Intelligence Policy on Unauthorized Disclosures (2002)

“Intentional leaks of intelligence are a violation of law, may result in irrevocable damage to national security, and will not be tolerated,” according to a 2002 directive from the Director of Central Intelligence (pdf) that was itself leaked.

The directive largely reiterates longstanding policy, though perhaps with increased vigor. It states twice that leaks will not be “tolerated” and twice more that intelligence agencies will take “aggressive” measures to combat leaks.

The document notably advises intelligence officials not to prepare a damage assessment of a leak whenever there is a prospect of criminal prosecution against the leaker, implicitly suggesting that an accurate damage assessment might not always favor the prosecution.

The unclassified directive was obtained and published last week by, a website that publishes confidential and controlled documents of various types.

See Unauthorized Disclosures, Security Violations, and Other Compromises of Intelligence Information, Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/8, December 9, 2002

Last August, a Freedom of Information Act request for a copy of all such unclassified DCI Directives was denied on appeal by Delores M Nelson of the CIA Agency Release Panel. In her denial letter (pdf), she strangely cited FOIA exemption (b)(1), among others, indicating that although they are unclassified, the requested Directives are at the same time “properly classified.” Neither the law of non-contradiction nor the Freedom of Information Act is effectively enforced at CIA.

A selection of unclassified DCI Directives (which are gradually being superseded by DNI Intelligence Community Directives) can nevertheless be found here. Thanks to Jeffrey T. Richelson of the National Security Archive for an updated list of DCI Directive titles.

New Army Doctrine on Stability Operations

An Army field manual (large pdf) published today updates military policy on “stability operations,” referring to the use of military and other instruments of national power “to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”

The new manual “represents a milestone in Army doctrine,” grandly writes Lt. General William B. Caldwell IV. “It is a roadmap from conflict to peace, a practical guidebook for adaptive, creative leadership at a critical time in our history.”

“The manual captures the key lessons of our past, including the hard-won experiences gained through seven years of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq,” according to a blogger from the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center.

“But this doctrine looks beyond the here and now to address a likely future where threats to our national security emerge from regional conflicts arising from increased competition for scarce natural resources, teeming urban populations with rising popular expectations, unrestrained technological diffusion, and a global economy struggling to overcome the strain of the American financial crisis, meet mounting demands from emerging markets, and extend foreign development aid into third world countries.”

See Stability Operations, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, October 6, 2008. The new manual was previewed in the Washington Post on October 5.

Navy Urges More Classification by Compilation

In a newly released series of instructions, the Chief of Naval Operations has directed Navy classifiers to give greater attention to the possible need to classify compilations of unclassified information.

According to executive branch classification policy, compilations of information may be classified even when all of their component parts are unclassified.

Thus, the executive order on classification states (EO 13292, at section 1.7e): “Compilations of items of information that are individually unclassified may be classified if the compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship that: (1) meets the standards for classification under this order; and (2) is not otherwise revealed in the individual items of information.”

Now, U.S. Navy classifiers have been told to “consider classification by compilation when updating SCGs [security classification guides] due to the large volume of data transmitted and stored on unclassified and classified Department of the Navy (DON) networks and websites.”

That language appears in each of a dozen Chief of Naval Operations Instructions issued on July 21, 2008 dealing with Navy security classification guides. The Instructions list the titles of many dozens of Navy classification guides on topics ranging from undersea warfare (pdf) to intelligence cover and deception (pdf).

Classification by compilation is a disputed area and a policy that lends itself to misuse since it involves even greater subjective factors than ordinary classification.

A careful but critical account of the subject prepared in 1991 for the Department of Energy is “Classification of Compilations of Information” (pdf) by Arvin S. Quist, June 1991.

The CIA and the Culture of Failure

“A steady stream of intelligence failures in the 1990s occurred in every facet of CIA activity, from intelligence collection to analysis to counterintelligence to covert action,” writes John Diamond in a new book on “The CIA and the Culture of Failure.”

This is of course well-trodden ground, and the author himself reported many of the underlying episodes for the Associated Press, Chicago Tribune and USA Today.

But Diamond probes beneath the familiar surface of events in an effort to understand the dynamics at work, and to show how individual intelligence failures interacted cumulatively and dialectically to yield the CIA of today.

“The events of the 1990s both stemmed from and led to a steady erosion of intelligence capability, contributing to a series of intelligence lapses and alleged lapses and to a consequent decline of confidence in the intelligence community that left the CIA critically weakened,” he concludes. “These processes fed off and fueled one another, leading to a fatal cycle of error, criticism, overcorrection, distraction, and politicization.”

Diamond writes without identifiable animus towards the CIA, and gives due weight to the agency’s defenders and the critics of its critics. Even on well-rehearsed topics such as the CIA’s failure to anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union, he adds significant nuance and avoids cliche.

See “The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S. Intelligence from the End of the Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq” by John Diamond, Stanford University Press, September 2008.

Headlines from Elsewhere

“FBI Prevents Agents from Telling ‘Truth’ About 9/11 on PBS” by Jeff Stein, Spy Talk, CQ Politics, October 1.

“Former CIA Director Porter Goss’s Dusty Foggo Problem” by Laura Rozen, Mother Jones blog, October 1.

“China Report Urges Missile Shield” by Bill Gertz, Washington Times, October 1, with a copy of the draft report from the International Security Advisory Board obtained by Mr. Gertz here (pdf).

Security controls on information and intellectual property claims are increasingly restricting public access to the most useful information, according to Nobel laureate Robert B. Laughlin, who will address the Cato Institute on October 10.

Various Resources

A blistering critique of U.S. counterintelligence capabilities was authored by Michelle Van Cleave, the former National Counterintelligence Executive, in a case study prepared for the Project on National Security Reform. See Chapter 2 (pdf page 74) of this document (pdf).

“Fundamental Elements of the Counterintelligence Discipline” (pdf), published by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive and the ODNI in January 2006, is available here.

The CIA’s Office of General Counsel is profiled in a new paper (pdf) by former CIA assistant general counsel John Radsan, published in the Journal of National Security Law and Policy.

The missions and functions of the oddly named “U.S. Army Nuclear and Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency” (formerly the Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency) are described in the new Army Regulation 10-16 (pdf), September 24, 2008.

“Exploring the U.S. Africa Command and a New Strategic Relationship with Africa” is the title of an August 2007 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing that has just been published.

The Congressional Research Service discussed “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa” (pdf) in a report that was updated August 22, 2008.