409         313         313
 Technical Support to Headquarters and
   Field Assistance                        3,857       1,763       1,792
 Support Services Contracts                7,435       7,174      10,183
 AOSS Modernization                                                1,200
 Information Security Research Center        250         400         415
 Technical Security Research Center          655         662         682
 Total Additional Support                $13,782     $11,757     $16,030
                           SECURITY EVALUATIONS RESULTS
      Mr. Bevill.  Please characterize the results of security
 evaluations conducted at DOE sites during the last year.
      Mr. Podonsky.  The results of Security Evaluations inspections
 and assessments activities are very briefly summarized with the
 following information. The Security Evaluations Annual Report for
 FY 1992 provides a more detailed assessment of the inspections
 conducted and the overall status of DOE protection programs.
      Protection of special nuclear material was adequate at all
 facilities reviewed. Many sites are in the process of reducing or
 consolidating their nuclear material inventories to facilitate
 remediation efforts and reduce operating costs. Some sites have made
 substantial progress by consolidating security interests and have
 reduced both the direct (e.g., cost of guard force operations) and
 indirect costs (e.g., time spent complying with security
 requirements) of safeguards and security. Although protection of the
 nuclear material is adequate, many facilities rely heavily on
 manpower-intensive measures to provide adequate protection.
      Protection of classified matter is inconsistent.  Although
 physical protection of classified documents at most facilities is
 consistent with DOE order requirements, several facilities have
 deficiencies in document control procedures and accountability
 systems. Further, computer security at DOE  facilities is not
 uniformly effective.
     Personnel security programs have improved considerably; the
 elimination of the longstanding reinvestigation backlog is particularly
 notable. However, continued attention is require to assure sustained
 effectiveness and reduce the timeframes required to process clearances.
      Protection program management within DOE requires continued
 attention.  Progress has been noted in some areas and at some
 facilities. For example, significant progress was made toward
 updating the DOE orders (most of which had not been updated since
 1988). However, protection program management at all levels of DOE
 can be improved. At the Headquarters level, additional effort is
 necessary to resolve longstanding safeguards and security policy
 issues and provide consistent and timely direction and guidance to the
 field.  At the field level, efforts to implement effective and efficient
 systems should be more aggressively pursued, management control and
 feedback systems (e.g., the survey and self-assessment programs)
 should be improved, and the required planning documents should be
                             TRENDS TRACKING
      Mr. Bevill.  How does the Office of Security Evaluations track
 trends or patterns in deficiencies identified at various sites?
      Mr. Podonsky.   Security Evaluations has several functions
 that involve tracking safeguards and security trends and patterns:
 the inspection program, the assessments program, the Facility Officer
 program, and information management systems. These systems combine
 to provide DOE managers with a comprehensive picture of the status
 of safeguards and security programs, including trends and patterns
 identified at various sites.
      The inspection program is specifically designed to identify
 strengths and weaknesses at individual DOE sites. The findings at each
 facility are tracked through resolution and, where appropriate,
 reinspection or safeguards and security readiness reviews are
 conducted. Security Evaluations also routinely reviews Security Affairs
 Safeguards and Security Information Management System (SSIMS), which
 provides information on the status of findings throughout DOE.
      In the assessments program, Security Evaluations periodically
 reviews the status of selected program elements, focusing on trends
 and patterns across DOE facilities. Innovative technologies,
 safeguards and security policy issues, and potential program
 enhancements are also identified.  Reports summarizing the assessment
 results are distributed to all DOE Operations Offices.
     Security Evaluations assigns a Facility Officer to each major DOE
 facility to monitor the status of each facility. One of the Facility
 Officer's responsibilities is to track findings.
     Security Evaluations uses a variety of hardcopy and computerized
 information management systems to facilitate tracking trends and
 patterns across DOE. As an example, Security Evaluations Policy
 Information Resource Management System encompasses policy issues,
 Security Evaluations findings, exceptions, working groups, and
 orders. Security Evaluations is also currently working on developing
 additional automated data bases.
     Security Evaluations disseminates the results of its analysis of
 trends and patterns through its annual reports (which summarize the
 overall status of safeguards and security across DOE) and assessment
 reports (which provide detailed information on selected topics).
 Further, Security Evaluations routinely uses its analysis of trends
 and patterns across DOE as a basis for inspection planning.
      Mr. Bevill.  What improvements have you seen in the Department's
 security posture since your office was established?
