No. 31 (5 December 1995)
On top of the poor timing, the sale is objectionable both because of the weapon and the customer. Turkey has a widely acknowledged human rights problem and a penchant for using U.S.-supplied weapons to carry out the abuse (see ASM No. 30 p. 3). In addition, export of ATACMS—which has not been sold to any foreign gov- ernment—undermines U.S.-led efforts to limit the spread of ballistic missiles and cluster munitions, and it is likely to intensify the arms race between Turkey and Greece.
The administration says the $130 million deal will further U.S. foreign policy and national security "by improving the military capabilities of Turkey while enhancing weapon system standardization and interoperability."
Under the terms of the Arms Export Control Act, Congress has 15 days from the time of notification to review the sale before the administration may proceed. Several members of Congress have raised concerns.
"Attack ‘Ems": Weapon Profile and History ATACMS is a semi-guided ballistic missile with a range of 30-165 km. The missile carries an anti-personnel/anti-materiel cluster munition warhead that spews shrapnel over a 150 square meter area.
Each warhead contains 950 cluster bomblets, which are said to have a low dud rate of about 4 percent, translating into roughly 38 dud bomblets per missile fired. Unex- ploded ordnance from these missiles would pose an indiscriminate hazard to civilians similar to landmines.
Loral Corporation of Camden, Ark. is the prime contractor. ATACMS entered low-rate initial production for the U.S. Army in 1989 and became operational in August 1990. Production was accelerated to permit the system's use in Operation Desert Storm. The Army fired 32 ATACMS during the war, destroying Iraqi surface-to-air missile sites, logistics and refueling sites, convoys, and multiple launch rocket and howitzer batteries. According to the Pentagon's 1992 report, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, "During one ATACMS strike, more than 200 unarmored vehicles were destroyed as they attempted to cross a bridge."
The U.S. Army is currently procuring an "improved" ATACMS, with a range of more than 300 km.
Human rights In a letter to the President, Sen. Paul Sarbanes urged that the deal be dropped, saying it sends the message to Turkey that "our military relations can continue unaffected even as Turkey's government flouts the values and principles on which the NATO alliance is based." Also citing human rights concerns, Sen. Patrick Leahy said the sale would be a mistake. Leahy said that if the sale does go forward, however, the administration must gain assurance that ATACMS will not be used in Turkey's war against Kurdish militants.
Because of the missile's range and offensive potential, the deal is of great concern to neighboring countries as well. "Given Turkey's bellicose threats against Greece relating to ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty, [it] could have a destabilizing impact on the region," predicted Sarbanes.
Missile proliferation concerns A U.S. Army handbook identifies the Soviet-made Scud and Israeli-made Jericho missiles as foreign counterparts to the ATACMS. These systems are covered by the export controls of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Although the range of the current model ATACMS is below the 300 km threshold of the MTCR, the United States has argued in the past for prohibitions on the export of any missile that could be modified to travel a distance of 300 km, which ATACMS clearly can be. The administration claims to have addressed MTCR concerns by preventing removal of the rocket motor. However, countries which the United States and its allies are pressuring to limit similar sales are unlikely to find this claim persuasive.
Although attention to the issue is increasing, little is known about the international trade in light arms: None of the major sources of data on the global arms trade include information on these weapons (although several states have recommended that the U.N. Register be expanded to do so). Even the United States—which is more open than other exporters—is not very forthcoming in this area.
This was not always the case. Until 1980, the State Department prepared an annual report (known as the "Section 657 report," for the law mandating it) which listed, by country, all munitions—from bullets to bombers—exported from the United States in the preceding year. The 657 report, which was repealed by the Reagan administration, included information on both government-negotiated and commercial arms sales. By re-establishing such transparency in its own exports, the U.S. government would be better equipped to persuade other countries to exercise similar openness and oversight.
Currently the only way to gather information about U.S. gun exports (past and present) is through the Freedom of Information Act. In 1994, the ASM Project requested information from the Commerce, Defense and State Departments on exports of light weapons during 1980-1993.
