WASHINGTON, DC 20515 6415
I am pleased to come before you today to share with you the results of the year-long inquiry that we call IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century. I was determined, as Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, to undertake a review of the roles, functions and structure of our Intelligence Community (IC), not because anyone thought that the Community was unable to meet today's challenges, but because it had been largely shaped by the Cold War and now faces new challenges as we enter the 21st century.
The proposals that you will hear about today will form, ultimately, the basis of a legislative package that I will introduce within the next few weeks. This package will be the basis for further discussion on the Committee, as we look at the results of other efforts by our Senate colleagues, the Council on Foreign Relations and, most recently, the Aspin-Brown Commission. Let me add that I do not view these efforts as being duplicative. In fact, I am happy to say that, in the case of the Aspin-Brown Commission report, for example, there are significant areas of agreement as well as some areas of disagreement, all of which will be discussed. Consequently, I believe that we, the Nation and the IC have all benefited from each other's work and the distinct approaches we each have taken.
IC21 has been guided by the following broad concepts:
Overarching Principle: A More Corporate IC
During our work on IC21, we constantly referred back to the success of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This was a useful model. First, it has intellectual coherence in that it sought to achieve one major goal that had been lacking: "jointness." Second, it concentrated on the big changes, set forth general guidance and then let those responsible handle many of the details.
In looking at the IC we have today, one is struck by its somewhat ad hoc structure. Although each of the components makes sense individually, this is not a structure one would design from scratch. Only intelligence, of all major government functions, is carried out by disparate agencies and organizations that are either independent of one another or are housed in departments whose main functions are policy, not intelligence Unless one looks at the intelligence process as an integrated whole working towards an agreed end, the IC makes little sense and can become, in its individual parts, self-serving.
That is why, throughout our IC21 proposals, we have emphasized the idea of a truly corporate IC, an IC in which all components understand that they are part of a larger coherent process aiming at a single goal: the delivery of timely intelligence to policy makers at various levels.
To achieve this goal, central management should be strengthened; core competencies ~collection, analysis, covert action) should be reinforced; and infrastructure should be consolidated wherever possible.
Major IC21 Legislative Proposals
Role of the DCI. The role and status of the DCI are central. We believe he should continue to serve at the pleasure of the President and should continue to have direct control over the CIA, the Clandestine Service and the Community Management Staff. We take this view on the DCI's tenure because we believe that the quality of his relationship to the President is crucial. Although it would be beneficial for the IC to return to the practice of DCIs not automatically changing with each new Administration, it is important for the President to have a DCI with whom he feels comfortable. The analogy that some raise about term limits for the Director of the FBI is not apt: the DCI is the senior intelligence official; the Director of the FBI is not the senior law enforcement official - the Attorney General is and that individual serves at the pleasure of the President. Regarding continued DCI management of various components, we agree with the view we often heard during the IC21 process, that the DCI needs some bureaucratic basis for his authority or he will be largely irrelevant.
However, the DCI also needs authority within the IC that corresponds to his responsibility. Therefore, we are proposing:
However, that body - the President, Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense - is not always able as a single entity to provide the DCI with the necessary guidance and feedback he requires. Therefore, we propose re-establishing the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) under the NSC, as have Aspin-Brown and the SSCI in the past. The CFI will be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; other members will be the Secretaries of State and Defense; the Chairman of the JCS; and the Attorney General (when counter-intelligence issues are discussed), or their deputies.
Two Deputy DCIS (DDCIs). Each DCI has found himself torn between his community-wide duties and the running of one agency, the CIA. The DCI needs to be able to delegate parts of each function, often on a daily basis, but within a structure that is both permanent and flexible. We propose that there be two DDCIS. Both DDCIS should be individuals with extensive national security experience; both will be confirmed by the Senate. At no time may more than one of these officials (the DCI and two DDCIS) be an active duty military officer.
One DDCI will direct the CIA and, to promote corporateness, be responsible for all IC production and analysis.
