(Issue No. 18, January 1993)
ARMS TRADE AND MILITARY AID LEGISLATION PASSED BY THE 102ND CONGRESS October saw passage and enactment of the FY93 foreign aid appropriation bill, the defense authorization and appropriation bills and the Defense Production Act amendments. New military expenditure reporting requirements were established, a one-year moratorium on US exports of land mines was enacted, and $1.77 billion was appropriated for arms industry conversion. Military Assistance On 5 October, the House adopted the $26.3 billion foreign aid appropriation bill by a 312-105 vote. The Senate passed it the same day with a voice vote, and President Bush signed the measure into law (PL 102-391) the next day. The bill appropriates $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing grant military aid and concessional loans for weapons purchases, nearly $700 million less than in FY92. Israel will receive $1.8 billion of this total, in grant aid, to be disbursed within 30 days of enactment of the bill. Of this, up to $150 million may be used to fund research and development in the United States, and $475 million can be used for procurement of Israeli-made weapons and services. The bill also mandates that $200 million worth of US weapons be pre-positioned in Israel. Egypt will receive $1.3 billion of the FY93 grant aid, bringing the total for Israel and Egypt to $3.1 billion, which leaves about $350 million for all others. Morocco will receive $40 million in grant aid. El Salvador is to receive $11 million in grant military aid, "only for non-lethal items for maintenance, sustainment, restructuring, and reduction and only in strict accordance with ... the Salvadoran Peace Accords." Breaking with recent past tradition, all military aid for Greece, Turkey and Portugal will be on a low-interest loan basis, with the principal amount of direct loans not to exceed $450 million for Turkey, $315 million for Greece and $90 million for Portugal. $42.5 million was appropriated for International Military Education and Training (IMET). Cutting the entire $2.3 million requested by the Administration, Indonesia is barred from receiving IMET because of its massacre of civilians in East Timor in October 1991. Zaire, Sudan, Liberia, Somalia, Guatemala, Peru and Malawi are prohibited by the bill from receiving any US military aid. No money from the foreign aid bill may be used to aid Cuba, Iraq, Libya, Vietnam, Iran or Syria, or any country whose elected head of government is deposed by an act of the military (coup or decree). Thailand, which had a military coup in February 1991, is affected by this provision. Jordan cannot receive any military or economic aid until the President certifies to Congress that Jordan has taken steps to advance the Middle East peace process and is in compliance with UN Security Council sanctions against Iraq (see page 5). Military Expenditure Data Required The foreign aid appropriation bill amends Section 116(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act so that the annual country reports on human rights required under the section must now include "a description of the military expenditures of each country receiving United States foreign assistance, and the efforts each country is making to reduce those expenditures." In addition, the conferees note in their report on the bill (House Report 102-1011) that they "expect the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the United States executive director to each international financial institution ... to vigorously advocate and promote policies ... to encourage developing countries to significantly reduce military and military-related expenditures and increase resources for primary health care and basic education." Foreign Aid to Former Soviet Union The foreign aid bill allocates $417 million in economic aid for former Soviet republics. Eligibility for this money is restricted to governments that establish "responsible policies and practices regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons." These funds are also conditioned on movement toward the withdrawal of all Russian and CIS troops from the Baltic states. A provision in the Senate version of the bill, sponsored by Sen. Jesse Helms, would have made this money (other than humanitarian aid) conditional on an end to sales by Russia of any weapons or related services to Iran. Instead, as resolved in the Conference Committee, "the President shall report to the appropriate congressional committees [Foreign Affairs/Relations] that the United States has entered into serious and substantive discussion with Russia to reduce exports of sophisticated conventional weapons to Iran and to prevent sales to Iran of any destabilizing numbers and types of such weapons." The first such certification is due by 5 February; otherwise, the President is directed to end all US assistance other than humanitarian aid (defined as food, clothing and medicine) to Russia. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy in South Asia The foreign aid appropriation bill adds a new section on "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy in South Asia" to the Foreign Assistance Act. The measure encourages the President to pursue regionally negotiated nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, with the ultimate goal being concurrent accession by Pakistan and India to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. By 1 April 1993, and every six months thereafter, the President must report to the Appropriations Committees, the Speaker of the House and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on nuclear proliferation in South Asia, "including efforts taken by the United States to achieve a regional agreement on nuclear non-proliferation, and including a comprehensive list of the obstacles to concluding such a regional agreement." Within six months of enactment, the President must also report on the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of China, Pakistan and India, including, but not limited to, whether that country possesses a nuclear explosive device or all of the components necessary for one; a report on the status of each country's missile development program, including foreign assistance to the program, and foreign sales of missiles or missile components to the country and steps which the US has taken in response to such sales; and whether that country has agreed to and is adhering to peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements. Arms for Bosnia? Asserting that the federated states of Serbia and Montenegro have a large supply of military equipment and ammunition (including more than 1,000 battle tanks, armored vehicles and artillery pieces), and that the UN arms embargo sustains the military advantage in favor of the aggressor, the foreign aid bill calls for the UN to exempt Bosnia-Herzegovina from the UN arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia. Section 599D of the bill provides the funding authority for the President to grant up to $50 million of defense articles to Bosnia from US military stocks in FY93, if the UN arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina is lifted, and if the President certifies that the transfer of such goods "would assist that nation in self-defense and thereby promote the security and stability of the region." US allies must also be prepared to join in such a military assistance effort. The bill in no way compels the President to provide such aid. Defense Production Amendments Codify Offset Policy In late October President Bush signed the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1992 into law (PL 102-558). In addition to reauthorizing the lapsed Defense Production Act, many measures related to the defense-industrial base and, therefore, to US arms production and sales capacity are contained in the act. Of particular interest, section 123 codifies and enacts the "Policy on Offsets in Military Exports" enunciated by President Bush on 16 April 1990. Offsets---such as licensed production, co-production or subcontractor production arrangements---are side deals that an arms manufacturer uses to induce foreign buyers to choose its product over its competitor's product. Many developing countries require that weapons purchases be accompanied by some technology transfer offsets in order to assist in the creation of an indigenous arms industry. The 1990 Bush policy statement noted that offsets for military exports are inefficient and distort the market, but, so as not to interfere with US arms sales competitiveness, did not seek to limit them. Under the policy, though, no agency of the US government may "encourage, finance, enter directly into, or commit US firms to any offset arrangement." At the National Security Council's urging, however, the President may encourage or restrict offsets, or use government funds to finance offsets. The act calls for the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to consult with foreign governments on limiting the negative effects of offsets in arms sales. It mandates an annual report by the Commerce Department on the impact of offsets on defense preparedness, industrial competitiveness, employment and trade, but not national security. The findings of these reports are to be used in bilateral and multilateral negotiations aimed at limiting offsets.
Foreign Ownership of Defense Contractors Curtailed A provision in the FY93 DOD authorization bill (section 835) prohibits the purchase of certain US defense companies by a foreign government or its agent, "unless the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress that such sale would not pose a significant risk of diversion of sensitive US defense technology to a foreign firm or government and would not otherwise harm US national security interests." Only prime contractors which had a total of $500 million or more in DOD or DOE contracts during the previous fiscal year, and companies working on classified programs, are affected. The measure was spurred by Thomson-CSF's attempt to purchase LTV Corporation's missile business in April 1992 (see ASM no. 15 p. 1 for background). Thomson is partially owned by the French government. Mideast Threat Assessment Due Section 1331 of the DOD authorization bill requires that the Secretaries of Defense and State, together with the director of the CIA, submit a report to Congress on the United States' strategic posture in the Middle East by 1 February. The report is to include: US plans for ensuring Israel's military technological superiority over potential threats; the state of strategic cooperation between the US and Israel; a military threat assessment describing the overall threat to US strategic interests in the Persian Gulf, to Israel, to Egypt, and to the Gulf Cooperation Council states; and an assessment of the threat to the US and to regional US allies due to the proliferation of long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Peacekeeping Due along with the FY94 Defense Department budget submission is a report to Congress assessing the UN Secretary General's June 1992 report on "Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping." In particular, the DOD report is to