The State Department denied our request, refusing to release any information about light arms shipments it authorized. Fortunately, Congressional investigators looked into the matter. According to data they obtained, between 1989 and 1993 the State Department granted 1,600 export licenses for over $100 million of small arms to eight Latin American countries, indicating the existence of large-scale commercial gun exports (see Senate Hearing 103-670).
The Commerce Department provided some information, although not as specific as we requested. In the last issue of this newsletter we reported the quantity and value of export licenses Commerce granted for shotguns, shells and several other commodities (see ASM No. 30 pp. 1-2).
In the accompanying table, we summarize the Defense Department data we obtained. It shows that between fiscal years 1980 and 1993 the Pentagon shipped over 170,000 rifles and submachine guns to countries around the world, including large quantities to Chad, El Salvador, Honduras, Lebanon, Somalia and Thailand. Pentagon Small Arms Exports, 1980-1993
Notes: Includes transfers under Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Programs. Source: Defense Security Assistance Agency, 14 Sept 94.
Meeting in the Hague on 11-12 September, the United States and 27 other governments agreed to a framework for a new multilateral forum to monitor transfers of weapons and militarily-useful goods and technologies. Three working groups are currently fleshing out procedural and administrative details of the regime, which succeeds COCOM—the cold war forum that blocked strategic trade to communist countries. Progress will be deliberated at the next high level meeting on 18-19 December, and the "new forum" or "new arrangement" (as it is currently called) will allegedly be up and running in early 1996 (see ASM No. 30 p. 9).
According to an official summary of the meeting, participants agreed that "the new arrangement should prevent the acquisition of armaments and sensitive dual-use items for military end uses, if the behavior of a state is, or becomes, a cause for serious concern of the participants." The new forum will rely on each participating government to maintain national controls on the export of relevant items to "any destination which they may consider not in conformity with these principles."
The document states explicitly that the new regime will not target any state or group of states, but the United States has been working with a clear target list in mind. Speaking to reporters about the new forum, Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis said the primary goal of the regime is to block the flow of arms and related technologies to current rogue or pariah states, which she identified as Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Libya.
Yet, the summary says the decision to transfer or deny an item will be the sole responsibility of participating governments. Unlike COCOM, the forum provides no mechanism for one member to block another's exports. At regular meetings of the new forum, participants will exchange information on their exports and export denials of covered munitions and dual-use items.
The forum will also host more frequent contact among a small group of the regime's top arms suppliers—the United States, Russia, France, Britain, Germany and Italy—which have "special responsibilities," according to Davis. She said these fora will give the United States a chance to convince others about the dangers of particular sales.
A working group in Paris is currently developing the lists of covered equipment. At a minimum, Secretary Davis said, information will be shared on transfers of major weapons systems, as defined by the UN Register of Conventional Arms (see p. 5). She added that some nations, including the United States, want to broaden existing categories, and possibly add new ones, such as small arms.
Russia, Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics—former targets of COCOM—were among the 28 governments at the Hague meeting. Other participants include members of NATO, Australia, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland.
Davis said the regime will be open on a "global non-discriminatory basis" to those who meet the membership criteria: adequate national export controls, adherence to the major non-proliferation regimes (such as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group) and "responsible export policies toward the pariah countries." Argentina, Bulgaria, South Korea, Romania and Ukraine are already working to develop the export control polices necessary for membership.
According to Davis, China "has shown some interest in what we're doing, but has still a very long way to go to meet the criteria for membership." (China sells arms to Iran.) She said that the United States has already begun discussions with China on their export controls. "It is our goal to bring China in, and when they come in they would clearly join the small group of major suppliers."
Inhumane Weapons Conference Breaks Down
Forty-nine states that are party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (a.k.a. the Inhumane Weapons Convention) met in Vienna during 25 September-13 October to formally review the treaty. The central goals were to improve the protocol dealing with landmines and to add a new protocol banning blinding laser weapons.
