Streamlining Declassification: Imagery and Image Products

A 2014 memorandum from Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, released this week under the Freedom of Information Act, drew a new distinction between intelligence satellite images and the intelligence products that are derived from those images.

The subtle new distinction affects the classification and declassification of the two categories of information, and may help to facilitate the release of a growing volume of imagery-related material by US intelligence agencies.

The new policy affirms that original satellite images retain their privileged status as a subset of protected intelligence sources and methods that can only be declassified by the Director of National Intelligence (pursuant to executive order 12951). However, the declassification of intelligence products based on those images is now delegated to the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

Adopting this distinction will mean “streamlining our procedures,” the DNI memo said, and “enabling the overall process to be more responsive to future Freedom of Information Act requests.”

See “Classification and Marking of Imagery Derived from Space-based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems,” memorandum from DNI James R. Clapper to NGA Director Robert Cardillo, November 12, 2014.

Whether the policy shift has already enabled more disclosure of intelligence imagery through the Freedom of Information Act is doubtful. We haven’t seen evidence of it.

But what is true is that the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency has undertaken to provide an increasing amount of unclassified imagery and mapping products to the public, including online resources concerning the Arctic, the Nepal earthquake, and the Ebola outbreak, as well as various disaster relief packages. Though it is easy to take the availability of this material for granted, it shouldn’t be; an affirmative decision and something of a cultural shift by the intelligence community (or at least by NGA) was required in order to accomplish it.

The indiscriminate use of the term “intelligence sources and methods” to justify withholding of intelligence-related information from the public has long been a source of frustration and a cause for criticism.

The 1997 Moynihan Commission on secrecy said that “this very general language has come to serve as a broad rationale for declining to declassify a vast range of information about the activities of intelligence agencies” and that it “appears at times to have been applied not in a thoughtful way but almost by rote.”

The Commission recommended that the scope of the term be clarified so as to limit its application.

DNI Clapper’s 2014 memorandum on intelligence image products may be understood as a step in that direction.

Intelligence Budgets on a Downward Slope

Intelligence community budgets appear set to continue on the modest downward slope of the last several years.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence said yesterday that it was requesting $53.5 billion for the National Intelligence Program (NIP) in FY 2017, a slight reduction from the $53.9 billion that was requested for the NIP in FY 2016. (The amount actually appropriated has not yet been disclosed.)

“Recognizing the challenges of this fiscal environment, the IC continues to review its operational, investment, and infrastructure programs to identify areas for savings. The Budget reflects the results of a deliberative process to ensure that the IC focuses on those programs that have the most impact and highest priority,” ODNI said in a fact sheet on the FY 2017 request.

Meanwhile, the Department of Defense said that it was requesting $16.8 billion for the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) in FY 2017, down from the $17.9 billion requested for the current fiscal year.

Public disclosure of the NIP budget request was required by Congress in the FY 2010 intelligence authorization act. But there is no corresponding requirement for DoD to publicly report the amount of its annual budget request for the MIP.

The practice of voluntarily declassifying and disclosing the MIP budget request was started by James R. Clapper when he was Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). Doing so “made sense,” he said recently, particularly since the NIP budget figure had to be released anyway.

Some Members of Congress expressed disappointment that the Obama Administration did not also voluntarily disclose the budget requests of individual intelligence agencies.

“There is no transparency there — they’re complying with the thinnest of laws about the [aggregate] number,” said Rep. Peter Welch (D-VT). “Members of Congress and the American public really are learning nothing.” See “Obama Keeps Public in Dark About ‘Black Budget’ Requests” by Steven Nelson, U.S. News, February 9.

*    *    *

The U.S. Constitution in Article I (Section 9) requires a public “Statement and Account” of the government’s receipt and expenditure of all money.

Past attempts to invoke this requirement to challenge intelligence budget secrecy have foundered on a 1974 US Supreme Court ruling in U.S. v. Richardson which said that a taxpayer lacked “standing” to make the argument in court.

But in a recent law review article, Chapman University professor Lawrence Rosenthal argued that this is not, or should not be, the end of the story, and that the Statement and Account clause may still have potency against secret intelligence expenditures.

