The Bush Intelligence Agency

By MSgt. Anthony Pendleton
HQ AIA/HO
Kelly Air Force Base, Texas

President George Bush became the first leader of a western nation to have served as the chief of a national intelligence service.

He was first influenced and exposed to politics by his father, Prescott Bush, Republican Senator for Connecticut from 1952 to 1963, and an ardent supporter of the CIA.

The future president’s experience in politics and the intelligence community continued through a wide variety of important diplomatic and political postings. In 1966, he won election to the U.S. House of Representatives from Texas, and served two terms. Two years of service as America’s UN Ambassador followed, beginning in 1971. Then came a stint as chairman of the Republican National Committee.

In 1974, Bush traveled to Beijing, and served there as the Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office during the period when the U.S. was renewing ties with China.

From this post, President Ford called on him to take over as the Director of Central Intelligence. It was this job that fully educated him on both the importance and limitations of intelligence work. He thoroughly enjoyed this work, and asked President Carter to keep him on as DCI. When Carter refused, Bush resumed private life.

His return to politics came in 1980 when Ronald Reagan selected him as his vice presidential running mate. Their victory ultimately brought George Bush to the presidency in 1988.

During his first month in office, President Bush received intelligence reports on the possible collapse of the Soviet economic and political system. Mikhail Gorbachev was attempting to reform his country’s entire system. Those attempts, coupled with the accelerating economic decline were doomed to failure.

President Bush, during the next four years, would be challenged by massive changes to the world’s political, military and economic scenes. Changes in the political leadership of the former Soviet Union, the collapse of the Soviet “empire,” and the turbulence in the former Soviet satellites challenged the free world’s intelligence community in some very unique ways.

Failing to predict the speed with which the changes took place became probably the greatest failure of the intelligence community. But, as President Bush pointed out, intelligence work is not an exact science.

The changes were, however, so rapid that there was a real danger of the destabilization of the former Soviet Union. This could have meant the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In trying to counter this threat, U.S. intelligence experts were heavily taxed in their efforts to stay current with what was going on in the new independent countries forming out of the former Soviert Union, and the disposition of nuclear weapons still held in those new countries.

In addition to the changing Soviet Union, other major concerns were thrown into the mix.

The developing situation in Panama involving that country’s dictator, General Manuel Noriega, was one of them. Intelligence reports clearly proved that Noriega, himself a former CIA asset, had become a player in international drug trafficking, He was intimidating American citizens and had rigged the Panamanian elections in May of 1989 to keep himself in power. President Bush ordered the CIA to try, through covert means, to encourage Panamanian efforts to remove Noriega. When this failed, Bush approved direct U.S. action, Operation Just Cause.

U.S. troops entered Panama during the early morning hours Dec. 20, 1989. Initial intelligence reports on Noriega’s location were confused, but by Jan. 3, 1990, he was in custody.

Operation Just Cause had been the largest military action since Vietnam, but was insignificant compared to what was to follow later in 1990.

Iraq’s Saddam Hussein had already began rattling his sword. But this was the spring of 1990, and the lead up period to the Bush/Gorbachev summit – a follow up to their December 1989 meeting in Malta. Saddam was put on the back burner for now, for two reasons.

The spring of 1990 was when Lithuania chose to declare its independence from Moscow. Gorbachev denounced the move as invalid. However, it became apparent to most, by this time, that he could do nothing but make denunciations. The ever-accelerating departure of various former Soviet republics alarmed U.S. officials.

The Bush administration supported these freedom movements, but remained concerned that the instability within the former Soviet Union would cause Gorbachev’s hard line opponents to act and bring about a return to fundamental Leninism. Intelligence efforts simply were not able to keep up with the pace of the changes taking place.

Boris Yeltsin had been elected president of the Russian Republic despite Gorbachev’s attempts to prevent this election – further proof of the weakening of Gorbachev’s influence.

