Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin
Brigade IEW in a Force Projection Army
by Captain Steven Guitron
Editor's Note: This article represents some of the
initial work done on the revision of FM 34-80, Brigade and
Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations.
The divisional maneuver brigade of the past could
rely upon its organic assets to provide the type and amount of
intelligence needed by the commander to successfully plan and
execute operations. Since today's brigade could become a task force
headquarters in the new force projection army, the brigade and its
battalions must be prepared to employ their own assets and assume
control of attached intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW)
assets from higher echelons. The S2, as the commander's
senior intelligence officer, must be educated and skilled in
the employment of the entire spectrum of assets, to include
division, corps, and sister Services' sensors. This knowledge must
include assets that the brigade and division do not currently
possess or assets in final development that are provided for a
Range of Military Operations
Maneuver brigades no longer face a single, well-defined
conventional threat. Now, these brigades must focus on conducting
contingency operations as part of a force projection operation.
Whether airborne, air assault, armor, light infantry, or mechanized
infantry, they must be capable of conducting operations across the
range of military operations. Brigades and their battalions must be
able to conduct missions in peacetime, conflict, and war against
threats ranging in size from well-armed regional powers in
Southwest Asia to paramilitary groups in famine-stricken Africa.
At the brigade, peacetime is typically that time when the brigade
is involved in normal training activities and noncombat operations.
Examples include a rotation to the National Training Center and
firefighting in a national forest.
Confrontation and hostilities short of war to secure tactical
objectives characterize conflict operations. In this situation the
brigade must prepare for operations and rapid deployment. The S2
must focus intelligence to the commander's priority intelligence
requirements for predeployment, deployment, operations, and
redeployment. By using this sequence the S2 provides the commander
with the type of intelligence he needs to successfully execute the
assigned mission. The S2 and the direct support (DS) military
intelligence (MI) company must be fully prepared to receive new IEW
and communications systems. (See Figure 1.) This equipment could be
an AN/TSQ-90 TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote
Intelligence Terminal (SPIRIT) or a Joint Deployable
Intelligence Support System (JDISS) terminal. Teams equipped
with these systems should be intertwined within the existing
brigade intelligence structure and used to provide the support
intended by their parent organization. Should the brigade become an
Army Force component of a joint task force (JTF) or a JTF
headquarters itself, then its IEW capabilities will expand rapidly.
The S2 section could receive assets and personnel from division,
corps, sister Services, and national agencies such as the Defense
Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.
The S2 must prepare the normal intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB), collection management, and all-source products
for the impending deployment and conflict. He should make extensive
use of higher echelons' (division, corps, theater,
and national level) databases for the remaining intelligence
requirements. Examples of conflict operations are peacekeeping,
noncombatant evacuation operations, and support to insurgency.
War is the last environment. War involves the use of force in
combat operations against an armed enemy. A general war is one in
which major powers mobilize all national resources in a struggle
for survival or dominance. At the brigade level, war requires
battlefield intelligence which is accurate and timely. The brigade
commander will use this intelligence to successfully fight and win
the close battle and possibly the deep battle if the brigade acts
as a force projection brigade. In support of operations, the S2
must effectively employ all intelligence capabilities within the
area of operations. By using scouts, patrols, DS MI assets, and
higher echelon intelligence support, the S2 can quickly provide a
common view of the battlefield to each echelon within the brigade.
This common view enables the combat commanders to make
knowledgeable decisions based on the current tactical situation.
Operations during war place extreme stress on the intelligence
structure and acquisition process. In light of this, the S2 must
ensure that commander's critical intelligence requirements are met
first and delay those that will not influence a decision until
sufficient assets are available. This attention to detail in the
collection management and synchronization process will ensure
intelligence needed for decisions reaches the commander.
Force Projection Operations
Force projection operations typically include the ability to
rapidly alert, mobilize, deploy, and operate anywhere in the world
throughout the range of military operations. These operations
extend from mobilization through deployment and operations to
redeployment. Force projection usually begins with a
rapid response to a crisis although it may involve a deliberate,
slower build-up and deployment. During peacetime, the
maneuver brigade includes deployment as part of its training.
Brigades usually conduct force projection operations as part of the
division or alone. IEW plays an important role in force projection
operations by providing the timely and accurate intelligence needed
by the brigade commander.
The brigade S2 and the analysis and control team (ACT) capitalize
on the flexibility of the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) remote
workstation to support the brigade commander's force projection IEW
requirements. The ACT officer in charge (OIC) configures the ACT
components to provide seamless, uninterrupted intelligence support
from predeployment through redeployment stages in any force
projection operation. The ACT uses its ASAS workstations to update
databases, develop intelligence products, disseminate
intelligence, and control DS MI company operations throughout the
operation. If equipped with ASAS, the subordinate battalion S2s use
their workstations to provide the information needed at the brigade
level. At the same time the battalion S2s can retrieve intelligence
products from the brigade S2.
Army brigades and their subordinate battalions prepare to routinely
execute six of the eight stages of force projection operations
defined in FM 100-5, Operations. These six stages are-
- Predeployment Activity.
