Building Situational

Awareness In Force XXI

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by Colonel Barbara G. Fast 

The end of the Cold War, combined with the advent of the technological revolution, is presenting the Army and the other branches of the military with an unprecedented opportunity and need to redefine military operations for the 21st century. The pace of operations is busier than ever, yet the Services face downsizing and dramatic budget cuts. Each Service is addressing its warfighting business, looking for ways to operate with a smaller yet more lethal force. Accessing information and leveraging technology are central to a new way of warfighting. Information and technology, when combined with changes in doctrine and organization, should be able to create conditions for decisive victory. Each Service has a program to catapult itself into the next century:

General Gordon R. Sullivan (USA, Retired) described Force XXI as a campaign plan? An evolutionary "journey for the Army as an institution."1 Force XXI is about integration? taking existing technology and systems, leveraging new technology, and digitizing the entire process to create an interactive, interoperable force on the battlefield. There are three axes to the Force XXI campaign plan: the redesign of Army operational forces, the reinvention of the Institutional Army, and the development and acquisition of information-age technologies.2

This article will focus on the third axis: information-age technologies. My emphasis will be on command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) programs; their battlefield architecture; and the effectiveness of systems, technology, and information to enhance decisionmaking. Since decisionmaking is facilitated by the achievement of situational awareness, this article will examine, from an intelligence perspective, whether developing processes for information collection, processing, and dissemination will be adequate to meet the Force XXI goal of giving commanders the level of situational awareness necessary for good, informed decisionmaking.

Subarchitectures as a Component of Battlefield Architecture

In contrast to attitudes that prevailed during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, today many senior Army leaders now cite Intelligence as a leader in the leveraging of technology, digitization, and support to the combat commander. But are the intelligence processes, combined with the other battlefield functional area (BFA) processes, evolving quickly enough to support better situational awareness and decisionmaking?

The battlefield architecture consists of all the BFAs, their systems, and their processes. C4 subarchitectures are a subset of this overall architecture and have three basic components. The first comprises information sources, such as sensors that collect data, and operational units that provide input. The next component includes the collection management, processing, analysis, and dissemination facilities. In the intelligence area, this translates to the Analysis and Control Element (ACE) and Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) at the tactical and operational levels, respectively. Commanders, decisionmakers, and other users are the third and final component.3 I will focus on the second component, since intelligence contributes the most to the overall battlefield architecture in this component.

Collection Management

To achieve situational awareness, we must know where the enemy is and is not. The fielding of the intelligence family of systems is the key to accomplishing this difficult task. Most collection system improvements are in the development or prototype stage and include such systems as Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), Ground-Based Common Sensor, Advanced QUICKFIX, Guardrail Common Sensor, Enhanced TRACKWOLF, and the Airborne Reconnaissance Low. When employed as a seamless collection entity, these systems will comb the battlefield for information as never before.

However, one should not be fooled into believing that these systems alone will be sufficient. To meet Force XXI goals, all combat, combat support, and combat service support systems and units must be digitally integrated. This means that intelligence and non-intelligence assets must be designed (or redesigned) to be interoperable. Special purpose-built intelligence systems must be designed and fielded quickly to augment or, in some cases, replace traditional intelligence collectors.

There are many platforms on the battlefield whose primary mission is something other than intelligence collection (such as the Apache Longbow). However, each of these platforms is also ideally suited to provide information. The problem is that this secondary role is either being recognized only as an afterthought or is completely overlooked. These information resources must be identified and incorporated into the information web, preferably while still in the acquisition stage. Other information sources, such as civil affairs units, have access too and should be part of a collection plan. As a whole, an "intelligence preparation of the collection environment" must be done. This will determine optimal collection strategy, needs, and synchronization of assets.

Additional technology should be employed in collection platforms. On-board processing should be increased to the maximum extent feasible. Also, collection systems should be upgraded with a capability to detect message format errors before data is sent to processing centers. Compatible datalinks to central processing systems should be used to decrease the complexity of communications. There are other promising technologies just over the horizon, including infrared signature development, acoustic sensor arrays, multi-domain smart sensors, robotics, and voice identification, that also should be integrated as their maturity and resourcing permits.

