A new satellite image appears to show part of India’s new SSBN partly concealed at the Visakhapatnam naval base on the Indian east coast (17°42’38.06″N, 83°16’4.90″E).
By Hans M. Kristensen
Could it be? It is not entirely clear, but a new satellite image might be showing part of India’s first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, the Arihant.
The image, taken by GeoEye’s satellite on March 18, 2012, and made available on Google Earth, shows what appears to be the conning tower (or sail) of a submarine in a gap of covers intended to conceal it deep inside the Visakhapatnam (Vizag) Naval Base on the Indian east coast. Continue reading →
The Obama Administration proposal to renew the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act for another five years would be amended to a three year extension, if the Senate Judiciary Committee has its way.
Last June, the Senate Intelligence Committee approved — without amendment — the Administration’s request for a five year renewal of the intelligence surveillance authorities of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) that are due to expire at the end of this year. Shortly thereafter, the Senate Judiciary Committee asked that the measure be referred for its consideration as well.
Last week, the Judiciary Committee reported its version of the bill and, unlike the Intelligence Committee, it insisted on amending the Administration proposal, over the opposition of Republican members of the Committee.
The amended version of the bill would not curtail the scope of existing surveillance authorities.
However, the Committee amendment would extend those authorities until 2015, rather than 2017 as the Administration asked. It would further require the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community “to conduct a comprehensive review of the implementation of the FISA Amendments Act, with particular regard to the protection of the privacy rights of United States persons.” The Inspector General would also be required to publicly release an unclassified summary of the review. A similar proposal offered by Senators Wyden and Udall was rejected by the Senate Intelligence Committee.
These modest amendments to the Administration proposal are necessary and appropriate, the Judiciary Committee said in its new report on the bill.
“The alternative of a five-year extension […] without any additional oversight or accountability requirements, and without the benefit of the complete work of the inspectors general, is ill-advised and inconsistent with this Committee’s constitutional responsibility to provide vigorous and effective oversight.”
All Republican members of the Committee voted against the amended bill and urged that the Obama Administration’s position be adopted by Congress.
“Our oversight of the statute has found no evidence that it has been intentionally misused or that more oversight is needed,” the Republicans wrote in a minority statement appended to the report. “The combination of the statutory limitations on collection, targeting and minimization procedures and guidelines, and compliance oversight by the Administration and Congress, ensure that the rights of U.S. persons are sufficiently protected when their communications are incidentally collected in the course of targeting non-U.S. persons located abroad.”
Yet such oversight has failed in the past, the Committee report noted. In its narrative account of the background to the bill, the Committee majority recalled that the post-9/11 surveillance program began outside the framework of the law and without proper congressional notification or approval.
“This warrantless surveillance was conducted outside the scope of FISA, without any approval by the FISA court, and without the full knowledge or consent of Congress,” the Committee report noted. “The public first became aware of the existence of this warrantless surveillance program in December 2005 through a report in the New York Times.”
Although the Judiciary Committee bill, as amended, is inconsistent with the version reported out of the Senate Intelligence Committee, the report noted that the amended bill was supported by Sen. Dianne Feinstein, the chair of the Intelligence Committee, which should presumably increase the likelihood of its approval by the full Senate. If approved, the amended bill would then have to be reconciled with the “clean,” unamended extension that was approved by the House.
The Director of National Intelligence “is committed to protecting civil liberties and privacy, which are foundational principles of our Nation’s democratic society, preserved in the Constitution of the United States, and guaranteed in Federal law.”
Beyond affirming the value of civil liberties, the new directive — ICD 107 — also directs the establishment of oversight mechanisms and of procedures for redress of alleged violations.
The DNI directive does not include definitions of privacy or civil liberties, and its practical meaning is somewhat elusive.
“Intelligence activities shall be conducted in a manner that protects civil liberties and privacy,” the directive states. But that seemingly categorical statement is rendered ambiguous by the very next sentence.
“The IC shall protect civil liberties and privacy in a manner that enables proper intelligence integration and information sharing and safeguarding.”
