Concepts and Doctrine
The Intel XXI Concept III: The Seven Intelligence Tasks
by Captain Neal J. Wegner
Editor's Note: In the April-June 1996 issue of
MIPB, Captain Wegner began his three-part series on the Intel XXI
concept. In this edition, he concludes the series, addressing the
seven intelligence tasks neccessary to provide the warfighter with
In the July-September 1996 issue of MIPB, I wrote
about the Force XXI operational patterns and how these are the key
to supporting the warfighter. Understanding these six operational
patterns is essential for intelligence professionals. When we
better understand how warfighters operate, we can more accurately
focus our support to them.
This is the approach we took when writing the Intel XXI concept.
From our understanding of the warfighters' operational patterns, we
derived seven intelligence tasks. These represent what must be done
to provide warfighters with dynamic and responsive intelligence
support (see Figure 1). These seven tasks are
We envision that these seven tasks will broaden, redefine, and
possibly supercede those currently associated with the intelligence
cycle.1 They are neither linear nor cyclic, but instead must be
continuously and dynamically performed in support of doctrinal
- Attack (electronic).
In Force XXI, intelligence professionals will be required to direct
the full range of intelligence and reconnaissance, surveillance,
and target acquisition (RSTA) assets. These assets include not only
organic collectors, but also joint, national, and multinational as
well. Input from all battlefield sensors must be managed and fused
to provide a dynamic, accurate picture of the battlespace.
Consequently, intelligence operations must go beyond the
traditional intelligence collection management activities and take
into account the entire intelligence and RSTA domain. It is
imperative that the senior intelligence officer be directly
involved in planning, coordinating, synchronizing and directing the
entire intelligence and RSTA effort. In other words, S2s and G2s
must act as their commander's chief of reconnaissance.
To effectively direct the intelligence and RSTA systems of the
future, intelligence personnel must be able to dynamically plan,
coordinate, and synchronize the intelligence and RSTA mission using
visual displays, artificial intelligence, and automated
synchronization matrices. They must also know the status and
location of all available intelligence assets. Intelligence
personnel must be able to see, in real-time, the execution of
intelligence and RSTA operations. They must also be able to see and
manage sensor-to-sensor and sensor-to-shooter linkages. Operators
must know how to pass area and target coverage horizontally and
vertically to other organizations. With such capabilities,
intelligence elements will be able to dynamically task, retask, and
shift the focus of intelligence and RSTA coverage and thus more
effectively satisfy the reconnaissance and intelligence objectives
of their commanders.
To dynamically sync and resync operations, commanders and
staffs must also have a real-time view of the intelligence and RSTA
operation while it is executed. Such current battle displays for
the commander and staff must graphically present the intelligence
and RSTA objectives as they are happening, and portray them in the
context of the overall situation. With such capabilities, future
commanders and their staffs will be able to more
effectively direct and influence intelligence and RSTA operations
and mass effects on the critical targets while maintaining the
operational tempo (OPTEMPO).
Intel XXI collection systems will enable commanders to see their
extended battlespace with great fidelity. These systems will
provide commanders with the intelligence needed to understand their
battlespace and to locate, identify and track critical targets. The
sensor inventory will include multispectral-sensor-equipped combat
vehicles, aircraft (both manned and unmanned), and soldiers.
The trend of future collection is for fewer, more modular and
tailorable systems. They will be accurate, automated, and cover
full spectra and wide areas. Unmanned aerial and ground sensors, to
include robotics and microelectronic machines, will operate
together to provide coverage in areas inaccessible to conventional
On the future battlefield, the individual solider will continue to
be a critical component of the collection system. Information from
front-line soldiers, special operations forces, long-range
surveillance units, counterintelligence teams, interrogators, and
other specialized human intelligence (HUMINT) operations, will be
fused with data from high- technology sensors to answer the
commander's priority intelligence requests (PIR). As demonstrated
in Haiti and Bosnia, stability and support operations will require
increased emphasis on HUMINT assets and soldiers operating on the
ground to provide the required intelligence.