Seventy non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were represented at the Review Conference, including humanitarian and refugee relief, human rights, veterans, disarmament, religious, demining, mine victims', and medical and rehabilitation organizations from industrial and developing countries. Most NGOs present participate in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.
Realizing that a total ban was not going to be achieved (despite professions by several national delegations that they supported the "eventual" elimination of anti-personnel mines), the Campaign sought several interim goals: regular, automatic review of the Convention (preferably every five years); expansion of the scope of the landmine protocol to all circumstances; and meaningful verification and compliance mechanisms. Other short term goals included achieving a minimum metal content in mines to ensure detectability, and a prohibition on anti-handling and anti-sensor devices on mines.
Additionally, many of the NGOs present worked for the establishment of a new protocol to outlaw blinding as a method of warfare. In the end, a new Protocol IV was adopted. However, rather than banning blinding as a method of warfare, it proscribes only weapons designed to blind soldiers with unenhanced vision. Thus, blinding as collateral damage of optic warfare is exempt.
Work on landmines broke down with no consensus. Following the United States' and United Kingdom's lead in seeking to exempt their own mines from control, other countries sought to maintain their current mine arsenals as well. Little progress could be reached on detectability and on self-destruct/self-deactivate time frames. At an impasse, the negotiators agreed to suspend the Review Conference until January, when the military/technical working group will resume. The full Review Conference will reconvene in late April in Geneva.
The majority of NGOs present viewed this outcome as preferable to the very weak text which was the alternative. In the next six months, national campaigns will continue educating their politicians to the global humanitarian and socio-economic crises posed by mines.
The 10th plenary meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was held in Bonn during 10-12 October. The regime—initiated in 1987 by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S.—grew to 28 at this meeting, with the participation of Russia (see ASM No. 30 p. 9) and South Africa (see ASM No.27 p. 6). Brazil's membership was accepted.
The MTCR restricts exports to non-MTCR members of ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 300 km or more and a payload of 500 kg, or any missile capable of carrying a chemical, biological or nuclear payload. Component parts and technologies are also restricted.
For the first time, the MTCR plenary considered region-specific approaches to curbing missile proliferation, including promotion of ballistic-missile free zones and missile flight testing restrictions or notification (see Inside the Pentagon 2 November 1995).
Canada had previously floated a proposal for a global ban on missiles with ranges from 300 to 5,500 km. While several members supported the idea, the United States opposed it, fearing that such an initiative would lead to calls for strategic missile disarmament. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has supported the idea of globalizing the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which already bans the United States and former Soviet Union from having missiles with a range of 500-5,500 km.
In pressing the case for a more thorough-going approach to the missile threat, a Canadian official said: "We see the solution to the problem of ballistic missile proliferation as being founded on enduring rules of international law, not technical fixes or ad hoc responses like [anti-missile systems] or the MTCR. These are not long term answers" (see International Defense Review 6/95).
U.N. Focuses on Gun-Running
In his keynote speech before the 50th U.N. General Assembly in October, President Clinton focused on the global threat posed by terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking. "No one is immune, not the people of Latin America or Southeast Asia, where drug traffickers wielding imported weapons have murdered judges, journalists, police officers and innocent passersby," said the President.
Citing the facility with which these groups obtain the weapons needed for their operations, President Clinton urged states to ratify existing anti-terrorism treaties and to work with the United States "to shut down the grey markets that outfit terrorists and criminals with firearms." With no specifics provided, he called for the establishment of "an illegal arms and deadly materials control effort."
The State Department is reportedly pursuing some policy initiatives related to the President's speech. In addition, the President signed a Decision Directive (no. 42) on transnational crime in October, covering narco-trafficking and gun running among other things.