There will also be a DDCI for Community Management (DDCI/CM), who will oversee an enhanced Community Management Staff (CMS) and will be responsible for the collection, acquisition and infrastructure management elements of the IC.
Specifically, the DDCI/CM will be responsible for rationalized and consolidated management of infrastructure and services of common concern across the IC. These will include - at a minimum - personnel management, community-level training, security, information systems and communications. He will do so through an Infrastructure Support Office (ISO).
He will also be responsible for IC-wide requirements and collection management, which will direct all collection tasking (HUMINT and technical) to the appropriate agencies, ensuring a coherent and multi-disciplinary approach to all collection issues.
The CMS should compile the IC budget, and should have a program analysis and evaluation capability, a comptroller capability, and the authority to withhold funds. The CMS will coordinate directly with its counterpart DMI staff to develop the IC-wide budget.
This structure will allow the DCI to move more freely between his major responsibilities, while being assured that he has two Deputies who can carry out his directives and act for him when he is occupied elsewhere. The DCI will designate which DDCI will be Acting DCI in his absence.
Director of Military Intelligence. The Defense Department is and will remain one of the largest consumers and largest components of the IC. The defense intelligence establishment, within itself, faces many of the same structural problems we have noted for the IC. Just as the IC needs a stronger managerial center, so do defense intelligence efforts.
We propose creating a Director of Military Intelligence (DMI). The DMI will be a uniformed officer. He will be the Secretary of Defense's senior military intelligence adviser. The DMI, as a senior member of the IC, will be accountable to the DCI in all matters relative to the IC. In order to have a firm institutional base, the DMI will also be the Director of the DIA. Finally, he should be the program manager of the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and program coordinator for what is now known as Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA). This change reflects the need for a greater "corporate" structure on the defense side as well, and the role that the DMI and his immediate staff will play as part of the IC corporate team.
Community All-Source Analysis.
(a) CIA. President Truman created the CIA to coordinate disparate intelligence reports and analyses. It quickly became a producer in its own right. This development, now over 40 years old, cannot and should not be reversed. Rather, the CIA's role as the premier all source analytical agency should be reinforced and underscored. To do so, CIA should house not only analysts, but also second- and third-tier exploiters of the various collection disciplines, in order to create a true synergy between collection and production and to develop true all-source analysis.
(b) DIA. The DIA"S's role as the focal point for management of Defense's all-source analysis and production should be reinforced. This is important to note, even though it does not require any legislative change.
(c) INR, DOE/INT and Treasury/OIS. These offices will continue to be the primary analytical producers for their departmental consumers and will participate in IC-wide analyses. This does not require any legislative change.
(a) Clandestine Service. Given the political and administrative problems sometimes created by clandestine collection and covert action, the bureaucratic ties to the DCI must be made more direct. These activities require an inordinate amount of the DCl's time, in terms of both management and testimony before Congress. Although the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) at CIA typically enjoys direct access to the DCI, the DDO is actually two or three levels removed from the DCI. Moreover, there is no compelling organizational reason to manage the clandestine service jointly with analysis in the CIA. This is the result of historical accident and ongoing practice.
We propose removing the DO from the CIA, renaming it the Clandestine Service, and placing it directly under the DCl's control. The Clandestine Service will be responsible for all clandestine human collection, currently handled by the CIA/DO and the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS).
The Clandestine Service could continue to be housed at CIA, but it should be managed as a separate entity. The Clandestine Service will be headed by a Director, appointed by the DCI from among intelligence professionals. There will be a Deputy Director, who is a two-star professional military intelligence officer and is responsible for support to the military and for coordination, as appropriate, with the military services, CINCs and OSD.
(b) Technical Collection Agency. One of the most frequently-heard criticisms of intelligence collection management - and one that we endorse - is the domination of "stovepipes." These are distinct collection disciplines and entities that are managed separately, housed in a number of agencies. They are often competitors - especially during budget debates -rather than mutually supportive. The "stovepipes" also make it much more difficult to make educated, IC-wide decisions about overall collection needs and the resources that are required. "Break down the stovepipes" was one of the recommendations we heard most frequently during our deliberations.
