By Mr. SPECTER:
S. 421. A bill to improve the objectivity, reliability, coordination, and timeliness of national foreign intelligence through a reorganization of positions, and for other purposes; to the Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, today, I am reintroducing legislation calling for the creation of the position of a Director of National Intelligence and a reorganization of other intelligence positions. When I introduced this legislation in the 100th and 101st Congresses, I stated that its goals were to improve the objectivity, reliability, management and timeliness of foreign intelligence. In the 6 years I have served on the Select Committee on Intelligence, I have become more convinced than ever that these goals are not now being fully achieved. More importantly, I am concerned that unless the responsibilities and authorities of senior officials in our intelligence hierarchy are more clearly delineated than those in the National Security Act of 1947, intelligence as a fundamental element of support to our policymakers and to the Congress will suffer in terms of quality and cost. For the reasons I shall outline, these changes are essential to national security.
Two years ago I stated that this bill would enhance considerably the objectivity and reliability of our Nation's intelligence, which the events of the past have demonstrated to be lacking. Equally, this legislation would greatly improve the needed management structure and control of the activities and vast resources of our country's intelligence agencies and departments. My assessment has not changed. My remarks then are equally poignant today and I therefore intend to repeat my arguments, provide new examples and strengthen the legislation. During the Iran-Contra hearings, then Secretary of State George Shultz testified, in very clear terms as to the principal problem with U.S. intelligence. `[One is] the importance of separating the function of gathering and analyzing intelligence from the function of developing and carrying out policy. If the two things are mixed together, it is too tempting to have your analysis and selection of information that's presented favor the policy that you're advocating.' Secretary Shultz went on to say that long before the Iran-Contra events came to light, he already had come to have grave doubts about the objectivity and reliability of some of the intelligence he was receiving precisely because the people who supplied it were too deeply involved in advocating and carrying out policy.
There were cogent reasons in addition advocated by a distinguished American, Mr. Clark Clifford, who was instrumental in the 1947 legislation creating the Central Intelligence Agency.
Director Webster has done a good job during his watch of staying outside of the policy arena and carrying out his intelligence duties in an impartial manner. Some of his detractors have even criticized him for being too detached from foreign policy. I applaud his strict interpretation of his duties and the courage of his convictions in adhering to them. However, I am guided in this legislation by the lessons of our intelligence history since 1947.
In the 44 years since passage of the National Security Act, Directors of Central Intelligence have been tested repeatedly on
their ability to maintain a delicate separation of two competing responsibilities. On the one hand, the Director has been expected to provide unvarnished intelligence information to the President and other foreign policymakers. On the other hand, he has been asked to be a participant in the making and execution of foreign policy through covert actions. If history has taught us anything, it is that the desired separation cannot and has not been consistently maintained. Since 1947 several Directors have been political activists who regarded their position as license to shape the foreign policy of the United States. Their primary vehicle invariably was covert action, the most notorious of which were the disastrous Bay of Pigs operation and the Iran-Contra affair.
If fault is to be found, it should start with the National Security Act which formed the CIA and the position of Director of Central Intelligence. The primary focus of that legislation was the creation of the Department of Defense and the position of Secretary of Defense. In part because of the need for secrecy and in larger part because of the bureaucratic infighting among the military services, FBI and the remnants of the OSS for primacy in the national intelligence arena, the duties and responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence were obfuscated in law. Since that time, it has been left to each Director to interpret his duties and responsibilities guided by changing Executive orders. Certainly, the closest authority for the DCI even to conduct covert actions rests in an interpretation of section 102(d)(5) of the 1947 National Security Act which charges the CIA to `perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.' At best it is unrealistic and probably unfair to expect our Nation's senior intelligence officer to be the purveyor of objective, unbiased information upon which the President and Secretary of State may formulate a foreign policy, while at the same time charging him to influence and implement that policy in the form of covert action.
At worst, the problem is particularly acute when the Director is a foreign policy activist. Director William Casey was not the first Director of Central Intelligence who desired to be involved to some degree in the formulation or implementation of foreign policy, nor is he likely to be the last. Recognizing this, we should take steps to ensure in law some clearer definition of what we expect and not expect our chief intelligence officer to be. We simpy cannot afford to have two Secretaries of State, two foreign policymakers who may be attempting to move the country in different directions, one overtly and the other covertly. No one is well served by this contradiction as outlined by George Shultz---not the President, not the Congress and not the country.
We have a choice, we can preserve the status quo and hope that the current--and each of his successors--will have absorbed the lessons of the past particularly the Iran-Contra affair. Or we can create a better system of checks and balances and strong management. We can do this by separating the duties of the Director as quasi-leader of the Intelligence Community and as the day to day manager of the Central Intelligence Agency. We can
do this by more clearly defining the responsibilities and authorities of both positions. We can do this at minimum cost. And, we can do this without the creation of a new layer of bureaucracy.
