Army doctrine has embraced the intelligence synchronization process. This process
requires a plan. Without an effective intelligence synchronization plan, timely answers to PIR
will elude decisionmakers. As we grapple with and solve the challenges of the intelligence
synchronization plan, we will achieve new levels of performance
in providing timely intelligence support to the commander.
The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful insights of Major Kenneth Watras and Chief
Warrant Officer Three Joseph Okabayashi in developing this article.
1. Brigadier General John F. Stewart, Jr., "Operation DESERT STORM, The Military
Intelligence Story: A View from the G2, 3d U.S. Army," April 1991.
2. For insight into synchronization planning from the collector's viewpoint, see Captain Timothy
J. Moynihan's "MI Battalion Synchronization Matrix: Tactical Tool for the Commander and
Staff," Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, Vol.19, No. 1,
3. General Gordon R. Sullivan, "Delivering Decisive Victory: Improving Synchronization."
Military Review, Vol. LXXII, No. 9, September 1992, 8.
4. The G2 may employ intelligence synchronization to answer information requirements
whenever those answers are required at particular times. I have emphasized PIR in this article by
5. FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, 8 July 1994, 1-11.
6. FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, 27 September 1994,
7. Ibid, 2-20.
8. FM 34-2, Collection Management and Intelligence Synchronization Planning, 8
March 1994, 3-26.
Major Lady is the Senior Intelligence Observer and Controller for Operations Group A,
BCTP. Readers can reach him at (913) 684-9929/9820 or DSN 552-9929/9820.