      Mr. Podonsky.  In the late 1970s, safeguards and security
 entered a downswing in the cycle that is at least partly attributable
 to a lack of attention to operational issues during the turmoil
 associated with the creation of DOE. As an example of the lack of
 attention, most of DOE's safeguards and security orders were not
 issued until after 1984 (several years after the Department was
 created). Predictably, the effectiveness of safeguards and security
 programs had degraded to unacceptable levels in the early 1980s.
 Category I quantities of special nuclear material were not
 consistently provided adequate physical protection, accountability
 systems were inadequate, protective force personnel were not adequately
 equipped or trained, and protection of classified documents and
 material was inadequate. In the early days of Security Evaluations
 performance testing, facilities often performed miserably.
      Since Security Evaluations was created as an independent office
 in 1985, the overall status of protection of special nuclear material
 has improved dramatically.  Most DOE facilities completed safeguards
 and security upgrade programs during the mid to late 1980s, investing
 approximately $500 million in new security hardware and adding
 thousands of security staff. Most vulnerabilities affecting high
 priority special nuclear material targets have been addressed. While
 problems occasionally recur, they are generally degradations in one
 layer of a multi-layer security system rather than direct threats to
 special nuclear material of the type frequently noted in the early
     In recent years, DOE safeguards and security programs have become
 much more effective. Many improvements have resulted from heightened
 attention to protection requirements, increased allocations of both
 personnel and funding, and more intensive oversight. However, the
 security systems are not optimally efficient. Many DOE facilities
 still rely heavily on costly, manpower intensive measures to provide
 adequate protection.
                             SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS
      Mr. Bevill.  Describe the most significant accomplishments of
 the Office in FY 1992 and FY 1993. How has the security of the
 Department been improved?
      Mr. Podonsky.  During FY 1992 and the first half of FY 1993,
 Security Evaluations was able to maintain and enhance its inspection
 program, refocus its assessments efforts on DOE's current needs, and
 produce and disseminate information and tools to other DOE offices
 for their use in inspection programs.
      Security Evaluations inspection program continues to be regarded
 as one of DOE's most effective oversight programs. Although we continue
 to find and report problem areas, Security Evaluations is respected by
 the field and viewed as a resource by DOE managers. DOE operations
 office managers have repeatedly cited Security Evaluations process and
 protocols as the model for other DOE oversight activities. One of the
 most significant enhancements in the inspection program in the past 2
 years has been the maturation of the Safeguards and Security Readiness
 Review program. Safeguards and Security Readiness Reviews are similar
 to comprehensive inspections but are conducted on short notice and
 are usually focused on selected aspects of a protection program. The
 Safeguards and Security Readiness Review program's goal is to provide
 an accurate picture of day-to-day readiness and to assure that
 facilities do not relax between inspections. One of the primary
 reasons Security Evaluations decided to emphasize Safeguards and
 Security Readiness Reviews and conduct fewer comprehensive inspections
 is cost savings. Safeguards and Security Readiness Reviews are smaller
 and cheaper to conduct. More importantly, however, Security Evaluations
 found that the Safeguards and Security Readiness Review program has
 significantly reduced the costs associated with facilities preparing
 for inspections.
     Another enhancement to the inspection program has been the
 increased focus on protection program management. Security Evaluations
 has been focusing on the protection program management topic in an
 effort to assure that management is providing the resources necessary
 to support security programs and is using those resources effectively.
 Security Evaluations believes this is an important initiative and that
 this will become increasingly more important as DOE manages the
 transition to environmental restoration and remediation.
      Security Evaluations has evaluated DOE's current needs and has
 shifted the focus of its assessments program. Previously, assessment
 reports focused primarily on program weaknesses. Recently, Security
 Evaluations has been focusing not only on what is wrong but also on
 what can be done. The reports on the personnel clearance process and
 the use of helicopters throughout DOE are recent examples of Security
 Evaluations assessments that provided DOE managers with the information
 needed to enhance their programs. For example, in the personnel
 clearance special study, Security Evaluations identified potential
 enhancements that should reduce the time required in the processing
 of clearance requests.
      Recognizing that DOE managers must identify innovative safeguards
 and security technologies that hold promise for cost-effective
 application without loss of protection, Security Evaluations is
 currently conducting a safeguards and security technology assessment.
 DOE managers indicated that they are hindered by a lack of readily
 available information about safeguards and security technology that
 has the potential to reduce operating costs. To meet DOE needs,
 Security Evaluations objectives are to identify user needs for
 safeguards and security technology applications and to identify
 and describe technologies that can be appropriately applied in the
 near term to help the field apply resources more cost effectively.