The results will be a new and strengthened full-time leader of the intelligence community--a Director of National Intelligence--with clear responsibilities and authorities for providing objective, reliable, and coordinated intelligence to policymakers and for managing and integrating much more effectively the collection, analysis and vast resources of the intelligence community.
An equally important element of this legislation focuses on the ever more critical need for better management and direction of the activities and vast resources of our several intelligence departments and agencies--the so-called intelligence community which is more aptly described as a guild than an integrated enterprise. In the view of this Senator, a serious management deficiency exists because the Director lacks the authority to manage the community and to marshall its vast resources. A Director of National Intelligence with clear responsibility and full authority could and must correct this imbalance. The time of protected intelligence budgets is gone.
When President Truman created the CIA to centralize intelligence and the position of Director to head this new Agency. He tasked the Director to coordinate the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security. Unfortunately and noted above, the Director's authorities as spelled in the act were limited, weak and vague; they were `to advise,' `to recommend,' and `to correlate' the activities of those several Government departments which at the time consisted of the intelligence services of the Army and Navy, a small bureau in the State Department, a portion of the FBI and remnants of the OSS. Since 1947, those Government departments have grown and multiplied far beyond the vision of President Truman. However, the responsibility and authority to manage and direct them have not kept pace. The result is that today the intelligence community is virtually rudderless.
Several Presidents since John F. Kennedy have directed their chief intelligence officer to devote the bulk of his time to the intelligence community. For a number of reasons this has not happened. Suffice it to say that, in some cases, Director's have found the operational role of the CIA more glamorous and politically safer than managing an amorphous community composed of agencies and departments opposed to centralized direction. Events such as Watergate, congressional investigations of wrongdoings, and the turnover of DCI's, also have contributed to the neglect.
Today, the intelligence community consists of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence, the large foreign intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, offices for the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance, the National Photo Interpretation Center, the FBI's Foreign Counterintelligence
Division, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and elements of the Treasury and Energy Departments. These organizations provide what we call national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. There are other elements in the Federal Government, mostly within the Defense Department, which run a vast system of tactical intelligence nearly as complex and as expensive as that of the national foreign intelligence world. Outside of the Government, there is another world of contractors who design and develop these complex intelligence systems and, in some cases, operate them for the intelligence agencies.
Make no mistake in construing my remarks. The functions performed by these agencies are fundamental to our national security. But their budgets are in the billions; their growth in terms of people is the greatest in the history of U.S. intelligence; their missions and challenges now and for the foreseeable future so demanding, complex and costly that their management and leadership can no longer be accomplished on a part-time basis by a Director without real authority and one who also must manage the CIA.
The Intelligence Oversight Committees which review the programs and budgets of the intelligence community have long identified management of the intelligence community as an important issue. In 1976, the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence--the predecessor to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence--`found concern that the functon of the DCI in his roles as intelligence community leader and principal intelligence adviser to the President is inconsistent with his responsibilities to manage one of the intelligence community agencies--the CIA.' The committee also expressed concern that the DCI's new span of control--both the entire intelligence community and the entire CIA--may be too great for him to exercise effective detailed supervisor of clandestine activities. Those concerns are even greater today than they were 15 years ago, because of the greater challenges and costs facings intelligence, the growing competition for resources and the unacceptable risks to U.S. foreign policy.
As a start, the Senate Select Intelligence Committee is undertaking a major review of the Department of Defense intelligence with a view to its reorganization. The committee is of the view that in the face of severe budget constraints, current defense intelligence programs and infrastructures cannot be sustained at current levels and forms. While the threat from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact has diminished, there are new threats and new intelligence requirements such as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation and the needs to monitor arms control agreements. The breadth of requirements will continue and will likely expand; the cost cannot. In our report accompanying the fiscal year 1991 intelligence authorization bill, the committee has noted the assessment of defense intelligence made by the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe who criticized the Defense Department's intelligence for `significant duplication of effort; insufficient integration and sharing of information; uneven security measures and regulations; pursuit of parochial
service interests rather than joint intelligence interests; and gaps in intelligence support and coverage, despite the number of intelligence organizations.'
Another problem cited in the report is one which transcends strictly Department of Defense Intelligence, that is, the excessive isolation of tactical and national intelligence communities from one another. `Military commanders seek self-sufficiency through organic systems and organizations on the argument that national intelligence systems cannot be relied upon for support. The national community, likewise, emphasizes its peacetime missions and pays scant attention to the commander's need.'
