To the Editor:

Lieutenant Colonel Collin A. Agee's article on the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) in Bosnia was informative. ["Joint STARS in Bosnia: Too Much Data, Too Little Intel?," Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, October-December 1996.] In it, he raises some quetions about force structure. This letter is the official response from the Directorate of Combat Developments at Fort Huachuca. LTC Agee noted that the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) Ground Station Module (GSM) Company at XVIII Airborne Corps was to be deleted. There are discrepencies between what is doctrine and what units are changing as part of their MTOE force. The GSM Company was an MTOE vice a proponent-approved Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE). Joint STARS supports artillery and aviation units as well. Ownership of this targeting resource by the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs) that need it will ensure that we do not break faith with the commitments we have made to our fellow soldiers.

LTC Agee also addresses the requirements for the GSM's follow-on, the Common Ground Station (CGS). Both of these systems are intended for the Now Battle taking perishable data from not only Joint STARS but also the commander's tactical terminal and joint tactical terminal (CTT/JTT), and the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and feeding a product or report to the supported unit. Those same units have the All-Source Analysis System' s Remote Work Station (ASAS RWS) or a complete Analysis and Control Element (ACE). It is the responsibility of these latter elements to develop the common, relevant picture and disseminate it to the warflghter. Currently, there is no requirement to export that picture to the GSM/CGS. We are working on that fix. While the GSM/CGS is evolving, it remains to be seen whether its functions will be limited or training expanded. There are analyst tasks in the current Imagery Ground Station Operator (IGSO) course.

LTC Agee cites the need for an information manager at corps and division. Personnel are not available and any change to the force would have to be offset by a like amount. Rather than reduce intelligence slots, we need to assure personnel assigned to the ACE bring to the job the necessary skills.

Lastly, LTC Agee suggests the Joint STARS squadron be relooked. The applicable TOE 34-534A, Military Intelligence Company (Joint STARS), (297th MI Battalion, 513th MI Brigade) calls for staff personnel as well as command and control. The effective date for this TOE is October 1998. Until then, task organization is the answer.

John K. Quinn
Fort Huachuca, Arizona

To the Editor:

The purpose of this letter is to correct what I perceive to be an error in several recent issues including the April-June issue of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin. The error appears in the Editor's Note found on page 43 in the article "Intelligence and the Peacekeeper in Haiti." The term "Operations Other Than War" used throughout this article is no longer doctrinally accurate. Precise terminology while discussing peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, and operations in aid of civil authorities should replace "OOTW." A message from the Joint Staff, DJS 311514Z Aug 1995 released this guidance.

The term "Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)" first appeared in Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. Since its establishment in Joint Pub 3-0, MOOTW has progressively gained wider acceptance and usage; the term was not challenged during the preliminary or final coordination of Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. Furthermore, the concept of MOOTW is embedded in other capstone and keystone joint doctrine publications including Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States; Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces; and Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.

Subsequent to the approval of Joint Pub 3-07, disagreement over the use of the MOOTW framework has surfaced. In spite of recommendations to create a different terminology construct, no adequate substitute has as yet been suggested which better depicts what MOOTW was meant to, and in fact does, convey. "Stability and support operations," "other military operations," and "peacetime operations" are less precise than MOOTW and do not supplant the existing doctrinal framework. Furthermore, deviating from doctrinally approved concepts and definitions, where no "exceptional circumstances" exist, is inconsistent with the established policy for the use of joint doctrine. To do so is in conflict with the Chairman's Title X function of "Developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces" and the authoritative-guidance nature of this doctrine.

In my opinion, the intent of the Defense Joint Staff (DJS) message of 31 August 1995 sought to minimize the confusion about the term, not to discontinue the use of an approved and doctrinally sound term. The message states that

"Military Operations Other Than War is a category for a variety of operations and not an operations itself. There is a clear understanding that some types of military operations other than war can involve combat, presenting commanders and forces with a set of uncertainties with which we previously have not had to cope. In all military communications and correspondence, it is vital to address the specifics of the operation being discussed and not rely on the categorical title of military operations other than war. If peace operations are the topic of a message, use peace operations in the subject line and the text. Improper usage of the term military operations other than war can create confusion and may imply there is a diminished need to provide for the security of U.S./Multinational forces."

