Concepts and Doctrine

The Intel XXI Concept III: The Seven Intelligence Tasks

by Captain Neal J. Wegner

Editor's Note: In the April-June 1996 issue of MIPB, Captain Wegner began his three-part series on the Intel XXI concept. In this edition, he concludes the series, addressing the seven intelligence tasks neccessary to provide the warfighter with intelligence support.
In the July-September 1996 issue of MIPB, I wrote about the Force XXI operational patterns and how these are the key to supporting the warfighter. Understanding these six operational patterns is essential for intelligence professionals. When we better understand how warfighters operate, we can more accurately focus our support to them.
This is the approach we took when writing the Intel XXI concept. From our understanding of the warfighters' operational patterns, we derived seven intelligence tasks. These represent what must be done to provide warfighters with dynamic and responsive intelligence support (see Figure 1). These seven tasks are
We envision that these seven tasks will broaden, redefine, and possibly supercede those currently associated with the intelligence cycle.1 They are neither linear nor cyclic, but instead must be continuously and dynamically performed in support of doctrinal intelligence functions.


In Force XXI, intelligence professionals will be required to direct the full range of intelligence and reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) assets. These assets include not only organic collectors, but also joint, national, and multinational as well. Input from all battlefield sensors must be managed and fused to provide a dynamic, accurate picture of the battlespace. Consequently, intelligence operations must go beyond the traditional intelligence collection management activities and take into account the entire intelligence and RSTA domain. It is imperative that the senior intelligence officer be directly involved in planning, coordinating, synchronizing and directing the entire intelligence and RSTA effort. In other words, S2s and G2s must act as their commander's chief of reconnaissance.
To effectively direct the intelligence and RSTA systems of the future, intelligence personnel must be able to dynamically plan, coordinate, and synchronize the intelligence and RSTA mission using visual displays, artificial intelligence, and automated synchronization matrices. They must also know the status and location of all available intelligence assets. Intelligence personnel must be able to see, in real-time, the execution of intelligence and RSTA operations. They must also be able to see and manage sensor-to-sensor and sensor-to-shooter linkages. Operators must know how to pass area and target coverage horizontally and vertically to other organizations. With such capabilities, intelligence elements will be able to dynamically task, retask, and shift the focus of intelligence and RSTA coverage and thus more effectively satisfy the reconnaissance and intelligence objectives of their commanders.
To dynamically sync and resync operations, commanders and staffs must also have a real-time view of the intelligence and RSTA operation while it is executed. Such current battle displays for the commander and staff must graphically present the intelligence and RSTA objectives as they are happening, and portray them in the context of the overall situation. With such capabilities, future commanders and their staffs will be able to more effectively direct and influence intelligence and RSTA operations and mass effects on the critical targets while maintaining the operational tempo (OPTEMPO).


Intel XXI collection systems will enable commanders to see their extended battlespace with great fidelity. These systems will provide commanders with the intelligence needed to understand their battlespace and to locate, identify and track critical targets. The sensor inventory will include multispectral-sensor-equipped combat vehicles, aircraft (both manned and unmanned), and soldiers. The trend of future collection is for fewer, more modular and tailorable systems. They will be accurate, automated, and cover full spectra and wide areas. Unmanned aerial and ground sensors, to include robotics and microelectronic machines, will operate together to provide coverage in areas inaccessible to conventional collection means.
On the future battlefield, the individual solider will continue to be a critical component of the collection system. Information from front-line soldiers, special operations forces, long-range surveillance units, counterintelligence teams, interrogators, and other specialized human intelligence (HUMINT) operations, will be fused with data from high- technology sensors to answer the commander's priority intelligence requests (PIR). As demonstrated in Haiti and Bosnia, stability and support operations will require increased emphasis on HUMINT assets and soldiers operating on the ground to provide the required intelligence.


Analysts convert battlespace information into intelligence and understanding to support effective decisionmaking. As the extended battlespace grows and the OPTEMPO increases, Intel XXI will provide systems common to all echelons for rapid processing, analysis, and output of intelligence and RSTA information. Analysis including the processing of intelligence data while on the move will be necessary to support our continuous operations. Future analysis capabilities will support the rapid and dynamic creation of the commander's picture. In the end, analysts must be able to make the enemy situation come alive so that commanders can quickly understand and act on what they see. The ability to rapidly analyze and process data will demand a system that provides a virtual connection between collectors and warfighters, with efficient filtering to prevent any information overload.
Intelligence analysis will support IO by focusing on the collection of intelligence on adversary command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence (C4I) capabilities and procedures. Understanding the adversary's decisionmaking process also can support accurate assessments of potential command and control (C2) targets and targeting of critical nodes in synchronized attacks.
The operational value-added of such analytic capabilities will be more timely, relevant, and accurate battlefield visualization. It will provide the commander with the ability to understand threat force capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions in relation to the terrain, weather, and operational situation. It will rapidly turn information into understanding so that commanders can more effectively conduct decisive operations. Analysis is key to effective contingency planning, wargaming, rehearsal, and execution. It therefore supports all phases of operations during peacetime and conflict.