In order to promote improved information sharing, the Director of National Intellingence told agencies to make use of “tearlines.” This refers to the practice of segregating and withholding the most sensitive portions of a document, allowing the remainder to be “torn off,” literally or figuratively, and widely disseminated.
“Tearlines are portions of an intelligence report or product that provide the substance of a more highly classified or controlled report without identifying sensitive sources, methods, or other operational information,” a new DNI directive states. “Tearlines release classified intelligence information with less restrictive dissemination controls, and, when possible, at a lower classification.”
“Tearlines shall be written for the broadest possible readership in accordance with established information sharing policies, and requirements in law and policy to protect intelligence sources and methods.”
In the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Congress mandated that “the President shall… issue guidelines… to ensure that information is provided in its most shareable form, such as by using tearlines to separate out data from the sources and methods by which the data are obtained” (section 1016(d)(1)).
Although the tearline approach also lends itself to public dissemination of national security documents, with particularly sensitive material removed, the new intelligence directive does not explicitly extend to sharing information with the public.
In 1984, President Reagan ordered the Director of Central Intelligence to develop “capabilities for the pre-emptive neutralization of anti-American terrorist groups which plan, support, or conduct hostile terrorist acts against U.S. citizens, interests, and property overseas.”
The President further ordered the DCI to “develop a clandestine service capability, using all lawful means, for effective response overseas against terrorist acts commmitted against U.S. citizens, facilities, or interests.”
The capacity of gas centrifuges to enrich uranium increased by two orders of magnitude between 1961 and 1967, from 0.39 kg-SWU/year to 30 kg-SWU/year. That striking fact was declassified by the U.S. Department of Energy in 2008 and made public this month. See update/correction below.
Under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act (section 142), which governs the classification of nuclear weapons-related information, the Department of Energy is required to conduct a “continuous review” of its classified information “in order to determine which information may be declassified.” And so it does.
Slowly and methodically, the Department has declassified numerous categories of nuclear information over the last several years. Those declassification actions were documented recently in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from the Federation of American Scientists.
Other declassifications involve obscure matters of uncertain significance, like the now-declassified “fact that thorium metal is used in the radiation case of the W71 warhead.”
In each instance, declassification is preceded by a deliberative process which considers whether the information is already widely known; whether its publication would assist an adversary in the development of countermeasures to U.S. systems or in development of its own nuclear capability; whether disclosure would have a detrimental effect on U.S. foreign relations; whether it would benefit the public welfare; and whether it would otherwise enhance government operations.
With respect to the declassification of historical U.S. centrifuge information, the DOE record of decision noted that while the information was not widely known, it would not assist in development of countermeasures, would not have a detrimental effect on foreign relations, and would not enhance government operations. Other aspects of the justification for declassification of centrifuge data, however, remained classified and were not released.
On the whole, DOE seems to have a well-articulated procedure for conducting declassification of atomic energy information. Under DOE regulations, there is even a provision for members of the public to propose topics for declassification (10 CFR 1045.20), though it has rarely if ever been invoked.
The outcome of the declassification process, however, is somewhat unpredictable. It is contingent upon an official — but inevitably subjective — assessment of current technological developments and political trends. The correct answer is not always self-evident.
“Prior classification decisions, while not unwarranted, might have taken a slightly different direction had the post-Cold War environment been more clearly seen a decade ago,” wrote a Los Alamos technical evaluation panel in a 2003 report to DOE headquarters.
Classified atomic energy information still plays a potent role in public policy and is not exclusively the province of technologists. This week the Nuclear Regulatory Commission granted a license to General Electric-Hitachi for construction of a uranium enrichment plant in Wilmington, NC, which uses a controversial laser enrichment process known as SILEX. Arms control advocates (including FAS) and others argued that the SILEX process raises distinctive proliferation concerns that weigh against its adoption.
Aside from nuclear weapons information classified under the Atomic Energy Act, the Department of Energy also classifies national security information by executive order. DOE described the current state of its national security information program in a recent report on its performance of the Fundamental Classification Guidance Review.