consider whether the US should fund UN peace keeping operations out of the national defense budget, rather than the State Department budget as is currently the case. The report is also to consider whether the US should keep equipment specified by the Secretary General available for immediate sale, loan or donation to the UN and/or transport UN troops and equipment as needed cheaply or for free. The report is called for by Section 1342 of the DOD authorization bill. For FY93, $27.166 million is appropriated in the foreign aid bill for peace keeping operations. $300 million is authorized in the DOD bill, but none is appropriated. Ban on Landmine Exports Passes Section 1365 of the Pentagon authorization bill makes it the policy of the US government to seek "verifiable international agreements prohibiting the sale, transfer or export and further limiting the use, production, possession, and deployment of anti-personnel landmines." It is the sense of Congress that the President should seek through an international agreement to prohibit the sale, transfer or export of such landmines. For one year, the Act, bans the sale, financing or licensing of any landmine exports. Pursuant to the above law, the State Department placed a notice in the Federal Register stating that "all licenses, approvals, sales or transfers of landmines specifically designed for anti-personnel use, regardless of method of delivery, are suspended until further notice. Additionally, all existing authorizations for the sale, export or transfer of such defense articles are revoked until further notice." The DOD authorization bill also mandates---six months after enactment---an assessment of international landmine clearing efforts in situations where war refugees are attempting to be repatriated; an analysis of the specific types of mines in the various countries and the availability and suitability of technology for disposing of those mines; and an evaluation of the "desirability, feasibility and potential cost of United States assistance on either a unilateral or multilateral basis" in mine clearing. Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 Title XVI of the DOD authorization act extends the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (PL 101-513) to Iran, making it US policy "to oppose, and urgently to seek the agreement of other nations also to oppose, any transfer to Iran or Iraq of any goods or technology ... [that] could materially contribute to either country's acquiring chemical, biological, nuclear, or destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons." The bill further mandates that "If any person transfers or retransfers goods or technology so as to contribute knowingly and materially to the efforts by Iran or Iraq ... to acquire destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons," for a period of two years the US government cannot do business with the sanctioned person and all export licenses will be denied. If a foreign government is found to be culpable, the business prohibition and export prohibition will be applied to the government, all foreign and military aid will be cut off for one year, and all coproduction and codevelopment agreements suspended for one year. "Advanced conventional weapons" are defined to include long-range precision guided munitions, fuel air explosives, cruise missiles, low observability aircraft, "advanced military aircraft," military satellites, electromagnetic weapons, laser weapons, advanced command, control and communications systems, electronic warfare systems, or intelligence collections systems that "the President determines destabilize the military balance or enhance offensive capabilities in destabilizing ways." Defense Conversion Measures Funded The defense authorization act authorizes $1.5 billion for a variety of defense-to-civilian conversion programs, and Title VII of the defense appropriations act provides $1.77 billion in funding for such measures in FY93. The money appropriated is targeted toward defense industry and technology base initiatives, community adjustment and assistance programs, and personnel assistance, with the majority ($870 million) going to technology base initiatives. Ambiguous Air Show Policy Passed Legislation limiting taxpayer support for US contractors selling arms overseas was passed as Section 1083 of the DOD authorization bill (see ASM no. 17 p. 3 for background). The measure requires the US defense industry to reimburse the Pentagon for the cost of transporting Pentagon-owned equipment to international arms bazaars, all costs for military personnel accompanying the equipment and any other "miscellaneous incremental costs" which would not otherwise have occurred. However, if transporting the equipment to the air show meets "training requirements that would otherwise have to be met," industry would not be required to pay the cost incurred. Under the legislation, industry would not be required to lease the equipment at fair market value, nor to insure the equipment. The military services cannot participate in international marketing shows unless the Secretary of Defense submits a report 45 days before the opening of the show detailing why participation in the show is in US national security interests, explaining the arms control impact of promoting sales of the weapons, and estimating the cost of participation. Department of Defense cooperation with US industry at air shows has been under contention since 1991, when the Pentagon assisted industry at the Paris Air Show and subsequent shows by supplying aircraft and military personnel---in some cases at no