Joint Pub 3-07 establishes the Chairman's authoritative guidance for Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. As the DJS message concludes,

"Active discussion of the principles of military operations other than war, particularly where they overlap with and diverge from the principles of war, and the training and planning for them, will help in resolving any confusion that has arisen while this publication was being developed. We request your assistance in this endeavor."

Commander George McCaffrey, USN
Washington, D. C.

Editor's Note:
While the MIPB is not intended to be a doctrinal Army reference, it is an approved publication with the mission of professional development. We strive to ensure use of correct doctrinal terminology in the articles published in MIPB. According to the final drafts of Army publications FM 100-20, Stability and Support Operations (SASO), dated April 1996, and FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols, dated July 1996, SASO is the recognized Army term replacing Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Miltary Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) is a term used by the joint community in accordance with Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.

To the Editor:

I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the article ["Victory in Egypt: 3d ID(M) DISE," Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, October-December 1996] about the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3d ID(M)) intelligence operations and their good use of a Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE). The authors, Lieutenant Colonel Boll, Major Holachek, and Captain Ellington, obviously "have the bubble." It was refreshing to read a precisely correct understanding of current doctrine and the excellent implementation of it that is obviously going on in the 3d ID(M). My reading of how they have used JDISS and INTELINK brought other thoughts to mind that might prove interesting to your readers.

The combination of JDISS and INTELINK provides access to enormous amounts of data through a common "window." In most cases, data linked using hypertext to a server and homepage is accessible to potential users, be they using JDISS applications or a browser application. The power of JDISS is that these systems are in many places where relevant data is analyzed. The standard packages enable a user to "open the window" to another user and get what they have. This is a simple but powerful capability. The JDISS established the paradigm.

The same idea is behind the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) implementation of browser technology to ride either Analysis and Control Element (ACE) software or remote workstation (RWS) software to enable the surf-and-pull of relevant data by the ASAS intelligence operator-analyst. While recent versions of the ASAS software have put the browser into the systems, the key operational impact will not be realized until the multi-level security (MLS) server and the ASAS Trusted Workstation (TWS) are accredited and fielded to the force. Once fielded, the ACE operator can post all available intelligence from his own echelon (and accessed from higher) to the server and allow any RWS working with TWS to browse all the available information. Furthermore, the capability provided by the TWS to allow the user to establish intelligence requirement profiles will enable the user to tell ASAS and the TWS what areas and entities he is interested in and let the workstation do the monitoring of existing data as it becomes available. This will automatically identify when the "good stuff" shows up. Such a capability at brigade and below can give these echelons a much higher probability of successfully weeding through the volumes of intelligence available to them and finding the nuggets that answer the priority intelligence requirements. The use of a RWS and TWS in the TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal (SPIRIT), as explained by the 3d ID(M) authors, might be the perfect place to incorporate this capability.

The realization of another important requirement to fully integrate all necessary JDISS 2.0 applications into the ASAS Block II software will complete a greatly needed capability. In essence, the entire ACE will become a virtual JDISS workstation. Other JDISS users will look through their windows to data in an ACE in the same way that they open a window to another JDISS today. Likewise, this ACE will "see" and be able to work seamlessly with any stand-alone JDISS.

These two powerful capabilities of the future will build upon the methodologies and architectures being used by the 3d ID(M) and other units. Used together, they can more effectively address the need to seamlessly supplement the outputs of national intelligence producers with the particular and much more focused needs of the tactical commander. The trick is to get it done now!

Colonel Theodore G. Chopin,
TRADOC System Manager ASAS
Fort Huachuca, Arizona

To The Editor:

Dr. Robert J. Bunker's article ["Internetted Structures and C2 Nodes," Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, April-June 1996] makes a fair theoretical argument as to why future armies with nonhierarchical command structures will be more difficult to defeat simply because, if I may use any elementary analogy, "cutting the head off no longer kills the snake." But this relates to the center of gravity concept only if the center of gravity is command and control (C2).