Update/correction: The declassified historical centrifuge data was previously published in a 2009 paper entitled Gas Centrifuge Theory and Development: A Review of U.S. Programs by R. Scott Kemp of MIT. The information was declassified due in part to research conducted independently by Dr. Kemp and released by him after obtaining the approval of DOE.
One of the features that make Congressional Research Service reports broadly valuable is that they often reflect the privileged access to executive branch information that is enjoyed by CRS, at least in some areas, compared to what an ordinary member of the public can expect. So, for example, a newly updated CRS report on Central Asia provides authoritative tabulations of US foreign assistance to Central Asian countries, broken down by country and by year for the past two decades. Assembling this data independently would be a difficult and time-consuming chore, if it were possible at all. See Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, updated September 19, 2012. (For a critical assessment of US aid to Central Asia based on data previously published by CRS, see “U.S. Military Aid To Central Asia: Who Benefits?” by Joshua Kucera, September 25.)
Some other new and newly updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that materialized on our website include the following.
Nonstrategic nuclear weapons, surveillance of journalists, building a new foundation with Yemen and much more.
From the Blogs
Declassification Declassified- PRC and the W88 Warhead: In 2006, the Department of Energy formally declassified the already widely publicized fact “That the People’s Republic of China obtained some Restricted Data information on the W88 [nuclear] warhead, and perhaps the complete W88 design.” Then, in a remarkable display of bureaucratic acrobatics, DOE classified the memo that authorized the declassification of that information. The declassification memo was found to merit classification at the Secret/Restricted Data level. Five years later, in 2011, the two-sentence memo was reviewed for declassification and DOE has now released it.
Production of (Deleted) Weapons, 1981: For decades, President Reagan’s 1981 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 7 remained entirely classified. According to a 1999 listing of Reagan NSDDs issued by the National Security Council, even the title of NSDD 7 was classified. In 2008, the document was partially declassified, bearing the title “[deleted] Weapons.” It stated: “The production and stockpiling of [deleted] weapons is authorized with stockpiling being restricted to the United States [deleted].”
Securing Radioactive Sources: In 2005, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a series of orders that helped clarify measures that could be taken to help safeguard high-risk radioactive materials. These measures are about to be collected into a single new regulation, 10 CFR 37, that will put much of this information in one place. In a new post on the ScienceWonk Blog, Dr. Y discusses measures to secure radioactive sources.
Govt Appeals Order to Release Classified Document: This week, government attorneys appealed an extraordinary court order that required the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to publicly release a classified government document. They said the order reflected “improper skepticism” of the government. In response to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by the Center for International Environmental Law, DC District Judge Richard W. Roberts had ruled earlier this year that a classified USTR position paper was not “properly classified” and therefore must be disclosed under FOIA. Steven Aftergood writes that this was a bold move by Judge Roberts, since it involved making an independent assessment of (i.e., “judging”) the validity of a government classification action. That is a task that courts have gradually shunned over the years.
Surveillance of Journalists- A Look Back: The DoD disavowed active surveillance of journalists. Even if there were surveillance to be done, it would probably not be performed by DoD. The celebrated CIA “family jewels” report on illegal Agency activities prior to the mid-1970s that was finally released in full in 2007 included descriptions of CIA operations to surveil reporters in order to identify their confidential sources.
Building a New Foundation with Yemen: FAS President Charles Ferguson and Special Projects Director Mark Jansson write about the International Science Partnership in AAAS’s quarterly publication, Science & Diplomacy. Promising opportunities exist for technical collaboration between American and Yemeni scientists and engineers who can play an important role in overcoming some of Yemen’s most pressing challenges, building a foundation for a more robust bilateral relationship, and paving the way to multilateral collaboration on issues affecting the region.
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, 2012: In a new edition of the Nuclear Notebook, Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project, and Dr. Robert S. Norris, senior fellow for Nuclear Policy, write in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists regarding nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Today, at least five of the world’s nine nuclear weapons states have, or are developing, what appears to meet the definition of a nonstrategic nuclear weapon: Russia, the United States, France, Pakistan, and China.