In his annual report in September on the work of the U.N., the Secretary-General also called for direct action "to deal with the flourishing illicit traffic in light weapons, which is destabilizing the security of a number of countries." (Document A/50/1)
On 2 November Japan, Argentina, Ecuador and South Africa introduced into the disarmament committee a draft resolution on small arms. The resolution, which was passed, directs the Secretary-General to establish a panel of governmental experts to report on: the types of light weapons being used in conflicts being managed by the U.N.; the production and flows of such arms; and the ways of preventing and redressing excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms. (A/C.1/50/L.7)
The Geneva-based U.N. Commission on Disarmament made progress in 1995 on elaborating guidelines on illicit arms trafficking. These guidelines emphasize the need for national strategies to deal with the trade and for bilateral and international coordination to control it. The Commission will address illicit arms trading again in 1996.
The Secretary-General released the third issue of the U.N. Register on Conventional Arms in October. The report shows quantities of imports and exports of seven categories of war material during 1994. The Register was initiated after the 1991 Gulf War to head off destabilizing arms accumulations such as Iraq had amassed. By shedding light on arms acquisitions, the report is also intended to build confidence among regional states.
Participation in the register is voluntary, and all information is provided by states and is unverified. By early November 87 governments had provided data, approximately the same number as in the past two years. Russia did not submit data until early November, causing many to worry about the future viability of the Register.
For the second year in a row Egypt, Colombia and Bolivia abstained. Many of America's other major arms clients have not participated in the register since its inception. Among these countries are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, and Taiwan (not a U.N. member),
Many Caribbean, Latin American and African states provided "nil" reports. Jamaica noted that "the categories listed for inclusion in the Register are not relevant to Jamaica." For the second year, Jamaica provided information on its small arms and ammunition imports.
An expert group commissioned during 1994 considered further development of the Register, but broke down without agreement over the issues of adding arms holdings through national procurement (as well as imported arms) and nuclear weapons. Others have suggested adding smaller arms, such as landmines, light artillery and guns.
There are concerns that the register will whither unless those countries which strongly backed its creation do more to encourage participation. The United States, for example, could condition its arms transfers on participation in the register, provide more specificity about its exports, and volunteer information about procurement through domestic production.
Source: UN General Assembly document A/50/547
Weapons manufacturers, market analysts and government officials gathered at the State Department on 20 September for a meeting of the Defense Trade Advisory Group (see ASM No. 30 p. 7). This government-industry forum meets twice annually in a partially public meeting to discuss U.S. arms export policy.
Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Thomas McNamara explained that the United States attempts to restrain international arms transfers in general, while vigorously supporting U.S. firms in sales competitions that are consistent with U.S. foreign and national security policy. He noted that the United States now captures about half of all new sales.
For the first time, members of the military services—Army, Navy and Air Force—addressed the group.
General Hale Burr, Jr., Assistant Deputy Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs, said the Air Force is currently managing arms contracts totaling $108 billion. Equipment sales represent about three-quarters of this total, support about 20 percent and training about 1 percent. Burr said arms sales are necessary because the United States increasingly will need to fight with coalition partners, and this is simplified by having common equipment.
Roughly half of the sales are destined for the Middle East and Africa, with the other half split between Europe and the Pacific. Only one percent of Air Force sales currently go to Latin America, but Burr (yearningly?) said that Chile, Argentina and Brazil have all expressed interest in buying used F-16s. (The administration has maintained a policy of denying exports of advanced fighters to the region.)
Frank Besson, Director of Security Assistance for the Army, noted that arms sales are "big business for the Army." The Army has over 5,000 active foreign military sales cases worth $47 billion, with some $24 billion to be delivered. Besson noted that sales benefit the Army: "If we can sell it overseas, the price comes way down for the U.S. Army."
In what was undoubtedly the most impassioned presentation, Rear Admiral John Snyder, Deputy Director, Navy International Programs Office, argued that the United States should seek greater dominance of the international arms market. The United States, Snyder said, currently exercises "unrealistic restraint."
He said: "When you look around the world right now, and you look at where there is major conflict, generally speaking, people are not killing people with U.S. weapons." [See William Hartung, "U.S. Weapons at War," World Policy Papers, New York: World Policy Institute, June 1995.]