“In terms of its text, original meaning, and its place in constitutional ethos and structure, the [Statement and Account] clause is comprehensible only if it is understood as a mechanism that enables the people to effectively hold the government accountable for its use of public funds. Disclosing an aggregate figure without more makes the clause a bit of foolscap…. If the clause requires only a meaningless and ineffectual disclosure, however, it becomes impossible to explain what it is doing in the Constitution.”

“Perhaps the level of disclosure required if we take the clause seriously would put the United States at a disadvantage when compared to other nations that fund their intelligence communities in secret. Or perhaps the resulting accountability would make our intelligence community stronger; we will never know unless we adopt a more transparent regime. Ultimately, however, the constitutional question about disclosure of intelligence spending does not turn on considerations of policy but on the Statement and Account Clause itself. If we take the clause seriously, the current regime cannot stand.”

See “The Statement and Account Clause as a National Security Freedom of Information Act” by Lawrence Rosenthal, Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, Volume 47, No. 1, Fall 2015.

ODNI Workforce Profiled in Human Capital Plan

Demographic information concerning the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Intelligence Community as a whole is provided in a newly-released ODNI Strategic Human Capital Plan, 2012-2017.

As of 2012, the total Intelligence Community workforce was 76.6% white, and 61.6% male, both higher than the overall federal workforce (which was 65.6% white and 55.9% male).

Intelligence agencies need to do better, wrote Damien Van Puyvelde and Stephen Coulthart of the University of Texas at El Paso in a recent opinion piece. (The ODNI Human Capital Plan was obtained under FOIA by Prof. Van Puyvelde.)

“To properly understand a wide world of actors and adversaries, the U.S. intelligence community needs a diverse workforce. The good news is that the IC understands this; the bad news is it’s still largely white and male. It’s time to pay more attention to the various barriers that keep members of some key demographics from joining up,” they wrote. See “The Intelligence Community Must Remove Barriers to Minority Recruitment,” DefenseOne, January 25, 2016.

The ODNI Plan does affirm the value of diversity. However, it uses the term in two distinct senses: ethnic or racial diversity (“We strive to have a workforce that is representative of the U.S. labor force”), and diversity of backgrounds, skills and perspectives related to the intelligence mission (“ODNI requires a diverse workforce with a deep, collective understanding of global political, economic, social, scientific, technological, and cultural developments that affect U.S. national security”). While there is undoubtedly overlap between the two types of diversity, they are not the same.

“The average age of the ODNI workforce — cadre and detailees — is 44 years, and 37 percent are age 39 or under,” the ODNI document also states. (“Cadre” employees are those hired by ODNI, while “detailees” were hired by other agencies.)

Employee job satisfaction within the Intelligence Community is comparatively high, according to a recent survey publicized by ODNI.

“The IC finished in first place in national security and second overall — up from fourth place in 2014 — among large agencies that employ more than 15,000 full-time permanent employees,” the ODNI news release said.

The survey did not distinguish among the member agencies of the Intelligence Community, some of which are bound to be more satisfying than others.

Competencies of Intelligence Community Employees

Employees of the U.S. intelligence community are expected to be bold, innovative and imbued with moral courage.

At least, those are the desired qualities that are defined in a series of Intelligence Community Standards (ICS) first issued in 2008 that have just been released under the Freedom of Information Act.

Even a non-supervisory employee at levels GS-15 and below is expected (under ICS 610-3) to demonstrate creative thinking (he or she “designs new methods and tools where established methods and procedures are inapplicable, unavailable, or ineffective”); to consider alternative points of view (she “seeks out, evaluates, and integrates a variety of perspectives”); and to display intellectual integrity (he “exhibits courage when conveying views, presenting new ideas, and making/executing decisions irrespective of potentially adverse personal consequences. Does not alter judgments in the face of social or political pressure.”).

Higher-level, supervisory personnel are to do all of that, and more (ICS 610-4).

And senior officers (ICS 610-5) “are expected to personally embody, advance and reinforce IC core values: a Commitment to selfless service and excellence in support of the IC’s mission, as well as to preserving, protecting, and defending the Nation’s laws and liberties; the integrity and Courage (moral, intellectual, and physical) to seek and speak the truth, to innovate, and to change things for the better, regardless of personal or professional risk.”

