United States Department of State
Defense Trade Advisory Group

Minutes of the Plenary Session
May 16, 1997
East Auditorium
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC

Partially Closed Meeting

Thursday, May 16, 1996
Loy Henderson Conference Room
U.S. Department of State
10:00 - 4:45 P.M.

To allow for discussion of classified information, the Department of State restricted attendance at the afternoon briefings to DTAG members and government officials. A Federal Register notice announced that the DTAG May 16, 1996 meeting would be partially closed to the public. As none of the closed session speakers incorporated classified statements into their presentations, these Minutes summarize the entire day's proceedings.


REMARKS: Dr. Paul Kaminski
Paul Kaminski Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, argued that increased defense cooperation can help resolve problems which have arisen in the post-cold war period. After the Cold War, there have been major changes in regional conflicts, military requirements, and economic relations among nations. Countries face limited defense budgets and a growing number of regional conflicts requiring coalition interventions. Because decreased resources limit U.S. involvement in coalition actions, partnerships with other nations have become more important to achieve multilateral objectives. The United States continues to increase defense cooperation with its allies in NATO and the Pacific. Advancing command and control interoperability and mutual logistics support has the added benefit of encouraging better economic cooperation.

Economic changes are especially apparent in the Partnership for Peace (PFP) nations. Financial constraints prevent these countries from acquiring the necessary equipment to modernize their armed forces. Since U.S. defense companies welcome additional sales opportunities for their products, the United States has strong economic incentives to strengthen ties with the PFP. Industry-to-government and industry-to-industry relations between the United States and PFP nations have strengthened in recent years. Dr. Kaminski emphasized that while substantial economic and interoperability benefits result from defense cooperation, there are also important political reasons for collaboration: military and industrial ties comprise strong security relations.

DOD has taken action to facilitate collaborative efforts. It has changed its requirements for unique military specifications. Second, it has reviewed its procurement policies to ensure that limited resources are used most effectively to advance the national interest. DOD aims to obtain the best value for U.S. funds and to avoid developing systems which already exist. Lastly, DOD is working to remove bureaucratic barriers and streamlined procedures on international defense cooperation. For example, a 1994 directive has shortened the review period for draft memoranda of understanding (MOUs) from 130 days to 30 days.

DOD's Armaments Cooperation Security Committee (ACSC) has identified new opportunities for cooperation. Three International Cooperative Oppurtunity Groups (ICOGs) have been established since October 1995: the United States and its allies are developing lists of programs for cooperation in major weapons systems, S&T; programs, and advanced concept technology demonstrations. In addition, the ACSC is examining how Defense Cooperation Armaments (DCA) resources in U.S. embassies can best be utilized in the post-Cold War era.

The NATO Cooperative RhD Program ensures that all partner nations get involved at the outset of a development program. Under it contributions from our allies would match U.S. funds. In the MY' 97 budget, the program was adjusted to place more emphasis on enhancing coalition operations, including ways to reduce friendly fire incidents.

Dr. Kaminski concluded by discussing DOD's Defense Export Loan Guarantee Program. Other nations have mechanisms for supporting their defense industries. Until now there was nothing comparable in the United States, since by law the Export-Import Bank generally cannot finance defense articles and services. The new program can issue up to $15 billion of loan guarantees, would be supported entirely by users' fees, and would not duplicate FMS or commercial arms transfer procedures. DOD Acquisition and Technology is developing the Defense Export Loan Guarantee Program in consultation with other parts of DOD and other agencies.

During the discussion period, Dr. Kaminski was asked when the loan guarantee program would become operational. He replied that various parts of DOD and other agencies are discussing how the program will be implemented. Regarding offsets, he prefers a commercial model, noting that teaming arrangements are set up all the time. Dr. Kaminski and his counterparts in NATO countries agree that "Fortress Europe" would not be beneficial for either the United States or Europe. In addition, progress is being made on bolstering defense cooperation outside of NATO: at the recent U.S./Japan summit, agreements were reached on defense supplies. A general concern is that some senior members of Congress who are knowledgeable about international defense programs are leaving office. Dr. Kaminski tasked the DTAG Technical Working Group to become a mechanism by which to keep up with technology improvements in key areas and with reporting to him, and said that the Defense Science Board would brief the DTAG.