cost to industry. Most recently, the US treasury gave US arms industry a $161,700 subsidy for showing nine military aircraft and helicopters at the Farnborough Air Show in September. Recoupment Fees Being Rolled Back The Senate version of the FY93 DOD appropriation bill contained a provision, deleted in conference, which would have reconfirmed that research and development recoupment fees must be charged on sales of major military equipment. At the same time, the bill would have mandated that these funds revert to the Pentagon RDT&E account, rather than into the Treasury general fund account as is presently done. The Senate also sought to reduce Pentagon RDT&E funding by $178 million, the amount which the Pentagon has estimated it will recover through recoupment fees on foreign military sales in fiscal year 1993. The Pentagon recovers government-funded research and development costs for weapon systems through recoupment fees on foreign military sales. As it now stands, any non-NATO country buying "major military equipment" in a government-to-government deal must pay such a fee, which can be as much as 5 percent of the cost of the weapon system. (No recoupment fees are mandated on direct commercial sales.) But defense industry and Bush Administration officials have recently sought to repeal recoupment---Section 21(e)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act---on the grounds that it hurts US arms sales competitiveness by increasing the price. In June, the Bush Administration dropped recoupment fees on all sales of non-major military equipment. No amendment to the legislation was necessary to do so. Efforts to end all recoupment fees are likely in the 103rd Congress. ARMS SALES IN PROGRESS Israeli Compensation for Saudi Sales 26 September---The White House announces that it will transfer an unspecified number of AH-64 Apache and UH-60 Black Hawk multipurpose (combat, assault and transport) helicopters to Israel, in an effort to compensate for the US sale to Saudi Arabia of 72 F-15 aircraft announced earlier in the month (see ASM no. 17). The helicopters will be provided under a 1990 Congressional provision that allows Israel to receive up to $700 million worth of now-excess US defense articles from the NATO theater. The White House also announces that some further (unspecified) military equipment would be forward-positioned in Israel. In 1991 Congress authorized the pre-positioning of up to $300 million worth of US weaponry in that country, and according to a Washington Post account, the US already has placed about $100 million of military equipment there. The Post speculates that the new equipment includes air-to-air missiles and Patriot missiles. US and Taiwan Formalize F-16 Deal 12 November----Taiwanese and US government officials sign a letter of offer and agreement (LOA) for the sale of 150 F-16A/B fighters . Six days later the two governments sign an LOA for approximately 180 engines, spares and support equipment. Pratt & Whitney will supply $1 billion worth of F11-PW-220 engines for the F-16 aircraft, with delivery scheduled for the last quarter of 1996 through 2000 . Congress was notified of the $5.8 billion aircraft sale on 14 September (see ASM no. 17). In early January, Taiwanese legislators threatened to block the deal unless Taiwan received some F-16 production technology. Ting Shouchung, described as "a top lawmaker in the Parliament's defense committee," said "It would be unthinkable and ridiculous if we did not have an offset agreement to manufacture parts" for the F-16 . Licensing production to Taiwan would be ironic, as the sale was approved in September largely as a (US) jobs issue. Meanwhile, the US sought to discourage Taiwan from purchasing 60 Mirage 2000-5 fighters, worth $2.6 billion, from France, surrealistically claiming that the purchase would destabilize the region and encourage China to buy more arms . Taiwan went ahead and bought the French planes. Poor Saudis 18 November----Defense Daily reports that Saudi Arabia has asked the US to withhold delivery and attempt to resell nine already-paid-for Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) manufactured by Loral Corporation. The deal was part of a $68 million MLRS package, including 300 rockets, announced in September 1990. Due apparently to cash flow shortages, Saudi Arabia also has not yet finalized several weapons purchases already notified to and passed by Congress, including 465 M1A2 tanks and 72 F-15 aircraft. US and Singapore Formalize F-16 Deal 20 November----US and Singapore government officials sign an LOA for the $310 million sale of 11 General Dynamics' F-16 A/B fighters. These 11 aircraft will join the eight F-16s purchased by the Singapore Air Force in the late 1980s. The sale was presented to Congress in June. Long-Awaited Turkey Helicopter Contract Signed 8 December----Sikorsky Aircraft and the government of Turkey sign a contract for a $1.1 billion sale and coproduction agreement for 95 Black Hawk helicopters. Forty-five will be bought off the shelf, with transfers beginning immediately; the remaining 50 will be co-produced in Turkey. Financing for this arms sale will be arranged by the Export-Import Bank, as agreed on a one-time-only basis in 1990. Massive Armor Sale to Kuwait 5 January---With no time to waste, the outgoing Bush Administration notifies Congress on its first day in session of the Army's intention to sell $4.5 billion worth of armor and artillery to Kuwait. The announcement of the sale of 256 M1A2 Abrams tanks was anticipated, as General Dynamics beat out Vickers Defence Systems, the British manufacturer