"It is my opinion that we exercise...far more restraint on our arms transfers than any other country that I have seen operating in the world. You might want to argue that point, but...we really, really worry about every single bullet, or piece of technology, or gun, or airplane, or anything that we transfer throughout the world."
"I'd much rather go to war against a country that has bought U.S. equipment, than a country that's bought comparable equipment from France, or from Russia, or from Israel, or from any other country. If they got equipment from the United States, I know damn well what they got in their inventory, I know what their readiness is....I also know what their tactics are, and I know how to defeat their weapons" Snyder said; "if a country's going to get technology anyway, let's make it U.S. technology."
In closing, McNamara dampened the Army/Navy/Air Force salesmen's dreams somewhat, saying he does not "foresee the day when arms sales by the United States will be treated as identical with non-military exports. Arms sales are a special category and need to be treated as a special category."
Dubai Air Show
At taxpayer expense, the Department of Defense brought a dozen aircraft to the Dubai Air Show, seeking to promote sales of some of the United States' premiere weapons systems oil wealthy sheikdoms. The show was held in the United Arab Emirates during 12-16 November.
The Pentagon conducted flying demonstrations of Lockheed Martin's F-16D fighter-bomber, McDonnell Douglas' C-17 ‘Globemaster' transport plane, and Bell's ‘Super Cobra' attack helicopter. The F-15E ‘Strike Eagle,' the ‘Apache' attack helicopter and several others were displayed on the ground.
The Pentagon estimated the cost at $500,000. Under U.S. law, the Secretary of Defense must certify that participation is in U.S. "national security interests" before public funds can be used to market arms (see ASM No. 24 p.1).
In justifying the expenditure, Under secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe said that U.S. security and foreign policy interests are served by "promoting standardization and interoperability of equipment with our military allies and highlighting the strength of U.S. commitment to the security of the region." He added that direct DOD participation "is supportive of President Clinton's emphasis on the promotion of America's economic security as the first pillar of our foreign policy. Our presence at this event can stimulate trade, investment, and economic cooperation."
The striking union, the International Association of Machinists (IAM), protests Boeing's willingness to export jobs as a marketing tool to win sales. In the past six years, Boeing has cut 62,000 jobs, a third of its workforce.
The strike has focused the media spotlight on "offsets," the side deals that routinely accompany multi-billion dollar arms and aerospace sales (see ASM No. 28 p. 5). These agreements require a supplier to direct some benefits— usually production work or technology—back to the purchaser as a condition of the sale. One of the most politically powerful claims supporting U.S. arms trading today is that weapons exports sustain American jobs. But, as Boeing workers know, offsets dilute and sometimes negate the employment benefits of arms exports.
Boeing wants to increase the amount of work it subcontracts overseas from 48 to 52 percent, a move the company says will save it $600 million a year. Moreover, Boeing officials argue that they must provide offsets because the market demands them; foreign subcontracting "happens to be part of doing business," said a company official.
The union generally supports exports, but it disagrees about how far the company should go to secure a sale. IAM President George Kourpias said, "By sending high-skill jobs and production all over the world, Boeing is punching holes in America's future."
Buyers use production offsets to assist the development of their own military and commercial industries. Europe used licensed production of American weapons and other offsets to rebuild its arms industries during the 1950s and 1960s; now developing nations are now following suit.
The 1991 sale of 120 F-16 fighter-bombers to South Korea highlights labor's concerns. Under the deal, South Korea purchased 12 aircraft built entirely in the United States; 36 more were delivered in kits to be assembled in Korea and 72 planes will be built by Samsung in Korea. In 1992, thousands of General Dynamics workers in Ft. Worth rallied in protest when they were asked to train their South Korean replacement workers. General Dynamics eventually had to send the 500 Korean workers to Turkey's F-16 plant for training.