The March 1996 DTAG Quarterly Report is attached at end of these Minutes. It summarizes in detail the accomplishments and ongoing activities of the DTAG Policy Working Group (PWG), Regulatory Working Group (RWG), and Technical Working Group (TWG), and describes special pro jects to which members of all three groups contributed. The DTAG officers augmented this information with additional comments. Future PWG projects may include studies on facilitating international arms cooperation, the policy and regulatory aspects of consolidation of the defense industry, advanced aircraft sales, and U.S. arms transfer policy towards Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The TWG is developing Terms of Reference for examining software source code, teaming arrangements, and provisos on licenses. The DTAG Secretariat is working towards establishing a DTAG Homepage on the internet.

Deputy Assistant for Export Controls Martha C. Harris discussed evolving U.S. arms transfer policy towards Central Europe, the New Independent States (NIS), Latin America, and ASEAN. Political and economic changes in these countries have required the Administration to review USG export policies towards these regions.

Until early 1995, the USG only considered case-by-case requests to export less advanced systems to Central Europe and prohibited transfers of sophisticated lethal weapons systems. Over the last several years, the CE countries have made significant progress in meeting our standards on receiving U.S.-origin arms transfers. They have strengthened their security ties with the United States, showing enthusiasm for the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and interest in joining established European security and political institutions such as NATO. Second, the CE states have implemented democratic and market reforms. They have installed democratically-elected leaders, instituted parliaments and civilian control over their militaries, removed most price controls and media restrictions, and redirected trade away from the former Soviet Union towards the West. Last, CE countries have a good record overall on pursuing nonproliferation objectives. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania have progressed enough to become members of the Wassenaar Arrangement. We continue to urge Bulgaria to declare or follow through on its nonproliferation commitments and to improve its export control practices. Albania and the Baltics have farther to go, but are beginning to make headway in establishing effective export and retransfer controls.

These reforms have led the United States to revise its arms transfer policy towards Central Europe. Since February 1995, there is no longer a presumption of denial for arms sales to all CE states except the former Yugoslav Republics, which are under a UN arms embargo. All proposed transfers of defense equipment--including sales of lethal items, coproduction or licensed production of U.S.-origin systems, and requests to incorporate U.S. technology into foreign-origin equipment--are considered on a case-by-case basis. The USG does not authorize unlimited transfers. Instead, it scrutinizes each proposed sale according to set criteria, including multilateral restraint, legitimate self-defense needs, regional stability, support of nonproliferation regimes, and whether a nation has adequate retransfer restrictions.

In recent months, the United States has revised its arms transfer policy towards the Yugoslav republics to make it consistent with United Nations actions, while continuing to take account of important U.S. foreign policy concerns. In November 1995, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution stipulating that the arms embargo against the former Yugoslav republics would be lifted in phases. In December a peace agreement was signed.

On March 14, 1996. the UN arms embargo against the Yugoslav republics was partially lifted. Because the embargo still stands on heavy weapons and their ammunition, tanks and armored vehicles, landmines, and military aircraft and helicopters, U.S. manufacturers cannot export these items at this time. The embargo on this equipment is scheduled to be lifted on June 14. The USG is moving to bring the two non-combatant republics, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, into a U.S. legal and policy status consistent with the rest of Central Europe. Specially tailored policies will continue to be applied to the three former combatants, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia-Montenegro.

CE governments want to acquire U.S.-origin items, but financial constraints have compelled them to request mainly marketing licenses, advisory opinions, and price and availability data. These countries will most likely not make significant purchases anytime soon. U.S. officials advise the CE states to prioritize their purchases, so as to best use their limited resources to meet their defense requirements.

Despite limited defense procurement funds, the CE states are determined to modernize their air defense capabilities with U.S. advanced fighter aircraft. They are actively considering the F-16 and the F/A-18. The sale of F-16s and F/A-18s would represent a significant increase in the level of technology which the United States is willing to give the CE nations. But since the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland already own limited numbers of Russian-built MiG-29s, sales of F-16s and F-18s would not represent increased capabilities. The United States has agreed in principle to transfer fighter aircraft to these three states.

Until recently U.S. defense manufacturers were not permitted, except under exceptional circumstances, to sell their products to Russia and the other New Independent States (NIS). These countries, and their predecessor the Soviet Union, have always been on the ITAR proscribed list. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin began working at the 1993 Vancouver Summit to reduce restrictions on U.S./Russian trade, on the condition that Russia would adopt responsible defense trade policies. Russias status as one of the founding members of the Wassenaar Arrangement was a major step towards fulfilling this condition. On April 3, Russia was removed from the ITAR proscribed list. Although there is no longer a presumption of denial on exports of defense articles and services to Russia, or on the import of such items from Russia, the USG will continue to review applications on a case-by-case basis to ensure that the proposed transactions are consistent with U.S. law and policy.