- Entry Operations.
- War Termination and Post-conflict Operations.
- Redeployment and Reconstitution.
Brigade predeployment activities include planning, task organizing,
and echeloning the brigade and subordinate battalions. It also
includes preparing personnel and equipment for deployment. When
alerted, the brigade may have to modify existing operations plans.
These modifications may include readjusting task organizations,
sequencing forces, and refining sustainment requirements.
During predeployment operations, the brigade S2 and battalion S2s
conduct necessary actions in order to retrieve key intelligence
data needed for deployment. The brigade S2 supports peacetime
contingency planning with IPB products and database management for
likely contingency areas. The contingency plan identifies the IEW
requirements supporting the plan. The plan also establishes
collection strategies and plans that will activate upon alert
notification. For smooth transition to hostilities, the brigade S2
must coordinate collection and communications plans before the
crisis occurs. After activation of the contingency plan, the
brigade S2 surges the intelligence effort to support the
decisionmaking process. The S2 must refine intelligence products
and prepare the initial entry IEW support.
During predeployment, the ACT exchanges information and databases
with the division analysis and control element (ACE) and, if
authorized, with the corps ACE. It also exchanges information with
other intelligence organizations at higher and lower echelons. The
ACT establishes connectivity with the division ACE so it can access
other Services, joint, national, and Reserve Component intelligence
activities that collect against or possess information on the
The proper arrival sequence of the brigade into an area of
operations contributes to the stabilization of the situation and
maintains a viable force protection capability. Success in force
projection operations hinges on the capability of airlift and
sealift assets to move forces to the area of operations quickly.
The size and composition of forces requiring lift are based on
mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, and time available
(METT-T). The capabilities of host nation support and a forward
presence of U.S. forces are also factors. Once the brigade arrives
in theater, it moves to marshaling areas, staging areas, and then
tactical assembly areas before executing operations.
If the brigade deploys as part of a division, then the division G2
would deploy a tactically tailored, initial entry team the
deployable intelligence support element (DISE). If the
brigade deploys alone, a divisional DISE would not deploy and the
brigade would rely upon its ACT augmented with a TROJAN SPIRIT. The
mission of the DISE is to provide the division commander with
continuous, timely intelligence during the initial stages of a
force projection operation.
In force projection operations, the commander tactically tailors
IEW support for each contingency. The commander should attempt to
retain unit integrity and standard relationships when developing
force packages. However, the deployment of the entire DS MI company
may not be feasible. Tailoring of the force allows the brigade
commander, with advice from the brigade S2 and DS MI company
commander, to build a force that can fulfill current and future
needs of the mission. Some considerations when building the IEW
- Assessing the requirements. During mission analysis the
brigade S2 must adequately determine the intelligence requirements
of the upcoming operation based on METT-T. By performing this
initial analysis of the mission, the brigade S2 and DS MI company
commander can propose a tailored force based upon their knowledge
of the available IEW assets, communications links, and processing
requirements. Other factors to consider are strategic lift
resources and host nation support.
- Deploying a DISE. Will the configuration practiced during
command post and field training exercises work for an actual
deployment? Are the soldiers trained in their DISE support
functions? Are communications practiced on a standard basis to
ensure reliability? If so, then the division's DISE could deploy
initially to support the operation then receive reinforcement as
lift assets become available to the division.
- Integrating IEW into the deployment flow early. The
commander must ensure that assets flow into the theater as they are
required. The brigade S2 can support this objective by keeping the
commander informed about which IEW assets best support his
operation. The brigade commander can then judge when to allocate
scarce airspace for IEW assets. If the S2 does not educate the
brigade commander on what an MI soldier or IEW system can do for
him in terms of tactical value, it will be extremely difficult to
explain why it is important to put that TROJAN SPIRIT on an
aircraft and leave behind a Bradley fighting vehicle.
The brigade arrives in theater either as an entry force or a
follow-on force. Entry forces can conduct either opposed or
unopposed entry operations to secure the lodgment. Follow-on forces
expand lodgments and build up combat power to sustain combat
operations. During an opposed entry, the brigade conducts a
forcible entry into an area that may contain hostile forces. In
this situation, initial entry forces are primarily combat forces.
During an unopposed entry, the brigade may serve as a deterrent,
act as an advance party for a larger force, or participate in
noncombat operations. The brigade may also conduct an unopposed
entry under hostile conditions.
Force protection and situation development dominate collection
activities in this stage. The division G2 and the brigade S2
attempt to identify all threats to arriving forces and assist the
commander in developing force protection measures. During initial
entry operations, echelons above corps organizations provide major
intelligence support in a "push" mode to the division and brigade.
This support includes departmental, joint, and scalable
Army intelligence structures capable of deploying forward.
Collection and production capabilities are enhanced as IEW assets
in the deployment area build up. As organic IEW assets flow into
the theater, the brigade commander and S2 begin to rely on them for
tactical intelligence although national and theater organizations
remain a source of tactical intelligence.