 The expected publication date for the assessment report is
 July 15, 1993. The results of that assessment will be distributed to
 all operations and program offices. The intent of the assessment is
 to systematically identify existing or emerging technologies that
 could provide effective security while reducing costs at DOE
 facilities. The study is an example of Security Evaluations effort to
 provide DOE managers with the information needed to manage effectively.
      One of Security Evaluations secondary missions is to promote
 communications and develop inspection techniques. In FY 1992, Security
 Evaluations issued a set of comprehensive inspectors guides that cover
 all major safeguards and security topics. These guides are used by the
 field survey staff and personnel involved in self assessments, as well
 as Security Evaluations inspectors. Security Evaluations also hosted
 several interagency symposiums and an internal DOE forum. In these
 meetings, Security Evaluations and other agencies and offices shared
 techniques and tools. By sharing techniques and tools, Security
 Evaluations is promoting a gradual but steady improvement in DOE
 safeguards and security programs.
 In addition to the concrete accomplishments, Security Evaluations
 has an important role as a leader and trend setter.  As Security
 Evaluations focuses on selected aspects of DOE programs, those programs
 tend to get the attention of DOE management and are improved.  This
 trend has been evident since the mid-1980s when Security Evaluations
 focused primarily on vulnerabilities in the protection of DOE's most
 sensitive security interests (nuclear weapons components and strategic
 quantities of special nuclear material). As those vulnerabilities were
 addressed, Security Evaluations gradually expanded its emphasis on
 classified information, personnel, and computer security programs,
 which have been gradually improving.
      Security Evaluations views today's safeguards and security
 challenges as efficiently maintaining adequate protection of vital
 security interests in a idly changing environment. If DOE does not
 anticipate and prepare for the rap future, security could once again
 degrade to unacceptable levels. Conversely, if DOE is proactive and
 starts managing resources more effectively now, adequate security can
 be maintained at reduced costs. Therefore, in its role as a trend
 setter, Security Evaluations will be increasingly focusing on protection
 program management and cost-effective issues.
      Mr. Bevill.  Describe the radioactive materials packaging
 certification program. Why was it established? What activities are
 required of your office to perform this function?
      Mr. Brush.  Based on the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and the
 unique nature of DOE, the Department of Transportation authorized DOE
 to conduct its own radioactive materials certification program. The
 program is required to be equivalent to that of the Nuclear Regulatory
      The purpose of the radioactive materials packaging certification
 program is to ensure the health and safety of the public and workers
 and the protection of the environment when radioactive materials are
 transported by DOE and its contractors.  Principal functions of the
 program include: evaluating packaging designs; maintaining a database
 of certified packagings; and providing external liaison for packaging
 certification matters between DOE and concerned agencies.
     The evaluation of DOE packaging designs involves reviewing Safety
 Analysis Reports for Packagings for compliance with DOE orders and with
 the regulations of the Department of Transportation and the Nuclear
 Regulatory Commission. Evaluations are accomplished by performing
 independent reviews and confirmatory analyses of structural, thermal,
 containment, shielding, and criticality integrity; operating
 procedures; acceptance tests; maintenance procedures; quality assurance;
 and material information provided in the Safety Analysis Reports for
 Packagings. On the basis of these reviews and analyses, the Department
 determines that the packagings meet all applicable DOE orders and
 other requirements.
                        MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT
     Mr. Bevill.  Last year you were very critical of the safeguards
 and security management and oversight. Has there been noticeable
 improvement in the past year?
      Mr. Podonsky.  Clearly, there has been improvement in safeguards
 and security management in the past year at both Headquarters and in
 the field. However, safeguards and security management must improve
 further and adopt a more proactive stance if DOE is to resolve long
 standing deficiencies and take advantage of the unparalleled
 opportunities for reducing safeguards and security costs by
 consolidating and, where possible, eliminating security interests.
      At Headquarters, the efforts to update the DOE Orders, to
 eliminate expensive but questionably effective policies (e.g.,
 accountability systems for classified documents), and to eliminate
 the reinvestigation backlog are examples of management's willingness
 to tackle longstanding problems.  However, many longstanding
 deficiencies remain to be corrected.  For example, as noted in the
 Security Evaluations annual report and a recent General Accounting
 Office study, many DOE facilities still do not have the basic planning
 documents that are required to assure that the protection strategy
 and objectives are current, approved, and understood by both the
 facility and DOE Headquarters. Further, resolution of some issues
 has been slow even when a clear course of action was identified,
 as exemplified by the continued failure to document a clear and
 consistent safeguards and, security policy to cover Work for Others.