For example, he states that striking "the center of gravity of a hierarchical structure can paralyze its decisionmaking capability..." but would "have almost no effect on a nonhierarchical structure." First, this assumes the center of gravity is the command structure. Secondly, he misses the point that information is a tool only. Also, while it may fundamentally alter how we communicate, it will not replace the requirement for structured command that is not only fundamental to the very nature of military orders execution, but required for coordinated and synchronized military operation.

In fact, the information age may have the exact reverse effect of the nonhierarchical trend Dr. Bunker predicts. For example, 20 years ago it was not uncommon for a division G3 planner to sit down and write an entire division contingency operations plan, done as a project over a 6-month period with little or no staff interaction. As any division planner who has spent weeks participating in Battle Management Center planning cells will tell you, that would be unthinkable today. This is simply because the overload of information requires much more detailed planning and cooperative mission analysis among battlefield operating system (BOS) staff elements. In this case, information has contributed to a more structured hierarchy, due to increased dependence, reliance, and interaction with other staff elements.

Dr. Bunker rightly seems to acknowledge that center of gravity may not just mean C2, for he states that
" ...development of internetted structures is likely within societal organizations. Isolating national will, public opinion, or even key individuals as a likely center of gravity will no longer be feasible."

Perhaps I am missing something, but I do not understand, nor does he argue how, "internetted structures" will bring about a weakened, noncohesive national will, or fragmented public opinion, against a perceived common threat.

Next, if for example, we are facing an enemy whose center of gravity is his artillery forces, I fail to see how his possible complex internetted structure will prohibit us from identifying this as a center of gravity or from successfully defeating this center of gravity. How does this structure eliminate his artillery as a center of gravity? I certainly agree with his assessment that an enemy's "advanced battle command structure" will make it more difficult to defeat him. To jump to the conclusion that this somehow eliminates a specific center of gravity makes no sense to me, especially when dealing with "physical strength," a potential component of center of gravity per FM 100-5, Operations.

I accept Dr. Bunker's encouragement for junior officers such as myself to take a risk in writings and actively participate in new doctrinal concepts. But Captains Neidrauer and Bennett were not defending an outdated concept when they articulated the center of gravity concept at the lower echelon maneuver level. Down here in tactical units such as the 82d Airborne where "the rubber meets the road" and where most junior officers operate, maneuver commanders want S2s who can identify enemy strengths and weaknesses, and the enemy's center of gravity. They may then employ a defeat mechanism to achieve victory. Until the time centers of gravity may no longer exist, maneuver S2s such as myself must be proficient in their identification and articulation.

Captain Paul T. Carter
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

To the Editor:

Captain Jeffrey Steel made an outstanding point about where an aviation S2 belongs during the battle ["Apache S2: Improving Intelligence Support to Combat Aviation," Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin January-March 1996]. The only place for an aviation unit S2 to be during tactical operations is in the Air Tactical Command Post (ATAC). Having served as the 82d Aviation Brigade S2, I can tell you this is true for three primary reasons.

The distances involved in a deep attack or air assault generally prevent direct communications over the operations and intelligence (O&I) net (FM radio). Sitting back at the command post (CP) in the rear monitoring the dead O&I net is not productive. If you want to influence the current battle, you must be able to talk to the aircraft.

Once an aviation operation is underway, all communications are generally passed over the command net (that is reality). Even the S3 shop in the rear is relatively quiet once an operation begins and the aircraft go across the forward line of own troops (FLOT). Credibility in any S2 job is critical. Lead from the front. Pilots notice when the S2 is fully involved and risking his or her own neck by flying cross-FLOT. It shows you have enough confidence in your own analysis to risk your own life, as well as the unit's aircraft and pilots.

Flying in the ATAC keeps the S2 fully apprised of the situation, better then any other intelligence officer in the division or corps. You are there to make those critical assessments as combat information flows in. You can relay critical data to the G2 and save "the weeds" for later. The S2 noncommissioned officer in charge back at the command post is fully capable of monitoring the operations and intelligence nets and passing critical information to you in the ATAC.

Finally, having the S2 fly in the ATAC with the commander or S3 and the fire support officer fuses the staff team. You develop a routine in training and reduce reaction time during actual operations. Remember, the S2 should be "ALWAYS OUT FRONT" and in this case "ABOVE" as well.

Major Stephen K. Iwicki
Washington, D.C.