On a related note, the United States and Russia recently signed an agreement prohibiting Russia from exporting firearms and ammunition attractive to criminals to the United States. Russia will be limited to exporting collector's items, Olympic-style target pistols, and rifles designed solely for hunting or sporting purposes.

With regard to the other NIS states, the Department is currently reviewing their status on the proscribed list, with the hope of removing some of them from the proscribed list soon.

The United States is convinced that meeting the legitimate defense needs of friendly Latin American nations will advance both U.S. and Latin American interests. In February 1995, the Peru-Ecuador border conflict led the United States to suspend munitions exports to those countries. When they ended hostilities and made progress towards resolving the dispute, the Administration lifted its embargo for non-lethal items in May 1995 and for lethal items in November 1995. Although we have returned to considering transfers of lethal weapons on a case-by-case basis, we prohibit transfers of sophisticated weapons systems which would upset the regional balance of power, and continue to urge Peru and Ecuador to limit their arms purchases. The USG reviews export requests to Guatemala on a case-by-case basis, but closely scrutinizes proposed transfers of lethal equipment because of human rights concerns. Although democratic governance was restored to Hiti nearly two years ago, the United States maintains an arms embargo because of concerns about street violence.

These examples illustrate that Latin America's nascent democracies have adopted democratic principles after enduring oppressive military rule and human rights abuses. Civilians continue to try to gain control of their militaries and halt human rights violations. This suggests that Latin American nations are more likely to be undermined by instability within the region and drug trafficking than by external military threats. U.S. arms transfers to the region should therefore not upset the existing military balance, should contribute to reducing the more probable threats of regional conflicts and narcotics, and should support these nations' goal of controlling their defense spending. For these reasons, the United States hesitates to introduce advanced weaponry into Latin America. The USG would review proposed transfers of advanced systems to determine how they would affect the regions military balance.

In Southeast Asia, the United States is primarily concerned with maintaining regional stability. We aim to meet the legitimate defense needs of ASEAN countries while not introducing new capabilities into the region. F-18 technology has been releaseable to ASEAN nations since 1988. Malaysians purchase of F/A-18s, notified to the Congress in May 1993, is the first sale of this aircraft to an ASEAN country. Thailand selected the F/A-18 in an international competition which included Russian and French planes, and last January we notified the Congress of the sale. The Department is in the process of reviewing a letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) for F-18s to Thailand. Thailand is interested in acquiring AMRAAM missiles to meet its security needs, and as a treaty ally, the United States is committed to supporting those needs. We are discussing various options within the context of our nonproliferation concerns and arms transfer policies. Our major concern is that we not be the first to introduce this new sophisticated weapons system into the region.

The USG continues to review requests to export strategic tankers to ASEAN nations on a case-by-case basis. The USG would only authorize transfers which would not destabilize the region and which meet a clearly defined defensive or operational need. In March 1995, Dr. Davis made an exceptional approval under this policy for Singapore. Two U.S. companies were allowed to market jet powered, boom-configured air-refueling tankers in Singapore, with the proviso that this would not be permitted for any other ASEAN country. Singapore required such tankers because of its unique operational and training requirements, including participation in distant joint exercises. These marketing efforts have not yet led to a sale. With the Commerce Department's concurrence, the Department of State recently approved Singapore's request for two to four KC-135R tankers through excess defense articles (EDA) channels.

The United States has significant commercial, political, and security interests in Indonesia, but human rights concerns have caused us to deny requests to export small arms and lethal crowd control items. The USG closely scrutinize requests for non-lethal items applicable to crowd control or police work.

During the question period, DTAG members asked whether the State Department would reconsider its restraint policy on advanced aircraft sales to Latin America, in light of reports that Peru has signed a contract to purchase MiG-29s. Hugh Hamilton, Director of the Office of Export Control Policy (PM/ATEC), replied that it is important to clarify who is making this request. He noted that as of the date of the DTAG plenary meeting, no civilian government in Latin America has yet requested advanced aircraft or weapons systems. When asked how the United States would respond to Taiwan's desire to upgrade its naval forces, Dr. Harris replied that the United States would continue transferring certain systems within existing policy guidelines. The United States has offered the F-16s meant for Pakistan to Indonesia, and although it has been decided that Pakistan will be partially reimbursed, the terms of the entire deal have not been finalized. When asked how the USG applied human rights criteria to arms transfer decisions, Dr. Harris responded that because each situation presents unique concerns, the criteria is applied differently for each case. Hugh Hamilton added that when human rights abuses occur, it is gratifying that in most cases no U.S. equipment is involved.