The Nontraditional information sources, along with intelligence platforms, must be incorporated into collection plans to maximize our effort to locate the enemy. However, the tools for collection and resource management of these sources are not yet available. The All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) and various Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program (TENCAP) systems contain different collection management software. There is not a singular, seamless collection management program that takes us from the tactical to the national level. We need an agreement to integrate the Joint Collection Management Tools (JCMT) software or some like functionality in all systems. This will permit multi-echelon tasking and requirements tracking for the first time. The ability to task, track, cross- cue, and manage collection assets is a companion piece to this requirement. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) is building this software into an ASAS-Remote Workstation (ASAS-RWS) as part of the Task Force XXI advanced warfighting experiment.

While we are doing it better than ever before, we still cannot collect every shred of information about the enemy. There are a finite number of collection systems and the ability to cover the battlefield is highly dependent on the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T). Therefore, thorough intelligence preparation of the battlefield, focused priority intelligence requirements, and well-thought-out reconnaissance and surveillance plans are more important than ever. This limitation underscores the requirement for an automated, dynamic intelligence synchronization matrix. This matrix should also agree with the mission analysis wargaming results. USAIC&FH and the XVIII Airborne Corps are working together to establish a viable automated synchronization matrix.


Major processing centers are found at division level and above. ASAS is the backbone of the division- and corps-level processing systems and has been used successfully in both exercises and real-world operations. The ability of ASAS to correlate large amounts of data from multiple sensors to display a coherent picture of the battlefield places it squarely in the Force XXI arena. ASAS was cited by Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) senior observer/controllers as an integral part of the success achieved during division- and corps-level campaigns that were conducted as part of a joint exercise, Unified Endeavor, in April 1995.4 It was evident that the picture available to the corps and divisions with ASAS, was more accurate, timely, and facilitated decisionmaking, compared to that of the Joint Task Force Headquarters (without ASAS). As some of the first equipment in country, ASAS also was employed with some success in Haiti and is now employed in our operations in Bosnia. At the theater level, ASAS-Extended provides commands with an added capability to process all-source intelligence and to interoperate with tactical ACEs.

The concept of split-based operations permits the phasing of intelligence capabilities into a theater and continuous on-the-move operations in theater. A small cell deploys early with or even ahead of the first combat units to begin processing information and sending data back to a sanctuary or home station. This Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE) is tailored to the mission, but usually consists of a TROJAN SPIRIT, an ASAS-RWS, a workstation with Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) software, and often a TENCAP system like the Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal (MITT) to provide downlinked near-real-time data and imagery. This capability resolves problems faced during DESERT STORM and has been validated in Haiti, Bosnia, and at numerous exercises. It is part of the tactical tailoring that is occurring in both collection and processing.

Until now, most sensor information flowed directly to major processing centers only at division-level and above. The MI community fielded the first two Common Ground Stations (CGSs) in 1997. The CGS will be fielded at the brigade level, providing the brigade's first-ever capability to independently receive sensor data, imagery, and video, and to develop a time-sensitive electronic picture of the battlefield (especially when combined with an ASAS-RWS). The brigade intelligence challenge will be to determine how information is merged, the level of analysis done at the CGS, which information needs to go directly to decisionmakers or shooters, and how to get all of it into an ASAS-RWS for analysis.

CI/HUMINT Information. Shortfalls remain in our ability to task and process valuable battlefield information, especially counterintelligence (CI) and human intelligence (HUMINT). Not using these assets extensively in exercises such as a BCTP Warfighter Exercise or a National Training Center rotation may have contributed to a lack of understanding, until recently, of how to task them in real-world contingencies. Rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center, with its low-intensity focus, and recent real-world activities in peace operations? which are CI- and HUMINT-heavy? have shown the value of these disciplines. A Rand study found that CI and HUMINT are the "highest value systems for noncombat operations for long-term situations characterized by infrequent operations by small units or groups." 5 Former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry cited the demands on CI as increasingly complex throughout the spectrum of conflict and called for a Department of Defense database and automated information network.6

In low-intensity conflicts or peace operations, important information which establishes a pattern, trend, or provides other information (such as morale or intentions) is contained in text. In Haiti, incident tracking became a critical and nontraditional task? Information concerning civil disturbances and criminal activity was important to follow.7 The Theater Rapid Response Intelligence Package (TRRIP) database provides a single-source preprocessing tool to CI/HUMINT operators and analysts. TRRIP has been used successfully by the 519th MI Battalion in Haiti and by the 66th MI Group, corps, and divisions in Bosnia. TRRIP and other sensors feed the Blackbird database. This database permits retrieval from text files and linkage of events, personalities, and organizations. In the future, these systems will be replaced by the CI/HUMINT Automated Tools Set (CHATS).