     At the field level, safeguards and security management has improved
 but is not uniformly effective. For example, Operations Offices and
 facilities have had varying levels of success in ongoing cost-reduction
 efforts.  Through a concerted transition effort, DOE's Hanford Site was
 able to eliminate and consolidate security interests while maintaining
 adequate security. This effort resulted in a dramatic reduction in the
 number of security clearances (reduced by 66%) and potential longterm
 cost savings, both in direct security costs and in indirect operational
 costs associated with maintaining security. Other DOE offices have also
 made some progress in trimming costs.  However, some sites that have
 experienced drastic reductions in weapons program activities have not
 made corresponding progress in reducing safeguards and security costs.
     Mr. Bevill. How many positions are included in the Personnel
 Security Assurance Program (PSAP) in FY 1992, FY 1993 and FY 1994?
 How do you measure the effectiveness of this program? What are the
     Mr. McFadden. In FY   1992, 10,493 positions in the Department of
 Energy and its contractor workforce were identified as PSAP positions.
 The number of identified positions has since been revised downward,
 due largely to changes in the DOE mission and the consequent
 consolidation of special nuclear materials at certain sites.  With
 material consolidated in limited locations, less individuals require
 placement in the PSAP. The number of identified positions and the
 number of actual positions are disparate, as the program is in its
 initial implementation. By FY 1994 the number of identified positions
 and the number of actual positions should be equal at about 9,000
 positions. In FY 1992 there were 210 occupied PSAP positions, all
 under the Idaho Operations Office. In FY 1993 there were 7,996 PSAP
 positions either occupied or in the initial processing stages.
      The effectiveness of the program can be measured by an evaluation
 of the attitudes of the individuals taking part in the PSAP. This
 evaluation is conducted in both pre- and post-orientation for the
 program, with followup evaluation done 1 year after initial orientation.
 Effectiveness can also be measured through increased referrals for
 security concerns and the greater sharing of information between the
 evaluation elements of the program.
     The benefits of the program include the ongoing evaluation of
 individuals in highly sensitive positions to deter and detect behaviors
 or conditions which might indicate security concerns. The evaluation
 includes a medical examination, psychological assessment, drug
 screening, and security review.  The Office of Safeguards and Security
 has determined that participation in the PSAP reduces the insider
 threat from the violent insider to the passive insider.
      Mr. Bevill. How many individuals were relieved of their positions
 in this program (PSAP) in FY 1992 and FY 1993?
      Mr. McFadden. A total of 10 individuals have been removed from PSAP
 duties in FY 1992 and FY 1993. Two have subsequently been returned to
 those duties.
                         SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS
     Mr. Bevill. What attempts are being made to reduce the number and
 level of clearances throughout the Department?
      Mr. McFadden. As a result of the general downsizing of classified
 activities within the Department, particularly in the nuclear weapons
 program, the number of active security clearances were reduced during
 the interval of April 1992 to April 1993 from about 176,000 to about
 166,000.  Additional reductions will be realized this year as the
 national laboratories have been directed to eliminate corporate policies
 that require all employees to be cleared as a condition of employment
 at a Department of Energy owned site.  Instead, Department contractor
 employees will be processed for a Department of Energy clearance only
 when such action can be justified based upon the duties of the
 employee's position. Efforts are also underway at Department contractor
 sites to consolidate classified and special nuclear material
 inventories, which will result in the need for fewer clearances by
 their employees.
      Mr. Bevill. Provide by field office and facility the number and
 types of clearances held by DOE employees, contractors, and other
 Federal employees in FY 1992 and FY 1993.
      Mr. McFadden. There are just under 167,000 clearances currently
 held by DOE Employees, contractors, and other Federal employees.
 Current information will be provided for the record.