Considering the state of the species, it would be remarkable if more than a small fraction of the IC workforce comes close to meeting the lofty standards for performance and conduct that are described here. But perhaps these statements of expectations themselves serve a wholesome, instructive purpose, making their own fulfillment somewhat more likely.

And the standards are more than rhetorical flights. They are to be used (pursuant to Intelligence Community Directive 610) for “qualification, training, career development, performance evaluation, [and] promotion.”

Principles for Implementing IC IT Enterprise

The guiding principles for implementing and operating the Intelligence Community (IC) Information Technology Enterprise (ITE) were set forth in a 2013 memorandum from the Director of National Intelligence that was recently released under the Freedom of Information Act.

The purpose of IC ITE (pronounced “eye sight”) is to establish a common information architecture for the entire U.S. intelligence community, thereby fostering integration and making information sharing among agencies the default option.

“Information acquired, collected, or produced by IC elements shall be available for access for all IC missions and functions, subject to applicable legal and policy requirements,” the 2013 DNI memo said.

Once available through IC ITE, however, access is still to be limited by need-to-know. “Determinations about access to and use of such information within IC ITE shall continue to be based upon content and mission need.”

Nevertheless, agencies are expected and required to make “their” information available to the larger IC. “Unless a discovery exemption has been obtained, originating IC elements shall authorize and provide for automated discovery and retrieval of intelligence and intelligence-related information in IC ITE.”

“IC ITE moves the IC from an agency-centric IT architecture to a common platform where the Community easily and securely shares technology, information, and resources,” according to an ODNI fact sheet. “These new capabilities, with seamless and secure access to Community-wide information, will positively and deeply change how users communicate, collaborate, and perform their mission.”

IC ITE technically “went live” in 2013, but it is still at an early stage of development.

“The classified annex of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 required the CIA, DIA, NRO, NGA, and NSA to provide specific plans for adoption of IC ITE-compliant capabilities,” the Senate Intelligence Committee noted in a report earlier this year.

DNI Directive on Controlled Access Programs

The Director of National Intelligence last month issued a new directive on Controlled Access Programs (CAPs).

CAPs are the Intelligence Community equivalent of what are otherwise called Special Access Programs (SAPs). These are classified programs that involve access restrictions above and beyond ordinary classification controls. CAPs include compartmented intelligence programs, but are not limited to them.

The new directive, Intelligence Community Directive 906, establishes the policy framework for management and oversight of Controlled Access Programs. The directive itself is unclassified.

ODNI Issues Transparency Implementation Plan

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence yesterday released a transparency implementation plan that establishes guidelines for increasing public disclosure of information by and about U.S. intelligence agencies.

Based on a set of principles on transparency that were published earlier this year, the plan prioritizes the objectives of transparency and and describes potential initiatives that could be undertaken.

Thus, the plan aims to “provide more information about the IC’s governance framework”; to “provide more information about the IC’s mission and activities”; to “encourage public engagement” by intelligence agencies in social media and other venues; and to “institutionalize transparency policies and procedures.”

The plan does not include any specific commitments nor does it set any deadlines for action. And it is naturally rooted in self-interest. Its purpose is explicitly “to earn and retain public trust” of U.S. intelligence agencies.

Nonetheless, it has the potential to provide new grounds to challenge unnecessary secrecy and to advance a corresponding “cultural reform” in the intelligence community.

Perhaps the most important thing about it is the fact that it has been embraced by the Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, who announced its release yesterday at a conference at George Washington University. The DNI’s endorsement gives it an indispensable bureaucratic potency and creates an expectation that measurable results will follow.

But the text of the plan itself also has several noteworthy features. For example:

*    *    *

The ODNI plan instructs intelligence agencies to release substantive (though unclassified) intelligence information that could be of use to the public:

“The IC should review and provide appropriate information that is of current public utility, such as certain types of foundational information (including imagery). To facilitate the foregoing, the IC should develop a repeatable process of moving unclassified material not subject to other statutory protections to unclassified systems where it may be released.”

This important guidance points in a direction which is exactly the opposite of where CIA has taken its Open Source Center (now the Open Source Enterprise). After decades of providing open source material to the public through the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and then the OSC, the CIA terminated those public offerings in 2013. That move might now be reconsidered in light of the new transparency implementation plan (though CIA says it has no plans to do so).