Analysts convert battlespace information into intelligence and
understanding to support effective decisionmaking. As the extended
battlespace grows and the OPTEMPO increases, Intel XXI will provide
systems common to all echelons for rapid processing, analysis, and
output of intelligence and RSTA information. Analysis including the
processing of intelligence data while on the move will be necessary
to support our continuous operations. Future analysis capabilities
will support the rapid and dynamic creation of the commander's
picture. In the end, analysts must be able to make the enemy
situation come alive so that commanders can quickly understand
and act on what they see. The ability to rapidly analyze and
process data will demand a system that provides a virtual
connection between collectors and warfighters, with efficient
filtering to prevent any information overload.
Intelligence analysis will support IO by
focusing on the collection of intelligence on adversary command,
control, communication, computers, and intelligence (C4I)
capabilities and procedures. Understanding the adversary's
decisionmaking process also can support accurate assessments of
potential command and control (C2) targets and targeting of
critical nodes in synchronized attacks.
The operational value-added of such analytic capabilities will be
more timely, relevant, and accurate battlefield visualization. It
will provide the commander with the ability to understand threat
force capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions in relation to
the terrain, weather, and operational situation. It will rapidly
turn information into understanding so that commanders can more
effectively conduct decisive operations. Analysis is key to
effective contingency planning, wargaming, rehearsal, and
execution. It therefore supports all phases of operations during
peacetime and conflict.
OPTEMPO and force dispersal require that commanders have an
uninterrupted flow of, or access to, intelligence on the move. As
operational forces disperse and conduct distributed operations, a
robust and flexible dissemination means becomes a critical
requirement. Without it, Intel XXI will not be able to provide
commanders with timely visualization of their respective
Variations of smart push- smart pull technologies will provide
the required information and allow automatic updates based on
established search criteria. Automatic processing of requests for
information (RFIs) will speed-up the process of answering the
commander's PIR. If information is not immediately available, the
requester could access the status of ongoing actions in response to
the request. Future technologies will allow dispersed processors to
access available data without overburdening communications.
Dissemination is a key element of the intelligence process. No
matter how much information is collected, processed, analyzed, and
stored, intelligence is of no value unless it is available to
combat commanders when they need it. The right intelligence and
targets provided to battle commanders when they need them is the
value-added of effective dissemination. This helps sustain the
OPTEMPO, enhances lethality, and improves survivability.
The future intelligence system under design will present an
accurate and relevant high-fidelity intelligence picture of the
battlespace, integrated with overall situation information
including high-resolution weather and terrain data. This picture
will convey an immediate understanding of the operational impact of
the current and projected situation, including the impact of IO on
the adversary's decisionmaking pro- cess. The production of this
presentation is made by an organization of highly skilled, well-
trained intelligence soldiers who analyze the threat, weather, and
terrain within the context of the operational situation and the
The commander and staff's understanding of the battlespace and the
enemy situation is fundamentally derived from a coherent and timely
"picture" of the battlespace presented by the S2 and G2. This
intelligence task encompasses battlefield visualization the
understanding of what the available information means in terms of
the six dimensions of the battlespace:
Additionally, the commander's ability to anticipate difficult
decisions, analyze options, and reduce uncertainty directly relates
to his intelligence staff's assessment of future enemy actions and
intentions in time and space. The portrayal of those actions during
the wargaming process and the rapid unfolding of combat operations,
will include live and virtual images which produce a dynamic and
coherent picture of the battlefield. In addition to displaying the
current location, size, and type of unit, the display will
graphically depict the currently projected capabilities of an
entity in terms of time and distance. Ultimately, the commander
must understand the impact of what is presented and use that
understanding to make knowledge-based decisions.
Future Intel XXI presentation capabilities represent a quantum leap
in the intelligence system's support to the commander's ability to
decide, act, resynchronize operations and focus his resources.
Advanced presentation capabilities enable sustained OPTEMPO,
enhanced lethality, and improved survivability.