An immediate observation is the absence of leadership, leadership which a strengthened Director of National Intelligence would bring to bear. In my view there is currently no guiding hand because the Director lacks the sufficient mandate and authority to act. Several past Directors have attempted to take a strong hand to integrate and manage the intelligence community most of which resides in the domain of the Defense Department. However, the Defense Department has been too strong and too entrenched and the Director's authority too weak to force any real changes. Consequently, the congressional intelligence oversight committees have directed the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence to act. Other legislation will likely be required to generate the degree of change necessary.
This bill is a major start. It accomplishes important hierarchical changes. First, it amends the National Security Act of 1947 to make clear that the principal role of foreign intelligence and of the agencies who provide such intelligence are to ensure the provision of objective, reliable, coordinated and timely information upon which the President and other senior foreign policymakers may base sound foreign policy decisions.
Second, it establishes the position of `Director of National Intelligence' to serve as the primary adviser to the President on national foreign intelligence matters and as the full-time manager of the intelligence community with clearly defined statutory responsibilities and authorities. The title is not new; it was proposed several times in the past.
Third, it makes the Director of National Intelligence a statutory member of the National Security Council to ensure that he is aware of emerging issues for which there is an intelligence need and to ensure that there is an objective intelligence basis for national security and foreign policy decisions being contemplated.
Fourth, it ensures that the position of the Director of National Intelligence is not a hollow one by giving the Director not only the statutory authority to approve and submit the intelligence community program, resources and budget, but also to task all intelligence collection and analytical resources.
Fifth, it relieves the Director of National Intelligence of the responsibility for managing covert actions but charges him with responsibility for overseeing the conformity of such actions with stated foreign policy and applicable laws and regulations.
Sixth, it establishes the position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to manage the CIA on a full-time basis including the management of covert actions directed by the
Seventh, it eliminates the need for a Director of the intelligence community staff since the 240 person staff plus other offices and personnel would report directly to the Director of National Intelligence.
Finally, I endorse completely the view expressed by Director Webster that the CIA's directorship should not change every time a new President is elected. This gives rise to charges that the position has been politicized and that there is an inadequate institutional memory of lessons learned from the past. In the past 20 years, there have been seven heads of the CIA and only two of these were career intelligence officers. We cannot afford a generalized loss of confidence in the CIA's objectivity and reliability. The politicization of its analysis such as was expressed by former Secretary of State Shultz even the perception of such politicization, demands a more professional approach to intelligence activities and analysis. Therefore, to reduce the risk of politicization, this bill also would:
Create a fixed, 7-year tenure for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Require that at least one of the positions of Director or Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency be filled by career intelligence officer from the intelligence community.
I am not proposing that the Director of National Intelligence be tenured because I believe that the President should have the right to select individuals who are to serve as his primary advisers.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
Section 1. This Act may be cited as the `National Intelligence Reorganization Act'.
Sec. 2. Section 101(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended in the fourth undesignated paragraph--
(1) by striking out `and' at the end of clause (6);
(2) by striking out the period at the end of clause (7) and inserting in lieu thereof'; and'; and
(3) by adding at the end thereof the following:
`(8) The Director of National Intelligence in his role as primary adviser on intelligence.'
Sec. 3. Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting new section 102.
`Sec. 102.(a)(1) There are hereby established the positions of Director of National Intelligence (hereafter in this Act referred to as the `DNI') and the Deputy Director of National Intelligence who shall each be appointed by, serve at the pleasure of, the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
`(2) The principal role of foreign intelligence and of the agencies which provide such intelligence is to ensure the provisions of objective, reliable, coordinated, and timely information upon which the President and other senior foreign policy makers may base sound foreign policy decisions. To ensure such provision, the DNI shall serve as the nation's senior intelligence officer and primary adviser to the President on foreign intelligence matters. Accordingly, the DNI shall be prohibited from any duties involving the formulation of foreign policy and the management of covert actions except as may be specifically authorized by this Act. The Deputy Director of National Intelligence shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director during his absence or disability.
`(3) The DNI shall be responsible directly to the President and the National Security Council.
`(4) Upon request, any department, agency, or other component of the United States Government involved in intelligence or intelligence-related activities shall detail for the use of the DNI such staff as may be necessary to carry out the duties of the DNI under this section.
`(b) To carry out his responsibilities under this section, the DNI shall--
`(1) ensure that such objective, reliable and coordinated national foreign intelligence is provided to the President and officials in the executive and legislative branches in a timely manner;
`(2) provide policy direction to the national foreign intelligence activities of all agencies, departments, offices, and other entities of the intelligence community.
