Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry
March 20, 2002
Table of Contents
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. Present Trends in Federal Aerospace Research and Development
Budgets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
III. Business Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Additional Time toNegotiate Long-term Resolution
of Foreign Sales Credit and
Extra-Territorial Act of
. . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
B. Strengthen Research and Development Tax Credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
C. Establish Shared Savings for Cost Efficiencies and Rationalization…. 6
IV. Defense/Dual-Use Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A. Accelerate Implementation of the Defense Trade Security Initiative… 8
B. Update Country Risk Surveys to Modernize Export Licensing
Compliance Practices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
C. Modernize the Defense Export Loan Guarantee Program . . . . . . . . . . 10
IV. Air Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A. Transform the U.S. Air Transportation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
VI. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry was established by Section 1092 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2001, Public Law 106-398. It was formed to study the future of the U.S. aerospace industry in the global economy, particularly in relationship to U.S. national security; and to assess the future importance of the domestic aerospace industry for the economic and national security of the United States. The Commission will issue a final report to the President and Congress on November 19, 2002. Periodic interim reports will also be issued.
A. Mission Statement
The Commission shall develop and recommend a series of public policy reforms that will permit the U.S. aerospace industry to create superior technology, excel in the global marketplace, profit from investments in human and financial capital, benefit from coordinated and integrated government decision-making, assure our national security, access modern infrastructure, and give the United States a capacity throughout the 21st Century to reach for the stars.
B. Congressional Mandate
The Commission was given a broad mandate to study:
· The adequacy of projected budgets of the federal departments and agencies for aerospace research and development and procurement;
· The adequacy of the current acquisition process of federal departments and agencies;
· The procedures for developing and fielding aerospace systems incorporating new technology in a timely fashion;
· The policies, procedures, and methods for the financing and payment of government contracts;
· Statutes and regulations governing international trade and the export of technology;
· Policies governing taxation, particularly with a view to assessing the impact of current tax laws and practices on the international competitiveness of the aerospace industry;
· Programs for the maintenance of the national space launch infrastructure; and
· Programs for the support of science and engineering education.
The Commission is composed of 12 members: six appointed by the President, two each by the House and Senate Majority Leaders, and one each by the House and Senate Minority Leaders. The Chairman is the Honorable Robert S. Walker, former Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, and the Vice Chairman is the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, former Secretary of the Air Force.
The commissioners appointed by the White House are:
Dr. Buzz Aldrin
President, Starcraft Enterprises, Sharespace, Starbooster & Starcycler
Mr. Edward M. Bolen
President, General Aviation Manufacturers Association
The Honorable John W. Douglass
President, CEO and General Manager, Aerospace Industries Association
Dr. Neil de Grasse Tyson
Director, Hayden Planetarium
The Honorable Robert S. Walker
Chairman, Wexler & Walker Public Policy Associates
Ms. Heidi R. Wood
Executive Director, Morgan Stanley
The commissioners appointed by the Congress are:
Mr. R. Thomas Buffenbarger
President, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers
The Honorable Tillie K. Fowler
Partner, Holland & Knight
The Honorable John J. Hamre
President & Chief Executive Officer, Center for Strategic & International Studies
The Honorable F. Whitten Peters
Partner, Williams & Connolly
The Honorable William Schneider
President, International Planning Services, Inc.
Mr. Robert J. Stevens
President and Chief Operating Officer, Lockheed Martin Corporation
Technological advances have driven aerospace progress since the first flight of the Wright brothers and Dr. Robert Goddard’s first rocket launch. It is clear to the Commission that investments in the research and development (R&D) of aerospace technology are absolutely crucial to continued U.S. aerospace progress and leadership.
A. Department of Defense
The Commission applauds
the President’s proposed fiscal year (FY) 03 augmentations to Department of
Defense (DoD) R&D investments. The
increases proposed both this year and last year are especially important
because they follow a period of significant decline. The Commission supports the DoD goal to increase science and
to three percent of the overall budget,
and encourages continued progress toward this goal in the FY03 budget. The encouraging trends in defense R&D
are a base to be built upon, but challenges will face us in future budget
years. In future reports, the
Commission will assess potential industrial base issues.