OPTEMPO and force dispersal require that commanders have an uninterrupted flow of, or access to, intelligence on the move. As operational forces disperse and conduct distributed operations, a robust and flexible dissemination means becomes a critical requirement. Without it, Intel XXI will not be able to provide commanders with timely visualization of their respective battlespaces.
Variations of smart push- smart pull technologies will provide the required information and allow automatic updates based on established search criteria. Automatic processing of requests for information (RFIs) will speed-up the process of answering the commander's PIR. If information is not immediately available, the requester could access the status of ongoing actions in response to the request. Future technologies will allow dispersed processors to access available data without overburdening communications. Dissemination is a key element of the intelligence process. No matter how much information is collected, processed, analyzed, and stored, intelligence is of no value unless it is available to combat commanders when they need it. The right intelligence and targets provided to battle commanders when they need them is the value-added of effective dissemination. This helps sustain the OPTEMPO, enhances lethality, and improves survivability.


The future intelligence system under design will present an accurate and relevant high-fidelity intelligence picture of the battlespace, integrated with overall situation information including high-resolution weather and terrain data. This picture will convey an immediate understanding of the operational impact of the current and projected situation, including the impact of IO on the adversary's decisionmaking pro- cess. The production of this presentation is made by an organization of highly skilled, well- trained intelligence soldiers who analyze the threat, weather, and terrain within the context of the operational situation and the commander's intent.
The commander and staff's understanding of the battlespace and the enemy situation is fundamentally derived from a coherent and timely "picture" of the battlespace presented by the S2 and G2. This intelligence task encompasses battlefield visualization the understanding of what the available information means in terms of the six dimensions of the battlespace:
Additionally, the commander's ability to anticipate difficult decisions, analyze options, and reduce uncertainty directly relates to his intelligence staff's assessment of future enemy actions and intentions in time and space. The portrayal of those actions during the wargaming process and the rapid unfolding of combat operations, will include live and virtual images which produce a dynamic and coherent picture of the battlefield. In addition to displaying the current location, size, and type of unit, the display will graphically depict the currently projected capabilities of an entity in terms of time and distance. Ultimately, the commander must understand the impact of what is presented and use that understanding to make knowledge-based decisions. Future Intel XXI presentation capabilities represent a quantum leap in the intelligence system's support to the commander's ability to decide, act, resynchronize operations and focus his resources. Advanced presentation capabilities enable sustained OPTEMPO, enhanced lethality, and improved survivability.


The attack intelligence task supports the application of lethal and nonlethal means to high- payoff targets. It also includes attacking the adversary's decisionmaking process to prevent effective C2 as well as the traditional intelligence targeting effort. Commanders require a thorough understanding of the adversary's C2 structure and his decisionmaking process to effectively attack it. Detailed analysis, to include a thorough understanding of the military information environment developed in peacetime and updated during the all phases of the military operation, provides the foundation for understanding the adversary's information systems operations. This analysis forms the basis for developing and executing effective C2 attack actions to destroy, disrupt, deny, or degrade adversary information networks, C2 systems, information and intelligence sources, and decisionmaking processes.
Sophisticated nonlethal attack options to deny, disrupt, interrupt, interfere, distort or destroy information will be planned and executed in part by intelligence units as a key portion of the commander's C2 attack strategy. Electronic attack (EA) options may range from surgically jamming the frequency spectrum to intrusion into C2 systems to manipulate data. Command and control warfare (C2W) battlefield damage assessment (BDA) is essential in assessing the effects of C2 attack and maintaining information dominance. However, devising a means to conduct BDA on targets which have been nonlethally engaged poses significant challenges to future intelligence staffs.
EA is part of an integrated operation that helps the commander shape the battlespace, thereby enhancing our ability to achieve information dominance at the decisive moment. Its aim is to prevent the enemy from being able to react in time to our actions. Effective electronic attack operations will allow friendly forces to manage adversary perceptions, execute deception operations, and protect friendly forces and information.


Protect actions can be offensive or defensive in nature. Offensive protect uses all attack means (for example C2W, physical) to reduce the adversary's ability to attack friendly C2. It will place added emphasis on attack of multidisciplined RSTA systems and intelligence capabilities as the "eyes," "ears," and "brain" of the adversary attack capability. Defensive protect reduces friendly vulnerabilities to adversary attack by employing physical and electronic protection. Protective measures must be incorporated into Army systems as they are planned, designed, and developed. Failure to do so increases the risk to our forces. Our ability to thoroughly understand and graphically depict the IO battlespace is the basis for effective protect planning and execution. Protective actions allow commanders to effectively command and control their forces while optimizing their survivability and OPTEMPO.