of the Challenger 2 tank, in October for the highly-publicized Kuwait armor sale. In addition to the tanks, the deal includes 46 M88 tank recovery vehicles, 125 M113 armored personnel carriers, 30 M1064 mortar carriers, 1,178 machine guns, 967 SINCGARS radios, 132 M998 troop and cargo carriers, trucks, ammunition and other supporting equipment. See ASM no. 17 p. 4 for background on the M1A2 sale. MISCELLANY CBO Explores How to Limit Mideast Arms In September, the Congressional Budget Office released an excellent 85-page report on Limiting Conventional Arms Exports to the Middle East. The report opens by noting that US military force and procurement decisions are now driven by the size and capabilities of Third World forces, rather than the Soviet military. Therefore, continuing to arm developing countries, especially in regions of greatest strategic interest---such as the Middle East---does not seem smart. The report outlines in greater detail than has been done elsewhere how an arms export control regime (rather than a transparency regime) might be configured, exploring both qualitative and quantitative limits on arms exports to the region. It assesses the military and economic costs of the various options. To obtain a copy, call (202) 226-2809. State Department Soft on Jordan? 1 October---Appearing before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Edward Djerejian, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, says that since June Jordan's enforcement of UN trade sanctions against Iraq has "tightened significantly. The Jordanian military has assumed an important role in the effort and Iraq has received correspondingly fewer embargoed goods through Jordan." Congress has heard this before, and they are skeptical. In September, the GAO reported (in GAO/NSIAD-92-343) that the State Department "inaccurately described the timing and scope of their actions to halt military assistance to Jordan" during Operation Desert Storm. The State Department told Congress that as of 2 August 1990 the department had placed a hold on the approval of new LOAs for Jordan. However, between 2 August and 4 October 1990, 12 new LOAs were approved. A ban on transfers of military goods was not implemented until 7 March 1991---after the war had already ended. Not taking the State Department's word for it this time, the FY93 foreign aid appropriation bill barred aid to Jordan "unless the President determines and so certifies to the Congress that (1) Jordan has taken steps to advance the peace process in the Middle East, (2) Jordan is in compliance with United Nations Security Council sanctions against Iraq, and (3) that such assistance is in the national interest of the United States." Senate Gets Moving on "Iraq-gate" After more than two years of House-side activity on the Iraq/Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) scandal, the Senate finally gets into the act in October, undoubtedly spurred to action by the impending Presidential election and by the trial of a BNL-Atlanta employee accused of single-handedly perpetrating the Bank's fraud. The Senate Intelligence, Agriculture and Judiciary Committees each request that the Attorney General appoint an Independent Counsel to investigate their concerns that high ranking officials of the Justice Department, the FBI and the CIA obstructed justice by withholding or falsifying information on the issue. In December the Attorney General rejects their requests. On 27 October the Senate Banking Committee, with jurisdiction over exports administered by the Commerce Department, hears three panels on past US exports of dual-use technologies to Iraq prior to its invasion of Kuwait. Specifically to be addressed, Chairman Donald Riegle says, are whether US exports strengthened Iraq's military capabilities and whether the Administration has accurately disclosed the degree to which its licensing policy toward Iraq strengthened that country's military capabilities. The Chairman's opening statement outlines the history of Congressional involvement and government obfuscation, annexing several declassified inter- and intra-agency memos on US policy toward Iraq. The memos show that the US continued licensing dual-use equipment to Iraq even after intelligence reports warned Bush Administration officials that Iraq was actively pursuing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and developing ballistic missiles. House Banking Committee Chairman Henry Gonzalez releases a sheaf of papers with his prepared testimony, including a declassified portion of NSD 26 (the now-infamous 1989 Presidential memo which said "The United States Government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq"); also letters from the State Department to Congressional committees investigating US exports to Iraq, and relevant interagency correspondence, including the 25 July 1990 memo from Secretary of State Baker to Secretary of Commerce Mosbacher requesting (one week before it invaded Kuwait) that additional controls be placed on dual-use exports to Iraq, given its "extraordinarily aggressive weapons proliferation efforts." Also testifying: Congressman Doug Barnard, Kenneth Timmerman (author of The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq), David Kay (leader of three UN/IAEA inspections in Iraq), Gary Milholin (Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms), and Henry Rowan (Chairman, Inductotherm Industries, Inc.). Timmerman suggests several reforms to the US export licensing and control system, including: ending Commerce's export licensing role and establishing an independent Export Control