Table of Contents
and Key Judgments
of the Commission
Specific Commission Tasks
Makeup of the Commission
A Review of Previous Studies of NIMA
Support to the Commission
NIMA from the Beginning
NIMA in Context
The National Security Context
The Collection Context-FIA
Two-and-a-Half Roles for NIMA
NIMA as an Intelligence Producer
NIMA as a GIS Provider
The Role of Acquisition in NIMA
The Promise of NIMA
Convergence of Imagery and Geospatial Processes
What Did the Geographer Know ... and When Did He Know It?
What Did the Imagery Analyst Know... and When Did She Know It?
Convergent Systems and Convergent Products
A Tale of Two Cities
"Magic Maps"-Another Kind Of Convergence
NIMA and Its Stakeholders
NIMA and Its "Customers"
Kudos from Users
Support to CIA and DIA
Customer Readiness for Change-The Paper Chase
Turning Consumers Into Customers
NIMA "Commercialization" Strategy
The Short Attention Span of Most Consumers
Tension Between "National" and "Tactical" Users
Is There a "National Versus Tactical" Problem?
A Characterization of the Problem
The Need to Turn Down the Heat
Identifying Some Component Problems
Strategies for Relief and Mitigation
Some Longer-Term Concerns
NIMA and Its Peers and Partners
How NIMA Is Viewed by Industry
NIMA and the Other INTs
NIMA and Foreign Government Activities
NIMA and Its Suppliers
NRO and FIA
DARO, Where Are You When We Need You?
NIMA's Changing Role in a World of Commercial Suppliers
Commercial Imagery Providers
NIMA's Commercial Imagery Strategy
Commercial Value-Added (GIS) Product Suppliers
NIMA's Buying Habits-Actions Speak Louder Than Words
A Strained Relationship with Industry
NIMA Management Challenges
The Role of the DCI Versus SECDEF
The Tenure of the Director of NIMA
The Job of Director, NIMA
Authorities of the Director of NIMA
D/NIMA Span of Control
NIMA's Information Systems-TPED At Last!
If That's TPED, What is USIGS?
The Scope of TPED-Why Does It Cost So Much?
Managing TPED "Operations"
TPED Acquisition Management
The Role of Commercial Technology
The IDEX Replacement, IEC, Is a Case in Point
Making Commercial TPED Acquisition Work
Does It Scale?
Is the Design Too Tightly Integrated? Too Complex?
Choosing the Right Architects
Planning a Smooth Transition-Prototyping and Evolution
The Current State of TPED
The Need for an Extraordinary Program Office
To Establish the Baseline Architecture
To Migrate Toward a Data-Centric, Web-Centric Design
To Integrate Airborne and Commercial Imagery with NTM
To Integrate Libraries and Communications
To Support Multi-INT TPED
To Address TPED Implications of JCS-Identified FIA Shortcomings
Creating the EPO
Technical Advisory Board
NIMA Research and Development: A Road Less Traveled
NIMA and Its Information Architecture-A Clean Sheet
The Importance of Architecture
Toward a New Architecture
A Database to Support the TPED Process
Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination as Transactions
Product, Application, and Client Independence
The Need for a Rigorous Data Model
Ways to Absorb Data from Third Parties
Methods to Deal with Logical Inconsistencies
Methods to Separate Public from Restricted Information
New Data Types
Precision and Persistence
Toward Multi-INT integration
Conclusions of the "Clean Sheet" Exercise
DOD and DCI Policy and Planning
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (C/JCS) should commission a study
of the demands and constraints that military doctrine places on imagery
intelligence and geospatial information. The study should be available
for congressional review within 18 months.
The Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD/AT&L)
should include the cost of information as part of the total cost of
ownership (TCO) of each new system; the programmed availability of
that information should be the equivalent of a Key Performance Parameter
(KPP). New, more emphatic guidelines should be promulgated to the
Department of Defense, and available to Congress within one year.
D/NIMA should provide positive mechanisms that inform every consumer
as to the 'true cost' of NTM imagery in order to promote conservation
of this scarce resource, as well as to support rational economic decisions
about the use of commercial imagery.
Long-Term (Strategic) Versus Operational (Short-Term)-nee "National
The DCI, operating through the ADCI/C in conjunction with the ADCI/AP,
should provide a suitable mechanism for high-level, collaborative
resolution of lingering imagery contentions.
ASD(C3I) and DDCI/CM should work with NIMA leadership to aggressively
seek the sources and means-dollars, competent management, and skilled
personnel-needed to make NIMA's mission whole and its infrastructure
The DCI and SECDEF should, at the earliest opportunity, provide additional
SES/SIS billets for NIMA. Congress should act favorably on the request
with similar alacrity.