U.S./ALLIED DEFENSE COOPERATION: Embassy Representatives
Brigadier General Dov Shefi, Director of the Israeli Embassy's Defense Industry Cooperation and Exports Office, noted that Israel has missions in New York and Washington focusing on defense trade. Their activities involve $1.8 million in purchases, representing 30% of Israelis defense budget. His office promotes joint ventures and Israeli defense industry activities, developing and implementing MOUs and maintaining liaison with Department of State export control officials. Israel's SIBAT is responsible for overseeing the country's export control system and policies. An Israeli defense firm requires a permit from SIBAT before entering into negotiations. SIBAT always issues export licenses with retransfer prohibitions to prevent unauthorized diversions. A special emphasis is put on assuring a U.S. prior approval, in accordance with U.S. laws and regulations, whenever U.S. items or technologies are involved. General Shefi provided written material on controls over Israeli defense exports.

Haim Barzilay, General Shefi's Deputy Director, discussed the U.S./Israeli Defense Industrial Cooperation MOU. This MOU, which was signed in 1987 and which will be renewed next year, is an umbrella agreement which presently contains five annexes. Projects under the Procurement Annex include a Cobra-type helicopter sights, air-to-ground missile, night vision goggles, and armor protection. The ARROW project is also developed under the provisions of the MOU. The goal of the Test and Evaluation Annex is to achieve maximum standardization for such procedures. The Government Quality Assurances Services Annex has been successful, with DOD/OSD requesting that DOD projects in Israel be provided with quality assurances services. The last annex on Mechanisms for Procuring Qualified Products from Qualified Manufacturers is in the initial stage of implementation. The MOU agreement implements the principle of reciprocity in all its Annexes. It was also indicated that restrictions on solicitations in the U.S, provide the main difficulty for better cooperation.

Simon Webb, Minister of Defense Materiel from the U.K. Embassy, focused on three aspects of U.S./UK cooperation which can be improved: advancing interoperability, more rapid license processing, and a more equitable trade in defense goods. Regarding interoperability, our two countries should cooperate not just because of economic advantages, but because we share common political objectives. The two nations participate in joint military efforts, most recently in the Gulf, Turkey, and Bosnia. These and other joint endeavors show that problems on interoperability and combat identification need to be addressed.

The United States and UK strongly support the Wassenaar Arrangement and condemn arms sales to pariah states, but wish to provide defense articles and services quickly to friends and allies. Although the Office of Defense Trade Controls has made substantial improvements towards reducing license processing times, difficult cases continue to be time-consuming. These cases often involve extraterritoriality -- when a piece of equipment consists of components from several U.S. sources -- or may be subject to the National Disclosure Policy.

Mr. Webb urged that the United States consider additional defense purchases from the UK. The fact that the UK has spent millions on U.S. defense equipment has been unpopular within the UK and throughout Europe. The existence of numerous joint U.S./UK projects disproves the widespread perception in the UK that the United States is a closed market. Nevertheless, this misconception has produced pressure for the UK to close its markets towards the United States. It should be noted, however, that the trade balance between the United States and the UK is favorable towards the UK.

Major General Sven-Olof Hokborg, Defense and Air Attache for Defense Cooperation, and Lars Bjerde appeared from the Swedish Embassy. For a relatively small country, Sweden procures a significant amount of U.S.-origin defense items. Sweden's defense budget has shrunk by 10%, and to compensate for this, the country hopes to increase interoperability among military forces friendly to Sweden. An MOU is in place for U.S.-Swedish defense cooperation. Priorities include developing industry-to-industry contacts, getting munitions export licenses approved quickly, and resolving problems of extraterritoriality. Following the practice of commercial industries, the Swedish defense industry has committed resources to explore market possibilities. Webb and Hokborg recommended establishing ITAR regulations to address defense cooperation on special programs, to be approved under criteria of "project licenses."