CI/HUMINT information must also reach the all-source database. Because ASAS accepts only formatted reports, important free-text information cannot be merged seamlessly into the correlated database. A "work-around" is to link a text field to the data in the correlated database so that when an operator clicks on a symbol, the amplifying textual information is retrieved and displayed. Such required improvements abound for ASAS and hopefully will be fielded during the next major software upgrade. This tool would certainly be useful for enhancing a commander's situational awareness. Web browser technology also holds great promise for working with text files.

Open-Source Intelligence. The problems of integrating our special operations, long-range surveillance, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) reporting are similar to those in integrating CI/HUMINT information. The information superhighway and automation in general have created an explosion of OSINT. There are two challenges in using this information. The first is the time required to convert large volumes of data into usable intelligence. For example, 82d Airborne Division intelligence analysts in Haiti found a wealth of information on the Internet, from the names of local officials to the locations of warehouses, but it was time-consuming to convert that data into a textual format.

The second challenge is to find the genuine pearls in this huge sea of information.9 The National Ground Intelligence Center has developed a software package called Pathfinder (see the MIPB January-March 1996 issue, page 33). Pathfinder can sort, compare, retrieve, and visualize thousands of documents at a time. The software loads the electronic media into a database, provides analyst tools, and through link analysis permits users to draw conclusions. Analysts compared merged 1990 and 1994 Iraqi deployment databases and found that the two sets clustered separately. This permitted analysts to conclude that, while similarities existed, Hussein's intentions were much more limited in scope in October 1994.10 Software like Pathfinder, when incorporated into existing systems, significantly contributes to overall situational awareness by automatically processing and analyzing vast amounts of information. A collateral use for a Pathfinder-like capability is an information-protect mode to collect, establish audit trails, and "sniffer" data, among other information, to determine the security of our nets.

Document exploitation (DOCEX) is another area which confounds intelligence operations. Even if linguists are available, document translation is time-consuming and diverts scarce linguist resources from other equally or more important tasks. Translator software like the FALCON system being tested at Fort Brag, North Carolina, would permit a quick document scan. If it is deemed to be of value and if linguists are not available on site, the document could then be electronically scanned, digitally transmitted to a DOCEX center, and returned later for user incorporation.

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Other Improvements. There are other processing improvements to be undertaken. While signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) reporting more easily conforms to standard message format, upgrades in onboard processing would significantly ease problems encountered in processing data at either interim or major processing centers. Other promising initiatives include the building of neural networks to perform parallel processing, an increase in computing power to eliminate report backlogs, and the use of an integrated approach to sensor fusion.

Perhaps the biggest challenge ahead lies in the fusion architecture for obtaining inputs on enemy sightings by non-intelligence sources located throughout the battlespace. In addition to digitally connecting these assets across the battlefield, decisions are required on report generation, format, distribution, and the fusion process. These decisions should be made now so that architectures can be based on requirements, not technology. Because this issue cuts across all BFAs, it will be complex to resolve? Especially if reporting software is hard to use or gets in the way of the primary mission.

Finally, digitization should allow a more realistic and speedy assessment of battle damage assessment (BDA). As Major General (USA, Retired) John F. Stewart, Jr., suggests, "BDA is an art, not a science, and it is an emotional issue." 11 However, through automated reporting, a BDA architecture, and a relational spreadsheet database linked to the main database, great strides can be made to objectively quantify this art.

Imagery Intelligence. Imagery technology continues to evolve. High quality, softcopy imagery can now be obtained by processing centers through TENCAP systems. At certain commands, the Mobile Imagery Exploitation System (MIES) and other Receive Locations (RL) permit first-phase exploitation of imagery in direct response to the commander's needs.12 For other processing centers, such as JICs, divisional ACEs, and brigades with no organic RL, imagery can now be transmitted digitally using compression techniques.