Deploying intelligence assets of the brigade establish liaison with
staffs and units already present in the area of operations. Liaison
personnel and basic communications should be in place prior to the
scheduled arrival of parent commands. The brigade S2 and the DS MI
company commander should establish intelligence communications
networks to support the brigade commander and subordinate battalion
Operations are the missions the brigade executes that contribute to
overall mission accomplishment. The brigade may conduct both combat
operations and other operations such as peacekeeping, humanitarian
assistance, and support to drug enforcement. The brigade commander
shifts his focus from IEW support for deployment to support
required for sustained operations. In the operation stage, IEW
operations reach a crossover point in intelligence support where
organic tactical intelligence becomes the commander's primary
source of support, reducing the reliance on top-driven national and
theater intelligence. The brigade commander uses both tactical and
operational intelligence to decisively engage and defeat the enemy.
During operations, the brigade S2 supports the development of
friendly plans that identify and attack enemy centers of gravity
while avoiding enemy strength. The DS MI company commander
continually evolves his concept for employing his personnel and
equipment to reflect changes in the operation. The brigade S2's
collection management and synchronization plans continue to support
the brigade commander's decisionmaking and planning.
Intelligence synchronization is a shared effort shared by the
brigade S2 and DS MI company commander. This coordinated effort in
the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence helps
ensure linkage of IEW operations to the commander's requirements
and responses in time to influence decisions. At the brigade level,
synchronization of intelligence evolves from the intelligence line
of the brigade's Battlefield Operating System (BOS)
Synchronization Matrix. By actively participating in the wargaming
process, the brigade S2 remains fully aware of the upcoming
intelligence requirements. The intelligence staff applies this
knowledge to develop the brigade reconnaissance and surveillance
(R&S) plan. The ACT, based on the S2's guidance and R&S plan,
develops the brigade's IEW collection plan and intelligence
synchronization matrix (ISM). The brigade S2 uses these tools to
further develop and track the PIR, specific information
requirements, and specific orders and requests sequence.
The synchronization of the dissemination effort must be the
responsibility of the ACT OIC. The OIC must ensure that each ACT
analyst has a copy of the BOS synchronization matrix, the ISM, and
the collection plan. By providing these working tools to the
analysts, they can rapidly review outstanding PIR, update ASAS
alarms, and provide intelligence by the latest time the information
is of value. The ACT OIC, in conjunction with the S2, also
determines which analysts have message release authority.
By allowing senior analysts message release authority, the ACT OIC
empowers them with the authority to execute timely dissemination of
tailored intelligence products to the combat commanders.
War Termination and Post-Conflict Operations
War termination and post-conflict operations are
activities taken to restore conditions in the areas of operation
that are favorable to U.S. national policy. During this period, the
brigade focuses on force protection and preparing for redeployment.
Post-conflict operations also include restoring order and
reestablishing host nation infrastructure. Planning and versatility
are two vital components of successful post-conflict operations.
The brigade commander and his staff begin planning post-conflict
operations before cessation of combat operations. This planning
Post-conflict activities include a variety of tasks from enemy
prisoner of war control to civil affairs operations. The brigade
also begins retraining its units on critical tasks and preparing
for follow-on missions. The brigade S2 continues to support the
commander's PIR. The nature of these requirements may shift from
assessing threat forces to assessing political, economic, and other
conditions that effect force protection and the desired end state.
- Adjusting the rules of engagement.
- Evaluating and improving force protection measures.
- Transferring responsibilities to units assuming control
of the brigade's area of operations.
Redeployment and Reconstitution
Redeployment is situation de-pendent and requires task organizing
and echeloning similar to deployment. Some assets will depart
early, such as advance parties, nonessential personnel, and
equipment. During this phase, units continue to train on
individual and mission essential tasks. The objective of
reconstitution is to prepare for follow-on missions rapidly. These
activities include rebuilding the unit's integrity and accounting
for soldiers and equipment. The focus is on
reconstitution of units to predeployment levels of readiness.
As the combat power and resources decrease in the
area of operations, force protection becomes the focus of the
brigade commander's PIR. This in turn drives the commander's
selection of those MI assets that should remain deployed in support
of the brigade. The ACT, a TROJAN SPIRIT team, and the DS MI
company's counterintelligence and interrogation
personnel, will normally be among the last to redeploy
due to their ability to retrieve information and support force
The Army has transitioned into an era in which smaller, more
capable forces must quickly deploy and influence regional struggles
within days. This new force projection army not only must support
any mission with smaller combat ready units but also with smaller
supporting forces. Supporting forces such as the DS MI company must
be able to deploy on a moment's notice and conduct operations.
Intelligence success or failure on today's battlefield depends upon
how well the commander and S2 employs their IEW resources.
Captain Guitron is the primary author for the revision
of FM 34-80. Prior to his assignment at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, he
served in a variety of positions in the 1st Infantry Division at
Fort Riley, Kansas, including assistant brigade S2, armor battalion
assistant S2, and ground surveillance radar platoon leader. Readers
can reach him at (520) 538-0979 or DSN 879-0979.