In this series of articles, we began with an overview of Force XXI principles and the commanders' requirements. Recent operations in Haiti and Bosnia, among others, have given us a preview of the challenges that lie ahead and the wide range of missions our 21st century Army could face. We discussed how we must design, equip, and train the Intel XXI force to meet the commanders' needs in a resource-constrained environment with nontraditional missions and proliferating technologies and weapons. Our 21st century intelligence force must be flexible, tailorable, rapidly deployable, and capable of joint and coalition operations. As we said earlier, the second part of this series covered six of the Force XXI warfighters' operational patterns. (There is a seventh pattern, prepare, which we did not discuss in that article.) We considered these patterns in our development of the Intel XXI concept .
The 21st century intelligence force will provide commanders with a knowledge-based, prediction-oriented capability that can meet their information and intelligence requirements. Central to this concept are quality soldiers, leaders, and civilians. Intel XXI represents a force that will
Captain Neal J. Wegner is currently an action officer in Concepts Dvision, Directorate of Combat Developments at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. Readers can contact him via E-mail at wegnern@huachuca-emh1. and telephone (520) 538-2258/ 7213 or DSN 879-2258/7213.

Evolution of FM 34-40 to IEW Support to C2W

by Major Robert A. Peterson

Intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) provides commanders with the ability to visualize the expanded battlespace in C2W and to identify where and when they gain information dominance over an adversary. Through the Intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS) and other BOSs, information is collected and protected while the C2W elements operations security (OPSEC), psychological operations (PSYOPS), deception, physical destruction, and electronic warfare (EW) influence, disrupt, or stop adversary information flow.

Support for Information Dominance

The requirement for information and intelligence products on adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities to support information dominance is a basic intelligence function. Most of the intelligence tasks required to support C2W are already known and practiced, but C2W requires greater detail on adversary C4I; decision makers, and their decision cycles. IEW capabilities must keep pace with evolving communications and information technology to ensure our continuing support to the commander. The U.S. Army has historically trained and executed OPSEC, PSYOPS, deception, EW, and physical destruction missions. To some extent, units synchronized some or all of these missions, and in turn, they were synchronized with intelligence. C2W requires the synchronization of all its elements and intelligence with maneuver to make information a successful combat multiplier.
Due to the elusive nature of the target information, information communications systems, and sensors intelligence analysts, whether they are all source or single source, require accurate and detailed data with which to develop their information and intelligence products. In order to support C2W, intelligence analysts must be diligent in peacetime to develop and maintain the requisite databases, estimates, and information or intelligence product sources to support the wide range of contingencies. As witnessed in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the deployment phase is not the time to find that you do not have the information available to support the commander.
For information and communications infrastructures, the difficulty in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating the intelligence to support IO and its subset, C2W, requires careful asset and requirement management to ensure satisfaction of the C2W intelligence requirements. The intelligence effort against information and communications infrastructures also needs to raise in priority to satisfy detailed C2W planning and execution requirements.

The New FM 34-40

The publication in March 1997 of a new FM 34-40, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) Support to Command and Control Warfare (C2W), continues the momentum of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) in evaluating the impact of IO at the operational and tactical levels. The evolution of FM 34-40, Electronic Warfare Operations (November 1987), to IEW Support to C2W, indicates the requirement to synchronize the five elements of C2W. Units have to synchronize OPSEC, PSYOP, military deception, physical destruction, and EW in an environment where information systems and communications technology continues to make rapid advances. The manual ties together IEW with C2W in the following areas:
The new publication follows on the heels of FM 100-6, Information Operations (August 1996), and Joint Publication 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (February 1996). The soon-to-be-published FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations also provides insight into C2W by introducing a new operations order C2W annex that incorporates OPSEC, PSYOP, military deception, and EW. Physical destruction, the fifth C2W element, remains in the fire support annex with offensive EW (for example; jamming). It is critical that the C2W annex and the fire support annex with its C2W physical destruction element be cross-checked and the tasks deconflicted.
Major Peterson is the Executive Officer, 305th MI Battalion at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He served as an instructor for the MI Officer Basic and Advanced Courses and the 35G assignment-specific training course. Major Peterson has also served with the 741st MI Battalion, 751st MI Battalion at Field Station, Korea; and the 504th MI Brigade. He holds an administrative science master's degree in Information Technology Management from Johns Hopkins University and a bachelor's degree in Computer Science from Texas A&M University. Readers can contact him via E-mail 102415.2325@, (520) 533-6839, and DSN 821-6839.