Most of these centers have few imagery analysts. Therefore, imagery must be annotated before it is disseminated to these centers. In the future, as automated target recognition technology matures, basic imagery can be pushed to or pulled by these centers, and analysts can rapidly present the information to the commander. The combination of standardized formats, compression, digital imaging transmission advances, and new technologies will streamline the imagery architecture. As the national imagery community places its priority on and refines its support to the combat commander, the process, along with the technology, should provide the necessary imagery support.

Another form of imagery is video, provided by platforms like the UAV. Video terminals in command centers on the battlefield could provide real-time, excellent resolution of targets or areas of interest. In the future, video will be displayed on multipurpose workstations, and video exploitation tools will ease the analytical process.


We have addressed collection and processing, but before the correlated product is passed to the commander, there is one last important player? The analyst. Analysts play a critical role because they take all of this processed data and other information and create intelligence. This is where science and art merge to become "sci-art."

It is important for analysts to understand the dynamics of data and how to leverage it for situational awareness. There is no lack of data on the digitized battlefield. Analysts create a product for the commander based on a multistep process. They take the enemy situation (provided by the intelligence processor) and the friendly situation (provided by a command and control (C2) system) and add the "Blue" and "Red" political, economic, cultural, and psychological perspectives. They evaluate the significance of events and intangibles, such as morale. The analysts factor in what they know and do not know about the enemy, and assess possible, probable, or known enemy intentions. Thus, a product is formed to create the situational awareness that the commander needs. Analysis is a very ambiguous process. Knowledge-based tools are required for both the analysts and the decisionmaker. With further maturity, artificial intelligence is forecast to enhance the probability of an accurate and more-timely assessment.

Independent analysis can occur now at all intelligence centers on the battlefield, in sanctuaries, and in the national capital region. Each center reaches independent conclusions and develops its own interpretation or picture of the battlefield. The capability to independently create different views of the battlefield is important and necessary, because it allows us to tailor the picture and the assessment to the needs of the individual commander. Thus the new tools, enabled by technology, add another dimension to intelligence by permitting analysts to leverage the whole of the intelligence spectrum to reach the resolution and presentation required by commanders at all echelons. It might seem that we have created chaos? Multiple, redundant, yet different pictures of the battlefield. The solution is for these pictures and assessments to be shared and agreed upon to create a common picture of the battlefield. In a division, for example, final approval of the common picture rests with the G2.


After processing, the next step is dissemination. The future lies in the "smart pull-brilliant push" architecture developed by the intelligence community. In the past, intelligence has been a hierarchical discipline, with information being pushed up or down from echelon to echelon. The new architecture permits skip-echelon and networked dissemination.

The "push" of information is best served when it responds to certain criteria. The criteria (continuously reevaluated) might be based on a time interval, on specific information needs, or on attainment of a new level of battlefield awareness. Entire databases can be pushed, if required, although this is not a quick or easy chore. This is primarily due to the lack of maturity in software, declassification issues, a continuing lack of systems interoperability, and communications challenges. Centers can also push updates or single pieces of information, as required, given the ability of the terminating machine to read the data. More often, it is an intelligence estimate (graphical and textual) that is pushed. This remains a time-consuming process, because there is too much human intervention and manipulation required to create updates as frequently as many commanders or centers request or expect. The bottom line is, while we are able to create and disseminate graphic and textual updates better than ever, we still have a long way to go before this process achieves the required maturity. "Pull" technology is progressing extraordinarily quickly and provides great promise. The ASAS Program Office is developing software which will allow users to pull information as needed.

An innovative dissemination initiative called Intelligence Link (INTELINK) is now in use. It permits users to enter its network and to pull desired information. INTELINK is based on the Internet concept and uses web browser software to negotiate through data. Organizations can create homepages, and archived text, databases, and imagery are available for any user with the appropriate password. INTELINK files can be converted by users to common user software graphic files to support further dissemination or manipulation. Additionally, at the request of a user, commands with homepages can place information or imagery on INTELINK for easy access. In the future, INTELINK may be organized both by command and by function, further increasing its utility to the user. It has been employed in experiments with the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (4th ID (M)), for garrison and exercise intelligence operations, and in real-world contingency operations such as those in Haiti and Bosnia. Clearly, this type of user-friendly software would have equal applicability for C2 in the other BFAs as well.