We propose consolidating the technical collection disciplines - SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT -into a single agency. The Technical Collection Agency (TCA) will be designated a Combat Support Agency (Type 3), as NSA currently is. Its director will be either a senior defense or intelligence civilian, or a three-star officer.
The TCA would contain the personnel involved in collection and processing activities, and first-tier analysts who serve as a "bridge" to the analytical community.
(c)Technology Development Office (TDO). The TDO will be responsible for the research & development and acquisition of airborne and spaceborne collection systems, but not for their operation once "launched." The TDO will be comprised of portions of the current NRO, the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) and CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T) et al.
National Intelligence Evaluation Council. The IC has had a longstanding inability to track the relationship between resources and products, and between production and consumers' needs. This inability deprives both the DCI and the IC of central management tools and can leave the intelligence process to run on inertia. This evaluation function is especially important as IC resources either remain level or decline.
Some evaluation responsibilities are already housed within the National Intelligence Council. This function should be expanded and taken over by a separate entity, the National Intelligence Evaluations Council (NIEC). The NIEC will be responsible for evaluating IC-wide collection and production, working closely with those who are managing the requirements, collection management and resource allocation functions on the Community Management Staff. The head of the NIEC will be appointed by and report directly to the DCI. The remainder of the NIC - the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) - will become part of the CIA.
Congressional Oversight. We believed that, as part of IC21, it was incumbent on us to review how we in the House carry out intelligence oversight. The proposals that follow are not part of the Intelligence Community Act of 1996, as they affect only the House rules and do not need enactment into law. Nonetheless, they are part of IC21 and I expect to be talking with the Rules Committee and the Speaker about them. We believe, perhaps not surprisingly, that the current oversight system has responded well to the concerns that have shaped it since the mid-1970s. Oversight comprises two roles: investigator and advocate. This latter function, advocacy, is especially important for intelligence, as intelligence has no natural advocates within the government or the larger body politic.
One of the major tensions within the current oversight process is that we continue to treat intelligence as an extraordinary function of government, rather than as an accepted one. There are, we admit, aspects of intelligence that are extraordinary, but we believe that we should try, to the extent possible, to treat intelligence in a more "normal" manner.
We do not recommend creation of a Joint Intelligence Committee. The main argument in favor of a joint committee is that by reducing the number of Members and staff with access to intelligence information, the chance of leaks will be lessened. Leaks are deplorable and cannot be tolerated. We disagree strongly, however, with the misperception that Congress is the major source of such leaks. A joint committee will not appreciably reduce the number of people with access to classified information and would erode our national process of checks and balances. It would also underscore the view that intelligence is somehow different.
Both the House and Senate Intelligence Committees currently have tenure limits for Members. This derives from the view that the old oversight system suffered from too cozy a relationship between long-term Congressional overseers and the IC. Tenure limits seek to obviate this. However, tenure limits also have their cost: the rapid turnover of Members and senior staff reduces the rigor of oversight, given the time it takes to learn many of the intricacies involved in intelligence.
We believe that the current oversight system is sufficiently mature to allow either easing or eliminating the tenure limits. Consideration should also be given to making HPSCI a standing committee, perhaps with a proviso that continues to allow the Speaker to make appointments.
Conclusion. To repeat what I said at the outset: the United States continues to need a strong, highly capable and increasingly flexible IC. We believe that the changes we have proposed - that form the basis for the Intelligence Community Act of 1996 - along with many non-legislative recommendations in the IC21 report, will allow us to keep those aspects of the IC that are strong and improve those that need to be updated, so that the IC can continue to serve us well as we enter the 21st century.
I look forward to a rigorous debate over our proposals and the others that have been made, and to passage and enactment of the Intelligence Community Act of 1996.