The attack intelligence task supports the application of lethal and
nonlethal means to high- payoff targets. It also includes
attacking the adversary's decisionmaking process to prevent
effective C2 as well as the traditional intelligence targeting
effort. Commanders require a thorough understanding of the
adversary's C2 structure and his decisionmaking process to
effectively attack it. Detailed analysis, to include a thorough
understanding of the military information environment developed in
peacetime and updated during the all phases of the military
operation, provides the foundation for understanding the
adversary's information systems operations. This analysis forms the
basis for developing and executing effective C2 attack actions to
destroy, disrupt, deny, or degrade adversary information networks,
C2 systems, information and intelligence sources, and
Sophisticated nonlethal attack options to deny, disrupt, interrupt,
interfere, distort or destroy information will be planned and
executed in part by intelligence units as a key portion of the
commander's C2 attack strategy. Electronic attack (EA) options may
range from surgically jamming the frequency spectrum to intrusion
into C2 systems to manipulate data. Command and control warfare
(C2W) battlefield damage assessment (BDA) is essential in assessing
the effects of C2 attack and maintaining information dominance.
However, devising a means to conduct BDA on targets which have been
nonlethally engaged poses significant challenges to future
EA is part of an integrated operation that helps the commander
shape the battlespace, thereby enhancing our ability to achieve
information dominance at the decisive moment. Its aim is to prevent
the enemy from being able to react in time to our actions.
Effective electronic attack operations will allow friendly forces
to manage adversary perceptions, execute deception operations, and
protect friendly forces and information.
Protect actions can be offensive or defensive in nature. Offensive
protect uses all attack means (for example C2W, physical) to reduce
the adversary's ability to attack friendly C2. It will place added
emphasis on attack of multidisciplined RSTA systems and
intelligence capabilities as the "eyes," "ears," and "brain" of the
adversary attack capability. Defensive protect reduces friendly
vulnerabilities to adversary attack by employing physical and
electronic protection. Protective measures must be incorporated
into Army systems as they are planned, designed, and developed.
Failure to do so increases the risk to our forces. Our ability to
thoroughly understand and graphically depict the IO battlespace is
the basis for effective protect planning and execution. Protective
actions allow commanders to effectively command and control their
forces while optimizing their survivability and OPTEMPO.
In this series of articles, we began with an overview of Force XXI
principles and the commanders' requirements. Recent operations in
Haiti and Bosnia, among others, have given us a preview of the
challenges that lie ahead and the wide range of missions our 21st
century Army could face. We discussed how we must design, equip,
and train the Intel XXI force to meet the commanders' needs in a
resource-constrained environment with nontraditional missions and
proliferating technologies and weapons. Our 21st century
intelligence force must be flexible, tailorable, rapidly
deployable, and capable of joint and coalition operations.
As we said earlier, the second part of this series covered six of
the Force XXI warfighters' operational patterns. (There is a
seventh pattern, prepare, which we did not discuss in that
article.) We considered these patterns in our development of the
Intel XXI concept .
The 21st century intelligence force will provide commanders with a
knowledge-based, prediction-oriented capability that can meet their
information and intelligence requirements. Central to this concept
are quality soldiers, leaders, and civilians. Intel XXI represents
a force that will
- Produce timely presentations of their battlespaces for
commanders, enabling an accurate understanding of the operational
environment, adversary, terrain, and weather.
- Provide intelligence personnel with the resources
necessary to conduct, coordinate, and synchronize intelligence
operations in concert with supported operations.
- Equip the force with tailorable, multispectral collection
capabilities to deal with emerging threats and technologies.
- Synchronize and leverage national intelligence and
collection resources in support of operational decisionmaking.
- Support operations on the move using broadcast and smart
- Provide Force XXI with an effective weather capability by
giving soldiers the information they need to fight and operate in
all weather conditions.
- Support lethal and nonlethal attack targeting and
execution through the synchronization of intelligence in IO and
C2W, seizing the advantages of information dominance.
Captain Neal J. Wegner is currently an action officer
in Concepts Dvision, Directorate of Combat Developments at the U.S.
Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. Readers can contact him
via E-mail at [email protected] amy.mil and telephone (520)
538-2258/ 7213 or DSN 879-2258/7213.
Evolution of FM 34-40 to IEW Support to C2W
by Major Robert A. Peterson
Intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) provides
commanders with the ability to visualize the expanded battlespace
in C2W and to identify where and when they gain information
dominance over an adversary. Through the Intelligence battlefield
operating system (BOS) and other BOSs, information is collected and
protected while the C2W elements operations security (OPSEC),
psychological operations (PSYOPS), deception, physical destruction,
and electronic warfare (EW) influence, disrupt, or stop adversary
Support for Information Dominance
The requirement for information and intelligence products on
adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities to support information
dominance is a basic intelligence function. Most of the
intelligence tasks required to support C2W are already known and
practiced, but C2W requires greater detail on adversary C4I;
decision makers, and their decision cycles. IEW capabilities must
keep pace with evolving communications and information technology
to ensure our continuing support to the commander.
The U.S. Army has historically trained and executed OPSEC, PSYOPS,
deception, EW, and physical destruction missions. To some extent,
units synchronized some or all of these missions, and in turn, they
were synchronized with intelligence. C2W requires the
synchronization of all its elements and intelligence with maneuver
to make information a successful combat multiplier.
Due to the elusive nature of the target information, information
communications systems, and sensors intelligence analysts, whether
they are all source or single source, require accurate and detailed
data with which to develop their information and intelligence
products. In order to support C2W, intelligence analysts must be
diligent in peacetime to develop and maintain the requisite
databases, estimates, and information or intelligence product
sources to support the wide range of contingencies. As witnessed in
Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the deployment phase is
not the time to find that you do not have the information available
to support the commander.
For information and communications infrastructures, the difficulty
in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating the intelligence to
support IO and its subset, C2W, requires careful asset and
requirement management to ensure satisfaction of the C2W
intelligence requirements. The intelligence effort against
information and communications infrastructures also needs to raise
in priority to satisfy detailed C2W planning and execution
The New FM 34-40
The publication in March 1997 of a new FM 34-40, Intelligence and
Electronic Warfare (IEW) Support to Command and Control Warfare
(C2W), continues the momentum of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center
and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) in evaluating the impact of IO at the
operational and tactical levels. The evolution of FM 34-40,
Electronic Warfare Operations (November 1987), to IEW Support to
C2W, indicates the requirement to synchronize the five elements of
C2W. Units have to synchronize OPSEC, PSYOP, military deception,
physical destruction, and EW in an environment where information
systems and communications technology continues to make rapid
advances. The manual ties together IEW with C2W in the following
The new publication follows on the heels of FM 100-6, Information
Operations (August 1996), and Joint Publication 3-13.1, Joint
Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (February 1996). The
soon-to-be-published FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations
also provides insight into C2W by introducing a new operations
order C2W annex that incorporates OPSEC, PSYOP, military deception,
and EW. Physical destruction, the fifth C2W element, remains in the
fire support annex with offensive EW (for example; jamming). It is
critical that the C2W annex and the fire support annex with its C2W
physical destruction element be cross-checked and the tasks
- Information operations and C2W terminology.
- G2 and EW officer roles in the C2W staff.
- IEW in the C2W planning process.
- Intelligence support to C2W.
- Tactical HUMINT, imagery intelligence, measurement and
signatures intelligence, and signals intelligence and electronic
warfare considerations in C2W.
- The supporting agencies for Army IO and C2W.
Major Peterson is the Executive Officer, 305th MI
Battalion at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He served as an instructor for
the MI Officer Basic and Advanced Courses and the 35G
assignment-specific training course. Major Peterson has also served
with the 741st MI Battalion, 751st MI Battalion at Field Station,
Korea; and the 504th MI Brigade. He holds an administrative science
master's degree in Information Technology Management from Johns
Hopkins University and a bachelor's degree in Computer Science from
Texas A&M University. Readers can contact him via E-mail
102415.2325@ compuserve.com, (520) 533-6839, and DSN 821-6839.