B. Civil Aviation
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) R&D investments represent the fundamental long-term, high-risk, precompetitive technology development that individual suppliers of aviation and space systems need but cannot support under near-term pressures from financial markets. Technologies and systems in use today are the result of R&D investments made 20 or more years ago. The United States is just now beginning to see the effects of the R&D budget declines of the 1990s in our air traffic control system capabilities, the technological parity of foreign-built aircraft, and the aging facilities of our federal research laboratories.
In contrast, the
European community’s research programs
are driven by a policy seeking world leadership for its civil aeronautics
As the President and Congress
move ahead to address the nation’s future aerospace needs, new investments will
be required. The Commission encourages
the Congress to
The European community is placing increased
emphasis on integrating and coordinating individual research programs. The European Commission’s annual
aeronautics R&D funding has increased six-fold since 1990 and is expected
to double again to $1.5 billion over the next five years. These investments are in addition to those
allocated by member states. Though
precise accounting is not available, estimates show the French government
allocated more than $300 million in grants and loans for civil aeronautics in
1999 alone. Germany is estimated to
provide an additional $100 million per year.
Seek Additional Time to Negotiate
World Trade Organization Ruling that the Extra-Territorial
Income Exclusion Act of 2000 is Non-Compliant
On January 14,
2002, a World Trade Organization (WTO) appellate body issued a final ruling
that a U.S. law, called the Extra
is an illegal export subsidy and, thus, inconsistent with WTO rules. If the United
States does not act to come into compliance with the WTO rules, U.S. exporters
could face sanctions totaling as much as $4-6 billion per year in the form of
tariffs on the sale of U.S. goods.
European Union (EU) countries rely heavily on a value-added tax for revenue. The tax is imposed on imports and rebated at the border for exports. EU countries also tend to tax their companies more leniently on overseas earnings than on domestic profits. In order to partly offset the differences in tax treatments between Europe and America, United States tax law allowed domestic companies to establish FSCs that provided a means to reduce taxes on a share of profits derived from exports. When the WTO determined that the FSC regime was inconsistent with WTO rules, because it was deemed an illegal export subsidy, the United States repealed FSC and enacted the ETI regime in November 2000.
The WTO has now ruled that the ETI regime is also an illegal export subsidy. The loss of the ETI regime would negatively impact the competitiveness of U.S. exporters doing business in Europe by creating another competitive discriminator. This would add to several other factors already benefiting our European competitors, including outdated U.S. export control laws, increasing demand for offsets, and European government subsidies of national companies. Loss of the ETI tax incentive could result in the loss of U.S. employment if companies moved jobs to offshore facilities that enjoy favorable treatment by foreign governments.
Interim Report #2, Recommendation 1
The U.S. Trade Representative should seek additional time for the United States and EU to develop a long-term resolution of this issue that maintains the level of tax relief for all industries.
B. Strengthen Research and Experimentation Tax Credits
For the aerospace industry, heavily dependent on advanced technology, the federal research and experimentation (R&E) tax credit has become ineffective. Lack of permanence and the small number of firms qualifying for the full 20 percent R&E tax credit have eliminated the desired incentive for companies to invest in R&D.
U.S. tax law currently
provides an incentive for R&D spending with a credit equal to 20 percent of
incremental R&D expenditures measured by reference to the taxpayer’s
average R&D expenditures
the period 1984 through 1988. Few aerospace
companies qualify for the 20 percent R&E tax credit since the base time
period was a high-water mark of military procurement and R&D spending. Since the base period, defense procurement
(on a constant 2001 dollar basis) has declined by 57 percent , meaning that fewer
technologies will transition to procurement opportunities for contractors . [Shouldn’t we be tracking R&D expenditures
here?] An Alternative Incremental Research
Credit (AIRC) is available for companies that do not benefit from the regular
R&E tax credit. The alternative
rate is 2.65 percent to 3.75 percent
of R&D expenditures exceeding one percent of gross receipts. These rates provide some incentive but
do not provide the full savings of the 20 percent regular credit.