*    *    *

The new transparency policy (in principle 3d) calls on intelligence agencies to “consider the public interest to the maximum extent feasible when making classification determinations.”

This is a remarkable statement that goes beyond any requirement in existing classification policy. In particular, President Obama’s 2009 executive order 13526 on classification does not include the public interest as a factor in original classification decisions at all.

The new plan dutifully states that it does not “modify or supersede” executive order 13526. But it does in fact present a different classification construct, or at least a different emphasis. As the plan says, it “reinforces Executive Order 13526, which governs classification standards, while also guiding the IC to consider the public interest to the maximum extent feasible in conducting declassification reviews in order to make as much information available as possible while protecting intelligence information.”

  *    *    *

The new transparency plan could end up altering the future contours of classification policy throughout the intelligence community because it will inform the upcoming Fundamental Classification Guidance Review. That Review is a government-wide evaluation and recalibration of national security classification policy that is due to be completed by 2017.

“The ODNI should work with the Information Security Oversight Office to provide guidance to IC elements on updating classification guides. This guidance should be aligned with the Principles as appropriate,” the plan says, in what may prove to be a misleadingly bland passage.

    *    *    *

The IC plan does not mention the name of Edward Snowden. It speaks of the need to provide channels for “submitting concerns or observations on potential misconduct by IC offices or employees.” But it does not clearly recognize or grapple with what might be called the Snowden conundrum.

That is the peculiar fact that the telephone metadata collection activities that Snowden and, later, most members of Congress and the interested public found objectionable had been secretly approved by all three branches of government. Within the government, collection of “all” telephone metadata was not considered misconduct, potential or actual. As a consequence, “whistleblowing” about these fully authorized activities using internal procedures would have been inapt and ineffective.

The problem, rather, was that a “lawful” secret government program had exceeded the implicit boundaries of public consent. Under the circumstances, disclosure was the only way to resolve the conundrum. This is a failure of congressional oversight above all, but it ought to be faced squarely by each branch of government involved.

*    *    *

“We believe transparency is worth the cost,” said DNI James R. Clapper in his October 27 speech announcing the new implementation plan.

“Because if the American people don’t understand what we are doing, why it’s important and how we’re protecting their privacy and civil liberties, we will lose their confidence and that will affect our ability to perform our mission — which ultimately serves them.”

See, relatedly, “Clapper’s transparency plan for intelligence community grinds forward” by Josh Gerstein, Politico, October 27.

A commitment to “Increase Transparency of the Intelligence Community” was included in the Open Government Partnership: Third Open Government National Action Plan that was released by the White House yesterday.

Open Source Center (OSC) Becomes Open Source Enterprise (OSE)

The DNI Open Source Center has been redesignated the Open Source Enterprise and incorporated in CIA’s new Directorate of Digital Innovation.

The Open Source Center, established in 2005, was tasked to collect and analyze open source information of intelligence value across all media – – print, broadcast and online. The OSC was the successor to the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which gathered and translated world news coverage and other open source information for half a century.

“As part of the Agency modernization effort announced by Director Brennan earlier this year, the DNI Open Source Center (OSC) changed its name to the Open Source Enterprise (OSE) on October 1, 2015,” said CIA spokesperson Ryan Trapani. “OSE remains dedicated to collecting, analyzing, and disseminating publicly available information of intelligence value. The organization’s new name reflects the broad relevance and scope of the open source mission.”

“OSE retains its role as the Intelligence Community’s (IC) center of excellence for open source collection, analysis, and tradecraft,” he added. “Director Brennan also retains his role as the interagency Open Source Functional manager.”

As FBIS also did for several decades, the Open Source Center used to produce a publicly available line of products, including translations and open source analyses. But at the end of 2013, to the dismay of many longtime subscribers, CIA abruptly terminated that channel of public information, citing costs and the easy availability of alternate public sources.

“That decision was primarily due to the cost-prohibitive nature of updating the feed and in light of the broad accessibility of open source information on the Internet,” said Mr. Trapani. “Nevertheless, OSE remains committed to fulfilling its core mission of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating open source information. At this time, however, OSE has no plans to expand the scope of its services to include the regular release of unclassified, non-copyrighted materials to the public.”

