Commander's Comments

The information age has had great effects across the spectrum of conflict, challenging our organization to keep pace with evolving missions. One of the most significant revolutions of our modern military is the transition from the serial warfare of World War II to the parallel warfare of Desert Storm. Serial warfare was born out of necessity to achieve strike mass and place the maximum number of bombs on target to achieve a desired objective. However, we’ve realized that servicing targets sequentially is not the most optimum method for achieving combat objectives.

Given the fact that we could attack a limited set of targets (due to limited assets, required restrikes, etc.), we were forced into an input-based targeting philosophy. Input-based targeting suggested that we initially concentrate on the assets available and measurables, such as the number of sorties flown or number of bombs dropped. It is a simple approach to targeting since a target set is selected, attacked, and then assessed for mission success. Input-based targeting has limited utility since it does not directly address the larger issue of a commander’s objectives.

Although many attempts were made to conduct more sophisticated nodal analysis and tie strikes to objectives, our immature analytical techniques did not allow us to fully realize the linkages among target sets.

Through technology, we have been able to achieve great strides in how we conduct warfare and in how we select targets. In Desert Storm we were witness to the first effective use of parallel warfare where multiple targets, from tactical to strategic, were struck simultaneously. We achieved great results due to a subtle change in targeting philosophy combined with the means necessary to adequately assess the cascading effects caused by attacking critical nodes. By migrating to output-based targeting we placed primary emphasis on meeting the commander’s objectives.

How is this different? Through input-based targeting we would, for example, select bridges as a target set and focus on destroying a supporting strut and estimating the effect of destroying the strut. Output-based targeting looks at the bridge from a transportation system point of view and selects the most vulnerable component of the system to achieve the commander’s objective of disrupting lines of communication. The most vulnerable component may not be the bridge. It could be a tunnel or some other critical node.

Output-based targeting identifies a whole new challenge to the intelligence community as we are no longer supporting damage assessment to determine effects, but now must look from a systems point of view to determine effectiveness. This means effects-based targeting and effectiveness-based BDA. Determining effectiveness requires volumes more intelligence to catalog not only physical characteristics of a target, but functional, as well. We have not achieved the commander’s goal if the building is destroyed, but the function that was performed inside the building had previously been dispersed or relocated.

It is much harder to assess operational-strategic effectiveness as this usually involves more qualitative rather than quantitative measures of effectiveness. When human nature, psychology, and political ends are thrown into the success equation, drawing conclusions about achieving a desired effect becomes more nebulous. We must continue to strive for innovative ways to use our technological advantage for constructive gains.

As the drive for more detailed information continues to shape our force, we at AIA have to keep pace with evolving mission needs. One area of concern is the way we organize to support the operational environment of the Combat Air Force. Recurring employment of U.S. forces in military operations other than war has U.S. aircraft in regions of the world where they weren’t originally planned to deploy. This means there are new electronic warfare requirements that must compete in an era of force drawdown and reduced budgets.

However, these needs are often not recognized until operational limitations in supporting actual tasks force them to be recognized. Threat systems from both Former Soviet and Western nations are in the inventories of potential adversaries and are being modified by them in such a way that existing EW equipment no longer provides adequate warning and countermeasures. Deficiencies in EW capabilities degrade task accomplishment and could result in an unacceptable level of mission risk.

It is important now to focus on aircraft survivability as the measure of EW utility and to tailor EW suites for a given aircraft to meet the specific environment in which it will be flying.

Until now, each MAJCOM has been advocating its own needs and prioritizing accordingly. However, since much of EW equipment is common across platforms, advocacy for equipment has been diffused. The purpose of the recently developed AF EW Roadmap is to unite these varied EW plans into one integrated document. AIA has a part in this Roadmap, both in requirements and in contributions.

Since it is not possible to conduct EW without electronic intelligence, AIA has identified numerous shortfalls in ELINT support, including both tasking and dissemination of information to the user, which require greater emphasis. Among these are support to both the technical ELINT and S&TI arenas. Focus on providing intelligence to the “crisis of the day” has diverted resources away from the support required to preserve EW capabilities in the long term. In turn, AIA must ensure that we can provide adequate data, EW analysis, and reachback to deployed forces, optimizing commanders’ limited assets.

Historically EW has been highly dependent upon intelligence as is evidenced by the reciprocal development of measures, countermeasures, and counter-countermeasures between opposing military forces and their respective intelligence communities. Today intelligence support to EW is being pulled in several directions even as intel resources are declining. A balance must be struck between identifying, analyzing and exploiting the most advanced threats and providing exploitation and other Intel support of threats which are older, possibly modified, and much more likely to be encountered operationally.

An organization as large as AIA must continually strive for ways to streamline, organize, support, and operate the vast resources at its disposal. EW provides a good example of how decisions that seemed logical come under increased scrutiny over time. We are in the business of supporting warfighting CINCs. Efficiently supporting activities from targeting to execution to BDA is graded by our ability to meet the CINC’s objectives. It is a challenging world with rapid technological improvements and an ever-changing adversary. But, as Giulio Douhet stated in 1921, “It is often said that military planes should be changed in design and construction every three months because of the constant and rapid technical progress being made in aviation,” our challenge has historical precedent. Drawing on the lessons learned throughout our history will keep our organization at the forefront of maximizing the tools at our disposal.

Major General John R. Baker
Commander, Air Intelligence Agency