                     CLEARANCE STATISTICS FOR FY 1992
                     DOE         DOE
                  EMPLOYEES   CONTRACTORS    0GA     CONGRESS      TOTAL
      Q              1,465      34,502       138            0     36,105
      TS                 0           0         0            0          0
      L                 20         546         0            0        566
      SE                 0           1         0            0          1
 Total               1,485      35,049       138            0     36,672
      Q                240       1,339         6            0      1,585
      TS                 0           0         0            0          0
      L                 22         690         0            0        712
      SE                 0           0         0            0          0
 Total                 262       2,029         6            0      2,297
      Q              3,298       2,227     4,563          324     10,412
      TS               153          47         2            0        202
      L                120         275       192            1        588
      SE               517         629         8            0      1,154
 Total               4,088       3,178     4,765          325     12,356
      Q                304       3,889        17            0      4,210
      TS                 0           0         0            0          0
      L                182       8,578         0            0      8,760
      SE                 0           0         0            0          0
 Total                 486      12,467        17            0     12,970
      Q                386       7,278        58             0     7,722
      TS                 0           0         0             0         0
      L                  1         428         1             0       430
      SE                 0           0         0             0         0
 Total                 387       7,706        59             0     8,152
      Q                827      20,199       143             0    21,169
      TS                 0          11         0             0        11
      L                 66       4,162        14             0     4,242
      SE                 4          19         0             0        23
 Total                 897      24,391       157             0    25,445
      Q                278       3,938        33             0     4,249
      TS                 0           0         0             0         0
      L                  0       7,031         6             0     7,037
      SE                 0           0         0             0         0
 Total                 278      10,969        39             0    11,286
      Q                165       4,263        16             0     4,444
      TS                 0           0         0             0         0
      L                165       5,924        11             0     6,100
      SE                 1           0         0             0         1
 Total                 331      10,187        27             0    10,545
      Q                204       9,830         9             0    10,043
      TS                 0           0         0             0         0
      L                  0         405         0             0       405
      SE                 0           0         0             0         0
 Total                 204      10,235         9             0    10,448
      Q                212      12,886         5             0    13,103
      TS                 0           0         0             0         0
      L                  0         211         0             0       211
      SE                 7           0         0             0         7
 Total                 219      13,097         5             0    13,321
      Q                377      15,468       141             0    15,986
      TS                 0           0         0             0         0
      L                104       6,167         3             0     6,274
      SE                 0           0         0             0         0
 Total                 481      21,635       144             0    22,260
      Q                104       2,218        16             0     2,338
      TS                 0           0         0             0         0
      L                  0       5,989         0             0     5,989
      SE                 0           0         0             0         0
 Total                 104       8,207        16             0     8,327
      Q              7,860     118,037     5,145           324   131,366
      TS               153          58         2             0       213
      L                680      40,406       227             1    41,314
      SE               529         649         8             0     1,186
 GRAND TOTAL         9,222     159,150     5,382           325   174,079
                     CLEARANCE STATISTICS FOR FY 1993
                   DOE            DOE
                EMPLOYEES     CONTRACTORS     0GA   CONGRESS      TOTAL
      Q           1,709         35,290         72        0        37,071
      TS              0              0          0        0             0
      L              10            504          0        0           514
      SE              1              0          0        0             1
 Total            1,720         35,794         72        0        37,586
      Q             238          1,246          8        0         1,492
      TS              0              0          0        0             0
      L              26            653          0        0           679
      SE              0              0          0        0             0
 Total              264          1,899          8        0         2,171
      Q           3,734          2,858      4,561      318        11,471
      TS            143             17          3        0           163
      L              81            274        161        1           517
      SE            496            601          9        0         1,106
 Total            4,454          3,750      4,734      319        13,257
      Q             312          3,704         17        0         4,033
      TS              0              0          0        0             0
      L             199          8,157          0        0         8,356
      SE              0              0          0        0             0
 Total              511         11,861         17        0        12,389
      Q             409          6,419         33        0         6,861
      TS              0              0          0        0             0
      L               0            238          1        0           239
      SE              0              0          0        0             0
 Total              409          6,657         34        0         7,100
      Q             556         16,370        114        0        17,040
      TS              0              3          0        0             3
      L             313          7,184         16        0         7,513
      SE              0             17          0        0            17
 Total              869         23,574        130        0        24,573
      Q             272          3,462         26        0         3,760
      TS              0              0          0        0             0
      L               1          6,680          5        0         6,686
      SE              0              0          0        0             0
 Total              273         10,142         31        0        10,446
      Q             119          2,625         18        0         2,762
      TS              0              0          0        0             0
      L             283          4,521         16        0         4,820
      SE              0              0          0        0             0
 Total              402          7,146         34        0         7,582
      Q             153          7,371          4        0         7,528
      TS              0              0          0        0             0
      L               1            222          1        0           224
      SE              0              0          0        0             0
 Total              154          7,593          5        0         7,752
      Q             239         13,162          4        0        13,405
      TS              0              0          0        0             0
      L               2            198          0        0           200
      SE              3              0          0        0             3
 Total              244         13,360          4        0        13,608
      Q             407         15,283         84        0        15,774
      TS              0              0          0        0             0
      L             118          6,943          2        0         7,063
      SE              0              0          0        0             0
 Total              525         22,226         86        0        22,837
      Q              91          1,928         13        0         2,032
      TS              0              0          0        0             0
      L               0          5,443          0        0         5,443
      SE              0              0          0        0             0
 Total               91          7,371         13        0         7,475
      Q           8,239        109,718      4,954      318       123,229
      TS            143             20          3        0           166
      L           1,034         41,017        202        1        42,254
      SE            500            618          9        0         1,127
 GRAND TOTAL      9,916        151,373      5,168      319       166,776
                         SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS
      Mr. Bevill. Now that several former nuclear materials production
 sites have been deactivated and transferred to the waste cleanup
 program, how has this impacted the number of security clearances?