`(3) develop such strategy, objectives and guidance for the intelligence community to enhance capabilities for responsing to expected future needs for national foreign intelligence;
`(4) provide direction to program managers, heads of agencies, departments, offices, and other entities for the national foreign intelligence program and budget;
`(5) evaluate and audit national foreign intelligence programs and budget performance;
`(6) review, evaluate, approve, and submit, to the Congress through the President, a national foreign intelligence program and budget;
`(7) review and approve all requests for reprogramming national foreign intelligence funds;
`(8) develop collection strategies, objectives, and targets in the intelligence community for national foreign intelligence requirements and priorities established by the National Security Council;
`(9) direct, control, and manage the tasking of national foreign intelligence collection activities;
`(10) coordinate, produce, and disseminate all national foreign intelligence and, levy analytic tasks on all intelligence community production organizations and entities in consultation with those organizations and entities. Intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security shall be open to the audit of the DNI, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, shall be made available to the DNI for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination;
`(11) establish appropriate mechanisms for competitive analysis so that diverse views and judgments within the intelligence community are brought to the attention of national policymakers;
`(12) conduct jointly with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, military net assessments which allow for independent judgments by the DNI on areas critical to United States national security, strategy, tactics, or specific weapon systems;
`(13) oversee covert actions on a periodic basis for compliance with stated foreign policy objectives and established laws and regulations.
`(14) direct manage and control the development and maintenance of services of common concern by designated intelligence organizations on behalf of the intelligence community;
`(15) direct, manage and control foreign intelligence and counterintelligence arrangements with foreign governments, foreign intelligence and counterintelligence relationships between agencies of the intelligence community and the intelligence or internal security services of foreign governments, and establish policies and procedures governing the conduct of liaison by any agency, department, office or other entity of the United States Government with such services;
`(16) establish security countermeasure standards for the safeguard of foreign intelligence systems and information;
`(17) protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;
`(18) establish appropriate staffs, committees, or other advisory groups to assist in the execution of the Director's responsibilities; and
`(19) review the tactical intelligence programs and budget of the Department of Defense to eliminate duplications with programs which are or can be readily provided by the National Foreign Intelligence program.
Sec. 4. (a) Title I of the Nationals Security Act of 1947 is amended by changing old section 102 to be new section 102A with the following changes:
(1) by inserting the words `director of the' before the caption `central intelligence agency'.
(b) Section 102A, subsection (a) of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended--
(1) by inserting after the words' . . . National Security Council', the words `and Director of National Intelligence';
(2) by striking out `Director of Central Intelligence' and inserting in lieu thereof `Director of the Central Intelligence Agency'; and
(3) by striking out `Deputy Director of Central Intelligence' and inserting in lieu thereof `Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency'.
(c) Section 102A subsection (a) of such Act is further amended--
(1) by inserting `(1)' immediately after `(a)';
(2) by striking out the proviso and the colon immediately preceding such proviso at the end of the second sentence and inserting in lieu thereof a comma and the following:
`except that at no time shall the two positions of the Director and Deputy Director be occupied simultaneously by--
`(a) commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in an active or retired status; or
`(b) individuals not having previously served in career positions in the Intelligence Community;
`(c) the term of service of the Director shall be seven years. The Director may not be reappointed and may be removed by the President only for cause; and
`(d) the provisions of 102A subsections (a)(1) shall apply to the service of the first Director and the first Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency appointed after the date of enactment.'.
(d) Section 102A, subsections (b) and (c). References in these sections to the Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence shall be deemed to be references to the Director or Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(e) Section 102A subsection (d) of such Act is amended to read as follows:
`(d) For the purpose of carrying out the Agency's intelligence activities in the interests of national security, it shall be the duty and responsibility of the Agency, under the management direction of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency:
`(1) to collect, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, including information not otherwise obtainable, and to coordinate the collection of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence within the United States with the Federal Bureau of Investigation as authorized by law or procedures established by the Attorney General: Provided, That the Central Intelligence Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions;
`(2) to conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States and, without assuming or performing any internal security functions, conduct counterintelligence activities within the United States in coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as authorized by law and procedures established by the Attorney General;
`(3) to coordinate counterintelligence activities and the collection of information not otherwise obtainable when conducted outside the United States by other departments and agencies.
`(4) to manage covert actions approved by the President; covert actions unlike intelligence activities are the sole responsibility of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who is directly accountable to the President and the NSC with regard to these actions;
`(5) to conduct services of common concern as directed by the DNI;
`(6) to carry out or contract for research, development, and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to authorized functions;
`(7) to protect the security of its installations, activities, information, property, and employees by appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the Central Intelligence Agency as are necessary; and
`(8) to conduct such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described in paragraphs (1) through (7), including procurement and essential cover and proprietary arrangements.'.
Sec. 5. (a) Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by--
(1) changing Director of Central Intelligence to read Director of National Intelligence;
(2) adding at the end thereof the following:
`Director of Central Intelligence Agency.'.
(b) Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
`Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.'.
Sec. 6. The provision of section 102a of the Act relating to the Director of the Intelligence Community staff is repealed.
Sec. 7. The Central Intelligence Act of 1949 is amended by changing references to the Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to mean the Director or Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.