On November 5, FAS President Dr. Charles Ferguson will speak at a forum on nuclear regimes hosted by Virginia Tech in Arlington VA. Dr. Ferguson will speak about nuclear power and nonproliferation regimes.
The Nuclear Posture Review Report (NPR) came out two years ago. Yet, questions remain with regard to America’s nuclear posture. What are our objectives for America’s nuclear arsenal? Can we reach consensus on those objectives? Should we maintain the current size of the arsenal or reduce it? Should we modernize what we have? What does this mean for nonproliferation? What does this mean in light of the Obama administration’s calls for Global Zero?
On September 18, the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) and the Air Force Association (AFA) hosted a discussion titled, “Making Sense of the Nuclear Posture” in Washington, DC. Dr. Janne Nolan, a faculty member of the Elliott School at George Washington University and senior fellow at the Association for Diplomatic Studies, and Dr. Christopher Ford, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, presented two perspectives on America’s nuclear posture.
Dr. Nolan emphasized three points.
Within debates on nuclear policy, there is a “formal split” between declaratory policy and operational policy. Nolan dated this split back to the 1960s. Declaratory policy occurs within Congress, bureaucracies, the public sphere, etc. Here, Nolan explained, one oftentimes finds positions tending toward the extreme in both directions. There is little moderate ground. The NPR falls within this realm of policy. Though it originates from broad presidential guidelines, it is the product of bureaucratic infighting. Hence, the purpose of the NPR is to move the consensus forward in light of competing interests. Nolan commented that it is hard to think of nuclear strategy as the result of democratic processes. On the other hand, operational plans are formed by military and political leaders. These do not draw from changing public sentiments on nuclear weapons.
Nolan hinted that the NPR does little to address certain issues. These include questions of targets, the level at which the U.S. targets, and the harmony between political and military objectives with regard to nuclear weapons. She focused on the frustrating absence of core understanding regarding the utility of nuclear weapons. This includes the dilemma of global zero. Nolan reiterated that global zero has no substance in the operational plans, remaining purely within declaratory policy. The lack of core understanding prevents the U.S. from building architecture to address a world of multiple deterrents. Gone are the days of one deterrent, the Soviet Union. Furthermore, now the U.S. must answer the question of how to “deter the un-deterrable” – terrorists seeking nuclear weapons. These questions include a “discussion of numbers.” Nolan mentioned one desire for a nuclear arsenal that has parity with Russia. However, in response to a question posed, Nolan explained that the numbers debate is “bogus and misleading of the true intent in creating a stable posture” flexible to current deterrents.
Finally, Nolan commented on the debate of modernizing current nuclear forces, which has recently re-surfaced thanks, in large part, to Dana Priest’s articles in The Washington Post. Nolan praised Priest, claiming she did a public service in raising the issues. Yet, Nolan emphasized the importance of distinguishing between urgent needs and long-term modernization with regard to nuclear forces. Nolan mentioned the prickly issue of how the New START Treaty was ratified with the understanding of a modernization program. She advised the president to revisit this and reach a consensus on the understanding surrounding the Treaty.
Dr. Ford provided a history of America’s reasons for pursuing a nuclear program. The U.S. acquired nuclear weapons to conclude a great power conventional war. Then, the U.S. kept them to prevent the outbreak of another war. Nuclear weapons have been used as a bargaining chip should deterrence fail. With the Nixon administration, the U.S. gave up biological weapons, thinking that a nuclear capability was sufficient to deter. Since then, the U.S. has used nuclear weapons in alliance relationships, both to provide security to friends and to persuade friends to not pursue their own nuclear programs.
Ford mentioned his shock that the NPR was reasonably moderate given Obama’s talks of disarmament. However, Ford criticized the NPR with respect to nonproliferation and the perception of disarmament.