The R&E tax credit is
scheduled to expire in 2004. With the
lengthy time frames of most R&D projects, the uncertainty of the credit’s
its value and the incentive for
private investment in new technology.
Legislative proposals currently pending in Congress (H.R. 41 and S. 41)
would make the R&E credit permanent and increase the alternative credit
rates to between 3 percent and 5 percent.
The U.S. R&E credit is the third lowest of nine countries surveyed
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). I [not sure this comparison is helpful]ncreasing
the alternative tax credit rates and making the credit permanent would improve
the industry’s financial status
and strengthen the country’s technological base.
Interim Report #2, Recommendation 2
the U.S. tax code to:
· Make the R&E tax credit permanent
· Increase the alternative credit rates to achieve parity with the savings provided by the regular credit
2.b. In the ,E, including changes in the baseline period, increases in the rates for the AIRC and other improvements .
C. Establish Shared Savings for Cost Efficiencies and Rationalization
The DoDand NASA costsare provided oand NASA not the
There is little incentive
for contractors to undertake initiatives that will have long-term positive
benefits on program performance and cost because the government is the
predominant beneficiary of the savings.
On cost-based contracts, Do
oD , not the contractors,
receives the savings resulting from rationalization. During contract negotiations, government
contract officers remove all contractor savings benefit through renegotiation
of the overhead rate. The lower
realized costs then become the basis for lower profits on follow-on work.o –
The costs of rationalization without reward are a disincentive to contractors to pursue rationalization One means of motivating the contractor to take on the cost of productivity and rationalization improvements is to share a portion of the savings Current Acquisition Excellence initiatives sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to move most contracts from a cost to a performance basis would provide more contractor incentive to fund cost savings and rationalization.
Interim Report #2, Recommendation 3
Provide incentives to contractors to
pursue cost efficiencies and further rationalization of inefficient operationsthe
an initiative, developed by OSD (AT&L),
A summary of the approach is as followsRules for Shared
- Ensure net savings result in each year of a not-to-exceed five-year period by amortizing associated costs. Recognize the cost of capital associated with amortized costs.
Contractor receives up to 50 percent of the net savings as
government receives at least $2 in savings for every $1 costsit expends after deducting the
negotiated shared savings amount and the cost of capital, and contractor implements planned efforts to
are precluded for the same effort.
Contractor submits to the government-contracting officer a plan to achieve
cost efficiencies and further rationalization
in a programb. The government contracting officer ensures
proposed savings are the direct result of the proposed efforts, contractor
proposal, audits the proposal, negotiates an advance agreement for shared
savings, and obtains the agreement of the appropriate departments, agencies and
· Method for Sharing Savings
Additional “plus up” to profit on cost-based contracts
would be negotiated
at the business segment level.
would agree to share up to 50 percent of savings from
new cost savings initiatives for up to five years.
The Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI) contains several important elements that can significantly improve the access of U.S. aerospace firms to the international market and strengthen defense-industrial collaboration within the alliance. The pace of implementation of several of these initiatives has slowed, including electronic licensing, the U.S. Munitions List (USML) review, bilateral negotiations with major allied nations to create exclusions from export licensing requirements, and a reduction in the barriers to Global Program/Project licenses.
The Secretary of State promulgated the DTSI in May 2000. The DTSI contains 17 initiatives that can make a constructive contribution to defense trade process reform and liberalization and, hence, materially improve market opportunities for U.S. defense exporters. The implementation of the DTSI has slowed, thus limiting the pace of reform needed in defense trade policy and regulation. The implementation of electronic licensing can increase the speed of license processing, reduce costs, and improve compliance with export control regulations. The review of the USML can hasten the removal of items from the list that are needlessly burdening the compliance monitoring process and increasing cost to U.S. exporters by requiring the licensing of items that should not require export licenses.
States has begun negotiations with Australia and the United Kingdom to create a
regulatory and compliance “template” to facilitate a wide range of exclusions
from a requirement for export licensing.