      Mr. McFadden. When a site is deactivated, the number of security
 clearances associated with that site decreases.  Usually, the level of
 security clearances associated with a deactivated site also decreases.
 At the Richland Operations Office, for example, the number of Q
 clearances was reduced during the period from July 1990 through January
 1993 from 10,235 to 2,753, or by 73 percent. At that same office, a
 total of 2,591 security clearances were eliminated during the interval
 of February 1992 through January 1993.
                          SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS
      Mr. Bevill. What steps are being taken to reduce the number of
 clearances?  Are there any impediments to a quick reduction?
      Mr. McFadden. As sites are deactivated, classified and special
 nuclear 20 material inventories are consolidated or the sites
 reconfigured as quickly as practicable. As consolidation and
 reconfiguration activities proceed, security clearance levels and
 numbers are also reduced in a prudent manner without endangering
 National Security. The only impediment to a quick reduction will be
 our limited ability to consolidate special nuclear material because
 of limited storage and staging facilities.
                           PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM
      Mr. Bevill. What is the Department's current security clearance
 policy?  When was this policy developed and when was it last updated?
      Mr. McFadden. The Department's Personnel Security Program policies
 and procedures are stipulated in Order 5631.2, last reissued on
 September 15, 1992. The Department's security clearance policy conforms
 to pertinent provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and Executive Orders
 that require an individual's eligibility for access to classified
 matter or special nuclear material to be based upon review and
 adjudication of investigative reports provided by the Federal Bureau of
 Investigation or Office of Personnel Management, or other agencies or
 departments provided that the scope and extent of the investigation
 meets standards set by the Department of Energy.  Individuals are
 granted a security clearance only when access is required to classified
 information or special nuclear materials and when it is clearly
 consistent with the national interest to do so.  When a serious question
 is raised concerning an individual's eligibility for a security
 clearance, the case is processed under Departmental administrative
 review procedures to determine whether the security clearance should
 be denied or revoked. Individuals granted a Department of Energy
 security clearance are reinvestigated at 5-year intervals.
      Mr. Bevill. What is the current backlog of reinvestigations? Is it
 increasing?  What efforts are being taken to reduce the backlog?
      Mr. McFadden. As of March 1, 1993, the number of reinvestigations
 that are due to be conducted (that is, the most recent investigation
 was conducted more than 5 years ago) has been reduced to 7,672. This
 number includes both backlogged cases, and cases that normally will
 "come of age" as part of a continuing cycle of 5-year reinvestigations.
 There are less than 2,000 reinvestigations remaining from the original
 "backlog" of 132,000 reinvestigations that resulted from the Department
 of Energy policy change of December 1985 which mandated reinvestigations
 for all levels of security clearances every 5 years. The Department
 anticipates elimination of the remaining 2,000 backlogged investigations
 by the end of FY 1993. (NOTE: The 7,672 also includes 2,910 clearances
 that are held by employees of other Federal Government agencies,)
                           SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET
      Mr. Bevill.  What were the number, by type and performing agency,
 of investigations and reinvestigations performed for FY 1992, FY 1993,
 and FY 1994? Describe the reasons for the increases or decreases?
      Mr. McFadden. The following data on investigations and
 reinvestigations is inserted for the record: (The information follows:)
                                      FY 1992       FY 1993       FY 1994
                                      ACTUAL       ESTIMATED      REQUEST
 FBI    Initial                          44            12           10
 FBI    Reinvestigation                  10             9            8
 OPM    Initial
           Single Scope Background        0        10,700        10,000
           Background                13,488            50            60
           Limited Background             0         1,220         1,217
 OPM    Reinvestigations
           Periodic - Single Scope        0        20,025        19,976
           Special Background           371             0             0
           Limited Background        21,716         7,809             0
 OPM    National Agency Checks
           Initial                    8,525         3,650         4,990
           Reinvestigations          12,784         5,460         8,125
     TOTAL INVESTIGATIONS            56,938        48,935        44,386
      FBI investigations decreased in FY 1993 as that agency is now
 being used strictly for initial investigations for individuals who
 occupy positions of a high degree of importance or sensitivity (150
 positions have such designations within the Department).