Stephen Geis of PM/ATEC reported that there has been little progress for six months on rewriting the Export Administration Act (EAA). The State Department's main objections involve the bill's provisions on terrorism. The bill's sponsor, Congressman Toby Roth, successfully avoided sequesterial referral of the bill to the House National Security Committee. While prospects for passage by the House are good, the EAA's fate in the Senate is less clear. Although emergency powers granted under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) take away some of the incentive to reform the EAA, the desire to pass a new bill prevails throughout the Administration.

Rose Biancaniello of the Office of Defense Trade Controls summarize the Presidents March 14, 1996 announcement on jet engine hot sections and communications satellites. While the Department of State will retain control over hot section technologies which have military applications, commercial hot section technologies for commercial aircraft will be controlled under Commerce's Commodity Control List (CCL). Commercial communications satellites (comsats) would also fall under Commerce's dual-use controls, even if they contain U.S. Munitions List (USA) components or technologies. The munitions spares and technologies themselves will remain subject to State Department licensing authority. This announcement provides for improved interagency review procedures, It does not decontrol combats, but rather clarifies which agency has jurisdiction over specific items and technologies. Draft regulations on how State and Commerce will implement these decisions are in the interagency review process. Agencies will have to fulfill Arms Export Control Act (AECA) notification requirements on removing items from the USML, and will need to establish new foreign policy controls.

Eric Newsom, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, and Cliff Johnson of Under Secretary Lynn Davis' staff discussed progress towards establishing the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. The Arrangement will provide a forum for governments to collectively consider how munitions and dual-use transfers affect their international and regional security interests. It will complement and reinforce, rather than duplicate, existing nonproliferation regimes. A key objective of Wassenaar is to level the playing field on export reporting and transparency. The United States, which has some of the most rigorous export reporting requirements, hopes to bring a similar level of transparency to the export activities of regime partners.

During the Arrangement's first plenary meeting in Vienna on April 2-3, 1996, Russia did not agree to the text of the regime's initial elements negotiated at the Hague in December 1995. Because Russia refused to join the consensus of the other participant nations on this issue, the meeting was suspended. The United States and other nations are convinced that transparency or information sharing is central to the Wassenaar Arrangement, and is disappointed that Russia was unwilling to abide by this. The plenary reconvenes in July, with the goals of finalizing the initial elements, plans for the Secretariat in Vienna, control lists, and information exchange procedures by unanimous consent.

Despite the results of the April meeting, the United States remains convinced that Wassenaar can contribute to peace and security in the post-Cola War period. During the Cold War, COCOM sought to maintain the West's strategic advantage over the Soviet Union and its allies by prohibiting virtually all advanced weaponry and technology exports to Communist countries. Although East-West tensions have diminished, new threats have arisen. A major threat is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WED), which led the United States and other nations to institute the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSO), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and Australia Group (AG). The Wassenaar Arrangement is intended to augment these multilateral nonproliferation regimes.

Membership in the Wassenaar Arrangement is open to any country which meets the membership criteria. A country must be a producer/exporter of arms or industrial equipment; must adhere to key arms control and nonproliferation treaties; and must have effective export controls. Most importantly, a country must have national policies preventing transfers of weapons and sensitive dual-use items to pariah states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. At the April 1996 plenary, it was decided that Argentina, Romania, and South Korea met the criteria for admission into the regime. Their participation brings the number of regime members to thirty-one.

The Wassenaar Arrangement will help prevent destabilizing accumulations of arms through several methods of information sharing. Governments will share information on potentially destabilizing activities, including clandestine projects, dubious acquisitions trends, and sensitive dual-use transfers to states outside the regime. Wassenaar members will share information on over a hundred dual-use items and technologies, including machine tools, computers, and telecommunications equipment. They have agree to notify non-participating states about denials of items on this list on both a case-by-case basis and an aggregate and periodic basis.

All Wassenaar members except Russia accept the "no undercut" provision: if a member state authorizes a sensitive dual-use list transfer, and another regime member had previously denied a similar transfer, the country granting authority to export should notify Wassenaar members. For the notification to serve its purpose, it must occur soon after the government gives approval or issues a license. This would allow other regime members to object to an unacceptable transfer, and for the country allowing the export to reconsider its position before any deliveries take place. Although each country has discretion to implement its export decisions, it is hoped that the ''no undercut provision" will encourage common and consistent export policies and eliminate inadvertent undercuts.