Although these negotiations began in earnest, they have stalled and need
an impetus to reach an agreement. An
effort to exploit residual authority under the Arms Export Control Act to
facilitate issuing comprehensive licenses covering an entire defense industrial
program or project has been burdened by needless regulatory barriers. These regulatory barriers have prevented the
Interim Report #2, Recommendation 4
administration’s political leadership should take the lead to accelerate
implementation of the DTSI as an important
first step in a comprehensive reform of the nation’s arms transfer policy and
I. 4.b . In
particular, implementation of electronic licensing, the review of U.S.
Munitions List , and barriers to use of the global
program/project licenses established in the DTSI should proceed as quickly as
4. c . Bilateral
negotiations with Australia and the UK should be reinvigorated .
B. Update Country Risk Surveys to Modernize Export Licensing Compliance Practices
Effective compliance with U.S. Munitions List export regulations depends on up-to-date knowledge of the willingness and ability of nations abroad to implement their obligations to prevent unauthorized use or retransfer of U.S. defense hardware and technology exports. In many cases, U.S. government surveys of individual country risk are years out of date.
The U.S. government conducts country risk surveys to support the export licensing function. U.S. export licensing practices, license provisos, and similar restrictions imposed on U.S. exporters are dependent on an up-to-date and detailed understanding of the willingness and ability of recipient nations to comply with restrictions on the unauthorized use or retransfer of U.S.-origin defense exports. Unfortunately many of these surveys are several years out of date. The absence of up-to-date data causes export-licensing authorities to depend on data that may no longer reflect current conditions in many United States defense export markets. Moreover, up-to-date country risk surveys will provide a basis for government-to-government consultations to strengthen compliance among the community of nations with whom the U.S. shares modern defense hardware and technology.
Interim Report #2, Recommendation 5
The administration should update country risk surveys
immediately to align compliance practices with contemporary conditions in U.S.
defense export markets.
In 1996, the Congress
established the Defense Export Loan Guarantee (DELG) program in the DoD. The purpose of the statute was to create an
export credit mechanism for U.S. defense exporters. This program shares most of the characteristics of the U.S.
Export-Import Bank loan guarantee program for civil sector exports with an
important exception – the defense loan guarantees are not subsidized with funds
appropriated to the DoD. Because of
statutory constraints and regulatory and administrative practices, this program
has proven to
be unusable by the DoD –
only one small transaction has been executed in more than five years of
operation. As a result, the United
States is the only significant exporter of defense-related equipment without an
official exports credit mechanism. The
DELG program needs to be modernized to facilitate the financing of U.S. defense
The Congress has been concerned with the inability of the Department of Defense to use the DELG to serve U.S. national security objectives. The FY02 DoD Authorization Act requires DoD to prepare a report describing its limitations in using the provision for the purpose intended in the statute. This report is now in preparation, and is likely to be delivered to the Congress in April 2002. The report could constitute an evidentiary basis for an Administration legislative initiative to modernize the DELG.
Interim Report #2, Recommendation 6
The DELG should be modernized to permit the DoD to create an effective unsubsidized export credit organization to facilitate the financing of defense exports to U.S. allies and friendly nations abroad. Modernization of the DELG should remove dysfunctional statutory and regulatory constraints that frustrate implementation of the DELG statute. Among the pertinent changes that should be implemented through both a legislative initiative and policy changes are:
restrictions on the capitalization of
interest by users
of the DELG;
· Permit users of the DELG with allocations of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to use their FMF to finance the payment of DELG exposure fees and other costs associated with the DELG;
· Broaden the eligibility for the DELG financing based on a waiver by the Secretary of Defense. This should include the financing of allied participation in collaborative defense-industrial projects with the United States to minimize the disruption to crucial multi-year programs from out-of-phase national budgeting;
administrative practices (including U.S. Export-Import Bank
processing for a user fee) to reduce the DELG’s administrative costs to the
DoD and its users; and
· Modify administrative practices to facilitate the adding of nations to the list of eligible parties to the DELG program.