Also in the spring of 1990 a major confrontation with nuclear implications was developing on the Indian subcontinent. India had built up its forces to over 200,000 troops in the disputed Kashmir territory.

This alarmed Pakistan and the world since both countries had the bomb. No threats to use them had been voiced; however, many world leaders felt that Pakistan was capable and willing to do so.

They had suffered a humiliating loss to India in their 1971 war, after which they lost East Pakistan (now called Bangladesh), and would be unwilling to suffer a similar fate again. Both sides were getting ready for war, and even a miscalculation could set off a nuclear exchange. U.S. intelligence clearly showed this, and it also clearly showed that Pakistan had no chance of winning such a war.

President Bush sent Robert Gates (DCI by May 1991) to present proposals to both sides. Gates had with him the intelligence evidence to show the Pakistani leadership the truth of their situation along with assurances for India that their issues would be addressed. The ploy worked. Both sides reduced their preparations for war, and India moved most of its troops out of Kashmir.

After the India/Pakistan situation President Bush turned his attention back to the Iraqi matter. Intelligence reports on Saddam Hussein’s continued military build up were provided to him, but he didn’t heed them. He believed Saddam could, by a mixture of well-applied diplomatic pressure and foreign aid, be made to see reason and moderate his behavior.

The first public warning that Saddam was preparing to wage war came during his speech of April 1,1990. He boasted about his arsenal of chemical weapons, and generally tried to promote himself as the hero of the Arab world by making veiled threats against Israel.

Intelligence reports also showed that Saddam had designs on Kuwait, but these were ignored or discounted. President Bush discussed the situation with various Middle Eastern leaders but all reassured him that Saddam was only making threats. But Saddam’s rhetoric wasn’t bluff. He did invade Kuwait. President Bush was able to put together an international coalition that freed Kuwait.

It was a marvelous effort, but many problems within the intelligence community came to light. Modern imagery technology proved to be the most valuable tool available during the Gulf War. However, the demands on it far exceeded what had been anticipated.

Of course, the chronic problem of the lack of interservice coordination and cooperation again reared its ugly head. Only a third of the units using Secondary Image Dissemination System in operations could communicate with one another.

The most potentially dangerous failure involved battle damage assessments. Intelligence estimates had greatly exaggerated the level of destruction we had levied on Iraqi materiel and manpower assets, and had also failed to gauge properly the damage our efforts produced on Iraqi morale.

Human intelligence efforts had, from the beginning, simply failed to reveal Saddam’s political and military aims. This coupled with concerns about the breakup of the former Soviet Union, and the associated potential for nuclear weapons proliferation made it apparent that agent recruitment was needed.

In fact, a number of major problems prompted the administration to initiate sweeping changes within the intelligence community. To enhance the DCI’s ability to coordinate intelligence efforts, a DCI Community Management Staff, headed by the executive director of community affairs, was set up.

The National Intelligence Council and National Intelligence Officers were moved into separate facilities to strengthen their independence from the CIA, which improved coordination of intelligence analysis efforts throughout the community.

In March 1992, President Bush approved the establishment of a National Human Intelligence Tasking Center to coordinate HUMINT gathering efforts. Repeated failures to coordinate IMINT information made it necessary for Secretary Cheney to order the creation of the DOD Central Imagery Office.

The first task of its 13-member panel was to “streamline, consolidate, reduce or enhance” imagery collection by the National Reconnaissance Office.

The final change made by the Bush administration concerned intelligence community support for military operations. Intelligence materials provided by the NSA or the CIA were rarely used by the military, so the CIA established the Office of Military Affairs to bridge the gap. Its job, simply put, was to make sure the military’s needs were met.

These reforms, and the openness encouraged by President Bush resulted in unprecedented levels of contact between the intelligence and academic communities and also within the government itself. The changes made were some of the most innovative and far reaching since President Truman oversaw the establishment of the current national intelligence collection and analysis systems.