That’s unfortunate.

While there is indeed a surfeit of “news” and “information” of all kinds, the open source analytical products generated in the intelligence community have the potential to add value to public discourse. A somewhat random cross-section of OSC products from several years ago that illustrates the range and quality of these analyses, obtained without authorization, is available here.

“If I were the DNI, I would… direct the OSC to release as much unclassified material as it could,” I suggested in a speech last year to a conference of intelligence community lawyers. But I’m not, and it didn’t.

However, the new ODNI transparency implementation plan may present an occasion to reconsider the CIA non-disclosure policy regarding unclassified open source products.

Though the Open Source Center is no more, its name and logo live on in various locations, like this official website.

“OSE’s portal along with other materials branded with the previous OSC seal and moniker, will be updated with new OSE labeling in the coming months,” Mr. Trapani said.

In 2006, the DNI issued Intelligence Community Directive 301 on the National Open Source Enterprise, but it was rescinded in 2012, according to an ODNI spokesman. “It was determined that ICD 113, Functional Managers, provided sufficient authorities and responsibilities for all functional managers, including D/CIA as the open source intelligence [manager].”

On Foreign Disclosure of U.S. Intelligence

Classified U.S. intelligence information may be shared with foreign recipients when it is advantageous to the U.S. to do so and when it is not otherwise prohibited by law, according to a directive that was publicly released last week by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

“It is the policy of the U.S. Government to share intelligence with foreign governments whenever it is consistent with U.S. law and clearly in the national interest to do so, and when it is intended for a specific purpose and generally limited in duration,” states Intelligence Community Directive 403, Foreign Disclosure and Release of Classified National Intelligence, which was originally issued on March 13, 2013.

There are some nuances, however.

For example, intelligence will ordinarily be shared with] foreign governments or their components, coalitions of governments, or international organizations. But individual foreign nationals and independent contractors “do not constitute foreign entities for purposes of foreign disclosure or release except as designated by the DNI.”

(“Disclosure” here means communicating the intelligence without transfering a copy of it for retention. “Release” means providing a copy that the recipient can keep.)

The release last week of Intelligence Community Directive 403, which had been sought through a Freedom of Information Act request, itself represents a novel act of transparency. The prior guidance governing Intelligence Disclosure Policy under DCI Directive 6/7 had not been publicly disclosed, as far as is known. The topic of intelligence liaison relationships, which is distinct but related to foreign disclosure, is among the most sensitive and least publicly documented areas of U.S. intelligence policy.

The current foreign disclosure policy was elaborated in several guidance documents that were also released by ODNI last week:

Criteria for Foreign Disclosure and Release of Classified National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG) 403.1, March 13, 2013

Procedures for Foreign Disclosure and Release Requiring Interagency Coordination, Notification, and DNI Approval, Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG) 403.2, August 8, 2014

Criteria and Conditions for Emergency Foreign Disclosure and Release, Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG) 403.3, April 29, 2014

Procedures for Interagency Coordination Prior to Foreign Disclosure and Release to Senior Foreign Officials, Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG) 403.4, October 25, 2014

ICPG 403.1 specifies several categories of intelligence information that may not be shared with a foreign government.

These include intelligence which is protected against disclosure by law or treaty; intelligence on a U.S. person that is not publicly available; intelligence derived from Grand Jury information; and intelligence obtained through a liaison relationship with another government, among other categories.

Intelligence community officials are instructed to anticipate the purposes for which the shared intelligence might be used.

“Disclosures and releases that would support or facilitate lethal action require special consideration and authorization, including referral to the NSC and compliance with NSC direction as appropriate,” according to ICPG 403.1.

Intelligence Lessons from the 2009 Fort Hood Shooting

In 2010, then-Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair convened a panel to review the November 2009 Fort Hood shooting committed by Army Maj. Nidal Hasan and the Christmas Day bombing attempt by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab aboard Northwest Flight 253.

A redacted version of the resulting panel report was finally declassified and released this week. See Report to the Director of National Intelligence on the Fort Hood and Northwest Flight 253 Incidents, Intelligence Community Review Panel, 15 April 2010.  The panel was led by former Acting DCI John E. McLaughlin.