1. Issue The
U.S. air traffic system is not scalable to meet the nation’s future
transportation needs and is vulnerable to attack. The suppressed capacity demand resulting from the September 11,
2001, terrorist attack and economic slowdown should not be misinterpreted as a
reason to delay needed short-term and long-term improvements to the nation’s
air transportation system. This would
be a serious mistake. Government plans to address these problems
are inadequate, behind schedule and underfunded. 2. Background/Findings The nation’s air
transportation enterprise is a critical component of America's economic health
and quality of life. Aviation is responsible
for more than $1 trillion in U.S.
economic activity, transports more than 40 percent of the value of
international trade, and employs nearly 11 million
workers. Americans use aviation more
than any other country in the world, with personal travel accounting for 50
percent of the total. Our nation’s
security also depends on aviation.
Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies depend on aviation
assets to ensure the public safety. The
Department of Defense and North American Air Defense Command contribution to
the nation's protection are inextricably linked to the operations and data
supplied by the air traffic control system.
Prior to September 11, 2001,
the nation’s air traffic control system was straining under progressively
increasing demand and growing delays.
The costs of those delays – both
business and personal – were rapidly becoming unacceptable to the public, the
true owners of America’s airspace.
Recent studies documented the annual loss associated with
flight delays at over $8 billion. The
aftermath of the September 11 terrorist
attack highlights the vital importance of a safe, secure, and freely moving air
transportation system – as well as the fragile financial condition of the
nation’s air carriers. The effective operation,
innovative use, and strategic development of air transportation must become a
clear national priority. a. Finding
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) capacity enhancement plans are important
but will not meet anticipated traffic demands and security needs. At best they will preserve the status quo. The FAA’s Operational
Evolution Plan (OEP) is an organized collection of over 100 programs addressing
capacity problems. The stated goal of
the OEP is to increase the capacity of the National Airspace System by
approximately 30 percent by the year 2010.
This is equivalent to about 700-800 more flights in the air at a given
time during normal operating hours. Air traffic demand, however,
is expected to grow by at least 30 percent
in that same period, so the planned increases in capacity will only continue
the current delays, not eliminate them.
And, if new, highly economical aircraft and point-to-point
transportation services emerge as anticipated in the next few years,
substantial new demand would overwhelm a system already near gridlock. These factors, coupled with the need for
enhanced security, will only compound delays.
Innovations in service and efficient travel would benefit the entire
nation and should be encouraged – not limited by a lack of sufficient
infrastructure. Today’s processes and plans
for expanding airport and air traffic control infrastructure require many years
lead time and are fraught with technical, political, environmental, and
management challenges. Building, or
even expanding, a single runway at a major airport can take one to two decades
to complete, even if the local community favors its construction. Coordinating the upgrade of ground, airborne
and space systems for improved operations is a hugely complex job that relies
upon consensus and voluntary agreements between government and private
operators and also requires planning lead times of many years. The nation’s only current air
traffic development strategy is the OEP.
While the OEP will at best only meet rising demand over the next decade,
it should be supported until a more capable system can be deployed. So while we must continue aggressively with
the OEP, a substantially greater capability is clearly needed. b. Finding #2:
The FAA plans are not fully funded and are already
behind schedule .
Since the events of September
11, the FAA has understandably focused on immediate actions required to meet
security challenges. Demand for air
traffic services and for airspace has already begun to recover, but strategic
developments and investments in the OEP are being deferred. Even more critical, OEP capacity
improvements rely heavily on the voluntary purchase and installation of an
estimated $11 billion in new equipment by the airlines – a highly problematic
assumption given the economic realities airlines are facing today. The overall result is that even before
reaching the end of the first year of a ten-year plan, OEP schedules have been
delayed and needed funding priorities changed. c. Finding #3:
Current civil air transportation management
structures and consensus processes are not able to address these shortcomings. The commercial aviation
technology development and deployment process is fragmented with ad hoc,
overlapping, and often non-cooperative projects and little strong integrating
guidance. Government and the industry
respond to entities with competing interests: technology developers,
regulators, air traffic controllers and their bargaining units, air carriers
and their employee bargaining units, general aviation, and airport communities,
not to mention the technology providers, stockholders, and the Congress. Most of these groups have their own lobbying
organizations, which profoundly influence budget formulation and execution
processes. Within the Executive Branch,
the FAA, the Departments of Defense, Transportation and Commerce, the Office of
Homeland Security, NASA and others have aviation responsibilities that are
neither coordinated nor funded under an overall plan that is recognized as a
national priority. d. Finding
#4: The nation needs a clear air
transportation policy with an objective to move air traffic capacity substantially
ahead of anticipated demands while
enhancing public safety and homeland security . There is no
shortage of airspace – the skies are far larger than any highway and our
current “capacity” of 6500 or so aircraft aloft use only a tiny fraction of
existing airspace. The air carriers use
only 12 percent of the more than 5000 public use airports in the United
States. In fact, just 64 airports carry
85 percent of all air carrier traffic.