This Internet-like concept is the wave of the future. Many units have created homepages on ASAS-RWS to allow subordinate commands to pull intelligence. These homepages provide access to multiple databases, multimedia hypertext information, and graphics. The concept can be tailored to the user or the user can select, filter, display, and manipulate a variety of media and information as needed. Information can be stored in an interim file server until the consumer retrieves it, thereby freeing hard-drive space on the producer's system.

Broadcast dissemination is also a form of "push-pull" distribution which promises to bring great value-added to the battlefield. Broadcast has long been used by TENCAP and defense warning systems. Now, collaborative broadcast technology will permit processing centers to disseminate simultaneously to multiple users on the battlefield. Users can filter the information which is of value to them, thus avoiding extraneous information or information overload. Broadcast dissemination is especially valuable for high-value, fleeting targets with extremely short dwell times.


The digitized battlefield is completely dependent on reliable, secure communications for dissemination. To win the information war, we must dominate the electromagnetic spectrum. Shortcomings in communications have been documented during all contingencies; these shortcomings mainly deal with mobility, range, bandwidth, data rate, error rate, throughput, sufficiency, and redundancy. The intelligence community, alone, has overwhelmed the capability of communicators, thereby necessitating the introduction of TROJAN SPIRIT. Major General Stewart, in his DESERT STORM after-action report, called for a dedicated intelligence communications system.13 TROJAN SPIRIT and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) remain the intelligence community's most reliable means of communications.

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All of the Services are transitioning from an analog to a digital communications design. Force XXI initiatives in communications call for a greater reliance by all BFAs on satellite communications, fiber optics, wire, and long-range wireless systems. Most of the initiatives incorporate asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) and synchronous optical network (SONET) technology, cellular technology, efficient antennas, packet and multimedia compression, protocol filtering, automating routing and reconfiguration, and improved data modems. The 4th ID (M) has used ATM to set up multimedia networks. This includes installing ATM switches in the Mobile Subscriber Network to optimize bandwidth. The Global Broadcasting System (GBS) and the Direct Broadcasting System (DBS) should make broadcast dissemination commonplace. The tactical internet is expected to provide a seamless communications network on the tactical battlefield.

It is critical that we have these communications capabilities and that they be interoperable, from foxhole to the national command center. Things that increase complexity? Routers, bridges, packet switches, satellite circuits? Must be simplified to prevent potential transmission glitches. To ensure maximum operational efficiency, an automated network planning management and troubleshooting system must be installed. As with sensors, there will never be enough bandwidth. An "appetite suppressant," focused commander's critical information requirements, and push-pull dissemination will help to keep the networks from oversaturation. We cannot meet the goals of Force XXI without the communications backbone.

Recommendations for Achieving Force XXI Goals

Combat commanders will need better situational awareness in Force XXI. The following improvements to the intelligence processes should be considered to meet that goal.

Collection. We must develop and integrate all sensors to provide a seamless collection web. Focus on the family of systems as the highest priority, but also incorporate new technology (like acoustic sensor arrays, voice identification, and onboard processing) where possible. Use special purpose-built systems, tailored to the environment. Beginning in the acquisition process, identify and develop all potential sources of information (both intelligence and non-intelligence systems) so that there is one single sensor architecture. Develop and integrate collection requirements and intelligence synchronization-management tools to create one multi-echelon capability.

Processing. We should continue data processing and analysis initiatives, add analyst tools, and incorporate CI/HUMINT applications into the digitization architecture. We need to incorporate Pathfinder-like capabilities to permit analysts to comb through and organize large amounts of free text information. Refine document translator software and incorporate it into operations. Continue to add processing speed and parallel processing applications. Integrate imagery into processing and analysis. Develop a fusion architecture that addresses both intelligence and non-intelligence contributors to the common picture. Build the systems' architecture around the requirement and create one big, interactive database.

Dissemination. We should develop a "smart pull-brilliant push" architecture and field systems that get required information to the user quickly. Incorporate GBS and DBS technology to enable dissemination in tactical communications environments. Use compatible datalinks to the central processing systems to avoid complexity. Technology that can help prioritize, filter, alarm (for critical items), and aid commanders in decisionmaking should be a priority. Systems which interface with users should be developed like the Internet and INTELINK, with an ability to work from a homepage, pull what is desired, and display information in the form of a graphic representation with accompanying text and hyperlinks. Continue to improve the technical aspect of dynamic updates, with "quick" and "easy" being the watch-words.