      OPM Special Background Investigations (SBI) decreased in FY 1992
 and were "zeroed" out in FY 1993. The Department adopted the Single
 Scope Background Investigations (SSBI) which replaced and negated the
 need for the SBI.  SBI's were used primarily for individuals who
 require access to Sensitive Compartment Information (SCI) access
      OPM Background Investigations (BI) decreased beginning in FY 1993
 when the SSBI became available. BI's will only be conducted on DOE
 employees who occupy critical sensitive positions, but do not require
 access to classified material in order to perform their official duties.
      OPM Limited Background Investigations (LBI) conducted for
 reinvestigations decreased in FY 1993 and will be "zeroed" for FY 1994
 as a result of the adoption of the Periodic Reinvestigation - Single
 Scope Background Investigation (PRIS) in December 1992. LBI's are
 currently used only for initial L and Secret clearances for DOE
      OPM National Agency Checks with Credit (NACC) will increase as the
 need for the number of initial Q clearances is reduced.
                            PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM
      Mr. Bevill. Describe the effort to develop an electronic transfer
 program for security clearances, including the timetable for completion
 and cost by year.
      Mr. McFadden. The current time between the DOE request for a
 background investigation and when the completed product is received
 from the investigative agency (Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is
 approximately 90 days. However, depending on the geographic location,
 it takes another 15 to 30 days in mail time to send and receive the case
 papers and completed investigation.
      This project is to implement an electronic transfer system
 (including appropriate safeguards of data) between each of the DOE
 Operations Offices and the OPM's Office of Federal Investigations in
 Boyers, Pennsylvania, which will allow the DOE to electronically
 transfer the paperwork requesting a background investigation (including
 fingerprints) to OPM, and when the background investigation is
 completed, to have it electronically transferred to the appropriate DOE
 Operations Office for adjudication. This will also allow transfer of
 security files between DOE Operations Offices. The electronic transfer
 system will reduce the mail time between DOE and OPM from several weeks
 to several hours.
      The FY 1994 Security Investigations budget includes $2,950,000 for
 this project, which will take 2 years to complete, and approximately
 $2,200,000 will be required in FY 1995.
                          SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET
      Mr. Bevill. Provide an analysis of security investigation programs
 showing the funds for defense and other than defense programs.
      Mr. McFadden. Approximately 65 percent of the FY 1994 Security
 Investigations budget will be allocated for Defense activities, as
 shown below in the table which I would like to insert into the record.
 (The information follows:)
                         SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
                                FY 1994
           Defense                                        $34,667,750
            Other than Defense                              18,667,250
               Total SI Budget                              53,335,000
                  Use of Prior-Year-Funds                   (8,335,000)
                FY 1994 REQUEST                            $45,000,000
      Mr. Bevill. What was the average cost by type and performing
 agency of investigations and reinvestigations performed by FY 1992,
 FY 1993, and FY 1994? What is the average completion time?
      Mr. McFadden. Security investigations actual and estimated costs
 for FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994 are shown in a table below which I
 would like to insert in the record. (The information follows:)
      FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994 Columns of the FY 1994 Congressional
                                  FY 1992     FY 1993      FY 1994
 FBI Background Investigation     $4,089      $4,627       $4,997
 OPM Single Scope Background         N/A      $2,850       $3,125
      Investigation (SSBI)    1/
 OPM Background Invest. (BI)  1/  $2,475      $2,575       $2,850
 OPM Limited Background           $1,250      $1,400       $1,550
      Investigation (LBI)     2/
 OPM Periodic Reinvest. SBI          N/A        $675         $750
      (PRIS)                  2/
   OPM Special Background
      Investigation (SBI)         $2,575         N/A          N/A
 OPM National Agency Check           $42         $45          $50
      with Credit (NACC)
 *    FY 1993 and FY 1994 columns do not reflect OPM price increases
   1/      For 75 day service
   2/      For 120 day service
      The Federal Bureau of Investigation is completing applicant cases
 in 60 days and reinvestigations in 90 days. The Office of Personnel
 Management is currently completing Single Scope Background
 Investigations (used for the initial investigation for Q and Top
 Secret clearances) in 74 days; Periodic Reinvestigations for Single
 Scope Background Investigations (for reinvestigation of Q and Top
 Secret clearances) in 120 days, and National Agency Checks with Credit
 (used for initial and reinvestigation of L and Secret clearances) in 24
      Mr. Bevill. Provide a breakout, by activity, of.the $4.3 million
 requested for Security Investigations Activities.