Agency, directly subordinate to the White House; subjecting export licenses for countries of proliferation concern to mandatory DOD and Customs Service review; encouraging Russia, China, and other non-Western exporters of military technology to become partners in the establishment of multilateral proliferation guidelines and helping them set up effective export controls. Export Controls on Some Comsats Eased 23 October---Effective today, many military and non-military communication satellites are moved from the export licensing jurisdiction of the State Department's US Munitions List (USML) to the Commerce Department's Commerce Control List (CCL). Satellites incorporating certain advanced technologies, as well as technology for the design, development, and production of communication satellites, will remain on the USML. The move consummates a 16 November 1990 Executive Order directing the removal of items on COCOM's dual-use list from the USML, unless "significant US national security interests would be jeopardized." A validated license must be obtained from the Commerce Department for exports of satellites now on the CCL to all countries, except Canada. Spy Satellite Sales Possible 17 November---A State Department spokesman says that the Department is "carefully examining" the possible sale to the United Arab Emirates of a photo reconnaissance satellite with resolution of one meter, far better than current remote-sensing spacecraft, but not as good as US spy satellites. The deal is worth $100-500 million. Spain and South Korea are also reportedly seeking to buy spy satellites from the US. Proponents of such sales claim that if we don't sell, France, Russia or China might make the sale instead. (Currently only the US, Russia and China have operational spy satellites; France, Britain, Italy, Spain, Israel and India are trying to develop them. So far none have shown any intention of selling satellites.) Proponents also claim that the proliferation of reconnaissance satellites would benefit peace and stability by enhancing openness. Opponents of such sales say they would facilitate precise targeting of conventional or nuclear weapons, and, therefore, they call for an international ban on reconnaissance satellite sales. The decision awaits the Clinton administration. The FY93 Pentagon authorization bill requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress on "the foreign development of, acquisition of, or access to satellites with capabilities for military applications and the implications of such development, acquisition or access for the United States." The report is to include: a description of current Third World satellite capabilities and the projected threat posed to US; a description of plans for an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons "to counter the global proliferation of satellites with capability for military applications"; a review of other measures the US could take to counter the proliferation of such satellites; the likelihood of Third World countries developing or obtaining an effective ASAT weapon; an assessment of the US need for an ASAT weapon. The report is to be unclassified and is due to Congress six months after the bill is enacted into law [23 April]. RECENT GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS Aid to El Salvador: Slow Progress in Developing a National Civilian Police (GAO/NSIAD-92-338) 22 September 1992. Aircraft Sales to Foreign Governments to Fund Radar Procurement (GAO/NSIAD-93-24) October 1992. Arms Restraint Policy (hearing held by the Arms Control and Europe/Middle East Subcommittees on 24 March 1992) USGPO: 1992, 114 pp. Army Focus 1992: The Army in Transformation, Department of the Army (annual publication), September 1992, 37 pp. Army Inventory: Problems Managing Excess Supplies as the Army Draws Down in Europe (GAO/NSIAD-92-273) September 1992. Conventional Arms Sales Policy in the Middle East (hearings held by the Arms Control and Europe/Middle East Subcommittees of the HFAC on 26 June and 25 July 1991) USGPO: December 1992. The Drug War: Extent of Problems in Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela (GAO/NSIAD-92-226) June 1992, 26 pp. Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1992-93 (Part 5), Hearings and Markup before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, USGPO: 1992. Jobs and US Aerospace (hearing before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, HFAC, 6 August 1992) USGPO: 1992, 51 pp. Jordan: Suspension of US Military Assistance During Gulf Crisis (GAO/NSIAD-92-343) September 1992, 19 pp. Limiting Conventional Arms Exports to the Middle East, A CBO Study, by Michael O'Hanlon, Victoria Farrell and Steven Glazerman, September 1992, 85 pp. 1992 Joint Military Net Assessment (Joint Chiefs of Staff) 21 August 1992. Operation Desert Storm: Disposal and Sale of Excess Items (GAO/NSIAD-93-18FS) October 1992, 20 pp. Operation Desert Storm: Lack of Accountability Over Materiel During Redeployment (GAO/NSIAD-92-258) September 1992, 20 pp. Operation Desert Storm: No Evidence That Foreign Suppliers Refused to Support War Effort (GAO/NSIAD-92-234) September 1992, 20 pp. Pricing and Billing of the F-16 for Foreign Military Sales Customers, report by the DOD Inspector General, 30 September 1992. Proliferation Watch (produced by the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs) Vol. 3 No. 4, 12 pp. Security Assistance: Observations on Post-Cold War Program Changes (GAO/NSIAD-92-248) 30 September 1992. United Nations: US Participation in Peacekeeping Operations (GAO/NSIAD-92-247) 9 September 1992, 70 pp.