In addition to employment concerns, direct offsets on military sales also have serious security implications: they assist the development of foreign arms industries, over which the United States will have little or no control. In a 1995 study, Jobs on the Wing: Trading Away the Future of the U.S Aerospace Industry, the Economic Policy Institute asserted that offsets are "irretrievably transferring military technology and production know-how" which "will hasten the development of a new generation of commercial and military competitors." Following the lead of U.S. and European industry, new producers will fulfill their own armed forces' needs and then seek to export.
The U.S. government currently views offsets "as economically inefficient and market distorting" but does not prohibit U.S. companies from engaging in them. The IAM is trying to change that. They are seeking to bring business, labor and the government together to establish laws and regulations that would limit the ability of countries and non-U.S. companies to demand offsets in exchange for the purchase of U.S. manufactured goods. IAM officials have taken up the issue with administration officials at the State Department and office of the U.S. Trade Representative.
The IAM is also working a cooperative, diplomatic approach with organized labor in Western Europe, proposing that U.S. and European aerospace and defense companies and labor negotiate an end to the practice of using export of jobs and technologies as a marketing tool. (See Aviation Week & Space Technology 14 August 1995.)
IAM President Kourpias reportedly took the matter up with President Clinton, who ordered a White House review of the foreign contracting and U.S. policy (see Washington Post 26 November 1995).
U.S. Aiding Development of Japanese Aerospace
In 1988, the United States and Japan initiated joint development of a new Japanese combat aircraft, the FS-X, based on the F-16 fighter. By the time of the FS-X prototype's first flight on 7 October, development costs had reached more than $3.2 billion. Japan could have bought 140 F-16 aircraft directly from the United States for well under half the estimated $15 billion cost of building the FS-X. But Japan chose to purchase a redesigned plane because its aerospace industry is gaining important skills from the project.
An August 1995 study by the General Accounting Office reports that Japan hopes to use the FS-X program "to sever their dependence on U.S. licensed production and position themselves to be suppliers for future aircraft programs." Specifically, "Japanese FS-X engineers are acquiring valuable design and systems integration experience applicable to other military and commercial aircraft projects. By making extensive changes to the F-16 baseline, Japan has maximized the use of indigenous design concepts and technologies."
(U.S.-Japan Cooperative Development: Progress on the FS-X Program Enhances Japanese Aerospace Capabilities [GAO/NSIAD-95-145])
Sources: House International Relations Committee, DOD Excess Defense Articles Computerized Bulletin Board, DOD press releases.
Reports Show U.S. Still Leading Arms Exporter
In August the Congressional Research Service published its annual report "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1987-1994." According to this report, which measures sales in terms of dollar volume, the United States exported more weaponry in 1994 than the rest of the world combined (see table below).
This finding was consistently downplayed in press reports, while bullish French sales grabbed the headlines. The report cites $25.4 billion in new sales agreements to the developing world last year, with France accounting for $11.4 billion and the U.S. a distant second at $6.1 billion (45% market share for France versus 24% for the United States).
However, the report undercounts U.S. sales agreements in two significant ways. First, the report's definition of "developing world" excludes all of Europe, including Greece and Turkey—two of the world's biggest importers, and both major U.S. customers. Second, The report excludes commercial arms sales agreements and deliveries (those negotiated directly by the arms industry) for the U.S. only. The author suggests that this is a trivial omission (several hundred million dollars to a couple billion dollars in sales per year). While the inclusion of commercial sales would not bring the U.S. total up to the French level of arms sales to the Third World in 1994, it would narrow the gap.
When comparing new sales agreements to the whole world, the report shows that the United States was the overall leading seller, with $12.45 billion in sales in 1994, compared to $12 billion for France (35% market share for the U.S. versus 33.7% for France). Most significantly, the report shows that the United States led the world overwhelmingly in 1994 in terms of arms deliveries.
A second report, released by the UN Secretary General in October, complements the CRS report, showing what type of war material countries imported and exported during 1994. It demonstrates U.S. dominance in terms of quantity of arms delivered (see table p. 5 ).