Today, we are not capable of
exploiting this potential. Our current
air traffic system relies on, and is limited by, procedures and systems that
have not substantially changed since the 1960s – imprecise radar tracking,
voice radio communications, imprecise weather knowledge, severe visibility
handicaps, and human monitoring and traffic direction throughout every flight
with constant hand-offs between controllers. Today’s transportation system
constrains our nation’s economic productivity and growth, leaves us vulnerable
to human lapses in safety and security, and affects the quality of life of
every citizen. Removing those limitations
must become a national priority. The
Commission believes that the nation needs strong leadership, guided by a new
national aviation policy, to provide what America demands of, and deserves
from, aviation. Interim
Report #2, Recommendation 7 7.a. The Administration should immediately create a multi-agency task
force with the leadership to develop and implement an integrated plan to
transform our air transportation system. An integrated plan is needed
to define a new system architecture for the nation’s air transportation system
with procedures based on precision knowledge, automated control, and
instantaneous communications throughout the network. Capacity, safety and security will all be improved with
increasing precision and information sharing.
The technology needed to provide this capability is either available
today or feasible to develop in the near future. We need a national focus and a will to change. The many government organizations
with aviation interests should immediately be brought together under strong
administration leadership to collaborate on the design strategy for a
revolution in air transportation capacity, safety, and security. 7.b. The
Administration and Congress should fully fund air traffic control modernization
efforts in fiscal year 2003 and beyond and prioritize FAA and NASA research and
development efforts that are the critical building blocks for the future. Air
transportation is so important to the nation that the Administration and the
Congress need to make air traffic infrastructure modernization a top
priority. The FAA OEP needs to
be fully funded, and FAA and NASA need significant increases in R&D to
start developing a new air transportation system for the nation. R&D investments should focus on:
security, noise and emissions reduction, high bandwidth communications,
precision navigation and surveillance, small aircraft transportation
technologies, ground and airborne control automation, and advanced weather
sensing. New mechanisms and incentives
need to be developed to accelerate the application of existing and new
technologies and concepts into the marketplace. As Congress
begins consideration of the fiscal year 2003 budget, the Commission wishes to
stress the importance of fully funding the FAA OEP. For the fiscal year 2004 budget, the Commission recommends that
both the President and Congress work together to fully fund a new R&D
initiative to develop a new 21 st Century air
transportation system for the nation.
value of international trade through the top 50 U.S. gateways wasUnited States
contributions of the DoD
Moreover. Given the, this is a highly problematic assumption
This report is the second in a series of interim reports aimed at identifying issues the Commission believes are critical to the future of the U.S. aerospace industry and require immediate attention by the Administration and/or the Congress. The first report was issued on December 18, 2001, and focused on the need for the federal government to budget and fund aerospace activities as a sector. It is anticipated that the Commission will release other interim reports leading up to the release of its final report on November 19, 2002.
To support development of its findings and recommendations, the Commission has conducted two public meetings – on November 27, 2001, and February 12, 2002 – and has four more public meetings scheduled for this year: May 14th, August 22nd, September 17th, and October 23rd. The public is encouraged to attend these meetings, as well as to provide inputs directly to the Commission via its website at: www.aerospacecommission.gov or Mr. Paul F. Piscopo, Staff Director, Commission on the Future of the U.S. Aerospace Industry, Crystal Gateway 1, Suite 940, 1235 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Virginia 22202, via phone (703-602-1515), fax (703-602-1532), or e-mail ([email protected]).