Put simply, Force XXI is the future of our Army. With its advances, the Army can better dominate the battlespace, control the battlefield tempo, achieve overwhelming lethality, and execute a quicker, more decisive victory while minimizing casualties. The Army is well on its way to becoming a digitized and more situationally aware force.

Still, Force XXI plans for collection, processing, dissemination, and display processes are not sufficient to achieve complete situational awareness. Even if we apply all of the available technological tools, fog, friction, and human nature will intervene. We will never achieve total situational awareness. To say this aloud, or to advertise it, is to do commanders, intelligence officers, and all units across the battlefield a tremendous disservice. What we can say is that there is overwhelming evidence that we are significantly reducing the degree of uncertainty. What we know about the battlefield, its geometry, and the disposition, capability, and intentions of friendly and enemy units is exponentially greater than it has ever been before, and our situational awareness will continue to improve.

The Army's task is to endeavor continuously to limit the amount of uncertainty and to aid the commander in decisionmaking. We must continue to focus on gathering and presenting a picture of the battlefield that enables the commander to make decisions faster and that permits units to act more quickly than the adversary. The decisive advantage that is caused by an exponentially greater situational awareness of friendly and enemy forces will help to save lives and to win wars. C4I is a force multiplier. Still, we need trained, astute leaders and soldiers who leverage the science of war to succeed at the art of war. It is this combination of technology and operational and strategic art in joint and multinational operations that will truly be the measure of how well we succeed in the 21st century.


1. General Jack N. Merritt (USA, Retired), "A Talk with the Chief," ARMY, June 1995, 18.

2. Office of the Chief of Staff, Army, America's Army of the 21st Century, Force XXI, Meeting the 21st Century Challenge (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Director, Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force, 15 January 1995), 11.

3. Edison M. Cesar, Strategies for Defining the Army's Objective Vision of Command and Control for the 21st Century (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1995), 14.

4. Battle Command Training Program, "Unified Endeavor After-Action Briefing," briefing for the Army Force Commander, Fort Hood, Texas, 22 April 1995.

5. J. R. Bondanella, et. al., Estimating the Army's Intelligence Requirements and Capabilities for 1997-2001 (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1993), 31.

6. William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the United States (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, February 1995), 262-263.

7. Captain Michael W. Schellhammer, "Lessons from Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY," Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, Volume 22, Number 1 (January-March 1996), 18.

8. U.S Army Intelligence Center, All- Source Analysis System Counterintelligence /Human Intelligence Subsystem Users Functional Description (Fort Huachuca, Arizona: U.S. Army Intelligence Center, 8 December 1995), 1.

9. Colonel Richard Ricardelli, "News from the Front: Warfighter Intelligence and Combat Operations," Defense Intelligence Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Fall 1995), 40.

10. Timothy B. Hendrickson and Major Michael G. Knapp, USAR, "Project Pathfinder: Breaking the Barriers to More Effective Intelligence Analysis," Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, Volume 22, Number 1 (January-March 1996), 34 and 50.

11. Then-Brigadier General (Promotable) John F. Stewart, Jr., Operation Desert Storm, The Military Intelligence Story: A View from the G-2, 3rd U.S. Army (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, April 1991), 19.

12. Editor's Note: The "Receive Location," recently redesignated the "Dissemination Element (DE)", receives national data. These are usually fixed sites, except the MIES TENCAP systems which are mobile, deployable DEs (the only mobile ones in the Army).

13. Stewart, 29.

Colonel Fast is currently the Commander, 66th MI Group, in Augsburg, Germany. Her recent assignments include Commander, 163d MI Battalion (Tactical Exploitation), and G2, 2d Armored Division. COL Fast is a graduate of the University of Missouri with degrees in German, Spanish, and Education, and she holds a master of science degree in Business Administration from Boston University. Readers can reach her via E-mail at [email protected] and telephonically at 011-49-821-540-6611/ 7582 and DSN (314) 435-6611/7582.