Source: CRS Report 95-862F, pp. 87-88
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Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1987-1994, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (no. 95-862F), by Richard F. Grimmett, 4 August 1995, 92 pp.
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994 (hearings of the House International Relations Subcmte. on International Operations and Human Rights, 2 and 15 February 1995) Washington, DC: USGPO, 1995, 120 pp.
The Crisis in Sudan (hearing before the House International Relations Subcmte. on Africa, 22 March 1995) Washington, DC: USGPO, 1995, 122 pp.
Defense Trade News and Export Policy Bulletin, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, October 1995 (vol. 6 no. 1), 20 pp.
Drug War: Observations on U.S. International Drug Control Efforts, General Accounting Office Testimony (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-194), 1 August 1995, 9 pp.
East or West? Turkey Checks its Compass (Senate Foreign Relations Cmte. Minority Staff Report, September 1995) Washington, DC: USGPO, 1995, 11 pp.
Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1996 and 1997 (hearings of the House International Relations Subcmte. on International Operations and Human Rights) Washington, DC: USGPO, 1995, 351 pp.
Hearing on Guatemala (hearing before the Select Cmte. on Intelligence, 5 April 1995) Washington, DC: USGPO, 1995, 170 pp.
Issues in Export Control (hearing before the House International Relations Subcmte. on International Economic Policy and Trade, 25 January 1995), Washington, DC: USGPO, 1995, 86 pp.
International Terrorism (hearing before the House International Relations Cmte., 29 June 1995) Washington, DC: USGPO, 1995.
Middle East Overview and U.S. Assistance to the Palestinians (hearing before the House International Relations Cmte., 6 April 1995), Washington, DC: USGPO, 1995, 73 pp.
Narcotics Trafficking in Africa (hearing before the House International Relations Subcmte. on Africa, 24 March 1995) Washington, DC: USGPO, 1995, 43 pp.
National Security: Impact of China's Military Modernization in the Pacific Region, General Accounting Office Report to Congress (GAO/NSIAD-95-84), June 1995, 50 pp.
NATO's Future: Problems, Threats and U.S. Interests (hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcmte. on European Affairs, 27 April and 3 May 1995) Washington, DC: USGPO, 1995, 103 pp.
Overview of U.S. Policy in Europe (hearing before the House International Relations Cmte., 28 July 1995) Washington, DC: USGPO, 1995, 86 pp.
Overview of U.S. Policy Toward South Asia (hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcmte. on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 7 and 9 March 1995) Washington, DC: USGPO, 1995, 188 pp.
Panama: DOD's Drawdown Plan for the U.S. Military in Panama, General Accounting Office Report (GAO/NSIAD-95-183), 2 August 1995.
The Path Toward Democracy in Angola (hearing before the House International Relations Subcmte. on Africa, 13 July 1995) Washington, DC: USGPO, 1995, 45 pp.
Peacekeeping: Assessment of U.S. Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers, General Accounting Office Report to Congress (GAO/NSIAD-95-113), August 1995, 66 pp.
Report to Congress on Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Studies Completed in 1994, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 13 September 1995, 234 pp. [Contains, among other things, description of the government's unclassified research on conventional arms control in 1994.]
Threat Control Through Arms Control: Report to Congress 1994, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, July 1995, 143 pp.
Unexploded Ordnance: A Coordinated Approach to Detection and Clearance Is Needed, General Accounting Office Report to Congress (GAO/NSIAD-95-197), 20 September 1995.
U.S. Assistance Programs in the Middle East (hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcmte. on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 11 May 1995) Washington, DC: USGPO, 1995, 123 pp.
U.S.-Japan Cooperative Development: Progress on the FS-X Program Enhances Japanese Aerospace Capabilities, General Accounting Office Report to Congress (GAO/NSIAD-95-145), August 1995, 112 pp.
Western Hemisphere Drug Control Strategy (hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcmte. on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps, 4 April 1995) Washington, DC: USGPO, 1995, 106 pp.