At the last plenary, Russia recommended giving notification after the transfer has occurred. This would allow a country to use the information from a regime partner on a denied sale to arrange essentially the same sale, without telling the other partners until after the actual delivery. This proposal, finish only Russia supported, would substantially weaken the regime.

Arms transfers will be made more transparent through a detailed weapons list which will provide information twice a year. The list will initially consist of the categories of major weapons systems used for the CFE Treaty and the U.N. Arms Register, but will be revised to include the weapons of modern warfare. For both armaments and dual-use articles, governments will have the option of requesting additional information through diplomatic channels. These measures on information sharing are intended to encourage Wassenaar members to exercise restraint in transferring items to regions of potential instability, notably the Middle East and South Asia, and to avoid introducing new and potentially destabilizing capabilities into particular regions.

Like the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group, and Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement is based on national controls: each member will control items according to its own laws and regulations. Wassenaar is not directed against particular states, will not interfere with legitimate transfers, and wild not prevent countries from making purchases for legitimate self-defense needs. Instead, it focuses on states whose actions are destabilizing for other nations or harmful to their own peoples.

As members have drawn up munitions and sensitive dual-use lists in order to control unauthorized transfers and retransfers of these goods, the Arrangement precludes license-free trade. Member states have agreed to exercise extreme vigilance on a special sensitive list of dual-use articles and technologies. These items can potentially make major contributions to WMD development and proliferation.

While the United States is pleased with the progress so far, it is our position that the Wassenaar Arrangement does not go far enough to encourage transparency, restraint, and accountability in arms transfers. Some member countries opposed comprehensive information sharing, even through diplomatic channels, principally for commercial reasons. The United states found little support for its position of requiring prior notification of transfers. And because some members resisted targeting specific regions or countries, the USG could not obtain agreement that information sharing would be focused on individual countries or regions of concern. Consequently, at the outset information sharing will take place on a global basis. It is hoped that the Wassenaar Arrangement will be operational by this fall, but much depends on whether Russia will accept the same responsibilities as the other regime partners.

During the question period, DAS Newsom and Cliff Johnson elaborated on Russian objections to Wassenaar's "no undercut" provision. They noted that India was not a major arms producer and thus did not meet that criteria for joining the regime. In conclusion, they noted that Wassenaar members are taking measures to prevent confidential and proprietary business information from being disseminated: countries will use aggregate categories to report on their arms and dual-use sales.

DTAG 5/16/96 Plenary Meeting Attendees.
DTAG--Quarterly Report March 1996
Embassy of Israeli presentation on defense export controls.

DTAG Officers
William Schneider, International Planning Services, DTAG Chair
Mona Hazera, Northrop-Grumman, DTAG Vice-Chair
Jerry Eiler, Northrop-Grumman, DTAG RWG Chair
Mike Richey, Litton Industries, DTAG TWG Chair

Policy Working Group (PWG)
Burt Bacheller, McDonnell Douglas
Dean Bartles, Olin Ordnance
Robert Beach, R.K. Beach & Associates
Vincent DeCain, NOMOS Corporation
Jacob Goodwin, Export Capital Inc.
Joel Johnson, Aerospace Industries Association (AIA)
Robert Martin, Motorola
Saphanie Neuman, Columbia University
Henry Sechler, General Dynamics
Anna Stout, American League for Exports and Security Assistance (ALESA)
Douglass Wood, Textron/Cessna

Regulatory Working Group (RWG)
David Calabrese, Electronics Industries Association (EIA)
Giovanna Cinelli, Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay
Richard Colton, consultant
Debi Davis, TRW
Patrick Donovan, Honeywell
Richard Gogolkiewicz, General Dynamics
Beth Johnson, Teledyne
Henry Lavery, Security Assistance International, Inc.
Robert Lee, Communications & Power Industries
Stuart Quigg, Q International Ltd.
Vicki Ralston, Lockheed Martin
George Rao, Allied Signal Aerospace
Tom Reed, Rockwell International
Paula Reynolds, Allison Engine Company, Inc.
Paul Seymour, Smiths Industries
Joy Speicher, TRW
Catherine Thornberry, Export Procedures Company

Technical Working Group (TWG)
Phillip Avruch, COMSAT Corp.
Tom Becker, Sundstrand
Michael Delia, AAI Corp.
John Zopecky, Pratt & Whitney
James Matchett, GE Aircraft Engines
Douglas McCormac, TRW
Duncan Reynard, Space Systems/Loral
William Schmieder, Lockheed Martin
Ray Thorkildsen, Valentec

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