      Mr. McFadden. The breakout of our request for Related Security
 Investigations ActiVities is shown on a table which I would like to
 insert in the record.  (The information follows:)
      Electronic Transfer Program                     $2,950,000
      Implementation of Accelerated Access
      Authorization Program (AAAP)                      1,100,000
      National Industrial Security Program
      (NISP) support                                     250,000
           Total Related SI Activities                $4,300,000


      Mr. Bevill. This office was established to consolidate emergency
 response activities throughout the Department. Instead of creating more
 efficient operations, the total cost of emergency operations has
 increased substantially. Please justify this increase in funding.
      General Bickford. Efficiency of operations has increased with a
 slight increase in funding.  This increased funding results from
 breaking out common funding support from the Atomic Energy Defense
 Activities Appropriation. In fiscal years 1991 and 1992, common
 funding support from the Atomic Energy Defense Activities Appropriation
 amounted to $6.5 million and $3.05 million, respectively. Also, for
 FY 1992, $214,000 supported 3 FTEs directly funded by Departmental
 Administration. The increase from FY 1991 to FY 1992 is for additional
 contractor assistance for training, emergency plans review, data
 analyses, and to strengthen the DOE exercise and appraisal program.
 Also, the funding increase provides for state-of-the-art communications,
 display, and data processing equipment necessary for full operation of
 the improved Emergency Operations Center (EOC).
      The FY 1993 budget increase is for continued Emergency Management
 System (EMS) enhancement and the EOC.  Contractor support is required
 to continue, expand, and improve the EMS appraisal program; contractor
 and Federal support to meet guidance and oversight requirements of the
 EMS Program; and contractor support to strengthen DOE's EMS exercise
 and evaluation program to ensure effective EMS planning, preparedness,
 and response to emergency situations; and continued improvement of the
 Department-wide emergency training and technical assistance to the
 readiness assurance program and to support other exercises.  Funding for
 the EOC supports continued oversight and operation of the Headquarters
 EOC and the departmental emergency communication system between the
 Field Offices EOCs. The funding increase for capital equipment ensures
 compatibility throughout the Headquarters and Field Offices EOCs.
      Mr. Bevill. How are efforts of this office coordinated with
 the emergency response and operations funded in the defense
 programmatic areas?
      General Bickford. The Office of Emergency Planning and
 Operations is responsible for the development and operation of the
 Department's Emergency Management System (EMS), which is the
 framework for all of DOE's emergency planning, preparedness , and
 readiness assurance activities. The EMS has been established to
 ensure a fully coordinated and integrated emergency preparedness
 program is maintained by the Department.   The Office of Emergency
 Planning and Operations is also responsible for ensuring that
 Departmental policies and standards are appropriately applied in
 emergency management programs. This is accomplished through the
 review of emergency plans and procedures and periodic appraisals
 of emergency management programs and evaluation of other emergency
 preparedness activities.
      Emergency response and operations activities funded in the
 defense programmatic area include the unique radiological
 emergency response assets (i.e., the Nuclear Emergency Search
 Team, the Accident Response Group, the Aerial Measuring System,
 the Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability, the Federal
 Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, the Radiological
 Assistance Program, and the Radiation Emergency Assistance
 Center/Training Site) managed by the Department and the emergency
 management programs for DOE's defense-related facilities,
 operations, and activities. Program management responsibilities
 for the response assets are solely within the defense programmatic
 purview, subject to periodic review, appraisal, and evaluation by
 the Office of Emergency Planning and Operations, as are the
 emergency management programs for DOE's defense-related
 facilities, operations, and activities.
      Coordination is accomplished by the Office of Emergency
 Planning and Operations through a number of mechanisms and
 activities, including: chairing the Department's Emergency
 Management Advisory Committee, which is comprised of
 representatives of all Departmental elements with emergency
 preparedness responsibilities and interests; participation in the
 directives development process which sets Departmental
 responsibilities, authorities, and requirements; review and
 concurrence on emergency readiness assurance plans; and,
 concurrence in selection of Departmental representatives to
 interagency and international committees, work groups, and task
       Mr. Rogers. The U.S. Customs Service has a large presence at all
 US ports as well as the technology and capacity to inspect all goods
 entering the U.S. Are there any joint initiatives between the
 Departments of Energy and Defense and the Customs Service to detect the
 importation of nuclear weapons and parts? Please describe these
 initiatives including the requested funding for fiscal year 1994.
       Mr. Ford. There are no joint initiatives between the Departments
 of Energy and Defense and the Customs Service to detect the importation
 of nuclear weapons and parts.