In a nutshell, the report found, “There were several missed opportunities that could have increased the odds of detecting Abdulmutallab or Hasan. The causes of the missteps ranged from human error to inadequate information technology, inefficient processes, unclear roles and responsibilities, and an occasional lack of individual inquisitiveness.”

Beyond a detailed recounting of what was known by U.S. intelligence about the perpetrators, much of which has been withheld, the report fills a gap in the literature of intelligence reform with a look at systemic issues such as the state of information technology in the intelligence community (as of 2011), the process of watch-listing, and disagreements over the handling of U.S. person information.

“Inadequate information technology runs through both the Fort Hood and the NW Flight 253 narratives, particularly the inability of IT systems to help analysts locate relevant reporting in a sea of fragmentary data or to correct for seemingly minor human errors.”

“NCTC [National Counterterrorism Center] analysts, for example, have access to more than 28 separate databases and systems, each of which, for the most part, has a separate log-on. This means analysts have to search each database separately before trying to identify connections among their results.”

The existing search capacity “is intolerant of even simple mistakes in the queries and does not enable questions like: list everyone that is potentially affiliated with AQAP and has a passport or visa that would permit entry to the United States or UK.”

But the problem is not purely one of technology, the report said. “The Community cannot realize the potential of information technology to assist the counterterrorism mission without clarifying… procedures for sharing information on US persons.”

The report reflects a view that restrictions on collecting and disseminating US person information had become onerous and counterproductive.

“Many of the people we interviewed assessed that policy on handling US Persons data… was limiting the Intelligence Community’s ability to aggregate and exploit available data, especially information pertaining to critical domestic-foreign nexus issues.”

“We noticed a strong belief among collectors and analysts that restrictions on collecting, disseminating, accessing, and analyzing data on US Persons impede mission performance…. We also saw a surprising level of disagreement — even among experienced practitioners — on whether current US Person authorities allow intelligence officers to accomplish their missions, or whether new legal authorities are needed.”

(“Sharing US Person information with foreign partners, and tasking them to collect on US Persons appeared at various points,” the report says at the start of an otherwise redacted paragraph.)

“We see a need to simplify, harmonize, update, and modify the Community’s procedures relating to US persons,” the McLaughlin panel wrote.

What exactly this might mean in practice was not spelled out, but it didn’t seem to entail tightening, narrowing or curtailing the use of US person information, or increasing oversight of it.

“The report’s finding on the Intelligence Community’s ‘caution’ and ‘risk aversion’ in the collection of US persons information is particularly notable,” said Christian Beckner, Deputy Director, GW Center for Cyber & Homeland Security, “leading the review group to worry that ‘the next terrorist surprise could be the result of confusion or excessive caution about how to manage this issue.’  This finding is in striking contrast to much of the public dialogue following the Snowden leaks about intelligence activities related to US persons.”

The panel report also includes various incidental observations of interest.

“The panel is concerned that the overlap between CTC [the CIA Counterterrorism Center} and NCTC [the National Counterterrorism Center] extends beyond healthy competition and that the turf battles, duplications, and clashes are a drain on the resources and creative energy of both organizations.”

Furthermore, “It appears that much of the tension between the two organizations centers on issues related to the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) — everything from who takes the lead to what is said in the articles.”

The report cites inaccuracies in news media coverage of the Fort Hood shootings and Christmas Day bombing “that have skewed the discussions.” For example, contrary to some accounts, “There is no evidence indicating that [Anwar al] Aulaqi directed Hasan.”

The report also presents a previously unreleased 2010 DNI directive on “lanes in the road” (included as Appendix D to the report) that “establishes the responsibilities and accountability of leaders of major organizations with counterterrorism analytic missions.” In other words, it assigned specific counterterrorism roles to each of the relevant intelligence agencies.

“Each organization within the IC with a significant counterterrorism analytic effort is expected to work seamlessly with its counterparts, drawing on the specific strengths and advantages of partners, but is also expected to place particular emphasis on those missions they are uniquely positioned to conduct,” wrote DNI Dennis C. Blair in the April 7, 2010 memorandum.