The Director of NIMA should request through the DCI, and Congress
duly authorize and appropriate, an increment to the NIMA Program for
advanced research and development (R&D); the position of Chief
Technology Officer should be created and a top-notch individual found
to encumber it.
The Director of NIMA, in concert with the Director of NRO, should
develop, within 120 days, a new commercial imagery strategy-i.e.,
prepare an integration plan for commercial imagery-consistent with
current market conditions.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense should establish a fund against
which defense elements wishing to make direct use of commercial imagery
can charge their purchase.
D/NIMA should commission an independent 180-day study to determine
the maximum extent to which outsourcing could be extended, to include
operation of all infrastructure, production of all legacy MC&G
products, and much science-based imagery analysis. Results of the
study should be provided to the DCI and the SECDEF within 30 days
of completion, together with D/NIMA implementation(s).
D/NIMA should periodically review all "NIMA Standards" which, if divergent
from industry, should be revised (or revalidated); and, move NIMA
toward a level 3 organizational rating for Software and System Acquisition.
DCI and SECDEF, with the full support of Congress, should form an
"Extraordinary Program Office" (EPO) within 120 days in order to ensure
the prompt and efficient acquisition of required TPED functionality
D/NIMA should produce a proposed revision to the current plan for
IEC acquisition and deployment, to include new cost and schedule data,
for aggressively replacing all IDEX terminals with a fully capable
commercial alternative; DDCI/CM and ASD(C3I) shall find the means
to allow D/NIMA to execute this accelerated plan.
The SECDEF shall direct the ASD(C3I) and Chairman, JCS, to support
the Director of NIMA and the Director of NRO in the preparation of
a plan which clearly indicates the role and integration of airborne
and commercial imagery into TPED and which integrates geospatial and
Director, NIMA, should get out in front of any potential FIA upgrade;
in particular, he should study the implications for TPED for the five
FIA shortfalls identified by the JCS, each of which could have major
TPED implications and none of which has been considered fully in the
ASD(C3I) should ensure that the communications architecture for imagery
dissemination for Defense and its intersection with Intelligence subtends
both the designs of NIMA (more generally, of the "national" systems)
and the last tactical mile designed by the respective services and
secure sufficient DOD funding for execution.
The ASD(C3I) shall coordinate the efforts of NIMA, DISA, and the NRO
to ensure that both the communications links and acquisition strategy
for communications systems are sufficient to support TPED in the FIA
era. Director, DISA, shall certify his ability, within the current
POM/IPOM, to satisfy NIMA communications needs for dissemination or
report to the SECDEF and Congress on the reasons for his inability
to do so.
The DDCI/CM and ASD(C3I) shall jointly determine the extent and pace
of convergence toward a multi-INT TPED. Consistent with their findings,
the Director of NSA and Director of NIMA, inter alia, shall conduct
the necessary architecture study.
Management-Director of NIMA
The Director of NIMA should establish a Technical Advisory Board
The Secretary of Defense, with DCI endorsement and congressional support,
should fix the nominal tour length for the Director of NIMA at five
D/NIMA, along with other intelligence organizations, should work with
the JCS to establish the need for, and CONOPS for, advising US commanders
of the likely adversary insights into US operations-the OPFOR J2 role-given
the loss of US imagery exclusivity.
D/NIMA should consider appointing an "Archive Manager" to maximize
the value of the imagery archive, to be the advocate for archive use,
and to create a "spec-deck" for tasking "to inventory" otherwise unused
Culture and Convergence
Director of NIMA should regularize and extrapolate to the organization
more broadly his experiments with teams consisting of both Imagery
and GIS analysts to work specific, high-priority issues.
APPENDIX A: Terms Of Reference For The Independent Commission National
Imagery And Mapping Agency (NIMA)
SPECIFIC COMMISSION TASKS:
ORGANIZATION/MANAGEMENT OF COMMISSION:
APPENDIX B: List of Appearances and Interviews
Office of the Director for Central Intelligence
Community Management Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of Defense
National Imagery And Mapping Agency
National Reconnaisance Office
Glossary of Terms
| Executive Summary and Key Judgments
| Introduction | NIMA
from the Beginning
NIMA in Context | Two-and-a-Half
Roles for NIMA | The Promise of NIMA
NIMA and Its Stakeholders |
NIMA and Its "Customers" | Is There a "National
vs Tactical" Problem?
NIMA and Its Peers and Partners | NIMA
and Its Suppliers | NIMA Management Challenges
NIMA's Information Systems | NIMA
Research and Development
NIMA and Its Information Architecture | Recommendations
| Appendix A
Appendix B | Glossary
of Contents | Home | PDF