Ford stated that sanctions do not seem to alter the course of Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programs. The world’s proliferation continues unaffected by America’s current disarmament posture. Ford stated that during the Cold War, the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers – the U.S. and the Soviet Union – skyrocketed while proliferation was very rare. After the Cold War, both superpowers drastically cut their nuclear arsenals, and then proliferation increased greatly. Ford noted that other countries do not count America’s disarmament as legitimate until the U.S. cuts those nuclear weapons it actually needs. This would imperil U.S. national security, Ford argued. Finally, he mentioned how the New START was ratified with promises for the modernization of America’s nuclear forces.
Ford outlined his version of a nuclear posture, which would focus on survivability, security, reliability, and credibility. He argued that the idea of reduction poses too many risks at this time, given current technological advances. Also, Ford advised against abandoning the TRIAD, which is a “strategic hedge” against surprises from others’ technological innovations. With regard to modernization, Ford raised the point that the case for reductions gets harder when warheads are not modernized: if we do not believe that the arsenal meets our needs, then we will continue to think we need more of them.
Nolan and Ford appeared to agree on the need for modernization. However, both reiterated the importance of defining what that means. Both also pointed to the complexity of deterrence, indicating that it was multi-faceted and required clear communication to adversarial countries. Nolan and Ford emphasized how deterrence must be specified for each country the U.S. seeks to deter. As Nolan explained, any simple notions like the “sole use of nuclear weapons” are unhelpful and not usable when speaking of “all options” in diplomatic and military capacities. Finally, both hinted at optimism for technological advances with regard to conventional capabilities. As these advance, American may need to rely less upon nuclear weapons for deterrence in the future.
Fifty years ago, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) urged President John F. Kennedy to take “drastic action” against whoever had leaked classified intelligence information to a New York Times reporter. The Board also suggested that the CIA be empowered domestically to track down such leaks.
The PFIAB recommendations to President Kennedy were memorialized in an August 1, 1962 report that established a template for future efforts to combat leaks, up to the present day. The report stated:
“Based on a review of intelligence disclosures in a New York Times article by Hanson Baldwin, the Board recommended that:
“(1) the President emphasize to Government officials his concern about such disclosures and his intention in this case to identify and take action against the source of Government leaks to the newspaper writer;
“(2) the President take drastic action against the offender if identified by the FBI, or against the heads of offices from which the leak emanated;
“(3) the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA require their personnel to make memoranda of record on talks with the press, and to clear such contacts in advance with departmental Public Relations Officers;
“(4) those responsible for protecting intelligence data and techniques identify selected areas of sensitive data requiring special handling;
“(5) ways be sought to reduce the number of persons involved in preparing highly sensitive intelligence estimates;
“(6) the DCI and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency be provided with the investigative capability to run down leaks of sensitive intelligence data;
“(7) a confidential policy be established within the Executive Branch as to the degree of disclosure of intelligence data to be made to Congressional Committees;
“(8) a re-study to be made of possible proposals for legislation to protect official secrets; and
“(9) a review be made of Government policy and procedures with a view to declassifying non-sensitive information and thereby strengthening programs for the safeguarding of sensitive data.”
It is not known whether or to what extent the PFIAB recommendations were acted upon, and there is no indication that the source of the Times story was ever identified.
Needless to say, the prevalence of leaks was not discernibly affected by any actions to deter them that were taken by the Kennedy Administration or its successors. Still, the 1962 PFIAB recommendations defined options for combating leaks of classified information that would be reiterated time and again in the years to come.
“All contacts with any element of the news media in which classified National Security Council matters or classified intelligence information are discussed will require the advance approval of a senior official,” ordered President Reagan in his 1982 directive NSDD-19, echoing the third PFIAB recommendation above.
The pending anti-leak legislation that was introduced lately by the Senate Intelligence Committee also bears a family resemblance to the PFIAB menu of recommended actions.
In fact, the congressional intelligence committees appear to have internalized a PFIAB-like perspective to a surprising extent, and they have prioritized executive branch security interests above other considerations. While fiercely opposing leaks of classified information, the intelligence committees have had nothing to say about the subpoena of New York Times reporter James Risen or the ill-conceived prosecution of former NSA official Thomas Drake or similar actions which jeopardize values other than security, narrowly construed.